MR. GABRIEL IDOWU OLAWOYE v. ALHAJA K. A. BELLO (2015)

MR. GABRIEL IDOWU OLAWOYE v. ALHAJA K. A. BELLO

(2015)LCN/7803(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 6th day of March, 2015

CA/L/318/2001

RATIO

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: LOCUS STANDI ; THE DEFINITION OF LOCUS STANDI AND THE TEST TO CONFIRM A PARTY’S LOCUS STANDI

Locus standi was defined in the case of TAIWO V ADEGBORO (2011) SCM 159 175 by the Supreme Court in the following words:
“Locus Standi means standing to sue or competence of a party to sue”. Per RHODES-VIVOUR J.S.C. An objection to the locus standi of the Respondent attacks the competence to sue and questions whether the Respondent has any legal or equitable interest to be protected. What the Respondent needs to show to confirm her locus standi is if she is able to show that her civil rights or obligations have been or are in danger of being infringed. So the essential here is for the Respondent to establish a cause of action in the statement of claim. Two main tests were set down by the Supreme Court in the case of TAIWO v ADEGBORO (SUPRA) thus:
(i) The action must be justiciable.
(ii) There must be a dispute between the parties.
The Supreme Court has simplified the qualification for locus standi. The chances of succeeding in the claim is not a relevant consideration. per. YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.

COURT: DUTY OF COURT; THE DUTY OF A TRIAL COURT TO EVALUATE EVIDENCE AND IT IS THE DUTY OF AN APPELLATE COURT TO ASSES OR EVALUATE EVIDENCE

Generally, evaluation of evidence is the duty of a trial court. It is settled that it is the trial court that receives all relevant evidence on an issue. After that, the next duty is for the trial court to weigh that evidence in the con of the claim and surrounding circumstances which is called assessment or evaluation of evidence. It is therefore not the duty of an appellate court to assess or evaluate evidence ordinarily, the court would do that only in exceptional cases where the trial court failed in that duty or exercised that power wrongly. It is only in such cases that the appellate court intervenes. See AJAO V ALAO (1986) NWLR (Pt.45) 802; OSHE v. OKIN BISCUITS LTD (2010) 11 NWLR (Pt.1206) 482; CHUKWU v NNEJI (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt.156) 363; OBI v OWOLABI (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.153) 363; TERIBA V ADEYEMO (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt.1211) 242; AKINTOLA v BALOGUN (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt 642) 532 and LAGGA v SARHUNA (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt.1114) 427. per. YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.

EVIDENCE: DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE; WHETHER DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IS THE BEST EVIDENCE

Documentary evidence has been held to be the best evidence, see the case of EGHAREVA v OSAGIE (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt 1173) 299 here the Supreme Court per OGBUOGU J.S.C. held thus:
“It is now settled that documentary evidence is the best evidence. It is the best proof of the contents of such document and no oral evidence, will be allowed to discredit or contradict the contents thereof except where fraud is pleaded”. per. YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.

LAND LAW: TRANSFER OF VALID LEGAL TITLE IN A PROPERTY; WHETHER THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNOR IS NEEDED TO EFFECT A VALID TRANSFER OF A LEGAL TITLE IN A PROPERTY

It is a requirement of the Land Use Act, 1978 that consent be obtained to enable a valid transfer of a legal title in a property. The question here is whether consent must be first obtained before a sale or it could be obtained later to ensure a valid transfer of title in a property. The Land Use Act 1978 makes specific provisions on the issue of consent in transfer of title. Section 22 prohibits the alienation of title without consent of the Governor, it states thus:
“22(1) It shall not be lawful for the holder of a statutory right of occupancy granted by the Governor to alienate his right of occupancy or any part thereof by assignment, mortgage, transfer of possession, sublease or otherwise howsoever without the consent of the Governor first had and obtained”.
This provision has received judicial interpretation in a plethora of cases and the gravamen of the interpretation is that some sort of agreement is allowed but final and complete transfer of title can only be done on the consent of the Governor. See the case of BROSSETTE MANUFACTURING NIG. LTD V M/S OLA ILEMOBOLA LTD & OTHERS (2007) NSCQR VOL 20 1137 held thus:
“In entering into an agreement, holder of title does not need the consent of the Governor. He merely operates within the first leg of a transfer or sale of an Estate in land which ends with the formation of a binding contract for a sale”.
It is settled that requisite consent can be sought and obtained at any stage but before the registration of the transfer deed. Therefore negotiations that can end into an agreement presentable for the Governor’s consent is allowed, See also AWOJUGBAGBE LIGHT IND. LTD V. CHINKUE (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt.390) 369. Whatever agreement or stage of alienation of a title in land it must end with a consent to be granted by the Governor or the transfer fails. Sale agreement is inchoate and crystallizes only on the grant of consent. Section 22 of the Land Use Act 1978 does not therefore prohibit preliminary steps towards the alienation of a title, See MOSES OLA & SONS NIG LTD v. B.O.N. LTD (1992) 3 NWLR 229 at 399 where the court held thus:
“The question of consent will only arise when the sale or auction has taken place, in that case the appropriate authority may have to give consent before the purchaser could acquire a valid title. So the question of consent will only come when the sale has taken place.”
And furthermore, the court held thus:
“I think this is a correct statement of the law with which I respectfully agree. In my considered opinion, the combined effect of Section 22(1) and (2) does not make an agreement to alienate without first obtaining the Governors consent void. It makes any agreement to alienate conditional upon obtaining the necessary consent. Before consent is obtained the agreement is inchoate. After the consent is obtained, the agreement becomes complete and effective.” Per MOHAMMAD J.C.A. per. YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ABIMBOLA O. OBASEKI-ADEJUMO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

MR. GABRIEL IDOWU OLAWOYE Appellant(s)

AND

ALHAJA K. A. BELLO Respondent(s)

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the Lagos State High Court Ikeja, delivered by HON. JUSTICE A. L. A. L. BALOGUN on the 25th day of March, 1993.

The appellant dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court filed a Notice of Appeal dated 7th day of April, 1993 setting out 5 grounds of appeal.

The brief facts of this appeal are that the Respondent who was Plaintiff at the trial Court approached the Court and by an Amended Statement of Claim sought the following reliefs:

“15.1. A declaration that by virtue of two deeds of Mortgage one dated the 11th day of November, 1977 and registered as No.78 at page 78 in volume 1666 Lagos and the other dated 7th day of February, 1978 and
registered as No. 48 at page 48 in volume 1690 Lagos respectively made between the defendant and Chief E.A. Oyemade and subsequently by virtue of a Public Auction Sale held on 7th day of February, 1984 the Plaintiff is the person entitled to a statutory right of occupancy in or over the building erected thereon situate, lying and being at No. 12 Kadiri Street (formerly numbered 6 Kadiri Street) Agege in the Ikeja Local Government Area of Lagos State which is more particularly described and delineated on Plan No. BD 251 dated 7th June, 1983 and attached to the foot of the Deed of Conveyance dated 13th November, 1975 and registered at No.43 at page 43 in volume 1530 of the Lands Registry in the office in Lagos.
2. An account of all rents and profits collected by the defendant in respect of the said property since 7th day of February, 1984 and payment of same to the Plaintiff.
3. An injunction restraining the Defendant, his agents and/or Servants from further collection of rent in respect of the said property.
4. Possession of the said property”

The Appellant mortgaged the property in question by 2 deeds of Legal Mortgage dated 7th day of February, 1978 and another dated 11th day of November, 1977 both duly registered. The Appellant defaulted in repayment to the financier and upon a Notice of Lender’s intention to exercise his power of sale in the two Deeds of Legal Mortgage, the financier finally instructed an Auctioneer who finally sold the property to the highest bidder (Respondent) and the Appellant (defendant) refused to yield up possession of the property thus the claim at the trial court.

The Respondent (Plaintiff) called 4 witnesses while the Appellant (Defendant) called 2 witnesses. The trial court found for the plaintiff and granted the reliefs sought. The Appellant alleged that the trial court granted unsolicited reliefs numbering 5. This aggrieved the appellant who filed the appeal setting out grounds of appeal in the Notice of Appeal. The Appellant’s brief is dated 12/8/03 filed on 9/9/2003 but deemed filed on 1/6/06 and a reply brief dated 10/11/14 filed on 12/12/14. The Respondents Brief is dated 16/5/11 filed on 25/5/11 but deemed filed on 16/11/2011.

The Appellant in his Appellant’s Brief formulated 5 issues for determination as follows:

1. Whether it was competent for the learned Trial Judge to have granted to the Plaintiff/Respondent reliefs not claimed nor sought by her in paragraph 15 of the 3rd Amended Statement of Claim.
2. Whether the Plaintiff/Respondent acquired any interest in the property the subject matter of the action in view of the major conflict between Exhibits P16 and D5.
3. Whether the lower court property (sic) evaluated the evidence adduced by the parties before arriving at its decision on this matter.
4. Whether a Mortgaged property in favour of a financier/money lender could be sold without the consent of the Governor of Lagos State first had and obtained as stipulated in Sub Sections 22 and 26 of the LAND USE ACT 1978.
5. Whether the Plaintiff/Respondent is protected by S.21 of the Conveyance Act 1881 due to the fact that Sub Sections 19 & 20 of Sale by Auction Law Cap 126 Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria 1973 were not complied with by the appointed Auctioneer.

The Respondent adopted the issues formulated by the appellant and the court shall also adopt same as issues for determination in this appeal.

ISSUE ONE:

Whether it was competent for the learned Trial Judge to have granted to the Plaintiff/Respondent Reliefs not claimed nor sought by her in paragraph 15 of the 3rd Amended Statement of Claim.

The Appellant in addressing this issue submitted that the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff are specifically provided at paragraph 15 of the 3rd Amended Statement of Claim which are recited at page 323 – 324 of the records of appeal but that the trial Judge in the judgment granted reliefs not sought for thereby making a case for the Respondent in not just granting what was not sought for but reframing the reliefs by an addition. This, the Appellant contends is beyond the trial Judge’s powers, he relied on:

(1) EKPENYANG & ORS V. EYANG & ORS (1975) 2 SC 77 at 80 – 81
(2) CHIEF OJA OJAH V. CHIEF EYO OGBONI (1996) 6 NWLR (PT.454) 272 at 290.
(3) ONWE ONU V. OKE AGU (1990) 5 NWLR (PT.451) 662 at 664 (A) 668 (D).
(4) FELIX OKOH EZEONWU V CHIEF ONYECHI & ORS (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt 438) 499 at 520 – 521.

Appellant further argued that parties and court are bound by the pleadings and issues joined by the parties, citing AFRICA CONTINENTAL SEAWAYS LTD V NIGERIA DREDGING (1977) 5 SC 238 at 248 to submit that awarding relief number 5 was gratuitous that not being part of the reliefs of the Respondent at the trial court.

Appellant submitted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant any relief not sought by the Claimant. He relied on the following authorities: ADEGBAYI v. ISHOLA (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt.831) 343 at 735 and OKOSUN V CBN (1996) 2 NWLR Pt.428 77 at 87.

Arguing further the appellant submitted that what the trial Judge did was making a case different from what parties had joined issues on thereby breaching the rule of fair hearing as enshrined in Section 33 of the 1979 Constitution applicable to the case, he relied on AFRICAN CONTINENTAL SEAWAYS LTD V NIGERIAN DREDGING & GENERAL WORKS LTD (1977) 5 SC 235 at 248 and 250.

Furthermore, appellant argued that raising an issue suo motu and to base a decision on such without calling on the parties to address the court is a breach of the rule of fair hearing and such a decision will be set aside.
He cited the following cases in support:

(i) ADEMOLA v SODIPO (1992) 7 NWLR (PT.253) 257.
(ii) KATTO V CBN (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt.214) 126.
(iii) AGIDIGBI V. AGIDIGBI (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt.221) 98 at 114.
(iv) ALBION CONSTRUCTION LTD v PAO INVESTMENT & PRO LTD (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt.219) 583 at 596.

Appellant contended that the learned trial Judge fell into error by making a new case for the Respondent, he then urged the court to find for the Appellant under this issue.

The Respondent submitted that the appellant misconceived the reliefs granted by the trial court as the main relief is for a declaration and there must be an end to litigation, he relied on the authority of AKANBI V ALAO (1980) 5 NWLR (Pt.108) 118 to urge the court to find for the Respondent under this issue.

RESOLUTION:

The 3rd Amended Statement of Claim of the Respondent at paragraph 15 has 4 items of claim and the paragraph states thus:

“15.1. A declaration that by virtue of two deeds of Mortgage one dated the 11th day of November, 1977 and registered as No.78 at page 78 in volume 1666 Lagos and the other dated 7th day of February, 1978 and registered as No. 48 at page 48 in volume 1690 Lagos respectively made between the defendant and Chief E.A. Oyemade and subquently by virtue of a Public Auction Sale held on 7th day of February, 1984 the Plaintiff is the person entitled to a statutory right of occupancy in or over the building erected thereon situate, lying and being at No.12 Kadiri Street (formerly numbered 6 Kadiri Street) Agege in the Ikeja Local Government Area of Lagos State which is more particularly described and delineated on Plan No. BD 251 dated 7th June, 1983 and attached to the foot of the Deed of Conveyance dated 13th November, 1975 and registered at No.43 at page 43 in volume 1530 of the Lands Registry in the office in Lagos.

2. An account of all rents and profits collected by the defendant in respect of the said property since 7th day of February, 1984 and payment of same to the Plaintiff;

3. An injunction restraining the Defendant, his agents and/or Servants from further collection of rent in respect of the said property.

4. Possession of the said property.”

When it got to judgment the trial court granted 5 reliefs, it held thus:

“1) Subject to the consent of the Governor of Lagos State being sought hereafter and obtained, a Declaration that the piece or parcel of land measuring about 101′ x 50′ together with all the bedroom flats erected thereon situate, lying and being at No. 12, Kadiri Street, (formerly known as No. 6 Kadiri Street) off Oniwaya Road, Agege, Lagos and covered by a Deed of Conveyance dated the 13th day of November, 1975 and registered as No.43 at page 43 in Volume 1530 of the Register of the Deeds kept at the Lands Registry in the Office at Lagos and more particularly described and delineated with its dimensions and abuttal’s on the plan edged pink attached to the said Deed of Conveyance; and which property was by two Deeds of Mortgage (i.e. the Mortgage Deed dated the 11th day of November, 1977 and registered as No. 78 at page 78 in Volume 1666 of the Register of Deeds kept at the Land Registry in the Office at Lagos, and the other Mortgage Deed dated 7th day of February, 1978 and Registered as No.48 at page 48 in Volume 1690 of the Register of Deeds kept at the Lands Registry in the Office at Lagos) each made between Gabriel Idowu Olawoye (the Defendant) and Chief E. A. Oyemade (financier) and hereinafter described as the MORTGAGED PROPERTY; and which Mortgaged Property was subsequently by virtue of a PUBLIC AUCTION sold to the Plaintiff is the property of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff is the person entitled to a Statutory Right of Occupancy in and over the Mortgaged Property.

2) An Order for an account to be rendered by the Defendant to the Plaintiff of all rents and profits collected by the Defendant in respect of the said mortgaged property, or due for the use and occupation of any part of the mortgaged property by the Defendant or any tenant, since the 7th day of February, 1984 to date; or until possession is given up, or the Defendant ceases to collect such rents from any tenants occupying the Mortgaged property.

3) An Order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant by himself, his servants or agents or otherwise howsoever from further collecting rents in respect of the Mortgaged Property from any tenant or occupier of any part thereof.

4) An Order that the Defendant shall forthwith give up possession of the Mortgaged Property to the Plaintiff.

ON ACCOUNT TO BE RENDERED BY DEFENDANT etc:
(5) It is further ordered that in so far as that Court has granted the prayer for an account, amongst the reliefs claimed by and hereby awarded to, the Plaintiff against the Defendant, the Defendant shall submit to the Plaintiff and file in this court, within 30 days from today an account of all rents collected by him (and rent payable by him as well) in respect of the use and occupation of the “mortgaged property” from 7th February, 1984 to the date the account ends; and the Plaintiff shall thereafter surcharge the account within 30 days and it is further ordered that thereafter the hearing shall take place in this Court on the account, on such dates hereafter be filed by the Court. Liberty to Apply in that behalf. And that shall be the Judgment of the Court in the action”.

Generally, a court has no jurisdiction to consider a relief not claimed by either party and therefore cannot make a valid order in respect of such. It is so settled beyond the need to cite authorities that a court cannot give what was not claimed by the Plaintiff specifically unless such is a consequential order, See ADEMOLA V SODIPO (1992) NWLR (Pt.253) 251; OKEOWO & 2 ORS v MIGILIORE & ORS (1979) 11 S.C 87; FATUNBI & ANOR V EBENEZER OLANLOYE & ORS (2004) 4 -7 SC 68.
The main reason cannot be farfetched because it touches on bindingness of pleadings, jurisdiction and fundamentally, fair hearing. However, the court has the power to make consequential orders or grant consequential reliefs. A consequential relief was defined as follows:
“A consequential order is not an order which is merely incidental to a decision but one necessarily flowing directly and naturally from it and inevitably consequent. It must be giving effect to the judgment already given not by granting a fresh, unclaimed or unproven relief. It must be closely related to the substantial relief claimed”. Per ADEKEYE J.S.C. in DINGYADI V. INEC (NO.1) (2010) 18 NWLR (PT.1224) 1.

From the records of appeal, the Respondent by relief 2 claimed as follows:

“An account of all rents and profits collected by the defendant in respect of the said property since 7th day of February, 1984 and payment of same to the plaintiff”.

Relevant paragraphs of the pleadings are at paragraphs 13 & 14 of the 3rd Amended Statement of Claim which provides thus:

“13. Notwithstanding the said sale the Defendant refused to give and deliver up possession of the said property to the Plaintiff and still retains the same.
14. The defendant has since the said 7th day of February, 1984 been collecting rents from the tenants occupying the said property”.

Proffering evidence on this aspect of the claim, the Respondent testified and told the court that the appellant did not allow her to take possession nor collect rents since she bought the house and her instructions to the tenants to pay rents to her failed. Through her witness, told the court of efforts to gain possession and Exhibits D9 and D10 confirms the presence of tenants in the buildings and efforts to get them to pay rents. The actual number of tenants, rent paid by each were not pleaded on or evidence presented. To therefore claim Accounts, some material particulars were necessary but none in evidence and that probably explains the gratuitous grant of relief 5 in the judgment wherein the trial Judge said thus:

“ON ACCOUNT TO BE RENDERED BY DEFENDANT etc:

(5) It is further ordered that in so far as this court has granted the prayer for an account, amongst the reliefs claimed by and hereby awarded to the Plaintiff against the Defendant, the Defendant shall submit to the Plaintiff and file in this court, within 30 days from today and account of all rents collected by him (and rent payable by him as well) in respect of use and occupation of the “mortgaged property” from 7th February, 1984 to the date the account ends; and the Plaintiff shall thereafter surcharge the account within 30 days and it is further ordered that thereafter the hearing shall take place in this court on the account, on such dates hereafter to be filed by the court. Liberty to apply in that behalf. And that shall be the judgment of the court in this account”.

Above is definitely way out of the claim of the Respondent. Having failed to plead particulars and prove same, and having granted the relief for accounts, the court had no business whatsoever to delve into requesting for the filing of accounts into account and that a date would be fixed to determine same. There was no claim for surcharge before the trial court. A judgment should be the final determination of the rights of the parties. The trial Judge had no powers to go so far into making such orders which were not sought for nor established. Item 5 granted cannot be said to flow necessarily from the relief seeking for account. The Respondent sought for an account by the appellant to her and not to the court and did not seek to go back to court on any other issue related thereto because all she wanted was an order for account. That aspect of the judgment is without jurisdiction, not supported by pleadings and it breached the right to fair hearing. I agree with the appellant’s counsel that the trial Judge made out a case for the Respondent which is not supported by the pleadings. It is hereby struck out.

It is curious going through the record to see where the trial Judge virtually took over the prosecution of the claim when he descended into the arena by asking fundamental questions; questions which he later used the answers to arrive at his decision. The grant of this unsolicited relief must be a fall out from such interference in the prosecution of the case before him.

I find for the Appellant under this issue with regards to relief 5 introduced by the trial Judge. The other aspects complained about are incidental to the reliefs sought for and granted by the court. Nothing new is added to the reliefs outside giving effect to the reliefs by the trial court in making those specific orders.

ISSUE TWO:

Whether the Plaintiff/Respondent acquired any interest in the property the subject matter of the action in view of the major conflict between Exhibits P16 and P5.

The appellant in arguing this issue submitted that the Respondent by paragraphs 11 & 12 of the 3rd Amended Statement of Claim (see pages 158 – 162 of the Records of Appeal) and her evidence before the court, (pages 167 – 169 & 171 of the Records of Appeal) showed that one Mr. Emmanuel Olajubu was her agent or the person who informed her of the property to be auctioned and that she was given the title documents immediately after payment for the property by the auctioneer. That this contradicted the evidence of the auctioneer – PW2 who told the court that the title documents were given to the Respondent by the mortgagee. This, the appellant contended is a contradiction which should have made the Judge to discard the evidence of both the Respondent and PW2 in view of the pleaded case for the Respondent.

Furthermore, the Appellant highlighted the discrepancy in Exhibits D3, D4 and D5 which from a community reading show that the property was auctioned to Mr. E.A. Olajubu of No. 22, Bamishile Street, Mushin at the sum of N110,000.00 (One Hundred and Ten Thousand Naira) and not to the Respondent. Identifying the documents, appellant submitted that Exhibit D3 and D4 were made by Chief Oyemade while PW2 (auctioneer) made Exhibit D5.

The Appellant argued that Exhibit D5 (letter identifying Mr. Olajubu as owner of property) knocks off Exhibit P16 (purchase receipt issued to the Respondent) and that Mr. E.A. Olajubu is the purchaser of the property and not the Respondent. That PW1 confirmed Exhibit D5.

Another area of contradiction identified by the appellant is the evidence of PW1 who told the court that PW2 wrote a report while PW2 denied writing such a report; told the court that the Appellant acted for herself and not by a proxy or agent. This, the appellant argues, has weakened the case of the Respondent who is required to strictly prove her case.

Another area considered under this issue is the challenge to the Respondent’s locus standi. Appellant contended that the Respondent did not acquire interest in the property so as to enure her with locus standi to sue in respect of the property. Appellant argued that the trial court’s ruling that the issue was a triable issue was not effective as the trial went on to find that the Respondent has locus standi. Appellant questioned the rationale of such a finding if the Respondent did not buy the property. He questioned how the trial judge could arrive at that conclusion and he urged the court to find for the appellant under this issue.

The Respondent in reaction submitted that there is no conflict between Exhibit P16 and D5. Respondent argued that it is clear from the evidence before the court that it was the Respondent who purchased the property and that Mr. E.A. Olajubu was her agent. Respondent argued that where there is a dispute between two people over ownership of a property, either of them has the locus to institute the action and therefore the Respondent had the locus standi to institute the action. Respondent contended that there is evidence that it was the Respondent who paid for the property since the mortgage was not denied. He urged the court to find for the Respondent under this issue.

RESOLUTION:

The Respondent by her pleadings before the trial court averred that she was the purchaser of the mortgaged property which she bought at a public auction. In proof, the Respondent tendered Exhibit P16 which is the receipt evidencing payment for the property. In the course of trial it came to light by evidence that one Mr. E.A. Olajubu also presented himself as the owner of the mortgaged property and Exhibit D5 (a letter attached to another letter sent to the Appellant by the mortgagee states that the said Mr. Olajubu was the purchaser of the property. This to the appellant presents a conflict and puts to question who actually is the owner of the property? Thus the challenge to Respondent’s locus standi.

The Appellant went to great length to show that the contradiction erodes the locus standi of the Respondent to sue over the property.

An objection to the locus standi of the Respondent attacks the competence to sue and questions whether the Respondent has any legal or equitable interest to be protected. What the Respondent needs to show to confirm her locus standi is if she is able to show that her civil rights or obligations have been or are in danger of being infringed. So the essential here is for the Respondent to establish a cause of action in the statement of claim. Two main tests were set down by the Supreme Court in the case of TAIWO v ADEGBORO (SUPRA) thus:
(i) The action must be justiciable.
(ii) There must be a dispute between the parties.
The Supreme Court has simplified the qualification for locus standi. The chances of succeeding in the claim is not a relevant consideration.

Going by the test settled above, can the Respondent be said to satisfy it? By the pleadings, the Respondent averred and showed that she purchased the property, she tendered the payment receipt and also admitted that she also acted through an agent, Mr. E.A. Olajubu. The said Exhibit D5 is a letter alleging that one Mr. Olajubu is the purchaser of the property. That is the same person the Respondent also claimed acted for her. If there is a conflict or contest that can take away the locus standi of the Respondent then it can only come from the said Mr. Olajubu and not the appellant. This is because either of them, if they both assert that they purchased the same property can claim. Here there is no claim from the said Mr. Olajubu but only the Respondent. I don’t see the basis for the challenge by the Appellant because, whichever way it is looked at, his is to defend any claim against him for possession of the property which was allegedly sold by auction. Furthermore, the Respondent tendered a receipt evidencing payment for the property. I don’t see any contradiction that can erode the locus standi of the Respondent. The Respondent possesses a purchase receipt which gives her an equitable title over the auctioned property for which she seeks to recover possession from the Appellant who was the mortgagor. There is a cause of action which is justiciable and there is a dispute over the property purportedly sold by auction. One is an alleged buyer of the mortgaged property while the other is the mortgagor.
The test for locus standi is satisfied in this case. I find for the Respondent.

ISSUE THREE:

Whether the lower court properly evaluated the Evidence adduced by the parties before arriving at its decision on this matter.

The Appellant submitted that the Respondent did not traverse the 2nd further Amended Statement of Defence dated 8th May, 1991 filed on 13th May, 1991 (pages 219-223 of the Record of Appeal) wherein the issue of lack of consent to sell was raised. That the failure to react to the averment amounts to admission. Also, raised is the issue that the purchaser of the property was E.A. Olajubu and not the Respondent.

Appellant submitted that the Respondent failed to join issues with the appellant on these aspect and relied on the following:

(1) GABRIEL IWOHA & ANOR V. NIPOST & ANOR (2003) 8 NWLR (PT.822) 308 at 341.
(2) CHIEF RAYMOND OGOLO & ORS V CHIEF PAUL FUBARA & ORS (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt.831) 231 at 265.

Appellant submitted that Exhibit D3, D4 and D5 make Exhibit P16 false and that on this alone, the trial judge should have dismissed the claim of the respondent because documentary evidence is the hanger upon which to access the truth of a witness and relied on

1. KARIMU OLUJILE V ADEAGBU (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt 75) 238 at 255.
2. KIMDEY V MILITARY GOVT. OF GONGOLA STATE (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt.77) 445 at 473-474.

The appellant challenged the trial court’s acceptance of Respondent’s evidence without evaluating the appellant’s case and this, he contended breached the laid down procedure in the case of MOGAJI V ODOFIN (no citation) on the need for an imaginary scale. Furthermore, that the trial court did not evaluate the evidence before the court, Learned Counsel specifically mentioned this aspect:

(a) The contradictions highlighted earlier in Exhibits D3, D4 and D5 along the evidence of PW2 and the Respondent.

Again that the Respondent admitted under cross-examination that the title documents were not handed over to her and referred to page 172 of the Records of Appeal. Appellant submitted that this has knocked the bottom out of the case of the Respondent that she was given title documents upon payment for the house. Appellant argued that this is contrary to Exhibit D3, D4, and D5 which show that Mr. Olajubu was the purported buyer of the property in dispute. The appellant further submitted that by his Exhibit D1 and D2, he showed that the said Olajubu who had instructed that tenants be issued with demand notices is the purchaser of the property and the evidence to that effect was not disputed at the trial.

On the demand for Accounts, the appellant argued that it was not pleaded by the Respondent but the trial judge took it upon himself to cross-examine the appellant (see pages 347-348 of the Records of Appeal) which resulted in the unsolicited reliefs granted by the trial Judge. He argued that where the judgment is not supported by evidence, the appellate court can evaluate the evidence and make necessary orders supported by evidence. He relied on the following:

1. ONWUMEPE V. AGWUNEDU & ORS (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt 62) 673 at 684-685.
2. SAMSON AWOYALE V OGUNBIYI (1986) 4 SC 98 at 106-107, 122.
3. OLUBODE V SALAMI (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.7) 282 at 294.

He on this issue urged the court to find for the appellant.

The Respondent under issue 3 submitted that the trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence before the court to arrive at the decision and referred to page 57 of the judgment.

On whether the Respondent reacted to paragraph 9a, 9b and 10 of the Further Amended Statement of Defence, the Respondent submitted that a reply is not merely to deny defendants averments but to answer to new issues and since the paragraphs were traversed earlier, there was no need to deny them again. He referred to OKORODUDU v. AKINREMI (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.104) 172; OJE v BABALOLA (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt.185) 266. He urged the court to find for the Respondent under this issue.

RESOLUTION:

This is a challenge to the evaluation of evidence by the trial court by the appellant. Generally, evaluation of evidence is the duty of a trial court. It is settled that it is the trial court that receives all relevant evidence on an issue. After that, the next duty is for the trial court to weigh that evidence in the con of the claim and surrounding circumstances which is called assessment or evaluation of evidence. It is therefore not the duty of an appellate court to assess or evaluate evidence ordinarily, the court would do that only in exceptional cases where the trial court failed in that duty or exercised that power wrongly. It is only in such cases that the appellate court intervenes. See AJAO V ALAO (1986) NWLR (Pt.45) 802; OSHE v. OKIN BISCUITS LTD (2010) 11 NWLR (Pt.1206) 482; CHUKWU v NNEJI (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt.156) 363; OBI v OWOLABI (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.153) 363; TERIBA V ADEYEMO (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt.1211) 242; AKINTOLA v BALOGUN (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt 642) 532 and LAGGA v SARHUNA (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt.1114) 427.

The trial court going by the record went to great length to review, analyze and ascribe value to each witness’ testimony before arriving at a decision. The issue of selling the mortgaged property at an undervalue cannot have any effect if fraud was not alleged and proved. The evidence of an earlier valuation of the property by the appellant cannot be basis for the sale value at an auction. An auction is defined thus:
“A manner of selling or letting property by bids at a place open to the general public usually to the highest bidder by public competition. The prices which the public are asked to pay are the highest which those who bid can be tempted to offer by the skill and tact of the auctioneer under excitement of open competition”.
See OKONKWO v CCB (NIG) (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt.822) 352.

An auction value is a forced sale value and therefore can hardly be what the owner estimates should be the bid offer or highest bid in an auction. That would contrast sharply from a sale that is conducted by the mortgagor.
Whether issues were joined on that point is irrelevant and would not affect the fact that the sale was by auction by mortgagee is to protect his interest. He is not an agent nor trustee of the mortgagor.

The complaint of the appellant that the Respondent admitted under cross-examination that she was not handed over title documents is not made out by the records of appeal as contended. The alleged confusion as to who actually bought the property has been resolved earlier. It is not open to the appellant to choose who the claimant should be in seeking to wrestle the property from him. If it is the said Mr. Olajubu who actually bought and he stands by to watch the Respondent fight for ownership of the property then he has himself to blame.

Furthermore, there is no evidence on what exactly the Respondent wanted in respect of accounts she sought for as relief. As observed earlier, no particulars were pleaded and therefore the order for accounts is left hanging and at the mercy of the appellant. That may explain why the trial Judge went on a charitable expedition in granting relief 5 in the judgment. There is no evidence to justify the award for accounts in relief 5. The action of the trial Judge to fill in the gaps by asking the appellant direct questions on who the tenants are and when rents are collected are without foundation because there is no pleading to support it and should not come from the Judge. On this aspect, I agree with the appellant that the Judge erred. Relief 5 was struck out earlier because it was made without jurisdiction.

This issue is partially resolved in favour of the appellant.

ISSUES FOUR AND FIVE:

Whether a mortgaged property in favour of a Financier/Money lender could be sold without the consent of the Governor of Lagos State first had and obtained as stipulated in Sections 22 & 26 of the LAND USE ACT 1978

And

Whether the Plaintiff/Respondent is protected by Section 21 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 due to the fact that Sections 19 & 20 of Sale by Auction Law Cap 126 Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria 1973 were not complied with by the appointed Auctioneer

Arguing the two issues together, the appellant submitted that the appellant by paragraph 9(a) (i) & (ii) of the further Amended Statement of Defence challenged the sale for want of consent of the Governor of Lagos state. He referred to the findings of the trial Judge that consent was not necessary before the sale of a mortgaged property but necessary to rest title on the purchaser thus the conditional declaration of title made subject to consent.

Appellant argued that the findings go to confirm that a purchaser obtains no title until consent is obtained and therefore the mortgagor is entitled to retain possession of the property pending such consent. He relied on MOSES OLA & SONS NIG. LTD. v. B.O.N. LTD. (Supra) to submit that title does not pass until consent is granted. Appellant linked this issue with his challenge to locus standi of the Respondent to sue. Furthermore, that reliefs granted gratuitously have no basis since no right existed and the trial Judge had no juridiction to do so.

Another area of complaint is that the judgment was made conditional upon consent and the Respondent did not question this aspect of the judgment. He contended that there is still no consent from the Governor, this is the condition for the judgment and therefore the auction is invalid.

On sale by auction, appellant submitted that by Auction Law Cap 126 Laws of Lagos State 1973, by Exhibit P12, the mortgagee directed the auctioneer to advertise the proposed auction in the newspaper and by paragraph 19A of the Amended Statement of Defence, the appellant contended that the required 7 days Notice before the auction could take place was not complied with and this was confirmed by paragraph 10 of the 3rd Amended Statement of Claim of the Respondent which is an admission that the sale did not conform with the law especially Section 19 and PW2 admitted it under cross-examination.

Arguing further, appellant submitted that failure to comply with a mandatory provision cannot be waived or explained, he cited the following authorities to buttress the point: OSENI V. AIICO LTD (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt.11) 229; FOJULE v. F.M.B. (2001) FWLR (Pt.36) 893, (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt.697) 384; TAIWO v ADEGBORO (1997) 11 NWLR (Pt.528) 224; IHEKWOABA v A.C.B. LTD (1998) 10 NWLR (Pt.571) 590; OKONKWO V COOPERATIVE & COMMERCE BANK NIG. PLC (2003) FWLR (Pt.154) 457 and S.U. IHEKWOABA & ANOR V ACB (2003) 6 SC.

Appellant submitted that Section 19 and 20 of Auction Law could operate against the Respondent because she is not a bonafide purchaser within the contemplation of Section 21(2) Conveyancing Act 1881 and so the sale ought to be set aside. Appellant urged the court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial court.

On issues 4 and 5, the Respondent submitted that the requirement for consent before the sale of a mortgaged property has been over flogged and a mortgagee is not under an obligation to first seek and obtain consent before an auction. He referred to MOSES OLA & SON V. B.O.N. LTD (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt 229) 3.

The Respondent further argued that the court gave the Respondent less than what was pleaded for when the area not covered by the deed of legal mortgage the one upon which the boys quarters was built was excised from property sold since it was not part of the area mortgaged. He relied on OKEDARA V OBA AHMADU ADEBARA (1994) 6 SCNJ 254 267 to 268.

On relief 5 which the court granted without any claim, the Respondent justified same as conforming with substantial justice as decided in the authorities of NWOSU V IMO STATE ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION AUTHORITY (1990) 2 NWLR 135; OBASI BROS (NIG) LTD. v. WILBROS NIG LTD (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt.181) 606 and CONSORTIUM M.C. NIGERIA V NEPA (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt.246) 32.

Furthermore, Respondent argued that such awards are not illegal as the court in doing so is exercising its equitable jurisdiction. He cited UBA LTD V OMOLOHU (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt.241) 312 to submit that even though courts are not charitable organisations, the court can make such orders as the justice of the case demands.

On non compliance with the provision of sale by auction under the Auction Law of Lagos State, Respondent submitted that the law was substantially complied with and this does not nullify the Conveyancing Act 1881. He relied on OGUCHI v FMB (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt.158) 330 on the scope of the mortgagee’s powers under the mortgage deed and how such is exercisable. He finally urged the court to dismiss the appeal.

In reply, the Appellant submitted that the law requiring 7 days notice is mandatory and in this case, the evidence before the court shows that it was a day’s notice which is wrong and nullifies the sale as held in the case of MR. SUNDAY ADEGBITE TAIWO V SERAH ADEGBORO & ORS (2011) 6 SCM 159 175. He urged the court to allow the appeal.

RESOLUTION

ISSUES FOUR AND FIVE

These two issues taken jointly seeks to know if consent of the Governor is necessary before sale of a mortgaged property and whether the Respondent is protected by the Conveyancing Act in view of the non compliance with Section 19(1) of the Auction Law Cap 126 Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria, 1973.

On the failure to give the required period of Notice for sale by auction, it is clear from the Records of Appeal that the requirement of 7 days notice was not satisfied. The auctioneer gave one day’s notice and this was in breach of the Section 19 of the Auction Law of Lagos State, 1973.
Section 19(1) of the Auction Law provides as follows:
“No sale by auction of any land shall take place until after at least seven days public notice thereof made at the principle town of the district in which the land is situate and also at the place of the intended sale. The Notice shall be made not only by printed or written documents, but also by beat of drum or such other method intelligible to uneducated persons as may be prescribed, as the divisional officer of the district where such sale is to take place may direct, and shall state the name and place of residence of the seller.”
This was admitted by paragraph 10 of the 3rd Amended Statement of Claim and requires no proof. Having established that, what then is the effect of Section 21(1) Conveyancing Act 1881 (Statute of General Application) on Section 19 of the Auction Law of Lagos State? Several authorities such as OSENI V AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt.11) 229, IHEKWOABA V ACB LTD (1998) 10 NWLR (Pt.571) 590 and FAJULE V FEDERAL MORTGAGE BANK OF NIGERIA (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt 697) 384 all held that failure to give the required 7 days Notice before a sale by auction will ordinarily invalidate the sale. This position was reinforced by the Supreme Court in TAIWO V ADEGBORO (SUPRA).
However, Superior Courts had held that nothing invalidated a third party’s interest legally acquired except fraud. The said statute applies when title has passed. Title has not yet passed on to the Respondent due to lack of consent of the Governor. The Respondent told the court she had title documents, she did not tender them into evidence as proof that she has them. The judgment appealed against acknowledges this fact, that is why in granting the reliefs, the trial court said “subject to consent of the Governor”. In view of the above, Section 21(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1881 is not applicable and therefore the Auction Law is applicable. This is in addition to the authority in TAIWO V ADEGBORO (SUPRA) where the Supreme Court held:
“It is clear that before an auction can be held to be valid there must be 7 days Notice before the auction is held”.
This was in consideration of Section 19 Auction Law of Northern Nigeria applicable to Kwara State which is in pari materia with that of Lagos State under consideration here. The court in interpreting the above encouraged courts to seek the intention of the Legislature and the words used must be given their appropriate meaning and effect. Such words used are to be interpreted as understood in common English usage – See ESTATE OF SOULE V JOHNSON (1974) 12 SC 121. The court set aside the sale by auction of a mortgaged property for failure to comply with the requirement of 7 days notice.
It is important to acknowledge the essence of notice which has been held not to be to the benefit or protection of the mortgagor but in order to make the sale one of good faith, see the case of OKONKWO v. C.C.B (NIG) PLC (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt 822) 347 at 386 held thus:
“It is not a notice intended to be given to the mortgagor. It is to ensure that a true public auction, where everyone interested in the property may have the opportunity to bid for it, is conducted for a fair deal, devoid of unconscionable bargain through connivance or collusion. This is therefore not a notice which can be waived by the mortgagor. Actually, it does not lie with him to do so as it is not meant for him”.
The seeming conflict in the Supreme Court decisions in the OKONKWO v C.C.B (SUPRA) and TAIWO v ADEGBORO (SUPRA) can be resolved by the fact that title had validly passed in the former and the most recent of decisions should be adopted as the position of the law on the matter. The authority of ALHAJI MOHAMMED MOHAMMED V MARTINS ELECTRONICS COMPANY LTD (2009) LPELR- 3708 (CA) held as follows:
“In YUSUF V EGBE (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.56) 341; KOLAWOLE, JCA (of blessed memory) reiterated that this court is bound by its previous decisions which have not been over ruled by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, that the Court of Appeal must accept and apply loyally, the decisions of the Supreme Court and where the decisions manifestly conflict, it was his opinion that the later decision is binding on the Court of Appeal”.
Furthermore, OKORO J.C.A. (as he then was) also held thus:
“One sitting as Court of Appeal, must accept loyally the decision of the Supreme Court and where the decisions manifestly conflict, it is in my view that the latter decision that is binding on the Court of Appeal”.
I need not say more. I am bound to follow the later decision of the Supreme Court decision in the case TAIWO V ADEGBORO (SUPRA) which is latter in time.

Flowing from above, the sale by auction conducted in breach of Section 19 Auction Law of Lagos State is hereby set aside as there was no valid sale and title has not passed. In consequence, the Respondent is not protected by Section 21 of the Conveyancing Act (Statute of General Application) 1881. This issue is resolved in favour of the appellant.

Consequently therefore, this appeal succeeds, the judgment of HON. JUSTICE A.L.A.L. BALOGUN delivered on the 25th day of March, 1993 is hereby set aside. The sale conducted on the 7th day of February, 1984 is also set aside for failure to give required 7 days Notice.

The appeal succeeds.

UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft form, the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Yargata Byenchit Nimpar, JCA. I agree with her reasoning and final conclusions.

I must however emphasise that trial courts must restrict itself to the evidence before it and not to grant reliefs which were neither pleaded or evidence led to sustain it. The courts have held in a plethora of cases, that the court is not a Santa Claus. Courts of law are not created as charitable institutions engratia. See Ekpeyong vs Nyong (1975) 2 SC pg 71, Imam vs A.B.U. (1970) NNLR pg.39, Adefulu vs Okulaja (1996) 9 NWLR pt.718 p.252, Akinboni vs Akinboni (2002) 5 NWLR pt.761 Pg.564; where the court held:
“It is wrong or erroneous for a court to grant an order or relief, which is not claimed or brought by the party in whose favour the order was made. In the same vein, the court which is not a “Father Christmas” or a social welfare institution should not grant to a party an order, or relief or declaration in excess of or outside what he claimed or sought for”.
The rational of the rule, which forbids such gratuitous award by the court contrary to the rule of practice and pleadings, is to avoid surprises during proceedings and to ensure fair hearing to the parties without showing favour to one or the other. The rule against unsolicited or gratuitous awards by court is of general application to all cases as it affects or robs the court of jurisdiction to make such awards.
Adefulu vs Okulaja (1996) 9 NWLR Pt.475 pg.668, Omotunde vs Omotunde (2001) 9 NWLR pt.718 pg 252, Simton (Nig) Ltd vs Pamil Ind. Ltd (2001) 8 NWLR Pt.714 pg.49 at 59.
In The Nigerian Air Force vs Wing Commander T.I.A. Shekete (2002) 18 NWLR pt.798 pg.129; (2002) 12 SC Pt.II pg.52, the Supreme Court held inter alia:
“The moment a court of law grants a relief or prayer not sought by the party, it expands the boundaries of the litigation and unnecessarily instigates more litigation to the detriment of the parties, and for no reason at all”.
The litigation is for the parties and not the court. Therefore the court has no jurisdiction to extend or expand the boundaries of the litigation beyond what the parties have indicated to it. In other words, the court has no jurisdiction to set up a different or new case for the parties.

For this and the more robust reasoning in the lead judgment, I also allow this appeal. I abide by all the orders contained therein.

ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, J.C.A.: I have seen a draft copy of my learned brother Hon. Justice Yargata Nimpar JCA and I fully agree with the lucid reasoning and conclusions reached therein except to add a few words of mine.

What is the nature of the above relief granted by the trial judge? Can it be said to be a consequential relief? The purpose of a consequential relief is to give effect to a judgment. It must therefore flow from the circumstances of the decision of the court. It must not be at a cross purpose or in any way contradictory to the decision of the court nor must it be unnecessarily far reaching. In EZE v GOV. OF ABIA (2014) 14 NWLR (PT.1426) 192 at 216, 219-221 para G-D (SC) the Supreme Court held thus:
“It would be wrong for a court to order the payment of a specific sum as a consequential order when there is no evidence to support the sum ordered to be paid, as a consequential order should not be given for an unproven claim”
This is the same situation in the 5th relief granted herein by the directive to file Accounts.
See also AP PLC v ABORISADE (2013) LPELR-20362 (CA); EYIGBE v IYAJI (2013) LPELR – 20522 (SC), UKWUNNA & ANOR v UKWUNNA & ANOR (2011) LPELR – 4238 (CA).
Clearly, it is not a granting of fresh and unclaimed relief or a relief that was not proven by the party (by evidence) in whose favor it was granted.

Generally, a court of law is not a Father Christmas nor is it a philanthropic body whose duty it is to dish out unsolicited and unasked claim. See AGU v. ODOFIN (1992) 3 SCNJ 161 at 173; OBIJURU v OZIMS [1985] NWLR (PT.6) 167; ADESANYA v OTUEWU [1993] 1 NWLR (PT.720) 414; AGBI v OGBE [2006] 11 NWLR [PT 990] 65; EAGLE SUPER PACK (NIG.) LTD v ACB PLC (2006) 19 NWLR [PT.1013] 120.

On the failure to give the required notice for sale by auction, Section 19(1) of the Auction Law of Lagos State, 1973, applicable in the instant case provides:
“No sale by auction of any land shall take place until after at least seven days public notice thereof made at the principal town of the district in which the land is situate and also at the place of the intended sale. The Notice shall be made not only by printed or written documents, but also by beat of drum or such other method intelligible to uneducated persons as may be prescribed as the divisional officer of the district where such sale is to take place may direct, and shall state the name and place of residence of the seller”
Apparently, the purport of the above provision is for the mortgagee to give adequate notice to the public of the intended sale of the land. The mandatory notice required under this section is not meant for the mortgagor as such. It is to ensure that anyone who may be interested in the property may have the opportunity to bid for such property and also to ensure that it is devoid of any form of collusion. However, it is incumbent on the mortgagee to ensure that adequate notice – in this case at least seven days. The wording of Section 19(1) as reproduced above as to the seven days notice is clearly mandatory. See TAIWO v ADEGBORO (2011) LPELR – 3133 (SC), MUKHTAR JSC held thus:
“There is no gainsaying that the use of the world ‘shall’ in the above provision connotes compulsory and mandatory nature which transcends any form of discretion. The spirit of the provision requires that it must be complied with in toto, as a duty imposed by law that must be complied with and enforced”.
See MENAKAYA V MENAKAYA 2001 16 NWLR (PT.738) 203, ODUA INVESTMENT V TALABI (1997) 10 NWLR (PT.523) 1 AT 50.
This court is bound by the position of the law as expressed above.

For the above reasoning and the fuller ones in the lead judgment of my learned brother, YARGATAR BYENCHIT NIMPAR JCA, this appeal succeeds. I abide by the consequential orders made in the said lead judgment.

Appearances

P. S. UshurheFor Appellant

AND

Prince R. A. Oladeji for 1st RespondentFor Respondent