MR. EPAL OFEM OBONO & ANOR v. MR. UBI UBI OBONO
(2013)LCN/6329(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 22nd day of June, 2016
CA/C/113/2014
JUSTICES
IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. MR. EPAL OFEM OBONO
2. MR. OKRI INAH OMINI Appellant(s)
AND
MR. UBI UBI OBONO Respondent(s)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORIGINATING PROCESS SHOULD BE EXAMINED WHERE AN OBJECTION TO CAUSE OF ACTION IS RAISED
It is a well settled principle, that where an objection is raised to the effect that a suit does not disclose a cause of action or a reasonable cause of action, it is the originating process, the writ of summons, the statement of claim (where one is filed), or the originating summons (or motion, as the case may be), that should be critically, albeit dispassionately, examined to ascertain whether or not there is indeed a reasonable cause of action. See COOKEY V. FAMBO (2005) ALL FWLR (pt. 271) 25 @ 34 paragraphs D-E; SOCIETY BIC S.A. vs. C.I. LTD (2014) ALL FWLR (pt. 739) 1212 @ 1233. PER SAULAWA, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT DECLARATORY RELIEFS SOUGHT IN AN ACTION ARE DEEMED DISTINCT AND INDEPENDENT CAUSES OF ACTION
And the law is trite, that declaratory reliefs sought in an action are deemed to be distinct and independent causes of action. Thus, what the Court ought to take into consideration in determining whether or not there is a cause of action, are the contents of the statement and not the extent to which one relief can co-exist with one another. See DANTATA vs. MOHAMMED (2000) NWLR (Pt. 664) 176 @ 197 paragraphs B-C. PER SAULAWA, J.C.A.
IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The present (interlocutory) appeal is against the ruling of the High Court of Cross River State, delivered on January, 2014, in suit No. HUG/35/2013.
By the said ruling, the Court below dismissed the Appellants, application seeking to dismiss the Respondent’s suit. Dissatisfied with the said decision, the Appellants filed the notice of appeal thereof on January 16, 2014.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On October 3, 2013, the Respondent filed in the Court below a writ of summons against the two Appellants seeking the following reliefs:
(i) A Declaration that the claimant is entitled to the Statutory Right of Occupancy over the piece of land situate and known as No. 23 Ikom/Calabar Highway Lekpamkom, Ijiman, Ugep, measuring 1268.25 Square Meters bounded in the North by Etowa Ayom, south by Ebali Iwara Ekuta and Abam Iwara Ekuta, east by the Ikom/Calabar Highway, across which highway is Udumo Amos and west by Nkanu Openi.
(ii) Perpetual injunction restraining the defendants either by themselves, privies, agents, cohorts or hirelings from entering or further entering or
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trespassing into the said land or any part thereof and from doing anything inconsistent with the proprietary and possession rights of the claimant.
(iii) The sum of N5,000.00 each per month as profits in lieu of rents due to the claimant from the defendants.
(iv) The sum of N5,000,000.00 as General Damages for trespass.
See page 2 of the Record of Appeal.
Consequent upon the service of the writ of the Respondent’s summons and statement of claim, the Appellants filed their joint statement of Defence on October 28, 2013. Pursuant to Order 17 Rule 18(1) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, the Appellants equally filed a motion on notice seeking the following reliefs:
“(i) An order dismissing this action.
(ii) Any order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit and proper to make in the circumstances of this case.”
On the said January 9, 2013, the Court below delivered a considered ruling, thereby dismissing the Appellants’ motion in question.
?The Appellants’ brief of argument was filed on 21/12/15, but deemed properly filed on 03/3/16. At page 4 of the said brief, a total of five issues have so far been distilled from
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the five grounds of the Notice of Appeal, viz:
1. Whether the learned trial Judge was correct when he held that the Appellants being Customary Tenants of the Respondent are entitled to be sued for title and trespass because the Appellants had denied the over lordship of the Respondent.
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he struck out Relief 3 of the writ of summons claimed by the Respondent rather than dismissing the action after he held that it was a claim for profits in lieu of rents.
3. Whether the Learned Trial Judge was right when he held that the Appellants can be sued for trespass?
4. Whether the Learned trial Judge was right when he awarded costs of N25,000,00 (Twenty-five Thousand Naira) against the Appellants regard being lied to the facts and circumstances of the case?
5. Whether the Learned trial Judge was right in law (sic) when he failed to consider the objection raised by the Appellants that the land in dispute falls within a space of 45.72 metres on both sides of the Calabar/Ikom Federal Highway, on account of that information was coming to the Appellants and not from the case put forward by the
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Respondent.
The issues 1, 2 and 3 have all together been canvassed at pages 5 ? 10 of the Appellants’ brief.
In the main, it’s submitted, that the finding by the Court below, that the Appellants had committed trespass for which the Respondent was entitled to sue them for title and trespass was wrong. The reason being that, in a ruling on an interlocutory application the Court had a duty to ensure that it did not determine the same issues that would arise (for determination) in the substantive suit. See ACB LTD Vs. PRINCE AWOGBORO (1996) 3 NWLR (pt.437) 383, 385; (1996) 2 SCNJ 233.
Further submitted, that it was wrong on a violation of the Appellants’ right to fair hearing, for the Court below to have descended into the arena to make out a case for the Respondent that the Appellants were Customary tenants of the Respondent. See AJIDE Vs. KELANI (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 12) 248; AFRICAN PETROLEUM LTD. V. OWODUNMI (1991) 8 NWLR (pt. 210) 391, et al.
It was contended that it’s a conidial principle, that it’s the person who is in possession of the property that can sue for trespass.WALLIS vs. HAND (1892) 2 CH. 75; AMORI vs. AKANDE (1975) 2
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WACA 143 et al.
Further contended, that the finding of the Court below, that relief No. 3 was inconsistent with the Respondents claim for statutory declaration of right of occupancy and injunction is unwittingly an admission that the entire claim is inconsistent, bad and failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action. That the justice of the case would have been met if the Court below had proceeded to dismiss the case, because relief No. 3 is inextricably interwoven with reliefs 1 and 2 of the Respondents writ of summons.
In the circumstances, the Court is urged to resolves 1, 2, and 3 in favour of the Appellants.
The issue No. 4 is argued at pages 10 and 11 of the Appellants’ brief to the effect that the awarding of cost by the Court below was punitive and excessive thereby calculated to punish the Appellants.
It was submitted that though the award of cost is discretionary, the Court must exercise the discretionary power thereof judiciously and judicially, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. See OYEYEMI V. IREWOLE LOCAL GOVT. (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 270) 462; et al.
?Further submitted that in the instant case, cost
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awarded was too excessive and perverse. Thus, this Court is urged upon to intervene and reduce or set aside the cost awarded. See MUTUAL AIDS SOCIETY LTD Vs. AKERELE (1965) 1 All NLR 336; ALLIED BANK Vs. AKUBUEZE (1997) 6 NWLR (pt. 509) 374.
The Court is urged to resolve issue 4 in favour of the Appellants.
The issue No. 5 was canvassed at pages 11-13 of the said brief.
Submitted in the main, that the issue whether or not the land in dispute falls within a space of 45.75 metres on both sides of the Calabar/Ikom Federal Highway is an integral part of the case formulated by the Respondent. The said issue is equally a jurisdictional question, which ought to have been considered by the Court below. Therefore, the failure to resolve and pronounce on all issues legitimately raised by a party to a dispute, amounts to lack of fair hearing and a miscarriage of Justice. ATANO V. AG. BENDEL STATE (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 75) 201; KOTOYE Vs. CBN (1989) 2 SC (Pt. 1) 1; (1989) 1 NWLR (pt. 98) 419; et al.
In the circumstances, the Court is urged to resolve Issue No. 5 in favour of the Appellants.
On the whole, the Court is urged to allow the appeal.<br< p=””
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On the other hand, the Respondents’ brief was duly filed on 22/13/16. At pages 1-2 thereof, three issues have been formulated, viz:
(1) Whether it was apt for the learned trial Judge to hold that, the Respondent could maintain this action against erstwhile tenants or tenants adversely claiming his title as landlord?
Formulated from Grounds 1, 2 and 3,
(2) Whether it was in proper exercise of discretion that the Learned trial Judge in his ruling of 9th January, 2014 awarded N25,000.00 cost against the Appellants? Formulated from Ground 4.
(3) Whether the learned trial Judge failed to consider the objection raised by the Appellants that the land in dispute falls within a space of 45.72 metres…?
The issue No. 1 is canvassed at pages 2-7 of the Respondents, brief. It?s submitted, inter alia that from the pleaded facts, there exist an aggregate or set of facts disclosed by the Respondent that gave him a right to enforceable redress or relief against the Appellants. That the Respondent had a cause of action or reasonable cause of action which he was entitled to ventilate in the present suit. See ADEKOYA vs. FEDERAL HOUSING
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AUTHORITY (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 434) 1452 @ 1458-1459 paragraphs G-A; et al.
Further submitted that considering the reliefs thereof, the reliefs are consistent, cogent and logical. That the statement of claim
raised very serious questions as between the Respondent and the Appellants fit to be decided by the Court below. See paragraphs 5-11, 19-23 of the statement of claim. That in law, on all the said reliefs, the Respondent could maintain an action. See ECOBANK NIG. PLC VS. GATEWAY HOTELS LTD (1999) 11 NWLR (pt. 627) 397 @ 417 paragraph H.
It was contended, that on the pleaded facts, there can be no shred of doubt that the Respondent had all that he needed to originate this action which has disclosed all that it needed to disclose to be heard by the Court below.
In the circumstance, the Court is urged to resolve Issue No. 1 in favour of the Respondent.
The Issue No. 2 is canvassed at pages 7-8 of the brief to the effect that the complaint by the Appellant, the award of cost by the Court below was punitive is hypothetical and academic. The reason being that throughout the gamut of the Appellants’ brief, no inference has been made to the Record
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showing that the award of cost was punitive and excessive and calculated to punish the Appellants.
?It was contended that none of the elements mentioned in KOTOYE Vs. CBN (1990) 6 SCNJ 31 @ 51 et al, can be shown in this appeal on the cost awarded. Thus, the Court is urged to hold that the Court below was flawless in its order and award of cost.
The Issue No. 3 is canvassed at page 5, to the effect that there a proper consideration of the objection raised by the Appellants that the land in dispute falls within a space of 45.72 metres. The Court below could not have been expected to go on to examine whether the land in dispute falls within a space of the 45.72 metres. See FALOWO vs. BANIGBE (1998) 6 SCNJ 42 @ 60.
The Court is urged to resolve the Issue No. 2 in favour of the Respondent.
Conclusively, the Court is urged upon to disallow and accordingly dismiss the appeal.
I have accorded an ample consideration upon the nature and circumstances surrounding the appeal, the submissions of the learned counsel contained in their respective briefs of argument vis-a-vis the records of appeal, as a whole.
?As alluded to above, the Appellants
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have distilled a total of five issues from the five grounds of the Amended Notice of Appeal thereof.
Contrariwise, the Respondent has identified only three issues in the brief thereof for determination. I have deemed it expedient to adopt the five issues raised by the Appellants for the determination of the appeal anon.
Unlike the Appellants, however, I will deal with the five issues seriatim.
ISUES NO. 1
The first issue raises the question of whether or not the Court below was correct, when it held that the Appellants being Customary tenants of the Respondent are entitled to be sued for title and trespass, because the Appellants’ brief, the finding of the Court below at page 238 of the Record was copiously alluded, to the following facts:
3. N5,000 as profits in lieu of rents. This is where I have a problem because the law is that once a Customary tenant challenges the title of his overlord, his initial entry by let and permission of the overlord becomes trespassory. He becomes a trespasser from the date of his first entry. If that is so, then the claim for damages for trespass would adequately cover and take care of this relief. This
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relief No. 3 is therefore hereby struck out. My discussion of claim No.3 above resolved the issue of suing a tenant for trespass. I said it was possible and proper once a Customary tenant denies the title of his overlord. In that event the initial entry of the tenant into the land becomes trespassory and the tenant is liable in an action for damages for trespass.
The argument of the Appellants, in the main, is that the Court below was wrong to have completely dabbled into the substantive issues to decide that the Appellants were Customary tenants of the Respondent.
That it was never the case of the Respondent that the Appellants were his Customary tenants. Thus, it was wrong and a violation of the Appellants’ right to fair hearing, for the Court below to have descended into the arena to make out a case for the Respondent against the Appellants.
In the instant case, the interlocutory application giving rise to the present appeal is predicated upon the following grounds:
i. The statement for claim has woefully and spectacularly failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.
ii. The Claimant/Respondent cannot maintain an action for
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declaration of title; injunction and trespass against the Defendants/Appellants whom the Claimant/Respondent has pleaded as his tenants.
iii. It is well settled that the Court cannot declare title where necessary parties are not joined to the case.
iv. The action is demonstrably frivolous and egregious abuse of the Court process.
See pages 138 – 139 of the Record.
By implication, the Appellants’ application in question has raised a preliminary objection to the competence of the Respondent’s suit. It is a well settled principle, that where an objection is raised to the effect that a suit does not disclose a cause of action or a reasonable cause of action, it is the originating process, the writ of summons, the statement of claim (where one is filed), or the originating summons (or motion, as the case may be), that should be critically, albeit dispassionately, examined to ascertain whether or not there is indeed a reasonable cause of action. See COOKEY V. FAMBO (2005) ALL FWLR (pt. 271) 25 @ 34 paragraphs D-E; SOCIETY BIC S.A. vs. C.I. LTD (2014) ALL FWLR (pt. 739) 1212 @ 1233.
By paragraphs 5-11 of the statement of claim thereof, the
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Respondent has averred facts not only relating to the alleged title and its root, but his right and capacity to sue in protection of that title.
From the aggregate of pleaded facts contained in the statement of claim thereof, its obvious that there is a controversy between the respective parties, thus according the Respondent a cause of action or reasonable cause of action to institute the action in the Court below. Indeed, the fact that the Respondent has a reasonable cause of action, which he is entitled to ventilate at the Court below, is not at all in doubt! See ADENOYA V. FED. HOUSING AUTHORITY (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 434) 1452 @ 1458 – 1459; paragraphs G-A; COOKEY VS. FOMBO (supra) @ 38-39 paras H-B; OGUNDIPE V. NDIC (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 432) 1220 @ 1236 paras C-D.
What’s more, the doctrine has long been settled, to the effect that, in order to determine whether or not a statement of claim has disclosed a reasonable cause of action, what the Court ought to consider are the contents of the statement and not the extent which one relief co-exists with another. See DANTATA v. MOHAMMED (2000) NWLR (pt. 664) 176 @ 197 paragraphs C-D and @ 213 paragraphs
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B-C.
In the instant case, by paragraphs 5 – 11 and 19 – 23 of the statement of claim, the Respondent has raised and asserted facts regarding the vesting of title over the land in dispute; the admission of the said title by the Appellants by their tenants, status to the Respondent; and the Appellants’ adverse acts in challenging the title in question.
At page 236 of the Record, the Court below held, inter alia, thus:
?the law is that once a Customary tenant challenges the title of his overload, his initial entry by let and permission of the overload becomes trespassory.
I cannot agree more with the above finding of the Court below; the use of the phrase “Customary Tenant”, notwithstanding.
In the face of the adverse title claimed by the Appellants, most especially the 1st Appellant, it is trite that the Respondent was entitled to couple his claim of damages for trespass with that of title for the matters to be resolved once and for all. See UGOJI vs. ONUKOGU (2005) ALL FWLR (Pt. 271) 66 @ 78 paragraphs C-E.
In the circumstances, the issue No. 1 is resolved against the Appellant, in favour of the Respondent.
ISSUE NO.
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2
The second issue raises the question of whether or not the Court below was right when it struck out Relief 3 of the writ of summons claimed rather than dismissing the action, after it held that it was for profits in lieu of rents.
As alluded to above under issue No. 1, the Court below at page 238 of the Record, struck out relief No. 3 on the ground that:
….. the claim for damage would adequately cover and take care of this relief. This relief No. 3 is therefore hereby struck out.
As far-reachingly postulated above, the Respondent by the averments contained in the statement of claim thereof, pleaded facts sufficient to accord him the much required cause of action to institute the action against the Appellants. And the law is trite, that declaratory reliefs sought in an action are deemed to be distinct and independent causes of action. Thus, what the Court ought to take into consideration in determining whether or not there is a cause of action, are the contents of the statement and not the extent to which one relief can co-exist with one another. See DANTATA vs. MOHAMMED (2000) NWLR (Pt. 664) 176 @ 197 paragraphs B-C.
In the instant
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case, the said relief 3 of the statement of claim of the Respondent was struck out by the Court in limine on the unmistakable ground that it was incompetent. Therefore, the Court below could not be expected to dismiss the said relief since the matter was not contested and determined on the merits. Yet, it is a trite fundamental principle, that where an action is found to be incompetent, the only viable order that can be made by the Court is that of striking out, not dismissal.
In the circumstance, in the absence of a cross-appeal or Respondents notice filed by the Respondent, the Court below was right in striking out the said relief 3, rather than dismissing same. The second issue is equally hereby resolved against the Appellants.
ISSUE NO. 3
The third issue raises the question of whether or not the Court below was right, when it held that the Appellants can be sued for trespass.
Having resolved both issues 1 & 2 against the Appellants, there is no gainsaying the fact that the third issue must equally be resolved against them. The finding of the Court below in the vexed ruling, at page 236 of the Record, is to the effect that:
?It
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was possible and proper once a Customary tenant derives the title of his overload. In that event, the initial entry of the tenant into the land becomes trespassory and the tenant is liable in an action for damages for trespass.
For the above proposition, the Court below cited and relied upon ANYANWU VS. UZOWUAKA (2009) NWLR (pt. 1159).
In my considered view, the above finding is well supported by the trite proposition of law as aptly enunciated in the case of ANYANWU vs. UZOWUAKA (supra). In the circumstance, the third issue is hereby resolved against the Appellants, in favour of the Respondent.
ISSUE NO. 4
The fourth issue raises the question of whether or not the Court below was right, when it awarded costs of N25,000.00 against the Appellants, regard being had to the facts and circumstances of the case.
By virtue of the provisions of Order 36 Rule 1(i) of the Cross River State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2008:
“the party who is in the right is to be indemnified for the expenses which he was necessary put in the proceeding as well as compensated for his time and effort in coming to Court.”
What’s more, the Court
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below has been duly vested with a discretionary power under Rule 6 of Order 36 of the High Court Rules (supra), to award costs and determine by whom, and to what extent the costs are to be paid. In the case of UMO V. UDONWA, this Court had the privilege of aptly enunciating the purport of cost and factors that ought to be considered in awarding same, thus:
The combined effect of the above provisions of the two (2) Rules of the High Court is that it is vested with a judicial discretion in the assessment and award of costs…
In the above premises once the High Court exercises its discretion in the assessment and award of cost in allowance with the provisions of the rules… the exercise would be both judicial and judicious and therefore sustainable in law…
Costs as between party and party are given and awarded as an indemnity to the person entitled to them usually a successful party at the conclusion of proceedings in a case… in addition, in awarding costs, a Court is entitled to consider amongst other facts, the following:
(a) The summons fee;
(b) Duration of the case;
(c) Legal representation;
(d) Expenses incurred by the
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successful party in the ordinary course of prosecuting the case;
(e) The value or purchasing power of the Naira at the time of the award.
See (2014) All FWLR (Pt.721) 1608 @ 1622- 1623 paragraphs C -A; 1621 paragraph E.
?In the present case, the allegation by the Appellants at page 10 paragraph 2.2, to the effect that the award of cost by the Court below was punitive, excessive and calculated to punish the Appellants, is to say the least, hypothetical and unsubstantiated. Contrariwise, it is obvious from the records (pages 153 – 163) that the Respondent was made to file a counter affidavit and written address, for which he paid filing fees, aside the cost of settling same. What’s more, from 30/10/13, when the vexed motion was filed, to 09/01/14, when the vexed ruling was delivered by the Court below, a total of two months and 10 days had elapsed at the peril or expense of the Respondent vis-a-vis the counsel thereof.
Indeed, it’s a trite fundamental doctrine, that on matters of exercise of discretionary power, an appellate Court does not substitute the views thereof with those of the Court below. It behoves the appellate Court where
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necessary, to question and interfere with the exercise of discretionary power, only when it’s duly established that the discretion is wrongly exercised; or it’s exercised upon wrong principle, or in consequent upon the exercise, an injustice is occasioned. See SARAKI Vs. KOTOYE (1990) 6 SCNJ 31 @ 51; MK GOVERNOR OF IMO STATE Vs. NWAUWA (1997) 2 SCNJ 60 @ 75; OLUMESAN Vs. OGUNDEPO (1996) 2 SCNJ 172 @ 190.
I entirely agree with the Appellants’ learned counsel, that none of these elements enunciated in the foregoing authorities of the Apex Court has manifested itself in the present case.
In the circumstance, the fourth issue is hereby resolved against the Appellants, in favour of the Respondent.
ISSUE NO. 5:
The fifth and last issue raises the equally vexed question of whether or not the Court below was right, when it failed to consider the objection raised by the Appellants that the land in dispute falls within a space of 45.72 metres on both sides of the Calabar/Ikom Federal High Way.
?Referring to paragraph 24(1) of the Respondent’s statement of claim, it was maintained by the Appellants, that the issue of whether or not the land in
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dispute falls within a space of 45.72 metres on both sides of the Calabar/Ikom Federal High way, is an integral part of the case formulated by the Respondent.
The said relief in Paragraph 24(1) of the Respondent’s statement of claim reads thus:
A Declaration that the claimant is entitled to the statutory right of occupancy over the piece or parcel of land situate and known as No. 23 Ikom/Calabar High Way, Lekpankom Ijimal, Ugep measuring 1268.25 square metres bounded in the North by Etowa Ayom, South by Ebali/Ward Ekuta and Abam/Ward Ekuta, East by the Ikom/Calabar High Way across which is Uduma Amos and West by Nkanu Opene.
In view of the foregoing averment in paragraph 24 (1) of the Respondent’s statement of claim, it’s rather obvious, that the entire facts that the land in dispute falls within a space of 45.72 metres on both sides of the Calabar/Ikom Federal High Way were a product of the Appellants, written address/brief. Thus, the Court below was, therefore, correct when it held at page 237, lines 1 – 7 of the Record, thus:
That information is coming from the dependent/objector and not from the case put forward by the claimant which is
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the only thing I am to look at in considering the instant application. It may well turn out to be so during the trial but it is not so now that I am looking only at the case/pleadings put forward by the claimant.
In my considered view, to hold otherwise would have amounted to the Court below delving in to the substantive issues at the interlocutory stage of the case in limine. See FALOWO vs. BANGBE (1998) 6 SCNJ 42 @ 60.
In the circumstance, the fifth issue is equally hereby resolved against the Appellants, in favour of the Respondent.
Hence, having effectively resolved all the five issues against the Appellants, there is no gainsaying the fact, that the instant appeal is grossly lacking in merits. Consequent whereupon, the appeal is hereby dismissed by me. The ruling of the cross River State High Court, delivered on January 9, 2014 in suit No. HUG/35/2013 by the Hon. Justice E. E. Ita, is hereby affirmed.
The Respondent shall be entitled to costs assessed at N50,000.00 against the Appellants.
ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in advance a draft copy of the Judgment just delivered by my learned Brother, I.M.M.
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Saulawa, JCA, dismissing this appeal. The issues raised in this appeal have been comprehensively resolved by my learned Brother. I am in agreement with his reasoning and conclusion, which I adopt as mine.
I also dismiss this appeal and I abide by the Orders made in the lead Judgment, including the order as to costs.
JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the draft of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother I.M.M. SAULAWA, J.C.A and I totally agree with his lordship’s reasoning and conclusions therein.
For the more detailed consideration in the lead judgment, I equally find no merit in this appeal and I dismiss it accordingly.
I adopt the consequential orders in the lead judgment.
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Appearances
J. O. OBONO-OBLA with him, I. U. MGBE, ESQ.For Appellant
AND
P. O. OKOROFor Respondent
