MR. EMEKA JUDE NWATU & ORS v. UNIC INSURANCE PLC
(2018)LCN/11955(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 13th day of July, 2018
CA/E/206/2012
RATIO
JURISDICTION: INGREDIENT OF THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
”The law is trite that one of the ingredients for the exercise of jurisdiction by a Court include the requirement that the subject matter of the case is within the jurisdiction of the Court and that there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. See MADUKOLU & ORS VS NKEMDELIM & ORS (1962) 1 All NLR 587 at 594 and SKENCONSULT (NIG.) LTD VS SECONDY UKEY (1981) 1 SC.6..The law is also well settled that the question of jurisdiction is so fundamental that the adjudicating Court should determine the issue first before embarking on any proceedings for hearing on the merit. See KATTO VS CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 126.” PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH TINE TUR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. MR. EMEKA JUDE NWATU
2. MR. EJIKE EMMA NWATU
3. MRS. CHIOMA WINIFRED NWATU
4. VITUS OMENKEKWU Appellant(s)
AND
UNIC INSURANCE PLC Respondent(s)
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Justice, Enugu State, delivered by Hon. Justice B.E. AGBATA on 31/01/12 wherein the learned trial judge struck out the suit by the Plaintiff/Appellants on the ground of want of jurisdiction.
The Appellants commenced an action against the Respondent by filing a Writ of Summons on 21/2/2011 jointly suing for breach of contract and claiming three declaratory reliefs, special damages, general damages and exemplary damages. The claim as contained on Pg. 8 of the record is set out below:
i. A declaration that the defendant breached the contract between it and each of the plaintiffs. And that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the accumulated debt owed the Plaintiffs totaling N1,255,056.22, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to interest on their total deposit having been kept out of use of their money.
ii. A declaration that the Defendant issued its ACCESS BANK PLC cheques: No.100055364 in the name of NWATU EMEKA JUDE, dated 17/11/10 for N251,743.98; No. 10055872 in the name of NWATU EJIKE EMMANUEL dated 22/11/10 for N776,318.90; No.10055374 in the name of NWATU WINIFRED C. dated 29/10/10 for N112,939.45; and No. 10054592 in the name of OMENKEUKWU VITUS dated 15/9/2010 for N114,054.89, which were presented through the respective Plaintiffs banks and were dishonoured on the ground that there was no sufficient funds or insufficient funds standing to the credit of the drawer (DEFENDANT) of the various cheques in the Access Bank Plc. account belonging to the Defendant.
iii. A declaration that defendant’s conduct of obtaining Plaintiffs huge funds as a purported funds/investment manager is illegal.
iv. Special damages, the award of commercial interest on the debt of N1,255,056.22 at the rate of 15% from the December 2010 till date of the final determination of the suit.
v. GENERAL DAMAGES in the sum of N10,000,000.00 for breach of trust
vi. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES in the sum of N20,000,000.00.
On the 24th of October, 2011, the Respondent filed a notice of preliminary objection, challenging the jurisdiction of the High Court of Enugu state on two grounds namely:
I. The subject matter of this suit does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Honourable Court.
II. That the suit as presently constituted amounts to a misjoinder of both cause of action and parties.
On the 31st of January, 2012, the Appellants’ suit was struck out by the learned trial judge in a considered ruling on the basis of the Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection. The Appellants being dissatisfied with the said decision filed a notice of appeal dated and filed on 11/4/2012, transmitted the records on 12/6/12. Appellant’s brief was filed on 15/6/12. Respondent?s brief was filed on 9/11/12 and deemed filed on 14/11/17.
Mr. Chiobi Ekpechi Esq., who settled the Appellants’ brief identified two issues therein, for the determination of the appeal to wit:
1. Whether the decision of the learned trial judge striking out the Plaintiffs/Appellants suit for breach of Contract on ground of want of jurisdiction, without considering the statement of claim is not wrong.
2. Whether the learned trial judge without hearing and considering the plaintiffs/Appellants pending Motion on Notice, and the issue of competence of the Notice of Preliminary objection presented before it in the Plaintiffs’ written reply before the delivery of its judgment striking out the entire suit, is not a denial of fair hearing.
In a brief settled by M.A. Kazeem, the Respondent identified two issues for determination of the appeal to wit.
1. Whether the lower Court was right to entertain the Notice of Preliminary Injunction filed by the Respondent challenging the jurisdiction of the Court and to hold that it lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the suit being an insurance matter notwithstanding that the Respondent/Defendant had not filed any defence in the suit.
2. Whether from the nature of the suit, the lower Court was right in ruling that the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit being an insurance matter as well as a misjoinder and cause of action.
I have considered the record, the grounds of the appeal and the briefs of counsel. It is my humble view that the complaints raised by the Appellants can be determined with the following issue:
Whether the learned trial Court was right in striking out the suit on the grounds of want of jurisdiction.
SOLE ISSUE
Appellants’ counsel conceded that the law is settled that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain matters relating to breach of contract, recovery of debts, or damages for negligence by virtue of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). Counsel cited:Onuorah v. K.R.P.C Ltd (2005) ALL FWLR Pt. 256 at 1368, Paris C.E; Adelekan v. ECU-LINE Nv (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993), 33; I.T.P.P LTD v. UBN PLC (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 995) 483 SC.
Counsel submitted that the trial Court failed in its duty to consider the appropriate Court processes it ought to examine to determine issue of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the Court is bound to consider the Appellants statement of claim filed on 21/2/2011. Counsel cited: A.G Anambra State v. A.G Federation (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt.1047) 4; Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423 @ 588-589; Anazodo v. P.I.T (NIG) (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1084)529.
Counsel submitted that the learned trial judge was wrong when he failed to consider the written address challenging the process filed by the Respondent before striking out the suit.
Counsel cited: Onyekwuluje v. Animashaun (1996)3 NWLR (Pt. 439) 637; Mobil Prod. Nigeria Unlimited v. Monokpo (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) 346; Abiara v. Reg.TMCN (2007)11 NWLR (Pt.1045) 280 @ 300-301 Para E; Bamisile v. Osasuyi (2007)9 NWLR (Pt.1042). Counsel further submitted that the learned trial judge denied the Appellants judgment when he erroneously declined jurisdiction and struck out the suit. Counsel cited: Federal Government of Nigeria v. Oshiomhole (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 860) 305.
Appellant’s counsel argued that the Respondent did not file a reply to the points of law raised by the Appellants in the motion on notice dated and filed on 12/5/2011 and written address in opposition to the Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection filed on 31/10/2011, and by so doing the Defendant had conceded to the points of law canvassed in the Appellants’ reply. Counsel Cited: Maersk Line v. Addide Invest. Ltd (2002) FWLR (Pt. 125) 608.
Counsel submitted that at the time the learned trial judge struck out the Appellants’ suit, there was still a pending Motion on Notice filed on 12/5/2011, praying the Court to set down the case for hearing, and the motion was never determined. Counsel cited: Okeke-Oba v. Okoye (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 364) 605 at 6116, Para A-B.
Counsel prayed this Court to allow the appeal on the grounds that it is the claim before the Court, particularly the relief being sought that determines the jurisdiction of the Court. Counsel cited: Kotoye v. Saraki (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 357) 414; Skenconsult v. Ukey (1981)1 SC. 6.
Respondent’s counsel M.A. Kazeem Esq., submitted that the respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the lower Court on the ground that the subject matter of the suit was not within the jurisdiction of the lower Court and the suit amounted to a misjoinder of cause of action and parties.
Counsel argued that the Appellants have a misconstrued assumption that the Respondent needs to file its statement of Defence and other accompanying processes in order to properly file its preliminary objection. This assumption is tantamount to saying the Respondents filed a demurrer, which is different from raising a preliminary objection on jurisdiction. Counsel cited Mobil Oil (Nigeria) Plc v IAL 36 Inc. (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 659) 146 @167; Nigeria Deposit Insurance Commission (NDIC) v. Central Bank of Nigeria & Anor (2002) 3 SC 75 @ 89, (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt.766) 272.
Counsel submitted that the Courts have consistently stated that the rules of Court are meant to be obeyed, however the Supreme Court has cautioned against following the rules of Court sheepishly and that at all times, the interest of justice is paramount. Counsel cited: Oloba v. Akereja (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) 508.
Counsel further submitted that the issue of jurisdiction is beyond the facts contained ordinarily in the Rules of Court and as such at any point and in any mode it is raised, the Court is duty bound to consider it. Counsel cited: F.C.E Oyo v. Akinyemi (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1109) 44 @ 49.
Counsel submitted that the Appellants’ suit is a matter subject to the Nigeria Insurance Act on which only the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Section 80(1) of the Insurance Act and Sections 251 and 252 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). Thus by filing the matter at the lower Court, the Appellant had taken the matter out of Jurisdictional competence.
Counsel submitted that from the statement of claim of the Appellants at trial Court, it is evident that the Appellants are not joint plaintiffs and therefore the causes of action arose differently and not jointly. This is because joint plaintiffs presuppose that they all have the same interest which may have arisen in the same transaction which they now seek to enforce in Court.
Counsel further submitted that all the Appellants have separate contracts with the Respondent, entered into at different times and payments made at different times. Also none of the witnesses are competent or compellable witnesses for each other for the purposes of establishing their various cases. Therefore these differences presuppose differences in causes of action. The appellant cannot lump their separate causes of action in one suit, each Appellant having entered into the separate contracts independently without the knowledge of the other Appellants. Counsel cited: Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. Selfridge & Co. Ltd (1915) A.C. 847; Chuba Ikpeazu v. African Continental Bank Ltd (1965) NMLR 374.
Counsel submitted that the Appellants are neither proper parties nor desirable parties nor necessary parties for the purpose of determining the suit.
The test to determine whether a party is a person having interest in the suit is whether the person could have been joined as a party to the suit. Counsel cited:E.F.P. CO. LTD v. NDIC (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1039) 216 SC; Ojukwu v. Gov. Lagos State (No. 1) (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 10) 806 SC.
Counsel urged this Court to dismiss this appeal and affirm the ruling of the lower Court.
OPINION
Jurisdiction is a threshold issue which goes to the root of every matter and must be looked at from three perspectives:
1) Reference must be made to the subject matter of the suit.
2) Reference must be made to the persons or parties between whom the issue is joined and
3) Reference must be made to the kind of reliefs sought or any combination of these factors.
According to the Appellants the Respondents is an insurance company. It solicits for policy from members of the public who pay monthly premium, the principal money; the accrued interest is paid at the maturity of the policy. Its head office is at Plot 144 Oba Akran Avenue, Ikeja, Lagos with branch office at 2 O’Connor Street, Enugu, within the jurisdiction of this Court.
The 1st -4th Appellants were introduced to the company by its agents and they paid diverse sums of money as monthly premium. Each one of them entered into an amortization schedule with the Respondent. At the fullness of time, the Respondent did not only breach the contract of scheduled repayment to each Appellant it issued dud cheques to some of them and made some of the Appellants incur extra monetary losses by giving them letters of authority to their Lagos Headquarters. They went there, nothing came out of it. That is why the Appellants filed this suit claiming refunds of the diverse debts owed them and in addition payment of general damages of ten million naira and exemplary damages in the sum of twenty million naira only.
At Pg. 73 of the record, the learned trial judge held as follows:
”Section 60 (1) of Insurance Act Cap 183, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 provides : ‘Every offence under this Act shall, subject to the rules of Court, be tried in the Federal High Court and references in this Act to ‘Court’ or ‘the Court’ shall be construed accordingly”’.
This piece of legislation is self-explanatory and has left nothing to chance or guess work. The Court is Federal High Court. After the above very careful review of decided authorities and legislations, it is my humble view that I should agree and I hereby agree with Efe Ize-Iyamu Esq., that the subject matter of this suit does not fall within the jurisdiction of this Court. I so hold.”
The Law is indeed well settled that, a claimant’s claim as contained in his statement of claim determines which Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the claim. See ADEYEMI VS OPEYORI (1976) 9-10 SC.31; MUSTAPHA VS GOV. OF LAGOS STATE (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 539; TUKUR VS GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 592 and O.H.M.B. VS GARBA (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 788) 538, Anyah V. Iyayi (1993) 7 NWLR Pt. 305 Pg. 290; Onuorah V. Okeke(2005) 10 NWLR Pt. 932 P.47.
In the instant case, the claim of the Appellant relates to breach of an insurance contract. Critical analysis of Section 251(1)(a)-(s) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), does not show any where that jurisdiction to entertain a claim based on simple contract of insurance was vested exclusively on the Federal High Court as claimed by the Appellants. It is however the argument of the Respondent that additional jurisdiction had been vested on the Federal High Court by the combined effect of Section 80 of the Insurance Act, and Section 251(1) (s) of the Constitution.
Section 251(1) (s) of the 1999 Constitution (As Amended) provides that:
“251(1) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters-
(s) such other jurisdiction civil or criminal and whether to the exclusion of any other Court or not as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly.
Section 80(1) of the Insurance Act states that:
An offence under the Act shall, subject to the Rules of Court, be tried in the Federal High Court and References in this Act to ‘Court’ or ‘the Court’ shall be construed accordingly.
However, contrary to the Respondent’s understanding of Section 80 of the Insurance Act, jurisdiction to hear civil claims such as simple contracts as in the instant, was not vested in the Federal High Court, the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High is jurisdiction to entertain criminal matter as the Act only referred to ‘Offences’, which is to be interpreted to mean criminal offences. The Supreme Court in Sun Insurance Nigeria Plc. v. Umez Engineering Construction Company Limited (2015) LPELR-24737 (SC); (2015) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1471), Pg.576 which is almost on all fours with this case had cause to interpret the provisions of Section 251(1) (s) of the Constitution and Section 80 of the Insurance Act as we are also bound to do so in this case.
In that case, the Respondent claimed the insured value of its vehicle which had been stolen and the Appellant refused to pay. At trial, the Appellant raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Imo State High Court sitting at Owerri on the basis that the Court lacked jurisdiction. The trial Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed the objection and the Supreme Court in the lead judgment by Mahmoud Mohammed CJN upheld the decision of the High Court and the Court of Appeal.
The Court held that indeed in a simple contract of insurance as in the case at hand in this appeal, the State High Court has jurisdiction. The relevant provisions of the Insurance Act 1997 are in Pari Materia with the provisions of the Insurance Act 2002. The Supreme Court per Mahmoud Mohammed held as follows at Pg. 17-21 of Sun Insurance Nigeria Plc. v. Umez Engineering Construction Company Limited (2015) LPELR-24737 (SC):
”The Law is indeed well settled as correctly argued by the learned Counsel to the Parties in their respective briefs of argument that jurisdiction of a trial Court is determined by the Plaintiff’s claim as endorsed in the writ of summons and the statement of claim. See ADEYEMI VS OPEYORI (1976) 9-10 SC.31; MUSTAPHA VS GOV. OF LAGOS STATE (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 539; TUKUR VS GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 592 and O.H.M.B. VS GARBA (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 788) 538.
Thus in the present case, the claim of the Plaintiff/Respondent as earlier stated in this judgment, relates to simple contract insurance claim. Close examination of Section 251(1)(a)-(s) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), does not show any where that jurisdiction to entertain a claim based on simple contract of insurance was vested exclusively on the Federal High Court as claimed by the Appellant. That argument therefore does not support the case of the Appellant. As for the argument of the Appellant that additional jurisdiction had been vested on the Federal High Court by the Insurance Act of 1997, Section 251(s) relied upon by the Appellant reads –
“251(1) …(s) Such other jurisdiction Civil or Criminal and whether to the exclusion of any other Court or not as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly.”
It is the case of the Appellant that based on the above provisions of the 1999 Constitution, the National Assembly had conferred additional exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court on all civil claims arising from Insurance Contract by virtue of Sections 73 and 97 of the Insurance Act, 1997.
The provisions of Sections 73 and 97 of the Insurance Act state –
“73 Settlement of claims:
(1) Where –
(a) Civil proceedings are taken in Court in respect of any claim relating to the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising from the use of a motor vehicle covered by a policy of Insurance; and
(b) Judgment is obtained against the person insured; then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to this section pay to the person entitled to the benefit of such judgment the sum payable (including costs and interest on such sum) not later than 30 days from the date of delivery of the Judgment.”
I am afraid this Section 73 of the Insurance Act, has nothing to do with conferring jurisdiction on the Federal High Court or any Court for that matter and therefore it is not relevant in this case. As for Section 97 of the Act, it is an interpretation section which states-
“97 Interpretation.
In this Act, unless the con otherwise requires : “Court” means Federal High Court.”
Looking through the entire provisions of the Act, it is only Section 80 that deals with provisions for jurisdiction and prosecution and it states-
“80 Jurisdiction and prosecution.
(1) an offence under this Act shall, subject to the Rules of Court, be tried in the Federal High Court and reference in this Act to “Court” or the Court.” Shall be construed Accordingly.”
It is quite clear that the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court by Section 80 of the Insurance Act No. 2 of 1997 is in respect of the trial of all Criminal offences committed under the Act. No civil jurisdiction at all has been conferred by the Act on the Federal High Court. The statute is quite plain therefore that it does not confer any exclusive or any jurisdiction at all for that matter on the Federal High to entertain and determine simple claims arising from contract of Insurance between the Parties to that contract. The Courts below were therefore right in their Judgments that by virtue of Section 272(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, jurisdiction to entertain and determine all simple contracts of insurance claims between parties to such contracts remain with the High Courts of the States.
The law is trite that one of the ingredients for the exercise of jurisdiction by a Court include the requirement that the subject matter of the case is within the jurisdiction of the Court and that there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. See MADUKOLU & ORS VS NKEMDELIM & ORS (1962) 1 All NLR 587 at 594 and SKENCONSULT (NIG.) LTD VS SECONDY UKEY (1981) 1 SC.6.
The Respondent having shown that neither Section 251(1)(a)-(r) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, nor the provisions of the Insurance Act No. 2 of 1997 by virtue of Section 251(1)(s) conferred exclusive or additional jurisdiction to entertain simple claims on Insurance contracts on the Federal High Court, the subject matter of such claims remains under the jurisdiction of the state High Courts under Section 272(1) of the 1999 Constitution.
The law is also well settled that the question of jurisdiction is so fundamental that the adjudicating Court should determine the issue first before embarking on any proceedings for hearing on the merit. See KATTO VS CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 126.
In the final result, the Appellant having failed to show that the subject matter of the case of the Plaintiff/Respondent now pending at the trial Court is outside the jurisdiction of the trial or that the civil jurisdiction of the insurance claim now lies with the Federal High Court by virtue of Section 73 and 97 of the Insurance Act No. 2 of 1997, the appeal must fail.
My Lord Fabiyi JSC was of the view on Pg.24-25 of the LPELR-24737 that:
”Let me bring to the fore at this point the expressio unius est exclusio alterius Rule which means the express mention of one thing in a statutory provision, as herein – the Constitution – the grundnorm, automatically excludes any other stipulation which would otherwise have been applied by implication. See Ogbunyiya v. Okudo (1979) 6-9 SC 32, PDP v. INEC (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 626) 200; Buhari v. Dikko Yusuf (2003) 14 NWLR (Pt. 841) 446, Udoh v. Orthopaedic Hospital Management Board (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 304) 139 and Halsbury’s Law of England 4th Edition, paragraph 876.
In short, it is clear that a simple insurance contract matter does not fall within the Jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. It is not expressly imbued with jurisdiction to entertain such a matter. The decision of this Court in Adelekan v. ECU Line NV (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 33 at 52 is clear on the point.”
By the doctrine of stare decisis, I am bound by the above decision of the apex Court. I am constrained to add however that the combined interpretation of Section 251(1) (d) of the Constitution, and Section 66 of the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act 1991 and Section 46 (interpretation section) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Act 2004 may have led to another interpretation.
It is my humble view that insurance institutions fall under the phrase ‘other financial institutions’ referred to by Section 251(1) (d) of the Constitution due to the nature of the business carried out by the Respondent. The Bank and other Financial Institutions Act 1991 in Section 66 defined financial institutions as:
”other financial institution means any individual, body, association or group of persons; whether corporate or unincorporated, other than the banks licensed under this Act which carries on the business of a discount house finance company and money brokerage and whose principal object include factoring, project financing, equipment leasing, debt administration, fund management, private ledger services, investment management, local purchases order financing, export finance, project consultancy, financial consultancy, pension fund management and such other business as the Bank may from time to time designate.”
The Economic and Financial Crimes Act 2004 in Section 46 also define financial institution:
”Financial Institution” means banks, body, association or group of persons whether corporate or incorporate which carries the business of investments and securities, a discount house, insurance institutions, debt factorization and conversion firms, bureau de Change, Finance Company, Money brokerage firms whose principal business includes factoring, project financing equipment leasing, debt administration, fund management, private ledger services, investment services, local purchase order financing, export finance, project consultancy, pension funds management and other business as the Central Bank or other appropriate regulatory authorities may from time to time designate.”
Another Issue to be considered is that learned Appellant’s Counsel raised the issue of misjoinder of parties and argued that each of the Appellants have separate contracts with the Respondent, entered into at separate times and regarding separate amounts and that their claims cannot be lumped together. In my humble view that is a self-serving argument.
There is in existence in this case among the Appellants, common questions of law, facts and series of transactions between the parties. Where such is the case, the current conventional wisdom adopted in order to avoid multiplicity of actions and conflicts between claimants is for them to come together to prosecute their claim. This procedure has been encouraged by the Supreme Court See: Ige v. Farinde (1994) 7-8 SC Pg. 284; (1994) 7 NWLR Pt. 354 Pg. 42; Ayankoya v Olukoya (1996) 2 SCNJ; (1999) 4 NWLR Pt. 440 Pg.1 .
Be that as it may, the issue of the jurisdiction where contract of insurance can be brought having been settled by the Supreme Court, the Appeal has merit and it is allowed. The decision of Hon. Justice B.E Agbatah delivered on 31/1/2012 in Suit No: E/45/2011 is hereby set aside. This suit is sent back to the Honourable Chief judge of Enugu State for hearing de novo before another judge.
Appeal allowed. Costs of N50, 000 to each Appellant against the Respondent
IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A.: Having read the very erudite and comprehensive Judgment of my Learned brother the PJ., H. M. OGUNWUMIJU, JCA I have nothing more to add than to allow the Appeal. Appeal is allowed with cost of N50,000 each to the Appellant.
JOSEPH TINE TUR, J.C.A.: I agree.
Appearances:
Chiobi EkpechiFor Appellant(s)
Absent.For Respondent(s)
