MR. BUBA AMODU v. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE LAGOS STATE & ANOR
(2014)LCN/7255(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 3rd day of June, 2014
CA/L/896/09
RATIO
WHETHER AN APPELLATE COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT
It is a well-established principle that an appellate Court cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion by a trial Court, unless it is NOT exercised in accordance to law or it was exercised in a perverse manner – see Osakwe V. FGN (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 893) 305, Likita V. C.O.P. (supra), Atiku V. The State (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 757) 265. So, the decision regarding bail is entirely at the discretion of the trial Court based on what was before it, and where it appears that the discretion has been exercised judiciously, this Court will not interfere. per AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.C.A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: REQUIREMENT TO BRING SUSPECT BEFORE A COURT OF LAW WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria requires that a person who is arrested and detained on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence shall be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time and if he is not tried within a period of two months from the date of his arrest or detention, he shall without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought against him be released either unconditionally or upon such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears for trial at a later date. Section 35(4) of the 1999 Constitution; Olatunji & Anor v. F.R.N. (2003) 3 NWLR (pt. 807) 406. per CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
AMINA ADAMU AUGIE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MR. BUBA AMODU Appellant(s)
AND
1. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE LAGOS STATE
2. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LAGOS STATE Respondent(s)
AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant was arrested by the Police during a Police raid on 13/11/2001, at Ijora Olopa, Lagos, and was taken to the Head-Quarters of Zone 2 of the Nigeria Police, Onikan, Lagos. He was arraigned before the Magistrate Court 2, Igbosere, Lagos, on 23/11/2001, and charged with robbery and possession of weeds suspected to be Indian hemp. He was remanded at the Ikoyi Prison, Lagos, that same day – 23/11/2001, and remained in prison custody since then.
He instituted an action at the Lagos State High Court by an Originating Ex-parte Motion dated 3/8/2007 for leave to apply for the enforcement of his fundamental rights. The Application was heard and granted on 16/10/2007, and he subsequently filed a Motion on Notice dated 18/10/2007 praying for –
A. A DECLARATION that [his] continuous detention in prison custody – – at the instance of the Respondents and/or due to the failure of the Respondents and/or their agents to take steps to arraign and prosecute [him] in a Court of competent jurisdiction violates [his] fundamental rights to respect for the dignity of his person, personal liberty and freedom of movement as provided under Sections 34, 35 and 41 of the Constitution, and Articles 4, 5, 6 & 12(1) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act – – and is therefore unlawful, illegal and unconstitutional.
B. “AN ORDER releasing the Applicant unconditionally from detention in prison for gross violation of his fundamental rights as provided under Sections 34, 35 and 41 of the Constitution – – 1999 and Articles 4, 5, 6, and 12 (1) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap A9, LFN, 2004”.
C. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES as may be assessed by the Court against the Respondents for the oppressive, cruel, unlawful, illegal and unconstitutional refusal and/or neglect (by them) to take steps to arraign and prosecute (him) in a Court of competent jurisdiction as required by law as a result of which (he) has been wasting away in prison custody for over 5 years without justification under the most inhuman and degrading conditions.
D. GENERAL DAMAGES as may be assessed by the Court against the Respondents – – “.
“THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE RELIEFS ARE SOUGHT”, are as follows –
1. By virtue of S.34 of the 1999 Constitution and Articles 4 and 5 of the African Charter every Nigerian Citizen is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person and accordingly no person shall be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment.
2. By virtue of Section 35 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the African Charter, every Nigerian citizen shall be entitled to his personal liberty and where such liberty is deprived inter alia for the purpose of bringing him before a court upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence or to such extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his committing a criminal offence, he shall in the case of a person who is in custody or is not entitled to bail, be brought before a court of competent jurisdiction to be tried within two months from the date of his arrest or detention.
3. By virtue of S.41 of the 1999 Constitution and Article 12 of the African Charter every Nigeria Citizen is entitled to move freely throughout Nigeria.
4. The Applicant has been remanded/detained in Ikoyi Prison since 23/11/2007 till date, a period of over (5 years which is far beyond the constitutionally stipulated period of 2 months without being arraigned before a court of competent jurisdiction for trial.
5. The persistent failure and/or refusal of the Respondents or officers deriving authority from (them) to take steps to arraign and prosecute [him] before a Court – – hence his continued stay in prison custody without trial derogates from (his) fundamental rights as provided under the 1999 Constitution which include inter alia, his right to the dignity of his person, personal liberty and right to freedom of movement.
6. The failure and/or refusal by the Respondents/their agents to take steps to prosecute [him] as required by law clearly shows that [they] have no case against [him].
7. “The continuous unlawful, illegal and unconstitutional detention of the Applicant at Ikoyi prison constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment of the Applicant”.
The Motion on Notice was heard on 11/12/2007 without any Counter-Affidavit in opposition, but after it was reserved for Ruling, the 2nd Respondent filed a Motion on Notice dated 14/1/2008 praying the Court for the following orders –
1. Granting leave to – – arrest the Ruling of this Hon. Court slated for 15/1/2008.
2. Arresting the Ruling of this Hon. Court slated to be delivered on 15/1/2008.
3. AND/OR that the name of the Respondent/Applicant be struck out.
He also filed a Counter-Affidavit dated same day wherein it was averred that –
5. Upon receipt of the (Appellant)’s Motion on Notice, a search was conducted in the office of the 2nd Respondent for the Applicant’s duplicate case file.
6. The said search revealed that the 1st Respondent has not forwarded the duplicate case file to the office of the 2nd Respondent.
7. The Office of the 2nd Respondent is not seized of the facts surrounding this case.
8. – – The 2nd Respondent cannot affirm or deny the Applicant’s Affidavit in support.
9. The 2nd Respondent cannot take a stand in respect of this matter.
10. The name of the 2nd Respondent be removed from the Motion paper.
In his Ruling delivered on 17/1/2008, the learned trial Judge, O. A. Taiwo, J., found that based on the above averments, “the 2nd Respondent has nothing to contribute to the determination of the Application before [it]”, and held thus –
“The most important fact in this Application is that the Applicant was arrested in November 2001 and has remained in prison custody without trial since then. The Applicant has exhibited the remand warrant of the Applicant were (sic) been charged for conspiracy to rob and possession of weeds suspected to be hemp. These are not capital offences and the Applicant is entitled to be released on bail. It is my humble view that the Respondents have indeed infringed the FHR of the Applicant as provided for under S. 34, 35 and 41 of the 1999 Constitution … as he has been detained in custody without trial for over 5 years. Furthermore, the DPP has not received his case file since 2001. There is no legal advice. In the light of the above, I hereby grant the following reliefs sought as follows –
1. It is hereby declared that the continuous detention of the Applicant in prison custody – – since 23/11/2001 till date – – – due to the failure of the Respondents and/or their agents to take steps to arraign and prosecute the Applicant in a Court of competent jurisdiction violates the Applicant’s fundamental rights to respect for the dignity of his person, personal liberty and freedom of movement as provided under Sections 34, 35 and 41 of the Constitution – – and Articles 4, 5, 6 & 12(1) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act – – and is, therefore, unlawful, illegal and unconstitutional.
2. It is hereby ordered that the Applicant be released on bail in the sum of N100, 000.00 with one surety in like sum. Surety must be gainfully employed. DCR (Lagos) is ordered to verify address of surety.
3. As the Ministry of Justice is not seized of the facts of this case because the case file was not forwarded to them by the 1st Respondent, no damages will be awarded against the 2nd Respondent.
4. However, exemplary damages of N100, 000.00 is awarded against the 1st Respondent.
Dissatisfied with the Order that he be released on bail in the sum of N100, 000 with one surety in like sum, the Appellant appealed against that aspect of the decision only, with a Notice of Appeal containing two Grounds of Appeal.
In line with our Rules, the Appellant filed a Brief of Argument prepared by Ikenna Okoli, Esq., and Ejike Ikejiuba, Esq., wherein he formulated only one issue for determination from the said two Grounds of Appeal, and that is –
“Whether the trial Court was right to grant bail on conditions to the Appellant instead of releasing the Appellant unconditionally from detention?
The 1st Respondent did not file a brief, however, the 2nd Respondent did, and he also formulated one issue in his Brief settled by Mrs. M. O. Asumah; that is –
“Whether in the circumstances of this case the trial judge was correct in law to grant bail to the Appellant rather than release him unconditionally from Prison detention as prayed”.
In my view, there is not much difference between the issues as formulated by the Appellant and 2nd Respondent (hereinafter referred to as the Respondent).
They both draw attention to the same question although phrased differently; that is whether the lower Court was right to grant him bail with conditions, rather than release the Appellant unconditionally, which is what he prayed for.
The Appellant’s contention is that it was wrong to so do. He argued that the fact that the offences for which he was detained are not capital offences, as indicated by the lower Court, ought to have counted in his favour in the determination of whether or not to release him unconditionally; that Order 6, Rule 1 (1) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979, appears to give the Judge a discretion as to the order that may be made for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of his fundamental rights, and in exercising its discretion, the Court must do so judiciously and judicially; that the lower Court failed to exercise its discretion judicially and judiciously, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case; and that there cannot be a worse case than this of arbitrary and unlawful detention for which the Court ought to have released him from prison custody unconditionally.
Furthermore, that there was no basis for granting him bail as such bail with its conditions will serve no useful purpose; that the purpose of attaching conditions to the bail is to ensure that he appears for trial at a later date; that he did not ask for bail, and if the lower Court was considering exercising its discretion in granting bail, it should have given him an opportunity to address it on the appropriate order to make; and that in the absence of an opportunity to proffer arguments as to why only an unconditional release would suffice and not bail with conditions, the Court should have granted the reliefs sought.
He referred us to the decision of the Supreme Court in Abacha v. The State (2002) 11 NWLR (pt. 779) 437; the decision of this court in Shagari v. COP (2007) 5 NWLR (pt. 1027) 272 at 299-300, and further submitted as follows –
“An Order that the Appellant be released on bail in the sum of N100, 000.00 with one surety in like sum is as good as continuing unlawful detention of the Appellant, as [he] was not in a position after more than six (6) years out of circulation, to fulfill the bail conditions. That surely cannot be proper exercise of discretion. In the light of the foregoing – – the trial Court was wrong to grant bail on conditions to [him] instead of releasing the Appellant unconditionally from detention as sought by the Appellant”.
The Respondent referred to 35(4) of the 1999 Constitution, and submitted that the provision touching on this issue, is very clear – that it is a matter absolutely within the discretion of the Judge; that Order 6, Rule 1 (1) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979 (now Order 11 of the 2009 Rules), also reiterates the fact that any such directive given by the Court is subject to the court’s discretion, citing Likita v. COP (2002) 11 NWLR (PT. 777) 145; that it is settled that the fact that a Respondent did not file a counter Affidavit or oppose the Application for bail is not conclusive to admit the Appellant to bail, rather these are merely indicators that will assist the Court in exercising its discretionary power – Chinemelu v. COP (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 390) 484 and Danbaba v. The State (2000) 19 WRN 1 cited; and that the lower Court did not err when it refused to grant the relief of unconditional release sought by him.
It was also argued that contrary to his contention, the Appellant is not empowered under the law to dictate to the Court on the proper order to make in the circumstance of this case since all that is required under Section 35 (4) is for the Court to exercise its discretion as to the appropriate order to be made in each circumstance; that the lower Court took into consideration necessary factors and granted him conditional bail rather than unconditional release; and that he has not shown sufficient reasons to warrant the discretion of this Court setting aside the decision of the lower Court and entering same in his favour.
We were urged to uphold the lower Court’s decision for the following reasons-
1. The order of the Court granting conditional bail to him rather than unconditional release is well within the provisions of Section 35 (4) of the 1999 Constitution.
2. The Law does not envisage a situation where the Appellant would dictate to the Court about the proper order to be made.
3. The discretion to grant or refuse an application is within the powers of the Court and the Court has exercised that discretion in the interest of justice by granting him conditional bail. This will ensure that the Appellant does not abscond from justice and is available to stand his trial when a charge is proffered against him.
Let us start by looking at the law; Section 35(1) of the Constitution says that –
“Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases – –
(c) For the purpose of bringing him before a Court in execution of the order of a Court or upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence, or to such extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his committing a criminal offence.
The 1999 Constitution (as amended) further provides in Section 35(4) that –
“Any person who is arrested or detained in accordance with sub-section (1)(c) of this Section shall be brought before a Court of Law within a reasonable time and if he is not tried within a period of: –
(a) two months from the date of his arrest or detention in the case of a person who is in custody or is not entitled to bail; or
(b) three months from the date of his arrest or detention in the case of person who has been released on bail, he shall (without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought against him) be released either unconditionally or upon such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears for trial at a later date.”
In this case, the Appellant has argued that he did not ask for bail, and when the lower Court considered the option of granting him bail, it should have given him the “opportunity to address the Court on the appropriate order to make”, and in the absence of an opportunity to proffer arguments as to why he should be released unconditionally, the Court should have granted the reliefs sought.
The Respondent countered that “the law does not envisage a situation where the Appellant would dictate to the Court about the proper order to be made”.
Obviously, the Respondent is right; although the lower Court found that his continuous detention at the instance of the Respondents violated his rights, it did not have to automatically grant his prayer for “an order releasing him unconditionally from detention for gross violation of his fundamental rights”.
The Court has a discretion to grant his prayer and release him unconditionally or refuse to release him or release him on conditions that it deems appropriate to ensure that he appears for trial at a later date, which is what bail is all about -see Suleman V. COP (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1089) 298 where Niki-Tobi, JSC, said –
“The main function of bail is to ensure the presence of the Accused at the trial. That is the cynosure of all the criteria. It is the center-piece, And so this criterion is regarded as not only the omnibus ground for granting or refusing, but the most important”.
So, the Appellant did not have to address the Court on the appropriate order to make; it had a discretion to release him unconditionally or with conditions, which is the import of Section 35(4) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) – any person who is not tried within two months in the case of a person, who is in custody, shall be released either unconditionally or upon such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears for trial at a later date – see also Bamaiyi v. The State (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 715) 270 SC, where it was held –
“It is a proper and useful test whether bail should be granted or refused to consider the probability that the Accused will appear in Court to take his trial”.
The Appellant conceded that this is the position of the law but argued that the lower Court did not exercise its discretion properly because the order made that he be released on bail in the sum of N100, 000 with one surety in like sum is as good as continuing his unlawful detention since he was not in a position after more than 6 years out of circulation, to fulfill the bail conditions.
As I said earlier, a Court has discretion to admit an accused to bail or not and the definition of “discretion”, includes – “a public official’s power or right to act in certain circumstances according to personal Judgment and conscience”.
Thus, the Court’s decision to grant or refuse bail would vary from case to case – see Suleman V. COP, Plateau State (supra), wherein Akintan, JSC, observed –
“A judicial officer saddled with the responsibility of exercising a discretion is required to arrive at its decision in every case or situation based on the facts placed before him in the very case and apply the applicable law. His decision is, therefore, likely to vary from case to case since the circumstances in each case may vary. The question of stereotype or strict application of the rule of judicial precedent would not be of importance”.
In his contribution to the said Judgment, Niki Tobi, JSC, further explained that –
“In performing the judicial function, the Court wields a very extensive discretionary power, which must be exercised judiciously and judicially. – – – The Court cannot exercise its whims indiscriminately. Similarly, there is no room for the Court to express its sentiments. It is a hard matter of law, facts and circumstances, which the Court considers, without being emotional, sensitive or sentimental”.
In effect, there are no hard and fast rules regarding the grant or refusal of bail; the Court wields a very extensive discretionary power to either grant or refuse, and the only qualification is that it must be exercised judicially and judiciously.
In this case, the lower Court did not refuse the Appellant’s Application to release him from detention; it simply refused to release him unconditionally, but it ordered his release on bail albeit with conditions attached, which is what the Constitution allows it to do – release him unconditionally or with conditions attached to ensure that he appears for trial at a later date – see Section 35 (4).
The lower Court opted to release him on bail with the said conditions attached.
It is a well-established principle that an appellate Court cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion by a trial Court, unless it is NOT exercised in accordance to law or it was exercised in a perverse manner – see Osakwe V. FGN (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 893) 305, Likita V. C.O.P. (supra), Atiku V. The State (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 757) 265. So, the decision regarding bail is entirely at the discretion of the trial Court based on what was before it, and where it appears that the discretion has been exercised judiciously, this Court will not interfere.
In this case, the lower Court declared that the Appellant’s rights were violated by the Respondents and that he is entitled to be released on bail since “he has been detained in custody without trial for over 5 years”. He has argued that its Order to release him on bail is an exercise in futility since he was not in a position to fulfill the bail condition after more than 6 years out of circulation; but that is ample reason for the Court to refuse to release him unconditionally.
If he is not in a position to fulfill bail conditions, how will he turn up for trial?
Section 35(4) of the Constitution, which guarantees his right to liberty, allows him to be released “upon such condition as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears for trial at a later date”. The main function of bail is to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial – see Suleman V. COP (supra), and Onyebuchi V. FRN (2007) LPELR-4134 CA, wherein it was held that –
“The main function of bail is to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial. So if there is any reason to believe that the accused is likely to jump bail – – bail will properly be refused by the trial Court in exercise of its discretion in dealing with the application – – – This criteria has been described by the Supreme Court – – as the omnibus criteria and, therefore, the most important to be considered by the Court in exercise of its discretion, on bail application. It is based on the belief that the incentive to jump bail arises from the gravity and seriousness of the offence …
In this case, the lower Court’s decision to grant the Appellant bail rather than release him unconditionally cannot be faulted, and I will not interfere with it. However, there is an added dimension to this case that needs to be addressed.
The Respondent had averred in his Counter-Affidavit at the lower Court that the Appellant’s case file had not been forwarded to his office as at 2008, and in his brief filed in this Court in 2011, nothing was said about the case file, and whether or not the Respondents are prepared to prosecute the Appellant.
In other words, the Appellant has been in detention for almost 13 years, with no end in sight, which is appalling, and highly deplorable, to say the least. This is a Court of justice, and we cannot fold our hands and let injustice prevail. Fortunately, by Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, this Court can intervene.
Yes, the lower Court exercised its discretion properly but that is in 2008, and we are in 2014. More than 6 years has passed since he was granted bail, which he could not fulfill, and if we add that to years he had spent before then; he stayed more years in prison than he would have if he had been convicted.
The lower Court found in 2008 that his fundamental rights had been violated, what will we say today – over 6 years later? He prayed this Court to vary the decision of the lower Court and make an Order releasing him unconditionally; in the circumstances of this case, and pursuant to the powers vested in this Court by Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, his prayer is hereby granted.
Thus, the Appeal is allowed in part. The lower Court’s decision to grant bail is affirmed, however, the conditions attached thereto are hereby set aside, and in its place, I hereby order that the Appellant be released unconditionally.
CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA, J.C.A.: I read before now the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, A. A. AUGIE JCA. I agree with his Lordship’s reasoning and conclusions.
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria requires that a person who is arrested and detained on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence shall be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time and if he is not tried within a period of two months from the date of his arrest or detention, he shall without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought against him be released either unconditionally or upon such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears for trial at a later date. Section 35(4) of the 1999 Constitution; Olatunji & Anor v. F.R.N. (2003) 3 NWLR (pt. 807) 406. The appellant herein has been in custody since 2001 without trial. This is surely in breach of his fundamental rights to personal liberty as enshrined in the Constitution. The learned trial Judge no doubt exercised his discretion judiciously in granting him bail in 2008. He was unable to meet the conditions of bail and remained in custody up till now. My learned brother Augie JCA is right that this is a proper case where we can, under Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act 2004 exercise our discretion to grant the appellant bail unconditionally. I abide by the consequential orders of my learned brother.
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.: My Learned brother, Amina Adamu Augie JCA afforded me the opportunity of a preview of the lead judgment just delivered.
My Lord duly considered the issues raised, the salient facts and the relevant statutory and constitutional provisions applicable thereto leaving little or nothing for me to comment on without unnecessary repetition.
From the facts on record and the history of the appellant’s incarceration since 2001 the justice of the case demands the conclusions reached in the lead judgment.
Section 35(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) is very clear to the effect that any person arrested or detained in accordance with subsection (1) (c) shall be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time, and if not tried within a period of two months from the date of arrest or detention, in the case of a person who is in custody or is not entitled to bail, or three months in the case of a person who has been released on bail. Such a person shall be released either unconditionally or upon such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears for trial at later date.
Subsection (6) therein made provision for compensation and public apology from the appropriate authority or person for any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained.
The operative words in subsection (4) above is that the release shall be either conditionally or upon such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears for trial at later date should the prosecution chose to continue with further proceedings against him.
The Learned trial judge decided to choose the option of releasing the appellant upon conditions necessary to ensure that he appears for trial at a later date. In this regard, I agree with my Learned brother that the learned trial judge acted judicially and judiciously with the confines of Section 35 (4) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).
The Appellant’s counsel complaint that the release ought to be unconditional amounts to challenging the discretionary powers of the lower court to act one way or the other on the issue. This court can only interfere with such exercise of discretion where it is wrongly done without rational consideration. It is however not so in this case and is such that court is obliged to respect it.
However, the justice of the case demand that this court looks beyond the period of six years that the appellant had been in custody when the lower court gave it’s decision and note the fact that it is now about thirteen years of incarceration for an offence that is not capital in nature and for which, if convicted since 2001 would have served out his form.
To order that the appellant should be admitted to bail for the purpose of trial for an offence for which presently there is nothing to show that the case file has been received by the office of the D.P.P or that proof of evidence has been filed for the trial of the appellant will no doubt amount to standing justice on its revered head. This is indeed a case where this court will be justified by posterity if it invokes the provisions of Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act 2004 to make any order necessary for determining the real question in controversy in this appeal which is the unjustified detention of the appellant since 2001 till date. In this regard I also allow this appeal in part.
While affirming the decision of the Lower court in admitting the appellant to bail in 2007. It is ordered that, having regard to the continuous detention of the appellant till date without any trial, he shall forthwith be released unconditionally.
Appearances
Ikenna Okoli, Esq., with G. C. Obi, EsqFor Appellant
AND
Mrs. O. Ogungbesan with Mrs. Abiola AdeyinkaFor Respondent
