MR. ARCHIBONG TOM UDO v. MR. IBANGA UDO ROBSON & ORS
(2018)LCN/12002(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 20th day of July, 2018
CA/C/302/2013
RATIO
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT: ENFORCEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
“Fundamental right enforcement has a special procedure enthroned under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 to facilitate the exercise of one’s right as dispensed under Chapter IV of the Constitution. The rights themselves are the basic and fundamental human rights which inhere in every human being. These rights are in place because of the elevated nature of human beings above other creatures occupying the earth. Eso, JSC in RANSOME-KUTI VS. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FEDERATION (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 6) 211, said: ‘… It is a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land and which in fact is antecedent to the political society itself. It is a primary condition to a civilized existence’.” PER STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION: JURISDICTION TO HEAR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
“The original jurisdiction for the hearing of any fundamental rights causes is resided in a High Court in the State where it occurs. The Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of ADETONA VS. IGELE GENERAL ENTERPRISES LTD. (2011) 7 NWLR (PT. 1247) 535 has given an analysis of what the law is on this issue. I. T. Muhammed, JSC held: ‘Although, unlike the 1979 Constitution, Section 318(1) of the present Constitution does not define ‘High Court’, there is no doubt that the term carries the same meaning as given by Section 277(1) of the 1979 Constitution to mean Federal High Court or the High Court of a State. Therefore, it is my understanding that where a person’s fundamental right is breached, being breached or about to be breached, that person may apply under Section 46(1) to the Judicial Division of the Federal High Court in the State or the High Court of the State or that of the Federal Capital Territory in which the breach occurred or is occurring or about to occur. This is irrespective of whether the right involved comes within the legislative competence of the Federation or the State or the Federal Capital Territory. See the case of MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS VS. SHUGABA (1982) 3 NCLR 915. It has to however be noted that the exercise of this jurisdiction by the Federal High Court is where the Fundamental Right threatened or breached falls within the enumerated matters on which that Court has jurisdiction. Thus, Fundamental Rights arising from matters outside its jurisdiction cannot be enforced by the Federal High Court. See TUKUR VS. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 3 NSCC 225. Equally, a High Court of a State shall lack jurisdiction to entertain matters of Fundamental Rights, although brought pursuant to Section 46(2) of the Constitution where the alleged breach of such matters arose from a transaction or subject matter which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as provided by Section 251 of the Constitution’. (Underlining and highlight mine)” PER STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
STEPHEN JONAH ADAH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MR. ARCHIBONG TOM UDO – Appellant(s)
AND
1. MR. IBANGA UDO ROBSON
2. MR. JOHN UDO ROBSON
3. MRS. ELIZABETH UDO ROBSON
4. MR. ESEME (SARS) I. P. O.
5. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE – Respondent(s)
STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State sitting at Eket in Suit No. HEK/29/2011 delivered on 4th day of March, 2013 by Theresa I. Obot, J. The decision was sequel to an application filed at that Court by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents in this appeal against the Appellant and the 4th and 5th Respondents for the enforcement of their fundamental rights. The reliefs sought in the application are:(1) A DECLARATION that the arrest, detention, harassment and torture of the 1st and 2nd Applicants from the 3rd day of March, 2011 to the 30th day of March, 2011 at the behest and instigation of the 1st Respondent and at the 2nd and 3rd Respondents cell from 12:30am on the 3rd day of March, 2011 to 30th day of March, 2011 is illegal, unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void.
(2) A DECLARATION that seeking to arrest and the continuous invading of the compound of the Applicants at Ikot Obioro Okon, Eket in an attempt to arrest, detain and torture MRS. ELIZABETH UDO ROBSON the aged widow and mother of the 1st and 2nd Applicants at the behest and instigation of the 1st Respondent is unconstitutional and amount to infraction of or infringement of the Applicants human rights as provided for the guaranteed under Section 34(1), 35(1), 37 and 41(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and Articles 4, 5, 6 and Article 12 paragraph 1 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples, Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act and therefore illegal and or wrongful.
(3) AN ORDER for payment of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only, compensation or damages jointly and severally against the Respondents and in favour of the Applicants for the violation or infraction of or infringement on the Applicants fundamental and Human Rights as aforesaid is illegal and unconstitutional.
(4) AN ORDER directing the 2nd Respondent to refund the sum of N70,000.00 (Seventy Thousand Naira) only, collected from the 1st and 2nd Applicants and their surety as bail fee on the 30th day of March, 2011, 1st April, 2011, 8th April, 2011 and 18th April, 2011, respectively.
(5) AN ORDER FOR THE RESPONDENTS to tender public apology to the Applicants for the violation of their fundamental and or Human Right as aforesaid.
(6) AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Respondents by themselves and or their servants, agents or privies, their supervisor and successors in office however called from further infringement, violation or infraction on the Applicants fundamental and or Human Rights to movements and dignify of their persons as provided for under Section 34, 45 and 41 of 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and in particular from further intimidation, harassment, embarrassment and detention.
The Application was heard by the Court below and at the end judgment was entered in favour of the Applicants who are the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents in this appeal with most of the reliefs granted. Being dissatisfied with the decision, the Appellant filed this appeal on 23rd of May, 2013. This notice of appeal was amended with the leave of this Court and an amended notice of appeal was filed on 13th day of November, 2015. The record of appeal was transmitted on the 17th day of November, 2015 but deemed on 9th April, 2018 as properly transmitted and filed.
The Appellant filed his brief on 13th November, 2015 but deemed properly filed and served on 9th April, 2018. The 1st to 3rd Respondents filed their joint brief on 21st January, 2016 but deemed duly filed and served on 5th April, 2018. The Appellants filed a reply brief on 16th day of May, 2016. The 4th and 5th Respondents did not file any brief.
On the 7th day of May, 2018 when this appeal was argued in Court, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, Mr. R. A. Manga was in Court but the Counsel for the Respondents were not in Court in spite of the fact that they were duly put on notice for the hearing. The Court therefore heard the Appellants’ appeal and deemed the brief filed by the 1st to 3rd Respondents duly argued under Order 19 Rule 9(4) of the 2016 Rules of this Court.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant adopted his brief of argument and urged the Court to grant this appeal and set aside the decision of the Court below.
In this appeal, four (4) issues were submitted by the Appellant for determination while the 1st to 3rd Respondents in their brief distilled also four (4) issues which were differently worded but have the same content with the issues framed by the Appellants. The four (4) issues framed by the Appellant are worded as follows:
(1) Whether the High Court of Akwa Ibom State or the Federal High Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine 1st – 3rd Respondents application? (Ground 1).
(2) Whether it is proper to join several Applicants in one application for the purposes of securing the enforcement of their fundamental rights as the 1st – 3rd Respondents did at the trial Court if not whether the Respondents application was competent before the trial Court?
(3) Whether the Appellant’s liability can be premised on the liability of the 4th and 5th Respondents at the trial Court who were not properly sued? (Ground 3).
(4) Whether the trial Court was right to hold that the 1st – 3rd Respondents had proved their case and the Appellant properly said to be liable? (Grounds 4, 5 and 6).
The issues framed by the 1st to 3rd Respondents are worded as follows:
(1) Whether the High Court of Akwa Ibom State does not have original jurisdiction to hear, entertain and determine the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ application in respect of issues that happened in Eket, Akwa Ibom State and which does not fall within the competence/jurisdiction of the Federal High Court at all?
(2) Whether the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ (mother and her adult children) with the same complaints/cause of actions are not right to bring their application together, although with their names differently written on the processes filed?
(3) Whether the Appellant’s liability cannot be premised on the liability of the 4th and 5th Respondents who were properly sued and whom the Appellant instigated to deal brutally with the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ for 28 days in their cell at the State CID, Uyo, without any justifiable cause?
(4) Whether the trial Court was not right to hold that the 1st – 3rd Respondents’ indeed proved their case by awarding damages/compensation against the Appellant and the 4th and 5th Respondents jointly and severally.
Having carefully gone through the amended notice of appeal, any of the issues framed by the parties can fix the complaint in this appeal. I use the issues as framed by the Appellant as a flag for the consideration of this appeal. I start with the first issue.
ISSUE ONE
This issue is on whether it is the Akwa Ibom State, High Court or the Federal High Court that has jurisdiction over this matter?
The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that by Section 46 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, every victim of fundamental rights violations is empowered to seek redress in a High Court located in any state of the federation where the right has been contravened. That under Order 1 Rule 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, High Court means the Federal High Court, the High Court of a state or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
He canvassed that the 4th and 5th Respondents are agents and officials of the Federal Government. That only the Federal High Court has jurisdiction over this case. He relied on the cases of OMOSOMWAN VS. CHIDOZIE (1998) 9 NWLR (PT. 566) 477; ZAKARI VS. IGP (2000) 6 NWLR (PT. 607) 66 and GRACE JACK VS. UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, MAKURDI (2004) 14 WRN 91, 103.
The learned Counsel canvassed that the action brought by the Respondents before the Court below, fell squarely within the provision of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. That Section 251 of the said Constitution has completely taken away the jurisdiction of the State High Court in respect of action in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party. He cited the cases of NEPA VS. EDEGBERO & ORS. (2002) 18 NWLR (PT. 798) 79; NDIC VS. OKEM ENTERPRISES LTD. (2004) 10 NWLR (PT. 880) 107, 182.
For the 1st to 3rd Respondents, their Counsel in the Brief canvassed that the Fundamental Rights enforcement procedure is sui generis being specially and specifically designed with its own Rules by the 1999 Constitution. That challenging the jurisdiction of the State High Court is misconceived. That the infraction of right occurred in Eket. That the reliefs claimed does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. That the 4th and 5th Respondents are working within the State to maintain security and public order in the State. That the 4th and 5th Respondents are not agents of the Federal Government for this purpose. That the learned trial Judge was right to assume jurisdiction in this case. He urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondents.
It is of cognitive relevance to note in this case under hand that the cause before the Court below was that of infraction of the fundamental right of the 1st to 3rd Respondents. The jurisdiction for the hearing of the fundamental rights causes was prescribed by Section 46(1)-(3) of the 1999 Constitution as follows:
46. (1) Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress.
2. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of the provisions of this Section and may make such order, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement within that State of any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under this Chapter.
3. The Chief Justice of Nigeria may make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of a High Court for the purposes of this Section.
The original jurisdiction for the hearing of any fundamental rights causes is resided in a High Court in the State where it occurs. The Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of ADETONA VS. IGELE GENERAL ENTERPRISES LTD. (2011) 7 NWLR (PT. 1247) 535 has given an analysis of what the law is on this issue. I. T. Muhammed, JSC held:
‘Although, unlike the 1979 Constitution, Section 318(1) of the present Constitution does not define ‘High Court’, there is no doubt that the term carries the same meaning as given by Section 277(1) of the 1979 Constitution to mean Federal High Court or the High Court of a State. Therefore, it is my understanding that where a person’s fundamental right is breached, being breached or about to be breached, that person may apply under Section 46(1) to the Judicial Division of the Federal High Court in the State or the High Court of the State or that of the Federal Capital Territory in which the breach occurred or is occurring or about to occur. This is irrespective of whether the right involved comes within the legislative competence of the Federation or the State or the Federal Capital Territory. See the case of MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS VS. SHUGABA (1982) 3 NCLR 915. It has to however be noted that the exercise of this jurisdiction by the Federal High Court is where the Fundamental Right threatened or breached falls within the enumerated matters on which that Court has jurisdiction. Thus, Fundamental Rights arising from matters outside its jurisdiction cannot be enforced by the Federal High Court. See TUKUR VS. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 3 NSCC 225. Equally, a High Court of a State shall lack jurisdiction to entertain matters of Fundamental Rights, although brought pursuant to Section 46(2) of the Constitution where the alleged breach of such matters arose from a transaction or subject matter which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as provided by Section 251 of the Constitution’. (Underlining and highlight mine)
From this decision, the law as it is now is that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to hear any case where there is infraction of fundamental right but that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction only where the infractions are connected to the primary jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as listed in Section 251(1) of the Constitution.
In the instant case, the reliefs sought have to do with arrest, detention, harassment and torture. This is a personal claim; it has nothing to do with the primary jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. So, the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction.
I therefore agree fully with the learned Counsel for the Respondents that it is the State High Court that has jurisdiction in this case. Issue one therefore is resolved against the Appellant.
ISSUE TWO
This issue is whether it is proper to join several Applicants in one application for the purposes of securing the enforcement of their fundamental rights like the 1st to 3rd Respondent did at the trial Court.
The Appellant argued that 1st to 3rd Respondents failed to bring their application in a representative capacity or separately. That the right violated is personal to every individual. That this is fatal to the Respondents application at the Court below and further that it makes the application to be incompetent. He relied on the case of J.B.N. PLC VS. T.R.C. BANK LTD. (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 552) 17, 65. He urged the Court to strike out this case.
The 1st to 3rd Respondents in their Brief contended that the applications of the Applicants can be looked into together by the Court and that it will be cumbersome to expect each to file separate complaints. That the word ?person? in Section 46(1) (2) of the 1999 Constitution includes ‘persons’.
He relied on the case of UZOUKWU VS. EZEONU II (1991) 6 NWLR (PT. 200) 708. He urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the 1st to 3rd Respondents.
Fundamental right enforcement has a special procedure enthroned under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 to facilitate the exercise of one’s right as dispensed under Chapter IV of the Constitution. The rights themselves are the basic and fundamental human rights which inhere in every human being. These rights are in place because of the elevated nature of human beings above other creatures occupying the earth. Eso, JSC in RANSOME-KUTI VS. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FEDERATION (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 6) 211, said:
”… It is a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land and which in fact is antecedent to the political society itself. It is a primary condition to a civilized existence”.
The actions allowed to be enforced under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules are those in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution. An action under the Fundamental Enforcement Procedure Rules is a peculiar action. It is a kind of action which may be considered as ?sui generis? i.e. it is a claim in a class of its own though with a closer affinity to a civil action than a criminal action. The available remedy by this procedure is to enforce the Constitutional Rights available to citizens which had been contravened by another person or persons. Fundamental Rights are so basic and inalienable to every man that they have to be enshrined directly in the Constitution.
The advent of aggressive enforcement of fundamental rights in Nigeria under civilian administration has witnessed two Enforcement Procedure Rules. The first is that of 1979 under the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The second is that of 2009 which came under the regime of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The 2009 Rules liberalised in many ways the enforcement procedure of fundamental rights. The preamble to the 2009 Rules gave the overriding objective of the Rules in paragraph 3 as follows:
a. The Constitution, especially Chapter IV, as well as the African Charter, shall be expansively and purposely interpreted and applied, with a view to advancing and realising the rights and freedoms contained in them and affording the protections intended by them.
b. For the purpose of advancing but never for the purpose of restricting the Applicant?s rights and freedoms, the Court shall respect municipal, regional and international bills of rights cited to it or brought to its intention or of which the Court is aware, whether these bills constitute instruments in themselves or form parts of larger documents like constitutions. Such bills include:
i. The African Charter on Human and Peoples? Rights and other instruments (including protocols) in the African regional human right system.
ii. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments (including Protocols) in the United Nations Human Rights System.
c. For the purpose of advancing but never for the purpose of restricting the Applicant’s rights and freedoms, the Court may make consequential orders as may be just and expedient.
d. The Court shall proactively pursue enhanced access to justice for all classes of litigants, especially the poor, the illiterate, the uninformed, the vulnerable, the incarcerated, and the unrepresented.
e. The Court shall encourage and welcome public interest litigations in the human rights field and no human rights case may be dismissed or struck out for want of locus standi. In particular, human rights activists, advocates or groups as well as any non-governmental organisations, may institute human rights application on behalf of any potential Applicant. In human rights litigation, the Applicant may include any of the following:
i. Anyone acting in his own interest;
ii. Anyone acting on behalf of another person;
iii. Anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of a group or class of persons;
iv. Anyone acting in the public interest, and
v. Association acting in the interest of his members or other individuals or groups.
f. The Court shall in a manner calculated to advance Nigeria democracy, good governance, human rights and culture, pursue the speedy and efficient enforcement and realisation of human rights.
g. Human rights suits shall be given priority in deserving cases. Where there is any question as to the liberty of the Applicant or any person, the case shall be treated as an emergency.
The way the 2009 Enforcement Procedure Rules introduced liberality must be the focus of the Court to enable us adopt purposive interpretation of the Rules and advance the interest of justice to the victims of fundamental right violations in Nigeria. In the instant case, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondent were the Applicants at the Court below. The 1st Respondent deposed to a 26 paragraph affidavit in support of their application for the enforcement of their fundamental rights to liberty. The 1st Respondent deposed in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 materially as follows:
8. That in the night of 2nd March, 2011, we all slept in our compound, when it was around 12.30am of 3rd March, 2011 when we saw policemen from SARS Ikot Akpanabia who entered our house and quickly arrested myself and my brother the second Applicant on record, they were seriously looking for my mother as well who was fortunate not to be around on that fateful day.
9. That, that midnight myself and my junior brother were taken to Ikot Akpanabia in our night wears and that when we got to Ikot Akpanabia, we were told that the 1st Respondent wrote a petition against us that we set fire on his house and on his palm tree.
10. That I implored the Investigating Police Officer in the person of Mr. Eseme to please allow us to visit the scene and check my boundary and the 1st Respondent?s boundary and to see whether indeed I set fire to the house of the 1st Respondent and whether of a truth the palm tree that I set fire on the leaves is the property of the 1st Respondent.
11. That the 2nd Respondent told me not to teach him his work he quickly carried me and my brother and dumped us in the cell, that when we’ve spent 21 days in the cell he carried us to our village and he found out that the house of the 1st Respondent was not set on fire by me and my household and that the palm tree that was even set on fire is my late father’s property which is within our boundary.
12. That 1st and the 2nd Applicants were detained without any justifiable cause. That the 1st Respondent is a member of our Village Council who surreptitiously and without any justifiable cause invited the policemen from SARS to arrest and detain myself, the 2nd Applicant and seeking to arrest and detain my aged mother.
13. That police officers including the 2nd Respondent came from SARS with myself and the 1st Applicant to conduct search and for investigation but they could not see any burnt house but having collected huge sum of money from the 1st Respondent in order to mutilate, harass, detain, dehumanize and terminate our lives for the 1st Respondents to take over my late father?s properties and pieces of lands left for us as our inheritance.
14. That at the behest and instigation of the 1st Respondent I and the second Applicant were arrested and detained from 3rd March, 2011 till 30th March, 2011 that so many people from our village came for our bail application and the IPO refused bluntly to release us on bail.
The story of the 1st to 3rd Respondents here shows clearly that the violation of their right as alleged took place in one place at the same time and in the same circumstance. In all the civil procedure Rules of the High Courts in Nigeria, provision is made for persons in civil claim to claim jointly or severally. For example Order 13 Rule 1 of the Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009. The Rules therein provide:
All persons may be joined in one action as Claimants in whom any right to relief is alleged to exist whether jointly or severally and judgment may be given for such one or more of the Claimants as may be found to be entitled to relief and for such relief as her or they may be entitled to, without any amendment.
This type of provision helps to minimise pluralism of actions and save both the parties the cost and the Court to inconvenience of dealing with multiple suits in respect of one fault or line of claim. In the 2009, Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, there is no joinder provision. What we have is consolidation of separate suits filed. The focus may be that fundamental rights are personal rights and cannot be fought together as right varies from one person to the other. But in a situation such as in the instant case, the act complained of is the act of arrest and detention without bail and without an arraignment in Court for any known offence I still believe in the circumstance that the Court in the interest of justice and convenience can allow the parties to file their complaint together for the enforcement of their fundamental rights.
Since this provision is not in the rules the Courts are having it difficult to take it up. In the case of SOLOMON KPORHAROR & ANOR. VS. MR. MICHAEL YEDI & ORS. (2017) LPELR 42418 (CA), a decision of this Court, the facts are the 1st and 2nd Respondents who were Applicants at the trial Court sought against the Appellants and 3rd to 5th Respondents the enforcement of their fundamental right over the seizure and detention of their D7G bulldozer plant. The lower Court ordered among others the release of the said bulldozer. Application was brought for stay of the order alleging that the application filed in Court was incompetent due to the fact that the application was not filed properly before the Court. On appeal to this Court, the appeal was found meritorious. The Court struck out the application. Bada, JCA who read the lead judgment held inter alia as follows:
Under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) the rights are preserved in Chapter IV i.e. four. See RAYMOND S. DONGTOE VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PLATEAU STATE & ORS. (2001) 4 SCNJ page 131. The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 created a special procedure for proceedings under this peculiar category of action. It is only by these procedures that an action can be brought to enforce rights and it is the provisions of the 1979 Rules that guide the conduct of proceedings of all actions to enforce rights. The right to approach a Court to enforce a Fundamental Right is conferred by Section 46(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). Section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides thus:- ”Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court for redress”.
In this appeal under consideration, the application was brought by two separate Applicants (1) Mr. Michael Yedi and (2) Onodje Yedi Nig. Ltd. The words used under Section 46(1) of the Constitution set out above is very clear. The same provision is made in Order 1 Rule 2(1) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979. The adjective used in both provisions in qualifying who can apply to a Court to enforce a right is ?any? which denotes singular and does not admit pluralities in any form. It is individual rights and not collective rights that is being talked about. In my humble view, any application filed by more than one person to enforce a right under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules is incompetent and liable to be struck out. The above view is supported by the case of RTFTCIN VS. IKWECHEGH (2000) 13 NWLR PART 683 AT PAGE 1, where it was held among others that:- ”If an individual feels that his Fundamental Rights or Human Rights has been violated, he should take out action personally for the alleged infraction as rights of one differs in content and degree from the complaint of the other ……. is a wrong joinder of action and incompetent”.
Also in the case of OKECHUKWU VS. ETUKOKWU (1998) 8 NWLR PART 562 PAGE 511, it was held amongst others per Niki Tobi, JCA (as he then was) that:- ”As I indicated above, the Umunwanne family is the centre of the whole matter. A family as a unit cannot commence an action on infringement or contravention of Fundamental Rights. To be specific, no Nigeria family or any foreign family has the locus to commence action under Chapter IV of the Constitutionor by virtue of the 1979 Rules. The provisions of Chapter 4 cover individuals and not a group or collection of individuals. The expression ‘every individual’, ‘every person’, ‘any person’, ‘every citizen’ are so clear that a family unit is never anticipated or contemplated”.
The contention of learned Counsel for the Respondents that it is proper in law for two or more persons to apply jointly for the enforcement of their fundamental rights cannot be sustained.
The decision of this Court in KPORHAROR case (supra) is the current decision of this Court. By the doctrine of stare decisis I am bound by the earlier decision of this Court. I cannot in anyway deviate from it. I hold in the circumstance that it is not proper to join several Applicants in one application for the purpose of securing the enforcement of their fundamental rights. This issue is resolved in favour of the Appellant. With this major issue resolved in favour of the Appellant the remaining two issues, issues 3 and 4 have become academic and they are hereby discountenanced.
With this main issue resolved in favour of the Appellant, the appeal is already spent. The judgment of the lower Court which was based on an incompetent application cannot stand. The appeal is therefore allowed.
The judgment of the Court below delivered on 4th day of March, 2013 in Suit No. HEK/29/2011 is set aside. The suit before the trial Court is struck out. No costs awarded.
IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.C.A.: I concur with the view ably expressed in the judgment just delivered by Adah, JCA, to the effect that the decision of the Court below is predicated upon an incompetent application. Accordingly, the appeal being meritorious, is equally hereby allowed by me on the terms of the judgment herein.
JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE, J.C.A.: I had the privilege to read the draft of the lead judgment just delivered herein by my learned brother STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, JCA and I totally endorse the reasoning and conclusions therein.
The earlier position of this Court is that fundamental rights accrue to citizens individually and by lumping the applications together, the Respondents rendered their application incompetent.
?For the more detailed reasoning in the lead judgment, I equally find merit in this appeal and I accordingly allow it.
I adopt the consequential orders in the lead judgment.
Appearances:
R. A. Manga, Esq. with C. E. Asuquo-Tishion, Esq.and N. A. OsimFor Appellant(s)
For Respondent(s)
