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MR. ANIEKAN JACOB UDOFA VS AKWA IBOM STATE UNIVERSITY

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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE UYO JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT UYO

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE M. A. NAMTARI

 

DATE: 19TH MARCH, 2019     

                                   

SUIT NO: NICN/UY/10/2018

 

BETWEEN:

 

  1. ANIEKAN JACOB UDOFA

                       

 CLAIMANT

 

AND

 

AKWA IBOM STATE UNIVERSITY

                  DEFENDANT

 

 

REPRESENTATION:

 

UTIBEN NWOKO FOR THE CLAIMANT.

EKEMINI UDIM FOR THE DEFENDANT.

JUDGMENT

 

The Claimant who was a staff in the security unit of the Defendant had his employment terminated vide a letter dated 9th May, 2017. Not satisfied and believing that the termination was wrongful, the Claimant filed a complaint on 5th April, 2018 praying for the following reliefs against the Defendant:

  1. A Declaration that the claimant is still in the employ of the defendant and that his appointment as Patrolman Supervisor was wrongfully terminated by the defendant.
  2. An Order for reinstatement and payment of all outstanding salaries to date and continuing.

ALTERNATIVELY:

 

  1. A Declaration that the termination of appointment of the claimant by the defendant vide the letter dated May 9, 2017 is wrongful and unlawful whatsoever.

  1. N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) as general damages for unlawful termination of appointment of the claimant by the defendant.

 

  1. N500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) only covering filing fees, appearance fees and other incidental expenses as cost of action.

The Defendants entered Conditional Appearance on 11th July, 2018 and by leave of court filed Defendants’ Statement of Defence. On 10th August, 2018, the Defendant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection pursuant to Section 1 (1) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 104, Vol. 5, Laws of Akwa Ibom State, 2000.

The grounds for the objection are:

  1. The cause of action in this suit arose on the 12th day of May, 2017 when the Claimant was served with the letter of termination of his appointment dated the 9th day of May, 2017.
  2. Claimant filed this action against the Defendant (for the first time) on the 5th day of April, 2018, (a period of not less than 12 Calendar months).
  3. The Defendant, a public institution of higher learning, is a public officer and by Section 1 (1) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law, Cap. 104, Vol. 5, Laws of Akwa Ibom State, 2000, any action for any act, neglect or default complained against a public officer, ought to be commenced within 3 months next after the act complained of.
  4. The Claimant’s action was commenced more than 3 months after the cause of action arose.
  5. This honourable court has no jurisdiction to extend time for the Claimant, especially as the enabling Law does not make provision for extension of time.
  6. This honourable court therefore has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the Claimant.

The Notice of Preliminary Objection was supported by Affidavit of 10 paragraphs with 2 exhibits and a written address settled by Ekemini Udim. The Claimant in opposition filed a Counter-Affidavit of 14 paragraphs with a written address settled by Utibe Nwoko on 8th January, 2019. After series of adjournment to enable the Defendant file a rejoinder, on the 6th March, 2019 the court on the application of the Claimant deemed the written address of the Defendant as duly adopted. Thereafter, the Claimant also adopted his written address in reply.

 

SUBMISSION OF DEFENDANT

The Defendant submitted one issue for determination: Whether this suit commenced 12 months after the cause of action arose is still competent having regards to the provision of Section 1 (1) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law, Laws of Akwa Ibom State, 2000 which provides that all actions against public officers must be commenced not later than 3 months next after the act complained of?

The Defendant started by quoting Oyewole, JCA in the case of Akwa Ibom State University v. Mr. Thompson Ikpe (2016) 5 NWLR (1504) 146 at 162 para. A, thus:

“To determine whether a claim is caught by a statute of limitation, it is necessary to determine when the cause of action accrued.”

The Defendant also provided the definition of cause of action per Ejiwunmi, JSC in the case of Ikine v. Edjerode (2001) 18 NWLR (pt. 745) 446:

“Cause of action means, everything necessary to give a right of action.”

It was the contention of the Defendant that the cause of action in this suit arose on May, 2017 when the letter terminating the Claimant’s appointment was issued and served on him and therefore filing the suit 12 months after the cause of action has robbed the court of the jurisdiction to entertain the suit by virtue of section 1 (1) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 104, Vol. 5, Laws of Akwa Ibom State, 2000.

The Defendant thereafter reproduced the provisions of the said section 1 (1) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 104:

 

“Where any action, prosecution or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any law, duty or authority, the action or proceedings shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of …”

 

On the legal implication of non-compliance of the law on suits, the Defendant referred to the cases of Fred Egbe v. Justice Adefarasin (1985) 1 NWLR (pt) 549 at 568, Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Commission (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) and Akwa Ibom State University v. Thompson Ikpe (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1504) at 164 para. D-E, to the effect that where a statute provides for the institution of an action within a prescribed period, any action instituted after the period is totally barred as the right of the plaintiff to commence the action have been extinguished.

The Defendant went on to submit that having not brought this action within 3 months next after the act complained of, the Claimant is guilty of sleeping over whatever right he may have had and that the Public Officers’ Protection Law of Akwa Ibom State, which is a statute of limitation renders the Claimant’s action statute barred and robs the court of the jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

The Defendant further submitted that the Defendant in this case is a Public Officer in the eyes of the law and therefore covered by the protection given to Public Officers in Section 1 (1) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law of Akwa Ibom State. To justify this position, he cited the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Mallam Nasir Ahmed EI-Rufai v. Senate of the National Assembly (2016) 1 NWLR (pt. 1494) 504  where Adumien, JCA held that:

“The law is settled that the Public Officers Protection Act protects both artificial and natural persons who act in the public service of the Federation of Nigeria or of a State of the Federation of Nigeria.”

The Defendant also referred to Section 18 of the Interpretation Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 where the word “person” has been defined to include any body of persons, corporate or unincorporated.

On the same point the Defendant cited and quoted from Supreme Court cases of Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Commission (supra) and Attorney General of Rivers State v. Attorney General of Bayelsa State (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt.1340) 123. He also cited and quoted from Central Bank of Nigeria v. Shipping Company Sara B.V. (2015) 11 NWLR (pt. 1469) 131 at 154 paras 0-E and Bassey Essien & 6 Others v. College of Education, Afaha Nsit & 2 Others – Suit No: NICN/CA/51/2014, Court of Appeal and National Industrial Court of Nigeria respectively. It is therefore on the strength of the decisions of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, argued the Defendant that the Defendant is a public officer and therefore entitled to the protection of the Public Officers’ Protection Law, Cap. 104 VoI.5, Laws of Akwa Ibom State, 2000.

On the rationale of limitation law, the Defendant referred to what he called the locus classicus case of Sifax (Nig) Ltd v. Migfo (Nig) Ltd (supra), particularly the dictum of Joseph Ikyegh, JCA at page 61 paras. F – G where it was held thus:

“I think it is necessary to state from the onset that the purpose of any limitation enactment is to discourage and/or stamp out stale claims arising from the lethargy of the claimant whose inactivity would have caused evidence in the case to disappear or create lapse of memory of the witnesses in the case with the passage of time thus placing the opponent on disadvantage in meeting the case in court.”

The Defendant also submitted that equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent and that a Claimant who waited for 12 months before commencement of action against the Defendant is guilty of tardiness and cannot be said to have been vigilant or watchful over his rights especially when there is a law which limits the institution of legal actions within the first three months from the day the cause of action arose.

By way of conclusion, the Defendant argued that the Claimant having filed this suit 12 months after the act complained of, it is statute barred and urged the court to so hold and dismiss this suit in its entirety.

SUBMISSION OF CLAIMANT

In opposing this application, the Claimant raised a lone issue to wit: Whether on the Legal Personality of Akwa Ibom State University, the Public Officers Protection Law of Akwa Ibom State is applicable to it?

Claimant answered this in the negative and arguing that the reason being that the Akwa Ibom State University is not a public servant or public officer but an educational institution and a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal. The Claimant submitted that this position of the law has been reiterated and re-echoed in the recent case of Inuwa v. Bayero University, Kano  (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1637) 545 at 55 para D-F where Adefope Okojie, JCA, stated the current position of the law thus:

 

“In none of these statutes is it stated that educational institutions are included. While acknowledging that staff of “educational institutions established or financed principally by a Government of the State” come under this definition, it is not stated in any of these statutes that the educational institution itself comes under this definition. Section 1 (2) of the Bayero University Act, Cap B4, Laws of the Federation 2004 provides that the University may sue and be sued in its corporate name. It is also provided in section 8 (2) of the Act that “The powers conferred on the University of subsection (1) of this section shall be exercisable on behalf of the University by the council or by the Senate or in any other manner which may be authorized by statute. The parties sued in this case are the Bayero University, Kano and the Bayero University Governing Council. By the definitions above, the respondents are not public servants or public officers but are educational institution and a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal.”  

It is the submission of the Claimant that a public officer is a member of the public service of the Federation within the meaning of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or of the public service of State and that the Akwa Ibom State University is not public officer protected by the Public Officers Protection Law of Akwa Ibom State, 2000. The Claimant cited the definition of Public Service of a state by Adefope-Okojie, JCA in Inuwa v. Bayero University, Kano (supra) at page 555 thus:

 

“Public service of the state under section 318 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) is the service of the state in any capacity in respect of Government of the state and includes service as:

  1. Clerk of other staff of the House of Assembly;
  2. Member of staff of the High Court, the Sharia Court of Appeal, the Customary Court of Appeal or other courts established for the state by the Constitution or by a law of a House of Assembly;
  3. Member or staff of any commission or authority established for the State by the Constitution or by a law of the House of Assembly;
  4. Staff of any Local Government Council;
  5.  Staff of any statutory corporation established by a law of the House of Assembly;
  6. Staff of any educational institution established or financed principally by a Government of a State; and
  7. Staff of any company or enterprise in which the Government of a State or its agency holds controlling shares or interest;

In none of the above statutes is it stated that educational institution are included. Although the staff of educational institution established or financed principally by a Government of the State come under the definition, it is not stated in any of the statutes that the educational institution itself come within the definition.”

 

The Claimant conceded that the authorities cited by the Defendant on the Pubic Officers Protection Law represent good law but submitted they are completely inapplicable to the instant case. Citing the cases of Adegoke Motors Limited vs. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 250; Odua Investment Limited v. Talabi (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt. 523) 1, the Claimant submitted that judicial precedents do not apply mechanically but only when the facts of the previous case are the same or are similar to the case at hand. In addition, the Claimant referred to Akeju, JCA, in Ubeh v. Etuk (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1323) page 387 at 400 para C-H:

           

“It is good law that a case is decided on the facts before the court and they should also be cited in the light of the facts on which they are decided. Our principles of stare decisis will make no meaning if they are removed from their factual milieu. Such a situation will be like a fish not embedded, soaked or surrounded in or by water. Such fish will die. So too the priciples of stare decisis outside the facts of the case.”

 

On the same point, the Claimant cited the erudite Oputa, JSC in Fawehinmi v. NBA (No. 2) All FWLR (Pt. 448) 205; (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558 at 650 paras. G-H @ page 310:

 

“Our case law is the law of the practitioner rather than the law of the philosopher. Decisions have drawn their inspiration and their strength from the very facts which framed the issues for decision. Once made, these decisions control future judgments of the courts in like or similar case. The facts of two cases must be either the same or at least similar before the decision in one can be used and even there as a guide to the decision in another case. What the former decision establishes is only a principle and not a rule. Rules operate in an all or nothing dimension. Principles do not. They merely form a principium, a starting point. Where one ultimately lands will then depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in hand.”

According to the Claimant on the facts of this case, none of the cited cases have the University as the sole party as in the instant case and posited that in the case of Akwa Ibom State University v. Thompson Ikpe (supra) cited by the Defendant, one Prof. Sunday Peters, the Vice-Chancellor of the University was a party. He explained that in that case which was centred on the competency of appeal, the Court of Appeal, Calabar struck out the appeal on technical ground by a majority decision 0f 2-1 and submitted that it is inapplicable to the facts of the instant case.

The Claimant noted that all other authorities cited do not relate to Educational Institutions and so are not applicable and reiterated that the court have severally warned Legal Practitioners to cite cases only as authority when the facts are apposite. The Claimant further maintained that since a case can only be an authority for what it decides, and nothing more, it is extremely misleading for the defendant to refer to these authorities as applicable.

It is also the submission of the Claimant that it is settled law that where a lower court is faced with the conflicting decisions of a higher court on a particular issue as in this case, the rule is that the decision that is later in time operate as a bar and represents the correct position of the law citing the dictum of Omokri, JCA in the case of ANSA v. PTPCN (20080 All FWLR (Pt. 405) 1681 at 1701:

 

“It could be noted that the case of Olutol v. Unilorin (supra) came later in time of the case of O.H.N.B v. Garba & ors (supra), naturally it should be preferred and relied upon in this appeal. Althogh, O.H.M.B. V. Garba & ors (supra) was not considered or overruled in Olatutola v. Union Bank (supra) where there are conflicting judgment of court of equal jurisdiction over the subject matter in dispute, the rule is that the decision that is later in time operates as a bar and its represent the correct position of the law. See Mkpedem v. Udo (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 673) 631 at 644-645, (2001) FWLR (Pt. 66) 827 and Nwangwu v. Ukachukwu (2000) FWLR (Pt. 2) 273, (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 662) 674 at 695.”

The Claimant also supplied a firm and uncompromising position of the Supreme Court on the subject when Ogbuagu, JSC held in the case of Osakwe v. F.C.E. (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 1 at 29 paras G-H:

 

“I wish to stress that in the hierarchy of the courts, where there are two conflicting judgments, the Court of Appeal is bound by the latter or last decision of this court. It has no choice however brilliant and knowledgeable the justices of that court may think or hold that they are more than this court.”

In the light of the foregoing, the Claimant urged the court to follow the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Inuwa v. Bayero University, Kano decided in 2018 and strike out the objection with substantial cost.

 

DECISION OF THE COURT:

I have carefully gone through the processes, the arguments of the parties and most of the authorities thereof and the issue for determination in my candid view is: Whether this suit as presently constituted is statute-barred.

This case is predicated on Section 1 (1) of the Public Officers Protection Law of Akwa Ibom State, a statute of limitation, a point of law touching on the jurisdiction or competence of a court to adjudicate upon a matter before it. It is a fundamental and a threshold issue that needs to be dealt with at the earliest opportunity. The general principle of law is that where a statute provides for the institution of an action within a prescribed period, the action shall not be brought after the time prescribed by such statute. Any action that is instituted after the period stipulated by the statute is totally–barred and the right of action would have been completely extinguished.

Before going in the issue proper, two general principles of law on this area of the law and which are pertinent to a just determination of the matter should be noted. The first is for the Public Officers Protection Law to avail any Applicant, two conditions must cumulatively be satisfied:

(i)        It must be established that the person against whom the action is commenced is a public officer or a person acting in the execution of public duties within the meaning of that law.

(ii)      That act done by the person in respect of which the action is commenced must be an act done in pursuance or execution of any law, public duty or authority or in respect of an alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority.

See the Supreme Court cases of A.G, Rivers v. A.G, Bayelsa (2012) 7 S.C.N.J. 84, Bala Hassan v. Babangida Aliyu (2010) 43 N.S.C.Q.R.  217 and Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Commission, Kaduna State (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 584).

 

The Second is the yardsticks to determine whether an action is statute-barred, which are:

  1. a)The date when the cause of action accrued.
  2. b)The date of commencement of the suit as indicated in the writ of summons.
  3. c)Period of time prescribed to bringing an action to be ascertained from the statute in question.

See also the Supreme Court case of Ajayi v. Adebiyi (2012) 5 S.C.N.J. 480-481, per O. O. Adekeye, J.S.C.

 

I will therefore attempt to apply the facts of this case and the arguments of parties thereof to the foregoing principles in the determination of this application. So the starting point is the Defendant in this case a Public Officer to benefit from the protection of the law?  The parties’ answer to this are poles apart. While the Defendant submitted that it is a Public Officer therefore entitled to the protection of the law, the Claimant thinks otherwise. In support of its stance, the Defendant referred to the Court of Appeal cases of Mallam Nasir Ahmed EI-Rufai v. Senate of the National Assembly (2016) 1 NWLR (pt. 1494) 504 and Central Bank of Nigeria v. Shipping Company Sara B.V. (2015) 11 NWLR (pt. 1469) 131 at 154 paras 0-E. The Defendant also cited the Supreme Court cases of Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Commission, Kaduna State (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 584) and Attorney General of Rivers State v. Attorney General of Bayelsa State (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt.1340) 123 to buttress this point. The common denominator in these cases is the interpretation of various Public Officers Protection Laws, which are in pari materia with Section 1 (1) of Public Officers Protection Law of Akwa Ibom State. The underling decisions in all the above cases is that the words “any person” used in the various law is not limited to natural persons but includes artificial persons, public bodies, body corporate or incorporate as well as statutory bodies whether sued in official titles or not, so long as they are sued in respect of acts in pursuance or execution of any law or any public duty or authority.

The Claimant countered this and asserted that the Defendant is not Public Officer or Public Servant but an educational institution and a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal. On this, the Claimant cited the recent Court of Appeal case of Inuwa v. Bayero University, Kano (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1637) 545 at 555 paras D-F. Relying on the definition of Public Service of a State provided in the case, the Claimant argued that educational institutions are not included and therefore does not come within the definition of public service. While rejecting all the cases as inapplicable to the facts of this case, the Claimant/Respondent strongly contended that the position maintained in Inuwa v. Bayero University, Kano (supra) is the current position of the law on the subject.

Is that really so? I think not. While the decision in Inuwa v. Bayero University, Kano (supra) might well override the Court of Appeal decisions cited by the Defenant/Applicant (supra) for being later in time, the same cannot be said in relation to two cases emanating from the Supreme Court. On the issue of who is a Public Officer entitled to the protection of the Public Officers Protection Act, the case of Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Commission (supra) is undoubtedly the locus classicus. On a decision of four to one, the Supreme Court held that the words public officer or any person in public office as stipulated in section 2 of the Public Officers (Protection) Law, 1963 not only refer to natural persons or persons sued in their personal names but that they extend to artificial persons, institutions or persons sued by their official names or titles. In coming to this decision on a ratio of 4 to 1, my lord, I. A. Iguh, JSC, masterfully espoused all the issues raised in the case of Inuwa v. Bayero University, Kano (supra). He embarked on the interpretation of section 2 (a) of Public Officers (Protection) Law, 1963 which is on pari materia with sections 2 (a) of Public Officers Protection Act, cap P.41, Laws of the Federation, 2004 and Public Officers Protection Law, cap. 104, vol. 5, Laws of Akwa Ibom State. The learned jurist also utilized section 3 of the Interpretation Act, Cap 52, Laws of Northern Nigeria which is the same with section 18 of Interpretation Act, Cap. 123, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 used in Inuwa v. Bayero University, Kano (supra). Not only that, the issue of the Kaduna State Judicial Service Commission being a creation of statute/constitution was considered just like Bayero University, Kano in the case under review. The fact that educational institution was not specifically mentioned is of no moment given the broad definition of the Public Officer thereof.

In the light of the foregoing, it is my considered view that the Defendant is a public officer within the meaning of section 1 (1) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 104, Vol. 5, Laws of Akwa Ibom State. So any invitation to hold otherwise is tantamount to judicial impertinence which is not my portion.

Next, is the whether the act or default leading to the commencement of the case is in pursuant of the execution of any law or authority. Although this issue was overlooked by the parties, I think it suffices to say that when the Defendant terminated the appointment of the Claimant, it was essentially in the performance of a statutory duty. This without more has satisfied the condition placed before the Defendant in A.G, Rivers v. A.G, Bayelsa (2012) 7 S.C.N.J. 84 and Bala Hassan v. Babangida Aliyu (2010) 43 N.S.C.Q.R.  217. After all, all is required at this stage, is as long as the public officer acts in the usual function of his office, whether he does it correctly or wrongfully, he is protected by the section. It is not open to the court to pry into his conduct in carrying out his official assignment in order to determine whether the Act applies or not. See the case of Sulgrave Holdings v. FGN (2012) 7 S.C.N.J. 273-274.

Now to the crux of the matter. Is this suit statute-barred? The law has a simple formula for the determination of this, and that:

 

“Looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the plaintiff a cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed.”

These are the words of the famous wordsmith and jurist, Oputa, JSC, in Egbe v. Adefarasin (1987) 1 N.W.L.R. (pt.47) 1, which have been re-echoed in most cases on the subject.

In line with the above formula, I will reproduce verbatim paragraph 6 of the Statement of Material Facts dated and filed on 5th April, 2018:

Paragraph 6:

 

“The Claimant avers that he was shocked to receive a letter dated May 9, 2017 and served on him on or about 14th February, 2018, titled “LETTER OF TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENT DATED MAY 9, 2017.”

The date of filing the Complaint in this court is 5th April, 2018.

The question now is given the above scenario, when does time start to run for the application of the 3 months imposed by Section 1 (1) of the Public Officers Protection Law of Akwa Ibom State? To the Defendant, the effective date of the accrual of the cause of action was 12th May, 2017, the date of the receipt by the Claimant of the termination letter as acknowledged by the Claimant on the copy of the said letter annexed to the affidavit in support. A simple calculation from 12th May, 2017 to 5th of April, 2018, when the case was filed is about 12 months thereby exceeding three (3) months allowed by the Limitation Law of Akwa Ibom State. But in his counter affidavit, in paragraph 5, the Claimant averred that he was served the said letter on or about 14th February, 2018. And in paragraph 6, he further averred that he never signed nor acknowledged the said letter but did not tell us he received the said letter. I find and hold that the Claimant’s response to the receipt of the said letter is lacking in specifics, positivity and unequivocal and therefore unbelievable. In circumstance of like this, is the court helpless? In the words, given the fact that this a case fought on affidavit evidence, can the court evaluate such evidence? My simple answer is, the court is bound to evaluate the affidavit and come to the conclusion one way or the other. My authority for this is the case of Okoye v. Merchant Bank (2008) 7 S.C.N.J. 171, where Niki Tobi, J.S.C. of blessed memory held:

 

“I should also say that affidavit evidence is not sacrosanct. It is not above the evaluation of the courts. Like oral evidence, a court of law is entitled to evaluate affidavit evidence in order to ensure its veracity and or authenticity. While un-contradicted affidavit evidence should be used by the court, there are instances when such affidavit evidence clearly tell a lie and the courts cannot be blind to such a lie.”

 

It is also to be noted that the Claimant did not proffer any argument in respect of this important issue in his written address and the issue is hereby deemed abandoned. From all I am saying, the date of accrual of this cause of action is 12th May, 2017 and I so hold.  And since for the purpose of limitation law, time begins to run from the moment the cause of action arose or accrued, the period is about 12 months and therefore caught by the limitation law of Akwa Ibom State.

On the whole, I find and hold that this suit is statute-barred and hereby dismissed. I am fortified in this regard by the dictum of Mahmud Mohammed, J.S.C. in N.P.A. v. Lotus (2005) 12 S.C.N.J. 183:

 

“Where a defendant raises a defence that the plaintiff’s action is statute barred and the defence is sustained by the trail court, the proper order for the trial court to make is an order of dismissal of the plaintiff’s action and not to merely strike it out.”

 

I make no order as to cost.

Judgment entered accordingly.     

………………………………………

HON. JUSTICE M. A. NAMTARI

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