MR. ADEWUNMI ADEVIYINKA & ORS v. PASTOR KELN AGBAKWURU & ORS
(2019)LCN/12752(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 27th day of February, 2019
CA/L/940/2015
RATIO
APPEAL: REASON TO APPEAL
Thus, upon judgment given in a matter, the usual course of action for a party who is dissatisfied with the decision is to appeal to a higher Court for redress.
See:Nigerian Army V Iyela 2008 LPELR 2014 SC; Abba V Adikpe & Ors (2010) LPELR 3551 (CA); Nwude V FRN & Ors 2015 LPELR 24647 (C.A). Notwithstanding the above, the law allows for certain circumstances where even a judgment on the merits may be set aside by the same Court who made the decision. These situations are:
1. When the judgment was obtained by fraud; or
2. When the judgment is a nullity such as when the Court itself was not competent; or
3. When the Court was misled into giving judgment under a mistaken belief that the parties had consented to it; or
4. Where the judgment was given in the absence of jurisdiction; or
5. Where the procedure adopted was such as to deprive the decision or judgment of the character of legitimate adjudication. See: APC v. NDUUL & ORS (2017) LPELR-42415(SC); ABUBAKAR & ORS v. CEMENT COMPANY OF NORTHERN NIGERIA (2018) LPELR-44061(CA); and NPC v. ROPER & ORS(2018) LPELR-44920(CA).” PER JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT: RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING
“The right to fair hearing is a sacred, sacrosanct and fundamental, as it is entrenched in the grundnorm, that is in Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). At its core, the principle of fair hearing entails giving both sides to a dispute or matter before a Court of law the opportunity to be heard before a decision that would bind them is reached.” PER JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.
JUDGEMENT: WHEN A JUDGMENT IS GIVEN IN DEFAULT
“When it comes to Default Judgment, that is judgment entered on account of a partys failure to comply with a procedural step or his failure to show up for trial, the rule as to when a Court may set aside its own decision is not as stringent as stated above. In matters that are based on default judgment, the Court has the discretion to set aside its decision and reopen the case for full trial. In BELLO v. INEC & ANOR. (2010) LPELR-767(SC), the Supreme Court stated the position of the law thus:
“Any judgment in default of pleadings or appearance is not a final judgment since both parties were not heard on the merit of the case. The judgment was obtained by failure of the defendant to follow certain rules of procedure. Where the Court has not pronounced a judgment on merits or by consent, such a judgment may be set aside by any trial Court in the judicial division where the judgment was obtained.” See: TENO ENGINEERING LTD. V. ADISA (2005) LPELR-3142(SC); SKYE BANK v. UWALEKE (2018) LPELR-45016(CA); and STEMCO LTD v. INYANG(2018) LPELR-44303(CA).” PER JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.
JUSTICES:
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. MR. ADEWUNMI ADEYINKA
2. MISS ADEWUNMI ADEJOKE
3. MRS OYEBODE ADEPONLE
4. MRS. ADEWUNMI ADERONKE Appellant(s)
AND
1. PASTOR KELVIN AGBAKWURU
2. DIVINE MISSION ASSEMBLY
3. WEMA BANK PLC Respondent(s)
JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This is an Appeal against the ruling of the High Court of Lagos State in SUIT NO: ID/1225/2008 delivered by Honourable Justice O.A Williams on 30th January, 2014, wherein the Court ruled against the Appellants.
The material facts leading to this appeal are that the Appellants as Defendants to Counter Claim had by a Motion on Notice dated 3rd July, 2013, sought an order of the lower Court setting aside its judgment dated 19th April, 2013, via which the Court granted the claims of the 1st and 2nd Respondents as counter-claimant.
In a ruling dated 30th January, 2014, the learned trial Judge found that there was no basis upon which it could exercise its discretion to review its decision and dismissed the Appellants motion.
Dissatisfied with the above, the Appellants appealed to this Court vide a Notice of Appeal dated 10th February, 2014, with four grounds of appeal.
The Appellants Brief of Argument settled by Olawale Balogun Esq., of Olawale Balogun & Co., is dated and filed on 30th November, 2016, but deemed as properly filed on 9th February, 2017.
Appellants counsel formulated four issues for determination to wit:
1. Whether the Court was right in disregarding the substantial evidence before and thereby visiting the mistake/negligence of appellants counsel on the appellant.
2. Whether the trial Court was right in not calling oral evidence to resolve conflicts in the affidavits before the trial Court?
3. Whether the learned trial Court was right in not addressing the issue of fair hearing raised by the Claimant at the lower Court?
4. Whether the Court was right in not addressing the issue of non-service raised by the Claimant on record at the lower Court?
On the other hand, the 1st and 2nd Respondents Brief settled by Ambrose Obi Esq., of Ferris Wheel Chambers, is dated 8th February, 2017, and filed on 7th March, 2017.
1st and 2nd Respondents counsel distilled four issues for determination to wit:
1. Whether the learned trial judge did not properly reject the motion on notice to set aside the judgment in the absence of any reason to do otherwise. (Ground 1)
2. Whether there was any conflict in the facts led before the Court to warrant calling of oral evidence (Ground 2)
3. Whether the learned trial judge had breached the right to fair hearing of the appellant when it refused to set aside its judgment in the matter. (Ground 3)
4. Whether the learned trial judge denied the appellant his right to fair hearing when the Court below refused the application to set aside its judgment (Ground 4)
A calm look at the issues raised by counsel on both sides reveal that two issues call for determination to wit:
1. Whether the learned trial Judge rightly dismissed Appellants application to set aside its judgment.
2. Whether the trial Court breached the Appellants right to fair hearing.
ISSUE ONE:
WHETHER THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE RIGHTLY DISMISSED APPELLANTS APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE ITS JUDGMENT.
Learned counsel for the Appellants argued that the decision of the trial Court in its ruling of 30th January, 2014, was wrong, as it amounted to visiting of Counsels sin upon a litigant, which the law frowns at.
He relied on the case of Emmanuel v. Gomez (2009) 7 NWLR PT 1139, pg 1 at pg 13, paas A-B, 16, paras E-F.
Counsel predicated the above on the premise that there was ample evidence before the trial Court that the law Firm of Segun Lawrence and Co., who was being served with the Court processes had withdrawn its representation for the Appellants, a fact which the Respondents were well aware of.
Learned counsel also argued that the trial Court admitted in its ruling that there were conflicts in the affidavit but still went ahead to take a position on the affidavit without calling oral evidence to resolve said conflict.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents argued that there was no evidence before the lower Court to the effect that the counsel on record had ceased to represent the Appellants, as the counsel did not file any process to withdraw his representation, and all processes including hearing notice before the hearing of the Counter-Claim served on the Appellants through their counsel were duly received and acknowledged. He further argued that Appellants arguments that the Counsel had ceased representation was not raised before the Court below and should be discountenanced at this stage.
Learned counsel also argued that there are specific grounds upon which a judgment may be set aside by the same Court which gave the judgment, and that the Appellants failed to establish any of these grounds before the lower Court, hence the Courts rightful dismissal of Appellants application.
He relied on the case of TOMTEC Nig Ltd v. Federal Housing Authority (2009) 12 SC (PTIII) 162 at 190-191.
Counsel submitted that all relevant processes, including hearing notice were duly served on the Appellants through their counsel on record, while the Originating Processes were served on them personally, in line with the provisions of the law.
RESOLUTION
A Court of law when it has given judgment on a matter brought before it, after the parties have joined issues, aired their grievances and canvassed arguments in support of their respective positions, is generally precluded from re-opening it, as its duty as far as the law is concerned, is done. Thus, upon judgment given in a matter, the usual course of action for a party who is dissatisfied with the decision is to appeal to a higher Court for redress.
See:Nigerian Army V Iyela 2008 LPELR 2014 SC; Abba V Adikpe & Ors (2010) LPELR 3551 (CA); Nwude V FRN & Ors 2015 LPELR 24647 (C.A).
Notwithstanding the above, the law allows for certain circumstances where even a judgment on the merits may be set aside by the same Court who made the decision. These situations are:
1. When the judgment was obtained by fraud; or
2. When the judgment is a nullity such as when the Court itself was not competent; or
3. When the Court was misled into giving judgment under a mistaken belief that the parties had consented to it; or
4. Where the judgment was given in the absence of jurisdiction; or
5. Where the procedure adopted was such as to deprive the decision or judgment of the character of legitimate adjudication.
See: APC v. NDUUL & ORS (2017) LPELR-42415(SC); ABUBAKAR & ORS v. CEMENT COMPANY OF NORTHERN NIGERIA (2018) LPELR-44061(CA); and NPC v. ROPER & ORS(2018) LPELR-44920(CA).
When it comes to Default Judgment, that is judgment entered on account of a partys failure to comply with a procedural step or his failure to show up for trial, the rule as to when a Court may set aside its own decision is not as stringent as stated above. In matters that are based on default judgment, the Court has the discretion to set aside its decision and reopen the case for full trial.
In BELLO v. INEC & ANOR. (2010) LPELR-767(SC), the Supreme Court stated the position of the law thus:
“Any judgment in default of pleadings or appearance is not a final judgment since both parties were not heard on the merit of the case. The judgment was obtained by failure of the defendant to follow certain rules of procedure. Where the Court has not pronounced a judgment on merits or by consent, such a judgment may be set aside by any trial Court in the judicial division where the judgment was obtained.” See: TENO ENGINEERING LTD. V. ADISA (2005) LPELR-3142(SC); SKYE BANK v. UWALEKE (2018) LPELR-45016(CA); and STEMCO LTD v. INYANG(2018) LPELR-44303(CA).
The pertinent question begging for determination at this juncture, is whether the Appellants furnished the lower Court with cogent reasons to justify its review of the decision it made in favour of the 1st and 2nd Respondents as Counter-Claimants and the answer is in my view in the negative. The gravemen of the case of the Appellant in the lower Court is that he was not served the relevant processes, as the processes served on their counsel on record did not amount to proper service, as the counsel was no longer representing the Appellants.
The first problem with Appellants position is that service on a partys counsel is considered good service in our legal system. The Apex Court in SALEH v. ABAH & ORS(2017) LPELR-41914(SC) (Pp. 10-11, Paras. C-B) Per BAGE, J.S.C. stated thus on the point:-
“With regards to the first and main plank of the Respondents’ Preliminary Objection, we are of the emphatic opinion that since the Counsel to the respondents was served and he did not deny such service, there is effective and competent service. The contention that the Respondents should have been served personally is misplaced. Service on the Counsel, S.I. Ameh, SAN, being the legally and formally acknowledged representative of the Respondents, is good, competent and effective enough. Both Respondents were duly served via their counsel, who so hold. The real essence of the Supreme Court Rules on Notice (which is to prevent any part being taken by surprise which in a significant way amounts to denial of adequate opportunity to be heard) is achieved as both first and second Respondents were actually (and more then constructively) served via Counsel. And there is no dispute as to this state of affairs. Any assumed irregularity is only as to form, rather than substance. Any seeming irregularity does not bear on our jurisdiction and does not amount, by any definition, to denial of notice to the Respondents.”
See: ADEGBITE & ORS v. ADVANCED ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS & ANOR (2017) LPELR-41965 (CA); and Ezechukwu v. Onwuka (2005) LPELR-6115(CA).
Furthermore, the Appellants failed to follow the process set by law for the change of counsel, which is to approach another lawyer, who will in turn inform the Court via a Notice of Change of Counsel.
See: AGORO V. AROMOLARAN & ANOR.(2011) LPELR-8906 (CA); OJONYE v. ONU & ORS(2018) LPELR-44212(CA); and OKOH & ORS v. NWOBODO & ANOR (2017) LPELR-42726(CA).
Even if the lower Court was to bend over backwards in a bid to accommodate the Appellants presumably on the grounds that the Appellant is a layman, the affidavit filed in support was contradictory and therefore eminently unreliable. A fortiori, equity aids the diligent and a Party ought to follow up his matter with diligence, especially in a situation where the party’s counsel has supposedly abandoned the case as alleged in this appeal. A simple visit to the Courts registry would have availed the Appellants a great deal. A Defendant has the duty to defend his case. See: MAJEKODUNMI & ORS v. OGUNSEYE (2017) LPELR-42547(CA).
It should also be pointed out that the circumstances of this appeal does not fall within the parameters of what constitutes visiting the sin of counsel on the Client. This is an instance of an indolent party reaping the fruits of his indolence. Assuming it was the sin of the counsel, this would constitute a mistake so grievous as to make it of a nature as can be visited upon the Appellants. See: NYAKO v. ADAMAWA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY & ORS (2016) LPELR-41822(SC); MOBIL PRODUCING (NIG) UNLTD v. HOPE (2016) LPELR-41191(CA) and PRUDENT BANK PLC & ORS. v. OBADAKI (2010) LPELR-9200(CA).
I will not endeavour to delve into the position of the law with regards to material conflict in affidavit evidence of parties, as same is not applicable to this appeal. This is so because contrary to the submission of Appellants counsel, the lower Court did not find that there was conflict in the affidavit evidence, rather he found that the affidavit of the Appellants was riddled with material contradiction that made his case untenable, that is asserting on the one hand that the Appellants did not have the contact of their counsel, were not aware of the state of proceedings, yet asserting on the other hand that the Appellants pleaded with same Counsel to continue with the case to no avail.
The sum of my findings on this issue is that the issue is resolved against the Appellants.
ISSUE TWO:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT BREACHED THE APPELLANTS RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING.
Learned counsel for the Appellants argued that the decision of the trial Court granting the claims of the Respondent in their Counter-Claim, was invalid for breach of Appellants right to fair hearing, because the Court failed to acknowledge the Appellants Statement of Defence to the 1st Respondents Counter-Claim, but only acknowledged the Amended Statement of Defence and Amended Counter-Claim of the 1st Respondent, before reaching its decision. Counsel further argued that the Courts failure to afford the Appellants the opportunity to cross-examine the 1st Respondent before reaching a decision in his favour is a beach of fair hearing, which renders the proceedings a nullity.
He relied on:
Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999; Okogi v. Okoh (2010) 9 NWLR pt 1999, pg.311 at 325-326, paras F-B; Daniel v. FRN (2014) 8 NWLR pt 1410, pgs 615-616, paras H-D; Adigun v. AG Oyo State (1987) 1 NWLR (pt.53) 678; and Obodo v. Olomu (1987) 3 NWLR (pt59) 111, pg 139 paras D-F.
Learned counsel also argued that the failure of the trial Court to issue and serve Hearing Notice on the Appellants upon their failure to appear in Court, meant that the trial Court lacked the requisite jurisdiction to make a decision against the Appellants.
He cited the cases of Pam v. ANPP (2008) 4 NWLR pt1077, 219 at 245, paras D; and Ene v. Asikpo (2010) 10 NWLR pt.1203, pg 471 at 515-526 paras D-D.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents argued that the trial Court issued a Hearing Notice in respect of the opening of Respondents case as Counter Claimants slated for the 18th day of October, 2012, but the Appellants and their counsel were absent from the proceedings.
Counsel also argued that what transpired at the lower Court was that the Appellants were given opportunity to contest the case of the Respondents and cross-examine them, but failed to make use of same, as is their right, and as such cannot be heard to complain of breach of fair hearing.
He cited the cases of Hon. Muyiwa Inakoju & Ors v. Hon. Abraham Adeolu Adeleke & Ors (2007) 2 MJSC P1 at P.95 paras B-C; Daniel v. FRN (Supra); and Adigun v. AG Oyo State (Supra).
RESOLUTION
The right to fair hearing is a sacred, sacrosanct and fundamental, as it is entrenched in the grundnorm, that is in Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). At its core, the principle of fair hearing entails giving both sides to a dispute or matter before a Court of law the opportunity to be heard before a decision that would bind them is reached.
The Supreme Court in the case of ZENITH PLASTICS INDUSTRIES LTD v. SAMOTECH LTD(2018) LPELR-44056(SC) (Pp. 11-12, Paras. C-D), Per KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C., gave a wholesome exposition of the principle of fair hearing thus:
What is fair hearing? In Duke Vs Govt. of Cross River State & Ors (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt.1356) 347 @ 366 C it was held by this Court as follows: ‘The term ‘fair hearing’ within the context of Section 36 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, is that a trial ought to be conducted in accordance with all the legal norms designed to ensure that justice is done at all cost to all parties. The principle of fair hearing is that both sides must be given an opportunity to present their respective cases. It implies that each side has the right to know what case is being made against it and given ample opportunity to react or respond thereto.”
In Mohammed Vs Olawunmi & Ors (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.133) 458 @ 485 B-C it was held per Nnaemaka-Agu, JSC, “The right to fair hearing entrenched in Section 33 (1) of the 1979 Constitution entails not only hearing a party on any issue which could be resolved to his prejudice, but also ensuring that the hearing is fair and in accordance with the twin pillars of justice, namely audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua.” Further, in Pam & Anor. Vs Mohammed (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt.1112) 1 @ 48 E-F His Lordship, Oguntade, JSC stated thus: “The question of fair hearing is not just an issue of dogma. Whether or not a party has been denied of his right to fair hearing is to be judged by the nature and circumstances surrounding a particular case; the crucial determinant is the necessity to afford the parties equal opportunity to put their case before the Court before the Court gives its judgment.” See also: Denloye Vs Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (1968) LPELR- 25526 (SC); (1968) 5 NSCC 260.
See: HASSAN v. UNITY BANK(2018) LPELR-45261(CA); and EZEOFOR v. HONEY KING MEDIA LTD (2018) LPELR-44558(CA).
The crucial nature of this principle is seen in the consequence for its breach, which is that the proceedings, no matter how otherwise well conducted would amount to an exercise in futility. The reason for this is not farfetched, as justice cannot be said to have been done where a party is judged without the opportunity of stating his own side of the story.
See: OJO v. NIGERIA CUSTOMS SERVICE BOARD(2018) LPELR-44104(CA).
It must however be stated for the umpteenth time, that an opportunity to be heard is eminently distinct from being heard at all costs. While it is true that justice rushed is most times justice crushed, justice delayed is justice denied. Justice is indeed a three way traffic and a party will not be allowed to hold the Court of law and indeed the public at large to ransom in the guise of adherence to fair hearing. The implication of the foregoing is that where a party is given a reasonable amount of time as prescribed by the law to conduct its case and he fails to so do, the consequence of his omission cannot be said to constitute breach of the right to fair hearing.
See: TODAY’S CARS LTD v. LASACO ASSURANCE PLC & ANOR(2016) LPELR-41260(CA); and AHMAD v. SAHAB ENTERPRISES (NIG) LTD & ORS (2016) LPELR-41313(CA).
There is no gainsaying that a Hearing Notice is a crucial aspect of our proceedings and must be issued and duly served on party who has been absent from the proceedings when his matter has been fixed for hearing. The Supreme Court in ACHUZIA v. OGBOMAH (2016) LPELR-40050(SC)(P. 29, Paras. B-D) Per SANUSI, J.S.C, held thus:
“Failure to serve a hearing notice of date for hearing of a case on a party runs riot and violent to the principle of fair hearing as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution and any proceedings held or taken in the absence of a party who was not put on notice of the date of such proceedings is a nullity and therefore must be annulled. See Mobil Nigeria Plc vs Ezekiel Shut Pam (2000) 5 NWLR(pt 657) 506 at 529; Wema Bank Nigeria Limited & 2 Ors vs S.O. Odulaja & 4 Ors (2001) FWLR (pt 17) 138 at 142/143”.
See: NUT TARABA STATE & ORS v. HABU & ORS(2018) LPELR-44057(SC); OLORUNTOGBE v. SKYE BANK (2017) LPELR-42717(CA); and ABDULHAMID v. BABAGANA (2017) LPELR-43393(CA).
A look at the facts of the case at trial as contained in the records of proceedings reveal that hearing notice was duly served on the Appellants. There is therefore no basis for the assertion that the Appellants right to fair hearing was breached at the lower Court.
This issue is also resolved against the Appellants.
The implication of my findings in this appeal is that the appeal is bereft of merit and same is hereby dismissed. The Ruling of the lower Court delivered on 30th January 2014 is affirmed.
Parties to bear their costs.
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.: I have read a draft of the lead judgement delivered by my learned brother JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A., in this appeal and agree that the appeal is wanting in merit.
It is dismissed by me too for the reasons and in the terms set out in the lead judgement.
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU J.C.A.: I had a preview of the leading judgment rendered by my learned brother, JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A. I am in agreement with the reasons proffered by his Lordship, which culminated in the dismissal of the appeal.
Let me chip in a word in support of the leading judgment. The vexed issue of change of counsel in this matter at the trial Court, would have been unnecessary if the legal practitioners to the appellant, in this matter had done what was expected of them. It behoves Legal Practitioners involved in Litigation to be conversant with the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners, 2007. For the purposes of this matter, with respect to the alleged change of counsel of the appellant, Rule 29 (2) of the aforesaid Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners, 2007; is apposite. It provides inter alia:
“29(2) Where in litigation a client changes his lawyer, both the old lawyer and new lawyer shall give notice of the change to the Court.”
And for the avoidance of doubt, “Lawyer” means legal practitioner as defined by the Legal Practitioners Act, as interpreted by Rule 56 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners, 2007.
Therefore, it is expected of legal practitioners, who have been engaged by litigants, not to abandon their clients mid-stream, for whatever reason, without the Court being notified of their recuse from any matter that they were engaged to handle. It is equally incumbent on the new counsel taking over any matter, to also notify the Court of the change of counsel, in respect of the matter. Hence, it is appropriate for one to admonish Legal practitioners to obey their own Rules of Professional Conduct, 2007!
With respect to the appellants’ contention that he was denied of his right to fair hearing, the facts of the case as highlighted in the leading judgment, clearly indicate that, their complaint of a denial of fair hearing, has no merits.
Let me draw the curtain on this appeal, by recounting the judicial words on marble, of his Lordship, Niki Tobi, JSC., God bless his soul, when in circumstances not too dissimilar to the instant case, where parties just latch unto the principle of fair hearing, willy-nilly, as a talisman, a cure – for- all deficiencies in an action in trial Courts. In Orugbo & Anor. v. Una & Ors (2002) 9-10 S.C.61; (2002) LPELR – 2778 (SC) @ 36-37, the learned Law Lord, stated that:
“It has become a fashion for litigants to resort to their right to fair hearing on appeal as if it is a magic wand to cure all their inadequacies at the trial Court. The fair hearing Constitutional provision is designed for both parties in litigation, in the interest of fair play and justice. The Courts must not be given a burden to the provision which it will not carry or shoulder. I see that in this appeal. Fair hearing is not a cut – and – dry principle which the parties can, in abstract, always apply to their comfort and convenience. It is a principle which is based and must be based on the facts of the case before the Court. Only the facts of the case can influence and determine the application or applicability of the principle. The principle of fair hearing is helpless or completely dead outside the facts of the case.”
Further see: Magaji v. Nigerian Army (2008) 8 NWLR (pt.1089) 338; (2008) 34 NSCQR (pt.1) 108; (2008) LPELR -1814 (SC) @ 40. I have no doubt in my mind that the allegation of denial of fundamental right to fair hearing by the appellants in this matter is not available to them. They only succeeded in flogging and forcing the principle of fair hearing, which is dead, on the facts and circumstances of the instant matter. And it is a truism that he who flogs a dead horse, embarks on a fruitless exercise of dissipating his energy needlessly. With that, I am done.
I, too dismiss the appeal for being grossly lacking in merits. Each side shall bear their costs of the appeal.
Appearances:
Oluwatoyin Olalade, H.P. with him, Olawale Balogun For Appellant(s)
Ambrose Obi for 1st and 2nd Respondent For Respondent(s)
