MR. A. N. EDJEME V. NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATTON
(2010)LCN/4210(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Monday, the 5th day of July, 2010
CA/B/144/2006
RATIO
JURISDICTION OF THE STATE HIGH COURT: WHETHER THE STATE HIGH COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE A MATTER COMMENCED BY A FORMER EMPLOYEE OF AN AGENCY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WHOSE APPOINTMENT WAS TERMINATED IN VIEW OF THE PROVISIONS OF DECREE 107 OF 1993 AND THE 1999 CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
It does not admit of any argument that this matter was filed after the commencement of Decree 107 of 1993. In the case of NEPA V. EDEGBERO (supra) the facts are quite similar to facts here. In that case the Plaintiffs were former employees of NEPA whose appointments were terminated. They approached the Niger State High Court for a number of reliefs. When the jurisdiction of the High Court was challenged in view of the provisions Decree 107 of 1993, Section 230 (1) (9) (r) and (5) thereof, the Court decided in favour of its jurisdiction. On an appeal to the Court of Appeal, the decision was still in favour of the jurisdiction of the State High Court. On a further appeal to the Supreme Court, allowed the appeal and decided against the jurisdiction of the State High Court in favour of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. It must therefore now be understood and appreciated that a State High Court may have the jurisdiction to entertain a suit at the time the cause of action founded on that suit arose but at the time of the actual trial, it is divested of that jurisdiction. If at the date of the termination of the employment of the Appellant on 4th November, 1993, the State High Court would seemingly, though not in reality in view of the provisions of Decree 61 of 1991, appear to have jurisdiction over the claim of the appellant against the respondent, at the date of filing the action on 18/10/94, the State High Court had absolutely been divested of jurisdiction over the said claim by virtue of the provisions of S. 230(1) (q) (r) and (s). The Respondent is an agency of the Federal Government and operates under the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act CAP 320 LFN 1990. PER ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL, J.C.A
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT: WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE DETERMINATION OF A CAUSE ACTION AND WHETHER IT IS THE EXISTING SUBSTANTIVE LAW AT THE TIME A CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE THAT DETERMINES THE COURT THAT IS VESTED WITH THE JURISDICTION TO TRY A CASE
The decisions of the Supreme Court in OLUTOLA V. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (2005) ALL FWLR (PT.245) 1151 at 1189 and ISIAH V. SHELL PET. DEV. CO. LTD FWLR (PT.56) 608 have clearly defined and settled the law that while the existing substantive law at the time a cause of action arose governs the determination of the action, it is the law in force at the time of the trial of the action based on the cause of action that determines the Court that is vested with the jurisdiction to try the case. PER ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL, J.C.A
JURISDICTION OF A COURT: ESSENCE OF THE JURISDICTION OF A COURT; WHAT WILL BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE JURISDICTION OF A COURT
Jurisdiction of a court is the lifeline of an action, and if a court lacks jurisdiction, it automatically racks the necessary competence to try the case – see Achebe V. Nwosu (2003) 7 NWLR (pt.818) 103; university of Ilorin (2003) 17 NWLR (pt. 849) 214; Akeem V. Unibadan (2003) 10 NWLR (pt.829) 584; and Trade Bank Plc. V. Benilux (Nig.) Ltd. (2003) 9 NWLR (pt. 825) 416where the Supreme court held that in determining the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High court “the court must carefully examine the facts of the case to see whether they justify the application of the sub-section”. See also NEPA V. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (pt- 789) 79 SC, where the Supreme Court herd as follows- “It is not in dispute that the Defendant – NEPA is a Federal Government Agency … it is also not dispute that the cause of action in this matter arose out of the administrative action or decision of the Defendant… in the light of all these the action on hand came squarely within the provision of Section 230 (1) of the 1979 Constitution. It would appear… therefore, that the action would be one within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court”.. In that case, NEPA v. Edegbero (supra), the Respondents had their appointments terminated after they embarked on an industrial action, and the Supreme Court held that the Federal High court had jurisdiction. In this case, the Respondent is definitely a Federal Government Agency, and it follows that the lower court was right to hold it had no jurisdiction. PER AMINA A. AUGIE, J.C.A
Before Their Lordships
AMINA ADAMU AUGIEJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
GEORGE OLADEINDE SHOREMIJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMELJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MR. A. N. EDJEMEAppellant(s)
AND
NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATTONRespondent(s)
ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL, J.C.A (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the ruling of the Warri Division of the Delta State High court in Suit No. W265194 delivered on 27th May, 2004.
In an Amended Statement of claim dated 18th January, 1996, the Appellant, as the Plaintiff before the lower Court claimed for the following reliefs. They are: –
1) A declaration that the purported termination of Plaintiff’s contract of service with the Defendant view letter of termination reference No. AD/OER/C.2412 dated 4th November, 1993 given to the Plaintiff at Warri within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court is invalid, wrongful and therefore null and void and of no effect whatsoever;
2) An order of this Honourable Court restraining the Defendant, its servants, agents, officers, privies or by whosoever from giving effect to the said letter of termination dated 4th November, 1993; and
3) An order reinstating the Plaintiff to this position of employment and payment thereof of all arrears of salaries and all entitlements attached to his employment from the date of the purported termination.
In alternative to the foregoing main reliefs, the Plaintiff/Appellant sought for the following reliefs: –
a) A declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to retirement and pension benefits which accrued long before the purported termination calculated up till date of judgment; and
b) An order on the Defendant to calculate all the Plaintiff’s retirement or pension benefits from when he joined the civil service structure up till date of judgment as a Public Officer both in the State Civil Service and Federal Government Service.
In a statement of defence dated 15th May, 1996, the Defendant joined issues with the Appellant when it denied the key and material averments in the claim and prayed the lower Court to dismiss same for being vexatious, misconceived and abuse of process. For reasons which do not appear apparent from the record of appeal, trial could not start in this matter until 11th March, 2004 when the Plaintiff/Appellant opened his case when he gave oral evidence and tendered some documents in evidence. These documents include his letter of appointment, confirmation of appointment, promotions, approved conditions of service etc.
However, in a motion on notice dated 15th March, 2004 and filed on 17/03/04, the Defendant/Respondent sought for an order of the lower Court dismissing or striking out and/or abating the suit of the Plaintiff for being incompetent null and void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the Court to entertain its subject matter etc.
The ground for this application was set out thus: –
1. That by virtue of Decree 107 constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree of 1993; the state High court racked jurisdiction to entertain this Suit; and
2. This suit is an abuse of process.
This application was supported by a 9 paragraph affidavit. To oppose this application the plaintiff, as the respondent, filed a 7 paragraph counter-affidavit. Issues having been duly joined; arguments on the motion started on 29/03/2004 and continued and ended on 6/04/2004.
In a very short ruling dated 27/05/04, the lower court held: –
“By virtue of the combined effect of section 230(1) of Decree 107 of 1993 whish is now section 251(1) of the 1999, constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the decision in NEPA v. EDEGBERO (2002) 18 NWLR (pt.798) 79 at 97 paragraphs E-G this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain suits involving the Federal Government and her agencies. The Defendant Corporation… is a Federal Government Agency… it is herby struck out”.
The Appellant was dissatisfied with this decision of the lower Court and appealed to this Court pursuant to an extension of time to appeal granted on 17th May, 2005. The appeal is predicated on 3 grounds. To argue the appeal, the Appellant filed a brief of argument dated 25/11/06 while the Respondent replied with a brief of argument dated 8th January, 2007. The Appellant formulated 2 issues for the determination of this appeal while the Respondent formulated and argued a single issue. At the hearing of the appeal before us on 12/04/10 respective learned Counsel each identified adopted and relied on his brief of argument. The issues formulated by the Appellant appear to be a bit obscure and quite unclear. The issue formulated by the Respondent appear to me to be quite distinct and succinct. It is as follows: –
-Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the State High court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff’s suit in view of Decree 107 of 1993, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the decision of the Supreme Court in NEPA V. EDEGBERO (2003) FWLR (PT.139) 1556…
Though a bit clumsy and inelegant this issue appears to me to be preferable. I will therefore adopt and consider it in the determination of this appeal.
The main of argument of the Appellant is that the law applicable in the determination of jurisdiction is the law in force at the time the cause of action arose. Upon this postulation it was explained by learned Counsel on behalf of the Appellant that the cause of action challenging the termination of the employment of the Appellant could only have arisen on 4/11/1993, (the date of the letter) while Decree 107 of 1993 has its commencement date as 17th November, 1993.
In his reply to this key argument of the Appellant learned Counsel to the Respondent explained that there is a world of difference between the law applicable to jurisdiction and the law applicable to cause of action. He referred to the Supreme Court decision in ADAH V. N.Y.S.C. (2004) 13 NWLR (PT.891) 639 where it was held thus: –
“It ought to be understood that the law which supports a cause of action is not necessarily coextensive with the law which confers jurisdiction on the Court which entertains the suit founded on the cause of action. The relevant law applicable in respect of a cause of action is the law in force at the time the cause of action arose whereas the jurisdiction of the Court to- entertain an action is determined upon the state of the law conferring jurisdiction at the point in time when the action was constituted and heard.”
Let me begin by observing that the writ of summons that started this action is dated and filed on 18/10/94 while the statement of claim is dated 17/10/94. In paragraph 2 of the Amended Statement of claim, the Plaintiff/Appellant averred as follows:-
2. “The Defendant is a Federal Government Corporation charged with the responsibility of managing the Petroleum Resources of Nigeria…”
This averment was fully admitted in paragraph 2 of the statement of defence.
The Appellant had argued that because the termination of his appointment was effected through a letter dated 4/11/93 it was the State High Court that was the right and proper venue or forum to approach for the ventilation of his grievance. In support of this position learned Counsel had referred to a number of decisions but only quoted very extensively from the decision in UKWU V. BUNGE (1997) 1 NWLR (PT.518) 527 at 544.
With the greatest respect to learned Counsel to the Appellant, he quoted the case of UKWU V. BUNGE (supra) totally out of con and in total disregard and misconception to the issues in this appeal. The facts and circumstances in this appeal totally render the decision in UKWU V. BUNGB (supra) totally inapplicable. The decisions of the Supreme Court in OLUTOLA V. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (2005) ALL FWLR (PT.245) 1151 at 1189 and ISIAH V. SHELL PET. DEV. CO. LTD FWLR (PT.56) 608 have clearly defined and settled the law that while the existing substantive law at the time a cause of action arose governs the determination of the action, it is the law in force at the time of the trial of the action based on the cause of action that determines the Court that is vested with the jurisdiction to try the case.
It does not admit of any argument that this matter was filed after the commencement of Decree 107 of 1993. In the case of NEPA V. EDEGBERO (supra) the facts are quite similar to facts here. In that case the Plaintiffs were former employees of NEPA whose appointments were terminated. They approached the Niger State High Court for a number of reliefs. When the jurisdiction of the High Court was challenged in view of the provisions Decree 107 of 1993, Section 230 (1) (9) (r) and (5) thereof, the Court decided in favour of its jurisdiction. On an appeal to the Court of Appeal, the decision was still in favour of the jurisdiction of the State High Court. On a further appeal to the Supreme Court, allowed the appeal and decided against the jurisdiction of the State High Court in favour of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
It must therefore now be understood and appreciated that a State High Court may have the jurisdiction to entertain a suit at the time the cause of action founded on that suit arose but at the time of the actual trial, it is divested of that jurisdiction.
If at the date of the termination of the employment of the Appellant on 4th November, 1993, the State High Court would seemingly, though not in reality in view of the provisions of Decree 61 of 1991, appear to have jurisdiction over the claim of the appellant against the respondent, at the date of filing the action on 18/10/94, the State High Court had absolutely been divested of jurisdiction over the said claim by virtue of the provisions of S. 230(1) (q) (r) and (s). The Respondent is an agency of the Federal Government and operates under the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act CAP 320 LFN 1990. In the circumstance of this appeal, the lower Court was correct and in order when it declined jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the Appellant.
This appeal is totally devoid of any merit and it is hereby dismissed. I do not see any good reasons to order for transfer of Suit No. W/265/94 leading to this appeal to the Federal High Court, it is therefore accordingly struck out. No order for costs.
AMINA A. AUGIE, J.C.A: I have read before now the read Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Gumel, JCA, and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion. Jurisdiction of a court is the lifeline of an action, and if a court lacks jurisdiction, it automatically racks the necessary competence to try the case – see Achebe V. Nwosu (2003) 7 NWLR (pt.818) 103; university of Ilorin (2003) 17 NWLR (pt. 849) 214; Akeem V. Unibadan (2003) 10 NWLR (pt.829) 584; and Trade Bank Plc. V. Benilux (Nig.) Ltd. (2003) 9 NWLR (pt. 825) 416where the Supreme court held that in determining the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High court “the court must carefully examine the facts of the case to see whether they justify the application of the sub-section”. See also NEPA V. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (pt- 789) 79 SC, where the Supreme Court herd as follows-
“It is not in dispute that the Defendant – NEPA is a Federal Government Agency … it is also not dispute that the cause of action in this matter arose out of the administrative action or decision of the Defendant… in the light of all these the action on hand came squarely within the provision of Section 230 (1) of the 1979 Constitution. It would appear… therefore, that the action would be one within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court”.
. In that case, NEPA v. Edegbero (supra), the Respondents had their appointments terminated after they embarked on an industrial action, and the Supreme Court held that the Federal High court had jurisdiction. In this case, the Respondent is definitely a Federal Government Agency, and it follows that the lower court was right to hold it had no jurisdiction.
This appeal therefore lacks merit, and I also d it. I abide by the consequential orders in the read Judgment, including that on no cost.
GEORGE OLADEINDE SHOREMI, J.C.A: I have read before now the judgment of my learned brother Gumel JCA just delivered and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit I also dismiss same. I also abide with all consequential orders made therein.
Appearances
For Appellant
AND
For Respondent
