MOHAMMED IBRAHIM v. THE STATE
(2012)LCN/5428(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 31st day of May, 2012
CA/I/211/2009
RATIO
“For the prosecution to succeed in proving the offence of armed robbery the following essential ingredients must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. They are: (a) That there was robbery (b) That the robbery was an armed robbery. (c) That the accused while with arms participated in the robbery. See:- Olayinka v. State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1040) 561; Okosi v. A. G. Bendel State (1989) 1 NLWR (Pt.100) 642; Bello v. The State (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt.1043) 5641 and Oseni vs. State (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt.1293) 351 at 386. These three ingredients must co-exist and they must each be proved before an accused can be found guilty of the crime.” Per MSHELIA, J.C.A.
“Conspiracy is accepted as an agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. As direct practice, evidence of the plot between the conspirators is hardly capable of proof, the court establish the offences of conspiracy as a matter of inference to be deduced from certain criminal acts of the parties concerned. It is immaterial that the persons had not met each other. The bottom line of the offence is the meeting of the minds of the conspirators to commit an offence, and the meeting of the minds need not be physical. See:- Adepobi v. State (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt.1261) 347 at 375; Obiakor v. State (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt.776) 612, Gbadamosi v. State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt.196) 182 at 204, Nwosu v. State (2004) 15 NWLR (Pt.897) 466; Oduneye v. State (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt.697) 311 and Dabon v. State (1977) 5 SC 197.” Per MSHELIA, J.C.A.
“Section 24 stipulates:- “Section 24 subject to the express provisions of this code relating to negligent acts and omissions, a person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission, which occurs independently of the exercise of his will, or for an event which occurs by accident. Unless the intention to cause a particular result is expressly declared to be an element of the offence constituted, in whole or in part, by an act or omission the result intended to be caused by an act or omission is immaterial. Unless otherwise expressly declared, the motive by which a person is induced to do or omit to do an act, or to form an intention, is immaterial so far as regards criminal responsibility.” The expression “an event which occurs by accident” has been explained in the case of Adelumola v. State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.73) 683 at 692 by Oputa J.S.C. thus:- “It seems to me that the expression “an event which occurs by accident” used in section 24 of cap 42 of 1958 describes an event totally unexpected by the doer of the act and also not reasonably expected by any ordinary person. The reasonable man of the law. In other words, the test is both subjective from the stand-point of the doer of the act, as well as objective from the standpoint of the ordinary man of common prudence. The event should, to qualify as accidental, be a surprise both to the doer of the act that caused it and a surprising thing to all and sundry. See also Turaki vs. State (supra).” I wish to note that section 24 of the criminal code cap 24 of 1958 is a replica of section 24 of the criminal code law cap 38 vol. 11 laws of Oyo State 2000. I agree with the submission of respondents counsel that the defence of accident is not available to the appellant. The decisions of this court in the cases of Umoru vs. State (Supra) and Okeke vs. State (supra) cited by respondent’s counsel are instructive. See Okosi v. State (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.99) 642 at 672-674. The conduct of the appellant has sufficiently implicated him as such the defence of accident cannot avail him. It is in evidence that appellant locked up the guard dogs, prior to and during the course of the armed robbery operation and appellant also served as a pointer to the other armed robbers on what item they should steal. Appellant also advised them to use PW2’s vehicle to cart away their loot. The learned trial Judge rightly in my view rejected the defence on the ground that appellant denied committing the offences for which he was charged. This is in line with the decision of this court in cited Okeke v. State cited (supra) by respondent’s counsel in the brief of argument.” Per MSHELIA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MODUPE FASANMI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MOHAMMED IBRAHIM Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE Respondent(s)
ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Oyo State, Ibadan Judicial Division (Presided over by Hon. Justice A. L. Akintola), delivered on 27th February, 2009, wherein the appellant was convicted of the offences of conspiracy and armed robbery and sentenced to death.
The appellant was on the 27th of November, 2007, arraigned before the High Court of Oyo State, Ibadan Judicial Division upon a two count charge of conspiracy to commit armed robbery contrary to section 6(b) and punishable under section 1 (2) (a) and (b) of the robbery and firearms (special provisions) Act Cap R.II Vol. XIV Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 and armed robbery, contrary to and punishable under section 1(2) (a) of the Robbery and Firearms (special provisions) Act Cap R.II. Vol. XIV, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. The plea of the accused now appellant was taken to the two count charge and he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced. Prosecution in proof of its case called five witnesses and tendered 18 exhibits. The appellant gave evidence in his own defence and denied committing the offences charged. Appellant did not call any witness. In a considered judgment delivered on 27th February, 2009 by Akintola J. appellant was convicted in respect of the offences of conspiracy and armed robbery and sentenced to death.
Appellant felt unhappy and consequently lodged an appeal to this court against his conviction vide his Notice of appeal dated 5th March, 2009. On 20th October, 2010, this court granted leave to the appellant to amend his Notice of Appeal dated 3rd May, 2010 and same was deemed properly filed and served.
In compliance with the rules of court appellant filed his brief of argument on 19/11/10 but same deemed properly filed on 14/2/11. Respondents brief dated 14/3/11 was filed on same date. When the appeal came up for hearing both appellant’s and respondent’s counsel adopted their respective briefs of argument.
In appellant’s brief of argument he formulated two issues from the five grounds of appeal for determination. The issues are:-
(i) Whether the prosecution proved the offences of conspiracy to commit robbery and armed robbery against the appellant.
(ii) Whether the defence under S.24 of the Criminal Code was not available to the appellant in the circumstance.
Respondent also formulated two issues for determination as follows:-
(i) whether the respondent proved its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
(ii) whether the appellant has set out a valued defence under section 24 of the criminal Code Cap 38, vol. 11 Laws of Oyo State, 2000.
In determining this appeal, I will be guided by the two issues formulated by the appellant.
While arguing issue 1 appellant’s counsel relied on the definition of conspiracy as stated by the Supreme Court in Obiakor vs. State (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt.776) 612 at 628 and contended that the essential ingredients of the offence of conspiracy to commit robbery were not proved against the appellant to justify his conviction by the lower court. It was submitted that prosecution did not establish that there was an agreement between the appellant and any other person to commit robbery. Learned counsel contended that if the court had properly appraised and evaluated the evidence before it, it would have come to a conclusion that the prosecution did not prove the offence of conspiracy to commit robbery against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Learned counsel argued that PW1 never mentioned the appellant throughout his testimony before the trial court neither did he link the appellant to the incident that took place on the 7th of March, 2005. That PW2 in her testimony failed to show that the appellant acted in concert with the armed robbers who had attacked the house on that faithful day. Counsel further submitted that PW3’s testimony of seeing the appellant with the robbers is an afterthought. That PW3’s testimony was not corroborated by any other witness or evidence tendered in court. Counsel contended that the appellant maintained his story that he was held hostage by the robbers and one of them pointed a gun at him and he had to obey their instructions for fear that he might be killed. That appellant’s story was never shaken under cross examination. Counsel maintained that prosecution did not prove the offence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.
As regards the charge of armed robbery, learned counsel placed reliance on the case of Alabi vs. State (1993) 7 NWLR (pt.307) 311 at 523 wherein the Supreme Court re-stated the ingredients. The prosecution must establish to secure a conviction in a case of armed robbery. That failure of the prosecution to establish any of the ingredients enumerated in Alabi v. State (supra) is fatal to the prosecution. That the only ingredient required to be proved, is whether the appellant was one of those that took part in the robbery. Counsel submitted that of all the witnesses, the only person that proffered evidence to link the appellant with the robbery was PW3. That PW3’s testimony is unreliable and should have been discountenanced. Learned counsel submitted that the appellant’s story that he did not participate in the robbery was consistent at every stage. Learned counsel submitted further that considering the totality of the evidence adduced prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was one of the robbers. Reliance was placed on the case of Udosen vs. State (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt.1023) 125 at 150 and Alonge vs. IGP (1959) 4 FSC 203 204 (1959) SCNLR 516. That from the available evidence the trial court ought to have been left in a state of doubt which should have led to the acquittal of the appellant rather than his conviction. He urged the court to hold that the prosecution failed to prove the offence of armed robbery beyond reasonable doubt.
In response to the submission of the appellant under issue No.1 respondent’s counsel submitted that in order to establish the offence of armed robbery which is covered by count 2 of the charge against the appellant the prosecution must lead evidence to prove the following ingredients :
1. That there must have been a robbery or a series of robberies.
2. That each robbery was an armed robbery.
3. That the accused was one of those who took part in the robbery or robberies. See:- Bozin vs. State (1985) 2 NWLR (pt.8) 465.
Learned counsel submitted that criminal charges can be proved in any of the following way or by combination of them:
1. By the direct evidence of an eye witness.
2. By circumstantial evidence
3, By a confessional statement. See:- Igabele vs. The State (2006) 2 SC (Pt.11) p.61 at 79.
Learned counsel contended that throughout the evidence led by the prosecution and the defence, there was unanimity on the first two ingredients of armed robbery in the house of PW2 on 7/3/2005 but the point of departure is on the third ingredient, as to whether the appellant was one of the armed robbers. On the third ingredient learned counsel submitted that the prosecution led evidence which the trial judge believed and evaluated:
1. The appellant while serving as a night guard in PW2’s house, locked up the three dogs, prior to the commencement of the robbery operation, to facilitate the entry of his accomplices (page 41, lines 15-35)
2. PW3 testified that he saw the appellant in the house in the company of one of the armed robbers and heard the appellant telling him to carry the electronics in the house (page 47, lines 15 – 35 of the record)
3. PW2 at page 47, lines 5-15 of the record, testified that before the commencement of the robbery operation, she saw the accused in her car, which was not where he usually slept. PW3 testified at pages 47-48, lines 35-15 of the record, that he heard the appellant, telling the other armed robbers that they should use the car of PW2 to convey their loot and that they should not worry about the key, whereupon he (the appellant) started the car engine.
4. PW2 at page 49, lines 18-20 of the record also testified that he saw the appellant talking with the other armed robbers at the workshop within the compound of the house.
Learned counsel submitted that appellant in his testimony denied all the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and further stated that he was held under duress by the armed robbers during the operation and kidnapped for ransom afterwards. Counsel submitted that the learned trial judge after a painstaking analysis of all the evidence held that he believed the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses but disbelieved the testimony of the appellant. That the trial judge also believed that appellant was a member of the armed robbery gang, which attacked the house of PW2. Relying on the case of Adelumola v. State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.73) 683 at 690. Counsel contended that any trial court has the liberty and privilege to believe one side and disbelieve the other. It was argued that appellant in this case has not shown that the belief by the court of the prosecution’s witnesses is perverse or against the drift of evidence. That since the learned trial judge believed the evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses, it was only logical that appellant be found guilty of the offence of robbery as charged.
As regards the charge of conspiracy learned counsel referred to Section 6 (a) of the Robbery and Firearms (special Provisions) Act Cap R.11, LFN 2004 and contended that appellant aided, abetted and procured the other armed robbers who are now at large, to rob the house of PW2 on the 7th March, 2005 as such the appellant is a principal offender in respect of the two counts of conspiracy and armed robbery. Learned counsel submitted that the offence of conspiracy is complete once there is a meeting of the mind of two or more persons on an agreement to carry out an unlawful act. The meeting of the minds can be proved by conduct. Reliance was placed on Obiakor vs. The State (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt.776) 612 at 628 and Gbadamosi v. The State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt.196) 182 at 204.
Learned counsel further submitted that appellant herein was not only seen in the company of the other armed robbers at the scene of crime, but was also heard giving them operating directions on what they should steal and how they should evacuate their loot. That appellant is without doubt a co-conspirator with the other armed robbers who are now at large. Counsel urged the court to hold that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant was rightly convicted of conspiracy and armed robbery by the trial court based on the evidence adduced before the court.
For the prosecution to succeed in proving the offence of armed robbery the following essential ingredients must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. They are:
(a) That there was robbery
(b) That the robbery was an armed robbery.
(c) That the accused while with arms participated in the robbery.
See:- Olayinka v. State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1040) 561; Okosi v. A. G. Bendel State (1989) 1 NLWR (Pt.100) 642; Bello v. The State (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt.1043) 5641 and Oseni vs. State (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt.1293) 351 at 386.
These three ingredients must co-exist and they must each be proved before an accused can be found guilty of the crime. The direct evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW4 established the fact that there was a robbery incident on the 7th of March, 2005 at the house of PW2 (Mrs. Lara Adebimpe) at Boluwaji Area, Ibadan. The appellant while testifying as DW1 also confirmed that there was a robbery on the same day and place. As to whether the robbery was an armed robbery the eyewitness account of PW2, PW3 and PW4 clearly established that the robbery was an armed robbery. They gave eye witness testimonies on Oath that the robbers were armed with a cutlass which was used to assault PW2, The said cutlass recovered at the scene was admitted in evidence as exhibit E.
The appellant in his evidence as DW1 testified that one of the robbers was armed with a gun.
There is no dispute as to the fact there was robbery on the 7th of March, 2005 at the house of PW2 and some robbers were armed. The only point of departure is on the third ingredient, as to whether the appellant was one of the armed robbers. The learned trial judge in an attempt to resolve this issue, meticulously reviewed the evidence adduced by the prosecution as well as the defence. The prosecution led the following evidence which the trial judge evaluated and believed. PW2 in her testimony narrated how she saw the accused person unusually sleeping in her car parked within her home on the night of 6th March, 2005. PW2 also narrated in her testimony that the appellant while serving as a night guard in her house, locked up the three dogs, prior to the commencement of the robbery operation, to facilitate the entry of his accomplices. PW3 testified that he saw the appellant in the house in the company of one of the armed robbers and heard the appellant telling him to carry the electronics in the house. PW3 further testified that he heard the appellant, telling the other armed robbers that they should use the car of PW2 to convey their loot, and that they should not worry about the key, whereupon he (the appellant) started the engine.
The appellant also testified and denied all the testimonies and further stated that he was held under duress by the armed robbers during the operation and kidnapped for ransom afterwords.
The learned trial judge after a painstaking analysis of all the evidence held that he believed the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, but however, disbelieved the testimony of the appellant. The trial judge at page 117 of the record had this to say:-
“while I might have been in doubt hitherto as to the claim of PW3 about being able to recognize the accused person when he came into their sitting room and later an into his room because there was no electric light on save for moon light the doubt was cleared with the admission of the accused person that he was indeed standing with the armed robber in the workshop of the PW3’s family within their premises when he saw the PW3 in a commendable but risky demonstration of bravery escape through the fence but he gave himself solace denying who he was to the armed robber because he might soon invite help to rescue them. I am afraid, I do not believe this claim of the accused person, The PW3 did not only recognize him physically but also by his voice during the course of the armed robbery operation.”
I cannot fault the finding of the learned trial Judge reproduced (supra). It is trite that any trial court has the liberty and the privilege to believe one side and disbelieve the other. See:- Adelumola vs. State (1988) 7 NWLR (Pt.73) 683 at 690. The appellant in this case has not shown that the belief by the court of the prosecution’s witnesses is perverse or against the logical drift of evidence, if anything, it was the appellant’s own evidence, which was considered by the learned trial Judge as against the drift of evidence, and as such disbelieved same. As rightly held by the learned trial Judge the evidence against the accused now appellant is sufficiently strong, cogent and compelling to warrant the conviction of the appellant for the offence of armed robbery. I am satisfied from the totality of the evidence adduced that prosecution had proved the offence of armed robbery beyond reasonable doubt.
As regards the charge of conspiracy, prosecution equally has the burden to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy is accepted as an agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. As direct practice, evidence of the plot between the conspirators is hardly capable of proof, the court establish the offences of conspiracy as a matter of inference to be deduced from certain criminal acts of the parties concerned. It is immaterial that the persons had not met each other. The bottom line of the offence is the meeting of the minds of the conspirators to commit an offence, and the meeting of the minds need not be physical. See:- Adepobi v. State (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt.1261) 347 at 375; Obiakor v. State (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt.776) 612, Gbadamosi v. State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt.196) 182 at 204, Nwosu v. State (2004) 15 NWLR (Pt.897) 466; Oduneye v. State (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt.697) 311 and Dabon v. State (1977) 5 SC 197.
In the instant case, the appellant herein was not only seen in the company of the other armed robbers at the scene of the crime, but was also heard giving them operational directions on what they should steal and how they should evacuate their loot. These without doubt place the appellant as a co-conspirator with the other armed robbers who are now at large. I hold, that prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant acted in concert with the other armed robbers who are now at large to commit the offence of armed robbery. Appellant was rightly convicted for the offence of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Issue 1 is therefore resolved against the appellant.
Issue 2 is whether the defence under section 24 of the criminal code was not available to the appellant in the circumstances. This issue is distilled from ground 5 of the Amended Notice of Appeal. While arguing this issue appellant’s counsel submitted that contrary to the assertion of the trial court, the appellant did not invoke section 24 of the criminal code to show that he partook of the robbery unwillingly. That appellant at no time admitted that he participated in the robbery so he could not have raised a defence of partaking in the robbery unwillingly. That appellant invoked section 24 of the criminal code to explain why he did not tell PW2 that there were robbers in the compound upon her inquiry and why he was unable to raise any alarm which are acts that would have ordinarily implicated him as acting in concert with the robbers. Learned counsel submitted that appellant narrated that the armed robbers at gun point compelled him to act contrary to his volition. It was contended that appellant’s testimony that he did not participate in the robbery was consistent at every stage. Learned counsel submitted that the defence offered by section 24 of the criminal code was available to the appellant in the circumstances.
In response to this submission, respondent’s counsel referred to the provision of section 24 of the criminal code law and contended that the evidence of the appellant does not support a defence of accident. Learned counsel submitted that limb 1 of section 24 sets out a defence for an act of reflex nature, which the actor himself is unaware of. Reliance was placed on case of Turaki vs. State (1995) 3 NWLR (pt.381) 63 at 74-75. That limb 1 is employed in cases of accidental discharge of firearms. See:- Babuga vs. State (1995) 5 NWLR (Pt.395) 329 at 350.
Learned counsel further submitted that limb 2 of section 24 has of judicial attention and was succinctly expounded by Uwaifor J.C.A. (as he then was) in Umaru vs. State (1990) 3 NWLR (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.138) 363 at 370, when he said:-
“It should be carefully noted that section 24 does not speak of an act but an event which occurs by accident. A man may swing an axe forcefully to hue a tree. This is an intentional act. The head of axe may pull off to hit another and kill him. That is an event which occurs by accident although arising from an intentional act.”
Counsel submitted that from the foregoing analysis, it is therefore cognizable, that limb 1 of section 24 of the criminal code covers defences of unintentional acts which even the actor himself is unconscious of, while limb 2 of the same section covers intentional acts whose consequences are unforeseen by both the actor and other observers. It was contended that the acts of the appellant comprising twice locking up the guard dogs, prior to and during the course of the armed robbery operation, serving as a pointer to the other armed robbers on what item they should steal and advising them to cart away their loot in the vehicle of PW2 do not by any stretch of the imagination fall under any of the two limbs of section 24 of the criminal code law, because they are “neither unintended nor unforeseen by the actor.” Learned counsel further submitted that as noted by the learned trial Judge at page 121 lines 30-35 of the record, the appellant at all times before and during the trial denied participating in the armed robbery he was charged with and as such could not rely on the defence of accident. In Okeke v. State (1999) 2 NWLR (pt.590) pg 246 at 271, Niki Tobi J.C.A. (as he then was), held that “when an accused person claims that he did not commit the offence for which he is charged, the defence of accident does not arise.”
Counsel submitted that if the appellant still maintains his narration, that he performed all the acts alleged against him, under duress at gun point the proper defence, he ought to have canvassed is the defence of “excuse” under section 32 (4) of the criminal code law cap 38 vol. 11 laws of Oyo State, 2000 which excuses a person from criminal liability.
Counsel however, lamented that the defence of excuse will not avail him, in view of the capital punishment nature of the offences with which he is charged, as set out in the proviso to section 32 of the criminal code law. Learned counsel urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the respondent.
The issue to be resolved is whether the defence of accident is available to the appellant as provided under section 24 of the criminal code law, cap 38 vol.11 laws of Oyo State 2000, Section 24 stipulates:-
‘Section 24 subject to the express provisions of this code relating to negligent acts and omissions, a person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission, which occurs independently of the exercise of his will, or for an event which occurs by accident.
Unless the intention to cause a particular result is expressly declared to be an element of the offence constituted, in whole or in part, by an act or omission the result intended to be caused by an act or omission is immaterial.
Unless otherwise expressly declared, the motive by which a person is induced to do or omit to do an act, or to form an intention, is immaterial so far as regards criminal responsibility.”
The expression “an event which occurs by accident” has been explained in the case of Adelumola v. State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.73) 683 at 692 by Oputa J.S.C. thus:-
“It seems to me that the expression “an event which occurs by accident” used in section 24 of cap 42 of 1958 describes an event totally unexpected by the doer of the act and also not reasonably expected by any ordinary person. The reasonable man of the law. In other words, the test is both subjective from the stand-point of the doer of the act, as well as objective from the standpoint of the ordinary man of common prudence. The event should, to qualify as accidental, be a surprise both to the doer of the act that caused it and a surprising thing to all and sundry. See also Turaki vs. State (supra).”
I wish to note that section 24 of the criminal code cap 24 of 1958 is a replica of section 24 of the criminal code law cap 38 vol. 11 laws of Oyo State 2000. I agree with the submission of respondents counsel that the defence of accident is not available to the appellant. The decisions of this court in the cases of Umoru vs. State (Supra) and Okeke vs. State (supra) cited by respondent’s counsel are instructive. See Okosi v. State (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.99) 642 at 672-674. The conduct of the appellant has sufficiently implicated him as such the defence of accident cannot avail him. It is in evidence that appellant locked up the guard dogs, prior to and during the course of the armed robbery operation and appellant also served as a pointer to the other armed robbers on what item they should steal. Appellant also advised them to use PW2’s vehicle to cart away their loot. The learned trial Judge rightly in my view rejected the defence on the ground that appellant denied committing the offences for which he was charged. This is in line with the decision of this court in cited Okeke v. State cited (supra) by respondent’s counsel in the brief of argument.
I will similarly resolve issue 2 against the appellant.
The learned trial Judge had unquestionably evaluated the evidence and justifiably appraised the facts as such it is not the business of this court to interfere. See:- Igabe v. State (1999) 14 NWLR (Pt.637) 1.
In the final result this appeal fails. It is hereby dismissed. I affirm the conviction and sentence passed by the lower court on 27th February, 2009 in charge No.1/53c/2006.
MODUPE FASANMI, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in advance the lead judgment of my learned brother Mshelia J.C.A. I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusions contained therein, I adopt same as mine.
The appeal is devoid of merit. I too dismiss the appeal and affirm the conviction and sentence of the lower court.
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.: I have had the honour of reading in draft the lucid judgment just pronounced by my learned brother, Mshelia, J.C.A., in which I concur.
I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed. I dismiss same and abide by the consequential orders made therein.
Appearances
I. A Saka with O. C. Okonta (Mrs.) (heldbrief) of Ikenna OkoliFor Appellant
AND
O. A. Ladapo Senior Legal Officer Ministry of Justice, Oyo StateFor Respondent
