MAYIN CONSTRUCTION & PROPERTIES LIMITED v. ALH. BABANGIDA S. M. NGUROJE & ORS
(2018)LCN/12085(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 26th day of October, 2018
CA/K/251/2016
RATIO
JURISDICTION: WHETHER THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION
“The cause of action therefore has to do with the role of the Receiver/Manager in the sale of the property and not the location of the property. From the Statement of Claim therefore, it is the Federal High Court that has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter under Section 251 (1) (e) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended and not the High Court of the State where the land is situated. In the case of APOSTLE O.N. GODWIN & ORS V. ELDER F.U. OKWEY (2010) 16 NWLR PART 1219 p. 309; also reported in (2010) LPELR 1326 (SC), ONNOGHEN JSC now CJN stated that it is settled law that it is the claims of the plaintiff as contained in the Writ of Summons and/or the Statement of Claim that determines the question as to whether or not the Court before which the action pends has the jurisdiction to entertain and determine same. The Statement of Claim puts the jurisdiction of the Claims firmly and squarely in the Federal High Court. For this reason and the fuller reasons given in the lead judgment of my learned brother, the appeal lacks merit and is dismissed.” PER OBIETONBARA O. DANIEL-KALIO, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
OBIETONBARA O. DANIEL-KALIO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MAYIN CONSTRUCTION & PROPERTIES LTD Appellant(s)
AND
1. ALH BABANGIDA S.M. NGUROJE
2. ALH. SAIDU MAIRIGA NGUROJE
3. ALH. BASHIRU SAIDU
4. ALH. ABDULLAHI SAIDU
5. ALH. GARZALI SAIDU
6. ALH. NAFI’U SAIDU
7. ALH. ABDULMALIK SAIDU
8. ALH. USAMATU SAIDU
9. DUNAMA D. AZURA (TRADING AS D. D. AZURA & CO)
10. S. M. NGUROJE NIGERIA LTD (IN RECEIVERSHIP)
11. BANK OF AGRICULTURE LTD Respondent(s)
UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This appeal is against the Ruling of Honourable Justice Evelyn N. Anyadike of the Federal High Court of Justice, Kaduna Judicial Division in Suit No.FHC/KD/CS/126/2015, delivered on 28/10/2015, wherein the trial Court overruled the Preliminary Objection and held that it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
The Statement of Claim contained at pages 207-221 of the record sought for the following reliefs jointly and severally:
1. A declaration that the sale of S.M Nguroje Nig Ltd (Tea Estate) at Mai Samari Sardauna Local Government Area, Taraba State, which is covered by the Taraba State Certificate of Occupancy No. GS/7368 by the 1st Defendant who was the Receiver Manager of same to the 3rd Defendant is illegal, unlawful and same was done in breach of the 1st Defendant’s duty to act in utmost good faith and therefore liable to be set aside.
2. A declaration that the 1st Defendant cannot sell and convey valid title in S.M NGUROJE NIG LTD (Tea Estate) aforesaid to the 3rd Defendant or any other person when his appointment as receiver manager of the said company has ceased and any purported sale by him is null, void and of no effect whatsoever.
3. A declaration that the 2nd Defendant being the Principal of the 1st Defendant is vicariously liable in the sum of 10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira Only) being the value of the roof to the guest house and office block vandalized, cables to the generator that have been stolen, 3 numbers of kick starters to the generators and the tea bushes that have been damaged as a result of lack of security, want of professional expertise and negligence on the part of the 1st Defendant.
4. A declaration that the failure of the 1st Defendant to render a comprehensive and vivid account of his receivership of S.M NGUROJE NIG LTD (Tea Estate) showing in details the transactions undertaken by him on behalf of the company, the income and expenditures within the period of his receivership coupled with his failure to remit certain sums of money collected on behalf of the said company in receivership amounts to a breach of his fiduciary duty as a receiver to act in good faith.
5. A declaration that the interest rates and other bank charges charged by the 2nd Defendant and paid by S.M NGUROJE NIG LTD (Tea Estate) on the account it maintained with the 2nd Defendant is unlawful, unilateral, arbitrary and in excess of the CBN (Central Bank of Nigeria) approved interest rate for the life span of the loan.
6. An order of this Honourable Court nullifying the purported sale of S.M NGUROJE NIG LTD (Tea Estate) at Mai Samari Local Government Area, Taraba State which is covered by the Taraba State Certificate Occupancy NO.GS/7368 by the 1st Defendant to the 3rd Defendant and directing the 3rd Defendant to vacate and deliver up possession of S.M NGUROJE NIG LTD (Tea Estate) to the Plaintiffs forthwith.
7. An order of this Honourable Court directing the 1st Defendant to forthwith render a valid and comprehensive account of his receivership showing in details the nature of transactions undertaken on behalf of S.M NGUROJE NIG LTD (Tea Estate), income that has accrued and expenditure if any and to remit all monies collected on behalf of the S.M NGUROJE NIG LTD (Tea Estate).
8. An order of this Honourable Court reversing all the monies, rates and interest unlawfully claimed by the 2nd Defendant and unjustifiably paid by S.M NGUROJE NIG LTD (Tea Estate) on its account with the 2nd Defendant and a refund of such monies.
9. An order of this Honourable Court nullifying the 1st Defendant’s receiver manager’s report covering a period of one year beginning from August, 2013 to September, 2014 which he submitted to the Corporate Affairs Commission on 13th January, 2015 for containing false assertions and activities purportedly undertaken by him on behalf of S.M NGUROJE NIG LTD in breach of his duty to act in good faith as a fiduciary and in excess of his powers as a receiver manager of S.M NGUROJE NIG LTD.
10. The sum of 5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira Only) as general damages.
The facts as can be garnered from the records are that the 11th Respondent advanced money to the 10th Respondent which enabled it to buy the former tea estate of Lever Brothers at Mai Samari village, Sardauna LGA of Taraba State, the subject of statutory right of occupancy granted by the Governor of Taraba State, which was secured by a deed of legal mortgage over the tea estate of the 10th Respondent. The 10th Respondent between 23/9/2004 to 1/2/2014 paid only N5,000,000.00 out of N988,355,883.23 as at that date. Thus, the 11th Respondent appointed the 9th Respondent in August 2011 as Receiver/Manager. Consequently, the 1st to 8th Respondents as Directors of the 10th Respondent took out a concurrent writ of summons on 14/5/2015 before the Federal High Court, Kaduna Judicial Division, challenging the sale and seeking for same to be set aside. The Appellant by a Preliminary Objection challenged the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain the suit, which objection was overruled in the Ruling of 28/10/2015, holding that it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Dissatisfied, the Appellant filed this appeal.
Thus, the Appellant vide a further amended Notice of Appeal dated 15/12/2017 and deemed filed on 24/1/2018, formulated 3 Grounds of appeal contained therein. In accordance with the Rules of this Court, the Appellant filed its further amended brief of argument dated 15/12/2017 and deemed properly filed on 24/1/2018, settled by Chief L.D Nzadon, Esq, wherein he formulated an issue for the determination of the appeal to wit:-
“Whether the principal claim for a declaration that the contract for the sale of a landed property (tea estate) covered by Taraba State Statutory right of Occupancy No. GS/7368 located in Mai Samari, Taraba State by the 9th Respondent as Receiver/Manager to the Appellant is within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to try. (Grounds 1, 2 and 3 of the Notice of Appeal.”
The 1st to 8th and 10th Respondents jointly prepared their further amended brief of argument dated and filed on 2/2/2018, settled by A.A. Machika, Esq, and formulated an issue for determination thus:
“Whether the trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit. The 9th and 11th Respondents did not wish to contest the appeal and therefore did not file any brief.
At the hearing of the appeal on 26/9/2018, the Counsel to the Appellant adopted its brief of argument and prayed this Court to allow the appeal, whereas the Counsel to the 1st to 8th and 10th Respondents adopted their brief and urged this Court to dismiss the appeal. I shall consider this appeal on this issue thus:
Whether the trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit before it?
ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION:
Whether the trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit before it?
The Appellant’s learned Counsel has submitted that any defect in the competence of a Court to entertain a suit is fatal as decided in MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341. He posited that the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is conferred by Section 251(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and is determined also by the cause of action before it. He relied on OSADEBAY V. AG BENDEL STATE (1991) 1 NWLR (169) AT 571, OGBIMI V. OLOLO (1993) 7 NWLR (PT.304) 128. He submitted that the 1st to 8th and 10th Respondents by their principal reliefs Nos. 1, 2 and 6 predicated their suit on the sale of the property covered by Statutory Right of Occupancy No. GS/7368 and even filed a motion exparte to restrain the Appellant from transferring title to any other person whatsoever. It follows therefore that the main issue in dispute is the sale of land (tea estate) by the 11th Respondent through the 9th Respondent, and by Section 39(1)(a) of the Land Use Act, it is only the High Court that has jurisdiction in respect of proceedings for declaration of title to a statutory right of occupancy.
The trial judge was therefore in error to make the conduct of the 9th Respondent a determinant of jurisdiction rather than the cause of action. He relied on the case of ADETAYO V. ADEMOLA (2010) 15 NWLR (PT.1215) AT 192-194. He further submitted that the fact that the sale was by a Receiver/Manager does not ipso facto vest jurisdiction on the Federal High Court as held in TANAREWA (NIG) LTD V. PLASTIFARM LTD (2003) 14 NWLR (PT.840) AT 372. More so, it is reinforced that it is the principal claim before a Court that determines jurisdiction as held in TUKUR V. GOVERNOR OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT.117) AT 549. Again, he maintained that where an action falls within the jurisdiction of 2 different Courts, the Court that has jurisdiction to determine the main claim is the Court seized with jurisdiction as demonstrated in BABINTON-ASHAYE V. E.M.A.G ENT (NIG) LTD (2011) 10 NWLR (PT.1256) 524. He therefore urged this Court to allow the appeal.
On the contrary, the learned Counsel to the 1st to 8th and 10th Respondents has submitted that in determining jurisdiction, the claim is looked into as contained in the writ and statement of claim as decided in NASHTEX INTERNATIONAL V. HABIB NIG BANK & ANOR (2007) 17 NWLR (PT.1063) AT 324. That by their averments, reinforced by the case of TANAREWA (NIG) LTD V. PLASTIFARM LTD (2003) 14 NWLR (PT.840) AT 375, it is the Federal High Court that is vested with jurisdiction in action involving regulating, running, management or control of companies as specified in Section 251(1)(e) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). He emphasized that the claims of the 1st to 8th and 10th Respondents includes the undoing of what the 9th Respondent did as a Receiver/Manager of the 10th Respondent company as appointed by the 11th Respondent. He therefore, based on the foregoing, asked this Court to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal with substantial cost.
I have read the Ruling of the trial Court, the statement of claim and other ancillary issues concerning this appeal and what the Appellant seeks is to set aside the Ruling of the trial Court for lack of jurisdiction to entertain the case of the parties before it.
Where the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a matter, whatever the Court does in the case shall be an exercise in futility.
Anything done without jurisdiction is a nullity. It is trite that, in order to determine whether a Court has jurisdiction to entertain and determine a matter filed before it, that Court must look or refer to the statement of claim filed before it by the plaintiff. See Per SANUSI, J.S.C in A.G FEDERATION V. A.G LAGOS STATE (2017) LPELR-42769(SC). In our adversary system of the administration of justice, it is the entire pleadings of the parties that are looked into to determine the plaintiff’s case, the reliefs claimed vis-a-vis the jurisdiction of the Court and the defence. Paragraphs of pleadings cannot be relied on in isolation for this purpose. These are deducible from the pleadings principal or main issues and ancillary issues. See Per ADEKEYE, J.S.C. in ANAMBRA STATE ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION AUTHORITY & ANOR V. EKWENEM (2009) LPELR-482(SC). This therefore impels me to look at the statement of claim of the Respondents and the reliefs thereof contained at pages 207-221 of the record.
Paragraphs 1-5 of the statement of claim clearly reveals to us the legal status of the parties before the trial Court. The 1st Plaintiff is a shareholder and chairman of Board of Directors of S.M NGUROJE NIG LTD (Tea Estate), a company incorporated in Nigeria, the 2nd to 8th Plaintiffs are also shareholders and Directors in S.M NGUROJE NIG LTD (Tea Estate), the 1st Defendant was the receiver/manager of S.M NGUROJE NIG LTD (Tea Estate), while both the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are bodies corporate. From paragraph 6 all through reveals to us loan granted to the Respondents by a corporate body, the default of the loan and consequent appointment of a receiver/manager in accordance with the regulation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act. The parties herein therefore are Directors and shareholders of a corporate body, receiver/manager and corporate bodies respectively. It is crystally discernable that they are parties having corporate affairs and not family, political or natural affairs. The dispute herein arose after the appointment of the 9th Respondent as receiver/manager of the 10th Respondent. Invariably, it is a company matter and affairs arising from the conduct, affairs and functions of the parties concerned. Thus, this brings in the operation of Section 251(e) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which vests jurisdiction of companies in the Federal High Court.
Section 251(e) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) vests original jurisdiction in the Federal High Court- “Arising from the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act or any other enactment replacing that Act or regulating the operation of companies incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act.
See also Per TOBI, J.S.C (of blessed memory) in OBASANJO & ORS V. YUSUF & ANOR (2004) LPELR-2151(SC). The Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990, contains provisions dealing with the appointment, duties, powers and liabilities of a Receiver in its Sections 387 to 400. In this respect, Per GALADIMA, J.S.C in ADETONA & ORS V. IGELE GENERAL ENTERPRISES LTD (2011) LPELR-159(SC) had this to say:
“The originating summons in this case raises the issue of duties, powers and liabilities of Receiver/Manager which is a matter arising from Section 393 (1) (2) of the 1999 Constitution, the Federal High Court has, to the exclusion of any other Court, Jurisdiction to hear and determine civil causes and arising from the operations of the Companies and Allied Matters Act or any other enactment regulating the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act of any enactment regulating the operation of companies incorporated under the Act.”
Similarly, in NASHTEX INTL LTD V. HABIB (NIG) BANK LTD & ANOR (2007) LPELR-8605(CA), Per KEKERE-EKUN, JCA, in considering the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in respect of the appointment of a receiver/manager propounded that: “Section 251(1) (e) of the Constitution, Section 7 (1)(c) of the Federal High Court Act and Section 650 (1) of CAMA provide as follows: Section 251 (1) (e) of the 1999 Constitution: “251(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to any other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters – (e) arising from the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act or any other enactment replacing that Act or regulating the operation of companies incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act; Section 7(1) (c) of the Federal High Court Act 1990: “7(1) The Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction in civil Causes and matters – (c) arising from- (i) the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act or any other enactment regulating the operation of companies incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act.”
Section 650 (1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act: “650 (1) “Court” or “the Court” used in relation to a company means the Federal High Court, and to the extent to which application may be made to it as Court, includes the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Nigeria.” The common thread that runs through the various provisions reproduced above is that to invoke the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court, the cause or matter must arise from the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act or any other enactment regulating the operation of companies incorporated under CAMA.
In other words, does the confirmation of the appointment of a receiver/manager arise from the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act such as to confer jurisdiction on the Federal High Court? The statutory powers to appoint a receiver and/or manager of a company incorporated under CAMA are contained in Sections 209 and 389 of the Act. Section 209 of the Act relates to an aspect of the operations and management of a company by providing for the appointment of a receiver, which allows a debenture holder to realize his security or preserve the assets of the company. Section 393 (1) and (2) of the Act provides for the duties and powers of receivers and managers as follows:
“393 (1) A person appointed a receiver of any property of the company shall, subject to the rights of prior encumbrances take possession of and protect the property, receive the rents and profits and discharge all outgoings in respect of it and realize the security for the benefit of those on whose behalf he is appointed, but unless appointed manager, he shall not have power to carry out any business or undertaking. (2) A person appointed manager of the whole or any part of the undertaking of a company shall manage the same with a view to the beneficial realization of the security of those on whose behalf he is appointed.”
The appointment of a receiver or application before the Court to confirm the appointment of a receiver clearly arises from the operation of CAMA. It therefore comes within the purview of Section 251(1) (e) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 7(1) (c) of the Federal High Court Act. In the circumstance, the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to make such orders.
The implication of Section 251(1) (e) of 1999 Constitution as amended is that in an action involving regulating, running or management or control of companies, the Federal High Court would be vested with jurisdiction, .. an action could be maintained and entertained in matters affecting formation or winding-up of a company, memorandum and articles of association; shares and share holding; appointment, removal or change or alteration of director-s It also includes appointment of receiver and his various obligations such as giving notice of his appointment, filing statements of accounts with the Corporate Affairs Commission. These are contained in the various provisions of the Companies Act Cap. 59, particularly Sections 393, 396, 398 and 399. These provisions control the conduct of a receiver and any claim arising from a breach thereof or enforcing right thereunder will qualify as an action arising from the operation of the said Act or regulation. In Tanarewa’s case, the cause of action arose from a contract of supply.
It was held that it did not translate into a matter arising from the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act merely because the company in breach of the contract was a company in receivership. Having carefully examined the originating summons and the affidavit in support, it is my respectful view that pursuant to Section 251(1) (e) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 7 (1) (c) of the Federal High Court Act, 1990, and Section 650(1) of CAMA, the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Accordingly the High Court of Katsina-State, Malumfashi division lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
Two basic and interwoven factors or necessary threads determine the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to determine a suit before it. They are the parties and the subject matter of the suit. See Per GALADIMA, J.S.C in KAKIH V. PDP & ORS (2014) LPELR-23277(SC). Per RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C in OBIUWEUBI V. CBN (2011) LPELR- 2185(SC), tacitly pronounced that ?jurisdiction is the combination of parties and subject matter.” In the instant appeal, the parties are corporate bodies, whose administration and matters fall within the CAMA. As to the subject matter, the reliefs above are insightful and germane. It must be noted that reliefs 1 to 10, which deal with the issue of unlawful sale of the landed property by the receiver/manager and not by any dick and harry, cover and center on the appointment, conduct and functions of the receiver/manager and the property of the company. What all this means is that title of the land is not contested nor in issue here but the validity and sale of the landed property by the receiver/manager. See particularly pages 219-221 of the record. I am in agreement with the reasoning of the trial Court when it held at page 671 of the record that, the grouse of the plaintiffs in this suit centers on the conduct of the 1st Defendant as receiver/manager appointed by the 2nd Defendant over the assets of the aforementioned company. The sale of the company property used as collateral for the loan by the 1st Defendant in exercise of his functions as receiver/manager which the plaintiffs complain was done in bad faith and in breach of his fiduciary relationship with the company There is absolutely no dispute as to title of land but to declare the purported sale by the receiver/manager done in bad faith as illegal, unlawful and same was done in breach of the 1st Defendant’s duty to act in utmost good faith.”
In fact, it is to undo the evil the receiver/manager has done. See relief 1 at page 668 of the record.
Even where there are mixed reliefs, that is, principal and ancillary, as submitted by learned Counsel to the Appellant, the principal should be considered. The principal reliefs and parties in this appeal all border on the appointment and functions of the receiver/manager in management and sale of the landed property of the company. When it becomes necessary to sieve ancillary relief from principal, as demands by circumstance, it is done roughly to give mathematical answer to effect a purpose. The law allows it. See COTECNA INT’L LTD. V. IVORY MERCHANT BANK LTD. (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt.315) 26 at 38, TUKUR V. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (No. 2) 1989 4 (NWLR) (pt. 117) 517. The fact that landed property is involved does not oust the Federal High Court of its jurisdiction. The functions of the receiver/manager involves management of property whether landed or not and irrespective of wherever it is situate. I cannot see nor assume that the High Court of a State has any string of jurisdiction to entertain this matter. This suit and the issues therein completely fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as rightly decided by the trial Court and I so support and hold.
This issue is therefore resolved against the Appellant. The Appellant’s appeal therefore fails and it is hereby dismissed. In sum, the Ruling of Honourable Justice Evelyn N. Anyadike of the Federal High Court of Justice, Kaduna Judicial Division in Suit No.FHC/KD/CS/126/2015, delivered on 28/10/2015, wherein the trial Court overruled the Preliminary Objection and held that it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit, is affirmed. There shall be costs to the 1st to 8th and 10th Respondents assessed at N100,000.00 only against the Appellant.
MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.: I have had the benefit and read before now while in draft, the lead judgment of my lord, Justice Uwani Musa Abba Aji, JCA which has just been delivered. I am in agreement with the fluid reasoning and veritable conclusion reached therein, to the resounding effect that the appeal lacks merit and deserves nothing but the badge of failure and hammer of dismissal. I too adjudge the instant appeal matter as having failed and further endorse the consequential orders contained in the said lead judgment of my lord, Abba Aji, JCA including the one made with regard to costs.
OBIETONBARA O. DANIEL-KALIO, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the draft copy of the judgment of my lord UWANI MUSA ABBA-AJI JCA and I agree with the reasoning and conclusions of my lord. By way of a small contribution, a quick look at the Statement of Claim will show that the cause of action is the sale of S.M. Nguroje Nig. Ltd (Tae Estate) by the Receiver/Manager the 1st defendant at the lower Court, to the 3rd defendant in that Court.
The cause of action therefore has to do with the role of the Receiver/Manager in the sale of the property and not the location of the property. From the Statement of Claim therefore, it is the Federal High Court that has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter under Section 251 (1) (e) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended and not the High Court of the State where the land is situated. In the case of APOSTLE O.N. GODWIN & ORS V. ELDER F.U. OKWEY (2010) 16 NWLR PART 1219 p. 309; also reported in (2010) LPELR 1326 (SC), ONNOGHEN JSC now CJN stated that it is settled law that it is the claims of the plaintiff as contained in the Writ of Summons and/or the Statement of Claim that determines the question as to whether or not the Court before which the action pends has the jurisdiction to entertain and determine same. The Statement of Claim puts the jurisdiction of the Claims firmly and squarely in the Federal High Court. For this reason and the fuller reasons given in the lead judgment of my learned brother, the appeal lacks merit and is dismissed.
The Ruling of the lower Court is affirmed. I abide by the costs awarded in the lead judgment.
Appearances:
Chief L. D. Nzadon, Esq.For Appellant(s)
Zaid Umar, Esq. for 1st-8th and 10th Respondents.
Z. L. Dashe, Esq. for 9th Respondent.
D. Datok, Esq. for 11th Respondent.For Respondent(s)
