MATTHEW OLUESE v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ANOR
(2013)LCN/6434(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Monday, the 22nd day of July, 2013
CA/L/821/2012
JUSTICES
AMINA ADAMU AUGIE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
FATIMO OMORO AKINBAMI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MATTHEW OLUESE Appellant(s)
AND
1. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
2. LANDMARK BUREAU DE CHANGE Respondent(s)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION HAS THE PREREQUISITE POWER TO INSTITUTE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
…He has addressed the germane issues, especially Issue 1, and I will simply add that the Supreme Court knocked the bottom out of the Appellant’s arguments in the case of Amadi v. FRN (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt.1119) 259, wherein the Appellant had also argued that the Respondent lacked the prerequisite power to prosecute him, and by implication the trial Court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held-
“….The EFCC is a common agency for both the Federal and State Economic and Financial Crimes, and as such it qualifies as any other authority to institute criminal proceedings under Section 211(1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution…”
In that case, Amadi V. FRN (supra), Mukhtar, JSC (as he then was) further said-
“That is why I am in agreement with the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal when in his Judgment he stated the following:-
“- – In view of the high premium attached to speedy disposal of criminal cases, the Attorney-Generals of the States delegate their powers to the various State Commissioners of Police who institute and prosecute criminal matter in the name of such Commissioners of Police. Such powers are also delegated to the Federal Board of Internal Revenue, Nigeria Customs Service and lately EFCC by the Attorney-General of the Federation. This arrangement is made possible subject to the provisions of section 174(1)(b)(c) and 211(1)(b)(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, which provide that the Attorney-General of the Federation or State, as the case may be, shall have power to take over and continue any such criminal proceedings instituted by any other authority or person, and to discontinue at any stage before Judgment is delivered any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by him or any other authority or person”. PER AUGIE, J.C.A.
RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): By Notice of Appeal filed on the 19th of October 2012, the Appellant appeals the decision of Honourable Justice H.A.O. Abiru of the High Court of Lagos State, Ikeja delivered on the 27th of September 2012 in Charge No. ID/214C/2010.
The Appellant and Landmark Bureau De Change – his employer were convicted on the two count charges of stealing, and Issuance of Dishonoured Cheques.
FACTS
The Appellant is the General Manager of the 2nd Respondent. The Appellant received an order from one Gregory Ilobinno of Greful International Limited to sell and transfer the sum of $250,000.00 to a company in Norway known as Norfish Limited on behalf of the said customer, who has paid the naira denomination into the bank account of the 2nd Respondent, at the instance of the Appellant who gave him the said bank account, in his capacity as the General Manager of the 2nd Respondent.
The sum of 30 million naira was paid into the Spring Bank Account of the 2nd Respondent, and the Appellant then approached the bankers to the 2nd Respondent, bought some United States Dollars with it, and rather than carrying out instructions given to him by the customer, fraudulently converted the money to his use.
After persistent demand of the money by Gregory Ilobinno of Greful International, the Appellant issued and signed a cheque of the 2nd Respondent in the sum of N30 million dated 21st of October 2008.
The cheque, upon presentation was returned unpaid due to insufficient fund in the 2nd Respondents’ account.
Gregory Ilobinno of Greful International Limited then petitioned the office of the Executive Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission.
After investigation, the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent were charged to Court (the High Court of Lagos State Ikeja, to be specific) on a two count charge of stealing contrary to Section 390(8)(b) of the Criminal Code, Cap C17 Vol.2, Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003; and Issuing of Dishonoured Cheque contrary to Section 1(1)(b) of the Dishonoured Cheque (offences) Act Cap. D11 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 respectively.
By Notice of Appeal filed on the 19th of October 2012, the Appellant has four Grounds of Appeal which are:
Ground No 1: “The learned trial Judge erred in law and exceeded his jurisdiction in hearing and determining count 1 of the charge.”
Ground N 2: “The learned trial Judge erred in law or misdirected himself in convicting the 2nd Defendant on count 2 of the charge when all the ingredient of the offence had not been established.”
Ground No 3: “The learned trial Judge erred in law in convicting a non-existed person.”
Ground No 4: “The decision of the learned trial Judge is altogether unwarranted and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.” – pages 323-324 of the Record of Appeal.
Ground No 2, in my view ex facie is an incompetent ground. This is because, in law, you cannot complain of error in law or misdirection in one ground. This makes the Ground vague.
Order 6 Rule 2(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011 provides thus:
“where a ground of appeal alleges misdirection or error in law, the particulars and the nature of the misdirection or error shall be clearly stated.”
To say that the learned trial Judge erred in law or misdirected himself, without stating with specificity the particulars of error in law and of misdirection, makes the Ground of Appeal vague and liable to be struck out. OKORIE V. UDOM (1960) 5FSC 162; ANYAOKE V. ADI 1986 6 SC. 75.
This Ground is therefore hereby struck out, being incompetent.
The Appellant filed its Brief of Argument on the 13th of February 2013. It is settled by Titilola Akinlawon SAN.
The 1st Respondent filed his Brief of Argument on the 11th of April 2013. Same is settled by Benedict Ubi Esq.
The 2nd Respondent filed no Brief of Argument.
The Appellant filed a reply brief on the 14th of May 2013.
The Appellant had distilled three issues for determination from the Grounds of Appeal. They are:
(1) “Whether it was contrary to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 for a charge of stealing to have been prosecuted in the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria” – Distilled from Ground 1.
(2) “Whether the learned trial Judge was right in convicting the Appellant on count 2 of the charge proffered against him when all the ingredients of the offence had not been established” – Distilled from Ground 2.
(3) “Whether Landmark Bureau De Change was liable for conviction and with what consequence for the Appellant” – Distilled from Ground 3.
Ground 2 having been struck out, this automatically affects Issue No 2 as same flows from it. It is hereby struck out.
The position is that the Appellant’s brief of argument is predicated on two issues for determination, that is to say Issues 1 and 3.
The 1st Respondent distilled three issues for determination from its brief of argument. They are:
(1) “Whether the prosecution of the Appellant for a state offence by a Federal Government Agency in the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria upon a proper delegation of prosecutorial Authority by the Lagos State Attorney-General was contrary to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).”
(2) “Whether Landmark Bureau De Change was liable for conviction and with what consequences for the Appellant.”
(3) “Whether the 1st Respondent proved its case beyond reasonable doubt with regards to the two counts of stealing and issuance of dishonoured cheque at the trial Court.”
Issue No 2, having been distilled from Ground No 2 which was struck out, is also hereby struck out and cannot therefore be considered. I shall however determine this appeal on Grounds 1 and 3 and Issues 1 and 3 of the Appellant’s Brief which is essentially adopted by the 1st Respondent.
ISSUE NO 1
The Appellant argues that by virtue of Section 174(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, the Attorney-General of the Federation is empowered to
“Institute and undertake Criminal Proceedings against any person before any Court of Law in Nigeria other than a Court Martial in respect of any offence created by or under any Act of the National Assembly.”
That conversely Section 211(1) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria makes similar provisions in respect of the Attorney-General of a state, but with respect to offences created by or under any law of the House of Assembly.
He submits that the Attorney-General of the Federation is empowered only to prosecute offences created by or under an Act of the National Assembly (Federal offences) and the Attorney-General of a State is empowered only to prosecute offences created by or under any law of the House of Assembly (State offences).
Citing QueenV. Onoh (1962) 2 NSCC 416 he submits that stealing is a state offence.
Submits that in this case, on appeal, the Appellant was prosecuted by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in the name of the “Federal Republic of Nigeria” on count 1 which is an offence of stealing.
Submits that the prosecution relied on inter alia Section 174(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, which means he was exercising the power of the Attorney-General of the Federation contained in Section 174(1) of the 1999 Constitution.
He queries, can the Attorney-General of the Federation institute and undertake criminal proceedings, in respect of stealing, a state offence?
He submits that the 1st count with which the Appellant is charged states thus
“Stealing contrary to Section 390(8)(b) of the Criminal Code Law Cap. C17 Vol. 2 Laws of Lagos State.”
That the Attorney-General of a State is the one empowered only to prosecute offences created by or under any law of the House of Assembly (State offences). He submits that stealing is a State offence.
He submits that in the present case, the Appellant was prosecuted by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in the name of the “Federal Republic of Nigeria”. The offence is one of stealing.
He submits that the Attorney-General of the Federation is precluded from prosecuting a charge of stealing and was therefore disqualified from prosecuting the charge of the information proffered against the Appellant.
He submits that the Attorney-General of the Federation cannot exercise his power over state offences and similarly the Attorney-General of a state cannot exercise his power over Federal offences.
He submits that if either exercised power other than in accordance with the constitution, the exercise of such power would be a nullity.
He submits that there is no evidence on record to show that the Attorney-General of Lagos State delegated his powers to the Attorney-General of the Federation to prosecute the Appellant for stealing.
That assuming, but without conceding that there was any such delegation (which is denied) he submits that the count of stealing against the Appellant should have been proffered in the name of the Attorney- General of Lagos State and not in the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
He submits that it is wrong for the Prosecutor to have charged the Appellant in the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, when in fact he was exercising the power of the Attorney-General of Lagos State.
He urges Court to quash the conviction and sentence of the Appellant.
On Issue No 2, he submits that the Appellant was charged in the 2nd count as follows
“Issuance of dishonoured cheque contrary to Section (1) (a) of the Dishonoured Cheques (offences) Act Cap D11 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004”
Citing Section 1(1)(a) of the Dishonoured Cheques (offences) Act Cap D11 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria provides that
“Any person who obtains or induces the delivery of anything capable of being stolen either to himself or to any other person by means of a cheque that when presented for payment not later than three months after the date of the cheque is dishonoured on the ground that no funds or insufficient funds were standing to the credit of the drawer of the cheque in the bank on which the cheque was drawn, shall be guilty of an offence.”
He submits that the ingredients of the offence of issuance of a dishonoured cheque, under the above stated provision of the Act, are as follows:-
(a) Obtaining or inducing the delivery of anything capable of being stolen
(b) For the accused or any other person
(c) By means of a dishonoured cheque.
He queries “that thing capable of being stolen was obtained by the Appellant in return for a dud cheque in this case.”
He submits that the Appellant ostensibly obtained the sum of N30 million from the Complainant for the payment of the equivalent in U.S. Dollars. But that the question is “was this done by a dishonoured cheque?” He submits that the answer is no. This is because the dishonoured Spring Bank Cheque (159) dated 21/10/08 issued by Landmark Bureau De Change Limited said to be under the hand of the Appellant in favour of Gregil International Limited was not used to obtain from or induce the Compliance to part with N30 million, because the N30 million has already been obtained prior to the issuance of this cheque.
That the Complainant Gregil International Limited, actually paid the sum of N30 million into the account of Landmark Bureau De Change Limited account No 0261601000082 at Spring Bank Plc, Azikiwe Road Branch, Aba on the 16th day of September 2008.
That for the ingredients of this offence to be made out, the dud cheque must antedate the receipt of property or consideration and not postdate it as in the instant case. That the cheque must induce the complaint to part with something capable of being stolen. In the instant case, nothing was parted with after receipt of the dud cheque.
He submits that the learned trial Judge erred in convicting and sentencing the Appellant on count 2 when an ingredient of the offence was not present.
On Issue No 3 – he submits that in the information filed in this charge, the Appellant was charged along with “Landmark Bureau De change”.
He submits that Landmark Bureau De change is not known to law, as it is a non-existent person.
Submits that the way and manner the company’s name was stated in the charge suggests that it is a Business Name and not a Company incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act. That the
Business Name cannot be sued or charged to Court.
Citing SLB Consortium v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (Part 1252) 317, he submits that a business name is not accorded legal personality. That the charging and conviction of Landmark Bureau De change is a nullity.
Therefore the Appellant could not have been held responsible or liable for the acts of a non-existent person.
The 1st Respondent adopts essentially the issues proffered by the Appellant.
On Issue No 1
From records, the Appellant and Landmark Bureau De Change were charged by the Federal Republic of Nigeria. On the face of the information it says inter alia
“At the Criminal Division of the High Court of Lagos State holden at Ikeja on the ………….day of ……….2010, the Court is informed by the Executive Chairman of Economic and Financial Crime Commission on behalf of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that
1. MATTHEW OLUESE
2. LANDMARK BUREAU DE CHANGE is charged with the following offences……”
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – 1ST COUNT
Stealing contrary to Section 390(8) (b) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap C17 Vol. 2 Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003 – page 2 of the Record of Appeal. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004, enacted by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria – in Section 6(m) Part II, (on the functions of the Commission) stipulates thus:-
“taking charge of, supervising, controlling, coordinating all the responsibilities, functions and activities relating to the current investigation and prosecution of all offences connected with or relating to economic and financial crimes.”
Section 14(2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 has this to say
“Subject to the provision of Section 174 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (which relates to the power to the Attorney-General of the Federation to institute, continue, takeover or discontinue criminal proceedings against any person in any Court of Law), the commission may compound any offence punishable under this Act by accepting such sums of money as it thinks fit, exceeding the maximum amount to which that person would have been liable if he had been convicted of that offence”
It is apparent that the EFCC was informed on behalf of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to prosecute the Appellant and Landmark Bureau De Change.
It is also apparent that the offence for stealing is under the Criminal Code Law of a State (here Lagos State).
It is also apparent that the alleged offences with which the Appellant was charged were committed in Lagos within the Ikeja Judicial Division.
Section 56 of the Administration of Criminal Justice (Repeals and Re-Enactment) Law 2011, has this to say
“Every Court has authority to cause to be brought before it any person who is within the jurisdiction and is charged with an offence committed within the State, or which according to law may be dealt with as if the offence had been committed within the jurisdiction and to deal with such person according to Law”
By Section 60 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law, it enables offenders of Federal Laws to be tried and punished as if the offence had been actually or wholly committed in the State.
In the present case, the accused persons were alleged to have committed the offences in Lagos State, in the Ikeja Judicial Division. The grouse of the Appellant is that the Federal Government had no right to have charged him.
While the 1st Respondent concedes that the Federal Attorney-General has his prosecutorial powers defined and codified by Section 174 of the 1999 Constitution whilst the State Attorney-Generals have their prosecutorial powers defined and codified in Section 211 of the Constitution, the Federal Attorney-General of the Federation can prosecute in respect to the Economic and Financial Crimes offences, and can carry out such functions in the name and on behalf of the Federal Republic of Nigeria even when prosecuting under a component States Law in the Federation citing MIKE AMADI V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt.1119) 259.
Section 211 of the Constitution talks about the power of the State Attorney-General to prosecute, but decidedly the word may used in that Section does not restrict the delegation of the Attorney-General’s power to only officers in his department – MIKE AMADI V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (supra).
lf we take Section 174(1) of the Constitution, it is my view that the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 is one enacted by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and so the Attorney General of the Federation shall have power to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any court of Law in Nigeria, in respect of any offence created by or under any Act of the National Assembly.
But the offences of stealing and issuance of dishonoured cheques contrary to Section 390(8)(b) of the Criminal Code Law C17 Vol. 2 Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria 2003 and Section 1(1)(a) of the Dishonoured Cheques (offences) Act, Cap D11 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, cannot be isolated, as they constitute the term “any offence” in Section 174(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
It is my view that the Federal Attorney General has power to prosecute any offence in respect of which the EFCC is concerned. This because, as postulated by the 1st Respondent (righty in my view), the fight against corruption or economic and financial crimes can only be fought by the Federal Government through its Agencies and departments – NYAME V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2010) 11 NWLR (Part 1193) 344.
The EFCC is an Agency in the prosecution of economic and financial crimes offenders for both the Federal Government and the State Government in Nigeria. Its functions are unique, moreso Section 6(m) of the EFCC Act enables the body to prosecute all offences connected with or relating to economic and financial crimes as the matter at hand is.
At page 9 of the Record of Appeal is a report of a case of fraud and deceit by the Appellant.
As discerned from pages 12-37 of the Record of Appeal, the investigation of this matter was carried out by the EFCC.
I am of the view that it is not contrary to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 for a charge of stealing to have been prosecuted in the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria because Section 174(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic 1999, talks about “any offence created by under any Act of the National Assembly.”
Chapter 3 of the Criminal Code Act interprets the application of Criminal Law as applying to Federal and State Laws.
The answer to this issue is in the negative and same is resolved in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.
On Issue No 3
The 1st Respondent in his Issue No 2 had contended that this issue which revolves around the issue of proper parties, was not raised at the lower Court.
He submits that by virtue of Section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Law, any objection to a charge for any formal defect shall be taken immediately after the charge has been read over to the accused person and not later, citing FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA V. ADEWUNMI (2007) 4 S.C. 30. He submits that when on the 3rd of February 2011, the charges were read over to the Appellant at the time of the arraignment who understood perfectly the charges read to him in English Language, raised no objection as to any defect in the charge, but pleaded not guilty to the charge.
At pages 114 – 115 of the Record of Appeal, the Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges, after they were read to him in English Language and he seemed perfectly to understand same.
The Appellant did not object to the charges being read to him. He did not contend, as he now contends in his Brief of Argument – paragraphs 3.3.1 – 3.3.6 thereof, that Landmark Bureau De change cannot be sued or charged to Court. The Appellant further contends that Landmark Bureau De Change is not “Landmark Bureau De Change Ltd”, and since Landmark Bureau De Change and not Landmark Bureau De Change Ltd that was charged and convicted is a nullity. He submits that Landmark Bureau De Change is not a legal person.
He submits that therefore the Appellant could not have been held responsible or liable for the acts of a non-existent person.
Noteworthy is that the 2nd Respondent filed no Brief of Argument. By the rules of this court, he shall not be heard in oral argument. See Order 18 Rule 10 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011. The 1st Respondent did not indicate that he had a joint brief of argument with the 2nd Respondent.
The 1st Respondent urges this court to amend, the title and description given the 2nd Respondent in the information at the lower Court since it has been made an issue of contention by the Appellant at this stage of the appeal, even then it was not so contended at the Court of trial.
Now at pages 14 – 19 of the Record of Appeal, the Appellant in his statement to the authorities of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission dated 10th December 2008, did say that he is the General Manager of Landmark BLC Ltd of 12, Apapa/Oshodi Expressway, Apapa.
It is apparent that the EFCC did not even seek to prosecute the 2nd accused person, because the names on the charge sheet is not Landmark BLC Ltd of which the Appellant is General Manager but Landmark Bureau De Change.
The Appellant did not object to the charge when it was read over to him at the lower Court. He cannot do so now.
Moreso from records, by letter dated 22nd December 2008, one T.A. Akinwande for Registrar-General, Corporate Affairs Commission wrote to the Head of Operations, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 15A Awolowo Road Ikoyi, Lagos, I shall reproduce same verbatim.
“Corporate Affairs Commission
PRD/9/VOL. XIX889 22nd December, 2008
The Head of Operations
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
15A Awolowo Rood, Ikoyi.
INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES
RE- LANDMARK BUREAU DE CHANGE
Kindly refer to your letter Ref. CR: 3000/EFCC/LS/CT & GI/FSTB/VOL.1/533 dated 2nd December, 2008 on the above.
I am directed to inform you that there is information in our database to show that the above named company is registered with the Commission.
Please find below the particulars of the company.
Name of Company Landmark Bureau De Change
Registration Number 680244
Date of Registration 6th February, 2007
Share Capital 15,000,000
Reg. Office Address Umurze House, 12 Apapa/Oshodi
Expressway, Odi Apapa, Lagos
Annual Returns Net paid
NAMES OF DIRECTORS/SHARES ADDRESS
1. HRH IGWE PROMISE
6 Trinity Close, Olodi Apapa
Lagos (10,000,000)
2. OBIORA GODWIN EZE
No. 1 Saukiu Street,
Olochi. (2,500,000
3. EZECHUKWU EZE (2,500,000)
Thank you.
Yours faithfully,
T.A. Akinwande
For: Registrar General.”
Pages 172 – 173 of the Record of Appeal.
The Appellant’s contention that the 2nd Respondent is not a juristic person is therefore misconceived and I so hold.
The Appellant and indeed the 2nd Respondent were proper parties at the trial and were properly convicted, after being found guilty – KWAZE V. STATE 2003 FWLR (Part 159) 1504; SMART V. THE STATE (1974) 575.
This issue is resolved in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.
The result is that the Appeal lacks merit and same is hereby dismissed.
The Judgment of Hon. Justice H.A.O Abiru of the High Court of Justice, Ikeja Division, Lagos delivered on the 27th of September 2012 in Charge No. ID/214C/2010 is hereby affirmed.
No order as to costs.
AMINA A. AUGIE, J.C.A.: I have read in draft the lead Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Pemu, JCA, and I agree with him that this appeal lacks merit. He has addressed the germane issues, especially Issue 1, and I will simply add that the Supreme Court knocked the bottom out of the Appellant’s arguments in the case of Amadi v. FRN (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt.1119) 259, wherein the Appellant had also argued that the Respondent lacked the prerequisite power to prosecute him, and by implication the trial Court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held-
“….The EFCC is a common agency for both the Federal and State Economic and Financial Crimes, and as such it qualifies as any other authority to institute criminal proceedings under Section 211(1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution…”
In that case, Amadi V. FRN (supra), Mukhtar, JSC (as he then was) further said-
“That is why I am in agreement with the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal when in his Judgment he stated the following:-
“- – In view of the high premium attached to speedy disposal of criminal cases, the Attorney-Generals of the States delegate their powers to the various State Commissioners of Police who institute and prosecute criminal matter in the name of such Commissioners of Police. Such powers are also delegated to the Federal Board of Internal Revenue, Nigeria Customs Service and lately EFCC by the Attorney-General of the Federation. This arrangement is made possible subject to the provisions of section 174(1)(b)(c) and 211(1)(b)(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, which provide that the Attorney-General of the Federation or State, as the case may be, shall have power to take over and continue any such criminal proceedings instituted by any other authority or person, and to discontinue at any stage before Judgment is delivered any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by him or any other authority or person”.
That is the correct position of the law. The learned Justice has put it down succinctly and he did not err in doing so”.
That is the decision of the apex Court of the land, and we are bound by it. Thus, the Appellant cannot re-visit that issue in this appeal before this Court, and the end result is that I also dismiss the appeal for being unmeritorious.
FATIMA OMORO AKINBAMI, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in advance the Judgment just delivered by my learned brother PEMU JCA.
He had dealt with all the issues raised in this appeal extensively.
I agree with the conclusions reached and I also dismiss the appeal, same being lacking in merit.
The Judgment of Hon. Justice H. A. O. Abiru of the High Court of Lagos State Ikeja Division delivered on the 27th of September 2012 in Charge No. ID/214C/2012 is hereby also affirmed by me.
I abide by the orders in the lead Judgment.
Appearances
Titi Ajayi (Miss)For Appellant
AND
B. Ubi Eze Esq., I. Daramola (Mrs) with M.W. Bawa Esq.For Respondent
