MATTHEW AHUNGUR v. THE STATE (2011)

MATTHEW AHUNGUR v. THE STATE

(2011)LCN/4936(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Tuesday, the 29th day of November, 2011

CA/I/192C/2010

RATIO

MEDICAL EVIDENCE: WHETHER MEDICAL EVIDENCE IS ALWAYS SINE QUA NON IN A MURDER TRIAL

Medical evidence is not always a sine qua non in a murder trial where the cause of death is obvious and clear coupled with the confession of the accused to the commission of the crime. See the case of Akpa vs. The State (2008) 8 SCM 68. PER CHINWE E. IYIZOBA J.C.A.

CONFESSION: DEFINITION OF A CONFESSION

CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT; CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE A CONFESIONAL STATEMENT WILL BE ENOUGH TO GROUND A CONVICTION

The law is that where a confessional statement is direct, positive and unequivocal as to the admission of guilt by an accused person, the statement is enough to ground the conviction of the accused so long as the court is satisfied with the truth of the confession. See Olalekan v. State (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 746) 793: Salawu v. State (1971) NMLR 735: Nwachukwu v. State (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt.1062) 31 at 69 D-G. Per Ogbuagu JSC: “I wish to state and this is settled that a court can convict an accused person on the confessional statement made by him provided it is direct, positive and unequivocal about his committal of the crime. See the cases of Yusufu v. The State (1976) 6 SC 163 at 173, Okegbu v. The State (1984) 8 SC 65: Ogugu & 4 Ors v The State (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.134) 539: Kim v The State (1992) 4 SCNJ 81 at 110. (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt.233) 17 just to mention but a few. In other words, the law is clear that a free and voluntary confession of guilt, whether judicial or extra judicial, if it is direct and positive and properly established is sufficient proof of guilt and it is enough to sustain a conviction so long as the court is satisfied with the truth of such a confession. See the cases of Ikpo & Anor v The State [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 421)540 per Iguh JSC, citing several other cases therein, Igago v. The State (1999) at SCNJ 140. [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt.608) 568 and Hassan v. The State (2001) 7 SCNJ 643. (2001) 7 NSCOR 107 at 109, (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt.709) 184 and many others. PER CHINWE E. IYIZOBA J.C.A.

PROVOCATION: REQUIREMENTS THAT MUST CO-EXIST FOR A DEFENCE OF PROVOCATION TO SUCCEED

Before the defence of provocation can succeed the following requirements must co-exist: a) “That he has done the act for which he is charged in the heat of passion; b) The act must have been caused by sudden provocation; c) The act must have been committed before there was time for passion to cool; and d) The mode of resentment must be proportionate to the provocation offered.” See: Shande Vs. The State (2005) 12 NWLR (939) 301 at 316 E – H; also Oladipupo Vs. The State (1993) 6 NWLR (298) 131. PER MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MOORE A. A. ADUMEIN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

MATTHEW AHUNGUR Appellant(s)

AND

THE STATE Respondent(s)

CHINWE E. IYIZOBA J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant, Matthew Ahungur was arraigned before Shiyanbola J. of two Judicial Division of the Osun State High Court on the 28th day of January 2009 on a charge of murder. The facts of the case are not very much in dispute. The prosecution’s case was that in the evening of the 4th of June, 2005 at Kajola area Iwo, Osun State while the deceased Prince Sunday Adedoyin was in the beer shop of one Felicia Achiaga, the appellant met him there and demanded to know why he would not leave his ‘wife’ alone. The deceased replied the appellant that the woman now belongs to him, the deceased. The statement infuriated the appellant and he pulled out a cutlass he was carrying and chopped off the two hands of the deceased. The deceased was taken to the police station and died on his way to the hospital. The appellant went to the Divisional Police Station at Iwo to report the incident. He surrendered the cutlass to PW3, the investigating police officer, Sgt Tiamiya Olatoye
and it was admitted in evidence as exhibit P1. The appellant also made a confessional statement which was admitted in evidence as Exhibit P10. The case was later transferred to State C.I.D. Osogbo where the appellant again made another confessional statement to PW2 Sgt Gbenga Ojo. The confessional statement was attested to by one SPO Belham. Both the confessional statement and the attestation were admitted in evidence as Exhibits P6 and P7. In the two confessional statements, the appellant said he suspected his wife was going out with the deceased and that he had warned the deceased about four times including the day of the incident when he met the deceased at Oke-Ola and dared him not to go to his wife again and the deceased boasted that he was going there right now, and the appellant abandoned where he was going and traced the deceased to his wife’s shop. When he confronted the deceased, the deceased told him that Felicia is now his wife and anything he wants to do he should do. The statement provoked the appellant and he brought out his cutlass and chopped off the deceased’s two hands. The son of the deceased, Bamidele Adedoyin saw the corpse of his father in the hospital with his two hands almost cut off. He testified as PW1.
The appellant gave sworn evidence in his own defence and called no other witness. He admitted the main outline of the prosecution’s case as contained in his confessional statements. But apparently, in the attempt to find a plausible defence, he deviated and stated thus:
“On 4/6/2005 I came back from my farm around 4.00p.m and opened the door of my room from the outside. Immediately I opened the door, my wife rushed out. I then saw the deceased inside the room adjusting his trouser. I became afraid as the deceased was chanting incantations. I couldn’t do anything for about three to four minutes because I was confused and afraid. I then called the deceased and challenged him as to why he came to my matrimonial home to sleep with my wife. The deceased replied that my wife was now his wife and I lost my temper. I brought out my cutlass and matcheted him when the deceased attempted to attack me. The deceased shouted that he was dying and he ran out. I also came out and got an okada to the police station, where I reported that I met the deceased in my room having sex with my wife.”
The above constitutes the appellant’s defence. But the point is that the appellant had made confessional statements Exhibits P6 and P10, the voluntariness of which he did not challenge and which were not retracted. Indeed he ended his evidence in chief by stating:
“The Policemen wrote the statement for me to sign after reading it to me and after I understood same to be my statement”.
In respect of this conflict between the oral evidence of the appellant in court and his confessional statements, the learned trial judge had this to say:
“The accused appears not to be retracting his confessional statement, but wants this court to act on both his confessional statements and his evidence in court. It is however not possible for the court to act as such. A trial court is at liberty in certain circumstances to accept part of the testimony of a witness and reject the rest. See the case of Sule vs. The State (2009) 8 SCM 177 @ 181 ratio 6. This court shall accept part of the accused’s evidence which are not inconsistent with exhibits P6 and P10, and reject the rest which are inconsistent with exhibits P6 and P10 made when the matter was fresh. Consequently I reject the evidence by the accused person that he met his wife and the deceased in the room, while his wife rushed out, the deceased was adjusting his trouser. This part of the evidence is inconsistent with exhibits P6 and P10. I accept the contents of exhibit P6 and P10 to the effect that the accused person met the deceased in his wife’s shop; the latter having been made when the matter was still fresh. The accused person both in exhibits P6 and P10 and even in his evidence in court admitted macheting the deceased but that he was annoyed. The next question is…was the accused provoked?”
The learned trial judge then went on to consider whether the defence of provocation was available to the accused. He held that the alleged words of the deceased to the appellant was capable of constituting provocation but that the degree of retaliation by the accused, cutting off the two hands of the deceased was totally disproportionate to the provocation offered. The appellant was found guilty of the charge of murder and sentenced to death by hanging.
On 13/4/10, the appellant filed a notice of appeal to this court containing four grounds of appeal; out of which, his counsel Awoniyi Alabi Esq in his brief of argument formulated two issues for determination. The issues are:
1. Whether the defence of provocation succeeded and ought to have reduced the offence of murder to manslaughter. (Grounds 2 and 4).
2. Whether the learned trial judge improperly evaluated the evidence before him, which had occasioned a miscarriage of justice, thus rendering his decision perverse? (Grounds 1 and 3)
Akano K. M. (Mrs) Solicitor-General Ministry of Justice, Osun State with K. A. Tijani Principal State Counsel in their brief of argument for the respondent also identified the same issues for determination but in the reverse order:
1. Whether the offence of murder was proved beyond reasonable doubt (Grounds 1 and 3)
2. Whether the defense of provocation raised by defence could avail him (Grounds 2 and 4)
It appears to me that there is strictly no difference between the two issues formulated by the two sides and that the only real issue for determination in this appeal is whether the learned trial judge erred in holding that the defence of provocation was not available to the appellant but at page 75 of the record, the relief sought by learned counsel for the appellant was to set aside the decision of the learned trial judge and enter a verdict of discharge and acquittal for the appellant.
That means the appellant is challenging the entire judgment and not just the issue of availability of the defence of provocation. I shall consider the two issues together.
The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the learned trial judge did not properly evaluate the evidence before him, hence the wrongful conviction of the appellant for murder instead of manslaughter. Counsel argued that the prosecution was wrong in failing to call the appellant’s wife or any other eye witness to clear the doubt as to whether the incident happened in the matrimonial room or in the wife’s shop or whether or not the appellant was coming from his farm and had the cutlass with him or whether he pre-planned to kill the deceased. Counsel submitted that the learned trial judge while evaluating the evidence was overwhelmed and highly influenced by the statement of the accused person in Exhibit P10, and that it occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Counsel further submitted that there was ample evidence of things said and things done, which amounted to provocation serious enough to have caused the appellant to temporarily lose his self-control, and act independently of the exercise of his will, more so, given the appellant’s station in life. Counsel contended that the trial judge was right in his observation that the alleged words credited to the deceased was capable of constituting provocation and that having held that view, he was wrong in going ahead to convict the appellant of murder. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the ingredients of murder were established and that the learned trial judge was right to have convicted the appellant on the charge of murder. Referring to several authorities, counsel submitted that from the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3, the medical report exhibit P8 and the confessional statements exhibits P6, P10 there was no doubt that the deceased died, that the appellant caused the death of the deceased and that he intended to kill the deceased or at least cause him grievous bodily injury. Counsel submitted that the defence of provocation was not open to the appellant because the knowledge that his wife and the deceased were going out is enough to help him decide either to drop Felicia as his wife or to deal with the man trying to snatch his wife. He adopted the second option and decided to eliminate the deceased. That, counsel argued was evidence of malice aforethought. Counsel relied on Biruwa v. State (2005) 4 ACLR 336
This appeal is indeed a very simple matter. The appellant by his own confessional statements and in his oral evidence in court admitted cutting off the two hands of the deceased and running to the police station at Iwo to report himself (exhibit P6); or bringing out his cutlass and macheting the deceased(oral testimony). It is not in doubt that the deceased died. His son PWI identified his corpse to the medical doctor who conducted post mortem examination. He testified as PW1. Was death as a result of the injury inflicted by the appellant? The learned trial judge at page 63 of the record observed:
“The next question is whether death resulted from the act of the accused…According to the evidence of the accused and exhibits P6 and P10, the accused macheted the deceased in his hands which almost cut off according to the evidence of PW1 who saw the deceased at the hospital. According to exhibit P6, the incident happened around 4.00pm in the evening of 4/6/2005 and according to exhibit P8, the deceased was brought to the hospital dead which was confirmed at 6.15p.m of the same day 4/6/2005. It is observed here that death occurred immediately after the act, which was less than two hours after the act. Medical evidence is not always a sine qua non in a murder trial where the cause of death is obvious and clear coupled with the confession of the accused to the commission of the crime. See the case of Akpa vs. The State (2008) 8 SCM 68. In the present case, the cause of death which exhibit P8 attributed to Hemorrhage (primarily) and shock (secondarily) was due to heavy loss of blood primarily. The cause of death could be inferred even without exhibit P8 as the result of the act of the accused person and I so hold. See Michael v The State (2008) 10 SCM 83 ratio 1.”
The reasoning of the learned trial judge is in my view sound. Exhibits P2 and P3, photographs of the deceased with his two hands chopped off at the wrist confirm that death was due to heavy loss of blood. Death of the deceased clearly resulted from the unlawful act of the appellant. The evidence is straight forward and to the point. The appellant made a voluntary confessional statement which he did not retract. He committed the offence and reported himself to the police. The only issue really is whether the learned trial judge was right in holding that the defence of provocation was not available to the appellant.
Learned Counsel for the appellant had submitted that the trial judge was wrong in relying on Exhibit P10, the confessional statement of the appellant instead of his oral evidence in court and that the lower court should have called eye witnesses and the appellant’s wife to testify as to what really happened.
The learned trial judge found that the appellant’s oral evidence in court was in conflict with his voluntary and unretracted statement or confession to the police. He preferred the confessional statement because it was made immediately after the commission of the offence when the facts were still fresh in the memory of the appellant. The learned trial judge therefore rejected the oral evidence of the appellant that he met his wife and the deceased in the room and that while his wife rushed out, the deceased was adjusting his trouser. He accepted the evidence in the confessional statements that the appellant met the deceased in his wife’s shop. From the contents of Exhibit P10 which the learned trial judge believed, there was no eye witness to the events of 4/6/2005 as the persons present were just the appellant and the deceased. Even the appellant’s wife was not there at the time. Why should learned counsel close his eyes to these findings and insist that the prosecution should have called other eye witnesses including the appellant’s wife who was not at the scene at the material time. The contents of exhibits P6 & P10 further support the case of the prosecution that the incident happened in the wife’s shop and not in the matrimonial home. At the time of the incident, the appellant was not living with his wife. He said he had quarreled with his wife and he sent for her brother from Warri but he could not settle the problem for them instead he “sacked me out of the house, because of this I parked out for me to be sleeping any where I find myself.” Elsewhere in Exhibit P10, the appellant said:
“I met him sifting down in the shop, when I now called him, he answered me that yes Felicia is my wife that anything I want I should do it. The statement provoked me to the extent of wanting to kill him instantly. I brought out my cutlass…and matcheted him anywhere, he now started running to our house at other side of Kajola road.”
The above statement contradicts the appellant’s claim in his oral evidence in court that their matrimonial home is in same place as his wife’s shop. On the learned trial judge being overwhelmed or highly influenced by the statement of the appellant in exhibit P10, learned counsel apparently chose to ignore the fact that the statement he is referring to is a confessional statement made voluntarily by the appellant and which in his evidence in chief he acknowledged was his statement. In other words the confession was never retracted. Counsel had referred to the case of Ahmed v. The State (2001) 2 ACLR 131 @ 149 where Belgore JSC (as he then was) observed:
“In a situation where only the evidence of the accused person…is the only eye witness account he is either believed or there is no other evidence to believe. Our law is that prosecution in a criminal case must prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused person. In the absence of no other evidence, than that of the accused…and that evidence is not admission of guilt, but legitimate defence…the prosecution’s case has not been proved to the standard evidentially necessary .”
This quotation rather than support the view of the appellant’s counsel supports the respondent case in that a confessional statement was voluntarily made and was never retracted. The learned trial judge had the choice of either believing the oral evidence of the appellant or his confessional statement. He rightly in my view believed the statement in the confession which was made soon after the offence was committed. The later statement in court was an after thought to save the appellant from punishment for the heinous crime he committed.
An appellate court is bound by the findings of a trial court especially where much depends on which side the trial judge believed before making his findings.

Issues of the credibility of witnesses are best left to the trial judge who saw, heard and believed. Sunday Udofia v. The State (1984) S.C.

Section 27(1) of the Evidence Act defines a confession as an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed a crime and subsection (2) states that confessions, if voluntary are deemed to be relevant facts as against the persons who make them only. See Saidu v. The State (1982) 4 SC 41 at 64A-8: 70 E. The law is that where a confessional statement is direct, positive and unequivocal as to the admission of guilt by an accused person, the statement is enough to ground the conviction of the accused so long as the court is satisfied with the truth of the confession. See Olalekan v. State (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 746) 793: Salawu v. State (1971) NMLR 735: Nwachukwu v. State (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt.1062) 31 at 69 D-G. Per Ogbuagu JSC:
“I wish to state and this is settled that a court can convict an accused person on the confessional statement made by him provided it is direct, positive and unequivocal about his committal of the crime. See the cases of Yusufu v. The State (1976) 6 SC 163 at 173, Okegbu v. The State (1984) 8 SC 65: Ogugu & 4 Ors v The State (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.134) 539: Kim v The State (1992) 4 SCNJ 81 at 110. (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt.233) 17 just to mention but a few. In other words, the law is clear that a free and voluntary confession of guilt, whether judicial or extra judicial, if it is direct and positive and properly established is sufficient proof of guilt and it is enough to sustain a conviction so long as the court is satisfied with the truth of such a confession. See the cases of Ikpo & Anor v The State [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 421)540 per Iguh JSC, citing several other cases therein, Igago v. The State (1999) at SCNJ 140. [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt.608) 568 and Hassan v. The State (2001) 7 SCNJ 643. (2001) 7 NSCOR 107 at 109, (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt.709) 184 and many others.”
The learned trial judge was perfectly in order to rely on the confessional statement exhibit P10 and to accept only those parts of the oral evidence of the appellant which tallied with it while rejecting those inconsistent with it. See Sule v. The State. (2009) 8 SCM 177 @ 181.
At page 68 of the record, the learned trial judge found that the statement of the deceased to the appellant as contained in exhibit P10, the confessional statement that the appellant should do his worst because his wife now belongs to him was capable of constituting provocation; but because the degree of retaliation (cutting off the two hands of the deceased) was not proportionate to the provocation offered, the defence was not available to the appellant. While the learned trial judge is correct in his final conclusion that the defence cannot avail the appellant, having accepted exhibit P10 as the earlier confessional statement made by the appellant when the facts were still fresh in his memory, there are in the circumstances of the facts contained therein other reasons why the defence cannot avail the appellant.
In murder cases, for provocation to constitute a defence, three elements must co-exist – (1). The act of provocation must be grave and sudden. (2). The loss of self control must be both actual and reasonable. (3). The retaliation must be proportionate to the provocation. Wonaka v. Sokoto N.A. (1965) NSCC 28: Biruwa v. State (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt.220) 633. Abubakar Dan-Shalla v The State [2007] 12 MJSC 1.From the sequence of events in exhibits P6 & P10, the appellant had for some time suspected that the deceased was having an affair with his wife. He said he had warned him more than four times to leave his wife alone. On the day of the incident, 4/6/05, the appellant met the deceased at Oke-Ola area Iwo, he warned him as usual to leave his wife alone. The deceased replied that he was going to his wife’s place right now. The appellant went back to Kajola and indeed met the deceased in his wife’s shop. He said he was annoyed by the statement of the deceased that Felicia was now his wife and he should do his worst. But this was nothing new or sudden. From his confessional statement exhibit P10, that the deceased always pointed finger at him anywhere he saw him in town and threatened he would deal with him, it will appear that the appellant was well aware that the deceased considered him no threat as far as the woman Felicia was concerned. From exhibit P10, it will appear that Felicia was no longer interested in the marriage and had made him leave her house. As submitted by counsel for the respondent, the appellant had the choice to forget Felicia as a wife or deal with the deceased who he believed took his wife from him. He obviously chose to deal with the deceased. The fact that the appellant had a cutlass with him suggests that he had planned to do what he did and that it was not a case of sudden loss of self control. As pointed out by the learned trial judge, if the appellant had struck the deceased with his bare hands out of anger for what he said, and the unexpected happened, then the defence of provocation could be considered. The appellant clearly was not a victim of provocation which was grave and sudden as to deprive him of the power of self control. On the contrary he had been smarting from anger because of his belief that the deceased was having an affair with his wife or had taken his wife from him and he decided to kill the deceased. In exhibit P10, the accused had said “I did not know where the cutlass cut him because my intention was to kill him instantly.” The venom and strength with which the appellant inflicted the machete cut must have been enormous for the two hands to have been severed from the wrist. It is common knowledge that there are vital arteries and veins in the wrist which if cut with even an ordinary razor blade will lead to instant death through bleeding. On the other hand, it is possible that the appellant was aiming for the head or neck of the deceased and the deceased then raised his two hands to protect his head and they were cut off. Whichever, it is the clear that the intention was to kill. See Biruwa v. State (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt.220) 633 at 643 F-G Per Akpata JSC:
“Where a husband already has knowledge of the unfaithfulness and sexual immorality of his wife with another man and she has indeed deserted him, seemingly exercising her right as to whom to associate with, which is a matter of conscience and principle, and he kills that other man subsequently, provocation as a defence is not available to him it would be brutal murder because there would be nothing sudden in the provocation to deprive him of self control…”
The learned trial judge was right in holding that the defence of provocation set up by the appellant failed and that the prosecution established a case of murder against the appellant.
I find no merit in this appeal. It is hereby dismissed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant are affirmed.

MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.C.A. I have read in draft the judgment of my learned brother, C. E. Iyizoba, JCA just delivered and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion.
The facts of the case have been fully stated in the lead judgment. The main issue for determination in this appeal is whether the defence of provocation was open to the appellant in respect of the offence charged.
Before the offence of provocation can succeed the following requirements must co-exist:
a) “That he has done the act for which he is charged in the heat of passion;
b) The act must have been caused by sudden provocation;
c) The act must have been committed before there was time for passion to cool; and
d) The mode of resentment must be proportionate to the provocation offered.”
See: Shande Vs. The State (2005) 12 NWLR (939) 301 at 316 E – H; also Oladipupo Vs. The State (1993) 6 NWLR (298) 131.In the instant case there is no dispute as to the fact that the Appellant did the act for which he was charged. He reported himself at the police station immediately after he used a cutlass to chop off the hands of the deceased. However his two confessional statements, Exhibit P6 and P10, which were made voluntarily and never retracted, revealed that he had been nursing a grudge against the deceased for a long time on the suspicion that he was having an affair with his wife. The straw that broke the camel’s back was on the day of the incident when he met the deceased at Oke-Ola Area, Iwo and warned him to leave his wife alone. The deceased told him he was on his way to his wife’s shop. He changed course and went to his wife’s shop to see if the deceased’s threat was true. He did in fact meet the deceased there and this was when he used the cutlass in his possession to cut off the deceased’s hands at the wrist,
There is no doubt, from the facts as narrated by the Appellant in his confessional statements, that having had several altercations with the deceased, the situation in which he found himself on 4/6/05 was not sudden and did not come as a surprise. Being armed in advance with a cutlass, he clearly had a premeditated plan of what he would do when the deceased failed to heed his warning.
The force that must necessarily have been applied to almost completely sever both hands at the wrist, in my view, was a clear manifestation of an intent to kill and not merely to maim. I agree with my learned brother in the lead judgment that while it may be said that the words and actions of the deceased were provocative, the forced used by the Appellant was certainly not proportionate to the provocation offered. The Appellant was therefore not entitled to the benefit of a defence of provocation.
For these and the more detailed reasons eruditely advanced in the lead judgment, I also dismiss the appeal as lacking in merit. I uphold the conviction and sentence passed on the Appellant by the lower court.

MOORE A. A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading the draft of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, IYIZOBA, JCA. I completely agree with His Lordship’s resolution of this appeal.
From the facts of this case, as comprehensively summarized in the leading judgment, the defence of provocation does not avail the appellant. This is a pure case of premeditated murder by the appellant who had been brooding over the apparent lost of his ‘wife’ – Felicia Ochiaga to the deceased – Prince John Adedoyin. The act of the appellant brutally chopping off the two hands of the deceased, on the 4th day of June 2005, was not impulsive nor spontaneous. It was propelled by a carefully bottled up animosity by the appellant towards the deceased for the latter’s alleged sinful acts with the appellant’s said ‘wife’.
The appellant clearly committed murder, as rightly found by the learned trial judge and he ought to be punished, accordingly.
The well established principle of the law is that “it is in the best interest of the State that crimes not remain unpunished” as expressed in the maxim: “Interest republicae ne maleficia remaneant impunita.”For these reasons and more elaborate reasons given in the lead judgment, I too dismiss this appeal for lacking merit. I also affirm the conviction and sentence of the appellant.

Appearances

Awoniyi Alabi Esq.For Appellant

AND

K. M. Akano, Solicitor-General and K. A. Tijani principal State Counsel, Ministry of Justice Osun State.For Respondent