MATHEW v. FIRS & ANOR (2020)

MATHEW v. FIRS & ANOR

(2020)LCN/14169(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, May 22, 2020

CA/A/479/2014

Before Our Lordships:

Adamu Jauro Justice of the Court of Appeal

Peter Olabisi Ige Justice of the Court of Appeal

Emmanuel Akomaye Agim Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

EMMANUEL OTENE MATHEW APPELANT(S)

And

1. FEDERAL INLAND REVENUE SERVICE 2. FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE PUBLIC OFFICER (PROTECTION) ACT

The intention of the legislature in the Public Officer (Protection) Act is to provide protection for public officers, corporate or unincorporated bodies in the discharge of their public assignment. See OFFOBOCHE V OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT 2001 LPELR-2265 (SC). Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap 41 LFN 2004 provides as follows:- “Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect.
The action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury within three months next after the ceasing thereof…” PER JAURO, J.C.A.

HOW TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN ACTION IS STATUTE BARRED

It has been established in an imprimatur of judicial authorities that to determine whether an action is statute barred, all that is required is for one to examine the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the Plaintiff a cause of action and comparing that date with the date on which the Writ of Summons was filed. If the time on the Writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute-barred: See the case EGBE VS. ADEFARASIN (1987) LPELR – 1032 (SC).
The critical question is when did the cause of complaint arise? It is based on when it arose that it can be determined if the action was caught by the limitation laws.
The phrase, cause of action, has been defined as the fact or combination of facts which give rise to a right to sue. It consists of the wrongful act of the defendant which gives the claimant the right to complain and the damage consequent due to the wrongful act. See EGBUE VS. ARAKA (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 84) 598 AT 613; SAVAGE VS. UWECHIA (1972) 3 SC 214 AT 221. A cause of action is the factual basis or some factual situations, a combination of which makes the matter in litigation an enforceable right or an actionable wrong. See TUKUR VS. GOVT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 117) 517 AT 581. PER JAURO, J.C.A.

THE RATIONALE FOR THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

The rationale for the protection of public officers has been expounded in a legion of judicial authorities. In the case of EKEOGU V. ALIRI (1991) LPELR – 1079 (SC), the Supreme Court held the view that the Act is designed to protect a public officer against any action, prosecution or other proceeding; and for any act done in pursuance of or execution of any law, public duty, or authority; or for any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any law, duty or authority. In addition to this, it has been endorsed further by this Court and the Apex Court that the Act constitutes a limitation law which is designed for protecting public officers from being detracted in the conduct of their official duty by litigation that might have become otiose or in which witnesses may no longer be available due to the time lag. A person whose right has been affected by an act or default done or intended, in the lawful execution of a public duty must file an action for any redress within three months after such act or default.
It is pertinent to point out that the provisions of the POPA protecting a public officer is not absolute as an aggrieved individual has been adequately protected in some instances from the application of the limitation Act and when a public officer would be deprived of the protection guaranteed under the Public Officers Protection Act. See the decision of the Ilorin Division of this Court in the case of NIGERIA STORED PRODUCT RESEARCH INSTITUTE V. B.I.R., KWARA STATE (2013) LPELR – 22073 (CA). In essence, the provision of Section 2(a) of the POPA is not absolute. The argument of learned counsel to the Appellant to me in this regard is misplaced and same is hereby discountenanced. PER JAURO, J.C.A.

STATUTE OF LIMITATION

In other words, when a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action must be initiated, legal proceedings cannot be properly and validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Any such action instituted must be struck out as not being properly instituted before the Court. In effect, the right of the appellant to commence an action against the withdrawal and substitution of the 1st respondent is extinguished by operation of law – that is, Section 2(a) of the Public Officer Protection Law Cap 379 Laws of the Federation 1990. Egbe V. Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR pt. 47 pg. 1, Obiefuna V. Okoye (1964) 1 All NLR pg. 96, Adeosun V. Jibesin (2001) 11 NWLR pt. 724 pg. 290, Ibrahim V. Judicial Service Committee Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR pt. 584 pg. 1, Eboigbe V. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR pt. 347 pg. 649, Odubeko V. Fowler (1993) 7 NWLR Pt. 308 pg. 637.” Per ADEKEYE, J.S.C (Pp. 89-90, para. C) 20. PER JAURO, J.C.A.

ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the decision of the Federal High Court, Abuja Division delivered on 22nd June, 2010 by Honourable Justice A.I. Chikere wherein the Court below declined jurisdiction and struck out the Appellant’s suit for being statute barred.

BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Brief summary of facts that culminated into the instant appeal is that the Appellant, a former employee of the 1st Respondent (FIRS) instituted the suit that which is the subject matter of the instant appeal on the 27th June, 2008 vide a Writ of Summons dated 27th June, 2008 for which he claimed among other reliefs that his dismissal from service by the Respondents was unlawful, null and void. After the service of the said Originating processes on the Respondents, the 1st Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on the 5th March, 2009 challenging the competence of the suit on the ground that same was statute barred by virtue of the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act.

In a considered ruling delivered on the 22nd June, 2010, the Court below upheld the 1st

Respondent’s Preliminary Objection and struck out the Appellant’s suit for being statute barred.

Miffed by the decision of the Court below, the Appellant invoked the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court vide a Notice of Appeal dated 14th May, 2014 and filed on the same date.

In line with the Rules of the Court, the Appellant and the 1st Respondent filed and exchanged their respective briefs of argument. The 2nd Respondent did not file its Brief of argument and on the 23rd March, 2020, the appeal was heard on the Appellant’s and 1st Respondent’s Brief only.

The Appellant’s Brief of argument was dated 31st day of August, 2017 and filed on the 7th September, 2017. The said brief was settled by P.U. OGBADU ESQ., who at paragraph 3.1 of the Appellant’s Brief distilled two issues for the determination of this appeal to wit:
“1. Whether in determining the date of accrual of cause of action, the learned trial Judge was not wrong in placing reliance on the 1st respondent’s letter of dismissal of 11th February, 2005 and disregarding the letter and approving 2nd respondent’s letter of 26th

February, 2008 which was delivered/received on 15th April, 2008.
(Distilled from grounds 1, 2, 3 & 4 of the Notice)
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was not wrong, when she held that the Appellant’s suit is statute barred, and declined jurisdiction to entertain same. (Distilled from ground 5 of the Notice).”

The 1st Respondent’s Brief is dated 15th February, 2015 and filed on 18th February, 2015. The said Brief was settled by ANOZIEOBINNAYA OBI ESQ., who at paragraph 3.01 of the 1st Respondent’s Brief distilled three issues for the determination of the appeal to wit:
“1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in determining the date of accrual of the cause of action as 11th February, 2005?
2. Whether the limitation Period provided by the Public Officers Protection Act is Constitutional?
3. Whether the Appellant’s appeal and relief sought therein are not academic considering regards to the occurrence of the dismissal of the Appellant by the 1st Respondent vide is letter dated 11/02/2005 and the ratification of same by the 2nd Respondent vide its letter dated 26th February, 2008?

I have read through the pages of the record of appeal before this Honourable Court and the adopted briefs of argument of counsel to the parties in support of their postures in this appeal. The issues for determination canvassed by the parties are well examined and considered. In the resolution of this appeal, I consider the sole issue stated below apt and germane for the determination of the instant appeal:
“Whether the learned trial judge was right to have dismissed the suit for being statute barred?”

ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL
The summary of the Appellant’s argument is that in determining the date of accrual for cause of action, the trial Court disregarded the 2nd Respondent’s letter dated 26th February, 2008 and received on 15th April, 2008 and placed reliance on the 1st Respondent’s letter of dismissal dated 11th February, 2005. He submitted further that the 1st Respondent’s letter of 11/2/2005 was issued outside the confines of the 1st Respondent’s public duties, further from the colour of her public office and authority and beyond her statutory and constitutional duty. On the conditions that must be met

before the application of the public officer’s protection Act, he referred this court to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act.

He submitted further that the Appellant’s cause of action only became complete after he had exhausted all available local remedies and his appeal responded to vide the 2nd Respondent’s letter dated 26/2/2008. On the need for an officer to exhaust all the internal administrative remedies before heading to Court for redress, counsel referred this Court to paragraphs 090101 to 090209 of the Public Service Rules. He submitted that the learned trial judge in deciding when the cause of action accrued should have taken into consideration the dismissal letter dated 26th February, 2008 and delivered to the Appellant on 15th April, 2008, the letter being the final seal that made the Appellant’s fate final and not until the finality of decision on the Appellant’s fate, going to Court would have been undoubtedly premature. He referred this Court to its decision PROFESSOR ANYANWU V. UNIVERSITY OF JOS (2014) LPELR 22556.

It is the contention of Counsel that the learned trial Judge ignored

the totality of pleadings in the claim, in arriving at the date on which the cause of action arose. He argued that the law is settled that it is the totality of facts in the statement of claim that determines when the Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued. He referred this court to the case of OMOMEJI V. KOLAWOLE (2008) 14 NWLR (Part 1106) 180 at 205. It is the submission of Counsel that the determination of the accrual of cause of action on the 1st Respondent’s letter of dismissal of 11th February, 2005 was a point raised suo motu by upon which neither party was heard. Counsel argued that where a point is raised suo motu, the parties must be afforded the opportunity to address the Court on that point particularly the party that will suffer some prejudice or disadvantage by the point so raised. He referred this court to the case of OLUSANYA V. OLUSANYA (1983) 14 NSCC 47; AJUWON V. AKANNI (1993) 12 SCNJ 32.

It is also the submission of counsel to the Appellant that the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officer’s Protection Act is unconstitutional and offensive to the right of equality before the law and as such, cannot and should

not be relied upon to render an otherwise competent case incompetent. It is his further submission that if a government institution can sue a private person at any time it wants beyond three months after a wrong is committed against it by that private person, for a private person’s right of action against the same government institution to suffer the limitations imposed by the POPA is unconstitutional. He referred this court to the SECTION 1(1), 1(3) AND 42 OF THE CFRN, 1999.

On the whole, he urged this court to allow this appeal and set aside the decision of the Court below.

It is the submission of the Counsel to the 1st Respondent that upon a consideration of the averment of the Appellant in paragraph 10 of his statement of claim, the cause of action arose when the 1st Respondent dismissed the Appellant from its services vide the letter dated the 11th of February, 2005. He argued that once the time pleaded in the writ of summons is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, the action is statute-barred. He cited the case of CHIEF WOHEREM J.P V. EMEREUWA (2004) 7 SCJN 119 at 130, 132.

In response to the Appellant’s submission

that the Appellant needed to exhaust the administrative remedies before ventilating his grievances in Court, the 1st Respondent’s counsel submitted that the 1st Respondent contends that the relationship between it and the Appellant terminated on the 11th February, 2005 when it served the Appellant its letter terminating his employment with effect from February 2005. He submitted further that Appellant election to pursue an appeal to the 2nd Respondent was entirely an action carried out without prejudice to his constitutional right of an action in Court.

It is the contention of counsel that the Appellant elected to appeal to the 2nd Respondent (Civil Service Commission), Public Complaints Commission and the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria instead of proceeding to Court. He contended further that the 2nd Respondent after considering the appeal issued the Appellant with a letter dated 26th February, 2008 and that it took the Appellant a period of three years and four months to file this suit against his dismissal by the 1st Respondent. He argued that the law is trite that negotiation/arbitration of appeals between parties doesn’t prevent or stop the

limitation period from running. He referred this Court to the case GBADAMOSI LOHAN V. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, WESTERN NIGERIA (1928) AND HOWLETT V. LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (1908) 24 J.L R 331.

On the issue raised by the Court suo motu without affording the parties the opportunity to address it, learned counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted that it is not every mistake or error in a judgment that will result in an appeal being disallowed and that it is only when the error is substantial in that it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice that the appellate Court is bound to interfere. He submitted further that assuming that the learned trial Judge raised the issue suo motu, the decision reached by the Court did not occasion a miscarriage of justice because the facts leading to the decision that the case was statute barred were those that were already before the Court. He argued that it is the duty of the Court to draw inferences from facts before him. He referred this Court to the case of GWANTU V. YAKI & ORS (2013) LPELR – 21416 (CA).

On the constitutionality or otherwise of the POPA, learned counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted that the

limitation period imposed by statute is not in conflict with the Constitution, rather it goes to ensure that parties have ample opportunity to prosecute a matter in Court within whatever period as stipulated by law governing each material case. For the essence of limitation laws as provided by the POPA, he referred this Court to the case of AJAYI V. ADEBIYI & ORS (2012) LPELR – 7811 (SC), pp. 75.

He therefore urged this Court to hold that the Public Officers Protection Act is constitutional. On the whole, he urged this court to dismiss the appeal for lacking in merits.

RESOLUTION
The intention of the legislature in the Public Officer (Protection) Act is to provide protection for public officers, corporate or unincorporated bodies in the discharge of their public assignment. See OFFOBOCHE V OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT 2001 LPELR-2265 (SC). Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap 41 LFN 2004 provides as follows:- “Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority,

or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect.
The action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury within three months next after the ceasing thereof…”
It is not in dispute that the Respondent is an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria thus; the Public Officer’s Protection Act applies to it being a public body corporate of government. It is borne out of the record transmitted to this Court that the Appellant instituted the action which is the subject of the instant appeal on 27th June, 2008 however the parties have vehemently joined issues as to when the Appellant’s cause of action arose. The main issue under controversy is whether the Appellant’s cause of action arose when he received the 1st Respondent’s letter of dismissal of 11th February, 2005 or when the he received the 2nd Respondent’s letter dated 26th February, 2008 but delivered on 15th April, 2008.

The manner in which to ascertain if the Appellant’s action is statute barred as contended by the 1st Respondent is simple and straightforward. It’s simply to examine the facts pleaded in the Statement of Claim to see what the cause of action is. It has been established in an imprimatur of judicial authorities that to determine whether an action is statute barred, all that is required is for one to examine the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the Plaintiff a cause of action and comparing that date with the date on which the Writ of Summons was filed. If the time on the Writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute-barred: See the case EGBE VS. ADEFARASIN (1987) LPELR – 1032 (SC).
The critical question is when did the cause of complaint arise? It is based on when it arose that it can be determined if the action was caught by the limitation laws.
The phrase, cause of action, has been defined as the fact or combination of facts which give rise to a right to sue. It consists of the wrongful act of the defendant which gives

the claimant the right to complain and the damage consequent due to the wrongful act. See EGBUE VS. ARAKA (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 84) 598 AT 613; SAVAGE VS. UWECHIA (1972) 3 SC 214 AT 221. A cause of action is the factual basis or some factual situations, a combination of which makes the matter in litigation an enforceable right or an actionable wrong. See TUKUR VS. GOVT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 117) 517 AT 581.
The grouse of the Appellant as gleaned from his Statement of Claim at pages 3 – 6 of the record of appeal is that the 1st Respondent who had no authority to dismiss him from its service did so vide a letter dated 11th February, 2005 without affording him the opportunity to be heard by any of the Junior Staff Committee. This according to the Appellant, made him to petition the chairman of the 2nd Respondent challenging his purported irregular and unlawful dismissal by the 1st Respondent. Going by the Appellant’s averment in paragraph 14 of the Statement of Claim, the 2nd Respondent aligning with the position of the 1st Respondent, also dismissed him vide a letter dated 26th February, 2008 which was served on the Appellant on

Appellant on the 15th April, 2008.
It has been settled that a cause of action matures or arises on a date or from the time when a breach of any duty or act occurs, which warrants the person thereby injured or the victim who is adversely affected by such breach to take a Court action in protection of a legal right that has been breached. Going by the Appellant’s pleadings, the act of the 1st Respondent dismissing the Appellant from service gave the Appellant a right of complaint and a consequent damage as a result of the said dismissal. In the instant appeal, could it be said that Appellant’s right of complaint and consequent damage crystallized on the receipt of the 2nd Respondent’s letter approving his dismissal from service? I am of the considered opinion that on the 11th February, 2005 when the 1st Respondent served the Appellant a letter dismissing him from service, all material facts necessary to make the Appellant’s grievance proper before a Court with the jurisdictional competence have fully arisen. Moreover, going by the Appellant’s letter of employment dated 24th September, 1998 (see page 7 of the record of appeal),

the Appellant was employed by the 1st Respondent and not the 2nd Respondent. So therefore, the Appellant having been dismissed by the same body that employed him ought to have commenced legal proceedings against that same body that disengaged him from service. In resolving this issue, the trial Court at pages 47 – 48 of the record of appeal held as follows:
“I am of the considered view that by 11/2/2005 all material facts necessary to make out the Plaintiff’s case have fully arisen. There is a person to sue and also one to be sued. The letter dated 26/3/08 from the 2nd Defendant merely confirmed/upheld the dismissal of Plaintiff by 1st Defendant when it stated-
“In view of the above therefore in considering your appeal, the commission by this letter has approval (sic) and upheld your dismissal from service with effect from 12/9/2005.”
I do not agree with learned counsel to the Appellant that the Appellant could only ventilate his grievance in Court after exhausting all the administrative remedies available under Paragraphs 090101 to 090209 of the Public Service Rules. All the material facts required for the

institution of the action were available to Appellant but he chose to wait till the approval of his dismissal by the 2nd Respondent before heading to Court. In view of the fact that his action could be caught by the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, the Appellant could have sailed on the side of caution by instituting the action within the time prescribed by law and on the other hand pursue the administrative remedies (if any) available to him.
The learned counsel to the Appellant has also made concerted efforts in paragraph 5.6 to 5.12 of the Appellant’s Brief to move this Court to declare the provisions of the Public Officer Protection Act as being unconstitutional and offensive to the right equality before the law. The rationale for the protection of public officers has been expounded in a legion of judicial authorities. In the case of EKEOGU V. ALIRI (1991) LPELR – 1079 (SC), the Supreme Court held the view that the Act is designed to protect a public officer against any action, prosecution or other proceeding; and for any act done in pursuance of or execution of any law, public duty, or authority; or for

any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any law, duty or authority. In addition to this, it has been endorsed further by this Court and the Apex Court that the Act constitutes a limitation law which is designed for protecting public officers from being detracted in the conduct of their official duty by litigation that might have become otiose or in which witnesses may no longer be available due to the time lag. A person whose right has been affected by an act or default done or intended, in the lawful execution of a public duty must file an action for any redress within three months after such act or default.
It is pertinent to point out that the provisions of the POPA protecting a public officer is not absolute as an aggrieved individual has been adequately protected in some instances from the application of the limitation Act and when a public officer would be deprived of the protection guaranteed under the Public Officers Protection Act. See the decision of the Ilorin Division of this Court in the case of NIGERIA STORED PRODUCT RESEARCH INSTITUTE V. B.I.R., KWARA STATE (2013) LPELR – 22073 (CA). In essence, the provision of

Section 2(a) of the POPA is not absolute. The argument of learned counsel to the Appellant to me in this regard is misplaced and same is hereby discountenanced.
Learned counsel to the Appellant has also made heavy weather on the fact that the trial Court raised the issue in controversy suo motu without affording the parties, especially the Appellant who would be affected by its decision the opportunity to address it. The law has crystallized in this jurisdiction that it is not every omission or failure on the part of a Court to hear the parties on an issue that is fatal to its decision on the issue. The omission or failure to hear parties is only fatal when it is shown that a miscarriage of justice has been occasioned thereby to any of the parties affected by the decision of the Court. In the case of OGEMBE V. USMAN (2011) LPELR – 8155 (SC), the Supreme Court had rested the principle thus:
“While the Court has a duty to give parties an opportunity to be heard on any issue it raises suo motu, a failure to do so does not necessarily lead to a reversal of the decision. In the instant case, the Appellant must go further to show that the failure to hear

him on the point occasioned some miscarriage of justice.”
So the counsel for the 1st Respondent is right on the requirement of the law that the Appellant is to, in addition to showing that he was not heard by the Court below on the issue of raised suo motu by it, to demonstrate to the satisfaction of this Court that a miscarriage of justice was indeed occasioned to him by the failure or omission to hear him.
The effect of this is that since the Appellant’s cause of action accrued on 11/2/2005 i.e. the date of his dismissal from the service of the Respondents vide a letter of the 1st Respondent dated 11/2/2005 and having filed the suit which is the subject matter of the instant appeal on 27/6/2008, over three years outside the statutory period of 3 months stipulated under Section 2(a) of the Public Officer’s Protection Act (supra), the case of the Appellant is statute barred and the trial court is right to have dismissed same. On the consequence of an action that is statute barred, the Supreme Court in the case of HASSAN V. ALIYU & ORS. (2010) LPELR – 1357 (SC) held as follows:
“When an action is statute-barred, the

plaintiff who might have had a cause of action loses the right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process because the period of limitation had elapsed. An action commenced after the expiration of the statutory period within which an action must be brought is not maintainable. In other words, when a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action must be initiated, legal proceedings cannot be properly and validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Any such action instituted must be struck out as not being properly instituted before the Court. In effect, the right of the appellant to commence an action against the withdrawal and substitution of the 1st respondent is extinguished by operation of law – that is, Section 2(a) of the Public Officer Protection Law Cap 379 Laws of the Federation 1990. Egbe V. Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR pt. 47 pg. 1, Obiefuna V. Okoye (1964) 1 All NLR pg. 96, Adeosun V. Jibesin (2001) 11 NWLR pt. 724 pg. 290, Ibrahim V. Judicial Service Committee Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR pt. 584 pg. 1, Eboigbe V. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR pt. 347 pg. 649, Odubeko V. Fowler (1993) 7 NWLR Pt. 308 pg. 637.” Per ADEKEYE, J.S.C (Pp. 89-90, para. C)

On the whole, I hereby resolve the sole issue distilled by this Court in favour of the 1st Respondent and against the Appellant. I find no merit in this appeal, same is hereby dismissed. The decision of the Federal High Court sitting in Abuja delivered by Honourable Justice A.I. Chikere, in suit No. FHC/ABJ/390/2008 on the 22nd day of April, 2010 is hereby affirmed. No order as to costs.

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.: I agree.

EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my Learned brother, Lord Justice Adamu Jauro, JCA. I agree with the reasoning, conclusions and orders therein.

Appearances:

Abdulmalik Bello Esq. For Appellant(s)

Anozie Obi Esq. for 1st Respondent
H. Garba Esq. Director Legal Services, Federal Civil Service Commission for 2nd Respondent For Respondent(s)