MARY JOSEPH ISONGUYO v. EFIOKANWAN ARCHIBONG EYO & ANOR
(2016)LCN/8135(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 27th day of January, 2016
CA/C/24/2014
RATIO
PLEA OF REAJUDICATA; THE REUIREMENTS FOR A DEFENCE OR PLEA OF RES JUDICATA TO SUCCEED
It is well settled that for a defence or plea of res judicata to succeed the parties in the previous action which is pleaded, and in the present one must be the same, the subject matter must be the same, the claim must be the same and the Court which pronounced the judgment must be a Court of competent jurisdiction, Ogbogu v. Ndirbe (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.245) 40, Daniel Tayar Trans Ent. Nig. Co. Ltd. v. Busari (2011) LPELR-923(SC); A.G. of Nassarawa State v. A.G. of Plateau State (2012) LPELR-9730(SC); Ayuya v. Yonrin (2011) LPELR-686 (SC). The judgment in the earlier case to operate as estoppel per rem judicata must be a decision on the merit, a final judgment, deciding on the rights of the parties, Obasi Bro. Merchant Co. Ltd. v. Merchant Bank of Africa Securities Ltd. (2005) 2 S.C (PT 11) 51, Abiola & Sons Bottling C. Ltd v Seven-Up Bottling Co Ltd (2012) LPELR-9279 (SC). In Ogbogu v. Ndirbe (supra), the Supreme Court, per Ogundare JSC, said: It is trite that where a Court of competent jurisdiction has settled, by a final decision, the matters in dispute between the parties neither party nor his privy may re-litigate that issue again by bringing a fresh action. The matter is said to be res judicata. The estoppel created is one by record inter partes. Now there are two kinds of this estoppel. The first is called ’cause of action’ estoppel while the second is known as ‘issue estoppel’. Idigbe JSC distinguished the two types of estoppel by record inter partes in Fadiora v. Gbadebo (1978)3 SC 219 228-229 in these words:
?Now, there are two kinds of estoppel by record inter partes or per rem judicatam as it is generally known. The first is usually referred to as ’cause of action estoppel’ and it occurs where the cause of action is merged in the judgment, that is, Transit in rem judicatam (See King v. Hoare (1844) 13 M. & W 495 at
per. ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.
APPEAL: GROUNDS OF APPEAL; THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL TO BE VALID AND COMPETENT
It is well settled law that for grounds of appeal to be valid and competent, they must be related to the decision being appealed against and should constitute a challenge to the ratio of the decision on appeal. The Supreme Court in Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 261) 156 at 184, per Karibi Whyte, JSC observed thus:
“It is a well settled proposition of law in respect of which there
can hardly be a departure, that the grounds of appeal against a decision must relate to the decision and should constitute a
challenge to the ratio of the decision – See Egbe v. Alhaji (l990) 1 NWLR (Pt 128) 546 at 590. Grounds of appeal are not formulated in nubibus. They must be in firma terra, namely
arise from the judgment. However, meritorious the ground of
appeal, based either on points of critical constitutional importance or general public interest, it must be connected with a controversy between parties. This is the precondition for the vesting of the judicial powers of the Constitution in the Courts…parties…are not at liberty to argue grounds not related to the judgment appealed against.”
See also: Ikweli v Ebele (2005) 7 MJSC 125; CCB Plc. v Ekperi (2007) 4 MJSC 172. The ground of appeal must arise from and be based on the judgment on appeal, which is the matter in controversy between the parties. per. ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.
APPEAL: GROUND OF APPEAL; THE IMPLICATION OF HAVING A DETERMINATION BASED ON INCOMPETENT GROUNDS OF APPEAL
An incompetent ground of appeal cannot birth a competent issue for determination. It is trite that where a ground of appeal is incompetent and has been struck out, any argument offered in support thereof in the brief of argument becomes irrelevant. Therefore any issue for determination based on such incompetent ground of appeal goes to no issue and would also be struck out; Agbaka v Amadi (1998) 11 NWLR (PT 572) 16; Akpan v Effiong (2010) 17 NWLR (PT 1223) 421 SC. per. ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTION; WHETHER THE MERITS OF THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION SHALL FIRST BE CONSIDERED
As is customary and indeed as has been admonished in a long line of cases, the merits of the preliminary objection shall first be considered; First Bank of Nigeria Plc. v. T.S.A. Industries Ltd (2010) LPELR- 1283 (SC). per. ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PAUL OBI ELECHI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MARY JOSEPH ISONGUYO
(For herself and on behalf of the Family of Late Reverend Joseph Isonguyo) Appellant(s)
AND
1. EFIOKANWAN ARCHIBONG EYO
2. THE CHIEF REGISTRAR, HIGH COURT OF CROSS RIVER STATE, CALABAR Respondent(s)
ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the ruling of the High Court of Cross River State, sitting at Calabar presided over by Honourable Justice Akon Ikpeme, J, delivered on October 10, 2012 in which the suit of the Appellant was declared incompetent on grounds of res judicata.
The Appellant had alleged that her family was the owner and in possession of four detached group of bungalows all at No. 1 Atimbo Road, Otop Otop, Calabar with their tenants until December 13, 2011 when they were ejected and dispossessed of the property, pursuant to a warrant of possession dated June 14, 2011. The Appellant’s enquiry
revealed that the parties on record in the said warrant were all deceased and that no leave of Court was granted to issue same in favour of the 1st Respondent. However, upon the Appellant commencing action to have the Court to set aside the warrant of possession along with other ancillary reliefs, the 1st Respondent raised objection to the suit on the ground that the action for wrongful ejection was the same with a previous action
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for declaration of title and was therefore caught by the doctrine of res judicata.
The case of the Respondent, was that an earlier dispute based on title to the land in issue between the Appellant’s family and the 1st Respondent’s family had been finally determined by the High Court of Cross River State in a judgment delivered by Honourable Justice E. E. Ita on January 29, 2007 in Suit No: HC/410/2004. The facts of the said case were thus: the Appellant’s father, Reverend Joseph Isonguyo was a clergyman of the Mount Zion Light-House Full Gospel Church. The said Church acquired the 1st Respondent’s family land for evangelical purposes sometime in the 1920’s. Contrary to the purpose for which the land was granted, the Appellant’s father converted part of the church land to his personal and family property, and from 1993, the Appellant’s
family began to challenge the title of the 1st Respondent’s family to the land in issue as overlords. The Church distanced itself from this dispute and settled with the Appellant’s family, entering into a Deed of Assignment with the 1st
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Respondent’s family. But, the Appellant’s family maintained their challenge to the title of the 1st Respondent’s family over the said land. The 1st Respondent’s family saw this challenge as a clear case of misbehaviour rendering the Appellant’s
family liable to forfeiture and thereupon instituted Suit No:
Hc/410/l2004, seeking the following reliefs:-
(1) A declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to the Certificate of Occupancy over land situate and known as No. 1 Atimbo Road, Otop Otop, Calabar.
(2) N10 million damages for trespass.
(3) Order directing the Defendant to vacate the land.
At the conclusion of hearing of the suit, the trial Court entered judgment on January 29, 2007 in favour of the 1st Respondent’s family, declaring as follows:-
“Consequently, I declare that the family of Calabar of (sic) Chief Archibong Eyo Etim of Calabar is entitled to statutory right of occupancy in respect of the land: No. 1 Atimbo Road, Otop Otop, Calabar … in assessing the quantum of damages I have noted that the Grand Father and father of the present defendant on record
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were Clergyman. But I must record my disappointment at their crave for worldly things. Why did the man not build the place as a Manse for the church? He was selfish and wanted it entailed from him down the line of his children denying other Clergyman of the church a place to live in to carry out the evangelism for which the land was granted. It is as well that the church has no hand in that diversion of user for in that case the church would have been liable to forfeit the grant which was for evangelical purposes.”
See pages 81 – 82 of the Record of Appeal.
An appeal against this judgment was struck out by this Court, giving way for the enforcement of the judgment. A warrant of possession was issued on June 14, 2011 and the Appellant was thereupon ejected from the property on December 13, 2011 in accordance with the subsisting judgment of the High Court of Cross River State.
The Appellant, upon ejection via the warrant of possession, commenced Suit No. HC/11/2012 before the High Court of Cross River State, Calabar, seeking these reliefs:
1. A declaration that the ejection
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of the Claimant on 13th December, 2011 pursuant to the warrant of possession dated 14th June, 2011 in the name of dead parties without prior leave of Court was a nullity and same constituted trespass to Claimant’s ownership and possession.
2. An order setting aside the warrant of possession issued without jurisdiction in the name of dead parties dated 14th June, 2011 as same was a nullity.
3. An order re-instating the claimant to her 4 bungalows property at No. 1 Atimbo Road, Otop Otop, Calabar.
4. N20m damages for pain, suffering and trauma against the 1st Defendant.
5. N20M general damages for trespass against the 1st Defendant.
6. An order restraining the defendants from further illegal disturbance of Claimant’s peaceful possession and ownership of the 4 bungalows without the due process of a Court of competent jurisdiction.
See page 6 of the Record of Appeal.
The 1st Respondent as 1st defendant in the said suit filed an objection to the jurisdiction of the lower Court, raising the issue of res judicata. The learned trial Judge upheld the objection and struck
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out the suit for want of jurisdiction. Dissatisfied with the said ruling of the lower Court, the Appellant lodged this appeal upon four grounds.
The parties exchanged Briefs of Argument, which were respectively adopted on 4/11/2015. Ekpedeme Nelson-Iyoho, Esq. for the Appellant adopted the Appellant’s Brief filed on 1/11/2013 but deemed on 7/11/2013. The 1st Respondent’s Brief, in which a Preliminary Objection was raised, was filed on 7/3/2014 but deemed on 30/6/2014,and was adopted by Bassey E. Ikpo, Esq., holding the brief of Okon N. Efut, SAN. Mr. Nelson-Iyoho also adopted the Appellant’s Reply Brief filed on 28/5/2014 but deemed on 30/6/2014.
As is customary and indeed as has been admonished in a long line of cases, the merits of the preliminary objection shall first be considered; First Bank of Nigeria Plc. v. T.S.A. Industries Ltd (2010) LPELR- 1283 (SC).
By the Notice of Preliminary Objection the 1st Respondent prayed as follows:
TAKE NOTICE that the 1st Respondent herein hereby objects to Ground 2 of the Grounds of Appeal for being incompetent in that it does
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not arise from any decision or finding of the trial Court.
It was submitted for the Respondent that the Appellant cannot raise a ground of appeal which does not flow from the decision of the Court below. A ground of appeal must relate to the ratio decidendi; relying on Yadis Limited v. Gnic Limited (2007) 30 NSCQLR (pt. 1) p. 495 at 516. Ground 2 of this appeal states as follows:-
The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that Appellant ought to have appealed against the judgment
obtained in HC/410/04.
It was submitted that this was not a challenge to the ratio decidendi of the decision of the lower Court. It could be termed an obiter dictum as it was merely an advice or a hint on what the Appellant ought to have done. It was not a decision or holding or finding. The decision of the lower Court was that the suit was incompetent and that it lacked the requisite jurisdiction to entertain it. It was further submitted that any issue flowing from an incompetent ground of appealis equally incompetent and liable to be struck out as well; relying on NDIC v. Okem (2004) 18
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NSCQLR (Pt. 1) P. 42 at 9; Apapo v. INEC (2012) 8 NWLR (Pt.1303) P. 409 at 425. The Court was urged to strike out
Ground 2 of the Grounds of Appeal, as well as Issue No. 1 formulated therefrom, and arguments canvassed therein for incompetence.
In reply, it was submitted for the Appellant that the said ground 2 arose from the decision of the lower Court at page 127 of the Record of Appeal wherein the trial Court overruled the argument of the Appellant as follows:
“On the argument that the Court had no jurisdiction because the claim was by a dead person, this Court is of the view that claimant ought to have appealed against the judgment on HC/410/04.?
That the lower Court had assessed the argument of the Appellant discountenanced same and arrived at its decision that appeal was the appropriate remedy for the Appellant. Learned Counsel argued that this constituted a decision under Section 318 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, and appealable under Section 240 thereof and Ground 2 is in the circumstance competent.
He further submitted, assuming without conceding, that
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should the said objection stand, it would have no effect on Appellant’s Issue 1 which was distilled from both grounds 1 and 2 of the grounds of appeal. That ground 1 alone may sustain the issue without need for ground 2. The Court was however urged to discountenance the objection.
It is well settled law that for grounds of appeal to be valid and
competent, they must be related to the decision being appealed against and should constitute a challenge to the ratio of the decision on appeal. The Supreme Court in Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 261) 156 at 184, per Karibi Whyte, JSC observed thus:
“It is a well settled proposition of law in respect of which there
can hardly be a departure, that the grounds of appeal against a decision must relate to the decision and should constitute a
challenge to the ratio of the decision – See Egbe v. Alhaji (l990) 1 NWLR (Pt 128) 546 at 590. Grounds of appeal are not formulated in nubibus. They must be in firma terra, namely
arise from the judgment. However, meritorious the ground of
appeal, based either on points of critical
9
constitutional importance or general public interest, it must be connected with a controversy between parties. This is the precondition for the vesting of the judicial powers of the Constitution in the Courts…parties…are not at liberty to argue grounds not related to the judgment appealed against.”
See also: Ikweli v Ebele (2005) 7 MJSC 125; CCB Plc. v Ekperi (2007) 4 MJSC 172. The ground of appeal must arise from and be based on the judgment on appeal, which is the matter in controversy between the parties.
The ratio of the decision of the lower Court was that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit on ground of res judicata. The learned trial Judge at page 123 of the Record of Appeal had remarked thus:
“It is this Court’s view that the issues raised in reply to the
preliminary objection, should have been raised on appeal.”
This observation remains what it was, an observation. It cannot be elevated to a decision. Ground 2 did not arise from the decision of the lower Court and is therefore incompetent; and hereby struck out.
?An incompetent ground of appeal
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cannot birth a competent issue for determination. It is trite that where a ground of appeal is incompetent and has been struck out, any argument offered in support thereof in the brief of argument becomes irrelevant. Therefore any issue for determination based on such incompetent ground of appeal goes to no issue and would also be struck out; Agbaka v Amadi (1998) 11 NWLR (PT 572) 16; Akpan v Effiong (2010) 17 NWLR (PT 1223) 421 SC.
Issue No 1 formulated by the Appellant was predicated on grounds 1 and 2 of the grounds of appeal. I however agree with Mr. Nelson-Iyoho that Issue No 1 can be saved by ground 1 of the grounds of appeal which is competent. Accordingly, the Preliminary Objection succeeds in part.
Out of the three competent grounds of appeal, learned Counsel for the Appellant, distilled two issues for determination, as follows:
1. Whether considering the law and circumstances of this case. Appellant’s suit for wrongful ejection was caught by the doctrine of res judicata so as to render the case incompetent (Ground 1).
2. Whether the Court
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below was right to declare the ejection of the Appellant as proper under the circumstances complained of
(Grounds 3 and 4).
For the Respondent, the following issues were distilled from the grounds
1. Whether the trial Court was right to decline jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the ground that it was caught by the doctrine of Res Judicata. (Distilled from Ground 1).
2. Whether the Appellant who was neither a party nor lawful
representative of a party in Suit No. HC/410/04, and did not file any appeal against the judgment in that case, was right to
approach the trial Court instead of the Court of Appeal, seeking reliefs which had the effect of setting aside that judgment and/or its execution. (Distilled from Ground 2).
3. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in his finding that the warrant of possession was based on a valid Court order which was never upturned. (Distilled from Ground 3).
4. Whether the learned trial Judge was right to hold that the ejection of the Appellant from the premises raised the same issue as was in the previous case of HC/410/04.
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(Distilled from Ground 4).
I note that the Respondent distilled Issue No 2 for determination from ground 2 of the grounds of appeal, which has been declared incompetent. The said Issue No 2 is struck out. I also note that the issues raised for determination by the Appellant are quite comprehensive in determining this appeal. I shall therefore adopt the said issues.
It is well settled that for a defence or plea of res judicata to succeed the parties in the previous action which is pleaded, and in the present one must be the same, the subject matter must be the same, the claim must be the same and the Court which pronounced the judgment must be a Court of competent jurisdiction, Ogbogu v. Ndirbe (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.245) 40, Daniel Tayar Trans Ent. Nig. Co. Ltd. v. Busari (2011) LPELR-923(SC); A.G. of Nassarawa State v. A.G. of Plateau State (2012) LPELR-9730(SC); Ayuya v. Yonrin (2011) LPELR-686 (SC). The judgment in the earlier case to operate as estoppel per rem judicata must be a decision on the merit, a final judgment, deciding on the rights of the parties, Obasi Bro.
13
Merchant Co. Ltd. v. Merchant Bank of Africa Securities Ltd. (2005) 2 S.C (PT 11) 51, Abiola & Sons Bottling C. Ltd v Seven-Up Bottling Co Ltd (2012) LPELR-9279 (SC).
In Ogbogu v. Ndirbe (supra), the Supreme Court, per Ogundare JSC, said:
?It is trite that where a Court of competent jurisdiction has settled, by a final decision, the matters in dispute between the parties neither party nor his privy may re-litigate that issue again by bringing a fresh action. The matter is said to be res judicata. The estoppel created is one by record inter partes. Now there are two kinds of this estoppel. The first is called ’cause of action’ estoppel while the second is known as ‘issue estoppel’. Idigbe JSC distinguished the two types of estoppel by record inter partes in Fadiora v. Gbadebo (1978)3 SC 219 228-229 in these words:
?Now, there are two kinds of estoppel by record inter partes or per rem judicatam as it is generally known. The first is usually referred to as ’cause of action estoppel’ and it occurs where the cause of action is merged in the judgment, that is, Transit
14
in rem judicatam (See King v. Hoare (1844) 13 M. & W 495 at
504). Therefore, on this principle of law (or rule of evidence)
once it appears that the same cause of action was held to lie (or not to lie) in a final judgment between the same parties, or their privies, who are litigating in the same capacity (and on the same subject matter), there is an end of the matter. They are precluded from re- litigating the same cause of action. There is however, a second kind of estoppel inter partes and this usually occurs where an issue has earlier on been adjudicated upon by a Court of competent jurisdiction and the same issue comes incidentally in question in any subsequent proceedings between the same parties (or their privies); in these circumstances, ‘issue estoppel’ arises. This is based on the principle of law that a party is not allowed to (i.e. he is precluded from) contending the contrary or opposite of any specific point which having been once distinctly put in issue, has with certainty and solemnity been determined against him. (See Cutram v. Morewood (1803) 3 East
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346). Issue estoppel applies whether the point involved in the earlier decision is one of fact or law or one of mixed fact and law. However, for the principle to apply, in any given proceedings, all the preconditions to a valid plea of estoppel inter partesor per rem judicatam must apply, that, (1) the same question must be for decision in both proceedings (which means that the question for decision in the current suit must have been decided in the earlier proceeding), (2) the decision relied upon to support the plea of issue estoppel must be final (3) the parties must be the same (which means that parties involved in both proceedings must be the same) (per se or by their privies).”
Where the plea of res judicata is proved, it ousts the jurisdiction of the Court before which a fresh action is submitted for adjudication from entertaining the question already decided. Thus, a successful plea of res judicata constitutes a bar to any fresh action between the parties; Ito v. Ekpe (2000) 3 NWLR (Pt.650) 678; Ajiboye v. Ishola (2006) 11 MJSC 192.
The reliefs sought in
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Suit No HC/11/2012, as set out in the Statement of Claim found at pages 4 -7 of the Record of Appeal were:
a. A declaration that the ejection of the Claimant on 13/12/11
pursuant to the warrant of possession dated 14/6/11 in the name of dead parties without prior leave of Court was a nullity and same constituted trespass to Claimant’s ownership and possession.
b. An order setting aside the warrant of possession issued without jurisdiction in the name of dead parties dated 14/6/11 as same was a nullity.
c. An order re-instating the Claimant to her 4 bungalows property at No 1 Atimbo Road, Otop Otop, Calabar.
d N20m damages for pain, suffering and trauma against the 1st Defendant.
e. N20m general damages for trespass against the 1st Defendant.
The reliefs that were submitted for adjudication in Suit No HC/410/2004, as set out in the judgment of the lower Court therein found at pages 74 – 82 of the Record of Appeal, were as follows:
a. A declaration that Plaintiff is entitled to Certificate of Occupancy over land situates and known as No I Atimbo Road, Otop Otop, Calabar.<br< p=””
</br<
17
b. N10 million damages for trespass.
c. Order directing the Defendant to vacate the land.
The parties in HC/11/2012 were:
Mary Joseph Isonguyo (For herself and on behalf of
the Family of Late Reverend Joseph Isonguyo)
V.
1. Efiokanwan Archibong Eyo
2. The Chief Registrar, High Court Of Cross River State, Calabar
The parries in Suit No HC/410/2004 were:
Chief Duncan Edem Archibong
v.
Isonguyo J. Isonguyo.
Although no mention is made of HC/410/2004 in the pleadings in HC/11/20l2, Paragraph 7 i. avers that the warrant of possession upon which the ejection was carried out, was issued in the name of Chief Duncan Edem Archibong, who was the claimant in HC/410/2004.
The Appellant in Suit No HC/11/2012 was described in Paragraph 1 of the Statement of Claim thus:
The Claimant is presently, the eldest surviving child and family head of late Reverend Joseph Isonguyo family which family owned and have been in possession of 4 detached bungalows at No.1 Akimbo Road, Otop Otop, Calabar.
In the case of Iyaji v Eyigebe (1987) LPELR-1571(SC), the
18
Supreme
Court, per Oputa, JSC, adopted the definition of a privy thus:
“Who is a privy…In Carl-Zeis-Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) (1900) 1 All E.R. 536 H.L. at p. 550, Lord Reid held that privies include all those who are privy to the parties, in blood or title or interest and estoppel per rem judicatam operates for, or against not only parties but also those privies mentioned above.”
See also: Agbogunleri v Depo (2008) 1 S.C. (Pt.11) 189. Relying on this definition, the Appellant and the 1st Respondent were privies to Suit No HC/410/2004.
After judgment was pronounced on January 29, 2007 in Suit No HC/410/2004, an appeal was lodged in CA/C/33/2007: Bishop G. J. Isonguyo v. Chief Duncan Edem Archibong to challenge the said judgment. There was a Judgment in respect of that appeal, delivered by this Court on July 3, 2008 by Ngwuta, JCA (as he then was). A certified true copy of the said Judgment is found at pages 64 – 69 of the Record of Appeal. At page 66 thereof, this Court, per Ngwuta, JCA (as he then was) said:
?Be that as it may the Court lacks
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jurisdiction to hear any appeal filed by or on behalf of Bishop G.J. Isunguyo. The Respondent, as plaintiff in the Court below moved the Court to substitute the name of Isunguyo J. Isunguyo for Bishop G.J. Isunguyo on the ground that the latter died during the pendency of the suit. The order was
granted…Having passed on beyond jurisdiction Bishop purportedly the appellant herein, cannot initiate any proceedings before the Court…There being no proper appellant the purported appeal is hereby struck out.”
There was no appeal against this Judgment and there was no other appeal filed against HC/410/2004. The result is that said judgment in HC/410/2004 is still subsisting.
It is trite that the decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction is valid, subsisting and binding on the parties until it is set aside or discharged; Chukwueke v Okoronkwo (1999) 1 S.C. 71; Nwokedi v Okugo (2002) 7 S.C (PT 11) 176. This is the position even when the defendant believes the decision to be irregular or void or the order of the Court was wrongly made. As long as the decision has not been set
20
aside, it is binding on the parties.
The subject matter in both Suit No HC/410/2004 and suit No
HC/11/2012 is No. 1 Akimbo Road, Otop Otop, Calabar. The claim in HC/11/2012 is reproduced again hereunder:
a. A declaration that the ejection of the Claimant on 13/12/11
pursuant to the warrant of possession dated 14/6/11 in the name of dead parties without prior leave of Court was a nullity and same constituted trespass to Claimant’s ownership and possession.
b. An order setting aside the warrant of possession issued without jurisdiction in the name of dead parties dated 14/6/11 as same was a nullity.
c. An order re-instating the Claimant to her 4 bungalows property at No 1 Atimbo Road, Otop Otop, Calabar.
d N20m damages for pain, suffering and trauma against the 1st Defendant.
e. N20m general damages for trespass against the 1st Defendant
These claims in summary seek to have the warrant of possession set aside and damages for trespass. The subsisting judgment in HC/410/2004 already declared the Appellant a trespasser on the land in issue and ordered the
21
Appellant to vacate the said land; see page 81 of the Record of Appeal. The position of the law has always been that an adjudged trespasser has no right over the land in issue to be protected; Akibu v Odutan (1991) 2 NWLR (PT 171) 7, (1991) 2 SCNJ 30; Salami v Lawal (2008) 14 NWLR (PT 1108) 546 S.C. The learned trial Judge was therefore right in observing that the prayer for nullification of the ejection cannot be completely separated from the earlier judgment in HC/410/2004; page 127 of the Record of Appeal. The said ejection was done pursuant to a valid and subsisting judgment. That fact cannot be simply wished away. I must agree with the learned trial Judge that any complaint in respect of the validity of the judgment delivered in HC/410/2004 ought to be frontally challenged on appeal. The Appellant cannot through the backdoor as it were, re-litigate the issue of title to the land in issue.
The foregoing analysis and comparison of Suit No HC/410/2004 and Suit No HC/11/2012 reveals the parties are the same; the subject matter in both suit is the same; the claim is the
22
same; and the Court which pronounced the judgment in HC/410/2004, which is subsisting, is a Court of competent jurisdiction. The doctrine of res judicata is therefore applicable, and in the circumstance, the learned trial Judge rightly declined to exercise jurisdiction over Suit No HC/11/2012. See also Honda Place Ltd v Globe Motors Ltd (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt.945) 273. The Issues formulated for determination by the Appellant are thus both resolved against her.
I find this appeal completely unmeritorious. The appeal fails and is dismissed. The ruling of Hon Justice Akon Ikpeme, J., delivered on October 10, 2012 in Suit No HC/11/2012 is hereby affirmed.
Costs are assessed at N50, 000.00 against the Appellant in favour of the Respondent.
IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.C.A.: I agree.
PAUL OBI ELECHI, J.C.A.: I have read in draft the Judgment just delivered by my Learned brother Onyekachi Aja Otisi, JCA.
I adopt her reason and conclusion in dismissing the appeal and conclusion in dismissing the appeal as mine.
Also I abide by the Order as to Costs.
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Appearances
Ekpedeme Nelson-Iyoho, Esq.For Appellant
AND
Bassey E. Ikpo, Esq. holding the brief of Okon N. Efut, SANFor Respondent



