MARTINS APUGO v. RT. HON. STANLEY OHAJURUKA & ORS (2019)

MARTINS APUGO v. RT. HON. STANLEY OHAJURUKA & ORS

(2019)LCN/13653(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 15th day of July, 2019

CA/OW/224/2019

JUSTICES

AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

MARTINS APUGO Appellant(s)

AND

1. RT. HON. STANLEY OHAJURUKA
2. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRES
3. ADAMS OSHIOMOLE (NATIONAL CHAIRMAN ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS)
4. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
5. CHIEF (MRS.) CHINYERE ADUNNI UDU Respondent(s)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT AN ELECTION TRIBUNAL MUST DELIVER ITS JUDGMENT IN WRITING WITHIN 180 DAYS

The provisions introduced into the 1999 Constitution in respect of pre-election matters, by the ?Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Fourth Alteration, No. 21) Act, 2017?, by way of amendment to Section 285 of the said Constitution read thus: –
?(9) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.
(10) A Court in every pre-election matter shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from the date of filing of the suit.?
Provisions similar (and not word for word) to those re-produced above are not new to the 1999 Constitution. In this regard see Section 285(5) and (6) in particular of the amended Constitution in relation to Election Tribunal. The provisions in question read thus: –
?(5) An election petition shall be filed within 21 days after the date of the declaration of the results of the election
(6) An election petition tribunal shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from the date of the filing of the petition.?
Law reports are now replete with decisions of the Supreme Court regarding the interpretation to be accorded the provisions re-produced above, particularly in respect of the failure of an election petition tribunal to deliver its judgment in an election petition within the 180 days period from the date of filing the same as stipulated in the provisions above. In my considered view, it is clear from the cases, that the position of the Supreme Court in its numerous decisions on the failure of the tribunal to deliver its decision in an election petition within 180 days from the date of filing, is that any decision rendered outside the said 180 days for any reason whatsoever, is void or is a nullity, and that the petition in which such decision is rendered, is liable to be struck out. In other words, I can safely say that the position of the Supreme Court regarding the 180 days period provided for the giving of judgment in an election petition, is to the effect that barring the end of existence (and when in my considered view, time itself would definitely become static for the calculation of any action required of we humans), there is nothing conceivable that can be validly relied upon as extending the time within which a Court/tribunal is mandated by law to do all that is expected of it, in the entertainment of an election petition. See in this regard, the cases of ABUBAKAR V. NASAMU (2012) LPELR ? 7826 (SC); UGBA V. SUSWAM (2012) LPELR ? 9726 (SC); ANPP V. GONI (2012) 7 NWLR; and PDP V. CPC (2011) LPELR ? 2909 (SC), amongst many others.
As far back as 13/7/2007, Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC; in the case of BAKARE V. NRC (2007) LPELR-712 (SC) had stated to the effect that the Supreme Court when faced with the construction of a statutory provision in pari materia with one that has been previously construed by it, has to follow the principle laid down in the earlier case and cited the case of Mobil Oil Plc v. IAL 36 Inc. (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 659) 146; (2000) FWLR (Pt. 10) 1632 at 1640 in this regard.PER LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.

THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS

It is also in my considered view very settled that any Court lower to the Supreme Court, (based on the doctrine of stares decisis), by law, must accord the provisions of an enactment already or previously interpreted by the Supreme Court, the same interpretation when similar provisions are being considered in the case before it. This is why decided cases have evolved the principle to the effect that when a lower Court is confronted in a matter before it, with the provisions of an enactment that have been previously interpreted by a higher Court, all the said lower Court has to do is to simply apply the interpretation given the provisions in question, by the higher Court. See the case of ROSSEK V AFRICAN CONTINENTAL BANK LTD (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 312) 382. PER LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.

AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appeal is against the judgment delivered on 13/5/2019 by the Federal High Court holden at Umuahia, presided over by Hon. Justice D.E. Osiagor (hereafter to be simply referred to as ?the lower Court? and ?the learned trial Judge? respectively). The 1st Respondent herein as Plaintiff, initiated the instant action before the Federal High Court, Abuja Judicial Division, by an originating process which issued on 1/11/2018. The Federal High Court, Abuja Judicial Division, by its order made on 9/11/2018, subsequently transferred the case to the lower Court for adjudication. The case was initiated against the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, Appellant, and 4th and 5th Respondents herein, respectively. The claims of the 1st Respondent against the aforementioned parties, as contained in the statement of claim are as follows: –
?1. A declaration that the plaintiff having scored the highest number of votes cast for aspirants of the All Progressives Congress for the Ikwuano/Umuahia Federal Constituency held in Umuahia on the 5th of October 2018, which

the plaintiff participated with the 3rd defendant, is the nominated candidate of the 1st defendant for the Ikwuano/Umuahia Federal Constituency in the forthcoming general election/National Assembly (Federal House of Representative) elections in February 2019.
2. A declaration that the plaintiff having scored the highest number of votes cast in the primary election conducted for the aspirants for the Ikwuano/Umuahia Federal Constituency in Umuahia on the 5th of October 2018, is the only candidate of the 1st defendant ?All Progressives Congress? nominated and entitled to contest the forthcoming general election/National Assembly (Federal House of Representative) elections in February 2019 for the Ikwuano/Umuahia Federal Constituency.
3. A declaration that any other name not being the name of the plaintiff particularly the name of the 3rd defendant, substituted by the 1st and 2nd defendant (sic) and published by the 4th defendant as the candidate of the All Progressives Congress for Ikwuano/Umuahia Federal Constituency is contrary to Section 87(4)(c)(ii) of the Electoral act (sic) 2010 (as Amended) and as such null and void and of no

effect.
4. A declaration that neither the 3rd defendant nor any other person not haven scored the highest number of votes in the primary election conducted for the aspirants of the All Progressives Congress for Ikwuano/Umuahia Federal Constituency held in Umuahia on the 5th of October 2018, can be declared as nominated by the 1st defendant and entitled to have his/her name submitted by the 1st and 2nd defendants to the 4th defendant and published by the 4th defendant as the candidate of the 1st defendant for Ikwuano/Umuahia Federal Constituency in the forthcoming general election/National Assembly (Federal House of Representative) elections in February 2019.
5. A declaration that the findings of the Election Appeal Committee of the 1st defendant upholding the election of the plaintiff as the person with the highest number of votes cast in the primary election conducted for aspirants of the All Progressives Congress for Ikwuano/Umuahia Federal Constituency is binding and sacrosanct on the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendant (sic) and that the 2nd defendant as Chairman of the 1st defendant cannot pick and choose who he wants to represent the 1st defendant

against the wishes of the party members/delegates who voted for the plaintiff in the Ikwuano/Umuahia Federal Constituency Primary Election held in Umuahia on the 5th of October 2018.
6. An order of Court setting aside and declaring null and void any other result sheet except the clear copy of the result sheet issued by the Returning Officer of the congress/primary election for the Ikwuano/Umuahia Federal Constituency ? Rt. Hon. David Iyoha (JP) dated 6/10/2018 by him.
7. An order of Court returning the plaintiff as the winner of the congress/primary election conducted for the aspirants of the All Progressives Congress for House of Representatives held on the 5th of October 2018, and the lawful candidate of the 1st defendant.
8. An order that in the event that this suit is not determined before the conduct of the general election/National Assembly (Federal House of Representative) elections in February 2019, that the plaintiff as the winner of the congress/primary election of the All Progressive Congress for the Ikwuano/Umuahia Federal Constituency is the person entitled to the Certificate of return and to occupy the Federal House of

Representative sit (sic) in the event the election is won by the 1st defendant.
9. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx?

The case duly proceeded to trial before the lower Court, on the basis of the many processes considered relevant/appropriate filed therein by the parties. The plaintiff (i.e. 1st Respondent herein) closed his case on 18/3/2019. Defence commenced in the case on 1/4/2019 and continued on diverse dates until it closed on 18/4/2019, when the lower Court amongst others ordered thus:-
?All parties to file their written addresses and serve within the Easter vacation and judgment reserved for 30th April, 2019.?

The lower Court however delivered its judgment on 13/5/2019. It commenced the judgment which spans pages 390-414 of the record thus: –
?The judgment was originally slated for 30/4/19 but the Court was mandated to attend a training at Abuja hence the new date today.?

Thereafter the lower Court amongst others stated in the judgment thus: –

?xxxxxxxx On the whole the parties

just established how not to conduct party primary.
The basis of the 1st Defendant not over ruling the result in Exhibit 1 won by the Plaintiff and established by the Appeal Panel in Exhibit 2 runs contrary to the democratic norms and standard demanded by its constitution.
It cannot be justified nor sustained by this Court.
All the results outside exhibit 1 failed the test of value as it is incumbent on the Defendants to show that they were issued by those authorized by the national Executive Committee of the party to conduct the primary. PW1 has punctured that all.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
In the final analysis what was adopted by the party as result of the primary was not a product of a valid primary election. It was a mere competition of the absurd, a comedy of errors, beginning with the PW! Who did not submit his final original result to a conundrum of contradictions dipped in political tricks and insincerity.
The Court will therefore have no choice but annul the whole process and as falling too short of what the 1st defendant APC Constitution called ?democratically

conducted elections?.
The primaries of 5/10/18 is hereby annulled in line with the omnibus relief 9 of the Plaintiff Amended Statement of Claim.
This is the judgment of the Honourable Court.?

Being dissatisfied with the judgment of the lower Court, the Appellant initiated the instant appeal by lodging at the registry of the said Court on 20/5/2019, a notice of appeal dated 17/5/2019. The notice contains 9 grounds of appeal. The said grounds shorn of their respective particulars read thus: –
?GROUNDS OF APPEAL
GROUND ONE:      ERROR IN LAW
The trial Court erred in law when it further assumed jurisdiction, entertained and delivered judgment in the pre-election matter outside the 180 days provided by Section 285(10) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).
GROUND TWO:    ERROR IN LAW
The trial Court erred in law when it failed to appreciate the law that issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time.
GROUND THREE:   ERROR IN LAW
The trial Court erred in law in upholding that the 1st Respondent?s suit filed on 1/11/2018 is not statute barred.
GROUND FOUR:      MISDIRECTION IN LAW
The trial

Court misdirected itself in law in so reaching conclusions/decisions diametrically opposed to issue 2 it framed and set out to resolve in the circumstances of the case.
GROUND FIVE:    ERROR IN LAW
The trial Court served in law in adopting and relying on the evidence of the 1st Respondent?s sole witness (PW1) who did not testify before him in coming to its decision annulling the said primary election of the 2nd Respondent.
GROUND SIX:   ERROR IN LAW
The trial Court erred in law in relying on Exhibits 1 and 2 in coming to its decision annulling the said primary election of the 2nd Respondent.
GROUND SEVEN:    ERROR IN LAW
The trial Court erred in law in annulling the said primary election of the 2nd Respondent conducted on 5/10/2018 without any basis in law.
GROUND EIGHT:   ERROR IN LAW
The trial Court erred in law in spite of not having the jurisdictional competence and or power to do so, still granted the 1st Respondent relief not sought for and/or made order not sought for by any party to the suit.
GROUND NINE: ERROR IN LAW
The trial Court erred in law in relying on the alleged 1st Respondent?s omnibus

relief 9 in granting a relief not sought by the 1st Respondent.?

The reliefs which the Appellant seeks, as contained in the notice of appeal are: (i) an order allowing the appeal; (ii) an order setting aside the decision of the trial Court; and (iii) an order striking out and/or dismissing the 1st Respondent?s suit.

?The instant appeal in which the Appellant filed his notice of appeal on 20/5/2019 (contrary to 15/5/2019 as the Appellant either negligently or mischievously stated in some correspondences to the Presiding Justice of this Division and the Hon. President of this Court), was entertained on 10/7/2019. Though all the parties on record were on 9/7/2019 duly served with the notice of the hearing of the appeal fixed for today (i.e. 10/7/2019), the 5th Respondent was not present in Court nor represented by counsel. Even out of the other Respondents present in Court through representation by their respective counsel, only the 1st Respondent (i.e. the party who initiated the instant case), filed a brief of argument in the appeal. Against this backdrop, and as appeals before this Court are argued on briefs of argument of parties

and not at large and orally at that, the instant appeal glaringly became a contest solely between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent. As expected, the Appellant in urging the Court to allow the appeal adopted and relied on his brief of argument. Ditto, the 1st Respondent adopted and relied on his brief of argument in urging the Court to dismiss the appeal. The briefs of argument the aforementioned parties adopted and relied on, at the hearing of the appeal are: Appellant brief of argument dated 27/6/2019 and filed on 1/7/2019; and 1st Respondent?s brief of argument dated 5/7/2019 and filed on the same date.

The Appellant formulated a sole issue for the determination of the appeal. The issue which was disclosed to have been distilled from ground 1 of the nine grounds in the notice of appeal, reads thus: –
?Whether the judgment of (sic) lower Court delivered contrary to Section 285(10) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) is valid or competent in law

?I consider it expedient to formally strike out grounds 2-9 in the notice of appeal given the glaring fact that the Appellant has abandoned them by not distilling any issue

from each of the said grounds and/or distilling an issue covering all the grounds of appeal in question. This is in the light of the settled position of the law (which in my considered view does not require the citing of any authority or authorities in aid), that a ground or grounds of appeal, in respect of which an appellant neglects to distill an issue or issues for determination, is/are deemed abandoned, and is/are liable to be struck out on that score, or for that reason. Grounds 2-9 in notice of appeal, the instant appeal is founded on, are hereby struck out without ado.

I also consider it expedient to say that the Appellant having brought out the fact that the lower Court by first reserving judgment in the instant case (which was initiated on 1/11/2018), till 30/4/2019, and later delivering same on 13/5/2019), did this in contravention of the provision of Section 285(10) of the amended 1999 Constitution, cited cases he considered relevant, in urging this Court to resolve the sole issue he formulated for the determination of the appeal, in his favour and to allow the appeal.
?

The issue which the 1st Respondent (hereafter to be simply

referred to as ?Respondent?) formulated for the determination of the appeal in his brief of argument, reads thus: –
?In view of the circumstances of this case whether the provisions of Section 285(10) of the 1999 Constitution as amended should not be read together with Section 294(5) of the 1999 Constitution as amended.?

Suffice it to say, that the Respondent alluded to facts he considered to be relevant and as showing that the Appellant did not establish that he suffered any miscarriage of justice due to the shift by the lower Court of the date of the delivery of its judgment from 30/4/2019 (to which it was initially reserved) to 13/5/2019, when it was eventually delivered, and that the Appellant in any event cannot be said to have suffered any miscarriage of justice. That, this is in the light of the antecedents of the case and tactics employed by the Appellant at the hearing of the case. Also, citing cases he considered relevant, the Respondent urged the Court, to dismiss the appeal in the interest of justice. It is the stance of the Respondent that none of the intervening factors in the case (including the sending of

the learned trial Judge on a workshop in Abuja), were under the control of the said learned trial Judge or the parties.

the election
(6) An election petition tribunal shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from the date of the filing of the petition.?
Law reports are now replete with decisions of the Supreme Court regarding the interpretation to be accorded the provisions re-produced above, particularly in respect of the failure of an election petition tribunal to deliver its judgment in an election petition within the 180 days period from the date of filing the same as stipulated in the provisions above. In my considered view, it is clear from the cases, that the position of the Supreme Court in its numerous decisions on the failure of the tribunal to deliver its decision in an election petition within 180 days from the date of filing, is that any decision rendered outside the said 180 days for any reason whatsoever, is void or is a nullity, and that the petition in which such decision is rendered, is liable to be struck out. In other words, I can safely say that the position of the Supreme Court regarding the 180 days period provided for the giving of judgment in an election petition, is to the effect that barring the end of existence (and

when in my considered view, time itself would definitely become static for the calculation of any action required of we humans), there is nothing conceivable that can be validly relied upon as extending the time within which a Court/tribunal is mandated by law to do all that is expected of it, in the entertainment of an election petition. See in this regard, the cases of ABUBAKAR V. NASAMU (2012) LPELR ? 7826 (SC); UGBA V. SUSWAM (2012) LPELR ? 9726 (SC); ANPP V. GONI (2012) 7 NWLR; and PDP V. CPC (2011) LPELR ? 2909 (SC), amongst many others.
As far back as 13/7/2007, Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC; in the case of BAKARE V. NRC (2007) LPELR-712 (SC) had stated to the effect that the Supreme Court when faced with the construction of a statutory provision in pari materia with one that has been previously construed by it, has to follow the principle laid down in the earlier case and cited the case of Mobil Oil Plc v. IAL 36 Inc. (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 659) 146; (2000) FWLR (Pt. 10) 1632 at 1640 in this regard. It is also in my considered view very settled that any Court lower to the Supreme Court, (based on the doctrine of stares decisis), by law, must

accord the provisions of an enactment already or previously interpreted by the Supreme Court, the same interpretation when similar provisions are being considered in the case before it. This is why decided cases have evolved the principle to the effect that when a lower Court is confronted in a matter before it, with the provisions of an enactment that have been previously interpreted by a higher Court, all the said lower Court has to do is to simply apply the interpretation given the provisions in question, by the higher Court. See the case of ROSSEK V AFRICAN CONTINENTAL BANK LTD (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 312) 382. I am therefore of the considered view, that all that is expected of this Court regarding the 180 days within which the lower Court is to deliver its judgment from the date of filing a pre-election matter as stipulated in Section 285(10) of the amended Constitution, vis-a-vis when the lower Court delivered its judgment on 13/5/2019, is to simply accord the provisions of the said Section 285(10) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, the same interpretation the Supreme Court has consistently accorded the provision of Section 285(6) of the said Constitution.

This is particularly so, when it is appreciated that the opening words in the said Section 285(10) of the Constitution are: ?Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution. In this regard, see the case of NDIC V. OKEM ENTERPRISE LTD (2004) LPELR?1999 (SC) wherein, the Supreme Court dwelling on the term ?notwithstanding? when used in a statute said per Uwaifo, JSC; thus: –
?As has been observed, Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution begins with ?Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution” while Section 272(1) is specifically made “subject to the provisions of Section 251.” When the term “notwithstanding” is used in a Section of a Statute, it is meant to exclude an impinging or impeding effect of any other provision of the Statute or other subordinate legislation so that the said Section may fulfill itself. It follows that, as used in Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution, no provision of that Constitution shall be capable of undermining the said Section. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx?

In any event, the Supreme Court in my

considered view, has now made it clear as crystal that its position in respect of the sanctity or inviolability of the time frame for the delivery of judgment in election petition, is applicable to pre-election matters. In this regard, see the case of KUSAMOTU V. APC (2019) LPELR ? 46802 delivered on 15/2/2019.
I have stated herein before, that the Respondent filed his brief of argument in the instant appeal on 5/7/2019. Therein, the Respondent set out to justify and defend the validity of the judgment of the lower Court (which he never disputed to have been delivered outside the 180 days period from the date of the filing of his suit). Given this concession as it were, by the Respondent, I am of the considered view that (even if the Respondent did not see that the position of the Supreme Court in respect of the time period of 180 days in respect of election petitions, was by force of proper application of the doctrine of stares decisis applicable to the 180 days period in respect of pre-election matters), he has clearly set out to maintain a position that is antithetical to the decision of the Supreme Court in the Kusamotu case (supra) (and which

decision was pronounced prior to the filing of his brief of argument) and from which no Court in Nigeria can deviate for any reason whatsoever. Not even on the basis of the often-touted term of ?interest of justice?; as if ?interest of justice? can ever constitute a valid reason for the refusal by a lower Court to be bound by a decision of a higher Court that has expressly pronounced on an issue in contention between parties. In other words, I am of the settled view that it is more ?in the interest of justice? for this Court being a lower Court to the Supreme Court, to always espouse the position of law put in place by the Supreme Court in deserving situations and the instant case, is glaringly one.
Flowing from all that has been said, is that the sole issue formulated for the determination of the instant appeal by the Appellant, must be and is hereby resolved in his favour as I find the judgment of the lower Court having been delivered after the 180 days provided by law for that purpose from the date of the filing of the said case, to be null and void.

In the final analysis, the appeal is meritorious and it

succeeds. Accordingly, the judgment delivered by the lower Court in the instant suit on 13/5/2019, is hereby set aside; and case in which the said judgment was delivered, struck out.
I make no order as to costs.

RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A.: I had read before now, the lead judgment, just delivered by my Brother AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE JCA.
I agree with his reasoning and conclusion.
I also allow the appeal.
No order as to costs.

JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.: This appeal once again brings to the fore the now settled principle of law that in Election Petition and Pre-Election cases whether before the trial or appellate Courts, time is of the essence and that the timelines provision encapsulated in Section 285 of the 1999 Constitution as Amended by the 4th Alteration No 21 Act Of 2017 in respect of Pre-Election suits are sacrosanct and causes and appeals before trial and appellate Courts must be heard and determined within the period prescribed by the provisions of Section 285 of the Constitution as amended; in the case of a trial Court within a period of 180 days from the date of filing of the

suit as stated under Section 285 (10) and in the case of this Court and the Apex Court within 60 days as the case may be as provided in Section 285 (12) of the 4th Alteration 21 of 2017.
The authorities are legion that the Courts do not have the power for whatever reason to extend the time provided for under the provision of Section 285 of the 1999 Constitution as amended. In ANPP & ORS v. G0NI (2012) 7 NWLR (PART 1298) 147 at 182 the Court per ONNOGHEN JSC (Later CJN) emphasized the point thus;
“It has been held by this Court in a number of cases including consolidated appeal Nos SC/141/2011; SC/266/2011; SC/267/2011: SC/282/2011; SC/356/2011 and SC/357/2011: BRIG. GEN. MOHAMMED BUBA MARWA & ORS V. ADM MURTALA NYAKO & ORS delivered on 27th January 2012 that the time fixed by the Constitution is like the rock of Gibralter or Mount Zion which cannot be moved: that the time cannot be extended or expanded or elongated in any way enlarged; that if what is to be is done is not done within the time so fixed. it lapses as the Court is thereby robbed of the Jurisdiction to continue to entertain the matter?
See also – KUSAMOTU v. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS & ORS

(2019) WELR 46802 (SC): NYAKO v. ADAMAWA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY & ORS (2016) LPELR 41822 (SC); LP v. BELLO & ORS (2016) LPELR 40848 (CA).
The delivery of the judgment subject of the instant appeal by the lower Court outside the period of 180 days allowed by the Provisions of Section 285 (10) of the 1999 Constitution as amended is clearly without jurisdiction and it is for this and the more robust reasoning in the lead judgment that join my learned brother A. O. LOKULO-SODIPE. JCA in allowing the appeal. I abide by the consequential orders contain in the judgment.
?

Appearances:

A.U.K. NgumohaFor Appellant(s)

O.C. Ohajuruka for the 1st Respondent.

O.O. Amuzie for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents.

C.C. Okafor for the 4th Respondent holding brief for Aliyu M.B. Sambo.

5th Respondent though served with hearing notice is absent and not represented by CounselFor Respondent(s)

Appearances

A.U.K. NgumohaFor Appellant

AND

O.C. Ohajuruka for the 1st Respondent.

O.O. Amuzie for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents.

C.C. Okafor for the 4th Respondent holding brief for Aliyu M.B. Sambo.

5th Respondent though served with hearing notice is absent and not represented by CounselFor Respondent

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