MANNIR v. FRN
(2022)LCN/17068(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Monday, April 25, 2022
CA/K/435A/C/2019
Before Our Lordships:
Abubakar Mahmud Talba Justice of the Court of Appeal
Mohammed Baba Idris Justice of the Court of Appeal
Kenneth Ikechukwu Amadi Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
SHAMSU MANNIR APPELANT(S)
And
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
THE POSITION OF LAW ON PROOF IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
Proof in criminal trial is beyond reasonable doubt, while proof in civil cases is on the preponderance of evidence. They are on parallel lines and do not mix. PER AMADI, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 2009 APPLIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
The Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 deals with civil cases in the Federal High Court. It was not made to apply in criminal trials and does not apply in criminal trials. The Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 applies to criminal trials. It does not envisage the use of motion on notice under the Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules in a criminal trial. The learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the law and practice before the trial Court is that hearing of notice of preliminary objections are governed by the provision of Order 26 of the Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2009 now 2019. Counsel did not furnish the Court with either the statutory authority or the case law in support of the use of the provisions of the Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2009 now 2019 in a criminal procedure. Therefore I am of the considered view that the provisions of the Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2009 now 2019 are inapplicable in any manner or form in the proceedings relating to charge no FHC/KT/23C/2018 or any other criminal proceedings before the trial Court, and I so hold. Therefore all arguments of the Appellant based on the said Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2009 now 2019 in this matter go to no issue and are consequently discountenanced. PER AMADI, J.C.A.
THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE DEFINITION OF HARD DRUGS
The Appellant was charged under Section 14 and 19 of the NDLEA Act for conspiracy and unlawful possession of 41 kilograms of Tramadol. While there is no dispute as to the provision of Section 19 of the NDLEA Act. The said Section provides thus: Any person who without lawful authority, knowingly possesses the drugs popularly known as cocaine, LSD, Heroin or any other similar drugs, shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and liable on conviction to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not less than fifteen years and not exceeding 25 years. The argument of the Appellant is that Tramadol was not specifically named under the said Section 19 of the NDLEA Act Cap N40 LFN 2004. In the case of Okewu v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (supra), the trial Judge defined Indian hemp that is Cannabis Sativa as a narcotic drug because it alters perception or consciousness therefore under prohibition by law. The Court equally reached the same decision in Mohammed v FRN (Supra). In this case, the learned trial Court Judge held thus:
“It is well settled principle of law in recent times that any drug substance which if found in the possession of a person and if the content after being tested in any recognised Government Laboratory and if proves positive of Cocaine, heroin, LSD or any similar drugs is described as psychotropic substance and narcotic drug, most especially where if taking in excess can cause stupor, coma, drowsiness or convulsion that alters a person perception and tramadol falls within that category if taking in excess”. See page 10 of the ruling at page 47 of the record.
The use of the phrase “or any other similar drugs” clearly means that the list is not exhaustive. The learned Judge was therefore right in relying on the aforesaid cases in her ruling. These issues are equally resolved in the favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant. PER AMADI, J.C.A.
KENNETH IKECHUKWU AMADI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the ruling of the Federal High Court, Katsina Division, Katsina in charge no. FHC/K1/23C/2018 Coram; Hon. Justice H. R. Shagan delivered on the 27th day of May, 2019.
The brief facts of this case, which gave rise to the appeal are that the Appellant Shamsu Mannir and Tasiu Suleman, were arrested on the 15th October 2017 at Charanchi town in possession of 41 Kilograms of suspected psychotropic substance believed to be Tramadol by the men of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency during a JTF Operation. They were consequently charged under Section 14(b) and Section 19 of the NDLEA ACT CAP N30 Laws of the Federation 2004 on a two count charge of possession of narcotic drugs similar to cocaine, heroin and LSD before the Federal High Court sitting at Katsina on a charge sheet dated the 10th day of January, 2018.
The defendants pleaded not guilty to all charges and the case was adjourned for trial. The defendants’ counsel filed a notice of Preliminary Objection dated the 3rd day of December, 2018 on three grounds; the first ground being that the offences upon which the defendants were standing trial were unknown to Nigerian Law, for three sub-reasons:
Firstly, that tramadol is not listed among psychotropic substances outlined in the 2nd Schedule of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act. The Dangerous Drugs Act or any other Legislative or written law fully enacted.
Secondly, that Section 36(8) and (12) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) operated in favour of the defendants and
Thirdly, that Nigeria is not a signatory to the United Nation Conventions that restricts the sale of tramadol.
The second ground was that the charge preferred against the defendants was purely based on suspicion.
The third and final ground on which the Preliminary Objection was brought was premised on the assertion that the Court lacked the requisite jurisdiction to hear this case.
The preliminary objection was heard and in considered ruling of the lower Court delivered on 27/5/2017, it was dismissed. Aggrieved by the ruling the Appellant (defendant) filed a Notice of Appeal raising three grounds of appeal thus:
GROUND ONE:
The learned trial Court erred in law when it relied on the processes filed on behalf of the Respondent out of time without leave of the trial Court having been sought and obtained, in its ruling and dismiss the Notice of Preliminary Objection filed on behalf of the Appellant.
GROUND TWO:
The learned trial Court erred in law when it dismissed the Notice of Preliminary Objection filed and argued on behalf of the Defendant/Appellant.
GROUND THREE:
The learned trial Court misdirected itself in law when it relied on the cases of Mohammed v FRN (2013) LPELR21384, Okewu v FRN (2012) 2 SC (PT11) Ikye Eze v FRN (CA/YL/68C/2015)(2016) NGCA47, 6th May 2016 to dismiss the Defendant’s/Appellant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection without adverting its mind to the authorities cited by the Defendant/Appellant.
GROUND FOUR:
The learned trial Court erred in law when it held that Tramadol is a Narcotic drug similar to Cocaine, Heroin, LSD hence prohibited by law in Nigeria.
In the Appellant’s brief of argument, the learned counsel for the Appellant raised 4(four) issues for determination thus:
1. Whether the trial Court was right when it considered and relied on the Respondent’s written address against the Notice of preliminary objection in dismissing the Notice of Preliminary Objection, same having been filed out of time and without leave of the trial Court having been sought and obtained.
2. Whether the trial Court was right when it overruled the Notice of Preliminary Objection as being incompetent, frivolous, and vexatious and it lacks merit.
3. Whether the trial Court was right when it relied on the cases of Mohammed v FRN (2012) 2SC (Pt.11), Ikeyi Eze v FRN (CA/YL/68C/2015) 2016 NGCA47 6TH May 2016 whose facts and principles are different and distinguishable with the case at hand to overrule the Notice of Preliminary Objection.
4. Whether the learned trial Court was right when it held in its ruling overruling the Appellant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection that tramadol is a narcotic drug similar to cocaine, heroin, LSD hence prohibited by law without citing any authority to support such opinion.
In arguing issue one that is; as to the propriety of the reliance of the trial Court on the written address against the notice of preliminary objection same being filed out of time and without the leave of Court, Counsel answered the question posed in the negative. He reiterated to the Court on the importance and strength of rules of Court in dispensation of justice and trial proceedings, citing the cases of Isa v Abacha (2012) 12 NWLR (PT 1314) 406 & Bayero v Mainasara & Sons Ltd. Counsel submitted that in the absence of any provision regarding the hearing of preliminary objection in the Administration of Criminal Justice Act the provision of Order 26 Rule 4 Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 shall apply. That by the said provision, the other party is given 7 days within which to respond to the notice of preliminary objection served on him. That in this instant case, that the Respondent did not respond until after 48 days of service. That no motion for extension of time was filed, no default fees were paid and no leave of Court was sought in accordance with the provision of Order 48 Rule 4 Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019. The omission in his opinion rendered the process incompetent and lifeless before the Court, referring to Nwabueze v Okoye (1988)10-11 SC, Dakan v Asalu (2015) ALL FWLR (Pt. 799) 1055. Learned Counsel further submitted that it is against the principle of fair hearing for the trial Court to suo motu grant an extension of time to the Respondent and order Respondent to pay default fees without hearing the other party. He referred the Court to the cases of Ogwe v IGP (2015) ALL FWLR (PT 779) 1055 SC, Abdulkareem v Lagos State Government (2016) ALL FWLR (PT.850) 1123, Odom v PDP (2015) ALL FWLR (PT 773) 962 SC and Kayili v Yilbuk (2015) ALL FWLR (PT 775) 347 SC.
Continuing, counsel argued, that purported “Exhibit A” (a drug analysis report) which the Respondents had annexed to their written address against the notice of preliminary objection at the trial Court amounted to smuggling in of evidence. He contended that its competency was challenged but the trial Court ignored the challenge. He submitted that only an affidavit, which is a form of evidence, can contain annexures and be relied upon by the Court as a form of evidence. That the purpose of a written address was to let the Court, and to enable the other party know of facts summed up by him, and as such counsel’s submission cannot take the place of evidence. Counsel referred to the cases of Niger Construction v Okugbeni (1987) 2 SC 108 and Obodo v Olomu & Anor (1986)3SC 43. He urged the Court to hold that failure of the trial Court to rule on the propriety or otherwise of annexing “Exhibit A” to Respondent’s written address against the notice of preliminary objection is fatal and against the principles of fair hearing. In concluding this issue, counsel submitted that an incompetent process cannot be relied upon to erect an action as it must collapse, counsel referred to the cases of Pollyn v Miejene (2012) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1321) Igwe v Kalu (1990) 5 NWLR (PT 149) 155; and Trade Bank v Cham (2004) ALL FWLR (Pt. 235). He urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant and uphold the notice of preliminary objection as unchallenged, strike out the charge and discharge the Appellant on same.
In arguing issue two, that is; whether the trial Court was right in overruling the notice of preliminary objection as incompetent, frivolous and vexatious, Learned Counsel also answered the question in the negative. He stated that the first ground of their argument in the notice of preliminary objection is that the offences for which the appellants were charged is unknown to Nigerian Law. That the Appellants were arraigned on a two (2)-count charge of criminal conspiracy and possession of 41 kilograms of tramadol suspected to be psychotropic substances. That by the provision of Section 36(12) of the 1999 Constitution no person shall be convicted for an offence which is not defined and the penalty prescribed in a written law. That Section 14(b) and Section 19 NDLEA Act which were relied on by the prosecution did not mention tramadol as illegal.
That in defining a narcotic drug the Supreme Court in Okewu v FRN (2012) 2 SC (Pt. II) included ‘a drug that is controlled and prohibited by law’ in holding that cannabis sativa can be properly classified under ‘any similar drugs’. It was also hinged on the fact that cannabis sativa was prohibited by the provisions of the Indian Hemp Act 1960 but in this instance, no provision of the law prohibited the possession of tramadol. That the restriction of the possession of tramadol in Nigeria was just an administrative policy directive of the government and such policy directive cannot contravene the provisions of the Constitution particularly Section 36(8) 1999 CFRN. That this was the position of the Court in Okafor v Lagos State Government (2016) LPELR-41066 (CA).
Apart from the foregoing, counsel argued that the charge against the appellant was purely based on suspicion but the trial Court omitted or neglected to rule on this point. He stated that suspicion no matter how well placed does not amount to prima facie evidence and cannot take the place of same referring to the cases of Ohwovoriole v FRN (2003) FWLR (Pt. 141) P 2019 AT 2037 Abacha v State (2002) 7 SC (PT1), Abieke & Anor v State (1975) NSCC 404 AT 406. Counsel submitted that the failure of the lower Court to rule on this point amounted to a breach of fair hearing and gross miscarriage of justice. Counsel referred to Barrister Mike Nkwocha & Ors v MTN Nigeria Communications Ltd (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1099) 439 Para A-B.
In respect of issue three, that is; whether the trial Court was right in relying on Mohammed v FRN, Okewu v FRN, and Ikye Eze v FRN to overrule the notice of preliminary objection. Counsel answered his poser in the negative.
He argued that the facts and principles in these cases were fundamentally different from the case at hand. That the trial Court is bound to follow decisions of superior Courts only where the facts, issues and principles are similar. That these cases relied on by the trial Court were different in that in Mohammed’s case and Okewu’s case bothered on the possession of Indian hemp and since the Indian Hemp Act criminalised its possession, the Court would be right to hold it as a narcotic drug under the omnibus phrase ‘…any similar drugs.”. That in Ikye Eze’s case he was in possession of tramadol but in his confessional statement, it was referred to as cocaine. Counsel therefore submitted that the facts of these cases were not on all fours with the case at hand and urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.
On issue four, that is; whether the learned trial Court was right when it held in its ruling overruling the Appellant’s notice of preliminary objection that tramadol is a narcotic drug similar to cocaine, heroin, LSD hence prohibited by law without citing any authority to support such opinion. The argument of counsel contains repetitive arguments already made.
It is important to note that the learned counsel for the Appellant filed what he captioned Appellant Reply Brief to the Respondent’s Brief of Argument. I have very carefully read all the contents of the reply brief, nothing in it relates to any point of law or reply to any new issues raised by the Respondent in her brief of argument, rather it is a further argument and repetition of already canvassed arguments. I therefore discountenance it.
The learned counsel for the Respondent in his own Brief of argument raised two issues for determination and argued them as follows:
In respect of issue one that is; whether the trial Judge was right in considering the process filed by the respondent before the trial Court against the notice of preliminary objection. Counsel answered this poser in the affirmative, his reason being that all criminal trials are regulated by the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 (hereafter referred to as ACJA) and this enactment does not make provisions on the issue of timeline for filing of processes. That Section 492(3) ACJA 2015 states that where there are no express provisions in the Act the Court could apply any procedure that will meet the justice of the case. Counsel argued that the Appellant’s submission that recourse should have been made to the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 where there is a lacuna in the ACJA for time of filing was misconceived. This was because, firstly the ACJA itself allows for the application of judicial discretion, secondly civil and criminal proceedings are different and are governed by different rules, thirdly the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 has a restrictive application to civil proceedings and fourthly the provisions of Section 6(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which extends the powers of superior Courts to inherent powers and sanctions of a Court of law has eroded any possibility of the helplessness of the Courts as a result of any vacuum in any procedural rules.
Continuing, counsel argued that, assuming without conceding that the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 applied, it would still not make the process incompetent. This is because Order 51 Rule1(1) Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 is to the effect that failure to comply with the requirements of filing was to be treated as a mere irregularity because Courts are more concerned with doing substantial justice as against considering mere technicalities, counsel referred to the case of Morayo v AAU Akungba (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1552) 245 AT 249, Shuaibu v Muazu (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1409) 247 AT 339, FRN v Dairo (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt.1454) 141 AT 187. Furthermore, he submitted that the Court in its unfettered discretion to cure this irregularity ordered the Respondent to pay the sum of N35,000 in default of filing the process on time, which was paid.
Regarding the propriety of attaching ‘Exhibit A, learned counsel submitted that it goes to no issue as the learned trial Judge neither referred to it nor mentioned it. That the ruling was made based on judicial precedents and judgment of Supreme Court and no reliance was placed on the attached Exhibit A, hence it went to no issue. Furthermore and in any case, Exhibit A, was not raised at the trial Court and neither did the Appellant raise it as a ground of appeal in the notice of appeal. That by virtue of Order 6 Rule 4 and Order 17 Rule 3(3) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016 it was a fresh issue and ought to have been brought properly with leave of Court. Counsel prayed the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent.
In respect to issue two, that is; whether the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the notice of preliminary objection raised by the Appellant herein at the stage of the proceedings before the Federal High Court. The learned Counsel answered this question in the affirmative. Counsel argued that the Appellant’s objection was hinged on three issues
1. That the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case
2. The charge was based on suspicion and cannot legally sustain a trial
3. That the charge was unconstitutional offending Section 36(8) & Section (12) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
As regards the first issue, counsel submitted that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to hear drug related cases, referring to the case Okewu v FRN (supra). He acknowledged that even when the decisions related to Indian hemp the position of jurisdiction applies to all drugs. That Section 26 NDLEA Act also bestows jurisdiction on the Federal High Court and most importantly Section 251(1) M extends the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to drugs and poisons. Counsel also argued that within the context of Section 19 NDLEA Act and particularly with the phrase ‘or any other similar drugs’ tramadol was envisaged because all drugs which were harmful could not be fully listed. He also reminded the Court that tramadol has also been referred to as an opioid analgesic by the International Narcotics Control Board. It was against the backdrop of this that the National Council on health made tramadol a controlled substance in 2013. He then urged the Court to uphold the jurisdiction of the FHC over this case.
In answering the question as to whether the charge was based on suspicion, counsel contended that the Appellant’s counsel was wrong in saying so. That the charge though inelegant was clear and did not mislead the Appellant as to the offence he was charged with. Counsel submitted that the phrase ‘suspected to be psychotropic substances’ was of no moment to the charge as it was neither a fact in the case nor relating to any requirement of relevant Sections of the NDLEA Act. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the charge was not based on suspicion since the allegation of the offence was clear. In concluding his argument, counsel submitted that the objection raised was misconceived and premature since the Appellant was charged for offences contained in Section 14(b) and Section 19 NDLEA Act and by applying the ejusdem generis principle it can be extended to drugs like tramadol.
RESOLUTION
The learned counsel for the Appellant raised 4 (four) issues while the learned counsel for the Respondent raised 2(two) issues for determination in this appeal. The four issues raised by the counsel for the Appellant are more encompassing. I therefore, shall adopt them as mine in the resolution of this appeal as follows:
Issue one that is; whether the trial Court was right when it considered and relied on the Respondent’s written address against the Notice of preliminary objection in dismissing the notice of preliminary objection, same having been filed out of time and without leave of the trial Court having been sought and obtained.
Proof in criminal trial is beyond reasonable doubt, while proof in civil cases is on the preponderance of evidence. They are on parallel lines and do not mix.
The Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 deals with civil cases in the Federal High Court. It was not made to apply in criminal trials and does not apply in criminal trials. The Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 applies to criminal trials. It does not envisage the use of motion on notice under the Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules in a criminal trial. The learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the law and practice before the trial Court is that hearing of notice of preliminary objections are governed by the provision of Order 26 of the Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2009 now 2019. Counsel did not furnish the Court with either the statutory authority or the case law in support of the use of the provisions of the Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2009 now 2019 in a criminal procedure. Therefore I am of the considered view that the provisions of the Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2009 now 2019 are inapplicable in any manner or form in the proceedings relating to charge no FHC/KT/23C/2018 or any other criminal proceedings before the trial Court, and I so hold. Therefore all arguments of the Appellant based on the said Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2009 now 2019 in this matter go to no issue and are consequently discountenanced.
Furthermore, the Appellant raised the issue of an annexure marked exhibit ‘A’ annexed to the written address of the Respondent against the notice of preliminary objection. I have carefully read the ruling of the lower Court appealed against, no where did the trial judge mention or refer to the said ‘Exhibit A’. It was also not raised in the grounds of appeal. It is an entirely a new or fresh issue raised without the leave of Court, which is not allowed. Consequently, this issue is resolved against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent.
The third issue; whether the trial Court was right when it relied on the cases of Mohammed v FRN (2012) 2SC (Pt.11), Ikeyi Eze v FRN(supra) whose facts and principles are different and distinguishable with the case at hand to overrule the Notice of preliminary objection and issue four; whether the learned trial Court was right when it held in its ruling overruling the Appellant’s notice of preliminary objection that tramadol is a narcotic drug similar to cocaine, heroin, LSD hence prohibited by law without citing any authority to support such opinion are related and I shall take them together as follows:
The Appellant was charged under Section 14 and 19 of the NDLEA Act for conspiracy and unlawful possession of 41 kilograms of Tramadol. While there is no dispute as to the provision of Section 19 of the NDLEA Act. The said Section provides thus: Any person who without lawful authority, knowingly possesses the drugs popularly known as cocaine, LSD, Heroin or any other similar drugs, shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and liable on conviction to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not less than fifteen years and not exceeding 25 years. The argument of the Appellant is that Tramadol was not specifically named under the said Section 19 of the NDLEA Act Cap N40 LFN 2004. In the case of Okewu v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (supra), the trial Judge defined Indian hemp that is Cannabis Sativa as a narcotic drug because it alters perception or consciousness therefore under prohibition by law. The Court equally reached the same decision in Mohammed v FRN (Supra). In this case, the learned trial Court Judge held thus:
“It is well settled principle of law in recent times that any drug substance which if found in the possession of a person and if the content after being tested in any recognised Government Laboratory and if proves positive of Cocaine, heroin, LSD or any similar drugs is described as psychotropic substance and narcotic drug, most especially where if taking in excess can cause stupor, coma, drowsiness or convulsion that alters a person perception and tramadol falls within that category if taking in excess”. See page 10 of the ruling at page 47 of the record.
The use of the phrase “or any other similar drugs” clearly means that the list is not exhaustive. The learned Judge was therefore right in relying on the aforesaid cases in her ruling. These issues are equally resolved in the favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.
The last issue is issue two that is; whether the trial Court was right when it overruled the notice of preliminary objection as being incompetent, frivolous, and vexatious and it lacks merit.
The Appellant only took his plea in this matter and it was adjourned for trial before this motion was moved. Clearly, the aim and purpose of this motion is to stop or forestall the trial of the Appellant. The counsel for the Appellant is carrying out the singular aim of stopping the prosecution of the Appellant and in doing so tried to mislead the Court into using Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules in a purely criminal matter. This was a very dangerous invitation which if allowed has the capacity to cripple criminal prosecution. The issues raised in this “motion” can be raised in a no case submission or as defence on the merit to this case. The learned trial Judge of the lower Court was right in holding that the “notice of preliminary objection” as being incompetent, frivolous, vexatious and lacking merit. This issue is resolved against the Appellant. This appeal is lacking in merit and therefore dismissed. The ruling of the lower Court in Charge No FHC/KT/23C/2018 is hereby affirmed. The trial of the Appellant shall proceed forthwith. Judgment is entered accordingly.
ABUBAKAR MAHMUD TALBA, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft, the lead judgment of my learned brother, KENNETH IKECHUKWU AMADI, JCA. I entirely agree with his reasoning and conclusion that the appeal is lacking in merit. I also dismiss the appeal. I abide by the consequential order(s) in the lead judgment.
MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A.: I have had the benefit of reading in draft, the lead judgment of my learned brother, Kenneth Ikechukwu Amadi, JCA, just delivered. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached. I do not have anything useful to add. I abide by all the orders made therein.
Appearances:
M.T. STEPHEN, ESQ. For Appellant(s)
J.N. SUNDAY, DIRECTOR PROSECUTION NDLEA For Respondent(s)