MAAJI v. WILSON & ORS
(2022)LCN/17043(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Friday, July 22, 2022
CA/A/143/2016
Before Our Lordships:
Stephen Jonah Adah Justice of the Court of Appeal
Biobele Abraham Georgewill Justice of the Court of Appeal
Bature Isah Gafai Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
MRS. FATIMA MAAJI APPELANT(S)
And
1. MRS. KATE WILSON 2. MINISTER, FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY 3. FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY ADMINISTRATION RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT A DEFENDANT IS AT LIBERTY TO AMEND HIS STATEMENT OF DEFENCE WHERE THERE IS AN AMENDMENT OF THE STATEMENT OF CLAIM
The law is well settled that upon amendment of the statement of claim, the defendant is at liberty to amend his statement of defence in so far as is necessary to meet the facts introduced by the amendment. Failure to amend will leave the Respondent with his original statement of defence. See the case of Mobil Oil (Nig.) Plc v. IAL 36 INC (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 659) 146. In the instant case, the 1st Respondent amended his claim after the Court allowed the leave sought for the amendment. The amendment then gave the Court the opportunity to determine the real controversy between the parties. There are no flaws in the trial Court’s decision to allow the 1st Respondent the leave to amend his statement of claim. PER ADAH, J.C.A.
THE STANDARD OF PROOF IN CIVIL CASES
Our law is settled that the standard of proof in civil cases is based on the balance of probabilities or the preponderance of evidence. The application of this principle is the responsibility of the trial Court to do a proper evaluation of evidence to enable it arrive at settling in for the party who asserts the affirmative or determine the relative strength of the cases of the two contending parties before the Court. SeeEyo v. Onuoha & Anor., (2011) LPELR-1873 (SC), Wachukwu & Anor v. Owunwanne & Anor., (2011) LPELR-3466 (SC). PER ADAH, J.C.A.
THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE LATIN MAXIM “FUNCTUS OFFICIO”
Now, in law, the Latin phrase “functus officio” ordinarily means a task performed, having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further force or authority. However, in practice the idea is that the specific duties and functions that an officer was legally empowered and charged to perform have now been wholly accomplished and thus, the officer has no further authority or legal competence based on the original commission. This is because the thing which originally had life had become dead or moribund after the performance of the duty or function by the authority. Thus, a Judge or Court, who has decided a question brought before him becomes “functus officio” and therefore, cannot review his own decision except on grounds of want of jurisdiction, fraud, illegality etc. See Peter James Asifo Egbe V. Mrs. Adebisi George & Anor (2021) LPELR-53503(CA) AT pp. 53-55, per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA.
Thus, once a Court of competent jurisdiction delivers its ruling or judgment on a matter, it cannot revisit or review or set aside the said judgment except under certain conditions and more importantly, a Court lack the jurisdiction to determine an issue it is “functus officio” in respect of the issue or where the proceedings relating to the issue is an abuse of Court process. See Buhari V. INEC & Ors (2008) LPELR-814 (SC). See also Dingyadi & Anor V. INEC & Ors (2011) LPELR-950(SC); Alhaji Idris Alaya V. Engr. Adewumi Ademola Isaac (2019) LPELR- 46881 (CA). PER ADAH, J.C.A.
THE POSITION OF LAW ON AN AMENDMENT
What then can be said to be an amendment within the broader context of the litigation process in our Courts? An amendment simply put in the correction of an error committed in any process, pleading or proceedings at law or in equity and thus an amendment can be made either as a matter of course or by consent of the parties upon notice to the Court in which the proceedings is pending. As earlier observed, because the Courts are more concerned with deciding the rights of the parties than in their errors or mistakes, which can be corrected at any stage, an amendment which will not cause injustice to the other party and can at worst be ameliorated by cost will be granted at any stage if it is in the interest of justice. The aim of an amendment, as is commonly agreed is usually to prevent the manifest justice of a case from being defeated or delayed by formal slips which may arise in the prosecution of the case. See Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu V. Mallam Mumkaiia Isa (2014) LPELR -24169 (CA), per Sir Biobele Abraham Gcorgewill JCA. See also Akoko Edo Traditional Council V. Jafaru Odamah & Ors (2020) LPELR-49664(CA) AT pp. (Pp. 32-34). See also; Okafor V. Ikeanyi (1979) 3-4 SC 99; Chief Eyo Eta V. Chief Okon Dazie (2013) LPELR 20136 (SC); Adekeye V. Akin-Olugbade (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 214. PER ADAH, J.C.A.
STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the ruling and final decision of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, delivered on 7th February, 2013 and 21st July, 2015, respectively, in Suit No: FCT/HC/CV/207/2010.
This case was originated by the 1st Respondent who as a Plaintiff took out a Writ of Summons against the Appellant, 2nd and 3rd Respondents as Defendants at the lower Court. The Amended Writ of Summons was taken out on 22nd July, 2010 and sought the following reliefs in the Statement of claim, thus:-
1. A Declaration that the plaintiff is the rightful allottee and owner of all that property known as plot No. 613 with Old file Number AB 302, New File Number AB 10328 of about 2,100 Square Metres with Cadastral Zone B11 of Kaura District, Abuja.
2. A Declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to peaceful possession and occupation of all that property known as plot No. 613 with Old File Number AB 302, New Number AB 10328 of about 2,100 Square Metres within Cadastral Zone B11 of Kaura District, Abuja
3. A Declaration that the purported double allocation and or reallocation of plot No. 613 with Old File Number AB 302, New File Number AB 10328 of about 2,100 Square Metres within Cadastral Zone B11 of Kaura District. Abuja by the 1st Defendant to the 3rd Defendant is illegal, a breach of due process of law, null, void and of no effect.
4. An Order of this Honorable Court, restraining perpetually the Defendants, their agencies, department, allies, agents, officers, workman and all those deriving or claiming through them from further interference, obstruction and disturbance of plaintiff’s rights over the property known as plot 613 with Old File Number AB 302, New File Number AB 10438 of Kaura District, Abuja.
5. Any Order or Orders as this Honourable Court may make in the circumstances.
The 1st and 2nd Defendants, now 2nd and 3rd Respondents denied the claim of the 1st Respondent vide a Joint Statement of Defence on the 29th March, 2011.
The parties joined issues on the Writ and the matter proceeded to trial. The 1st Respondent testified on her behalf as PW1 and tendered several documents in evidence which were marked as Exhibits. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents called a lone witness and tendered several documents in evidence which were admitted and marked as Exhibits
On the 5th October, 2012 the 1st Respondent moved an application which was similar to an earlier application that was heard on the merit and dismissed by the trial court, the Court granted the second application which was seeking for reliefs praying the court for amendment of pleadings.
At the close of trial, learned counsel at the trial Court adopted their respective final written addresses filed on behalf of the parties. In a reserved judgment delivered by the trial Court on the 21st July, 2015, the trial Court entered judgment for the 1st Respondent, granting the relief sought in the Writ.
Aggrieved by this decision, the Appellant filed the instant appeal vide an Amended Notice of Appeal filed on the 31st day of May, 2018. There are twelve grounds of appeal listed in the notice of appeal.
The Record of Appeal was compiled and transmitted to this Court on the 20th April, 2016, Briefs of Argument were filed and exchanged in the following manner:
Appellant’s Brief of Argument dated 30th May, 2018, but filed 31st May, 2018.1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument dated 12th February, 2021 and filed the same date. While Appellant’s Reply Brief of Argument was dated 18th February, 2021 and filed on 22nd February, 2021.
However, before we proceed to the issues in the substantive appeal, let us treat the issues raised by the Appellant from the Interlocutory ruling of the trial Court, following the motion granted to argue fresh issues. The Appellant raised three issues which are:
1. Whether or not the learned trial Judge was right to grant the 1st Respondent reliefs contained in motion (M/513/2012) of 5/10/2012 when the reliefs sought are substantially similar with the reliefs sought in Motion (M/10688/2012) previously dismissed by the trial Court. (Distilled from Grounds 1 and 2)
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right having regard to the circumstance of the case to allow the 1st Respondent further amend her pleadings when indeed, the amendment sought introduced new issues which completely changed the case of the 1st Respondent against the Appellant. (Distilled from Grounds 3 and 4)
3. Whether the learned trial Judge was right to have premised his grant of the reliefs sought by the 1st Respondent in Motion M/513/2012 of 01/10/2012 particularly as it relates to the reliefs seeking leave of Court to amend her pleadings and to reopen her case for the purpose of tendering relevant documents earlier omitted “to mistake or inadvertence of counsel” when no such excuse or indeed any reason was canvassed in the affidavit in support of the application. (Distilled from Grounds 5 and 6).
I will proceed to consider and resolve the three issues together in one fell swoop, as the issues are connected one way or the other.
ISSUES ON RULING OF MOTION M/513/2012:
Learned counsel for the Appellant while arguing this issue cited the case of Omeika v. Omeika (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1371) 423 AT 432 and argued that where a trial Court has given a decision in a case on the merit, the Court is functus officio in relation to the case and it cannot ordinarily reopen it for fresh hearing and that the only option available to a dissatisfied party is to appeal against it. Counsel cited A.D.H Ltd v. Min., FCT (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1357) 493 AT 521 and submitted that the learned trial Judge having heard and determine the former application on merit cannot hear the latter application substantially similar to the one previously heard on merit without offending the doctrine of functus officio. Counsel relied on the cases of TSA Industries Ltd v. FBN Plc (No. 1) (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1320) 326 AT 345; African Re-Insurance Corp. v. J.D.P Construction (Nig.) Ltd. (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 838) 609; Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156; Kode v. Yusuf (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt. 703) 392.
Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that an appellate Court is loath to interfere with the way a lower Court exercised its discretion but will be compelled to interfere if the discretion was wrongly exercised, or was tainted with some irregularity or was in breach of law, or where the Court finds that it is in the interest of justice to interfere. Counsel relied on the case of Ajuwa v. S.P.D.C.N Ltd (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279); University of Lagos v. Aigoro (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 143; Imonikhe v. Attorney General, Bendel State (1992) 7 SCNJ 197 George & Ors v. Dominium Flour Mills Limited (1963) 1 All NLR 71; Mrs. C. I. Adetutu v. Mrs. W. O. Aderohunmu & Ors (1984) 6 SC 92; Willoughby v. I.MB Limited (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 48); Tiwani Limited v. Citi Trust Merchant Bank Limited (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 515); Bamishebi v. Ote (1995) 9 SCNJ 220 AT 228; Lawrence v. Lord Norreys (1888) 39 Chd. 213.
Learned counsel for the Appellant further submitted that where a trial Court takes into consideration extraneous matter or where it shuts its eyes to cogent facts presented to it or hazard a guess as was in the instant case, to arrive at a finding or decision; such finding or decision will be taken to be perverse and will be set aside on appeal. Counsel cited Sapo v. Sunmonu (2010) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1205) 374; Christaleb Plc v. Majekodunmi (2011) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1240) 294 AT 308; Shofolahan v. State (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1383) 281 AT 312.
In response, learned counsel for the 1st Respondent argued that all issues raised by a party in an appeal must derive from the grounds of appeal and the only exception is where a Respondent wish to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court by way of Preliminary Objection. Counsel relied on Yadis Nigeria Limited v. Great Nigeria Insurance Company Limited (2007) LPELR-3507 (SC); Tiza & Anor v. Begha (2005) LPELR-3251 (SC); Ohikhuare v. Malami & Ors (2013) LPELR-22348 (CA); Uboh v. FRN (2019) LPELR 48739 (CA).
Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent submitted that the Appellant is not the party that is entitled to bring such a complaint. She is not a party covered by the Public Officers Protection Act. She is a private party and nowhere in the suit was it indicated that she performed any act in the capacity as to be covered by the Public Officers Protection Act. Counsel relied on Airtel Networks v. George & Ors (2014) LPELR-22951 (CA); Mobil Producing Nigeria Unltd. v. Lasepa & Ors (2002) LPELR- 1887 (SC).
Learned counsel for the Appellant in his reply brief argued that the issue of jurisdiction is so fundamental that it can be raised by any of the parties to the matter or suo motu by the Court and anyhow by either of the litigating parties at any stage of the proceedings even for the first time on appeal at the Supreme Court for the reason that, parties cannot by themselves by consent, confer jurisdiction on a Court. Counsel relied onAccor (Societe Anonyme) v. H.I.R Ltd (2019) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1703) 44 AT 55; Anyanwu v. Ogunewe (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1410) 417; Kuranga v. Benge (2015) LPELR-25977; UBA & Anor v. Ezekiel (2018) LPELR-43779; Tukur v. Govt, of Gongola State (1989) 9 SC AT 34; Adu v. Lagos State Taskforce on Environmental and Special Offences Unit (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1575) 32.
In the instant appeal, the grievances of the Appellant against the interlocutory ruling and consideration were well placed before this Court. The trial Court had dismissed Motion reference no: M/10688/2012, before considering the later Motion reference no: 5/10/2012. The handling of the latter Motion is what is being challenged in the appeal. Let me bring to light the Motions as captured in the Record of Appeal.
The first Motion No: M/10688/2012. The Motion prayed for:
1. An Order of this Honourable Court granting leave to the Plaintiff to recall the plaintiff’s sole witness.
2. An Order of this Honourable Court granting leave to the Plaintiff to file additional witness statement on oath.
3. An Order of this Honourable Court recalling the 1st and 2nd Defendants’ sole witness.
4. And for such further order or orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.
It was heard on 17/6/2012 at pages 254-255. Then it was ruled upon on 11/7/2012 at pages 256-265. The Motion was refused for lacking in merit.
The second Motion was heard on 12/11/2012. It was ruled upon at pages 266 to 274.
The Motion had the following reliefs:
1. An Order of this Honourable Court granting leave to the Plaintiff/Applicant to further amend her statement of claim.
2. An Order of this Honourable Court granting leave to the Plaintiff/Applicant to file additional witness statement on oath.
3. An Order of this Honourable Court granting leave to the Plaintiff/Applicant to reopen her case for the purpose of tendering relevant documents earlier omitted.
4. An Order of this Honourable Court deeming the Plaintiff’s Further Amended Statement of Claim and the Additional Witness Statement on Oath filed separately but along with this Motion as properly filed and served, all requisite fees having been paid.
This Motion was ruled upon and the trial Court in allowing the Motion said at pages 273 to 274, as follows:
In the instant application, I hold the firm view that the amendment sought is for the purpose of determining the real issue in controversy between the parties and it will not overreach or prejudice the defendant.
The Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of Ologun v. Fatayo (2013) 1 NWLR Pt. 1325 pg. 303 at 316-317 para. E-B, held thus “The aim of amendment is usually to prevent the manifest justice of the cause from being defeated or delayed by formal slips which arise from the inadvertence of counsel. It will certainly be wrong to visit the inadvertence or mistake of counsel on a litigant. The Courts have therefore through the years taken a stand that however negligent or careless may have been the slip, however late the proposed amendment, it ought to be allowed if this can be done without injustice to the other side, for a step taken to ensure justice cannot at the same time be used to perpetuate an injustice on the opposite party. The test as to whether a proposed amendment should be allowed is therefore whether or not the party applied to amend can do so without placing the opposite party in such a position which cannot be redressed by that panacea which heals every sore in litigation namely costs”.
In the light of what is stated above, I am of the considered view that this application ought to be granted since it has not introduced a new issue and it has not overreached or prejudiced the Defendants. This application is accordingly granted as prayed for in the interest of doing substantial justice.
The grievances of the Appellant are that the trial Court had in the Motion refused the request of the 1st Respondent for filing additional witness statement on oath. That having once refused the application, the Court cannot revisit it. This issue as raised cannot be raised in vacuo without a consideration of its impact on the course of justice. The purpose of every Court in adjudication is to ensure that justice is delivered to the parties in the case. In carrying out this task, it is required of the Court to ensure that the interest of justice and no more is the primary consideration. Justice, it is well known also demands that the interest of the opponent or respondent is factored into the consideration of the Court. A quick look at the two Motions in contention in this case will show that the two are similar but not the same. The earlier Motion had no contemplation of amending the statement of claim as the second Motion did. The request for amendment of statement of claim was made based on the desire of the 1st Respondent/Applicant to amend her claim. The grant of such a request is discretionary. The law is sacrosanct that such exercise must be carried out judicially and judiciously having regards to the facts and circumstances of the case. A clear view of the decision of the trial Court in respect of the said Motion shows that the trial Court was justified in granting the Motion in the interest of justice. The Appellant has not in the appeal placed any justifiable reason to show that the amendment has caused him any injustice.
The law is well settled that upon amendment of the statement of claim, the defendant is at liberty to amend his statement of defence in so far as is necessary to meet the facts introduced by the amendment. Failure to amend will leave the Respondent with his original statement of defence. See the case of Mobil Oil (Nig.) Plc v. IAL 36 INC (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 659) 146. In the instant case, the 1st Respondent amended his claim after the Court allowed the leave sought for the amendment. The amendment then gave the Court the opportunity to determine the real controversy between the parties. There are no flaws in the trial Court’s decision to allow the 1st Respondent the leave to amend his statement of claim.
The issues raised in the appeal are therefore, in this wise hereby resolved against the Appellant.
On the substantive issue in the instant appeal, counsel for the Appellant distilled a lone issue in the Appellant’s Brief of Argument dated 3rd day of May, 2018, thus:
Whether the learned trial Judge was right to hold that the allegations of fraud and forgery made against the appellant and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents by the 1st Respondent further amended statement of claim were proved beyond reasonable doubt just for the reason that no reply was filed or that the 1st Respondent was not cross-examined. (Distilled from Grounds 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12).
While arguing this issue, learned counsel for the Appellant cited Section 138 (1) and 138 (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and submitted that in any proceeding, whether criminal or civil where allegation of the commission of a crime is in issue, the allegation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and the burden of proving that any person had been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is, subject to the provision of Section 141 of the Act, on the person who assert it, whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the action. Counsel relied on Otukpo v. John (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1299) 357 AT 382-383; M.M.A Inc v. N.M.A (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 506 AT 547; Adewale v. Olaifa (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1330) 478 AT 521; Nnachi v. Ibom (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 900) 614; Pam v. Mohammed (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1112) 1 AT 91; Azenabor v. Bayero University, Kano (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1169) 96 AT 115-116; Agienoji v. C.O.P Edo State (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1023)23.
Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that in an action for declaration of title, the onus is on the claimant who must succeed on his own case and not rely or take advantage of the defendant’s weakness or mistake to succeed. Counsel relied onIroagbara v. Ufomadu (Supra) AT 59-600; Orji v. D.T.M (Nig.) Ltd (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 467; Odogwu v. State (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1373) 74 AT 103; Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941); Okpara v. FRN (1977) 4 SC.
In response, learned counsel for the 1st Respondent submitted that the Appellant and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents argued that in the face of various allegations of impropriety and forgery, failed to show that the certificate of occupancy so produced was obtained following due process as was done by the 1st Respondent. Counsel relied on Ilona v. Idakwo & Anor (2003) LPELR-1496 SC; Afolalu v. The State (2010) LPELR-197 (SC); Samuel Theophilus v. The State (1996) LPELR-3236 (SC); Idundun v. Okumagba (1976) 9-10 S.C 227.
Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent submitted that a Court will only allow an amendment of pleadings after the close of evidence if it is only to bring the pleadings in line with the evidence and no new evidence will be required. Counsel relied on the cases of Taiwo & Ors v. Akinwunmi & Ors (1975) LPELR-3132 (SC); Dike v. The A.G. & Commissioner for Justice, Imo State & Ors (2012) LPELR-15383 (CA); Ojah v. Ogboni (1976) 10 NSCC Pg. 244 AT 247; Okafor v. Ikeanyi (1979) 12 NSCC Pg. 42 AT 47; Adetutu v. Aderohunmu (1984) 15 NSCC Pg. 389; Omaye & Anor v. Omagu & Ors (2007) LPELR-3558 (CA). Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the appeal with substantial cost.
Learned counsel for the Appellant in his Reply Brief, cited the case of NNADIKE & ANOR v. NWACHUKWU (2019) LPELR-48131 (SC) and argued that where there is a subsisting title over land in favor of one party, that title cannot be extinguished by the mere issuance of a C of O to another party without valid revocation of the earlier title. Counsel relied on the cases of Dzungwe v. Gbishe (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt 8) 528; Omiyale v. Macaulay (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1141) 597; Eperokun & Ors v. UNILAG (1986) SC; Pate v. Muhammad (2016) LPELR-41175 (CA); Ugbo v. Aburime (1994) 8 NWLR (pt. 160) PT. 1019; Ashiru v. Olukoya (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt 990) Pt. 1 AT 23; Section 131 (1) (2), 132 and 133 (1) of the Evidence Act.
Learned counsel for the Appellant further submitted that the fact that the identity of the Appellant became known to the 1st Respondent after parties had closed their case was not a justification to change the entire cause of action vide an amendment which to all intent and purpose should have been limited to name of parties. Counsel relied on Persons, Names Unknown v. Sahris International Limited (2019) LPELR-49006 SC. Counsel urged the Court to resolve all issues in favour of the appellant and allow the appeal.
Our law is settled that the standard of proof in civil cases is based on the balance of probabilities or the preponderance of evidence. The application of this principle is the responsibility of the trial Court to do a proper evaluation of evidence to enable it arrive at settling in for the party who asserts the affirmative or determine the relative strength of the cases of the two contending parties before the Court. SeeEyo v. Onuoha & Anor., (2011) LPELR-1873 (SC), Wachukwu & Anor v. Owunwanne & Anor., (2011) LPELR-3466 (SC).
In the instant case, the trial Court in its judgment took time to analyze and make findings on the position of the parties as to their entitlement to the plot of land in issue. It was the finding of the Court that the plaintiff (1st Respondent) adduced credible evidence to show that she indeed applied and was offered the disputed plot of land. The Court further found correctly that application for statutory right of occupancy is a condition precedent for the allocation of plot of land. That the defendants (Appellant, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents in this appeal), did not give any reliable evidence to show that the Appellant even applied for a grant of the plot of land. The trial Court at pages 307 to 310 of the Record of Appeal, examined the evidence placed before it and concluded that the plaintiff had proved her claims against the defendants. It is from the facts before us clear that the 1st Respondent is truly the one who was granted the plot in contention. The findings of the trial Court are unassailable. There is nothing found in this case that requires this Court to interfere with valid and valuable findings of the trial Court.
From the foregoing therefore, I am of the firm view that the issue raised here is resolved against the Appellant. There is no iota of merit in this appeal. The appeal is therefore, dismissed. The judgment of the trial Court in Suit No: FCT/HC/CV/2071/2010, delivered on 4th May, 2015, is hereby affirmed.
Parties are to bear their respective costs.
BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL J.C.A.: I was privileged to read in advance, a draft copy of the leading judgment just delivered by my noble lord, Stephen Jonah Adah JCA, and I am in complete agreement with the impeccable reasoning as marshalled out therein as well as the inescapable conclusion reached to the effect that the appeal, in relation to both the Interlocutory ruling and judgment of the lower Court, lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
My lords, the two pertinent questions in the appeal against the Interlocutory ruling of the lower Court delivered on 7/2/2013, are namely: whether in the light of the earlier ruling of the lower Court delivered on 11/7/2012, dismissing the first application of the 1st Respondent, the lower Court had become functus officio to deliver the ruling on 7/2/201 on the second application of the 1st Respondent, now appealed against by the Appellant, and if no, then whether the lower Court was right to have granted the latter Application of the 1st Respondent for amendment?
Now, in law, the Latin phrase “functus officio” ordinarily means a task performed, having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further force or authority. However, in practice the idea is that the specific duties and functions that an officer was legally empowered and charged to perform have now been wholly accomplished and thus, the officer has no further authority or legal competence based on the original commission. This is because the thing which originally had life had become dead or moribund after the performance of the duty or function by the authority. Thus, a Judge or Court, who has decided a question brought before him becomes “functus officio” and therefore, cannot review his own decision except on grounds of want of jurisdiction, fraud, illegality etc. See Peter James Asifo Egbe V. Mrs. Adebisi George & Anor (2021) LPELR-53503(CA) AT pp. 53-55, per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA.
Thus, once a Court of competent jurisdiction delivers its ruling or judgment on a matter, it cannot revisit or review or set aside the said judgment except under certain conditions and more importantly, a Court lack the jurisdiction to determine an issue it is “functus officio” in respect of the issue or where the proceedings relating to the issue is an abuse of Court process. See Buhari V. INEC & Ors (2008) LPELR-814 (SC). See also Dingyadi & Anor V. INEC & Ors (2011) LPELR-950(SC); Alhaji Idris Alaya V. Engr. Adewumi Ademola Isaac (2019) LPELR- 46881 (CA).
So, looking at the principal relief in the first application, which was principally for the recalling of the 1st Respondent’s witness and to file additional witness statement on oath and the principal relief in the second application, which was principally for further amendment of the 1st Respondent’s amended statement of claim, was the lower Court functus officio as vehemently contended for the Appellant in this appeal? In the leading judgment it has been most admirably resolved that the lower Court was not function officio going by the principal reliefs claimed in the two distinct applications. I agree! It was within the vires of the lower Court to consider the second application on its own merit and if meritorious to grant it as it was under no legal impediment or inhibition to do so by reason of its earlier ruling on completely different and distinct reliefs claimed by the 1st Respondent.
The next pertinent question, which has also been admirably resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent in the leading judgment, is whether the application for amendment by the 1st Respondent has merit and. was thus, rightly granted by the lower Court? I agree that the application for amendment, going by the materials furnished by the 1st Respondent before the lower Court as in the Record of Appeal, was highly meritorious and was therefore, rightly granted by the lower Court.
My lords, in law as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision on the real matters in controversy, it is as much a matter of right of the party to have it corrected, if it can be done without injustice, as anything else in the case is a matter of right and therefore an amendment will be allowed if it is intended to bring the pleadings in line with evidence already led. However, it must be pointed out at once that notwithstanding the utilitarian role of amendment in bringing into focus the real issue in controversy, yet the Court will not grant amendment to set up a different cause of action or change the character of the case of a party without an amendment of the writ of summons. It is also the law that where an amendment is sought purposely for either the reason of derailment it is certainly done in bad faith. There must in all circumstances be good faith and reason for an amendment to be obliged. The question of amendment, although open-ended as it may sound, is not however, a free for all match overreaching the cause of justice. It is rather for the just determination of a cause, which makes litigation effectual and meaningful.
What then can be said to be an amendment within the broader context of the litigation process in our Courts? An amendment simply put in the correction of an error committed in any process, pleading or proceedings at law or in equity and thus an amendment can be made either as a matter of course or by consent of the parties upon notice to the Court in which the proceedings is pending. As earlier observed, because the Courts are more concerned with deciding the rights of the parties than in their errors or mistakes, which can be corrected at any stage, an amendment which will not cause injustice to the other party and can at worst be ameliorated by cost will be granted at any stage if it is in the interest of justice. The aim of an amendment, as is commonly agreed is usually to prevent the manifest justice of a case from being defeated or delayed by formal slips which may arise in the prosecution of the case. See Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu V. Mallam Mumkaiia Isa (2014) LPELR -24169 (CA), per Sir Biobele Abraham Gcorgewill JCA. See also Akoko Edo Traditional Council V. Jafaru Odamah & Ors (2020) LPELR-49664(CA) AT pp. (Pp. 32-34). See also; Okafor V. Ikeanyi (1979) 3-4 SC 99; Chief Eyo Eta V. Chief Okon Dazie (2013) LPELR 20136 (SC); Adekeye V. Akin-Olugbade (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 214.
Now, in the appeal against the final judgment of the lower Court delivered on 21/7/2015, it has been shown, and quite brilliantly too, in the leading judgment, and with which I am in complete agreement, that the 1st Respondent proved, by the credible oral and documentary evidence led by her, fair and square her entitlement to the relief sought by her to a declaration of tile to the land in dispute, known as Plot No. 613 with Old File Number AB 302, New File Number AB 10328 and situate at Cadastral Zone Bl 1 of Kaura District Abuja.
It is the law that in a claim for declaration of title to land, such as the claim of the 1st Respondent, a party claiming title to land must do so by proving with credible evidence one or more of the five methods of proving title to land, namely: Evidence of traditional history of title, Production of genuine and valid documents of title. Acts of Ownership numerous enough, Acts of possession over a long period of time, and Act of possession of adjacent land long enough to make it probable that the owner of the adjacent land is also the owner of the land in dispute. The 1st Respondent proved her title fair and square by production of title document and was therefore, entitled to the judgment of the lower Court, as affirmed by the leading judgment. See Idundun V. Okumagba (1976) 6-10 SC 48. See also John Nyomi & Anor V. Engr. Callistus N. Njoku & Anor (2021) LPELR-55558(CA) per Sir Biobclc Abraham Gcorgcwill JCA; Mr. Frank Anyi & Ors V. Chief Harry Ayoade Akande & Ors. (2017) LPELR- 41973(CA) per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA; Arum V. Nwobodo (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 688) 870 AT p. 893; Nruamah V. Ebuzoeme (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 681) 1426; Morenikeji V. Adegbosin (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt. 825) 612; Ani V. Ewo (2004) 1 SC (Pt. 11) 115 AT p. 133; Romaine V. Romaine (1992) NWLR (Pt. 238) 650.
It is for the above few words of mine, by way of contribution to the fuller reasoning marshalled out in the leading judgment, that I too dismiss this appeal for lacking in merit. I shall abide by the consequential orders made in the leading judgment, including the order as to no cost.
ISAH BATURE GAFAI, J.C.A.: I have read in advance, the judgment delivered by my learned brother Adah, JCA. My lord has painstakingly resolved all the significant Issues in this appeal. I agree with the judgment in its entirety.
I will however add my voice in stressing a few points in the lead Judgment.
Firstly, the grant or refusal of the Orders sought from the trial Court in both Motions of the 1st Respondent (supra) is discretionary. This Court is not known to interfere with an exercise of discretion by a trial Court save in situations where it is shown that the discretionary exercise is manifestly neither judicial nor judicious; in other words, it evokes a patent view of injustice or perversity. The 1st Respondent’s latter Motion in particular, seeking essentially for amendment of the Statement of Claim undoubtedly lies at the discretion of the trial Court. The power of a trial Court to allow amendment of pleadings is discretionary and except where the exercise of such discretion is applied wrongly, this Court will not interfere.
See Adamaraja vs. Adaramaja (1992) LPELR-25011 (SC); Tabba vs. Lababedi & Anor. (1974) LPELR-3130 (SC), Awoyale vs. Ogunbiyi (1985) LPELR-661 (SC).
Furthermore, the provisions of Order 26 Rule 2 of the FCT High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2014 under which the Suit ensued provided that:
“2. The Court or a Judge in chambers may, at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his endorsement or pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.”
These provisions also clearly make the grant or refusal of the said Motion discretionary.
Secondly, as alluded to in the lead judgment, there is nothing showing a departure by the trial Court in identifying and applying the correct principles in the grant of the Order sought in the latter Motion. The trial Court properly considered the facts placed before it and formed the correct view that it was just to grant the Orders sought.
Thirdly, although the Orders granted in the latter Motion may appear to be similar to those refused in the earlier Motion, the thrust and effect of the two are entirely different because the latter Motion seeks specifically for amendment of Statement of Claim which is different from the main Order sought in the earlier Motion to recall the Plaintiff’s sole witness.
Fourthly, the amendment sought was clearly for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy as can be gleaned from the 1st Respondent’s Further Amended Statement of Claim found at pages 146-152 of the Record. What is more, nothing prevented the Appellant from amending her Statement of Defence to meet any new facts in the Amended Statement of Claim.
In my humble view, the Appellant is merely crying wolf.
There is no merit whatsoever in the appeal.
In consequence, I too join my learned brother in the lead judgment in dismissing this appeal as one without merit and affirming the judgment of the trial Court.
Appearances:
Adekola Mustapha, SAN, with him, A. Ayopemi, Esq. For Appellant(s)
…For Respondent(s)
