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M.L. MANDE ENT. LTD v. THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH IN NIG. & ORS (2022)

M.L. MANDE ENT. LTD v. THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH IN NIG. & ORS

(2022)LCN/17040(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, April 07, 2022

CA/A/637/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Peter Olabisi Ige Justice of the Court of Appeal

Biobele Abraham Georgewill Justice of the Court of Appeal

Bature Isah Gafai Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

M. L. MANDE ENTERPRISES LIMITED APPELANT(S)

And

1. THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH IN NIGERIA 2. THE MINISTER OF FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY 3. THE FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (FCDA) RESPONDENT(S)

 

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUE OF LIMITATION OF ACTION IS A QUESTION OF JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE

In law, and the parties are ad idem, the issue of limitation of action is a threshold question of jurisdictional competence and can even be raised at any stage and even suo motu by the Court. Thus, once it is found that an action had been commenced outside the limitation period prescribed by law, such an action is said to be statute barred, stale and thus, dead on arrival. It leaves the cause of action of such a Claimant bare and unenforceable in a Court of law. This is to obviate the need for Defendant to grapple with claims which have become stale and for which material documents and other relevant evidence might have been lost. See Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act, cap 522 LFN (Abuja) 1990. See also Nwadiaro V. Shell Development coy. Ltd (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 322 AT Pp. 337 – 339, this Court per JCA had stated inert alia thus:
“One of the principles of the Statute of Limitation is that those who go to sleep on their claims should not be assisted by the Courts in recovering their property. But another equally important principle is that there shall be an end of these matters, and that there shall be an end to stale demands.”
See further Amata V. Omofuma (1997) 2 N WLR (PT. 485) P. 93 AT p. 113, Obiefuna V. Okoye (1961) 1 SCNLR 144, Nwadiaro V. Shell Development Coy. Ltd (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 322 AT pp. 337 – 338, P. N. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd V. Abere (2001) 11 NWLR (723) 114, Angadi V. PDP (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 1. PER GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW WHERE A PARTY RELIES ON THE PLEA OF LACHES AND ACQUIESCENCE IN A LAND DISPUTE

My Lords, the gist of the plea of laches and acquiescence is knowledge, actual or constructive, of the other party of the adverse long possession of the land in dispute by the party relying on the plea. Thus, the party, as in the instant case, the 1st Respondent, relying on the plea of laches and acquiescence must, in order to succeed, not only plead but also lead credible evidence to prove the following essential elements of the plea of laches and acquiescence namely: That the party relying on the plea was in fact mistaken as to his own rights over the land; That the party relying on the plea had in reliance on his mistake expended money on the land; That the other party knew of the existence of his own right which is inconsistent with the right over the land claimed by the party relying on the plea; That the other party knew of the mistaken belief by the party relying on the plea of his right; That the other party encouraged the party relying on the plea expenditure of money. See Moss V. Kenrow (Nig.) Ltd (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 207 AT p. 226. See also Mali V. Shafi (1965) NMLR 33. See also Alade V. Aborishade (1960) SCNLR 398, (1960) 5 Esc 167, Agbon – Ojeme V. Selo – Ojeme & Ors 2020 LPELR – 49688 (CA) AT pp. 78 – 79, per Georgewill JCA. PER GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE PLACE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNICAL JUSTICE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

In African Songs Limited & Anor V. King Sunday Adeniyi Adegeye (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 335 AT p. 365 – 366, this Court had cause to consider the place of ‘substantial justice’ and ‘technical justice’ in the due administration of justice in this Country and had per Georgewill JCA, opined inter alia thus:
“My Lords, while in today’s jurisprudence of ‘substantial justice’ the issue of ‘mere technicality’ no longer holds sway, yet it is truism that competence is the soul of adjudication. It is in this sense the issue of competence can no longer in law truly be regarded as ‘mere technicality’ but rather be seen as substantial issue of law. In other-words while eschewing technicality for its sake, a Court can only exercise jurisdiction where all conditions precedent to the exercise of its powers have been fulfilled.”
​I do not think I can improve on the statement of law I made above and thus, I cannot but bow to it. I fully subscribe to its truism and so it is with the Appellant’s suit. See Umanah V. Attah (2006) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1009) 503 AT p. 525, where the Supreme Court had per Tobi JSC, (God bless His Soul), reiterated inter alia thus:
“Once a Court lacks jurisdiction… The matter ends there and the only procedural duty of the Court is to strike it out. No more and no less. The position of the law is as hard and as strict as that. The only valid way is to file the action in a Court of competent jurisdiction.”
In law, once a suit is found to be statute barred the proper order to make is one of dismissal. See NPA Plc. V. Lotus Plastics Ltd. & Anor (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 258. Consequently, the Appellant’s suit is hereby dismissed. PER GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. Coram: Peter O. Affen J, (as he then was) in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/2291/2013: M. L. Mande Enterprises V. The Registered Trustees of Seventh Day Adventist Church & Ors delivered on 26/9/2016 in which the claims of the Appellant as Claimant against the Respondents as Defendants were dismissed for lacking in merit, while part of the counter-claim of the 1st Respondent as 1st Defendant was granted against the Appellant.

The Notice of Appeal was filed on 16/2018 on 8 grounds of appeal, pursuant to the leave of this Court. See pages 1015 – 1024 of the Record of Appeal. The Records of Appeal, in Volumes 1 and 2 were duly compiled and transmitted to this Court 3/7/2018. The parties filed and exchange their briefs, which were adopted as their arguments at the hearing of this appeal on 3/3/2022. The Appellant was represented by Ibrahim Idaiyi Esq., appearing with A. G. Inyadu Esq. The 1st Respondent was represented by S. N. Mbaezue Esq. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents were represented by Adeolu Salako Esq., appearing with Chiamaka Echeozo Esq.

By a Writ of Summons filed on 18/3/2013 and a Further Amended Statement of Claim filed on 28/1/2015 before the Court below, the Appellant as Claimant claimed against the Respondents as Defendants for the following reliefs, to wit:
1. A Declaration that Plot No. 2N70 (New Plot NO. 849) of about 2800 sqm situate at Durumi District of Abuja and covered by offer of grant of right of occupancy within the Federal Capital Territory with reference No. MFCT/LA/92/MISC9715/16 dated 24/8/1993 is the property of the Plaintiff.
2. A Declaration that the 1st defendant is not the beneficial owner, but a trespasser to plot no. 2N70 (New Plot NO. 849) of about 2800 sqm situate at Durumi District of Abuja and covered by offer of grant of right of occupancy within the Federal Capital Territory with reference no. MFCT/LA/92/MISC9715/16 dated 24/8/1993.
3. A Declaration that the 2nd and 3rd defendant lacks the power to re-allocate or deal in any way with plot no. 2N70 (New Plot NO. 849) of about 2800 sqm situate at Durumi District of Abuja and covered by offer of grant of right of occupancy within the Federal Capital Territory with reference no. MFCT/LA/92/MISC9715/16 dated 24/8/1993 being property of the Plaintiff.
4. A Declaration that the purported re-certification of plot no. 2N70 (New Plot NO. 849) of about 2800 sqm situate at Durumi District of Abuja and covered by offer of grant of right of occupancy within the Federal Capital Territory with reference no. MFCT/LA/92/MISC9715/16 dated 24/8/1993 which is the property of the Plaintiff and the issuance of another certificate of occupancy in the name of the 1st Defendant by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants without valid title documents of transfer is null, void and of no effect whatsoever.
5. A Declaration that the purported sale of plot no. 2N70 (New Plot NO. 849) of about 2800 sqm situate at Durumi District of Abuja and covered by offer of grant of right of occupancy within the Federal Capital Territory with reference no. MFCT/LA/92/MISC9715/16 dated 24/8/1993 after the demise of Alhaji M.L. Mande the Chief Executive Director in 1999 and without the requite documents of transactions is null, void and of no effect whatsoever.
6. An Order of perpetual injunction restraining all the Defendants jointly and severally by their privies, agents, assigns, officials, servants or whatsoever called from further trespassing on plot no. 2N70 (New Plot NO. 849) situate at Durumi District which is the property of the Plaintiff interfering with the legal right of the Plaintiff, making use of, developing, or further developing, plot N2N70 (New plot no. 849) situate at Durumi District of Abuja and covered by offer of grant of right of occupancy within the Federal Capital Territory with reference no. MFCT/LA/92/MISC9715/16 dated 24/8/1993.
7. An Order directing or compelling the 2nd and 3rd defendants to forthwith cancel any purported certificate of occupancy that may have been issued in the name of the 1st Defendant and to allow the plaintiff to re-certify plot 2N70 (New Plot No. 849) in its name.
8. The sum of N20, 000, 000. 00 only
9. The cost of this action put at N500, 000. 00 only. See pages 406 – 456 in Volume 1 of the Record of Appeal.

Upon service, the 1st Respondent as 1st Defendant by its Amended Statement of Defense and counter-claim filed on 4/122015 claimed against the Appellant as Claimant the following reliefs, to wit:
1. A Declaration that the 1st Defendant is entitled to the statutory right of occupancy over the land subject matter of this suit and contained in the old Certificate of Occupancy No: FCT/QBU/MISC.9715 dated 25/9/1995, reissued as Certificate of Occupancy No. 030400 of 11/05/2012.
2. Order of Perpetual Injunction restraining the Plaintiff and its officers including their successors in title and or any other person claiming through them from ever interfering with the 1st Defendant’s use and management of the land in dispute in any manner inconsistent with the rights of the 1st Defendant.
3. An Order of Court mandating the Plaintiff to perfect the deed of transfer of title of the property, subject matter of this suit to the 1st Defendant to wit: i. Deed of Assignment, and ii. Power of Attorney having obtained full consideration to that effect.
4. An Order directing the Plaintiff to pay to the 1st Defendant the sum of N6,000,000.00 as cost of litigation. See pages 755 – 766 in Volume Il of the Record of Appeal.

BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS
The gist of the case of the parties before the Court below as can be gleaned from the pleadings and evidence, both oral and documentary, led as in the Record of Appeal, inter alia was that the Appellant was the original allottee of the land in dispute situate at Plot 849. Cadastral Zone, Durumi District, Abuja and did not at any time alienate same to one Mr. Benjamin Ochai or any other person and therefore, remained the owner of the said land in dispute. However, the 1st Respondent had alleged that the Appellant had for monetary consideration made vide Exhibit D15 transferred its title to the land in dispute to one Mr. Benjamin Ochai, who in turn had for monetary consideration transferred his rights in the said land to one Mrs. Cecilia Onuiri. It was from Mrs. Cecilia Onuiri that the 1st Respondent derived its title for monetary consideration made vide Exhibit D17 and proceeded to take steps to perfect its interest before the emergence of the Appellant to interfere with the process. The Appellant denied that its late Managing Director, one late Alhaji Mande, ever in his lifetime conveyed its interest to the 1st Respondent to warrant the process of perfecting title by the 1st Respondent since the Appellant had remained the owner of the said land having never transferred its ownership of the said land to any person, including all or any of the 1st Respondent’s predecessors in title. See pages 402 – 456 and 459 – 523 in Volume 1 of the Record of Appeal. see also pages 675 – 686 and 775 – 838 in Volume Il of the Record of Appeal.

At the close of pleadings, the matter proceeded to trial before the Court below. PW1 was one Mohammed Sanusi Mohammed Lawal. The Appellant tendered several documents which were admitted in evidence as Exhibits. DW1, was one Elder Washington Chimeziri Nwachukwu. DW2 was one Mrs. Cecilai Onuiri. The 1st Respondent tendered several documents, which were admitted in evidence as Exhibits. DW4, was one Ugonna Ununkwo. The 2nd and 3rd Respondent tendered some documents, which were admitted in evidence as Exhibits. The parties filed and exchanged the final written addresses, which were adopted on 12/5/2016. On 26/9/2016, the Court below delivered its judgment, in which it dismissed the claims of the Appellant against the Respondents, while it granted part of the counter-claim of the 1st Respondent against the Appellant, hence this appeal. See pages 936 – 945, 946 – 952, 952 – 954, 954 – 958, 963 – 1014 and 1015 – 1024 in Volume 11 of the Record of Appeal.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
In the Appellant’s brief, seven issues were distilled as arising for determination from the eight grounds of appeal, namely:
1. Whether from the state of pleadings and evidence, the Court below correctly admitted an unregistered deed of assignment (Exhibit D15) same having been pleaded and put in evidence as a document conferring and evidencing title in favor of ISI Respondent?
2. Whether Exhibits D15, D16 and D17 are admissible in evidence having failed to satisfy the provisions of Sections 102 (b) and 104 of the Evidence Act, 2011 which require certification of private documents in public custody and Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011, being a mandatory requirement for certification of computer-generated documents?
3. Whether the Court below was right to have admitted Exhibit D16 in evidence in view of its reliance on the decision in Abu V. Kuyabana (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 758) 599 AT p. 614 and Section 2 of Land Registration Act, Cap. 515. LFN, 1990 (Abuja)?
4. Whether the Court was right in ignoring or downplaying the importance of the fact of collection of the Certificate of Occupancy and went ahead to reach a conclusion that PW1 admitted the fact of collection of the Certificate of Occupancy in the custody of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents?
5. Whether the Court below was right in refusing to take note of clear acts of illegalities or irregularities in the course of proceedings?
6. Whether or not the Court below was correct in improperly evaluating 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ evidence and ascribing probative value to the pieces of evidence thereof?
7. From the peculiar circumstance of this case and totality of evidence and facts placed before the Court below, whether it was right in placing reliance on the Limitation Act, Cap. 522, LFN, 1990 (Abuja) and invoking the doctrine(s) of laches and acquiescence in giving judgment in favor of the 1st Respondent?

In the Respondent’s brief, the seven issues distilled in the Appellant’s brief as arising for determination in this appeal were adopted.

In the 2nd and 3rd Respondent’s brief, two issues were distilled as arising for determination in this appeal, namely:
1. Whether the Court below was right in its admission and evaluation of evidence in refusing to grant Appellant’s claim of having subsisting interest in Plot 2N70 (New plot No. 849) to warrant a reversal of the recertification of title and cancellation of the Certificate of Occupancy issued to the 1st Respondent by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. (Distilled from Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8)
2. Whether the Appellant’s claims could have been granted by the Court below when the claims were statute-barred? (Distilled from Ground 7)

I have taken time to consider the averments in the pleadings of the parties together with the evidence, both oral and documentary as led by them as in the Record of Appeal. I have also considered the submissions of learned counsel to the parties in their respective briefs in the light of the findings and decisions reached in the judgment of the Court below and I am of the firm view that the apt issues arising for determination in this appeal are the seven issues as distilled in the Appellant’s brief, and as adopted in the 1st Respondent’s brief, a consideration of which, in my view, would invariably involve a consideration of the two broad issues as distilled in the 2nd and 3rd Respondent-s brief. However, I shall commence with Appellant’s issue seven together with Respondent’s issue two, both dealing with the competence or otherwise of the Appellant’s suit. Thereafter, I shall consider the remaining issues one, two, three, four five and five together with the Respondent’s issue one and resolve all of them in one fell swoop.

ISSUE SEVEN
From the peculiar circumstance of this case and totality of evidence and facts placed before the Court below, whether it was right in placing reliance on the Limitation Act, Cap. 522, LEN, 1990 (Abuja) and invoking the doctrine of laches and acquiescence in giving judgment in favor of the 1st Respondent?

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
In his submissions on issue seven, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the Appellant had submitted inter alia that the Appellant was never at any time aware of the entrance into the land in dispute by the 1st Respondent and contended that Alhaji M. L. Mande of Appellant who only could have transferred title to the land in dispute died in 1999 without alienating the land in dispute to any of the predecessors in title to the 1st Respondent and urged the Court to hold that none of the Respondents pleaded the Statute of Limitation as required by law and therefore, the Court below was wrong to have invoked it as well as the inapplicable principles of laches and acquiescence against the Appellant in favor of the 1st Respondent to declare title to the 1st Respondent and to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court below since the Appellant’s Suit was competent. Counsel referred to Section 15(2) Limitation Act, Cap 522 LFN (Abuja) 1990; Section 7 of the Federal Capital Territory Act, LFN 1990; Section 43(1) (3) of the Land Use Act 1978; Order 23 Rule 6(1) of the High Court of the Federal Territory Abuja (Civil Procedure Rules) 2004, and relied on Ajayi V. Adebiyi (2013) 3 WRN 1, Oshodi V. Imoru (1936) WACA 93, Sanni-Omotosho V. Obidairo (2014) 37 WRN 47 p. 89, Coker V. Oguntola (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 587) 99; Solomon & Ors V. Mogaji & Ors (1982) 11 SC 1 AT pp. 25 – 32, Akanni & 7 Ors V. Makanju & 2 Ors (1978) 11-12 SC 1, Adebo V. Omisola (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt. 909) 149 AT p. 175; Oguejiofor V. Nwakalor (2011) 34 WRN 135 AT p. 163,. Nikagbatse V. Slater (2016) 11 WRIN 151, Iso V. Eno (2003) 12 XWLR (sic); Isaac V. Imasuen (2016) 5 WRN 29 AT p. 41, Moss V. Kenrow (Nigeria) Ltd (1992) 11 – 12 SCNJ (Pt. 1) 71, Ojeme V. Ojeme (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 685) 606, Maji V. Siafl (1965) N.MLR 33, Alade V. Aborishade (1960) 5 FSC 167, Nig. Distilleries Ltd V. Dada (2015) 37 WRN 162 AT pp. 167 – 168, Odutola V. Ibadan City Council (1978) 11 NSCC 252, Lindsay Petroleum Co. V. Hurd (1973 -74) LR 5 PC 221, Smith V. Clay (1767) 3 Bro. CC 649, Taiwo V. Taiwo (1958) 3 FSC 80, National Westminster Bank Ltd V. Barclays Bank International Ltd & Anor (1975) QB 654, Nelson V. Rye (1996) 2 All ER 186, Willmott V. Barber 15 Ch D 96, Emeshie V. Abiose (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 172) 192, Jukok Int’l Ltd V. Diamond Bank Plc (2015) 17 WRN 1 p. 60, UBN PLC V. IRONBAR (2010) 37 WRIN 160 AT p. 183, Canfailla V. Cjiahin (1939) 5 WACA 104, College of Education Ekiadolor V. Osayande (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1191) 423, Adekeye V. Akin – Olugbade (1987) 18 NSCC (Pt. 11) 865 and Byuan Resources Ltd V Minister of FCT & Ors (2016) LPELR – 41494 (CA).

1ST RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
In his submissions on issue seven, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the 1st Respondent had submitted inter alia that the claim of the Appellant was statute barred as rightly held by the Court below in that in law the question of limitation of action is a threshold issue which affects the jurisdiction of the Court and therefore, its application cannot be limited to specific pleadings and or the rules of Court and urged the Court to hold on the facts as pleaded the claims of the Appellant had become stale and was thus incompetent as was rightly found by the Court below and to dismiss the appeal and affirm the correct judgment of the Court below. Counsel relied on Ajayi V. Adebiyi (2013) 3 WRN 1, P. N. Udoh Trading co. Ltd V. Abere (2001) LPELR – 2893 (SC), Ekeocha V. C. I. & P.S.B. (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 392) 1976 AT p. 1985, Sulgrave Holdings Inc & Ors V. FGN & Ors (2012) LPELR – 15520 (SC) and Egbe V. Adefarasin (No. 1) (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 540.

2ND AND 3RD RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
In his submissions on his issue two, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents had submitted inter alia that the Appellant’s claim was clearly statute barred as was rightly held by the Court below in that the cause of action of the Appellant arose in 2000 when the 1st Respondent took possession of the land in dispute but the Appellant’s Suit was not filed until 2013 when the 12 years limitation period as prescribed by had lapsed and contended that in law the issue of limitation of action is a jurisdictional issue and can even be raised suo motu by the Court and that the Appellant’s Suit and had become stale when it was commenced and thus statute barred and urged the Court to so hold and to dismiss the appeal and affirm the correct judgment of the Court below. Counsel referred to Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522 LEN (Abuja) 1990, and relied on Amata V. Omofuma (1997) 2 NWLR (PT. 485) P. 93 p. 113, Atunrase V. Sunmola (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 105, Allen V. Odubeko (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 506) 638 p. 645, Omaye V. Omagu (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1087) 477 Q) p. 501, Egbe V. Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1, Obiefuna V. Okoye (1964) 1 SCNLR 144, Julius Berger (Nig) Plc V. Omogui (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 736) 401, Nwadiaro V. Shell Coy. Ltd (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 322 AT pp. 337 – 338, P. N. Udoh Trading co. Ltd V. Abere (2001) 11 NWLR (723) 114, Angadi V. PDP (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 1.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL REPLY TO 1ST RESPONDENT
In his reply submissions, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the Appellant had virtually rehashed and reiterated his earlier submissions and basically re-argued his appeal under the guise of a reply brief. The reply brief, it must be reiterated is not and cannot be an avenue for an Appellant to re-argue his appeal or merely to have a second bite at the cherry. See Order 19 Rules 5 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021. See Olafisoye V. FRN 2004 ISC Pt. 11 27, Ikine V. Edjerode (2001) 12 SC (Pt. 11) 94, Longe V. FBN (2010) 2 – 3 SC 61, Registered Trustees, Ikoyi Club 1938 V. Mr. Timothy Ikujuni (2019) LPELR – 47373 (CA).

However, having stated as above, let me for the purpose of completeness in this judgment proceed to review the submissions of the Appellant’s reply brief to the 1st Respondent, albeit briefly. It was submitted inter alia that for a Court to raise an issue of jurisdiction suo motu, it must be patently clear on the processes that the Court has no jurisdiction and contended that in the instant case the title of the 1st Respondent was tinted with fraud and irregularities as pleaded by the 1st Respondent and urged the Court to hold that fraud is an exception to the application of statute of limitation and the Court below having found that Exhibit D27 was tampered ought not to have relied on Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act 1990 and to allow the appeal and set aside the perverse judgment of the Court below. Counsel referred to Section 30 of the Land Registration Act, Section 57 of the Limitation Act, and relied on Chukwuekezie V. APGA (2019) LPELR – 47240(CA).

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL REPLY TO 2ND AND 3RD RESPONDENTS
In his reply submissions, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the Appellant had again virtually rehashed and reiterated his earlier submissions and basically re-argued his appeal under the guise of a reply brief. However, having stated as above, let me for the purpose of completeness in this judgment proceed to review the submissions of the Appellants’ reply brief to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, albeit briefly.

It was submitted inter alia that it was not patently clear that the Court below had no jurisdiction in view of the fact that the transactions were tainted with fraud and illegalities and contended that the Court below was wrong to have applied the provisions of the Limitation Act 1990 to hold, as it wrongly did, that the Appellant’s Suit was statute barred and to allow the appeal and set aside the perverse judgment of the Court below. Counsel referred to Section 57 of Limitation Act 1990, and relied on Chukwuekezie V. APGA (2019) LPELR – 47240 (CA), Executors of The Estate of Late Abacha V. Eke- Spiff (2009) 2 – 3 SC (Pt. Il) 93 (7b pp. 117 – 118, Kotoye V. Saraki (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 357) 414 p. 458, Idika V. Uzoukwu (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1091) 34 p. 72, Vinz International (Nig) Ltd V. Morohundiya (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1153) 562.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE SEVEN
My Lords, issue seven raises a threshold issue of the jurisdictional competence or otherwise of the Appellant’s Suit filed on 18/3/2013 as to whether or not it was statute barred at the time it was commenced against the Respondents?

Now, from the averments in the pleadings of the Appellant it can be gathered and or seen that the case of the Appellant was that it was allocated the plot of land in dispute by the 2nd Respondent through its now late MD, Alhaji M. L. Mande and had never parted with its ownership till date but that the said plot of land had by some form of illegality and fraud committed in the name of the late Alhaji M. L. Mande who died in 1999 been purportedly ultimately sold to the 1st Respondent. It was falsely alleged that the late Alhaji Mande had purported sold the said plot of land to one Mr. Benjamin Ochai in 1998, who in turn had vide an irrevocable Power of Attorney sold the said plot of land in 1999 to one Mrs. Cecilia Onuiri- the DW 2, who in turn sold the same to the 1st Respondent in 2000. These facts were basically undisputed. The crux of the dispute was as to whether or not the purported transfers from the Appellant to Benjamin Ochai and from him to Mrs. Cecilia Onuiri and from thence to the 1st Respondent were valid and authorized by the Appellant.

It was also not in any dispute that the 1st Respondent went into possession of the plot of land in dispute in the year 2000 upon its transfer to it by the said Mrs. Cecilia Onuiri and had applied to the 2nd and 3rd Respondent for recertification and perfection of its title. From these undisputed facts, without prejudice to and without deciding at this stage whether or not these various acts of alleged transfers of the plot of land in dispute were valid or not, the pertinent questions under issue seven are namely: when did the Appellant’s cause of action arise and whether it was statute barred?

My Lords, going by the pleadings it appears certain to me that the cause of action of the Appellant arose when the adverse possession of the plot of land by the 1st Respondent took place in 2000. The Appellant’s Suit from the endorsements on the Writ of Summons was filed on 18/3/2013. Thus, by ordinary elementary mathematical calculations it was commenced 13 years after the 1st Respondent went into adverse possession of the plot of land in dispute.

Now, by Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522, LFN (Abuja) 1990. it is provided thus:
“No action by a person to recover land (a) shall subject to paragraph (b) of this subsection, be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person bringing it or if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person.”
The law is that an action involving declaration of title by way of claim for recovery of land shall be commenced before the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued. Going by the pleadings, I find that the cause of action of the Appellant accrued in the year 2000 when the 1st Respondent into possession which was adverse to the right of the Appellant, of the plot of land in dispute. It follows that the Appellant had between the year 2000 and 2012 to institute and maintain a valid action in respect of the recovery of the plot of land in dispute from the 1st Respondent. However, the Appellant never did so until the years 2013, when it was one year over and above the 12 years as prescribed by law for the commencement of a valid action for the recovery of the plot of land in dispute from the 1st Respondent.

In law, and the parties are ad idem, the issue of limitation of action is a threshold question of jurisdictional competence and can even be raised at any stage and even suo motu by the Court. Thus, once it is found that an action had been commenced outside the limitation period prescribed by law, such an action is said to be statute barred, stale and thus, dead on arrival. It leaves the cause of action of such a Claimant bare and unenforceable in a Court of law. This is to obviate the need for Defendant to grapple with claims which have become stale and for which material documents and other relevant evidence might have been lost. See Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act, cap 522 LFN (Abuja) 1990. See also Nwadiaro V. Shell Development coy. Ltd (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 322 AT Pp. 337 – 339, this Court per JCA had stated inert alia thus:
“One of the principles of the Statute of Limitation is that those who go to sleep on their claims should not be assisted by the Courts in recovering their property. But another equally important principle is that there shall be an end of these matters, and that there shall be an end to stale demands.”
See further Amata V. Omofuma (1997) 2 N WLR (PT. 485) P. 93 AT p. 113, Obiefuna V. Okoye (1961) 1 SCNLR 144, Nwadiaro V. Shell Development Coy. Ltd (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 322 AT pp. 337 – 338, P. N. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd V. Abere (2001) 11 NWLR (723) 114, Angadi V. PDP (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 1.

I saw it earlier argued somewhere in the Appellant’s brief that the issue of limitation of action must be pleaded before it can be raised. However, upon being faced with the superior arguments of the Respondents, the Appellant agreed that the issues of limitation of action, being a threshold issue of jurisdiction, was too important to be circumscribed and or limited to the pleadings of the parties. Indeed, in law the question of limitation of action is a threshold issue which affects the jurisdiction of the Court and therefore, its application cannot be limited to specific pleadings and or the rules of Court. It can even be raised viva voce, since no Court has the competence to adjudicate the merit of a cause or matter which is incompetent before it no matter its zeal to render substantial justice on the merit. Indeed, jurisdiction is the epicentre and soul of adjudication. See Ajayi V. Adebiyi (2013) 3 WRN 1, where the Supreme Court per Adekeye JSC had stated inter alia thus:
“Limitation Law and Locus Standi are both threshold issues which can be raised anytime or for the first in the Court of Appeal or in the Supreme Court. It is not limited to being raised as a special defence and pleading them specifically as required by the Rules of Court…..lt transcends any High Court Rules. It can be raised by preliminary objection at any stage of the proceedings before any Court by any of the parties or even suo motu by the Court.”
See also P. N. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd V. Abere (2001) LPELR – 2893 (SC), Sulgrave Holdings Inc & Ors V. FGN & Ors (2012) LPELR – 15520 (SC) and Egbe V. Adefarasin (No. 1) (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 540.

My Lords, the law considers all claims commenced after the limitation period as stale and as dead and thus awaits the summons from on high on the resurrection day but until then it remains stale and unenforceable in a Court of law. The rationale for this position of the law was explained in greater details by this Court in Ikosi Industries Limited V. Lagos State Government & Ors (2017) LPELR – 41867(CA) per Georgewill JCA, inter alia thus:
“…The rationale for limitation of time for the commencement of action would seem to be that due to the length of time that must have elapsed, a Defendant, on being confronted with a stale claim, may have lost or unavailability of materials evidence or death or unavailability of vital key witnesses, due to no fault of his, necessary for his defense which would have otherwise been available if the claims were commenced timely within the period as allowed under the relevant applicable limitation law.”

In the light of all I have stated and found as above, I hold firmly that the Appellant suit was statute barred when it was commenced on 18/3/2013 against the Respondents before the Court below by the Appellant. It was thus liable to be dismissed in limine without much ado!

I now turn my attention to the equitable plea of laches and acquiescence. In paragraph 12 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Statement of Claim it was averred as follows:
“The 1st Defendant further shall at trial, rely on all legal and equitable defences to wit, laches and acquiescence. The 1st Defendant has been on this land whereupon it carried out a massive development to wit – a church building, parsonage and a school to the notice of the Plaintiff more than 16 years now. The value of these investments has been assessed at Ninety-Five Million Naira only. Plaintiff saw these houses being built and did nothing to show disapproval until late 2012 when it went to the Police with spurious allegations. The 1st Plaintiff shall at the hearing, tender and rely upon the Valuation Report made by Olaniyi Oladotun & Co. (Charted Estate Surveyors and Valuers) dated 9th day of February, 2015.” See page 758 of the Record of Appeal.

My Lords, the gist of the plea of laches and acquiescence is knowledge, actual or constructive, of the other party of the adverse long possession of the land in dispute by the party relying on the plea. Thus, the party, as in the instant case, the 1st Respondent, relying on the plea of laches and acquiescence must, in order to succeed, not only plead but also lead credible evidence to prove the following essential elements of the plea of laches and acquiescence namely: That the party relying on the plea was in fact mistaken as to his own rights over the land; That the party relying on the plea had in reliance on his mistake expended money on the land; That the other party knew of the existence of his own right which is inconsistent with the right over the land claimed by the party relying on the plea; That the other party knew of the mistaken belief by the party relying on the plea of his right; That the other party encouraged the party relying on the plea expenditure of money. See Moss V. Kenrow (Nig.) Ltd (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 207 AT p. 226. See also Mali V. Shafi (1965) NMLR 33. See also Alade V. Aborishade (1960) SCNLR 398, (1960) 5 Esc 167, Agbon – Ojeme V. Selo – Ojeme & Ors 2020 LPELR – 49688 (CA) AT pp. 78 – 79, per Georgewill JCA.
Now, both on the pleadings evidence led, as in the Records of Appeal, it was firmly established that the 1st Respondent with its predecessors has been in adverse possession of the plot of land in dispute as against the alleged right of the Appellant since 1998 but the Appellant asserted vehemently that it never parted with possession of the plot of land in dispute. It would follow then that being in possession, the Appellant would and indeed knew all along the adverse possession of the plot of land in dispute by the 1st Respondent and its predecessors in title from 1998. In my finding and in the absence of any rational explanations from the Appellant, this amounted to an undue, unconscionable and deliberate delay on the Appellant in asserting its alleged right over the land in dispute as would in law and indeed clearly amounted to and supported the defence of laches and acquiescence.
It appears, the Appellant wanted, by its passiveness, the 1st Respondent to fully develop the property, as it did by building its Church, Personage and School thereon, before the Appellant would step forward, as it sought to do by this suit, to claim both the plot of land in dispute and by implication all these developments affixed to the plot of land in dispute as belonging to whoever is adjudged the owner of the plot of land in dispute. The law as expressed in the land law Latin Maxim is ‘Quic Quid Platantur Solo Solo Cedit.’ See Anyi & Ors V. Harry Akande & Ors (2017) LPELR – 41973 (CA) per Georgewill JCA. See also Adejumo V. Olawaiye (2014) 31 WRN 30 AT P. 38.
However, it is true in law that for the equitable plea of laches and acquiescence to be successfully invoked and applied, the act of the Claimant must be beyond mere delay to pursue a right. There must also be an incidence of occurrences which shows that the Defendant has taken serious steps towards the res owing to the indolence of the Claimant. In this instant case, these facts were not only well pleaded but also creditably testified to by the PW1 against the Appellant. Indeed, and if I may ask: what more does the 1st Respondent need prove for the Court below to find the Appellant guilty of laches and acquiescence? Nothing I can find!

Now, on the issue of allegation of fraud as raised by the Appellant as operating against the application of the principles of laches and acquiescence, the law is that an allegation of fraud, even when made in a civil case, and if it be central to the issues joined by the parties, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. On the evidence led, as in the Records of Appeal, I find that the Appellant failed woefully to prove any of its diverse allegations of fraud, illegalities and forgery against all or any of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents. It failed to prove, most importantly, that the signature of Alhaji M. L. Mande, was forged by all or any of the Respondents. Indeed, in law, it is one thing to allege a crime, including fraud, but quite another thing to prove it by credible evidence beyond reasonable doubts as required by law.

Indeed, but regrettably, much of the evidence that ought to have been led but were not led by the Appellant seemed to have been supplied in torrent in the very brilliant treatise in the form of legal submissions by learned counsel for the Appellant, whose submissions though very short on the facts of the cases, I must confess could easily pass for a doctoral dissertation in law. I have searched but I cannot find where any evidence was led by the Appellant to the effect that the 1st Respondent carried out developments on the land in dispute without the permission of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to justify the torrent of legal decisions on this issue traveling from here to the English Courts as was explored in the Appellant’s brief. It has become settled law that no matter how brilliant a counsel address might be, it can neither take the place of evidence nor supply evidence not led by the party. So, it is regrettably with all the brilliant submissions of learned counsel for the Appellant not founded on the pleadings and evidence led by the parties as in the Records of Appeal. See Agbon – Ojeme V. Selo – Ojeme & Ors 2020 LPELR – 49688 (CA) pp. 78 – 79, per Georgewill JCA.

Truly, the learned counsel for the Appellant was so profound and profuse in reeling out and analyzing a plethora of decided cases on the issues of the principles of laches and acquiescence but was very short on the facts as pleaded and proved against the Appellant by the 1st Respondent. The Court below was therefore, right and on finer ground, when it held that the claim of the Appellant to the title to the land in dispute had become both stale and was also defeated by the finer principles of laches and acquiescence as pleaded and proved against it by the 1st Respondent. In law therefore, the Appellant’s claim was dead on arrival and incapable of any resurrection either by the Appellant or indeed even the Court below. See Igbum V. Nyarinya (2000) LPELR – 9938 (CA). See also Kaiyaoja & Ors V. Egunla (1974) 1 All NLR 426, Dr. Godwill Agbon-Ojeme V. Mr. Jude Selo – Ojeme & Ors (2020) LPELR- 49688 (CA) per Georgewill JCA.

In my finding therefore, the 1st Respondents not only pleaded and relied on laches and acquiescence but had also proceeded to prove it by credible evidence against the claims of title to the plot of land in dispute by the Appellant as required of it by law. Consequently, I hold that the Court below was right when it held that the claims of the Appellant to the title to the plot of land in dispute was caught by the doctrine of laches and acquiescence as relied upon by the 1st Respondents, and thereby extinguishing whatever title or right of the Appellant to the plot of land in dispute in favor of the 1st Respondents. This Court being an appellate Court does not make it a habit interfering with correct findings and conclusions of the Court below but rather we do affirm such correct findings and conclusions. See Alhaji Ndayako & Ors V. Alhaji Dantoro & Ors (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 AT p. 198. see also Abaye V. Ofili (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) 134 and Ukejianya V. Uchendu 18 WACA 46.

My Lords, having arrived at the inescapable conclusion that the Appellant’s suit was filed outside the 12 years limitation period prescribed by law and thus, statute barred, the issue of the perennial battle for supremacy between ‘substantial justice’ and ‘technical justice’ reared up its head at once to play on the conscience of the Court; should we jettison and discountenance technicality bordering on incompetence of the Appellant’s suit and consider the other issues in this appeal on the merit or should we give effect to the settled principle of law that nothing worth anything can ever come out from an incompetent Suit? In African Songs Limited & Anor V. King Sunday Adeniyi Adegeye (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 335 AT p. 365 – 366, this Court had cause to consider the place of ‘substantial justice’ and ‘technical justice’ in the due administration of justice in this Country and had per Georgewill JCA, opined inter alia thus:
“My Lords, while in today’s jurisprudence of ‘substantial justice’ the issue of ‘mere technicality’ no longer holds sway, yet it is truism that competence is the soul of adjudication. It is in this sense the issue of competence can no longer in law truly be regarded as ‘mere technicality’ but rather be seen as substantial issue of law. In other-words while eschewing technicality for its sake, a Court can only exercise jurisdiction where all conditions precedent to the exercise of its powers have been fulfilled.”
​I do not think I can improve on the statement of law I made above and thus, I cannot but bow to it. I fully subscribe to its truism and so it is with the Appellant’s suit. See Umanah V. Attah (2006) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1009) 503 AT p. 525, where the Supreme Court had per Tobi JSC, (God bless His Soul), reiterated inter alia thus:
“Once a Court lacks jurisdiction… The matter ends there and the only procedural duty of the Court is to strike it out. No more and no less. The position of the law is as hard and as strict as that. The only valid way is to file the action in a Court of competent jurisdiction.”
In law, once a suit is found to be statute barred the proper order to make is one of dismissal. See NPA Plc. V. Lotus Plastics Ltd. & Anor (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 258. Consequently, the Appellant’s suit is hereby dismissed.

It follows therefore, since the Appellant’s suit was incompetent and thereby robbed the Court below of its competence and jurisdiction, issues one, two, three, four, five and six for determination dealing with the merit or otherwise of the claims of the Appellant have become merely academic. Indeed, the Courts are loath to and do not saddle themselves with the consideration of matters which had become merely academic and therefore, of no utilitarian value to either of the parties. To embark on such exercise of jurisdiction of the Courts over matters which are no longer live would clearly amount to nothing but sheer waste of the very precious and, if I may say scarce, judicial time. See Charles Oke & Anor V. Dr. Rahman Mimiko & Ors (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 693) 1853. See also Uba Plc V. Dana Drugs Ltd (2018) LPELR – 44103 (CA), per Georgewill JCA, Mbachu V. Anambra – Imo Rivers Basin Development Authority, Owerri (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 342) 1482 AT p 1497.

However, this Court being only but the penultimate Court in the land, with the Apex Court still up there empowered and able to hear appeals from our decisions and having enjoined and admonished us to consider and resolve all issues submitted before us by the parties, I shall in due deference to that admonition proceed to consider, albeit briefly, the remaining issues in this appeal.

ISSUES ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR, FIVE AND SIX
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
In his submissions, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the Appellant had submitted inter alia that Exhibit D15, which is a Deed of Assignment is a registrable instrument and contended if it is not registered it can neither be pleaded nor tendered in evidence and if admitted in evidence must be expunged and urged the Court to hold that the Court below was erred in law when it admitted the unregistered Exhibit D15 as evidence of payment of purchase price amounting to equitable title of the 1st Respondent, which was not the case as pleaded by the 1st Respondent and to allow the appeal, set aside the perverse judgment of the Court below and grant the claims of the Appellant. Counsel referred to Sections 2, 3 and 15 of Land Registration Act Cap. 515 of the Laws of the Federal Capital Territory; Section 6 of the Evidence Act 2011, and relied on Haruna V. Akpe – Ime (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 680) 156 AT p. 175, Ojonye V. Ibrahim (2002) 1 NWLR (Pt. 747) 166 at 175-177. In Niger Construction Ltd. V. Ogbimi (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 744) 83 AT p. 93, David Owoeye Eso & Orr V. George Okere Adeyemi & Anor (1994) 4 N WLR (Pt. 340) 558, Ikonne V. Wachuku (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 172) 214, Abdallah Jammal V. Saidi & Fetuga 11 NLR 86, Elicali & Or V. Fawaz 6 WACA 212 at 214, Coker V. Ogunye (1939) 15 NLR 57, Amankra V. Zankley (1963) 1 ALL NLR 364, Agbonike V. Onyekabo (2001) 10 NWLR (Pt. 722) 576 p. 587, Ogbimi V. Niger Construction Ltd (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt. 986) 474 AT pp. 493 – 494, Asuquo V. Eyo (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1400) 247 AT p. 258, Fawehinmi V. NBA (No. 2) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558, BON V. Saleh (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt. 618) 331, Anozie V. Obichere (2006) 8 NWLR (Pt. 981) 140, FBN Plc V. Jibo (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt. 985)255, Ogunbambi V. Abowab (1951) 12 WACA 222, Adesanya V. Aderounmu (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 370, Ozua V. Suleiman (2009) 11 WRN 154 AT p. 176, Ekeocha V. Osuji (2002) FWLR (Pt. 105) 774, AT p. 778, Chinda V. Amadi (2003) FWLR (Pt. 145) 696 AT P. 709, Great Nigeria Ins. co. Ltd. V. Ladgroups Ltd (1988) 4 NWLR R (Pt. 33) 72 a p. 78 and Fakoya V. St. Paul’s Catholic, Shagamu (1966) 1 ANLR 68.

It was also submitted inter alia that DW1 testified that the original copies of Exhibits D15, D16 and D17 were with the 2nd – 3rd Respondents and duly captured in their electronic receptacles which rendered them public documents as well as computer-generated documents and contended that though the Appellant did not object to their admissibility they were rendered inadmissible by law having not fulfilled the condition precedent for admissibility of public document as well as computer-generated document and urged the Court to hold that they were wrongly admitted in evidence and should be expunged and the appeal allowed as the case of the 1st Respondent was based solely on these Exhibits and to set aside the perverse judgment of the Court below and grant the claims of the Appellant. Counsel referred to Section 52, 84, 90 (1) ( c), 102, 104, 105 and 285 of the Evidence Act 2011, and relied on Durosaro V. Avorinde (2005) 20 WRN 181 pp. 193 -194, Bob Manuel V. Woji (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1196)1, Alamieyeseigha V. FRN (2006) 34 WRN 49, Onochie V. Ikem (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 116) 458 AT p. 465, Agagu V. Dawodu (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 160) 56 p. 59, Kubor V. Dickson (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 534 and Asikpo V. George (2012) 53 WR.N 135 AT p. 145.

It was further submitted that from the evidence led by the parties, it was clear that the Appellant, through Alhaii M. L. Mande, did not collect the Certificate of Occupancy issued in its favour by the 2nd Respondent, which had remained in the custody of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and contended that in law the burden was on the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to prove that the Certificate of Occupancy was collected by the Appellant and urged the Court to hold that the Court below was wrong when it held that the PW1 admitted under cross-examination that the Certificate of Occupancy was collected by his late father, Alhaji M. L. Mande and to allow the appeal and set aside the perverse judgment of the Court below. Counsel referred to Sections 13 and 124 of the Evidence Act 2011; Contemporary Law of Evidence in Nigeria by Jerry Amadi p. 1307, and relied on Yesufu V. ACB Ltd (1981) 1 All NLR (Pt. 2) 211, Tata V. AG. Bauchi (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt. 317) 358 p. 371, Edet V. Chagoon (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1070) 85, Igbinovia V. UBTH (2001) FWLR (Pt. 50) 1745, Omisore V. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205, Orji V. DTM Nig. Ltd (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 467 and Oguanuhu V. Chiegboka (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1351) 588.

It also further submitted that Exhibit P5 was clearly in contrast with the Power of Attorney dated 2000 but altered to 2006 and the application for approval and consent to register Power of Attorney dated 27/6/2005 in Exhibit D28 in that it was different from the other ones relied upon by the 1st Respondent and purported to have been made between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent and contended that these are clear acts of illegality, particularly when Exhibit P 5 was not challenged or contradicted by the Respondents and urged the Court to hold that in law a Court of law is bound to take note of acts of illegality or void transaction, even though same are not raised by any party and to reevaluate the evidence led by the parties and come to the right conclusions and allow the appeal and set aside the perverse judgment of the Court below. Counsel relied on Ajaokuta Steel Co. Ltd V. Corp. Insurers Ltd (2004) 41 WRN 84 AT pp. 111 – 112, Chime V. Ezea (2009) 34 WRN 39 AT P. 135, Mogaji V. Odofin (1978) NSCC 121 and Woluchem V. Gudi (2004) 3 WRN 20.

1ST RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
In his submissions, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the 1st Respondent had submitted inter alia that Exhibit D15, was both on the pleadings and evidence led tendered by the 1st Respondent in proof of its equitable right over the land in dispute and contended though a registrable instrument it was admissible in law as evidence of payment for a land transaction as pleaded by the 1st Respondent and did not assert any legal title to the land in dispute and urged the Court to hold that the Court below was right when it held that Exhibit D15, being evidence of payment for land transaction coupled with undisputed possession and exercise of acts of ownership for a long period of 13 years by the 1st Respondent conferred on the 1st Respondent equitable title to the land in dispute and to dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit and affirm the correct judgment of the Court below. Counsel referred to Section 15 of the Land Registration Act, Cap 515 of the Laws of the Federal Capital Territory, and relied on Adesanya V. Otuewu (1993) LPELR – 146 (SC), Akinlolu V. Alaya (2007) LPELR – 344 (SC), Nsiegbe V. Mgbemena (2007) LPELR – 2065 (SC) and Okoye V. Dumez Nigeria Limited (1985) 6 SC 3.

It was also submitted that Exhibits D15, D 16 and D17. which original copies are proved to be missing and therefore, not in the custody of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, and thus not form part of the records of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, were admissible and rightly admitted in evidence by the Court below in that these documents are neither public documents nor computer-generated documents as was vehemently but erroneously submitted for the Appellant and contended that the said documents were only merely submitted to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to enable them process the consent sought as well as the recertification exercise according to law, and being documents temporarily submitted as part of the procedure for the perfection of its title, did not become any public documents thereby and urged the Court to so hold and to dismiss the appeal and affirm the correct judgment of the Court below. Counsel referred to Section 102 (b); 84 and 104 of the Evidence Act 2011 and relied on Daniel V. INEC (2015) LPELR – 24566 (SC) Awolola V. Gov. of Ekiti State (2018) LPELR – 46346 (SC) and Dickson V. Sylva (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 167.

It was further submitted that the 1st Respondent led unchallenged evidence the process of perfecting its equitable title was frustrated by the missing original copies submitted to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and also that the 1st Respondent participated in the recertification exercise on the basis of which the 2nd and 3rd Respondents issued a new Certificate of Occupancy in its name and contended that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents were legally bound to issue a new Certificate of Occupancy to the new owners, interest holders, such as the 1st Respondent, of a property covered by a Certificate of Occupancy and to dismiss the appeal and affirm the correct judgment of the Court below. Counsel referred to Section 4 of the said Land Use Regulation and relied on Terab V. Lawan (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 231) 569, Union Bank V. Onwukwe (2017) LPELR – 43279 (SC), ACN V. Nyako (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1491) 352 AT p. 395, Omisore V. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt.1482) 205 p. 323.

2ND AND 3RD RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
In his submissions on his issue one, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents had submitted inter alia that Appellant failed to prove its case that the Plot 2N70, New Plot No. 849, belongs to it and that it had not divested its interest to the 1st Respondent and contended that in actions for declaration of title to land, the onus rest squarely on the Appellant who must succeed on the strength of its own case and not on seeming weaknesses in the Respondents’ case and urged the Court to hold that on the evidence put forward the 2nd and 3rd Respondent duly carried out their statutory duties in compliance with the law in issuing a new Certificate of Occupancy to the 1st Respondent, but which handing over had been hampered by the Appellant’s suit and to dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit and affirm the correct judgment of the Court below. Counsel referred to Regulations 4 (2) (b) (ii), 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Capital Territory, Land Use Regulations 2004, and the Land Use Act 1978. Section 168 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011 and relied onAnagbado V. Faruk (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt.1653) 292 w p. 308, Jinadu V. Esurombi – Aro (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 944) 142 AT p. 202, Malami V. Ohikhuare (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1670) 132 AT pp. 160 – 161.

It was also submitted that in law an allegation of forgery or fraud are not just made ex-tempore because of the weight such allegations carry, even in a civil suit and therefore, the same standard of proof as applicable in proof of criminal offences beyond reasonable doubt is also required of the Appellant and contended that in the absence of any application for recertification by the Appellant, the 2nd and 3rd Respondent were perfectly in order to consider the application by the 1st Respondent under due process for re-certification, which was duly granted after a thorough authentication and verification process of all its required documents and urged the Court to hold that the Appellant’s allegation of fraud, illegality and forgery remained bare and unproved and to dismiss the appeal and affirm the correct judgment of the Court below. Counsel referred to Section 100 of the Evidence Act 2011, and relied on Adelaja V. Alade (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 608) 544 pp. 557-558, Ikoku V. Oli (1962) 1 SCNLR 30, Alake V. State (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 265) 260 AT p. 270; Jinadu V. Esurombi – Aro (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 944) 142 AT p. 182; Babalola V. Adewuyi (2012) 12 WRIN 132 AT p. 147; Otukpo V. John (2000) 8 NWLR (Pt. 669) 507 a p. 521; The Registered Trustees Mission V. Mrs. E.I Olowoleni (1990) 6 N WLR (Pt. 158) 514.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL REPLY TO 1ST RESPONDENT
In his reply submissions, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the Appellant had again virtually rehashed and reiterated his earlier submissions and basically re-argued his appeal under the guise of a reply brief, which brought nothing to the discussion table that has not been covered in the Appellant’s brief on these issues. There is therefore no use repeating these submissions here. See Order 19 Rules 5 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021. See also Olafisoye V. FRN 2004 ISC Pt. 11 27, Ikine V. Edjerode (2001) 12 SC (Pt. 11) 94, Longe V. FBN (2010) 2 – 3 SC 61, Registered Trustees, Ikoyi Club 1938 V. Mr. Timothy Ikujuni (2019) LPELR – 47373 (CA).

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL REPLY TO 2ND AND 3RD RESPONDENTS
In his reply submissions, which I have taken time to review, learned counsel for the Appellant had again virtually rehashed and reiterated his earlier submissions and basically re-argued his appeal under the guise of a reply brief, which brought nothing to the discussion table that has not been covered in the Appellant’s brief on these issues. There is therefore, no use repeating these submissions here. See Order 19 Rules 5 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021. See also Olafisoye V. FRN 2004 ISC Pt. 11 27, Ikine V. Edjerode (2001) 12 SC (Pt. 11) 94, Longe V. F BN (2010) 2 – 3 SC 61 and Registered Trustees, Ikoyi Club 1938 V. Mr. Timothy Ikujuni (2019) LPELR – 47373 (CA).

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR, FIVE AND SIX
My Lords, in law, when an Appellant alleges that a trial Court had not properly evaluated the evidence led by the parties it is simply a call on the appellate Court to consider first whether or not the trial Court had properly evaluated the evidence led before it and if it finds that the trial Court had not done so, then to proceed to and re-evaluate the evidence in the printed record to determine if the trial Court had made correct findings borne out by the evidence as led by the parties. It is thus the law that it is only where the trial Court had not properly carried out its sacred duty of dispassionately evaluating the totality of the evidence led and had thus failed in this primary duty that an appellate Court would have the legal justification to intervene and re-evaluate the evidence on the printed record in order to make appropriate findings of facts in line with the evidence led and in the dictates of justice to the parties. So, until an appellate Court arrives at such a conclusion the need for re-evaluation of evidence does not arise since an appellate Court has no business interfering with correct findings of a trial Court. See African Songs Limited & Anor V. King Sunny Ade (2018) LPELR – 46184 (CA) per Georgewill JCA. See also Williams V. Tinubu (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 755) 200, Amuneke V. The State (1992) NWLR (Pt. 217)347 and Sule Asariyu V. The State (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 709.

My Lords, having averted my mind to the basic principles of law on evaluation of evidence and findings by a trial Court and the duty of an appellate Court called upon to consider whether or not proper evaluation and correct findings have been reached by the trial Court to determine whether or not to intervene to reevaluate the evidence on the printed record and make proper findings, what then are the pieces of evidence as led by the parties before the Court below?

PW1, was one Mohammed Sanusi Mohammed Lawal. He adopted his written statements on oath made on 28/1/15 and 4/1/16 respectively. He was thoroughly cross-examined. He tendered the following documents which were admitted in evidence as Exhibits, namely; Certificate of Incorporation of Plaintiff as Exhibit P1; Corporate Affairs Commission Form 7 as Exhibit P 2; Offer of Terms of Grant/Conveyance of Approval in favor of the Plaintiff dated 24/8/93 as Exhibit P3; Acceptance of Offer as Exhibit P4; Death Certificate of Made Lawal as Exhibit P 5; Letter dated 7/5/12 written by Shukurah Chambers to Director, Development Control. FCDA as Exhibit P6: Letter dated 8/8/2012 by M.S. Shuaibu & Co to Inspector-General of Police as Exhibit P 7; Letter dated 31/5/12 by Inspector General of Police to Deputy Inspector-General of Police as Exhibit P8: Application for certified true copy of Police Investigation Report dated 14/7/14 by M.S. Shuaibu & Co as Exhibit P9; Police Investigation Report dated 8/8/12 as Exhibit P10; Some Photographs as Exhibit PI 1: Letter dated 2/8/12 by M.S. Shuaibu & Co as Exhibit P 12: Letter dated 10/8/13 by M.S. Shuaibu & Co to Director of Lands. AGIS as Exhibit PI 3; Application for legal search dated 13/3/13 by M.S. Shuaibu & Co as Exhibit P 14. See pages 936 – 945 in Volume Il of the Record of Appeal.

DW1 was one Fide – Washington Chimeziri Nwachukwu. He adopted his written statement on oath made on 4/12/15. He was thoroughly cross-examined. He tendered the following documents which were admitted in evidence as Exhibits D15 – D23. A Power of Attorney donated by the Appellant to one Mr. Benjamin Ochai in 1998 as Exhibit D15: A Power of Attorney donated by one Benjamin Ochai to Mrs. Cecilia Ezenwanyi Onuiri as Exhibit D 16; A Power of Attorney donated by Mrs. Cecilia Ezenwanyi Onuiri to the 1st Respondent in respect of Plot No 849 as Exhibit D17: Exhibits D18 – D23. See pages 946 – 952 in Volume II of the Record of Appeal. DW2 was one Cecilia Ezenwanyi Onuiru. She adopted her written statement on oath made on 15/3/16. She was thoroughly cross-examined. She identified Exhibits D15, D16 and D17 as the documents she handed over to the 1st Respondent. See pages 952 – 954 in Volume II of the Record of Appeal. DW3 was one Ugonna Onunkwo. He adopted his written statement on oath made on 23/2/15. He was thoroughly cross-examined. He tendered the following documents which were admitted in evidence as Exhibits namely; Search application samples as Exhibits D24A – D24F; Application for Caveat by M.L. Mande Enterprises Ltd as Exhibit D2; Reply to the Application for Caveat as Exhibit D26; Original Land Policy File (Brown Color) as Exhibit D27; Recertification File (Green Color) as Exhibit D28, and Correspondence File (Yellow Color) as Exhibit D29. See pages 954 – 958 in Volume Il of the Record of Appeal.

It on the strength of the averments in the pleadings of the parties as to the issues joined by them and the evidence, both oral and documentary, led by the parties through their witnesses, that the Court below had in its judgment delivered on 26/9/2016, dismissed all the claims of the Appellant against the Respondents while granting part of the counter-claim of the 1st Respondent against the Appellant, and concluding as follows:
“In the light of everything that has been said in the foregoing, it seems to me that the Plaintiff did not succeed in disavowing the transaction between it and Mr. Benjamin Ochai in 1998 as evidenced by Exhibit D15 nor did the Plaintiff establish that the 1st Defendant colluded with Officials of the 2nd and 3rd Defendant to usurp the disputed land. On a balance of probabilities, I find and hold that the Plaintiff acting through Alhaji M. L. Mande sold Plot No. 2N70 (New Plot No. 849), Durumi District; Abuja to Mr. Benjamin Ochai in 1998 for valuable consideration as evidenced by Exhibit DI 5, which the Plaintiff did not successfully impeach and the Plaintiff no longer has any subsisting proprietary title or interest thereto that is capable of sustaining type declaration sought in these proceedings…..ln the case at hand, the criminal allegations upon which the main claim is founded remain unsubstantiated, and the inevitable conclusion to which I must come is that the various heads of claim for declaration must fail, and this impinges negatively on the claims for perpetual injunction and damages for trespass. This is so because in an action founded on title to land, a party who does not establish a subsisting title to she land cannot maintain an action in.” See pages 963 – 1014 in Volume Il of the Record of Appeal.

My Lords, I have taken time to review the entirety of the averments in the pleadings of the parties, noting carefully the issue joined therein. I have considered the evidence led by the parties and used the copious documentary Exhibits tendered and relied upon by them and considered the cross-examination evidence of PW1, DW1, DW2 and DW3. It has become imperative since the introduction of written statement of oath as evidence in chief in civil proceedings that cross-examination is now the real test of the veracity of witnesses, the reason being that most written statements of oath nowadays are mere replica of the pleadings of the parties. It is thus by the cross-examination evidence the true worth of the evidence of a witness is ascertained. The law is well settled that evidence elicited in cross-examination, as in the instant appeal from the PW1 by the 1st Respondent, which supports the case as pleaded by the 1st Respondent, the cross-examining party, is good evidence on which a trial Court. such as the Court below can legitimately act on to make appropriate findings of facts. See Daggash V. Bulama (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 892) 144.

Now, under the intense heat of cross-examination, the PW1 admitted very crucial facts against the claims he was making against the Respondents, including admitting that he was not present when his late father, Alhaji M. L. Mande collected the original of the Appellant’s Certificate of Occupancy from the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. which one of the very basis of his allegation that the Appellant did not collect its Certificate of Occupancy from the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, a key aspect of his case against the Respondents. Indeed, being a very young person at the time of the alleged transactions way back in 1998, it would be understood that he knew next to nothing of the happenings at that between his father as the MD of the Appellant and any other person, including Mr. Benjamin Ochai, yet he wanted to be clever by half in trying to know even things he ought not to know and ended up giving very unreliable evidence in support of his case under his very intense cross-examination. It is settled law that no witness who has given materially inconsistent evidence on oath, and or tell lies on matters within their own personal knowledge before the Court, is entitled to the honour of being ascribed with any credibility by the Court on issues or matters in contention between the parties. See Ogunde V. Abdulsalam (2017) LPELR – 41875 (CA) per Georgewill JCA. See also Ezemba V. Ibeneme (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 894) 623.

My Lords, the 1st Respondent pleaded and placed before the Court below uncontroverted evidence of being in exclusive possession since the year 2000, which was not challenged by the Appellant, and of making payment of purchase price to Mr. Benjamin Ochai, and exercising acts of ownership on the land in dispute, by building a Church, a Parsonage and a School thereon, spanning over the long period of 13years. Indeed, none of these pieces of evidence were challenged by the Appellant. In paragraph 16 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Statement of Defence/counter-claim, it was averred thus:
“The said land was first allocated to the Plaintiff who through their lawful representatives assigned all their rights and interest in the land for valuable consideration to a certain Mr. Benjamin Ochai by virtue of a Deed of Assignment made in 1998.”

DW1 testified inter alia that the said documents were only submitted to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to enable them process the consent sought as well as the recertification exercise according to law. The nature of the electronic receptacle of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents was not given in evidence and maybe a mere electronic list of documents submitted to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, including Exhibits D15, D16 and D17 received from the 1st Respondent. It would clearly amount to speculation to hold that by the mere capturing of these documents in the electronic receptacle of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents rendered to become computer-generated documents which must comply with Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011. See Daniel V. INEC (2015) LPELR – 24566 (SC); see also Awolola V. Gov. of Ekiti State (2018) LPELR – 46346 (SC).

On Exhibit D15, the 1st Respondent pleaded and gave evidence through DW1 who testified at paragraph inter alia that one Sunday Abednego, acting as Ochai’s Solicitor, including M. M. Dalhatu, submitted to the offices of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on 18/04/2000 the documents made between the Plaintiff and Mr. Benjamin Ochai for registration, including a Deed of Assignment; Letter of Consent to Assign and Letter of consent to transfer ownership pending when the consent of the Minister was given for the Assignment. DW3 also testified inter alia to the above effect. See page 465 and 771 in Volume II of the Record of Appeal. Both of these witnesses were not even challenged on these facts in their cross-examination as the Appellant did not even join any issue with the Respondents on these facts as disclosed in Exhibits D15, D16 and D17, and which issues were merely being raised for the first time in this appeal without any pleading and or legal basis.

By Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011, it is provided thus:
“In any proceedings, a statement contained in a document produced by a computer shall be admissible as evidence of any fact stated in it of which direct oral evidence would be admissible, if it is shown that the conditions in Subsection (2) of this Section are satisfied in relation to the statement and the computer in question.”

The evidence of DW1 that the said D15, D 16, and D17 were captured on the 2nd and 3rd Defendants ‘electronic receptacles’ is in my finding not enough to explain the nature of the ‘capture’ and thus the fact that a computer captured a document does not ipso facto make the statements in that document computer generated. This is so because, it would appear and I find it so certain, that in such situations as in the Exhibits D15, 16 and D17, documents were already in existence before the electronic receptacle captured them and they were therefore, not computer-generated evidence as envisaged under Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011. It is clear to me and I so hold that Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 is limited in its scope and operation to only documents which are ‘computer generated’ and not any kind of documents, and thus not applicable to Exhibits D15, D16 and D17 respectively. See Dickson V. Sylva (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 167. See also Mr. Ray Okpu V. Trust Bond Mortgage Bank Plc (2021) LPELR- 54554 (CA) per Georgewill JCA, Jude Onwuzulike V. The State (2017) LPELR – 41889 (CA), Hon. Dickson V. Chief Timipre sylva & Ors (2016) LPELR – 41257 (SC), Daudu V. FRN 2018 10 NWLR (Pt. 1626) 169 and Kubor V. Dickson 2013 4 NWLR Pt. 1345 534.

I have taken a calm look at Exhibits D15, D16 and D17, which original copies were indisputably proved to be missing and therefore in my finding were not in the custody of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. They do not form part of the records of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and are therefore, not public documents. So, were they admissible or inadmissible in evidence and were they rightly or wrongly admitted in evidence? In my finding, being documents merely submitted to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents by the 1st Respondent for the processing of its application for recertification and perfection of its title, they did not become and were not public documents. They were also clearly not computer-generated documents by the mere fact that upon their submission they were electronically captured in the receptacle of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, being documents temporarily submitted as part of the procedure for the perfection of its title. See Section 102 (b); 84 and 104 of the Evidence Act 2011. See also Daniel V. INEC (2015) LPELR – 24566 (SC), Awolola V. Gov. of Ekiti State (2018) LPELR – 46346 (SC); Dickson V. Sylva (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 167, Mr. Aruna V. Hajia Kuburatu Ibrahim (2021) LPELR – 54137 (CA) per Georegwill. JCA and Guaranty Trust Bank V. Tabik Investment Ltd & Anor (2005) 3 FWLR (Pt. 217) 301 AT p. 311.

DW1 testified inter alia that on 29/2/2000, Mrs. Cecillia Onuiri by virtue of a Power of Attorney dated 29/02/2000 and for valuable consideration of N3,000,000.00 nominated the 1st Defendant as her Attorney over the said parcel of land now in dispute. This piece of evidence does not seem to me to be evidence of title but of existence of transaction between the parties for which money had exchanged hands. It merely evidenced the payment of valuable consideration by the 1st Respondent to DW1. The resultant document, being Exhibit D156, being pleaded and tendered in evidence as proof of equitable interest need not be registered to be admissible in evidence. See paragraph 18 of the 1st Respondent Amended Statement of Defence and counter-claim AT page 760 in Volume Il of the Record of Appeal, where it was averred thus:
“Shortly thereafter, the said Mr. Ochai in 1999, for valuable consideration appointed Mrs. Cecilia Ezewanyi Onuiri as his Attorney over the land vide an Irrevocable Power of Attorney made in 1999. Mr. Ochai handed over to Mrs. Onuiri both the Deed of Assignment and Power of Attorney made in 1998 between him and the Plaintiff, including the Original Certificate of Occupancy.”

Now, it seems so very clear and certain to me that going by the pleadings and evidence led by the 1st Respondent through PW1 and PW2, Exhibit D15, was tendered by the 1st Respondent merely as evidence of payment of purchase same, same as Exhibits D 16 and D17 and in proof of its equitable right over the land in dispute. In law, these documents are ordinarily registrable instrument and if tendered as documents of title must be registered to be admissible in evidence. However, having been pleaded and tendered as merely evidence of payment of purchase price in support of equitable title, they need not be registered to be admissible in evidence and I so firmly hold.
In law, a document pleaded and tendered as mere evidence of payment for a land transaction as pleaded by the 1st Respondent, and not assert any legal title to a land in dispute, is admissible in evidence for that purpose or which it was pleaded and tendered in evidence. Thus, the Court below was right when it held that Exhibit D15, being evidence of payment for land transaction coupled with undisputed possession and exercise of acts of ownership for a long period of 13 years by the 1st Respondent conferred on the 1st Respondent equitable title to the land in dispute. This finding by the Court below is both unimpeachable and impeccable and must be allowed to stand.

See Section 15 of the Land Registration Act, Cap 515 of the Laws of the Federal Capital Territory. See also Okoye V. Dumez Nigeria Limited (1985) 6 SC 3.
In Adesanya V. Otuewu (1993) LPELR – 146 (SC), the Supreme Court had stated inter alia thus:
“It is well settled law that the payment of purchase price coupled with being put in possession confers an equitable title enabling a purchaser in possession to call for a document of title. The title so acquired is capable of defeating subsequent purchasers.”
See also Akinduro V. Alaya (2007) LPELR – 344 (SC), where the Supreme Court had stated inter alia thus:
“A document inadmissible for a purpose may be admissible for another purpose. In the instant case, Exhibit 1 which is inadmissible in proof of title would have been admissible in proof of an appropriate equitable relief claimed.”
See further Nsiegbe V. Mgbemena (2007) LPELR – 2065 (SC), where the Supreme Court had reiterated inter alia thus:
“A purchaser of land who has paid and taken possession of the land by virtue of a registrable instrument which has not been registered, has thereby acquired an equitable interest which is as good as a legal estate.”
It is thus, good law that where a purchaser of land or a lessee is in possession of the land by an instrument that had not been registered but has paid the purchase money or the rent to the vendor or the lessor, then in either case, the purchaser or the lessee has acquired an equitable interest in the land which is as good as a legal estate and this equitable interest can only be defeated by a purchaser of the land for value without notice of the prior equity. A registrable instrument which has not been registered is admissible to prove such equitable interest and to prove payment of purchase money or rent. See Atufe V. Oghomienor (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 809) 327 AT pp. 347 – 348. See also Savage V. Sarrough (1973) 13 NLR 141, Ogunbambi V. Abowab (1951) 13 WACA 222, Fakoya V. St. Paul’s Church Shagamu (1966) 1 ALL NLR 74, Oni V. Arimoro (1973) 3 SC 163, Bucknor Maclean V. Inlaks Ltd (1980) 8 – 11 SC 1, Dr. J.C. Okoye V. Dumez Nig. Ltd. & Anor (1985) 6 SC 3 AT p. 12.

I find that the Court below thoroughly reviewed the entirety of the pleadings of the parties and dispassionately evaluated the entirety of the evidence led by the parties, and came to the irresistible conclusions, and rightly too in my finding, that the Appellant failed woefully to prove any or all of his claims against all or any of the Respondents, the 1st Respondent proved and had acquired an equitable title over the land in dispute as against the Appellant. See Azubuogu v. Oranezi (2017) LPELR – 42669 (SC), where the Supreme Court had admonished trial Courts, such as the Court below to read, review and construe paragraphs in pleadings wholistically and never in isolation.
The Court below, in my finding, admirably kept to this admonition and perfectly discharged its primary duty of evaluation of evidence led by the parties and arrived at impeccable findings of facts and reached conclusions which were ably and amply supported by the weight of evidence led which preponderates in favour of the Respondents over and above the wishy-washy evidence led by the Appellant. See Olufosoye V. Olorunfemi (1989) LPELR-1215 (SC). See also Anekwe V. Nweke (2014) LPELR – 22697 (SC).

No wonder, the learned counsel for the Appellant had focused all his attention on dismantling the counter-claim of the 1st Respondent but forgetting, perhaps conveniently, that it was the Appellant that was indeed the Claimant, whose claims against the Respondents were dismissed before the counter-claim of the 1st Respondent was granted against the Appellant.

Now, while the counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents had contended vehemently that the allegation of fraud was central and must be proved by the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt and that the Appellant failed to prove it as required by law, it was contended with equal vehemence by counsel for the Appellant that the mere pleading of the acts of the 1st Respondent as being fraudulent does not amount to an allegation of crime and therefore, the Appellant was under no duty to prove fraud beyond reasonable doubt and had indeed proved his allegation against the 1st and 2nd Respondents as required of him by law. Honestly, flowing immediately from the submission of the Appellant’s counsel above is a concession that the Appellant did not prove the allegation of fraud, if it amounted to a crime, beyond reasonable doubt as required by law. The law is and has always been that in any proceedings, whether civil or criminal, in which an allegation of crime is made and is central to the issues in contention between the parties, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the party making the allegation. See Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act 2011. See also Ukeje V. Ukeje (2014) LPELR – 22724 (SC), (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1413) 384, Adenle V. Olude (2003) FWLR (Pt. 157)1074, Fabunmi V. Agbe (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 299, Babatunde V. Bank of the North Ltd (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 608) 798 and Olowofoyeku V. AG. Oyo State (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt. 477) 190 AT p. 214.

Now, if the Original Certificate of Occupancy was not collected, how then was Exhibit D15 issued to the 1st Respondent’s predecessor in title? The fact that there is no acknowledgment copy in the records of the 2nd and 3rd Respondent, does it mean that the said Certificate of Occupancy was never collected? The Appellant led no evidence to prove its own allegation that it did not collect its own Certificate of Occupancy and, would rather wish that the Respondents proved for it, that it collected the original of the Certificate of Occupancy, even on the face of the admission by the PW1 that he was not there and therefore would not be in position to know in my finding, when it was collected by his father. Alhaji M. L. Mande, now late, when under the intense heat of cross-examination, he had testified inter alia thus:
“Q: How come you did not know about this land until a new Certificate of Occupancy was issued?
A: We only got to know about the land 10 years after my father’s death.
Q: You were not there when your father collected the Certificate of Occupancy?
A: I was not there.” See page 944 in Volume II of the Record of Appeal.

In the circumstances therefore, on the unchallenged evidence that the process of perfecting its equitable title was frustrated by the missing original copies submitted by the 1st Respondent to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and also that the 1st Respondent participated in the recertification exercise on the basis of which the 2nd and 3rd Respondents issued a new Certificate of Occupancy in its name, I find that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents were legally bound to issue a new Certificate of Occupancy to the new owners, interest holders, such as the 1st Respondent, of a property covered by a Certificate of Occupancy. Their acts are deemed and presumed to be regular unless and until they are rebutted by credible evidence to the contrary, none of which was forthcoming from the Appellant. See Section 168 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011; Regulation 4 (2) (b) (ii), 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Capital Territory, Land Use Regulations 2004. See also Terab V. Lawan (1992)3 NWLR (Pt. 231) 569, Union Bank V. Onwukwe (2017) LPELR – 43279 (SC), ACN V. Nyako (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1491) 352 AT P. 395, Omisore V. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt.1482) 205 AT p. 323.
In Malami V. Ohikhuare (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1670) 132 AT pp. 160 – 161, it was pronounced emphatically thus:
“The only ground the Minister of F.C.T Abuja can refuse to recertify an original Certificate of Occupancy by a holder of Certificate of Occupancy for recertification is where such a Certificate is proved to be unauthentic upon verification, otherwise the Certificate is valid for the term of years stated in the grant.”

My Lords, the Court below did carry out a meticulous review of the pleadings and evaluation of the entirety of the evidence, oral, on oath and documentary as led by the panics through their respective witnesses and arrived at correct findings of facts and conclusions in the judgment appealed against as regards the claims of the Appellant against the Respondents. Thus, in law this Court would have no business interfering with these correct findings of the Court below and this is so because an appellate Court has no duty interfering with the correct findings of a trial Court even where the reasons adduced and relied upon by the trial Court to arrive at the correct findings turns out to be wrong. See Alhaji Ndayako & Ors. V. Alhaji Dantoro & Ors (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 AT P. 198. See also Abaye V. Ofili (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) 134 and Ukejianya V. Uchendu 18 WACA 46.

It is now left for me to only reiterate that children who do not understudy and or take care to know the affairs of their parents and would only wake up upon the death of their parents to asserts rights to every conceivable and inconceivable properties of their parents must be wary of doing so if they don’t know what their parents had in their lifetime done with their own properties in other not to cause these unwarranted and completely unnecessary and unjustifiable litigation expenses to innocent person who had genuinely dealt with their parents in relation to the property sought to be recovered by the children. In the instant case, the PW1 only got to know, as he claimed of the Plot in dispute after ten long and solid years after the death of his father and immediately wanted to recover it, notwithstanding that his own father, had, in the exercise of his legitimate right, dealt with the property in his own lifetime. I had sometimes ago expressed these concerns in Anyi & Ors V. Akande & Ors (2017) LPELR – 41973(CA) per Georgewill JCA.

In the light of all I have stated and found above, issues one, two, three, four, five and six are hereby resolved against the Appellant in favour of the Respondents.

On the whole, having resolved issue seven for determination against the Appellant in favour of the Respondents and holding that the Appellant’s Suit was statute barred and thus liable to be dismissed in – limine and having also resolved issues one, two, three, four, five and six against the Appellant in favour of the Respondents, I hold that this appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed in its entirety. Consequently, this appeal is hereby dismissed for lacking in merit.

In the result, the judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, Coram: Peter O. Affen J, (as he then was) in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/2291/2013: M. L. Mande Enterprises V. The Registered Trustees of Seventh Day Adventist Church & Ors delivered on 26/9/2016, in which the claims of the Appellant as Claimant against the Respondents as Defendants were dismissed for lacking in merit, while part of the counter-claim of the 1st Respondent as 1st Defendant was granted against the Appellant, is hereby affirmed.
There shall be no Order as to Cost.

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the leading judgment just delivered by my learned brother, GEORGEWILL, JCA.

I agree with the reasoning and conclusion of my Noble Lord. I adopt them as mine. I agree that the judgment of Federal Capital Territory High Court, Abuja delivered by AFFEN, J (now JCA) wherein the claims of Appellant as Claimant against the Defendants were dismissed and in which part of the counter-claim of the 1st Respondent (1st Defendant) was granted against the Appellant be affirmed. No order as to costs.

BATURE ISAH GAFAI, J.C.A.: I have had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Sir Biobele Abraharn Georgewill, JCA. I am in full agreement with the erudite reasonings expressed in his lead judgment and the impeccable conclusion he reached thereby.

If I may add, by way of emphasis only, that from the Appellant’s Writ of Summons at the Court below found at pages 406 – 456 of the Record of Appeal (Volume 1), it is obvious that the suit was statute barred, just as found by the lower Court and as rightly affirmed by my lord in the lead judgment. The 1st Respondent’s counter-claim granted in part in the lead Judgment is also fully in accord with the justice of the case in this appeal which I also hereby grant. In effect, I too dismiss this appeal as unmeritorious and grant the 1st Respondent’s counter-claim in line with the order made on same in the lead judgment.

Appearances:

Ibrahim Idaiyi Esq, with him A. G. Inyadu Esq. For Appellant(s)

S. N. Mbaezue Esq., for the 1st Respondent

Adeolu Salako Esq., with Chiamaka Echeozo Esq., for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. For Respondent(s)