M.J. EKA-ETEH VS NIGERIAN HOUSING DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY LTD. & ANOR
(1973) LCN/1701(SC)
In the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Friday, June 8, 1973
Case Number: SC. 326/1970
RATIO
MORTGAGE: WHETHER A MORTGAGEE SELLING UNDER A POWER OF SALE MUST, IN EXERCISING THAT POWER, ACT IN GOOD FAITH
It is settled law that a mortgagee is not a trustee of a power of sale for the mortgagor (except as to the balance of the purchase money after a sale). It is a power given to him for his own benefit, enabling him to protect the mortgage debt. In Farrar v. Farrars Limited, in the Court of Appeal, the Master of the Rolls, in delivering the judgment of the Court, said:
“A mortgagee with a power of sale, though often called a trustee, is in a very different position from a trustee for sale. A mortgagee is under obligations to the mortgagor, but he has rights of his own which he is entitled to exercise adversely to the mortgagor. A trustee for sale has no business to place himself in such a position as to give rise to a conflict of interest and duty. But every mortgage confers upon the mortgagee the right to realise his security and to find a purchaser if he can, and if in exercise of his power he acts bone fide and takes reasonable precautions to obtain a proper price, the mortgagor has no redress, even although more might have been obtained for the property if the sale had been postponed. . .”. (40 Ch. D. 395 at p. 410).
The same view has been taken in other cases. The mortgagee must act bona fide, and should endeavour to secure a proper price. Though his primary objective is to realise the mortgage debt, nonetheless he is required to act in good faith.
The law is laid down even more strongly and more clearly in the House of Lords by Lord Herschell in the case of Kennedy v. De Trafford where he said:
“My Lords, I am myself disposed to think that if a mortgagee in exercising his power of sale exercises it in good faith, without any intention of dealing unfairly by the mortgagor, it would be very difficult indeed, it not impossible, to establish that he had been guilty of any breach of duty towards the mortgagor. It is very difficult to define exhaustively all that would be included in the words ‘good faith’, but I think it would be unreasonable to require the mortgagee to do more than exercise his power of sale in that fashion.” ([1897] A.C. 180 at p. 185).
We are also of the view that if a mortgagee selling under a power of sale takes the pains in exercising that power, to act in good faith, his conduct in regard to that sale cannot be impeached. The only obligation incumbent on a mortgagee selling under and in pursuance of a power of sale in the mortgage deed is that he should act in good faith. We, however, are conscious of the fact that in determining whether the mortgagee’s conduct in any given case comes up to the required standard or not, regard must be had to the circumstances of the particular case. Every case has to be determined on its own facts and in the light of its own circumstances. PER IBEKWE, AG. J.S.C.
MORTGAGE: WHETHER THE FACT OF AN UNDERVALUE ALONE IS ENOUGH TO VITIATE THE EXERCISE OF A MORTGAGEE’S POWER OF SALE
We think it is now beyond controversy that undervalue alone is not enough to vitiate the exercise of a mortgagee’s power of sale. It must be shown that the sale was made at a fraudulent or gross undervalue. Indeed, it is well established that’ ‘if a mortgagee exercises his power of sale bona fide for the purpose of realising his debt and without collusion with the purchaser, the court will not interfere even though the sale be very disadvantageous, unless the price is so low as in itself to be evidence of fraud.” (See Warner v. Jacob (1882) 20 Ch. D. 220).
In Coote on Mortgages, vol. 2, 9th ed., at p. 927, the law on this point is stated as follows:
“The only obligation incumbent on a mortgagee selling under a power of sale in his mortgage is that he should act in good faith. Whether selling under an express or statutory power, he may generally conduct the sale in such manner as he may think most conducive to his own benefit, unless the deed contains any restrictions as to the mode of exercising the power, provided he acts bona fide and observes reasonable precautions to obtain ‘not the best price’ but ‘a proper price”. PER IBEKWE, AG. J.S.C.
JUSTICES:
COKER, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
FATAYI- WILLIAMS, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
IBEKWE, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
APPELLANTS
M.J. EKA-ETEH
RESPONDENTS
NIG. HOUSING DEV. SOCIETY LTD. & J.A. ADEWUNMI
DAN IBEKWE, AG. JSC. (Delivering the judgement of the Court)
In his claim before the Ikeja High Court in Suit IK/201/64, the plaintiff M.J. Eka-Eteh (now appellant) claimed by his amended writ of summons as follows :- “An order setting aside the sale of the Plaintiff’s property at No.3, Eka-Eteh Street, Ikate, Mushin by the 1st defendants to the 2nd defendant on the ground of fraud, irregularity, non-compliance with the provisions of the Property and Conveyancing Law and that the purported sale was not made in good faith. “In the alternative – The Plaintiff claims from the 1st defendant the sum of £10,000 being damages for wrongful sale by the 1st defendant of his property to the 2nd defendant.” It is common ground that the plaintiff was the owner of the property situate at No. 3, Eka-Eteh Street, Mushin. In consideration of £2,500 advanced to him by the 1st defendants in September, 1962, the plaintiff mortgaged the said property to the 1st defendants (now 1st Respondents) the Nigeria Housing Development Society Limited by way of security for the loan. It is also not in dispute that in November, 1964, the 1st defendants, in exercise of their statutory power of sale, sold and conveyed to J.A. Adewunmi, the 2nd defendant (now 2nd respondent) the property in question for £2,850. In consequence thereof, the plaintiff M. J. Eka-Eteh as mortgagor, on the 28th day of November, 1964 brought this action against the mortgagees, the 1st defendants, and also against J. A. Adewunmi, the 2nd defendant who had bought from them, claiming that the sale be set aside “on the ground of fraud, irregularity, and non-compliance with the provisions of the Property and Conveyancing Law of Western Nigeria.” In the alternative, the plaintiff claimed damages from the 1st defendants.
The case therefore, turns on the regularity or otherwise of the purported exercise of the power of sale by the 1st defendants as mortgagees. Pleadings were ordered and filed. The Plaintiff in the relevant paragraphs of his amended Statement of Claim averred as follows:- “28. The Plaintiff states that the 1st defendants have no right of sale under the said deed of mortgage and purported to sell the property to the 2nd defendant to embarrass, defraud and put the business of the plaintiff in great disorder. 29. The Plaintiff will contend at the trial that the mortgage is bad and/or unenforceable for non-compliance with Property and Conveyancing Law. 30. The Plaintiff states that the alleged sale of the property was grossly below its market value. 31. The Plaintiff further states that the 1st defendants either concealed his state of account from the 2nd defendant at the time of the sale or was in collusion with the 2nd defendant in selling the property improperly and at such a ridiculous price. 32. That alleged power of sale of the 1st defendants was improperly and unreasonably exercised.” PAGE| 3 The defendants, in their Statement of Defence denied all the allegations. They claimed that they acted in good faith and in accordance with the law, as they averred in the following relevant paragraphs of their Statement of Defence:- “11. With regards to paragraph 28 of the Statement of Claim, the defendants admit in so far as the 2nd defendant is the purchaser of the said property but deny other allegations therein contained, and put the Plaintiff to the strict proof of them. 14. The defendants aver that at the time they exercised their power of sale; (i) The Plaintiff was and has been in breach of the terms of the mortgage deed. (ii) That notice in due form of law and under the said mortgage deed was served upon the Plaintiff. (iii) That thereupon their power of sale arose and (iv) That it was exercised in due form of law and without any irregularity. 15. The defendants will contend at the trial of this action that the statement of claim does not support the writ of summons and that the whole action discloses no fraud on the part of the defendants. 16. The defendants will further contend that he will reply on all legal and equitable defences available and also the Property and Conveyancing Law of the Western Nigeria.”
\The case then proceeded to trial. The plaintiff testified and called four witnesses including one Mr. John Wood Ekpeyong, an Estate Surveyor who valued the property for him in 1966. It is relevant to remark here that Mr. Ekpeyong admitted under cross-examination that he did not see the building in its uncompleted state in 1964 when it was sold. He only saw and valued the completed building in 1966, roughly two years after the sale. On their part, the 1st and 2nd defendants gave evidence in their own behalf; and in addition, the 1st defendants called a Mr. Charles Williams, their Chief Surveyor, who valued the property for them in 1964. The valuation report produced by this witness was received in evidence, without objection, and marked Exhibit ‘A6’. It reads as follows :- PAGE| 4 “R.E. Howard, Esq., A.G..M. Eka-Eteh – LM 1188 Property over the border; Situated on border road of Surulere and West Region. A very large chunk of property, but poorly constructed. First floor incomplete and decking roof leaking badly, this is probably due to commencement of walling for a second floor – walls approximately 3 courses high. Not painted externally. A lot of money will need to be spent on property to make it habitable – £750 to £1,000. Day Nursery on ground floor. No tenants on first floor. Reserve £2,750. W.C. Williams.” We wish to draw attention to the fact, that for reasons not apparent from the record, Mr. Williams’ valuation shows only a reserve price of £2,750. As a prelude to the review of the evidence before him, the learned trial Judge considered the law applicable to the case, and relevant for the proper determination of the issues between the parties. Since this aspect of the case is not in controversy, we prefer simply to set out without comments, the following provisions of the Property and Conveyancing Law; Cap 100 (Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria) which the learned trial Judge held, are applicable to the case. Sections 123 1(1) states:- “A mortgagee where the mortgage is made by deed, shall, by virtue of this Law, have the following powers, to the like extent as if they had been in terms conferred by the mortgage deed, but not further namely : (i) A power, when the mortgage money has become due, to sell, or to concur with any other person in selling, the mortgaged property, or any part thereof, either subject to prior charges or not, and either together or in lots, by public auction or by private contract, subject to such conditions respecting title, or evidence of title, or other matter, as the mortgagee thinks fit, with power to vary any contract for sale, and to buy in at an auction, or to rescind any contract for sale, and to resell, without being answerable for any loss occasioned thereby;” PAGE| 5 Section 126(2) states:- “A mortgagee exercising the power of sale conferred by this Law, shall have power, by deed, to convey the property sold, for such estate and “interest therein as he is by this law aurhorised to sell or convey or may be the subject of the mortgage, freed from all estates, interests, and rights to which the mortgage has priority, but subject to all estates, interests, and rights which have priority to the mortgage. (2) Where a conveyance is made in exercise of the power of sale conferred by this law, or any enactment replaced by this Law, the title of the purchaser shall not be impeachable on the ground – (a) That no case had arisen to authorise the sale; or (b) that due notice was not given; or (c) whether the mortgage was made before or after the commencement of this Law, that the power was otherwise improperly or irregularly exercised; and a purchaser is not, either before or on conveyance, concerned to see or inquire whether a case has arisen to authorise the sale, or due notice had been given, or the power is otherwise properly and regularly exercised; but any person damnified by an unauthorised or improper or irregular exercise of the power shall have his remedy in damages against the person exercising the power.”
On a careful study of the pleadings, and on a proper evaluation of the evidence given in support of them, the plaintiff’s case rested upon the following grounds :- (1) That no case had arisen to justify the sale, since the plaintiff was not in arrear at the time of the sale. (2) Even if a case had arisen, that due notice was not given to the plaintiff. (3) That the property was sold at a price grossly below its market value. (4) That there would appear to be collusion between the 1st and 2nd defendants. After weighing the evidence before him, the learned trial Judge, Ademola J., (as he then was) made certain findings based on a careful analysis of the claims before him. The learned trial Judge held that “the first defendants’ right to sell the property had arisen months before the property was sold.” Furthermore, he found that some interest under the mortgage was in fact, in arrears at the time, and as such, notice was not necessary, as “all that the law requires, is that the interest should be in arrear and unpaid for two months after becoming due.’ We are in accord with these findin



