LIWHU v. STATE (2020)

LIWHU v. STATE

(2020)LCN/14651(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, October 28, 2020

CA/C/235C/2016

RATIO

CRIMINAL LAW: ELEMENTS OF ESTABLISHING THE OFFENCE OF ARMED ROBBERY

For the offence of armed robbery to be established beyond reasonable doubt as required by law, the essential elements of the offence which must be proved directly; circumstantially or by the accused’s confessional statement are:-
(a) that there was a robbery or series of robberies;
(b) that the robbery was an armed robbery; and
(c) that the accused was the robber or one of the robbers.

The law is settled that the offence of robbery with firearms is committed where at the time of the commission of robbery; the accused is proved to have been armed with “firearms” or “offensive weapon” within the meaning of Section 11 of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, Cap R.11 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. Section 1 (2) (a) and (b) of the Act provides that –
1. Any person who commits the offence of armed robbery shall upon trial and conviction under this Act,
2. If –
(a) any offender mentioned in subsection (1) of this section is armed with any firearms or any offensive weapons or is in company with any person so armed, or

(b) at or immediately before or immediately after the time of the robbery, the said offender wounds or uses any personal violence to any person, the offender shall be liable upon conviction under this Act to be sentenced to death.
Similarly, Section 6 of the Act provides that any person who aids, counsels, abets or procures any person to commit an offence under Section 1, 2, 3 or of the Act whether or not he is present when the offence is committed or attempted to be committed shall be deemed to be guilty as a principal offender and shall be liable to be proceeded against and be punished accordingly. See IKEMSON V. STATE also reported in (1989) 6SC (prt 1) 114 at 132 – 133. PER SHUAIBU, J.C.A.

EVIDENCE: IMPLICATION OF FAILURE TO DISPROVE THE EVIDENCE OF VISUAL IDENTIFICATION OF AN ACCUSED PERSON

Where the evidence of visual identification of an accused person is not destroyed by credible evidence to the contrary, the Court is entitled to accept and act on it. See SEUN V. STATE (2019) 8 NWLR 12 (prt 1673) 144 at 153. PER SHUAIBU, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: WHETHER THE PROSECUTION IS REQUIRED TO TENDER THE WEAPONS USED IN THE ROBBERY IN A CASE OF ROBBERY

However, it is not in every case that failure to tender the weapon used in committing an offence or the recovered stolen items would be fatal to the prosecution’s case. The facts and circumstances of each case determine the materiality of that aspect of the evidence. See AJAYI V. STATE (2016)14 NWLR (prt 1532) 196, OLAYINKA V. STATE 92007) 9 NWLR (prt 1040) 561, GBADAMOSI V. STATE (1991) 6 NWLR (prt 196)182 and JATO V. STATE (2019)8 NWLR (prt. 1674) 317 at 327 – 328.
In AYINLA V. STATE (2019) 12 NWLR (prt 1687) 410 at 424 and 425 it was held that there is no law that states that the prosecution must tender the weapons used in the robbery before a case of armed robbery can be proved beyond reasonable doubt. PER SHUAIBU, J.C.A.

FAIR HEARING: RIGHT OF FAIR HEARING

By virtue of Section 36 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, in the determination of his civil rights and obligations including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by Court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such a manner as to secure its independence and impartiality. The right of fair hearing must however be exercised within the confines of the law, regulatory and procedural provisions; as may be applicable to the particular case. AHMED V. REGISTERED TRUSTEES, AKRCC (2019)5 NWLR (prt 1605) 300. PER SHUAIBU, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Mojeed Adekunle Owoade Justice of the Court of Appeal

Hamma Akawu Barka Justice of the Court of Appeal

Muhammed Lawal Shuaibu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

GODGIFT UNIMKE LIWHU APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant herein was arraigned before a High Court of Cross River State, sitting at Obudu Judicial Division, charged with Armed Robbery punishable under Section 1 (2) (a) and (b) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act Cap. R 11 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 in that while armed with a locally made pistol, he robbed Mrs. Happiness Ikwegbu of two LG Phones Model 300 & 330 valued at N51,000.00, Recharge cards valued at N550,000.00 and a sum of N250,000.00 cash.

Appellant pleaded not guilty. In order to prove its case the prosecution called four witnesses and tendered in Exhibits A, B, C, D, E and F. The appellant testified in his defence and tendered Exhibits G, H, J and K but called no other witness. At the end of the trial, learned counsel for the respective parties addressed the Court. In a reserved and considered judgment delivered on 3rd October, 2014, appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to death in a manner to be determined by the Governor of Cross River State.

The appellant was dissatisfied with the decision of the lower Court and

therefore appealed to this Court vide a notice of appeal filed on 31/10/2014. The appellant was granted leave to amend his notice and grounds of appeal and the said amended notice of appeal contains six grounds of appeals. Dan. O. Kulo, Esq. learned counsel for the appellant nominated four issues for the determination of this appeal at page 5 of the appellant’s brief of argument filed on 25/5/2017. These issues are reproduced hereunder as follows:-
1. Whether the judgment of the trial Court can be affirmed having regards to the evidence on record.
2. Whether the appellant had a fair hearing as enshrined in Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution as amended.
3. Whether the trial Court properly directed itself on the evidence when it found and held that the incident of 25/04/2012 was “an armed robbery” and the appellant was the robber.
4. Whether the trial Court acted in error when it admitted and acted on Exhibit F.

The respondent’s brief of argument deemed filed on 1/7/2020 was settled by Tanko Ashang, Esq., Attorney-General of Cross River State. The respondent adopts the four issues nominated by the appellant.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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Before considering the argument of learned counsel in support of the issues nominated by the appellant and adopted by the respondent, it is pertinent to set out the brief facts of the case giving rise to this appeal. On 25th of April, 2013 while Pw1 (Happiness Ikwegbu) was walking towards where she parked her car after closing her shop at about 9:30pm, the appellant came out from where he was hiding in front of the car and ordered PW1 to hand over her bag to him. When the latter refused, he started struggling to disposes the bag from her and in the process, the hand of the bag cut. He then pulled out a gun from his waist and shot into the air to scare her. The appellant made away with PW1’s bag by jumping onto a motorcycle that was waiting for him. Upon reaching home, PW1 informed her brothers about the incident and described the appellant to them having identified him because they once lived together in the same neighbourhood. PW1’s brothers set out for the search of the appellant in the early morning hours and on their way to Ohong village along Ogoja road, they sighted the appellant on a motorcycle with the rider behind their car.

Having recognized the appellant, they blocked the motorcycle which suddenly hit their car and both the appellant and the rider fell off from the motorcycle. As soon as the appellant sighted them, he got up and ran into the bush. The appellant was pursued and as he was running, some recharge cards were falling down from the appellant’s pocket and with the help of other people, the appellant was apprehended. And upon his arrest, more recharge cards and LG phones were recovered and the appellant was handed over to the vigilante group and later to the police at Obudu.

On issue one, learned counsel for the appellant referred to the essential ingredients of establishing the offence of armed robbery and contended that PW1 did not firmly establish the identity the person that allegedly robbed her and also failed to establish the use of an offensive weapon in the course of the robbery. He submitted that a combined effect of the evidence of PW1 and PW3 cannot establish the fact that an offensive weapon was used in committing the robbery incident of 25/4/2012.

Still in argument, learned counsel submitted that the evidence of PW1 does not synchronized with that

of PW3 in that PW3 did not proffer evidence to establish the fact that the gun he recovered from Paul Akeke was indeed used in the robbery and worst still, there was no description as to the type of the gun allegedly used. He cited the case of STATE V. DANJUMA (1997)5 SCNJ 126 at 136 to the effect that where there are contradictions and inconsistencies before a criminal Court such as to cast reasonable doubt upon the guilt of the accused person, such accused person should be given the benefit of doubt.

In further argument, learned counsel submitted that since the evidence of pw3 (Police investigating officer) could not give the trial Court a clue as to whether the robbery was carried out with a dangerous weapon, the only evidence left are the conflicting testimony of pw1 as well as the appellant’s judicial statement which shows that one Jonathan Adie probably robbed pw1 and may have been the person who fired the gun heard by the appellant. He referred to MAIYAKI V. STATE (2008) ALL FWLR (prt 419) 500 at 521 in urging this Court be wary in relying on the evidence of pw2, a relation of pw1 (victim of the crime) as the evidence of friends and relations

are interested persons.

In response to the above, learned counsel for the respondent argued that in all her statements to the police and evidence before the trial Court, pw1 was never wanting in identifying the appellant as the person that robbed her which fact of identification was never controverted by the appellant. He submitted that the fact that the appellant had earlier been identified by pw1 as the person that robbed her and the appellant being found immediately with some of the stolen items (recharge cards) is enough to rebut any explanation made to account his possession of same. Thus, the account given by the appellant that he bought the cards from one Jonathan Adie is incapable of attacking any investigative efforts. He cited the case of PATRICK IKEMSON V. STATE (1989)1 CLRN 1 at 6 – 7 on identification evidence.

It was also the respondent’s submission that in so far as the extra judicial statement (Exhibit F) states or suggest the inference that the appellant was actually involved in the crime, the trial Court was right in relying on same as a confession against the appellant in convicting him.

On whether or not the

appellant was armed, learned counsel submitted that the evidence of pw1 shows that the appellant was armed with firearm when he robbed her. This was also confirmed by the appellant himself in his confessional statement (Exhibit F). He contended that even though the appellant tried to refute the fact that he was the person who carried the bag and shot the gun; the said confessional statement copiously confirmed pw1’s evidence that the robbers were armed. And whether the gun used was the very gun recovered in the house of Paul Akeke or that the gun was never recovered at all, does not detract from the fact that the prosecution has proved all the essential ingredients of the offence of the armed robbery charged against the appellant as the non-recovery of the weapon used in the robbery incident is immaterial. He referred to FATAI OLAYINKA V. STATE (2007) 30 NSCQR 149 at 151.

It was finally submitted that there is no law that excludes the evidence of a relation and the fact that some stolen recharge cards were found on the appellant within 24 hours from the time of the robbery sufficiently corroborates the testimony of other witnesses that indeed the

appellant was involved in the robbery incident.

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Counsel to the appellant has submitted that the essential ingredients of the offence of robbery with arm or offensive weapon with which the appellant was charged has not been proved in that the alleged gun was recovered from another person and pw1 did not describe the weapon that was fired during the robbery incident.

Counsel attacked the evidence of pw1 and pw3 for being conflicting and incapable of establishing the fact that an offensive weapon was used in

connection with the alleged robbery incident. He also submitted that pw1 did not identify the appellant with certainty as the person who robbed her on the fateful day.

In her evidence in chief, pw1 did not minched any word that the appellant was the person that dispossessed her of the bag containing recharge cards, money and other sundry items and in the process, he fired a gun shot and later escaped on the waiting motorcycle. At page 42 of the record of appeal, pw1 said:
“I know the accused person on the 25/4/2012 at about 9:30pm, I closed from my shop to go home, I crossed where I parked my car only for me to put the key to open my car. I did not know that mystic (the accused person) was hiding in front of the car.
When I tried to open the car he came out from where he was hiding and said I should give him my bag. I refused. He started struggling. He then pulled a gun from his waist and shot in the air. I refused to release the bag not until the hand of the bag cut. He ran and climbed a standby bike (Okada) that was waiting for him. They zoom off through Anderson Street. In that my bag I had recharge cards of different denomination and

different networks with (six) (N550,000.00) five hundred and fifty thousand naira and a cash of (N250,000.00) Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira, 3 phones 29,500, LG 330, and TE phone and my shop key”.

When cross-examined on the identity of the accused (now appellant), pw1 said:-
“Yes, I know the accused before that day. I was born in 23 Anderson Street Obudu while accused born in 22 Anderson Street, Obudu. The elder sister is my close friend as my school mate. His late brother was like a son to my late mother.”

From the above; it is abundantly clear that the identity of the appellant was never in doubt. It seems to me that counsel to the appellant was under the wrong impression that the warning of Lord Wiggery CJ in R V. JOHNBULL (1976) 3 W.L.R 445 at 447 applies to all cases involving evidence of identification. It is only when the evidence identifying the appellant as the person who took part in the crime is too suspicious to be acceptable, then the said warning because imperative. For avoidance of doubt, the principle is that whenever the case against an accused depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of the

identification of the accused which the defence alleges to be mistaken, the judge should warn the jury of the special regard for caution before convicting the accused in reliance on the correctness of the identification. See ABUDU V. STATE (supra).
In the instant case, pw1 not only identified the appellant but also mentioned his name at the earliest opportunity as the person he had encounter with at the time of the robbery incident. In an answer put to pw1 in the course of cross-examination at page 43 of the record of appeal, she responded thus:-
“I told the police that his name is Mystica”.
Also in his evidence, pw2 corroborated the evidence of pw1 as regards the identity of the appellant wherein he stated at page 47 of the record of appeal that –
“I asked her if she recognized any of the guys that robbed her she said yes. She said she was able to recognize Godsgift Unimke properly called mestica. I asked her if she was sure, she said yes that he was wearing a black long sleeve shirt.”
Thus, the Court would not be wrong if it acts on evidence of identification of an accused where such identification is

spontaneous and natural. Where the evidence of visual identification of an accused person is not destroyed by credible evidence to the contrary, the Court is entitled to accept and act on it. See SEUN V. STATE (2019) 8 NWLR 12 (prt 1673) 144 at 153.
In the instant case, the evidence of pw1 and pw2 are in tandem with one another that the appellant was spontaneously identified as one who took part of the robbery in question. This fact is further strengthened by the discovery of the stolen recharge cards from the appellant within 24 hours after the robbery incident. The provision of Section 167 (a) of the Evidence Act 2011 states in unmistakable terms that where a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. In the present case, the account given by the appellant that he bought the recharge cards from one Jonathan Adie was effectively destroyed by the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution to such extent that it was incapable of any investigative efforts by either the prosecution or the lower Court.

Learned counsel for appellant has attacked the evidence of pw1 and pw3 regarding the weapon allegedly used in the robbery incident, contending that there was no synergy between the two pieces of evidence and thereby creating a yawning gap that ought to have been resolved in favour of the appellant. There is no doubt that the recovered locally made pistol tendered by pw3 and recovered from the house of one Paul Akeke was not linked to the appellant. However, it is not in every case that failure to tender the weapon used in committing an offence or the recovered stolen items would be fatal to the prosecution’s case. The facts and circumstances of each case determine the materiality of that aspect of the evidence. See AJAYI V. STATE (2016)14 NWLR (prt 1532) 196, OLAYINKA V. STATE 92007) 9 NWLR (prt 1040) 561, GBADAMOSI V. STATE (1991) 6 NWLR (prt 196)182 and JATO V. STATE (2019)8 NWLR (prt. 1674) 317 at 327 – 328.
In AYINLA V. STATE (2019) 12 NWLR (prt 1687) 410 at 424 and 425 it was held that there is no law that states that the prosecution must tender the weapons used in the robbery before a case of armed robbery can be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The

circumstances as in this case where the appellant ran away with the weapon made it impossible to tender the weapon. Better still, the evidence led by the prosecution at the trial established beyond reasonable doubt that there was a robbery on 25/4/2012, that it was an armed robbery and that the appellant has participated in the armed robbery.

Learned counsel also made a heavy weather regarding the evidence of pw2 who is a brother to the victim of the robbery. The fact that there is a blood relationship between a victim and the prosecution witness is not sufficient to make the witness a tainted witness whose evidence is unreliable, unless corroborated. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted and I agree with his submission that there is no law that prohibits a relation of the victim of the crime from testifying for the prosecution. See ADELUMOLA V. STATE (1988)1 NWLR (prt 73) 683, OGUONZEE V. STATE (1998) 5 NWLR (prt 551) 521 and IDAGU V. STATE (2018) 15 NWLR (prt. 1641) 127. In the instant case, there is virtually nothing in the evidence of pw2 who is a blood relation to pw1 to show that he had any personal interest or personal purpose to serve as

prosecution witness against the appellant. In the circumstance, issue one is resolved against the appellant.

On issue two, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the failure of the prosecution to make pw3 available for cross-examination left his damaging evidence unchallenged, uncontradicted and untested for its veracity and accuracy. He submitted that such failure breached the appellant’s right to fair trial as enshrined in Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution. Counsel cited the case of KIM V. STATE in contending that once it is established that the constitutional right to fair hearing has been breached in a judicial proceeding, the appellate Court has no alternative but to allow the appeal.

Continuing, he submitted that having mentioned the name of Jonathan Adie at the earliest opportunity as the person who called him to come and buy the recharge cards, it behove on the prosecution to secure the presence of the said Jonathan Adie and the trial Court should have pondered over the possibility that Jonathan Adie and not the appellant might have committed the robbery.

In his reaction, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that

although the record is silent on why pw3 was not cross-examined but the fact that the appellant was represented by counsel and at no point the appellant drew the Court’s attention of the need to cross-examine pw3, such omission cannot affect the prosecution’s case. He submitted that even if his evidence is expunched, the prosecution has made out its case through pw1, pw2 and particularly pw4, the substantive investigating police officer.

the present case was his right to cross-examine pw3 who testified on 15/7/2013 at pages 50 – 51 of the record of appeal. On that date, the appellant was represented by Messrs A. Izabi Undie, Esq. leading Natas Uche, Esq. and M. U. Abah, Esq. At the conclusion of the evidence of pw3, “Izabi – Undie Esq. said that he has an urgent matter to attend to and that he has suggested to his learned friend to oblige him a date subject to the convenience of the Court to cross-examine pw3.” As a result of the concurrence of counsel, the case was adjourned to 30/9/2013 for cross-examination of pw3/continuation of hearing. At the subsequent sittings of the Court, nothing was said about cross-examination of pw3 and the prosecution proceeded with its case by calling pw4, being its last witness. The question here is, was the appellant denied his right to cross-examine pw3 or was it that he chose not to cross-examine pw3? From the surrounding circumstances of the case, the appellant has not demonstrated that he was deprived the right to cross-examine the witness. Where an adversary fails to cross-examine a witness upon a particular matter; the

implication is that he accepts the truth of that mater as led in evidence. See EGBA V. STATE (2019)15 NWLR (prt 1695) 201. Also in BORISHADE V. F.R.N. (supra), it was held that in criminal trials it is not mandatory for the accused to cross-examine the prosecution witness as the failure will not be fatal to the accused’s defence because the burden of proof is on the prosecution.

In the instant case, pw3 merely recovered and tendered a locally made pistol from one Paul Akebke. The said Paul Akebke was neither an accused nor a witness at the trial and the evidence of pw3 in relation to the discovery of the locally made pistol has no evidential value. His evidence cannot benefit the prosecution nor harm the defence in any way. After all, the prosecution is not bound to call a host of witnesses, as a single witness if believed by the Court is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in a capital offence. See OSHO V. STATE (2012) 8 NWLR (prt 1303) 243. I resolved this issue against the appellant.

On issue three, it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that there was a lacuna in the prosecution’s case respecting the recovery of the locally

made pistol from the house of Paul Akebke in the sense he is a total stranger in this case. Learned counsel referred to Exhibit F wherein the appellant said he heard a gunshot when Jonathan Adie was approaching pw1 and thus a wide gap was created as to who fired the gunshot.

On the part of the respondent, learned counsel reiterated his earlier position that whether the locally made pistol recovered was the one used during the robbery or not or the gun used was never recovered at all does not vary the fact that the appellant was armed during the robbery in question. He submitted that the impregnable fact of identification of the appellant by pw1 coupled with his confession and the evidence of recent possession all tied up to the fact that the appellant has committed the offence charged.

In resolving issues one and two above; I have found as a fact that the appellant was duly and properly identified as the person who robbed pw1 and that he was found in possession of the stolen items soon after the theft. In other words, the evidence adduced is sufficient to establish that the appellant is the person who committed the crime. In the circumstances of this

case, the lacuna if any, as to the recovery or use of the locally made pistol has no utilitarian value to the prosecution’s case. An offence of robbery is completed where the accused is armed with any firearms or any offensive weapon or is in company with any person so armed. Issue three is resolved against the appellant.

Finally, on issue four, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant’s extra-judicial statement Exhibit F is a product of question and answer series and that it was obtained through torture. He submitted that the trial Court was in error to have admitted Exhibit F and acted on it.

Learned counsel for the respondent referred copiously to Exhibit F and submitted that no admission of involvement in a crime could be stronger than the admission made by the appellant in Exhibit F stating how he and Jonathan Adie conspired to attack pw1. They set out and executed their plan by robbing her of her valuables after firing a gunshot. He submitted further that the evidence of pw1 was aptly corroborated by pw2 and where it has been shown that the witness knew the accused person before the incident, had spent time

with the accused in the course of the confrontation, and the accused has confessed to the crime, the question of proper identification is settled.

By virtue of Section 28 of the Evidence Act, a confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime. Once an accused person makes a statement under caution stating or admitting the offence charged, then that statement becomes confessional. A confession proves one or all facts that constitute the offence. It also conclusively proves or identifies the accused person as the person who committed the offence. See DOGO V. STATE (2013)10 NWLR (prt 1361) 160 IGBINOVIA V. STATE (1981)2 SC 5 and OPEYEMI V. STATE (2019)17 NWLR (prt 1702) 403.

The appellant in this case had challenged the voluntariness of his statement and the trial Court conducted trial within trial and thereafter admitted the appellant’s statement as Exhibit F. Thus, trial within trial is a mini trial within a trial to ascertain the admissibility of the confessional statement of an accused. Where the decision of a trial Court in a trial within trial is

challenged, the duty of the appellate Court is to look at the evidence led and ascertains whether the conclusion of the trial Court on the confessional statement is correct. In order to ascertain whether the conclusion of the trial Court is correct, the appellate Court will look at the finding of facts made by the trial Court before reaching a conclusion on whether the finding is wrong. See BORISHADE V. F.R.N. (supra).
In the instant case, the appellant never appealed against the ruling of the trial Court on the said trial within trial, nonetheless, I have looked at the findings on the trial within trial vis-a-vis the evidence put forward by the prosecution and found same to be strong and compelling as to the possibility of the accused (now appellant) committing the alleged offence. The learned trial judge was therefore right when he found at page 81 of the record of appeal that:-
“Having found and held that the statement of the accused person was not obtained through question and answers that the accused was not beaten to make the statement and that the prosecution choose to tender one statement instead of the 2 statements, I am of the

view that the accused statement having confirm (sic) with all the necessary fundamental of a valid police statement, I hereby find and hold that the prosecution has proved that the accused made his statement in Calabar SAR’s office voluntarily.”

On the appellant’s contention that the confessional statement Exhibit F was obtained through a question and answer series; there is nothing in law that makes a statement inadmissible because it was obtained by questioning the accused person.HAMZA V. STATE (2019) 16 NWLR (prt 1699) 418 at 435.

As in the case of the voluntariness of the appellant’s statement, learned counsel also made an issue out of the signature on Exhibit F. Ordinarily, issues pertaining to correctness of the statement as recorded or the signature or thumb impression are question of fact to be decided by the trial Court. In the instant case, the issue of the appellant’s signature was tied to the issue of voluntariness of the said statement which the trial Court found to be voluntary and which finding I also endorsed based upon careful perusal of the record. Issue four is also resolved against the

appellant.

Resultantly, the appeal fail and it is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the lower Court delivered on 3rd October, 2014 is hereby affirmed.

MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the Judgment by my learned brother Muhammed Lawal Shuaibu, JCA.

My learned brother adequately dealt with the four (4) issues nominated for the determination of the appeal. In particular he upheld the legal effect of a free and voluntary statement made by an accused person in the determination of guilt in the criminal process. This, in recognition of the fact that confession of an accused person to the commission of a crime plays a major part in the determination of his guilt and that a Court of law is entitled to convict on the confession if it comes to the conclusion that the confession is voluntary as in the instant case. This is because the confession itself puts an end to the rough and speculative edges of criminal responsibility in terms of mens and actus reus.
For this reason and the detail reasons given in the lead judgment, I also dismiss the appeal.

HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, J.C.A.: The judgment of my learned

brother, Muhammed L. Shuaibu, JCA, was made available to me in draft before now.
I agree with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at. I also dismiss the appeal as lacking in merit.

Appearances:

M. Anana (HB of Dan. O. Kalo, Esq.) For Appellant(s)

John U. Ogbam, Director, MOJ, CRS For Respondent(s)