LIGALI ADUNBI v. THE STATE
(2018)LCN/11906(CA)
(2018) LPELR-45005(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 11th day of July, 2018
CA/L/70C/2016
RATIO
EVIDENCE: VOLUNTARINESS OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
“It is trite that the time to raise objection to the voluntariness of a confessional statement to the police is when it is sought to be tendered in evidence in which case a trial-within-trial would be conducted at that stage to determine the voluntariness of the statement. A challenge to such confessional statement on ground of voluntariness raised at defence stage, as in this case, was belatedly raised and did not affect the admissibility in evidence of the statements, Exhibits A3 and A5 vide F.R.N. v. Iweka (2013) 3 NWLR (pt.1341) 285 at 332” PER JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A
Before Their Lordships
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBAJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGHJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPARJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
LIGALI ADUNBI – Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE – Respondent(s)
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
The appeal is from the judgment of the High Court of Justice of Lagos State (the Court below) by which it convicted and sentenced the appellant to death for causing the death of one Sube Adunbi, his mother, by strangulation, contrary to Section 319 of the Criminal Code Law of Lagos State, 2003.
The case of the respondent, in outline, was that the appellant killed his mother by strangulation on the fateful day stated in the charge sheet for bewitching him and not helping him in life. On the other hand, the appellant’s case was that his late mother who was a drunk came back drunk while he was fighting with his motor-vehicle conductor over disagreement on missing money and she went between them to separate the fight in the course of which she fell down and started gasping and eventually died on the same day. The main defence of the appellant was accident.
The Court below believed and accepted the version of the respondent and disbelieved the defence of accident upon which it convicted and sentenced the appellant to death as charged.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court below the appellant filed a notice of appeal with two grounds of appeal which was subsequently amended with the leave of the Court and the amended notice of appeal filed on 26.02.18, but deemed as properly filed on 01-03-18.
The brief of argument prepared on behalf of the appellant and filed on 26.02.18, but deemed as properly filed on 01.03.18, contended that the record of appeal (the record) which is binding on the Court and the parties did not specify whether the charge was read and explained to the understanding of the appellant before the Court below recorded in page 32 thereof that the appellant elected to speak Yoruba and pleaded not guilty to the charge, therefore there was no proper arraignment of the appellant which rendered his trial a nullity vide Section 211 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law (ACJL) No.10 of 2007 Laws of Lagos State, Olowoyo v. The State (2012) 17 NWLR (pt.1329) 346 at 370, Omokuwajo v. F.R.N. (2013) 9 NWLR (pt.1359) 300 at 331, Alake v. The State (1991) 7 NWLR (pt.205) 589, Okeke v. The State (2003) 15 NWLR (pt.842) 25 at 73 ??? 74, Kajubo v. State (1988) 1 NWLR (pt.73) 721, Mohammed v. The State (2013) 5 NWLR (pt.1347) at 324 325, Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).
The appellant contended that the ingredients of the offence of murder comprise that the deceased had died; the death of the deceased was caused by the accused; and that the act or omission of the accused which caused the death of the deceased was intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence vide Gira v. The State (1996) 4 NWLR (pt.443) 375, Nwaeze v. The State (1996) 4 NWLR (pt.143) 375, Ajose v. State (2002) 7 NWLR (pt.766) 319.
According to the contention of the appellant these ingredients of the offence of murder were not proved beyond reasonable doubt in that there was no medical or autopsy report of the death of the deceased, nor did the investigation police officer, PW1, who gave evidence visit the graveyard or grave-site of the deceased to confirm the death of the deceased, nor was it established by the respondent that the appellant was responsible for the death of the deceased, therefore the Court below was wrong in holding that the deceased died of strangulation by the appellant vide Nwachukwu v. State (2000) 12 NWLR (pt.680) 144, Ben v. State (2005) 11 NWLR (pt.936) 346, Uguru v. State (2002) 9 NWLR (pt.771) 107, Onuoha v. State (2002) 1 NWLR (pt.748) 424, Oforlete v. State (2000) 12 NWLR (pt.681) 442, Igabele v. State (2004) 15 NWLR (pt.896) 336.
The appellant contended that the Court below based its decision entirely on Exhibit A4, the purported confessional statement of the appellant, when it was involuntarily made as stated by the appellant in his unchallenged testimony on the matter without the respondent proving its voluntariness; nor did the Court below test the purported confessional statement whether there was anything outside it to show that it is true, whether it is corroborated, whether the appellant had the opportunity of committing the offence, whether the facts stated in it are true as far as can be tested, whether the confession is possible and whether the confession is consistent with the facts ascertained and proved at the trial before attaching weight to it.
Consequently, it was contended by the appellant that the Court below was wrong in convicting him on Exhibit A, the purported confessional statement; more so, the other pieces of evidence are hearsay and of no evidential value; upon which the appellant advocated for the appeal to be allowed and the decision of the Court below set aside vide Borishade v. State (2012) 18 NWLR (pt.1337) 395, Oforlete v. State (2000) 12 NWLR (pt.681) 442, Agboola v. State (2013) 11 NWLR 646, State v. Ajie (2000) 11 NWLR (pt.678) 450, Ogoala v. State (1991) 2 NWLR (pt.175) 509, Ajose v. State (2002) 7 NWLR (pt.766) 319, Ajiboye v. State (1994) 8 NWLR (pt.364) 600, Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2005) 18 NWLR (pt.956) 166, James v. Nigerian Air Force (2000) 13 NWLR (pt.684) 422.
The respondent’s brief of argument filed on 30.04.18, but deemed as properly filed on 03.05-.18, contended that the arraignment of the appellant complied with Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Section 211 of the ACJL 2011 of Lagos State which is at par with Section 211 of ACJL 2007 and that arraignment as recorded in page 32 of the record was held to be correct and proper by the Supreme Court in the case of Olabode v. The State (2009) 5 NWLR 315 of 319 – 321 following Ogunye v. The State (1999) 5 NWLR (pt. 604) 548 at 567.
The respondent also contended that the Court below is deemed to have complied with the necessary pre-requisites of proper arraignment under the presumption of regularity of official and judicial acts vide Section 150 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011, Torri v. The National Park Service of Nigeria (2011) LPELR 8142, Okeke v. The State (2003) FWLR (pt. 159) 1381 at 1443.
The respondent contended that a criminal case may be proved by confessional statement or circumstantial evidence or by direct evidence vide Okoh v. The State (2008) LPELR CA/A/185C/06; that in the case, the PW1, police investigator of the case, gave evidence of information he gathered while investigating the case which is direct evidence vide Osuoha v. The State (2010) 16 NWLR (pt. 1219) 364 at 400.
It was also argued that there is no law requiring the tendering of the weapon used in the commission of an offence vide Kabaka v. State (2010) LPELR 4303 (CA).
It was further argued that the ingredients of the offence of murder is that the deceased died by the act or omission of the defendant which act or omission was done with intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm and that the defendant knew that death or grievous bodily harm was a probable consequence of his act or omission vide Assah v. The State (2015) LPELR 25586 (CA) which, according to the contention of the respondent, was established beyond reasonable doubt in that the appellant himself testified at the Court below that his mother was dead and buried immediately in accordance with Muslim rites thus removing any possibility of a post-mortem examination.
The respondent contended that the confessional statements, Exhibits A3, A4 and A5, were admitted in evidence without objection and that it was at defence stage of the case that the appellant raised the involuntariness of the confessional statement which was belated, therefore the Court below was right in convicting the appellant on the confessional statements, notwithstanding the appellant retracted the confession vide Solola and Anor. v. The State (2005) 2 NWLR (pt. 937) 460, Alarape and Ors. v. The State (2001) 5 NWLR (pt, 705) 79 at 100, Afolalu v. State (2009) 3 NWLR (pt.1127) 161 at 193, Obisi v. Chief of Naval Staff (2004) 11 NWLR (pt. 885) 482, Ubierho v. State (2005) 5 NWLR (pt. 919) 644.
The respondent contended that the confessional statement, Exhibits A3, A4 and A5, is direct, positive and unequivocal admission of the offence charged; that the decision of the Court below convicting the appellant on it reasonable; that the evidence not being perverse should not be disturbed; and that the appeal should be dismissed and the decision of the Court below affirmed vide Akpan v. State (1994) 9 NWLR (pt. 368) (no pagination), Omoregie v. The State (2008) 12 S.C. (pt. 111) 80, Ade v. The State (2008) 13 NWLR (pt. 1103) 149, Ogoala v. The State (1991) 2 NWLR (pt. 175) 509, Olalekan v. The State (2001) 18 NWLR (pt. 746) 793 at 824.
Pages 32 of the record contains the arraignment of the appellant thus-
Defendant Present
Appearance: Mrs. R. T. Oluwole Deputy Director of Prosecution
Mrs. C. R. Odutola with Mrs. B. O. Pearse
Mrs. Akinlosin O.P.D. for the Defendant
COURT: Please serve her a copy of the P/W.
Mrs. Oluwole DPP: I apply for the arraignment.
ARRAIGNMENT
Defendant elects to speak in Yoruba and pleads not guilty.
The appellant was represented by counsel at the time of his arraignment (supra). Counsel did not protest that the charge was not read and explained to the appellant before his plea was taken; nor did the appellant protest the charge was not read and explained to him in the language he understood. The plea itself was one of not guilty. Proceedings commenced thereafter with evidence taken from the respondent’s witness and cross-examined upon by the appellant and evidence from the appellant also taken and cross-examined upon by the respondent before judgment was pronounced in the case based on the evidence.
The presumption under Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 (Evidence Act) that official or judicial acts are regularly done enured to the taking of the plea (supra) as there is no suggestion in the record that the appellant’s plea was taken without the charge read and explained to him.
Moreover, the conviction was not based on the plea, nor does evidence exist showing the appellant was misled by the procedure (supra) as to occasion a substantial miscarriage of justice vide the proviso to Section 19(1) of the Court of Appeal Act 2004. See also Udeh v. The State (1999) 7 NWLR (pt.609) 1 at 23 ??? 24 thus :
”It is no where suggested that the charge was never read to the appellant or that he did not understand the same before he pleaded thereto. At all events, there is the provision of Section 150(1) of the Evidence Act which stipulates thus –
“When any judicial or official act is shown to have been done in a manner substantially regular, it is presumed that formal requisites for its validity were complied with.”
The arraignment of the appellant was both a judicial and an official act and having been executed in a manner which was substantially regular, the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite et soleniniter esse acta donee probetur in contrarium upon which is presumed that judicial and official acts have been done rightly and regularly until the contrary is proved becomes fully applicable. See Peter Locknan and Another v. The State (1972) 5 S.C. 22 and James Edun and others v. I. G. of Police (1966) 1 All NLR 17 at 21. In the face of the above, it seems to me that the application of this presumption is sufficient to resolve the 1st issue in favour of the respondent…
Finally on the issue of arraignment, the law is well settled that where, as in the present case, irregularity has been alleged in a trial, the burden is on the appellant to establish that the alleged irregularity has led to a substantial miscarriage of justice. Where the appellant does not show that the presumption of irregularity has led to a miscarriage of justice, it will be assumed that there was none. See Peter Locknan and Another v. The State (supra). As I have already observed, no irregularity has, in my judgment, been established in this case. And even if the appellant’s complaint is otherwise well founded, and I do not so hold, no substantial miscarriage of justice was established to have been occasioned thereby. I find that no irregularity has been established by the appellant in this case. I entertain no doubt that the arraignment of the appellant is without fault and is clearly valid.”
See further Ogunye and Ors. v. State (1999) 5 NWLR (pt.604) 548 at 567 ??? 569, Kalu v. State (1998) 13 NWLR (pt.583) 531 at 617, Olabode v. State (2009) 11 NWLR (pt.1152) 254 at 267 – 269.
The English version of the confessional statement of the appellant, Exhibit A3, (unedited) reads:
”I am a native of Osuke town in Awori Area of Ogun State. I did not attend any (formal) schooling since I was born. My mother’s name is Sube Adubi. My father’s name is Chief Akintola Asero Adubi. I am a professional driver and I drive commercial buses. I live at Odo-Ogun village along Ikorodu road, Lagos.
It was around one o’clock (a.m.) in the morning on the 09th/05/2005, that a man I know simply as ‘Baba Monday’came to my room where I live. He woke me up from my sleep. When I got up he brought out a fetish gourd and placed it on the floor and put his leg on it and also asked me to also put my leg in his own and he now told me that he wanted to send me on an errand and I must not refused to deliver the errand. After this he now gave from the bowl of food that he was holding and when we finished eating he now put some fetish medicine in his mouth and commanded me that he wanted to send me to my own mother. He then gave me a shoestring. He then commanded me to tie it to my mother’s neck and draw it tight until she dies.
I now went to the backyard and I saw my mother there. Then ‘Baba Monday’ told my mother to come and sit down on the bench but before my mother sat on the bench ‘Baba Monday’ used some medicine to rub on the bench and when my mother sat down she cannot speak again. I then put the shoes string round her neck and I draw it tight until she died. When my mother died then ‘Baba Monday’ then used a fetish medicine to command me that I should go back to sleep in my room and that I must not tell anybody and that if I should tell anybody I will die immediately.
After this I went back to my room and slept off but in the morning I was woken up from my sleep by my sister Kadija who told me that our mother is dead. There is a misunderstand between me and ‘Baba Monday’ previously. We disagreed with each other because of the canoe that we use to ferry passengers when ‘Baba Monday’ started to curse me and because of this I broke the car that he used to row the boat into pieces. Truthfully, I am the one that killed my mother but it was ‘Baba Monday’ that cursed me that I will kill my mother.
The other confessional statement of the appellant in Exhibit A5 (unedited) reads –
I, Ligali Adubi (m) having being duly cautioned in English language that I am not obliged to say anything unless I wish to do so. But whatever I say shall be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence.
I was born about 20 years ago to the family of Mr. & Mrs. Adubi of Odogun in Ikorodu Awori area of Ogun State. I did not attend any formal education. I am a commercial bus driver. I live at Odo-Ogun village in Ikorodu, Lagos. Sometimes in the month of April 2005, one Mr. Rasaki gave me one commercial bus to drive and just after two days the owner took the vehicle from me and I was not happy. I immediately informed my mother Mrs. Sube Adubi ”f” and she did not say anything.
I also recalled how one Sunday (m) handed over to me one Danfo bus to drive and within five days he took the vehicle away from me, and things has been so difficult with me because of all this things I then suspect my mother to be witch-ward and the person behind my problems. It was base on this I decided to killed my mother by tiding her neck with rob until she died. I decided to implicate one Baba Monday because I had quarrel with the man. Nobody asked me to kill my mother. I killed her on my own because she did not help me.
The appellant’s statements to the police (supra) were admitted in evidence without objection as Exhibits A3 and A5 vide page 40 of the record. The voluntariness of the statements were not challenged by the appellant at the time they were tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibits. The voluntariness of the statements was attacked by the appellant for the first time in his evidence in defence in pages 48, 49, 50 and 52 of the record that he was beaten seriously by the police before he was forced to sign the statements.
It is trite that the time to raise objection to the voluntariness of a confessional statement to the police is when it is sought to be tendered in evidence in which case a trial-within-trial would be conducted at that stage to determine the voluntariness of the statement. A challenge to such confessional statement on ground of voluntariness raised at defence stage, as in this case, was belatedly raised and did not affect the admissibility in evidence of the statements, Exhibits A3 and A5 vide F.R.N. v. Iweka (2013) 3 NWLR (pt.1341) 285 at 332 thus:
”At the risk of repetition but for emphasis, the law is trite that the voluntariness of a confessional statement can only be contested when it is about to be tendered in evidence. That is the appropriate time to raise the involuntariness or otherwise of a confessional statement. Where as in this case the respondent, was represented by counsel, it is assumed he ought to know what to do at each stage of proceedings. The Respondent failed to raise such objection. She cannot on appeal complain of absence of trial within trial. See Nwachukwu v. The State (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 902) 262 at 273; Oche v. The State (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1027) 214 at 219; Okoro v. The State (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 282) 425.
Since the essence of a trial-within-trial is to inter alia, decide whether or not to uphold an objection to the admissibility of a confessional statement, a retraction of an already admitted confessional statement cannot necessitate a trial-within-trial. To do so will be to take steps towards asking the Court to re-decide, reconsider and re-determine the admissibility of a document already admitted and marked as Exhibit, thereby creating a vicious circle. The law is trite that once a Court has taken their decision on an issue, it stands unless that decision is found to be perverse. It is a commendable path treaded by the trial Court. It averted the ominous consequence of holding in one breath that exhibit 2A having been admitted is not now admissible simply because it was belatedly retracted for no good cause. This is in tandem with the settled principle of law that a Court cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time”. See also Afolalu v. State (supra).
The Court below considered the retracted confessional statements in its judgment in pages 102 – 105 of the record and was satisfied that the confessional statements met the five recognized requirements (a) whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true;
(b) whether the statement is corroborated, no matter how slight;
(c) whether the facts contained therein, so far as can be tested, are true;
(d) whether the accused had the opportunity of committing the offence; and,
(e) whether the confession was consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved in the matter before it attached weight to the confessional statements.
The Court below also noted in its judgment in pages 104 – 105 of the record, in particular, that the appellant was the last to see the deceased alive and confessed to the police that he killed the deceased with whom the appellant was bitter for bewitching him and standing in his way of progress.
These findings therefore justified the Court below in attaching probative value or weight to the confessional statements which it found direct, positive and unequivocal and properly proved; more so, the appellant testified in pages 46 – 47 of the record that the deceased died within the same day of the encounter and was buried in his presence in their village thus giving corroborative evidence outside the confession confirming the death of the deceased, and I respectfully so hold.
That a conviction can be based solely on a confessional statement after the Court had properly assured itself of the probative value of the confession as in this case is no longer in doubt vide Essien v. State (2018) 6 NWLR (pt.1614) 167 at 175 per the lead judgment prepared by his lordship M. D. Muhammad, J.S.C., thus :
” I agree with learned appellant’s counsel that by virtue of a chain of decisions of this Court, see R v. Sykes (supra), Dawa v. State (supra) and Ikpasa v. State (supra), it is desirable to base the appellant’s conviction on further evidence outside his confession, the requirement of such corroborative evidence is however not mandatory. The principle still is that the Court, where the confession is direct, positive and unequivocal and properly proved, may convict an accused solely on such a confession. As learned respondent’s counsel rightly submitted, there is no evidence stronger than a person’s admission of the state of affairs: see Stephen v. State (supra), (1986) 5 NWLR (pt.46) 978, Oguonzee v. State (supra) and Ogoala v. State (1991) 2 NWLR (pt.175) 509”.
See also Oseni v. State (2012) 5 NWLR (pt.1293) 351, Hassan v. State (2017) 5 NWLR (pt.1557) 1, Fatai v. State (2013) 10 NWLR (pt.1361) 1 at 17 – 18, 20, Igba v. State (2018) 6 NWLR (pt.1614) 44 at 56 and 58.
The evidence of the appellant retracting the confession and advancing the defence of accident would not devalue or diminish the potency of the confession as in such case the confession is preferred to the subsequent evidence retracting it on the ground that the evidence is an afterthought vide the case of Egboghonome v. State (1993) 7 NWLR (pt.306) 383 where the Supreme Court sitting as a Full Court held to the effect that where an accused retracts his confessional statement the Court may still convict on the retracted statement which was made voluntarily and is positive, direct and unequivocal taking into consideration evidence outside the confessional statement which will make it probable that the confession is true. See also Igba v. State (supra) at 58 – 59.
The appellant admitted the death of the deceased in both his confessional statements, Exhibits A3 and A5 (supra), and part of his evidence where he testified that the deceased died on the same day of the incident and was later buried in his presence in their village. The appellant also confessed in his statements to the police that he strangled the deceased to death with a shoestring or rope on the same day thus making it unnecessary to tender medical evidence in proof of death and the cause of death of the deceased as the cause of death (strangulation) was obvious in the case vide Bamidele Patrick v. The State, unreported Appeal No. SC.384/2013 delivered by the Supreme Court on 23-02-18 per the lead judgment prepared by his lordship, Augie, J.S.C., inter alia thus:
”The law says that where cause of death is obvious, medical evidence ceases to be of any practical or legal necessity.”
See also Igba v. State (supra) at 68 following Ben v. State (2006) 16 NWLR (pt.1006) 582.
The appellant admitted in his confessional statements to the police that he strangled his mother, the deceased, to death using a rope which he tied round her neck showing there was no dispute on the murder weapon which obviated the tendering of same in evidence; more so, it is not mandatory to tender in evidence the weapon used in committing an offence unless the defence makes it an issue in evidence in the case at the Court of trial which was not the case here vide Babarinde v. State (2014) All FWLR (pt.717) 606, Attah v. State (2009) 15 NWLR (pt.1164) 284, Garba v. State (2000) 6 NWLR (pt.661) 378, Victor v. State (2014) All FWLR (pt.719) 1092.
Having established beyond reasonable doubt by the positive, direct and unequivocal confessional statements that the appellant murdered the deceased, his mother (matricide) in cold-blood by strangulation, the respondent proved all the ingredients of the offence of murder as charged to the effect that the deceased died; that the death of the deceased was caused by the act of the appellant; and that the act of the appellant which caused the death of the deceased was intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence vide Igba v. State (supra) following Haruna v. A.-G., Federation (2012) 9 NWLR (pt.984) 152 and the cases (supra) cited by both learned counsel on the elements of the offence of murder. The Court below was therefore right in convicting and sentencing the appellant to death for murdering the deceased, his mother.
Accordingly, I find no substance in the appeal and hereby dismiss it and affirm the decision of the Court below convicting and sentencing the appellant to death by hanging for murdering the deceased, his mother.
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.: My learned brother Joseph Shagbaor Ikyegh, JCA has succinctly considered the vital issues that require determination in this appeal in his lead judgement, which I read in draft.
The crucial issues are whether the arraignment of the Appellant was proper and valid and whether the High Court was right that the Respondent had proved the offences of murder against the Appellant as required by law; beyond reasonable doubt. As very ably demonstrated in the lead judgement, the essence of an arraignment of accused person charged with the commission of a criminal offence is for him to be formally notified or informed in the language he understands, of the nature and essential details of the offence/s he is alleged to have committed before and by the Court so as to provide him the opportunity to understand the offence/s and make a plea thereto. Once an accused person appears physically before a Court and the nature and material details of the offence/s he was charged with before the Court are read and explained to him and he freely pleads to the offence/s, absence of record to that effect from the proceedings of the Court or failure to record that the charge was read and explained to the accused person and he pleaded thereto, would not affect the validity of the arraignment. Solola v. State (2005) 11 NWLR (937) 460. Udo v. State (2005) 8 NWLR (928) 521. Olabode V. State (2009) 11 NWLR (1152) 254 cited in the lead judgement. Madu v.State (2012) 15 NWLR (1324) 405
Where, as in the Appellant’s case, an accused person was represented by Counsel at the time of the arraignment and he did not contest or challenge any aspect of the arraignment, the presumption would be that all requirements of the law for a valid arraignment have been fully or at least, substantially complied with in line with the provisions of Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 (Section 150 of 2004 Act), as shown in the lead judgment. Absence of the record that the charge was read and explained to the Appellant in the language he understands, that he clearly understood the nature of the offence he was charged with, that the Lower Court was satisfied on that fact and that he freely pleaded to the charge before recording the plea, from the record of proceedings of the arraignment, does not affect the validity of the arraignment.
I agree that the arraignment was valid in law.
On the confessional statement by the Appellant which Counsel attempted to challenge the admissibility of at the defence stage. I should emphasize that the attempt was belated in law, as shown in the lead judgment. See Oseni v. State (2011)6 NWLR (1242) 138. Osung v. State (2012) 18 NWLR (1332)256. Nwokearu v. State (2010) 15 NWLR (1215) 1.
I have read the judgment by the High Court and agree that even though the Appellant’s admission of the commission of the offence he was charged with in the confessional statement does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proof; See Igabele v.State (2006) 6 NWLR (975) 100, Adekoya v. State (2012)9 NWLR (1306)539, the confessional statement was proved as required by law and was alone sufficient to ground the conviction of the Appellant for the offence he was charged with. Isah V. State (2010) 16 NWLR (1218) 132, Adebayo v. A.G. Ogun State (2008) 7 NWLR (1085)201, State v. Isah (2012) 16 NWLR (1327) 613, Dele v. State (2011) 1 NWLR (1229) 508.
Overall, I completely agree with the lead judgment that the appeal is bereft of merit and join in dismissing it in the terms thereof.
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.: My learned brother, JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, JCA gave me the opportunity of reading in advance the judgment just delivered. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion arrived in the lead judgment. I have nothing more to add.
I too dismiss the appeal and abide by the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.
Appearances:
J. O. Aladesanmi, Esq.For Appellant(s)
Mr. Y. A. Sule (P.S.C. Ministry of Justice, Lagos State)For Respondent(s)
