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LASU & ANOR v. GANIYU (2022)

LASU & ANOR v. GANIYU

(2022)LCN/17020(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, January 20, 2022

CA/L/406/2008

Before Our Lordships:

Obande Festus Ogbuinya Justice of the Court of Appeal

Muhammad Ibrahim Sirajo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Adebukunola Adeoti Ibironke Banjoko Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. LAGOS STATE UNIVERSITY 2. MARSHALL FEMI ADEYINKA APPELANT(S)

And

TAIWO ADEGBOYEGA GANIYU RESPONDENT(S)

 

RATIO

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF JURISDICTION

In an abiding loyalty to the dictate of the law, I will attend to issue one first. The plinth of the issue is submissive to easy appreciation. It queries the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the respondent’s application/suit which parented the appeal. The law compels the Courts to accord premier attention to issue of jurisdiction, which is numero uno in adjudication, when raised in any proceedings, see Okwu v. Umeh (2016) NWLR (Pt. 1501) 120; Brittania-U (Nig.) Ltd. v. Seplat Pet. Co. Dev. Ltd. (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt.1503) 541; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; PDP v. Umeh (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1579); APC v. Nduul (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1602) 1; Adama v. Maigari (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1658) 26; APC v. Lere (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1705) 254. The reason the law, in its wisdom, insists on prime consideration of jurisdictional issue is obvious. Where a Court is drained of the jurisdiction to entertain a matter, the proceeding germinating from it, no matter the quantum of diligence, dexterity, artistry, sophistry, transparency and objectivity injected into it, will be trapped in the intractable web of nullity, see Elugbe v. Omokhafe (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 319; Lokpobiri v. Ogola (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1499) 328; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 144; Isah v. INEC (2016)18 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 175. Hence, I will obey this legal commandment so as not to insult the law. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW ON WHEN A COURT VESTED WITH JURISDICTION CAN HEAR A MATTER

​Jurisdiction, a mantra in adjudication, connotes the authority/power of a Court to determine a dispute submitted to it by contending parties in any proceeding, see Ajomale v. Yaduat (No. 1) (1991) 5 SCNJ 172; Mobil Pro. Co. Untltd. v. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1; Ndaeyo v. Ogunnaya (1977) 1 IM SLR 300; Ebhodagbe v. Okoye (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 472; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 144; A.-G., Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017)1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 210; Isah v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 175; Angadi v. PDP (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 1; Nduul v. Wayo (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1646) 548.

A Court of law is invested with jurisdiction to hear a matter when: “1. it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and 2. the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and 3. the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction”, seeMadukolu v. Nkemdilim (2006) 2 LC 2081961) NSCC (vol. 2) 374 at 379, per Bairamian F. J., Tukur v. Taraba State (1997) 6 SCNJ 81; Dairo v. UBN (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1029) 164; Okereke v. Yar’Adua (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100); Saraki v. FRN (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc. (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1549) 282; Bello v. Damisa (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1550) 455; Osi v. Accord Party (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1553) 387; Nworika v. Ononeze-Madu (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1672) 422; Adeleke v. Oyetola (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1721) 440. The three ingredients must co-exist in order to infuse jurisdiction into a Court. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A CLAIMANT’S  STATEMENT OF CLAIM AND RELIEFS DETERMINES THE JURISDICTION OF A COURT

Nota bene, the case-law has endorsed in toto a statement of claim as the major yardstick to be used by the Court to measure the presence or absence of its jurisdiction, see Ikine v. Edjerode (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446; A.D.H. Ltd. v. A.T. Ltd. (2006) NWLR (Pt. 989) 635; Oni v. Cadbury (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 87; B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Yar’adua v. Yandoma (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 213; Akpamgbo-Okadigbo v. Chidi (No. 2) (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 124; Isah v. INEC (supra); Lau v. PDP (supra); Azubuogu v. Oranezi (supra); Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386; A.-G, Fed. v. A.-G., Anambra State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 314; Roe Ltd. v. UNN (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 420; F.U.T., Minna v. Olutayo (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 176; A.-G., Lagos State v. Eko Hotels (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 518. In an action commenced by dint of originating summons/motion, as in the case that mothered the appeal, the affidavit in support serves as the statement of claim, see Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28; PDP v. Ezeonwuka (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 187; Lau v. PDP (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 60; Owuru v. Adigwu (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 1; CBN v. Aribo (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 130.
That is not all. In the eyes of the law, relief, too, is one of the determinants of jurisdiction of Court, see Onwudiwe v. FRN (2006) 10 NWLR (Pt. 988) 382; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114; PDP v. Oranezi (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 245; Gbileve v. Addingi (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1433) 394; Wambai v. Donatus (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 223; Emeka v. Chuba-Ikpeazu (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 345; Cocacola (Nig.) Ltd. v. Akinsanya (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1593) 74; Dec Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Shell (Nig.) Gas Ltd. (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1692) 273. I will bear in mind these legal parameters as the barometer to measure the propriety or otherwise of the lower Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the respondent’s suit. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal probes into the correctness of the decision of the High Court of Lagos, Lagos Division (hereinafter addressed as “the lower Court”), coram judice: O.A. Adefope-Okojie, J. (now JCA), in Suit No. M/239/2006, delivered on 20th November, 2006. Before the lower Court, the appellants and the respondent were the defendants/respondents and applicant respectively.

The facts of the case, which transformed into the appeal, are amenable to brevity and simplicity. The respondent was a driver of a commercial toyota bus with registration number XF 163 EKY. On 10th March, 2006, the respondent was fixing his tyre at a vulcaniser’s workshop in front of the premises of the first appellant. In the course of that, the armed security outfit of the first respondent (campus marshalls), led by the second respondent, came and arrested him. The allegation against him was that his bus was one of the vehicles used by the students for their protest action against the first appellant on 9th March, 2006. The armed marshalls beat, tortured, chained, handcuffed and detained the respondent. They forced him, at gun point, to admit, in writing, that he worked on 9th March, 2006 and a written apology for that. They paraded him, like a common criminal, through the highway. They took him to the P.P.L. Police Station where the police officers ordered them to release him but they refused. They seized and detained the respondent’s commercial toyota bus which caused untold hardships on him and members of his family. They continued to detain the toyota bus despite repeated demands for its release. Sequel to these, the respondent beseeched the lower Court, via an application filed on 31st May, 2006, under the fundamental right procedure, and tabled against the appellants the following reliefs:
a. A DECLARATION that the arrest, detention, torture, inhuman treatment of the Applicant by the Lagos State University marshals, a Security Department of LAGOS STATE UNIVERSITY OJO, in 10/03/2006 is unlawful, illegal and unconstitutional as same violate the Applicant’s Fundamental Right to personal liberty, human dignity as guaranteed by Sections 34 and 35 of the Constitution of the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1999 and the AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES (RATIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT) ACT 1990.

b. A DECLARATION that the seizure and continued detention of the Applicant’s vehicle (a bus with Registration No. ZF163 EKY), his only means of livelihood, since 10/03/2006 is unlawful, illegal and unconstitutional as same violate the Applicant’s Fundamental Right to personal liberty and Property as guaranteed by the Sections 35 and 44 of Constitution of Federal Republic of NIGERIA 1999 and the AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES RIGTH (RATIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT) ACT 1990.

c. AN ORDER directing the Respondents to immediately release from their custody, the Applicant’s bus (Registration No. XF163 EKY) to the Applicant.
d. AN ORDER directing the Respondents to immediately return the sum of N2,100.00, Driver’s Identity Card, Driver’s License, Reader Library Identity Card being items unlawfully confiscated from the Appellant on 10/03/2006.
e. AN ORDER directing the Respondents to pay to the Applicant the sum of N1,000,000.00 as damages to the Applicant for:
i. The torture and inhuman treatment of the Applicant by the Respondents.
ii. Special damages for Loss of earning at N7,000 per day. Startlingly, the appellants filed no process (counter-affidavit) in response to the suit despite the service of all the processes on them.

On 20th November, 2006, the lower Court heard the application. In a judgment delivered that day, 20th November, 2006, found at pages 66 and 67 of the record, the lower Court granted the respondent’s application.

The appellants were dissatisfied with the decision. Hence, on 30th January, 2008, the appellants, after obtaining an extension of time to appeal against the judgment from this Court, lodged a 5-ground notice of appeal, copied at pages 68-72 of the record, wherein they prayed this Court for:
An order allowing this appeal, setting aside the judgment of the lower Court and dismissing the application for fundamental rights.

Thereafter, the appellants filed their brief of argument in line with procedure for doing so in this Court. The respondent, despite the service of process on him, filed no brief of argument. The appeal was heard on 28th October, 2021.

​During its hearing, learned appellants’ counsel, U.F. Muhammad, Esq., adopted the appellants’ brief of argument, filed on 28th July, 2008, as representing his arguments for the appeal. He urged the Court to allow it. The respondent, despite service on him, was unrepresented and filed no brief of argument.

In the appellants’ brief of argument, learned counsel crafted three issues for determination, to wit:
1. Whether the Conditions precedent to the grant of the prayer for Fundamental Human Rights are fulfilled and the Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain same?
2. Whether the Respondent is not bound and did prove he is the owner of the Vehicle with registration No. XF 163 EKY and the learned trial judge is right when he held that Respondent is entitled to N300,000.00 damages when the Respondent failed to prove that he suffered or is entitled to any damage?
3. Whether having regard to the facts placed before the Court by the Respondent the learned trial judge was right to order the immediate return of the ignition and battery?

Arguments on the issues.
Issue one:
Learned appellants’ counsel submitted that it is only the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules (FREPR) and no other can be used to enforce, breach of fundamental rights. He relied on Chukwuogor v. Chukwuogor (2006) 7 NWLR (Pt. 979) 302. He posited that where the main claim is not on enforcement of fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be properly exercised. He cited Military Governor of Benue State v. Abayillo (2004) FWLR (Pt. 45) 602; Tukur v. Govt., of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549; Borno Radio Television Corp. v. Egbuonu (1997) 12 NWLR (Pt. 531) 29; Gafar v. Govt., of Kwara State (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1024) 375; Jack v. UNAM (2004) / SC (Pt. 2) 100; Peterside v. IMB (Nig.) Ltd. (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 712. He described the respondent as merely accessory even as the facts do not support the reliefs claimed under Sections 34, 35 and 36 of the Constitution, as amended. He postulated that the respondent failed to prove ownership of the bus. He observed that the respondent’s affidavit was contradictory and should not be believed. He referred to Arjay v. A.M.S. Ltd. (2003) NWLR (Pt. 820)577. He reasoned that a Court cannot resolve the conflict in such affidavit as that would mean entering the arena of conflict. He cited Momah v. VAB Petroleum Inc. (2000) NWLR (Pt. 654) 534. He noted that the seizure of the toyota bus did not come under Section 44 of Constitution, as amended.

Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent did not file a verifying affidavit, compliance with Order 1 Rule 2 (3) of the FREPR, so that a condition precedent was not met to enforce his fundamental rights. He reasoned that the respondent’s action ought to have come by way of writ of summons and not by originating motion. He relied on Alakija v. NBN (1978) 2 LRN/(1978). 10 SC 59; Famfa Oil v. A.-G., Fed. (2007) FWLR (Pt. 184); Oyewunmi v. Ogunbode (2001) FWLR (Pt. 82) 1919; Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156; Opekepe v. Sadiq (2003) FWLR (Pt. 150) 1654. He concluded that the lower Court had no jurisdiction to hear the application based on the foregoing reasons. He cited Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 /(1962) All NLR (Pt. 4) 581; Sken Consult v. Ukey (1981) /SCI; FCMT v. Eze (2006) 2 NWLR (Pt. 964) 221 on the mandatory ingredients of jurisdiction.

​Issue two.
Learned appellants’ counsel contended that the respondent did not prove ownership of the bus. He stated that the burden was on him to prove his assertion of its ownership or his claim be dismissed. He relied on Section 137 (1) of the Evidence Act, Cap E14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, LFN, 2004; Abimbola v. Abatan (2001) FWLR (Pt. 46); Okhuarobo v. Egharevba (2002) 5 SC (Pt. 1) 141; Jeric Nig. Ltd. v. UBN (2001) FWLR (Pt. 31); Abiodun v. Adehin (1962) All NLR 55; Makanjuola v. Ajilore (2000) FWLR (Pt. 18) 1328.

Learned counsel further contended that the respondent did not prove the claim for damages for the lower Court to grant N300,000.00 damages. He described the claim for loss of earnings as tantamount to claim for special damages which must be specifically proved. He referred to Omoregbe v. Lawani (1980) 3-4 SC 108. He insisted that the respondent did not prove the claim for damage as required by law.

Issue three.
Learned appellants’ counsel argued that the lower Court had no jurisdiction to order the appellants to release the ignition key and battery seized from the respondent because there was no claim for that. He explained that it is the claim of the plaintiff that determines the jurisdiction of the Court. He relied on Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31. He posited that the order exceeded the power of the lower Court and should be set aside. He cited Okafor v. Governor of Anambra State (1991) NWLR (Pt. 200); Sken Consult v. Ukey (supra). He urged the Court to set aside the order.

Resolution of the issues.
In an abiding loyalty to the dictate of the law, I will attend to issue one first. The plinth of the issue is submissive to easy appreciation. It queries the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the respondent’s application/suit which parented the appeal. The law compels the Courts to accord premier attention to issue of jurisdiction, which is numero uno in adjudication, when raised in any proceedings, see Okwu v. Umeh (2016) NWLR (Pt. 1501) 120; Brittania-U (Nig.) Ltd. v. Seplat Pet. Co. Dev. Ltd. (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt.1503) 541; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; PDP v. Umeh (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1579); APC v. Nduul (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1602) 1; Adama v. Maigari (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1658) 26; APC v. Lere (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1705) 254. The reason the law, in its wisdom, insists on prime consideration of jurisdictional issue is obvious. Where a Court is drained of the jurisdiction to entertain a matter, the proceeding germinating from it, no matter the quantum of diligence, dexterity, artistry, sophistry, transparency and objectivity injected into it, will be trapped in the intractable web of nullity, see Elugbe v. Omokhafe (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 319; Lokpobiri v. Ogola (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1499) 328; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 144; Isah v. INEC (2016)18 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 175. Hence, I will obey this legal commandment so as not to insult the law.

​Jurisdiction, a mantra in adjudication, connotes the authority/power of a Court to determine a dispute submitted to it by contending parties in any proceeding, see Ajomale v. Yaduat (No. 1) (1991) 5 SCNJ 172; Mobil Pro. Co. Untltd. v. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1; Ndaeyo v. Ogunnaya (1977) 1 IM SLR 300; Ebhodagbe v. Okoye (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 472; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 144; A.-G., Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017)1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 210; Isah v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 175; Angadi v. PDP (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 1; Nduul v. Wayo (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1646) 548.

A Court of law is invested with jurisdiction to hear a matter when: “1. it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and 2. the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and 3. the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction”, seeMadukolu v. Nkemdilim (2006) 2 LC 2081961) NSCC (vol. 2) 374 at 379, per Bairamian F. J., Tukur v. Taraba State (1997) 6 SCNJ 81; Dairo v. UBN (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1029) 164; Okereke v. Yar’Adua (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100); Saraki v. FRN (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc. (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1549) 282; Bello v. Damisa (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1550) 455; Osi v. Accord Party (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1553) 387; Nworika v. Ononeze-Madu (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1672) 422; Adeleke v. Oyetola (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1721) 440. The three ingredients must co-exist in order to infuse jurisdiction into a Court.

Nota bene, the case-law has endorsed in toto a statement of claim as the major yardstick to be used by the Court to measure the presence or absence of its jurisdiction, see Ikine v. Edjerode (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446; A.D.H. Ltd. v. A.T. Ltd. (2006) NWLR (Pt. 989) 635; Oni v. Cadbury (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 87; B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Yar’adua v. Yandoma (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 213; Akpamgbo-Okadigbo v. Chidi (No. 2) (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 124; Isah v. INEC (supra); Lau v. PDP (supra); Azubuogu v. Oranezi (supra); Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386; A.-G, Fed. v. A.-G., Anambra State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 314; Roe Ltd. v. UNN (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 420; F.U.T., Minna v. Olutayo (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 176; A.-G., Lagos State v. Eko Hotels (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 518. In an action commenced by dint of originating summons/motion, as in the case that mothered the appeal, the affidavit in support serves as the statement of claim, see Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28; PDP v. Ezeonwuka (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 187; Lau v. PDP (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 60; Owuru v. Adigwu (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 1; CBN v. Aribo (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 130.
That is not all. In the eyes of the law, relief, too, is one of the determinants of jurisdiction of Court, see Onwudiwe v. FRN (2006) 10 NWLR (Pt. 988) 382; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114; PDP v. Oranezi (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 245; Gbileve v. Addingi (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1433) 394; Wambai v. Donatus (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 223; Emeka v. Chuba-Ikpeazu (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 345; Cocacola (Nig.) Ltd. v. Akinsanya (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1593) 74; Dec Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Shell (Nig.) Gas Ltd. (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1692) 273. I will bear in mind these legal parameters as the barometer to measure the propriety or otherwise of the lower Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the respondent’s suit.

​Now, the main anchor of the appellants’ chief grievance, indeed their trump card on this terminal issue, is staked on the lower Court’s unbridled assumption of jurisdiction over the respondent’s application/suit which was erected under the canopy of fundamental right enforcement when the casus belli are ancillary claims to it.

It is the trite position of law that where the main/primary right/claim is not a fundamental right, or where a fundamental right claim is an ancillary to another claim, then it is improper to seek relief in a Court under the sanctuary of fundamental right procedure as such a situation impinges on the jurisdiction of the Court, seeSea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd. v. Anigboro (supra); WAEC v. Adeyanju (supra); Tukur v. Govt., Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517; Jack v. UNAM (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208; Amale v. Sokoto Local Govt. (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1292) 181; Emeka v. Okoroafor(2017) 11 NWLR (pt. 1577) 410, Nwachukwu v. Nwachukwu(2018) 17 NWLR(pt. 1648) 357.
Interestingly, the case-law has since evolved the acceptable judicial formula which the Courts use, as the template, to gauge the presence or absence of main or anciliary rights. In Sea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd v. Anigboro (2001) 3 NWHR (Pt.696) 159, Karibi-Whyte, JSC, incisively and insightfully, declared:
The correct approach in a claim for the enforcement of fundamental rights is to examine the reliefs sought, the grounds for such relief, and the facts relied upon. Where the facts relied upon disclose a breach of the fundamental right of the applicant as the basis of the claim, there is here a redress through the enforcement of such rights through the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979. However, where the alleged breach of right is ancillary or incidental to the main grievance or complaint, incompetent to proceed under the rules. This is because the right, if any, violated, is not synonymous with the substantive claim which is the subject- matter of the action. Enforcement of the right per-se cannot resolve the substantive claim which is any case different.

​I have, in due fidelity to the desire of the law, consulted the record: the spinal cord of the appeal. My first port of call is the residence of the respondent’s reliefs, grounds for the reliefs and facts in the affidavit which colonise pages 29-33 of the record. I have perused them with a fine tooth comb. Admirably, they harbour no ambiguity. I have, also, married them with the inelastic positions of the law catalogued above. The raison d’etre for the juxtaposition is not far-fetched. It is to ascertain if the respondent’s suit, as displayed in their reliefs, grounds or facts, obeyed or flouted the law on main or incidental claim within the ambit of fundamental right procedure.

A synopsis of the crux of the respondent’s case, decipherable from the facts in his affidavit and the grounds for the reliefs, is that he was, at gun point, unlawfully beaten, handcuffed, tortured, arrested, paraded on the highway, like a common criminal, detained and his commercial toyota bus impounded by the security outfit (Campus Marshalls) of the first appellant under the superintendence of the second appellant who was their generalissimo. The respondent’s first declaratory relief is pegged on his wrongful arrest, inhuman treatment and detention contrary to his fundamental rights to dignity of human person and personal liberty as guaranteed under Sections 34 and 35 of the Constitution, as amended. His second declaratory relief orbits around the illegitimate confiscation and detention of his commercial toyota bus, with registration number XF 163 EKY, in violation of his fundamental rights to movable property as entrenched in Section 44 of the Constitution, as amended. The fifth relief is weaved on a claim for compensation. That is cognisable under Section 35(6) of the Constitution, as amended, seeJim-Jaja v. C.O.P, Rivers State (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 225; FBN Plc v. A., – G; Fed (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 121; Muhammed v. IGP (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1663) 492. Thus, the respondent’s claims were/are hinged on his rights to dignity of human person, personal liberty and interest in movable property in Nigeria as enshrined in Sections 34, 35 and 44 of the Constitution, as amended, respectively. The fundamental rights of the Nigerian citizenry are warehoused in Chapter IV which houses Sections 33 – 45 of the Constitution, as amended.

​It stems from these that the respondent’s principal claims, as chronicled above, fall squarely within the firmament of fundamental rights. Then, the respondent’s fourth claim is for a return/release of money and personal items distrained unjustifiably by the appellants. Indisputably, this bears the hallmark of an incidental/tributary relief that is parasitic on the main claim. A Court that is equipped with jurisdiction to hear the main claim is vested with the vires to try the ancillary relief and vice versa. This hallowed principle of law traces its pedigree to the Latin Maxim: Accesoruim non-ducit sed sequitus suum principale, id est, that which is incidental does not lead, but follows its principal, see Tukur v. Govt of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWHR (Phill 7) 517. It follows that the respondent’s principal claims as, amply, demonstrated above, are rooted deeply in the allegation of breach of his fundamental rights. This brief legal anatomy on main and accessory claims, done in due obeisance to the law, with due reverence, clearly, punctures the appellants’ defeasible defence of categorisation of the respondent’s claim as incidental to fundamental rights. It is disabled from its birth. It cannot fly!

In the light of this tour d’ horizon on the dichotomy between main and auxiliary claim under fundamental right procedure vis-à-vis jurisdiction of the Court, the lower Court did not, in the least, fracture the law when it assumed jurisdiction to entertain the respondent’s action. In this premise, all the legal diatribes, which the appellants rained against the lower Court’s adjudication of the suit, are idle and pale into insignificance. I, therefore, dishonour the learned appellants counsel’s enticing and salivating supplication to sacrifice the succinct judgment of the lower Court on the undeserved shrine of wrong assumption of jurisdiction for want of legal justification. In the end, I have no choice than to resolve the issue one against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.

Having dispensed with issue one, I proceed to settle issue two: another jurisdictional issue. The kernel of the issue is plain and canalised within a narrow compass. It chastises the lower Court’s order to return the ignition key and battery to the respondent when they were not part of the items claimed in the college of reliefs.

​It is an elementary law, known for its antiquity, that a Court of law is drained of the jurisdiction to grant a relief that is not claimed by a party to a suit, see Ochonma v. Unosi (1965) NMLR 321; Agu v. Odofin (1992) 3 SCNJ 161; Agbi v. Ogbe (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 65; Eagle Super Pack (Nig.) Ltd. v. ACB Plc. (2006) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1013) 20; Odunze v. Nwosu (2007) 13 NWLR (pt. 1050) 1; Veepee Ind. Ltd. v. Cocoa Ind. Ltd. (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1105) 486; Osuji v. Ekeocha (2009) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1166) 81; Oduwole v. West (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 598; Stowe v. Benstowe (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1306) 450; Odom v. PDP (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1456) 547; Al-Hassan v. Ishaku (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1520) 230. The rationale behind this ageless principle of law is not far-fetched. A Court of law is not clothed with the garment of a philanthropist or santa claus that dashes ex gratia awards that are not solicited by recipients.

I had, at the cradle of this judgment, articulated the five reliefs supplicated by the respondent in his suit. Incontestably, none of the reliefs solicited for the return of the ignition key and battery from the appellants. In other words, their return was not claimed as a specific relief. I, therefore, concur with the appellants that there was no specific claim for the order of return of those two items: ignition key and battery.

​Be that as it may, the appellants have only scored a barren victory on my endorsement of their stance/viewpoint. The reason is simple. The lower Court granted relief (b) by declaring the seizure of the respondent’s vehicle, with registration number XF 163 EKY, as unlawful and unconstitutional. The success of that relief, a declaration that the seizure of the toyota bus was illegal and unconstitutional, brings to the fore the necessity to employ the concept of consequential order. In legal parlance, consequential denotes “following as a result of inference, following or resulting indirectly”, see Eze v. Gov, Abia State (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1426) 192 at 216, per Rhodes – Vivour, JSC. Then, “A consequential order is not one merely incidental to a decision but one necessarily flowing directly and naturally from, and inevitably consequent upon it,” see Akinbobola v. Plisson Fisko (1991) 1 NWLR (pt. 167) 270 at 288, per Nnaemeka – Agu, JSC. Thus, a consequential order gives meaning and effect to a judgment without granting a fresh relief. It must be a product or bye-product of the main suit and the evidence. Hence, the law gives the Court the inherent power to grant consequential orders in deserving cases, see Eagle Super Pack (Nig) Lad v. ACB Plc. (supra); Akeem v. University of Ibadan (2003) 10 NWLR (pt. 829) 584; Regd. Trustee, Apostolic Church v. Olowoleni (1990) 6 NWLR (pt. 158) 514; Amechi v. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (pt. 1080) 227; Unity Bank Plc. V. Denclag Ltd. (2012) 18 NWLR (pt. 1332) 293; Eze v. Gov. Abia State (supra); Osuji v. Ekeocha (supra)/(2009) 7 SCNJ 248; Ishola v. Folorunso (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1210) 169; OSIEC v. AC (2010) 19 NWLR (pt. 1226); Tindafai v. Jara (2016) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1513) 19; Mamman v. Hajo (2016) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1515) 411.

​It cannot be gainsaid that the respondent’s relief (c), order for release of the toyota bus, owes its paternity to prayer (b) – a declaration that the its seizure was illegal and unconstitutional. Instructively, prayer (c) had been earlier granted on 11th July, 2006. It is inconceivable that the granted prayers (b) and (c) can be effectuated without the release of the two items – the ignition key and battery. It follows that the order in controversy flew naturally and directly from the grant of its parents: reliefs (b) and (c). A fortiori when, under common course of natural events, the ignition key and battery are indispensable items that will kickstart the toyota bus into locomotion. Indeed, this falls within the province of common knowledge which does not require proof before this Court as ordained by the provision of Section 124 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Thus, the order gave efficacy to the other two orders in that they will not be holistically enforceable in its absence. This is because, it was/is a progeny of those two preceding orders. To this end, I hold the humble view that the order, which the appellants castigate its grant by the lower Court, falls squarely within the four walls of consequential order which is intra vires its power to make.

​It must be placed on record, perforce, that the cardinal principle of law that a Court is not cloaked with the jurisdiction to award unclaimed reliefs is elastic. One of its recognised exceptions is located in the realm of consequential order. The fact that the order is a quintessence of a consequential order constitutes a serious coup de grace to the appellants’ dazzling contention. Indeed, it perforates their defence. In effect, the lower Court did not defile the law when it granted the order to release the ignition key and battery to the respondent. It will smell of judicial sacrilege to tinker with an order that has not disclosed any hostility to the law. It will irritate the law. I resolve the issue two against the appellants and in favour of the respondent.

That brings me to the treatment of issue two. The meat of the issue is plain. It appertains to proof of the claim. It has two limbs. The first is on lack of proof of ownership of the bus. The second centres on want of proof of damages awarded. I will handle the appellants’ grouses in the two limbs seriatim.

​On the first limb, the appellants nursed the grudge that the respondent failed to prove ownership of the commercial toyota bus, with registration number XF 163 EKY, before the Court. It is imperative to observe, pronto, that the record, the bedrock of the appeal, revealed that the appellants were duly served with all the processes encompassed in the respondent’s application. Curiously, the appellants, in their infinite wisdom, failed to file a counter-affidavit or any process to neutralise the critical averments in the application. Put simply, the appellants starved the lower Court of any evidence refuting the allegations levelled against them. In essence, the crucial averments in the respondent’s affidavit were not controverted. In eyes of the law, those pungent depositions remained unchallenged. The law grants the Court the unfettered liberty to act on unchallenged affidavit, see Olofu v. Itodo (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 545; Uzodinma v. Izunaso (No.2) (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1275) 30; Eyiboh v. Abia (2012) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1325) 51; Tukur v. Uba (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1343) 90; Inegbedion v. Selo-Ojemen (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 211; Danladi v. Dangiri (2015) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1442) 124; APC v. INEC (2015) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1462) 531; Ezechukwu v. Onwuka (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1506) 539; Owuru v. Adigwu (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 1.
​The caustic effect of the appellants’ costly neglect is plain. They failed to deflate the respondent’s claim of ownership of the toyota bus. In the mind of the law, in the absence of a counter-affidavit, the appellants admitted in toto all the respondent’s assertions inclusive of his ownership of the toyota bus. What is admitted does not need further proof. In the presence of the undiluted admission, the lower Court paid due allegiance to the law when it granted the respondent’s reliefs relating to the seized toyota bus. In this wise, the appellants’ wholesale admission of the respondent’s ownership of the toyota bus, with due reverence, exposes the poverty of the appellants’ scintillating arguments on want of proof of its ownership. In sum, the defence of want of proof, brandished and paraded by the appellants, is a lame defence.
It is apropos to handle the second limb. It quarrels with the lower Court’s award of damages of N300,000.00 against the appellants for the infraction of the respondent’s fundamental rights.
To begin with, the respondents anchored his case, inter alia, on the provision of Section 35(1) of the Constitution, as amended: “Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty….” The specific subsection which comes in handy on the consideration of the issue is Subsection (6) of Section 35 of the Constitution, as amended. Since it is the cynosure of the issue, it is imperative to pluck it out, where it is ingrained in the Constitution, ipsissima verba, thus: (6) “Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained shall be entitled to compensation and public apology from the appropriate authority or person; and in this subsection, “the appropriate authority or person” means an authority or person specified by law.”
The comprehension friendly provision of Section 35 (1) of the Constitution, as amended, has fallen for interpretation before the Courts. It is now, firmly, propagated by the case-law authorities, on the footing of the prescription of Section 35 (6) (supra), that a party who establishes unjustified deprivation of his personal liberty is entitled, ex debito justitiae, to compensation in the form of damages, see Odogwu v. A.-G Fed. (1996) 9-10 SCNJ 51; Jim-Jaja v. C.O.P., Rivers State (supra); F.B.N. Plc. v. A.-G., Fed (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 121. The word “entitled,” as encapsulated in Section 35(6) (supra), denotes “to give (a person or thing) a title, right or claim to something; furnish with grounds for laying claim”, see F.BN Plc. v. A.-G, Fed. (supra) at 149, per Augie, JSC. Compensation is coterminous with damages which signify: “the pecuniary compensation which the law awards to a person for the injury he has sustained by reason of the act or default of another, whether that act or default is a breach of contract or a tort” or “the recompense given by process of law to a person for the wrong that another has done him,” see F.B.N. Plc v. A.-G, Fed. (supra) at 174, per Okoro, JSC.

The appellants’ main agitation was that the award of N300,000.00 damages was made to the respondent in the absence of proof of loss or injury to him. In Jim-Jaja v. C.O.P, Rivers State (supra), at 254, Muntaka-Coomassie, JSC, opined:
The appellant’s claim is in connection with the breach of his fundamental rights to his liberty by the respondents. The onus is on him to show that he was unlawfully arrested and detained i.e that his fundamental right has been violated, If this is proved, by virtue of the provisions of Section 35(6) of the 1999 Constitution Federal Republic of Nigeria, the complainant is entitled to compensation and apology, where no specific amount is claimed. Where a specific amount is claimed, it is for the Court to consider the claim and in its opinion, the amount that would be justified to compensate the victim of the breach. In this respect, the common law principles on the award of damages do not apply to matter brought under the enforcement of the Fundamental Human Rights procedure…. The procedure for the enforcement of the Fundamental Human Right was specifically promulgated to protect the Nigerians; fundamental rights from abuse and violation by authorities and persons. When a breach of the right is proved, the victim is entitled to compensation even if no specific amount is claimed.
This magisterial pronouncement, in the ex cathedra authority, demolishes the defence of want of loss or injury to the respondent invented by the appellants to castrate the legality of the award. Indeed, once a party proves that his fundamental right is tampered with, or likely to be tampered with, quia timet, he is qualified/entitled to recompense and apology as decreed by the sacrosanct provision of Section 35 (6) of the Constitution, as amended, see Jim-Jaja v. C.O.P., Rivers State (supra); F.B.N. Plc. v. A.-G., Fed (supra).

The fundamental right proceeding is sui generis as it is “a peculiar and special action provided for in the Rules”, Onyekwuluje v. Benue State Govt. (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1484) 40 at 83, per Peter-Odili, JSC. No wonder, the law has directed the Courts to display activism and dispatch in determining fundamental rights action, see Fidelity Bank Plc. v. Monye (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1307) 1; Lafia Local Govt. v. Gov., Nasarawa State (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 94; Benson v. C.O.P. (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1524) 445. The reasons for the recompense are not moot.

Personal liberty is a commodity of an inherently high value, see FBN Plc v. A.-G, Fed. (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 121. Personal liberty is precious and priceless so that the preservation of liberty of citizens must always be paramount, see Benson v. C.O.P (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1527) 445. Hence, the Courts are enjoined to protect rights to personal liberty and freedom of movement for enjoyment by the citizenry, see DSSS v. Agbakoba (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 595) 314; Azuh v. UBN Plc (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1419) 580. In effect, the lower Court’s award of N300,000.00 damages was in total alignment with the law. It was not, in the least, offensive to the law to magnet the intervention of this Court. In the aggregate, I will not hesitate to resolve the issue two against the appellants and in favour of the respondent.

On the whole, having resolved the three issues against the appellants, the destiny of the appeal is obvious. It is bereft of any morsel of merit and deserves the reserved penalty of dismissal. Consequently, I dismiss the appeal. The parties shall bear the respective costs they incurred in prosecution and defence of the doomed appeal.

ADEBUKUNOLA ADEOTI IBIRONKE BANJOKO, J.C.A.: I had earlier carefully gone through the draft copy of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JCA, before now. Based on the analysis and the reasons contained therein, I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached by my learned brother.

I hereby adopt same as mine and equally abide by the decision given therein.

MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM SIRAJO, J.C.A.: My learned brother, Obande Festus Ogbuinya, JCA, has availed me a draft copy of the lead judgment prepared by him and just delivered. I am in total agreement with his lucid legal expositions and judicial reasoning on the issues that had arisen for determination in this appeal, leading to the conclusion reached that the appeal should be dismissed. I adopt same as mine with nothing to add. I too dismiss the appeal for wanting in merit and abide by the order made in the lead judgment as to costs.

Appearances:

U. F. Muhammad, Esq. For Appellant(s)

No legal representation For Respondent(s)