LAMIKORO OJOKOLOBO & ORS. v. LAPADE ALAMU & ANOR
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 9th day of July, 1987
SC.42/1987
JUSTICES
MOHAMMED BELLO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ANDREWS OTUTU OBASEKI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ANTHONY NNAEMEZIE ANIAGOLU Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
AUGUSTINE NNAMANI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
BOOYAMIN OLADIRAN KAZEEM Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ADOLPHUS GODWIN KARIBI-WHYTE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
SALIHU MODIBBO ALFA BELGORE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
- LAMI KORO OJOKOLOBO
2. RAIMI AJAO OJOKOLOBO
3. OKUNOLA OJOKOLOBO Appellant(s)
AND
- LAPADE ALAMU
2. LADERO AREMU Respondent(s)
RATIO
THE AMENDED AND UNAMENDED SECTION 258 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, 1979 (HEREINAFTER KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTION).
It is also necessary to set down the amended and unamended Section 258 of the Constitution. Section 258(1) states-
“Every court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than 3 months after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses, and furnish all parties to the cause or matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision on the date of delivery thereof.”
By the Constitution (Suspension and Modification (Amendment) Act No.17 of 1985. Third Schedule Section 258 of the Constitution was amended by the addition of a new Subsection 4 which read –
“The decision of a court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of this section unless the court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal from or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining of sllch non-compliance has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.” PER NNAMANI, J.S.C.
THE PRIMARY RULES IN CONSTRUING THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
It has also been established by this Court that in construing the provisions of our Constitution, the Sections have to be taken together. See Senator Abraham Adesanya v. The Federal Republic of NIGERIA. PER NNAMANI, J.S.C.
THE PRINCIPLE OF LAW THAT AN ACT OF PARLIAMENT CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS HAVING RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT UNLESS THERE ARE EXPRESS WORDS IN THE ENACTMENT TO SHOW SUCH INTENTION
It is a well settled principle of law that an Act of Parliament cannot be construed as having retrospective effect unless there are express words in the enactment showing such an intention. This is based on the presumption that the legislature does not intend what is unjust. Statutes are construed as operating only in cases or on facts which came into existence after the statutes were passed unless a retrospective effect is clearly intended. One of the more well known statements on this rule is that of Wright, J. in Re Athlumney (1898) 2 Q.B. 551 at 551,552 where he said-
“Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this – that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right of obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only”
See also Moon v. Durden (1848) 2 Ex 22, 43. PER NNAMANI, J.S.C.
THE CARDINAL PRINCIPLE THAT STATUTES OPERATES PROSPECTIVELY AND CANNOT BE APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY UNLESS THERE ARE EXPRESS TERMS TO DO SO
It is a cardinal principle of our law that a statute operates prospectively and cannot apply retrospectively unless it is made to do so by clear and express terms or it only affects purely procedural matters and does not affect the rights of the parties: Oshinye v. Commissioner of Police 5 FSC 105 at 112, Kimbray v. Draper (1868) L.R. 3 QR. 160 at 163, In re Suche & Co. Ltd. (1875) 1 Ch. 48 at 50, Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (1905) A. C. 369 at 172 and A-G. v. Venazza (1960) A.C. 965 at 978. PER BELLO, C.J.N.
THE INCLUSION OF SECTION 258(1) AS A PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, 1979
The background to the inclusion of Section 258(1) as a provision of the Constitution has been very fully stated in the locus classicus of Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 5 SC. 79. The cases of Ariori & ors. v. Elemo & ors. (1983) 1 SC.13; Odi & ors. v. Osafile (1985) 1 NWLR. 17; Awobiyi & Sons v. Igbalaiye Bros. (1965) 1 All NLR. 163; Lawal v. Dawadu & anor. (1972) 1 All NLR (Part 2) 270; Akpor v. Iguoriguo (1978) 2 SC. 115 where judgments were reserved and adjourned for several months after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses of Counsel resulted in the apt laconical description of ‘preserving’ judgments rather than reserving them. The effect on the confidence in the proper administration of justice led to the mandatory provision that every court established under the Constitution shall deliver its judgment not later than three months after the conclusion of evidence and the addresses of Counsel. The expression every court has been construed to include all the Courts established under the Constitution which included appellate Courts. The expression not later than three months from the conclusion of evidence and the addresses of Counsel has been construed as a limitation on the exercise by the Courts of jurisdiction vested in them under the Constitution. See Odi & ors. v. Osafile & ors. (Supra). Accordingly the exercise of jurisdiction after the period prescribed has been held to be without jurisdiction, and the consequent acts a nullity. See Ifezue v. Mbadugha (Supra). PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.
NNAMANI, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is one more case in the series starting with the decision of this Court in Dominic Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 5 S.C. 79. That case of course dealt with the interpretation of Section 258(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of NIGERIA, 1979 (hereinafter known as the Constitution).
The short constitutional point taken in this appeal came about this way. In Suit No. 1/38/80 in the Ibadan Judicial Division of Oyo State, the respondents, as Plaintiffs, sued the appellants as defendants claiming as follows:-
“(a) Declaration that the entire members of plaintiff’s family are entitled to Statutory right of occupancy in respect of their family farmland situate, lying and being at Aromona village, Olojuoro Road, Ibadan, Oyo State of Nigeria which farmland had been in effective possession of the plaintiff’s family from time immemorial.
(b) N400 damages for trespass committed by the defendants, their servants and agents.
(c) Injunction.”
On the 12th October, 1982 Oguntoye, J. gave judgment allowing all the claims of the plaintiffs. I shall return to the proceedings in the High Court later. The defendants/appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal which on 22nd May, 1986 dismissed their appeal. The appellants then appealed to this Court. 3 grounds of appeal were originally filed. On the 18th day of May, 1987 learned Senior Advocate for the appellants, Professor A.B. Kasunmu moved this Court praying for leave to argue an additional ground of appeal couched in the following terms:-
“The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law in confirming the decision of the lower court which judgment is a nullity having regard to the provisions of Section 258 (unamended) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of NIGERIA.
Particulars of Error
Judgment was reserved on the 7th day of July,1982 by the trial Court after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses which judgment was not delivered until 12th day of October. 1982.”
That prayer was granted. It is necessary now to set down the relevant proceedings of the Trial Court. At the conclusion of the evidence on page 126 learned counsel to the plaintiffs and defendants in the trial Court addressed the Court as stated on page 127-138 of the Record of proceedings. At the conclusion of that address on page 138 the learned trial Judge D.E.A. Oguntoye, recorded this –
“Judgment reserved to 16/7/82”. On 16th July, 1982 the learned trial Judge. Oguntoye, J. recorded this – “Judgment not read and further adjourned to 23/8/82”.
This was on the top part of page 139 of the Record Lower down on that same page the proceedings for 23/9/82 were recorded thus-
“Court:- The point raised by Mr. Peluela as to the filing of the Counter-Claim has just been raised before me in another matter, and I wish to consider the point further. Judgment is therefore, further reserved to 12th October, 1982.
(Sgd.) D. E. A. Oguntoye
Judge
23/9/82”
As can be seen on page 140 of the Record, that judgment was delivered on 12th October, 1982. It is also necessary to set down the amended and unamended Section 258 of the Constitution. Section 258(1) states-
“Every court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than 3 months after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses, and furnish all parties to the cause or matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision on the date of delivery thereof.”
By the Constitution (Suspension and Modification (Amendment) Act No.17 of 1985. Third Schedule Section 258 of the Constitution was amended by the addition of a new Subsection 4 which read –
“The decision of a court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of this section unless the court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal from or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining of sllch non-compliance has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.”
In argument before this Court on 18th May,1987. Professor Kasunmu. S.A.N. was content to refer to the proceedings before the learned trial judge on 7th and 16th July, 1982 as well as on 23rd September and 12th October, 1982. He submitted that by virtue of Section 258(1) of the Constitution and the decision of this Court in Dominic Onuora Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 5 S.C. 79; Paul Odi v. Osafile (1985) 1 N.W.L.R. pt. 17; Shodipo v. Lemminkainen OY (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. pt. 8, 547, the judgment of the learned trial judge was a nullity, and that consequently the judgment of the Court of Appeal was equally a nullity. He referred to the new Sub-section 4 of Section 258 of the Constitution and submitted that, following the decisions of this Court in Kpema v. The State (1986) 1 N.W.L.R. 366.445; Taylor v. Trustees of the Trinity Methodist Church (1986) 4 N.W.L.R. 136, 141, that amendment which came into operation on 27th August, 1985 was not retrospective and so could not save the judgment in issue. He equally submitted that what transpired before the learned trial Judge on 23rd September, 1982 could not bring the case within the principles established in the case of Shodipo (supra). Chief F.R.A. Williams, S.A.N., appearing as amicus curiae, contended that the question was whether the amendment in 1985 is intended to apply to all appeals or to applications for review after the date of that amendment. He submitted that the amendment is directed to the Court of Appeal or the Court of Review. He submitted that the rule about retrospectivity is a presumption that legislation is not retrospective. This, he said, will only arise for consideration when there is doubt. He referred to Subsection 5 of Section 258 which he said reinforces the point that the matter is live when the appeal comes out before the High Court in case of review or the Court of Appeal in case of appeal. He referred to West v. Gwynne (1911) 2 CH. D.I; Attorney-General v. Vernazza 1960 A.C. 965. He also referred to two decisions of the Court of Appeal – The Registered Trustees v. Adeosun (1986) 3 N.W.L.R. 561: and Gafari v. Johnson (1986) 5 N.W.L.R.66. 71. Chief Williams finally submitted that the intention of Section 258(4) was to reduce the rigours of 258(1) and urged the court to give it a beneficial construction. Mr Odugbesan for the respondents submitted that the amendment was made to correct a mischief – the effect of Sub-section 1 of Section 258 dealt with the Judge. He submitted that all judgments not yet delivered prior to 27th August, 1985 will not be declared null and void unless there is miscarriage of justice. He submitted that Subsection 4 of Section 258 dealt with procedural not substantive law. It therefore had retrospective effect. He referred to the case of In re Athlumney (1898) 2 Q.B. 547 at 551-552. In reply, Professor Kasunmu submitted that Subsections 1 and 4 of Section 258 have to be construed together. He contendcd that by the provisions of Subsection 1 of Section 258 and the decision of this Court in Ifezue (Supra) a decision given outside the 3 months period was a nullity. He argued that there was already a vested right arising from such a null judgment. The amendment of the Constitution, he submitted, specifically put the operative date as 27th August. 1985 and so it would not apply to decisions given before 27/8/85, and coming before the Court of Appeal after 27/8/85. To say that it did would mean validating judgments that were already null and void.
Finally, he said that before the 27th August, 1985 amendment, and following Section 258(1) of the Constitution, there was no jurisdiction in the Court if the judgment was delivered outside the 3 months period. The effect of Subsection 4 of Section 258 is that there was no jurisdiction to examine the otherwise null judgment and so declare it only if there is a miscarriage of justice.
The constitutional point raised here is clearly of some importance. This Court had in three previous decisions – Kpema (Supra) Taylor (Supra) and Obadiara v. Uyigwe (1986) 3 S.C. 39 – held that the new Subsection 4 of Section 258 was not retrospective. It is however conceded that there was no argument on the issue in any of those cases. It is therefore within the principles enunciated by this Court to receive argument on the point, and if satisfied, to overrule its previous decisions. See Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank (1983) 1 S.C.N.L.R. 296 and a host of other cases. This is more so as it is a matter on which there are already 2 conflicting decisions of two divisions of the Court of Appeal. In the Adeosun case (Supra) the Court of Appeal decided that the Subsection had retrospective effect, but in fairness to the learned Justices of that Court, the issue was really not argued before them nor did they adduce any supporting reasons for that decision. The opposite was the case in Gafari v. Johnson (Supra) which was decided by the Lagos Judicial Division of the Court of Appeal. In that case, the issue was squarely whether the judgment delivered by the learned trial judge 6 months after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses was saved by Section 258(4) of the Constitution when that judgment had been delivered before 27th August, 1985. After hearing extensive argument on the issue the Court (Nnaemeka-Agu, Mohammed and Kutigi, J.J.C.A.) came to the conclusion that the amendment did not have retrospective operative effect and so could not save the judgment which was declared void following Ifezue (Supra). In a well reasoned lead judgment, Nnaemeka Agu, J.C.A., emphasising the words” shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity” held that they were words which in normal expression indicated something happening in future i.e. from 27th August, 1985. In concluding his judgment, the learned Justice said-
“There appears to be some force in the submission of Chief Kehinde that the provision is one of substantive law because it provides some relief against a breach of Section 258(1) of the Constitution. But it appears to me that this case may not rightly rest on mere classification which, in any event, is not always free from difficulties. It appears to me that for a constitutional provision such as this the best approach – and this is perfectly in accord with the presumption against retrospectivity – is to look at the provision itself and try to ascertain the dominant intention of the enactment. Whether it is intended to apply in future or to take away vested rights. I derive considerable support for this approach from the decision of the Federal Supreme Court in Are v. Attorney-General of Western Religion (1960) 5 F.S.C. 111 at 112”.
It is a cardinal rule of the construction of statutes that words should be given their ordinary natural meaning. To do this one has to look at the words of the statute carefully. Having done that, the use in Subsection 4 of Section 258 of the words shall set aside referred to earlier contemplates something in future, that is judgment delivered after the commencement date of the amendment which is 27th August, 1985. It had to refer to judgments delivered after that date for the section continues with the words “or treated as a nullity” which cannot apply to judgments delivered before 27/8/85 which, as I shall show hereunder, were already a nullity if they violated the provisions of Section 258(1). Furthermore, the condition in Section 258(4) which requires miscarriage of justice is a new ground going beyond the nullity stipulated by Section 258(1). It has also been established by this Court that in construing the provisions of our Constitution, the Sections have to be taken together. See Senator Abraham Adesanya v. The Federal Republic of NIGERIA. It follows that Subsections 1 and 4 of Section 258 of the Constitution have to be read together. Reading Subsection 1 first, it says that every court shall deliver its judgment not later than 3 months from the conclusion of evidence and final addresses. Since the provision is mandatory, the implication is that any judgment delivered after 3 months is a nullity. The Subsection is directed to every Court and so for a judgment to be valid it has to be delivered within 3 months, and as a corollary, any judgment delivered by a Court after that mandatory 3 months is a judgment delivered by that court without jurisdiction. That is the decision of this Court in Ifezue (Supra) and Odi v. Osafile. In the latter case, Obaseki, J.S.C. said at page 29-
“It seems clear that the Constitution itself sets a limit of time forthe exercise of the jurisdiction to “hear and determine” appeals and any determination outside the 3 months period from the date of the conclusion of evidence and final addresses (which constitutes the hearing) is a determination without jurisdiction. I do not see how one can overlook the phrase “subject to the provisions of this Constitution.” This constitutional restraint reinforces the construction of Section 258(1) by this Court that the provision is mandatory and not directory. That, in my view, settles or lays the point that any judgment delivered after 3 months from the conclusion of evidence and final addresses is a nullity at best. It is the Constitution that gave the jurisdiction. It is the Constitution that terminated it. Without jurisdiction, a court cannot exercise its judicial powers and any such exercise is an exercise in vacuo and null and void.”
Subsection 4 of Section 258 now carries the matter further. While the judgment per Subsection 1 is a nullity and is delivered without jurisdiction, Subsection 4 allows the court to examine that judgment and determine whether there was a miscarriage of justice. If there is none, then that judgment cannot be treated as a nullity. In other words, as Professor Kasunmu rightly submitted, after 27th August, 1985 the Court now has jurisdiction to so examine such a judgment before treating it as a nullity or not as the case may be. It is agreed by all that the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Amendment Act No. 17 of 1985 came into effect on 27th August, 1985.There is nothing on the face of the provisions of the Act to suggest that it was intended that it should apply to any transactions before that date. More specifically, there are no clear words in the new Subsection 4 of Section 258 of the Constitution to suggest that it was intended that it should apply to judgments delivered before 27th August, 1985- In other words, that it should have retrospective effect.
It is a well settled principle of law that an Act of Parliament cannot be construed as having retrospective effect unless there are express words in the enactment showing such an intention. This is based on the presumption that the legislature does not intend what is unjust. Statutes are construed as operating only in cases or on facts which came into existence after the statutes were passed unless a retrospective effect is clearly intended. One of the more well known statements on this rule is that of Wright, J. in Re Athlumney (1898) 2 Q.B. 551 at 551,552 where he said-
“Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this – that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right of obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only”
See also Moon v. Durden (1848) 2 Ex 22, 43. But the presumption against retrospectivity is a presumption and is therefore not rigid and inflexible. Scarman, J. in Carson v. Carson(1964) 1 W.L.R. 511 at 517 said it is “one to be applied always in the light of the language of the statute and the subject matter with which the statute is dealing.” The presumption can also be overcome either by express words in the Act or by circumstances sufficiently strong to displace it. See Sunshine Porcelain Potteries Ply. Ltd. v. Nash (1961) A. C. 927, 938. In the instant appeal, I have already indicated that there are no express words in Section 258(4) which would suggest that the legislature intended it to have a restrospective effect. Nor can I imply any such intention from the language. Are there then any circumstances which would lead one to agree that the presumption against retrospectivity had been displaced I agree with Chief Williams that the legislature in making the amendment must have been motivated by a desire to lessen the rigours on litigants often brought about by the application of Section 258(1) of the Constitution. That however is no reason for assuming that the legislature intended that remedy except in the case of judgments delivered after 27th August, 1985 which, when they come up for review or on appeal can only be set aside, although they may have been delivered outside the 3 months period, if there is a miscarriage of justice. If the argument that Subsection 4 has retrospective effect is accepted, how far back would it go’.’ At the very least, it would have to go back to October 1979 when Section 258(1) came into force. In that case the provisions of Subsection 4 ought to have been applied when cases such as Ifezue and Shodipo (1984) got to the Court of Appeal and to that extent they are in effect over-ruled. That must be so, for if Subsection 4 is to apply to cases decided before 27/8/85 whenever they come up on appeal, why would it not apply to Ifezue which may have been decided at the same time with such cases but may have come up on appeal earlier I think that I would look out for more express words before coming to the conclusion that the legislature intended to overrule Ifezue and the host of cases that have since followed it.
Two cases may more clearly show circumstances in which it would be reasonable to assume that a statute is intended to have retrospective effect. The first case is the Sunshine Porcelain case (supra). There Section 12(1) of the Victoria Worker’s Compensation Act 1951 in England, was first enacted in 1940 by way of amendment of an Act of 1928. It provided that-
“where (a) a medical practitioner certifies that a worker is suffering from a disease and is thereby disabled from earning full wages at the work at which he was employed and (b) the disease is due to the nature of any employment in which the worker was employed at any time prior to the date of the disablement”, compensation should be payable. The respondent was employed by the appellant company in 1931 and 1938; during their work she was exposed to dust containing silica: and the first symptoms of silicosis appeared in 1950. It was held that the presumption against retrospectivity was displaced by the circumstances and that she could claim under Section 12(1). The Court held that they could not require the respondent to prove that the disease started after 1946 when the section was enacted when it was known that the disease silicosis comes on slowly and may manifest itself after a long period.
The other case is Gwynne’s case (supra) which was cited to this Court by Chief Williams. In that case, what was in issue was Section 3 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1892.
That section read –
“In all leases containing a covenant, condition, or agreement against assigning, undertaking, or parting with the possession or disposing of the land or property it leased without licence or consent, each covenant, condition, or agreement shall, unless the lease contains an express provision to the contrary, be deemed to be subject to a proviso to the effect that no fine or sum of money in the nature of a fine shall be payable for or in respect of such licence or consent; but this proviso shall not preclude the right to require the payment of a reasonable sum in respect of any legal or other expenses incurred in relation to such licence or consent”
The question was whether the provision applied to leases executed before 1892. Joyce, J. holding that it did used words which on the face of them would appear to support the contention put forward in the instant appeal.
He said, at page5 –
“The Legislature, I think intended to prevent or put an end to something which, rightly or wrongly, was considered an injustice …………….
Looking at all the circumstances in reference to this enactment, and examining it in the way Lord Hatherly in Pardo v Bingham L.R.4 Ch 740 said the statute must be examined, and considering the express generality of the provision namely “in all leases” which I think is the same thing as if the statute had said “in every lease” without making any distinction between leases granted before and leases granted after the passing of the Act, upon the whole I come to the conclusion that this Section was intended to apply to every lease, both existing and future, and in effect, as from the commencement of this Act of 1892″
The Court of Appeal in England agreed with Joyce, J. Kennedy L.J. in his own judgment observed at page 15,-
“In the first place, it appears to me that the language of the Section though it does not exclude the contention of the appellant, favours the wider interpretation. The opening words, “in all leases”. prima facie negative a distinction between leases made before and leases made after the passing of the Act. Nor is there anything in the con to prevent or modify this inference. In order to give the section the limited application for which the appellant contends, you must add by implication after the words “all leases” some such words as “made after the passing of this Act”
It is clear to me that the circumstances of these two cases are different from those in the instant appeal, the circumstances of the earlier case perhaps more so. In the latter case I seem to see a greater justification for the construction there where the words “in all leases” were used than I would feel in Subsection 4 where the words “No judgment shall be” were used. Besides what Section 3 of the 1892 sought to do was to stop the lessor in future from exacting a fine for granting an assignment unless there is a clear provision that he can do so. Surely it must be the intention that the lessor whose lease contains such provision against assignment should be subject to the new condition.
Two matters remain to be considered. The first is that a statute is not to be given a retrospective effect so as to impair existing or vested rights. As was said in the 6th edition of Craies on Statute Law at page 386, a statute is retrospective” which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past”. In the instant appeal. I have already stated that in my view the effect of Section 258(1). and indeed that has been so declared by this Court, is that any judgment delivered outside the period of 3 months from the conclusion of evidence and final addresses is void. The party that lost in such a suit does have rights which have vested as a result of such a void judgment, for the party that was ‘successful’ cannot derive any consequential benefits from that judgment without being successfully challenged. It is therefore my view that in this case it was not the intention of the legislature to enact a subsection which would have the effect of adversely affecting such vested rights.
The second matter arises from the fact that it is settled law that the presumption against retrospective construction has no application to enactments which only affect procedure and practice of the Courts. As Mellish, J said in Republic of Costa Rica v Erlanger (1074) 3 Ch.D.62. no person has a vested right in any course of procedure. I think that what was involved here was not a matter of procedure, but touched on a substantive issue of constitutional law -judgments delivered outside jurisdiction and the question of miscarriage of justice. To that extent the case Attorney-General v. Vernazza (Supra) cited also by Chief Williams is not relevant to this case. That case clearly dealt with a matter of procedure – an amendment requiring a vexatious litigant to obtain leave of the High Court, before filing any suit and the question was whether this applied to cases which he had previously filed. It was held that it did. Lord Denning at page 977 of the report stated the law-
“If the new Act affects Mr. Vernazza’s substantive rights, it will not be held to apply to proceedings which have already commenced unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested. See Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd v Irving (1905) A.C. 369. But if the new Act affects matters of procedure only, then prima facie it applies to all actions, pending as well as future.”
He was of the view that the Act. did not affect Mr. Vernazza’s substantive rights.
For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that subsection 4 of Section 258 of the Constitution would only apply to judgments delivered after 27th August, 1985. It is therefore inapplicable in the present suit. To return, therefore, to the proceedings in this case, evidence and final addresses were concluded on 7th July, 1982, but the trial court’s judgment was delivered on 12th October, 1982, 5 days later than the mandatory 3 months prescribed by Section 258(1) of the Constitution. I have also looked at the proceedings before the trial court on 23rd September, 1982 to see if there was a reopening of the case within the principles set down by this Court in Shodipo (Supra). I am afraid that it does not fall within it. On the 23rd September, 1982 the learned trial Judge appeared to be talking to herself aloud – some point had just been raised before her in another matter. Although she said that she wished to consider the point further, she did not call for any further address by counsel.
In all these circumstances, the judgment of the trial court dated 12th October, 1982 was a nullity and I hereby so declare. I would therefore allow this appeal and it is hereby allowed. The judgment of the High Court delivered on 12th October. 1982 as well as the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 28/5/86 are set aside. The suit is remitted to the High Court of Oyo State, Ibadan Judicial Division for trial de novo by another Judge. I award costs of N300 in this Court and N350 in the Court of Appeal in favour of the appellants.
BELLO, C.J.N. (Presided): The facts of the case upon which the constitutional issue was predicated in this appeal are simple. The evidence and the final addresses at the trial of the case in the High Court of Oyo State holden at Ibadan were concluded on 7th July 1982. Although the trial judge had reserved judgment to be delivered on 16th July 1982, the judgment was not in fact delivered until on 12th October 1982, which was more than 3 months from the date of conclusion of the final addresses.
In Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 5 S.C. 79 this Court decided that any judgment delivered outside the 3 months limit prescribed by subsection 258(1) of the Constitution is null and void. The subsection provides:
“258 (1) Every court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than 3 months after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses, and furnish all parties to the cause or matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision within 7 days of the delivery thereof.”
The Constitution (Suspension and Modification) (Amendment) Decree 1985 which came into force on 27th August 1985 added to section 258 two new subsection as follows:
“258. (4) The decision of a court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of this section unless the court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal from or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining of such non-compliance has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.
(5) As soon as possible after hearing and deciding any case in which it has been determined or observed that there was noncompliance with the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the person presiding at the sitting of the court shall send a report on the case to the Chairman of the Advisory Judicial Committee who shall keep the Committee informed for appropriate action”
In Kpema v. The State (1986) 1 NWLR 396. Taylor v. The Trustees of T.M. Church (1986) 4 NWLR 130 and Obadiaru v. Uyigue (1986) 3 S.C. 39 this Court also decided that the foregoing amendment has no retrospective but has only prospective operation and hence the amendment is inapplicable to any case in which the conclusion of final addresses was before 27th August 1985 and the judgment was delivered outside the 3 months limit.
From the foregoing, it is transparently clear that learned counsel for the Appellants is right in his submission that the judgment of the trial court in the case on appeal is a nullity.
However, learned counsel for the Respondents and Chief Williams, as amicus curiae, have introduced a new dimension in the case on appeal which was not taken and canvassed by counsel and was not directly determined by this Court in any of the previous cases. The new dimension is the issue as to whether the amendment to section 258 affects substantive law or it affects purely procedural matter. Both counsel relied on the general principle of interpretation of statutes and contended that. if the provision of the amendment is an enactment of substantive law then, the operation of the amendment cannot be retrospective and must be prospective. On the other hand, if the amendment is a matter of procedure then, its operation is retrospective. Learned counsel submitted the amendment was of procedure and referred to In Re Athlumney (1898) 2 Q.B. 547 at 551-552 and West v. Gwynne (1911) 2 Ch. 1 at 15.
Moreover, Chief Williams relied on A- G. v. Vernazza (1969) A.C. 965 at 975 and 978 and 44 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Ed” paragraphs 922 and 925 to buttress his submission that retrospectivity should be put to the amendment. He referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal, Ibadan Division, in the Registered Trustees v. Adeosun (1986) 3 NWLR 561 which was in favour of his submission. He also drew our attention to Gafari v. Johnson (1986) 5 NWLR 66 where the Lagos Division of that Court held a different view. He contended that putting time limit in a statute for doing an official act is procedural and said the matter was not fully canvassed in Kpema v. The State (Supra) and Taylor v. The Trustees (Supra). He said the amendment is a remedial statute modifying the rule of procedure and should be given a beneficial construction.
In his reply, learned counsel for the Appellants adopted the reasoning of Nnaemeka-Agu, J.C.A. in Gafari v. Johnson (Supra) at pages 71-72 that the constitutional amendment is not procedural. He further submitted that the Appellants have a vested right to have the judgment declared a nullity and the amendment has affected that right.
It appears from the interpretation put to the amendment by this Court in Kpema and Taylor cases, despite the proclamation by the amendment of the demise of the ratio decidendi of Ifezue case, we are still haunted by the ghost of the ratio and the victims of the judicial errors committed prior to the amendment are not relieved of the hardships inflicted upon them by Ifezue case.
I am inclined to agree with the forceful submission of Chief Williams that beneficial and retrospective interpretation will repel the unwanted visitation of the ghost of Ifezue case and drive it away into the limbo of dark oblivion. Thus the parties will be relieved for ever of the hardships, anxieties and the long delay in the administration of justice brought about by its visitation.
It is a cardinal principle of our law that a statute operates prospectively and cannot apply retrospectively unless it is made to do so by clear and express terms or it only affects purely procedural matters and does not affect the rights of the parties: Oshinye v. Commissioner of Police 5 FSC 105 at 112, Kimbray v. Draper (1868) L.R. 3 QR. 160 at 163, In re Suche & Co. Ltd. (1875) 1 Ch. 48 at 50, Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (1905) A. C. 369 at 172 and A-G. v. Venazza (1960) A.C. 965 at 978.
In The Ydun (1899) P. 236, the vessel sustained damage as the result of alleged negligence of the Borough of Preston on 13 September 1893. The Public Authorities Protection Act, which provided that an action for negligence against any public officer must be commenced within 6 months next after the act complained of, was passed on 5 December 1893 and came into force on 1st January 1894. On 14 November 1898 the owners of the vessel issued a writ against the Borough for damages sustained by the grounding of their vessel. The Court of Appeal held the Act was an Act dealing with procedure only and applied retrospectively. Vaughan Williams L.J. stated at p. 246 of the report thus:
“I also agree that the Act is retrospective, for though, no doubt, the general rule of construction is that “nova constitutio futuris for man imponere debet non praeteritis.” it is pointed out in Moon v. Durden (1) that rule of construction yields to a sufficiently expressed intention of the Legislature that the enactment shall have a retrospective operation, and there is abundant authority that the presumption against a retrospective construction has no application to enactments which affect only procedure and practice of the Courts.”(Italics mine)
Again, while dealing with the construction of statutes which made provisions for “time” within which judicial proceedings might be taken, Lord Alverstone C.J. said at p. 338 in The King v. Dharma (1905) 2 K.B. 335:
“The rule is clearly established that, apart from any special circumstances appearing on the face of the statute in question, statutes which make alterations in procedure are retrospective. It has been held that a statute shortening the time within which proceedings can he taken is retrospective (2). The Ydun, (1899) p. 236 and it seems to me that it is impossible to give any good reason why a statute extending the time within which proceedings may be taken should not also be held to be retrospective. If the case could have been brought within the principle that unless the language is clear a statute ought not to be construed so as to create new disabilities or obligations, or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time when the Act came into force. Mr. Compton-Smith would have been entitled to succeed; but when no new disability or obligation has been created by the statute, but it only alters the time within which proceedings may be taken, it may be held to apply to offences completed before the statute was passed. That is the case here. This statute does not alter the character of the offence or take away any defence which was formerly open to the prisoner. It is a mere matter of procedure, and according to all the authorities it is therefore retrospective.”
The foregoing decisions seem to me to show that a statute making provision for “time” within which judicial proceedings can be taken is retrospective. I cannot see any good reason why a statute prescribing the time within which a court should dispose of proceedings ought not be so construed. The fact that the time limit prescribed by section 258 is a constitutional provision cannot be a valid reason because we have been applying the ordinary rules of interpretation of statutes in the interpretations of the several provisions of our Constitutions past and present.
Now, it is clear to me that the direction under subsection 258(1) of the Constitution that every court shall deliver its decision in writing not later than 3 months from the conclusion of evidence and final addresses is purely procedural and does not in any way affect the rights of the parties. The amendment added to the subsection by subsections (4) and (5) does no more than to spell out in clear terms the consequences of non-compliance with the provisions of the section, particularly subsection 258(1). It follows therefore that the amendment affects purely a matter of procedure and does not affect the rights of any party.
Furthermore, where a statute is passed for the purpose of explaining a former statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was passed: see Craies on Statute Law, 7th Ed. p. 395. It is quite clear that the amendment does no more than to resolve the contentious issue in Ifezue case as to whether the provisions of subsection 258(1) were mandatory or directory i.e. whether or not mere non-compliance with the subsection renders the decision of a court null and void. The amendment resolves the issue in the negative. Since the amendment simply “explains” the effect of non-compliance with subsection 258(1), it ought to have effect from 1st October, 1979 which was the date subsection 258(1) came into force. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court ought not be a nullity because the final addresses had been concluded on 7th July, 1982 when the amendment was in force.
Applying the principle, which I have earlier stated, of construction of statutes regulating judicial procedure or explaining a previous statute, I would hold that the amendment to section 258 of the Constitution ought to have been given retrospective effect.
In Odi & An. v. Osafile (1985) 1NWLR 17 this Court exhaustively considered the significance of adhering to the rule of stare decisi in constitutional cases and set out the circumstances on which the Court may depart from its previous decision. I do not intend to reiterate the circumstances herein, it is sufficient to state that the Court may depart from the previous decision if it is satisfied the previous decision is erroneous and was reached per incuriam and that adhering to the previous decision will perpetuate hardship or injustice. I am satisfied the decisions in Kpema and Taylor cases were reached per incuriam but as I pointed out in Odi v. Osafile (Supra) such decisions will not perpetuate hardship or injustice. Accordingly, one of the circumstances, i.e. perpetuating hardship or injustice that will warrant the Court to depart from the decisions in Kpema and Taylor cases has not been satisfied.
I would therefore allow the appeal and it is hereby allowed, I endorse the orders made by my learned brother Nnamani, J.S.C.
OBASEKI, J.S.C.: This issue for determination in this appeal is whether the judgment of the High Court in this matter delivered on the 12th day of October, 1982 by Oguntoye, J. is not a nullity having regard to the fact that evidence and final addresses were concluded on the 7th day of July, 1982 and the interpretation of section 258(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 in Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 5 SC. 79. The subsidiary issue raised by the respondents is whether subsection (4) of section 258 of the Constitution, and amendment introduced by Decree No. 17 of 1985, Constitution (Suspension and Modification) (Amendment) Decree No. 17 of 1985, can be invoked in this instant appeal to save the judgment of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Decree No. 17 of 1985 came into force on the 27th day of August, 1985.
These issues have been dealt with in detail in the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Nnamani, J.S.C. which judgment I had the advantage of reading in draft before today. I agree with his opinions on the issues and I adopt them as my own. For those reasons, and the reasons set out below, I would also allow the appeal. It is clear therefore that my answer to the first question or issue for determination is in the affirmative and my answer to the second or subsidiary question or issue is in the negative.
It appears that the arguments advanced in support of the view contrary to the opinion held by the majority of this Court in Ifezue v. Mbadugha (supra) is being resurrected in support of the argument that section 258(4) of the Constitution is retrospective. If subsection (4) of section 258 of the Constitution was promulgated as an amendment to save judgments delivered in contravention of section 258(1) of the Constitution and from the decision in Ifezue’s case, the arguments put forward in Ifezue’s case that subsection (1) of section 258 is directory which this Court rejected, cannot be entertained. It is concluded by the acceptance by the legislature that Ifezue’s case was correctly decided. A Supreme legislature has power to legislate and alter the law or overrule decisions which it considers not in the overall interest of the society. This Court cannot question the exercise of that jurisdiction by the Armed Forces Ruling Council. However, if the legislature exercises that jurisdiction as the Armed Forces Ruling Council has done by promulgating subsection (4) and subsection (5) of Decree No. 17 of 1985, Constitution (Suspension and Modification) (Amendment) Decree 1985 and issue touching the correct interpretation of subsections (4) and (5) are raised in this Court, the undoubted jurisdiction of this Court empowers it to ascertain the intention of the Armed Forces Ruling Council and declare it or interprete the provisions of the subsections accordingly. The provisions of subsections (4) and (5) of section 258 reads:
“(4) The decision of a court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of this section unless the court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal from or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining of such non-compliance has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof;
(5) As soon as possible after hearing and deciding any case in which it has been determined or observed that there was non-compliance with the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the person presiding at the sitting of the court shall send a report on the case to the Chairman of the Advisory Judicial Committee who shall keep the Committee informed for appropriate action.”
(Italics mine)
As observed above, the two subsections came into force on the 27th day of August, 1985.
It is sufficient to deduce from subsection (5) that it is not the intention that the non-compliance committed before 27th August, 1985 should be reported on for appropriate action by the Advisory Judicial Committee. Subsection 2 of section 8 of Decree No. 17 of 1985 expressly provides that:
“This decree shall be deemed to have come into force on the 27th day of August, 1985”
Although it was signed into law on the 8th day of November, 1985. Reading the 27th day of August, 1985 into subsection (4) of section 258 the subsection, in my view, will read:
“The decision of a court delivered on or after the 27th day of August, 1985 shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provision of this section unless the court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal Of review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining of such noncompliance has suffered a miscarriage of justice.”
Briefly, the facts relevant for the purpose of this judgment is that the hearing of the evidence and final addresses by the High Court Ibadan (Oguntoye. J.) was concluded on the 7th day of July, 1982 when the case was adjourned for judgment. Judgment was not delivered till the 12th day of October, 1982 a period of more than 3 months after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses. Having failed to deliver the judgment within three months, the learned trial judge has failed to comply with the provisions of subsection 1 of section 258 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979. This subsection (1) reads:
“Every court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than 3 months after the conclusion of evidence and address and furnish all parties to the cause or matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision on the date of the delivery thereof.”
The provisions of this subsection (1) has received judicial interpretation in this Court in several cases the locus classicus of which are:
(1) Dominic Ifezue v. Mhadugha (1984) 5 SC.79
(2) Paul Odi & Anor. v. Gbaniyi Osafile (1985) 1 NWLR. 17
In these two cases and others, this Court has consistently declared that the decisions delivered in contravention of subsection 258(1) of the Constitution were all delivered without jurisdiction and were therefore null and void and of no effect. This is because jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings and to hear and determine any criminal proceedings derive from the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. In the case of the High Court of a State section 236(1) of the Constitution confers that jurisdiction. In the case of the Federal High Court, sections 230(1) and (2) prescribe the jurisdiction. In the case of the Court of Appeal. section 219 of the Constitution confers the jurisdiction. Section 219 is in the following terms:
“Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Federal Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction, to the exclusion of any other court of law in Nigeria, to hear and determine appeals from the Federal High Court, High Court of a State, Sharia Court of Appeal of a State and Customary Court of Appeal of a State.”
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is conferred by section 213(1) of the Constitution on the Court in the following terms:
“The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction, to the exclusion of any other court in Nigeria to hear and determine appeals from the Federal Court of Appeal.”
Jurisdiction to determine a civil or criminal proceedings in a High Court or jurisdiction to determine an appeal in the Court of Appeal is not a procedural matter. When therefore, section 258(1) provided that this jurisdiction shall be exercised not later then 3 months from the conclusion of evidence and final addresses, it went beyond being a matter of procedure when the jurisdiction is exercised after 3 months. Any court without jurisdiction is incompetent to determine a matter and if it does exercise the jurisdiction it has not got, its decision is a nullity.
That was the position of the law before Decree No. 17 of 1985 was promulgated. If it had not been the Constitution which gave the jurisdiction to determine that terminated it or if it had been a State or Federal law which purport to prescribe the time within which the jurisdiction was to be exercised, I would have been persuaded to treat the provision purely as procedural and directory. If for example, the President of the Court of Appeal in exercise of his powers under section 227 of the Constitution were to prescribe in the Rules of the Court of Appeal time beyond which the jurisdiction to determine should not be exercised, I would regard the provision of the Rules as incompetent. If the National Assembly had made a law prescribing the time beyond which judgment should not be delivered, I would regard the law as incompetent and null and void to the extent of which it conflicts with section 258(1). It could not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
Being a constitutional provision, subsection (1) of section 25 affected the jurisdiction of the court.
Since the promulgation of Decree No. 17 of 1985, this Court has had occasion to consider its effect on decisions delivered outside the constitutional period prescribed by section 258(1) in the following cases
(1) Kpema v. The State (1986) 3 SC. 39
(2) Taylor v. The Trustees of T. M. Church (1986) 4 NWLR. 136
(3) Obadiaru v. Uyigue (1986) 3 SC. 39
albeit without as full addresses as in the instant appeal and decided that the amendment introduced in subsections (4) and (5) by Decree No. 17 of 1985 has no retrospective operation and do not affect judgments delivered by the High Court before 27th August, 1985.
In the instant appeal, in addition to the addresses of Professor A. B. Kasunmu, S.A.N. for the appellants and Tunde Odugbesan for the respondents, this Court had the advantage of the address of Chief F.R.A. Williams, S.A.N. as amicus curiae on the issue. While Professor Kasunmu submitted that the new subsections should be interpreted as prospective in effect, Mr. Odugbesan and Chief F.R.A Williams each with persuasive eloquence, submitted that the new subsections should be interpreted as retrospective from 1st October, 1979 in effect. Professor Kasunmu further submitted that if the subsections are given retrospective interpretation, it would affect vested rights and thereby violate the cannons of statutory interpretation. He submitted that the right to have the judgment declared a nullity is a vested right which will be affected by any such interpretation as is urged by Chief Williams. Chief Williams cited in support of his argument in favour of retrospective effect for the subsections (1) Attorney-General v. Vernazza (1969) AC 965 at 975 and 978; (2) 44 Halsbury’s Law of England 4th Edition paragraphs 922 and 925: (3) Registered Trustees v. Adeosun (1986) 3 NWLR. 561 (a Court of Appeal, Ibadan Division decision). He also brought to the notice of the Court that the decision of the Lagos Division of the Court of Appeal in Gatari v Johnson (1986) 5 NWLR.66 was against retrospective operation of the subsection.
The provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 came into force on the 1st day of October, 1979 see section 279(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. For the purpose of interpreting the provisions of the Constitution, the Interpretation Act 1964 was expressly made to apply by section 277(4) of the said Constitution. Section 2 of the Interpretation Act 1964 governs the operation of Enactments. Subsections (2) and (3) of the section is relevant for our purpose. It provides as follows:
“(2) Where no other provision is made as to the time when a particular enactment is to come into force, it shall, subject to the following subsection. come into force-
(a) in the case of an enactment contained in an Act of parliament on the date when the Act is passed;
(b) in any other case, on the day when the enactment is made:
(3) Where an enactment is expressed to come into force on a particular day, it shall be construed as coming into force immediately on the expiration of the previous day.”
By itself, expressly therefore, the Interpretation Act 1964 is of no assistance to the questions for determination and posed by counsel, I will therefore fall back on the cannon of construction.
In the area of construction, the primary concern of the courts is the ascertainment of the intention of the legislature or law makers. From this function, the court may not resile however ambiguous or difficult the application of the words of the law or Act may be, the Court is bound to place some meaning upon them. If the language is clear and explicit, the court must give effect to it, for in that case, the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. Its function is jus dicere, not jus dare. The words of a statute must not be overruled by the judges.
There is the presumption against intending injustice or absurdity. It is one of the guiding cannons of construction and interpretation of statutes. Upon this presumption rests the leaning against giving certain statutes retrospective operation. Generally, statutes are construed as operating only in cases or on facts which come into existence after the statutes were passed unless a retrospective effect is clearly intended.
It is a fundamental rule of Nigerian law (received from English law) that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or Law; or arises by necessary and distinct implication see Re Athlumney (1898) 2 Q.B. 551 at pp. 551. 552. What do we mean by retrospective operation of a statute A statute is retrospective “which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past.”
The provision of subsection (4) of section 258 of the Constitution though enacted or promulgated on the 8th day of November, 1985 was made expressly to take effect retrospectively from the 27th day of August,1985 and no further. But Chief Williams and Mr. Odugbesan contend that the operation of the statute should by interpretation, be made to date back from 1st October, 1979 when subsection (1) of section 258 came into force.
Subsection (4) should not in my view, be interpreted in violation or without regard to subsection (5). They should be read together. By the provision of subsection (5), the person presiding at the sitting where it has been determined or observed that there was non-compliance with the provisions of subsection (1), is entrusted with the duty of sending a report on the case to the Chairman of the Advisory Judicial Committee and the Chairman of the Advisory Judicial Committee shall keep the Committee informed for appropriate action.
The Advisory Judicial Committee is charged with the discipline of erring judges. It therefore appears that the clear intention of the law maker is to penalise or discipline erring judges.
Since no judge was expressly made liable to be disciplined for non-compliance with the provision of section 258(1) before the 27th day of August, 1985, it could not be the intention of the law makers that judges who contravened or failed to comply with the provisions of section 258(1) before 27th August, 1985 should be reported for necessary action by the Advisory Judicial Committee. The presumption against retrospectivity of penal legislation will operate to make the two subsections operate prospectively in respect of cases decided by the courts after the 27th day of August, 1985.
It should be observed that no court established under or by the Constitution is excepted from the operation of subsection (1) and consequently subsections (4) and (5) of the Constitution bind all courts whose decisions are subject to appeal or reviews. Assistance may be derived from the provisions of Section 33(8) of the Constitution. Section 33(8) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides or reads:
“No person shall be held guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission that did not at the time it look place constitute such an offence and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence heavier than the penalty in force at the time the offence was committed.”
The judge of a High Court or the Justices of the Court of Appeal ought not to be punished for non-compliance with section 258(1) of the Constitution committed before the amendment introduced by subsection (4) of section 258 came into force. It cannot, in my view therefore, be the intention of the law makers i.e. Armed Forces Ruling Council to punish the judges for such non-compliance committed before the 27th day of August, 1985. I cannot collect any indication of such an intention from the words of the subsections. It is therefore my opinion and I hereby hold that the subsections (4) and (5) are meant to operate in respect of decisions delivered on or after the 27th day of August, 1985 which were taken on appeal to appellate court for review.
The instant appeal deals with a matter that was already pending on appeal before the amendment introduced by subsections (4) and (5) was promulgated. The rights of the parties are therefore to be decided, in my view, as the law existed on 12th October, 1982 when judgment was delivered and when appeal against the decision was filed. See Attorney-General v. Vernazza (1960) AC 965
A statute which takes away the right of appeal or a vested right to a legal defence is not to be regarded as affecting mere matters of procedure. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving (1905) AC’. 369 In the ordinary way, the Court of Appeal cannot take into account a statute which has been passed in the interval since the case was decided at first instance because the rights of litigants are generally to be determined according to the law in force at the date of the earlier proceedings per Lord Denning in Attorney-General v. Vernazza (supra). But it is different when the statute is retrospective either because it contains clear words to that effect or because it deals with matters of procedure only.
The present amendment introduced by subsections (4) and (5) went beyond a mere matter of procedure. The amendments conferred jurisdictions which the courts exercising appellate jurisdiction did not have previously and took away jurisdiction it had previously. It altered the substantive law by giving validity to judgments which would have been declared null and void. It did not validate judgments that were already null and void.
For the above reasons and the reasons contained in the judgment of my learned brother, Nnamani, JSC., I hereby allow the appeal. The decision of the High Court and the Court of Appeal are hereby set aside and the case is remitted to the High Court of Oyo State, Ibadan Judicial Division for hearing de novo by another judge. The appellants are entitled to costs in this appeal fixed at N300.00 in this Court and N350.00 in the Court of Appeal.
ANIAGOLU, J.S.C.: The central issue in this appeal is whether subsection 4 of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification Amendment) Act, No. 17 of 1985, which came into force on 27th August, 1985 had a retrospective effect so as to save a judgment delivered on 12th October, 1982 in breach of section 258(1) of the 1979 Constitution, that is to say, outside the three months period prescribed by the said S.258(1) of the Constitution (See: Dominic Onuorah Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 5 S.C. 79), for the delivery of a judgment after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses, before the said subsection 4 became operative on 27th August, 1985.
My learned brother, Nnamani, J.S.C. has very carefully dealt with the issues involved in this appeal and has, in my view, come to the right conclusions. I agree with his reasoning and conclusion.
One principle basic in our legal system, and this distinguishes it from dictatorial systems, is that the law presumes that the legislature does not intend what is unjust and leans against giving retrospective operation to statutes unless retrospective effect is clearly intended. Scarman, J., in CARSON v. CARSON (1964) 1 W.L.R. 511 at 516 said that statement of law has been
“so frequently quoted with approval that it now itself enjoys almost judicial authority”.
See also CROXFORD v. UNIVERSAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. (1936) 2 K.B 253 – per Scott L. J. at page 281).
I am clearly of the view that subsection 4 of section 258 of the Constitution which came into force on 27th August, 1985 was not intended by the legislature to have a retrospective effect and that its provision governed acts in futuro from the date on which it came into operation. The clear implication of section 258(1) of the Constitution was that at the expiration of three months from the date the judgment was reserved, after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses, the Court must deliver its judgment otherwise it would cease to have jurisdiction to pronounce upon that judgment. The legislature, however, being mindful of ameliorating the rigours of subsection 1 of section 258 enacted subsection 4, to come into force on 27th August, 1985 and beyond restoring limited jurisdiction to the Appeal Court to have a second look at that judgment, on an appeal to it, and determine if there was a miscarriage of justice, with power to declare it a nullity if there was a miscarriage of justice.
Although section 236 of the 1979 Constitution granted unlimited jurisdiction to the High Court of a State
“to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.”
Section 258(1) has provided the extent beyond which that jurisdiction must not be exercised in respect of a case which was heard and that is:
“not later than three months after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses” .
After the said three months the jurisdiction, I hold, ceases.
What subsection 4 has done is not to revive the old jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of the case in hand, which terminated at the end of the three months period, but to invest a new jurisdiction upon the Appellate Court which is seized with the matter on appeal, or on any other Court before which the judgment is produced on review, enjoining it, from the operative date, namely 27th August, 1985, not to set it aside or treat it as a nullity if the sole ground for that is the non-compliance with the provisions of S.258(1), unless that Court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal from, or review of, that decision is satisfied that the party complaining of such noncompliance has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.
It is, thus, a new power granted to the Appeal Court or a Court having power to review the judgment. It is not a power granted to the trial Court.
In the instant case on appeal the judgment was delivered on 12th October, 1982 almost three years before subsection 4 came into force on 27th August, 1985. By that date Dominic Ifezue, in Ifezue (supra), would have enjoyed his vested right of a judgment in his favour proclaiming that the decision of the court, in that case, was a nullity. To hold that subsection 4 retrospectively affects his vested right would have meant that a judgment which was already in his favour would no more enure to him and to his benefit. That sort of thing would only obtain in dictatorships and not in a democratic Nigeria.
I would therefore allow this appeal and hereby allow it. The judgment of the High Court delivered on 12th October, 1982 was a nullity and must be and is hereby set aside together with the judgment of the Court of Appeal on that judgment. I hereby order that the case be sent back to the Ibadan Judicial Division of the High Court of Oyo State for a retrial before another Judge.
I abide by the order for costs as decreed in the lead judgment of my learned brother, Nnamani, J.S.C.
KAZEEM, J.S.C.: The appeal in this case concerns the interpretation of Section 258(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 (hereinafter referred to as “the Constitution” which provides as follows:-
“(4) The decision of a court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on ground of non-compliance with the provisions of this section unless the court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal from or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining of such non-compliance has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.”
The judgment which was delivered on 12th October, 1982 in breach of Section 258(1) of the Constitution was only five days late from the date of the last address on 7th July, 1982; but an attempt which did not materialise, was made to avoid the breach by re-opening the proceedings before the expiry of the three months stipulated by the section: Hence it was contended by the Appellants that the whole proceedings had become a nullity in that the judgment was delivered in breach of Section 258(1) of the Constitution. However, the Respondents argued that since no miscarriage of justice was caused in spite of the breach, the whole proceedings in Section 258(4) of the Constitution which became operative on 27th August, 1985; and it should be interpreted to have retrospective effect to the time of delivery of the judgment in October 1982.
I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just read by my learned brother Nnamani J.S.C.; and I entirely agree with his reasons and the conclusions reached in the judgment. I adopt them as my own. However, I wish to add these few points.
The issue for determination in the appeal is: Since it has not been shown that the delay in delivering the judgment within the three months after the final address had occasioned a miscarriage of justice, should Section 258( 4) of the Constitution be interpreted to have effect retrospectively to save the whole proceedings at the trial Or must the subsection be interpreted as effective only from the 27th August, 1985 when it became operative, in which case the whole proceedings would have become a nullity Judging from the submissions made before us, the problem had been approached from three different angles namely:
Firstly, it was argued that the amendment should be considered as a matter of procedure and not of substantive laws, in which case it should be applied to have retrospective effect on the proceedings. Secondly, it was contended that the amendment should be regarded as a matter of substantive law or that it was intended by its tenor to take effect in futuro in which case it could not be applied retrospectively. Thirdly, that the matter should be considered on the basis of the jurisdiction conferred on the courts by the Constitution.
On the first and second submissions, we were urged to adopt the views of Nnaemeka-Agu, J.C.A. in Gafari v. Johnson (1986) 5 N, W.L. R. at p, 17. In that case, there had been a breach of Section 258(1) of the Constitution as in this case; and it was contended that Section 258(1) of the Constitution should be applied retrospectively to save the whole proceedings from being rendered null and void. In declining to apply the subsection retrospectively, the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal considered very carefully whether the amendment was a question of procedure or of substantive law or whether it was intended to be applied to have effect in futuro. It is to be noted that if the amendment was interpreted as a matter of procedure, it would have retrospective effect in which case, it would have saved the proceedings in this case from being a nullity as decided in the cases of Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 1 S.C. 79 and Paul Odi & Ano v. Gbaniyi Osafile & Ano (1985) 1 S.C. 37. On the other hand, if the amendment was regarded as a matter of substantive law or that it was intended to take effect in futuro, the whole proceedings would not be saved from being a nullity unless the delay would not have occasioned any miscarriage of justice.
After examining many authorities on the point, the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal was of the view that although there was some force in the submission that the provisions of Section 258(4) of the Constitution should be interpreted as a question of substantive law because it provides some relief against a breach of Section 258(1) of the Constitution, he thought that the matter should not be regarded merely as one of classification which in any case was not free from difficulties. He then said:
“It appears to me that for a constitutional provision such as this the best approach – and this is perfectly in accord with the presumption against retrospectivity – is to look at the provision itself and try to ascertain the dominant intention of the enactment: whether it is intended to apply in futuro or to take away vested rights. I derive considerable support for this approach from the decision of the Federal Supreme Court in Chief Aminu Are v. Attorney- General of Western Region (1960) 5 FSC. 111 at p. 112 where their Lordships, per Abbott, F.J., tried to answer the question whether or not an amendment to a limitation statute was merely a matter of procedure. He said at p. 112:
“It seems to me that the important words in the section are “shall be entertained.” It is beyond doubt in my view, that the claim in this case represented as it is by the Petition of Right, was “entertained.” by the Court on the day of its filing, namely 29th May, 1958 some three weeks prior to the coming into operation of the amending law is clearly in futuro, and it is not necessary to say that it could by necessary implication have the effect of putting a stop to the proceedings which had already been validly commenced. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to saying that the amending statute secured the undoing of something already done.”
“I shall follow this approach in this appeal.”
The learned Justice of the Court of Appeal further examined the provisions of the amendment, and concluded thus:
“It is clear that as in Chief Are’s Case (supra) the words “shall not be set aside or be treated as a nullity” are an expression which in the ordinary usage of English contemplates something happening in futuro, that is from the date the Decree came into force on the 27th of August, 1985.”
As regards the question of interpretation on the basis of the jurisdiction conferred on the courts by the Constitution, it is clear that, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Section 236(1) of the Constitution confers unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court of a State “to hear and determine” any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.
In the same manner, Section 219 of the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, to hear and determine appeals from the Federal High Court, High Court of a State, Sharia Court of Appeal of a State and Customary Court of Appeal of a State. And by virtue of Section 258(1) of the Constitution the jurisdiction to “hear and determine” matters before those courts, will terminate with the delivery of judgment not later than three months after the conclusion of evidence and final address. It is equally clear that the Constitution itself had set down the time limit for the exercise of the jurisdiction “to hear and determine” proceedings, and any determination made in breach of the period laid down by Section 258(1) of the Constitution will render the proceedings a nullity. See the observation of Obaseki J.S.C. in Paul Odi & Ano. v. Osafile & Ano. (1985)1 S.C. 37 at pages 75-77
In my view, what the amendment in Section 258(4) of the Constitution brought about, was to confer special jurisdiction upon the courts with effect from 27th August, 1985, to revive the proceedings which otherwise would have become a nullity “unless the court exercising the jurisdiction by way of appeal from or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining of such non-compliance has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.”
Whether therefore, the amendment is considered from the basis of taking effect in future; or on the basis of special jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution to revive the proceedings, I am also of the view that the amendment cannot be interpreted as operating retrospectively so as to affect proceedings decided prior to the 27th August, 1985, the date when Section 258(4) of the Constitution became operative.
For the above reason, and the more detailed reasons contained in the lead judgment of my learned brother Nnamani J.S.C., I will also allow the appeal and I adopt the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.
KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C. (Dissenting): I have read the judgment of my learned brother Nnamani, JSC, in this appeal. I have also read the judgment of the learned Chief Justice of Nigeria, Mohammed Bello. I have been unable to reconcile my understanding of the law, with the reasoning and conclusions of my learned brother Nnamani, JSC. I also do not agree with the reasons of the learned Chief Justice allowing this ground of appeal and therefore the appeal in its entirety, I have arrived at a different conclusion dismissing the appeal through a different reasoning.
The issue before us arises from the additional ground of appeal filed on the 25th February, 1987, by Professor A.-B. Kasunmu SAN, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the judgment of the Court of first instance affirmed by the Court below was a nullity having been delivered by the Court of first instance in contravention of the provisions of Section 258(1) of the Constitution 1979. Accordingly the judgment of the Court below was itself a nullity.
It is in my view appropriate to reproduce the relevant part of the motion on notice which contains the ground of appeal and particulars of error alleged.
They are as follows –
“The learned Justice of the Court of Appeal erred in Law in confirming the decision of the Lower Court which judgment is a nullity having regard to the provisions of section 258 (amended) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Particulars of Error
Judgment was reserved on 7th day of July, 1982 by the trial Court after the conclusion of evidence and final address which judgment was not delivered until the 12th day of October, 1982.”
Appellant also sought orders for dispensing with the preparation of the record of appeal, filing of briefs and that the appeal be heard on the papers attached to the motion paper.
When the motion came up on the 18th day of May, 1987. Mr. Odugbesan, Counsel for the respondent indicated that he did not object to the grant of leave to argue the additional ground of appeal but was opposing the ground of appeal. Chief Williams S.A.N. who was in Court in respect of another appeal, sought leave of the Court to be heard as amicus curiae. Mr. Odugbesan announced his preparedness to argue the appeal on the 19th May, 1987. The appeal was accordingly adjourned to 19th May, 1987 for hearing.
It became clear during argument that the contention of learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, Professor A.B. Kasunmu SAN in this appeal, was that the judgment appealed against affirmed a judgment that was delivered more than three months from the date of final addresses and in contravention of S.258(1) and was therefore a nullity on the delivery thereof. He therefore contended that by virtue of the provisions of section 258(1) of the Constitution 1979, that judgment remained a nullity even though it was not realized by the Court below, at that time, and remained a nullity even now. It was his submission that the decided cases of this Court on this position of the law are numerous and well settled. Counsel referred to the provisions of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) (Amendment) Decree No 17 of 1985 which came into effect on 21/8/85 which amended section 258 of the Constitution 1979 by the addition of sub-sections (4) and (5) and submitted that it had no retrospective effect. Counsel relied on the recent decisions of this Court in Kpema v. The State (1986) 1 NWLR. 396, 405; Taylor v. Trustees of Trinity Methodist Church (1986)4 NWLR. 136. Counsel argued that the question is whether the amendment to section 258 applied to decisions delivered or on appeal before the 27/8/85 when the amendment came into force. It was contended that to accept that it did was to validate judgments which were null and void. It was submitted that there was nothing in the amendment to warrant such a construction. Counsel contended that the amendment affected vested rights. Professor Kasunmu argued that a nullity involved a vested right. Referring to the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v. Vernazza, (1960) AC. 965 Counsel submitted that the issue in that case was whether the statute construed was substantive or procedural. Referring to Craies on Statute Law 7th Ed. p.701 and Gafari v. Johnson (1986) 5 NWLR. 66 at p.71, it was submitted that the amendment in issue was substantive, and affected vested rights. It was finally submitted that the amendment concerned jurisdiction and therefore affected substantive rights. Professor Kasunmu opened his argument by referring to the case of Obadiaru v Uyigue (1986)3 SC.39 with respect to the position of this Court. He then referred to Ifezue v Mbadugha (1984) S.C. which is the locus classicus on the construction of section 258(1) of the Constitution 1979.
In his submission, Mr. Odugbesan emphasized the intention of the legislature and the mischief aimed at by the amendment. He contended that the mischief aimed at by the amendment was to correct the hardship resulting from the rigidity of section 258(1), and that the amendment was directed at appellate Courts. Mr. Odugbesan argued that as from 27/8/85 when the amendment came into force, all applications for a declaration of nullity on the grounds of non-compliance with section 258(1) must comply with the provisions of Section 258(4). Accordingly, all judgment even if void, but not so declared, were affected by the amendment. It was therefore submitted that as from the commencement of the amendment all applications before the Court to set aside a judgment and relying on Section 258(1), must establish that the violation of section 258(1) has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
Counsel also contended that the amendment was procedural in nature and therefore prima facie retrospective. Counsel urged the court not to allow this appeal solely on the contravention of Section 258(1). Section 258(4) which is now in force ought also to be complied with.
Making his own contribution as amicus curiae, Chief Williams’s submission clearly supported the position taken by Mr. Odugbesan for the Respondents. Like Mr. Odugbesan. he submitted that the amendment applied only to appellate Court. He added, reviews on application for certiorari. In Construing the words of Section 258(4) the learned Counsel submitted that the provisions of the Statute should be construed as they are. It was submitted that where the words are clear and unambiguous effect must be given to them. The retrospectivity rule he submitted, was a matter of presumption. He submitted that in the application of the provisions of Section 258(4), reference to the date of the decision sought to be nullified was immaterial and not required. We were referred to West v. Gwynne (1911) 2 Ch.1. Counsel submitted that it was important to consider the scope and of operation of the section as a whole. We were also referred to Attorney-General v. Vernazza (1960) AC.965. Chief Williams supported the position adopted by Mr. Odugbesan, and submitted that since the judgment of the Court of Appeal sought to be set aside was made after the amendment came into force, the amendment ought to be applied. Reference was made to Registered Trustees v. Adeosun (1986) 3 NWLR. 561 in support of the submission, and Gafari v. Johnson (1986) 5 NWLR 66 against the contention. Counsel submitted that the amendment was intended, and had modified section 258(1) and ought to have given a beneficial construction. We were referred to Halsbury’s Law of England 4th Ed. Vol. 44, para. 922 and to section 6(1) (c) of the Interpretation Act 1964. Citing Kpema v. State (1986) 1 NWLR. 396, Taylor v. Methodist Church (1986) 4 NWLR. 136, Chief Williams submitted that this Court should not be inhibited by these decisions from applying the clear and unambiguous provisions of S. 258(4). It was submitted that the issue in the instant case was not a matter of retrospectivity, since there was no definition as to the circumstances and the situation to which sub-section (4) of section 258 was to be applicable. Counsel submitted that if the amendment was held to be retrospective in effect, it should be regarded as a remedial statute modifying a rule of procedure and should be given a beneficial construction.
It seems to me that the problems of the construction of section 258 of the Constitution 1979 has continued to present difficulties despite valiant judicial efforts to construe the provision and its subsequent amendment in the light of the problems disclosed by its operation and application. I think it will be useful to adopt a historical approach to the proper construction of these provisions. The provisions in issue are Section 258(1), and the amendment which is the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) (Amendment) Decree No. 17 of 1985, which introduced S.258(4). The background to the inclusion of Section 258(1) as a provision of the Constitution has been very fully stated in the locus classicus of Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 5 SC. 79. The cases of Ariori & ors. v. Elemo & ors. (1983) 1 SC.13; Odi & ors. v. Osafile (1985) 1 NWLR. 17; Awobiyi & Sons v. Igbalaiye Bros. (1965) 1 All NLR. 163; Lawal v. Dawadu & anor. (1972) 1 All NLR (Part 2) 270; Akpor v. Iguoriguo (1978) 2 SC. 115 where judgments were reserved and adjourned for several months after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses of Counsel resulted in the apt laconical description of ‘preserving’ judgments rather than reserving them. The effect on the confidence in the proper administration of justice led to the mandatory provision that every court established under the Constitution shall deliver its judgment not later than three months after the conclusion of evidence and the addresses of Counsel. The expression every court has been construed to include all the Courts established under the Constitution which included appellate Courts. The expression not later than three months from the conclusion of evidence and the addresses of Counsel has been construed as a limitation on the exercise by the Courts of jurisdiction vested in them under the Constitution. See Odi & ors. v. Osafile & ors. (Supra). Accordingly the exercise of jurisdiction after the period prescribed has been held to be without jurisdiction, and the consequent acts a nullity. See Ifezue v. Mbadugha (Supra). There is no doubt that on the express words of the provisions without reading into them words which the legislature omitted but ought to have added to save the provision from absurdity, this construction cannot be faulted. See – Ogunmade v. Fadayiro (1972) 8-9 SC. 1; Nabham v. Nahham (1967) 1 All NLR. 42. However, the lone dissenting opinion of M. Bello JSC (now C.J.N. as he then was) in that case pointed out the inconvenience and injustice that will result from giving the provision a mandatory construction. He held that it should he read as directory, so that the non-compliance with the provision will merely be regarded as irregular and the act consequent will only be void where the non-compliance will result in a miscarriage of justice.
Ifezue v. Mbadugha (Supra) continued as the undoubted authority with respect to the construction of Section 258(1). The profession accepted the position grudgingly because contravention by even one or two days, which would have not resulted in a miscarriage of justice was relied upon to set aside very well reasoned decisions. See – Gafari v. Johnson (1986) 5 NWLR. 66. The provision then became the panacea for appellants who had no other reasonable ground of appeal. Appeals were allowed, parties were sent back to the court below without examination by the appellate Courts of the merits of their case. It was in this background that the amendment of section 258, by S.6 of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) (Amendment) Decree No. 17 of 1985 was promulgated and by sub-section (4) of Section 258 providing that the decision of a Court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 258(1) and enabled appellate Courts to consider whether the non-compliance complained of had resulted in a miscarriage of justice. This provision came into effect on the 27th August, 1985.
The main issue for determination in this appeal is whether the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) (Amendment) Decree No. 17 of 1985 which came into force on the 27th August, 1985, applied to the judgment under appeal in this case which was delivered, without jurisdiction by the High Court, Ibadan on the 12th day of October, 1982 and was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeal, Ibadan on 22/5/86. In other words, whether Decree No. 17 of 1985 has any retrospective effect
It has been submitted by Counsel for the appellant that since the amending Decree took effect on the 27th August, 1985, it could not apply to judgment delivered before that date. Again, that the Decree concerned vested right which is a substantive legislation and therefore could not be a procedural legislation and accordingly could not be retrospective in effect. The vested right relied upon was claimed to be the right by the appellant to have the judgment remain a nullity.
I have already referred to the cases cited in support of the contention. The main contention of Counsel for the Respondents is that the Statute was restrospective, and therefore affected judgments delivered before the date it came into force. I shall now consider the contentions. Resolution of the competing contentions necessitates an analytical consideration of the provisions of Section 258(1) and (4).
It is now necessary to construe the provisions of section 258(1) and (4) in order to gather the intention of the legislature by consideration of the mischief which the amendment was designed to prevent.
I have stated that the effect of the decided cases led by Ifezue v. Mbadugha (Supra) was that compliance with the provisions of Section 258(1) was mandatory. The effect of non-compliance resulted in nullity of consequent acts. The fundamental rule of the construction of Statutes to which all Courts adhere is that a statute is to be expounded “according to the intent of them that made it.” Where the words are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary and natural meaning. See University of Ibadan v. Ademolekun (1967)1 All NLR.213; Nabham v. Nabham (Supra); Lawal v. G.B. Ollivant Ltd. (1972)3 SC.124; Ahmed v. Kassim (1958) 3 FSC. 51; Yerokun v. Adeleke (1960) 5 FSC. 126.
In construing the words of a statute, the literal rule of construction is generally preferred. Where the provision is unequivocal and clear it has to be followed unless the words lead to absurdity. Where there is a gap or omission, it is for the legislature and not the Courts to fill. In Ifezue v. Mbadugha (Supra); Bello J.S.C., (as he then was) now C. J., attempted to fill the gap by reading into S.258(1) the words requiring the miscarriage of justice. The majority rejected the attempt. See Ogunmade v. Fadayiro (1972) R-9 S.C. J; Toriola v. Williams (1982)7 SC. 27. In determining the true meaning of an amending legislation it is generally useful, if not invaluable, to consider how the law stood when the amendment was made, what the mischief was for which the amended law did not provide and the remedy provided by the amendment to cure that mischief – See Heydon’s ease (1584)3 Rep.7b; Re Mayfair Property Co. (1898) 2 Ch.2R, 35.
I have endeavoured in this judgment to sketch a very short account of the travails of section 258(1) of the Constitution. It is well settled that the history of the circumstances which led to the enactment is generally allowed in the construction of the meaning, aims and scope of the enactment. See Udoye v. The State (1967) NMLR.197; Uwaifo v. A. G. (19R2)7 SC.124 Such historical factors enable the interpreter to determine whether the statute, or where it is an amendment, was intended to alter the law or leave it where it stood before – See Re A Debtor (19tn) I KR.705. See Mobil v. Federal Board of Inland Revenue (1977) 3 SC.53 Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank (1983) 1 SC. NLR. 296, 328. It is one of the presumptions in aid of construction of statutes that statutes enacted to amend the law are directed against defects exposed by the operation and application of the law sought to be amended. See Mobil v. F.B.I.R. (Supra). I think it is apposite to use the words of Jessel M.R. in Holme v. Guy (1877) 5 Ch. D. 901, 905, where he said,
“The Court is not to be oblivious of the history of law and legislation. Although the Court is not at liberty to construe an Act of Parliament by the motives which influenced the legislature, yet when the history of law and legislation tells the Court, and prior judgments tell this present Court, what the object of the legislature was, the Court is to see whether the terms of the section are such as fairly to carry out that object and no other, and to read the Section with a view to finding out what it means, and not with a view to extending it to something that was not intended.”
The provision under consideration falls squarely within the scope of this dictum which I adopt.
I shall now turn to sub-section 4 of section 258. It is important for a clear understanding to read the two sub-sections together. See Yesufu v. Ojo (1958) 3 FSC. 106, Akaigbe v. Idama (1964) 1 All NLR. 322. In this case in addition to reading the provisions of the Constitution vesting jurisdiction in the Courts. Section 258(1) (2) (3)(4) (5) should be read together. However, for the purposes of this judgment only sub-sections (1) and (4) are relevant and shall be construed together. I have already stated that section 258(1) has been judicially construed, and it is the effect of the construction placed on it that has provoked the promulgation of sub-section (4). Section 258(4) provides as follows-
“The decision of a Court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of this Section unless the Court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining of such non-compliance has suffered a miscarriage of justice thereof.”
The effect of this amendment is that an appellate Court is enjoined not to set aside or treat the judgment of a Court of first instance as a nullity solely on the ground that there was non-compliance with the constitutional requirement of the delivery of judgment by the Court not later than three months from the conclusion of evidence and final addresses. A person relying on such non-compliance for setting aside a judgment as being a nullity must in addition establish that he had suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason of such non-compliance. It therefore follows as a result of this amendment that non-compliance with the provision of section 258(1) is no longer mandatory. The requirement of section 258(1) may now correctly be described as directory only. Thus the amendment has created a situation whereby the provision applies only mandatorily in the Court of first instance. The provision is directory in the appellate Court. However. since the paramount consideration is whether the non-compliance with s.2SH(1) has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, the mandatory nature of the requirement of non-compliance in the Court of first instance seems to me of no relevance. The noncompliance which renders the judgment prima facie a nullity, requires a judgment of the appellate Court to declare the judgment a nullity- See UAC v. Macfoy (1962) AC. 152
It seems to me that the two sub-sections aforesaid have created the distinction between the effect of non-compliance which results in a nullity, See – Ifezue v. Mbadugha (Supra) and a non-compliance which is a mere irregularity in the appellate Courts. See s.258(4). This is an undesirable legal situation created by the drafting of the two sub-sections. The position now is as follows:
(a) when non-compliance does not result in a miscarriage of justice, it shall be regarded as an irregularity and the proceedings and judgment does not result in nullity. See – Harkness v. Bello Asbestos & Engineering Ltd. (1967) 2 QB. 729
(b) where non-compliance results in a miscarriage of justice the proceedings and judgment is to be regarded as a nullity
See – Re Pritchard deed (1963) Ch.502. In my opinion a combined reading of sub-sections (1) and (4) of section 258 of the Constitution requires every Court to deliver its judgment within three months of the conclusion of evidence and final addresses. An appellate Court considering an application to set aside such judgment on the ground of non-compliance shall not declare such a judgment a nullity solely on the ground of such non-compliance, An appellate Court shall, if satisfied that the non-compliance has resulted in a miscarriage of justice declare the judgment a nullity and set it aside. If satisfied that no miscarriage of justice has resulted thereby the judgment will not be set aside on the ground of non-compliance. Such non-compliance will be regarded as an irregularity.
The pertinent issue before this Court relates to the “scope of the application of the amendment. I have stated that the amendment is directed to appellate Courts and not to Courts of first instance. Consideration of the application of section 258(4) is only relevant when the appellant is seeking to set aside the judgment of a Court on the ground of non-compliance with Section 258(1).
Considerable importance has been attached to the question whether the amendment was procedural or substantive, and whether it was retrospective or not. It has been submitted that there are two decisions of this Court and one of the Court of Appeal that the amendment was not retrospective and one of the Court of Appeal that it is. In the first category are Kpema v. State (1986) 1 NWLR.396; Taylor v. Trustees of the Methodist Church (1986) 4 NWLR. 136; Gafari v. Johnson (1986) 5 NWLR. 66. In the second category is Registered Trustees & anor. v. Adeosun & anor. (1986) 3 NWLR. 561. On a careful reading of the judgments, there seems to be no conflict in the decisions. In Kpema v. The State (Supra) held not to be retrospective, there was no miscarriage of justice. In Taylor’s case, there was miscarriage of justice having adjourned the judgment for more than 6 months. In Gafari’s case the adjournment was for 7 months. In Adeosun the contention that the provision was retrospective was accepted. On the facts that was not an issue in any of the cases.
It is a fundamental presumption of statutory construction that no Statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the law or arises by necessary and distinct implication. See – West v. Gwynne (1911) 2 Ch. 15; Ikpassa v. State (1981) 9 SC. 7. Where the date of commencement of a legislation is clearly indicated in the enactment that date governs, and the law except otherwise stated in any of its provisions cannot be retrospective from the date so indicated. See- Ehiriukwu v. Ohanyereuwa (1959) 4 FSC. 212; Okafor v. Ibeziako (1965) 1 All NLR.407; Johnson v. State (1981) 2 SC. 29. The non retrospective effect of the amendment has been in this enactment clearly indicated. This is because a statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective effect or operation than its language renders necessary – See Lauri v. Renad (1892) 3 Ch. 421: Habib v. Principal Immigration Officer (1958) 3 FSC. 75. It is conceded that the presumption operates primarily and chiefly, where the enactment would prejudicially affect vested rights, or the legality or legitimacy of past transactions. The presumption is that legislation affecting vested rights or likely to impair them, creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or past considerations are not intended to be retrospective. See Babatunde v. Governor (1960) 5 FSC. 59.
Generally, legislation which governs procedure and practice of the Courts are presumed to be retrospective. See Swiss Air v. A.B.C. (1971) 1 All NLR.37. This is because no person has vested right in any course of procedure. Where the mode of procedure is altered, the litigant has no other right than to proceed according to the procedure as altered. It may even render his position more disadvantageous as in A. G. v. Vernazza (Supra). It is often difficult to distinguish between matters of procedure and those of substantive right. For instance a provision creating a right of appeal is different from that regulating procedure. In enactment regulating procedure prescribes the methods of enforcement of rights and duties and obtaining redress for wrongful invasion of these rights as well as the enforcement of obligations, or duties. Whereas substantive law is concerned with the creation, definition, limitation or regulation of these rights, duties or obligations. It follows therefore that imposing on the Courts an obligation, or duty to do something as this amendment has done is creating a new obligation, which is a matter of substantive law and not one of procedure. See A.G. of Western Region v. Chief Are (1960) 5 FSC.111
It was contended that the amendment being one of procedure was retrospective. I have not been persuaded that the amendment can be so construed. In the first place the presumption of retrospectivity has been displaced by the provision of a commencement date and the absence of any word expressly or by implication that it is. See Habib v. Principal Immigration Officer (1958):1 FSC.75. Secondly, the imposition of a new duty on appellate Courts deciding the questions of nullity based on non-compliance with section 258(1) is not a procedural but a substantive requirement the operation of which necessarily must be prospective in nature. See Attorney-General of Western Nigeria v. Chief Are (1960) 5 FSC.111. I therefore cannot, hold that the amendment was intended to be retrospective to a date earlier than the commencement of the Decree. I am of the firm opinion that the amendment is not retrospective. The English case of A.G. v. Vernazza (Supra) is not applicable to the facts of the case. I agree with Counsel for the appellant on this contention.
I however, do not find acceptable the submission by Professor Kasunmu. SAN that the judgment which is a nullity vested in the appellant any right which could be affected by the retrospective operation of the amendment. I think it is commonly accepted that no rights arise or can be derived from a nullity to displace the presumption of retrospectivity where it properly applies. See UAC Ltd. v. Macfoy (Supra). I hold that the judgment appealed against created no vested right and the proposition does not apply to this case. In any event the amendment not being retrospective the issue stricto sensu does not arise.
I now turn to the application of the amendment. It is well settled that every law takes effect from the commencement date indicated in the Statute or any future date so indicated. See Ebiriukwu v. Ohanyerenwa (1959) 4 FSC. 212. I have carefully read the amendment together with the parent provision. I have also analysed the provisions in this judgment. It is to me inescapable that the amendment was intended for the creation of duty on appellate Courts hearing appeals seeking to set aside judgments on the ground of non-compliance with section 258(1). It therefore applies to all appeals brought before appellate Courts as from the date of commencement of the amendment. See – Onuoha v. C. O. P. (1959) 4 FSC. 23.
I think it is pertinent as a matter of emphasis to accentuate the fact that the amendment in issue relates to the approach to be adopted by “the Court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal from or review of that decision…”
The Appellate Court is specifically enjoined not to set aside or treat the judgment appealed against as a nullity, unless it is “satisfied that the party complaining of such non-compliance has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.”
The words of this amendment could not be construed to refer to the imposition of a duty on the Court of first instance whose decision is subject matter of appeal. Its operation and application which speaks of judgment appealed against is limited to the function of the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly section 258(4) applies and can be invoked only in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. I agree entirely with the submission of Mr. Odugbesan for the Respondents and Chief Williams SAN, as amicus curiae, that the amendments applied only to appellate Courts. I therefore also agree with the further submission by Chief Williams that the date of judgment in the Court of first instance was therefore immaterial to the question of the application of the amendment. The relevant consideration is the date of the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over the judgment sought to be set aside or nullified on the grounds of non-compliance with section 258(1). In Ige v. Obiwale (1967) 1 All NLR.276; Madarikan JSC reading the judgment of this Court said,
“In the absence of special provision, the amending law can only affect appeals in cases instituted on or after the date on which it came into operation, and no such provision was made. See N. K. Adamolekun v. The Council of the University of Ibadan SC.3781 1966 – judgment delivered on the 7th August, 1967” See also Omogodo v. State (1981) 5 Sc. 5; Swiss Air v. A.B.C. (1971) 1 All NLR. 37.
The appeal against the judgment was filed on the 16th July, 1986. The ground alleging non-compliance with section 258(1) of the Constitution 1979 was filed on the 26th February, 1987. This is well within the period since the amendment came into force, on the 28th August, 1985. This Court is therefore bound to apply the provisions of Section 258(4) in determining the effect of non-compliance with section 258(1) on the judgment appealed against. This is because it is the provision in force in determining applications seeking to nullify or set aside judgment on the ground of non-compliance with section 258(1). I agree entirely with the submission of Chief Williams, SAN that the issue in this case is not one of retrospectivity. It is merely the application by the Court of the law in force to the case before it.
The view that this Court in so holding will be overruling its own decision in Ifezue v. Mbadugha (Supra) on the slightest pre seems to me mistaken. It is the obligation of this or any other Court established under the Constitution to adhere to rules of precedent. It is also an obligation to give effect to laws, whether abrogating or amending existing rights or creating new rights. It will be intolerable for society were the Courts refuse to recognise new rights or enforce new duties under the guise of observing precedents and not disturbing settled decisions. In my opinion, nothing is settled which does not enjoy the support of the law. It is the more intolerable for the administration of justice and the preservation of the polity if the Courts ignore clear and unequivocal constitutional provisions effecting a change, See Olawoyin v. C.O.P. (1961) 1 All NLR, 203. The change effected in S.258(4) was prompted by the experience from judicial decisions.
The ground of appeal argued has not satisfied the requirements of the amendment by showing that in addition to non-compliance with section 258(1), i.e. for delivering judgment after 3 months of the conclusion of evidence and final addresses, and that the non-compliance thereby resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The judgment on appeal is caught by the amendment. The ground of appeal therefore fails, and is dismissed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Appellant shall pay N300.00 as costs to the Respondents in this Court, and N350.00 in the Court below.
BELGORE, J.S.C.: I have had a preview of the lead majority judgment by Nnamani, J.S.C. with which I agree, Subsection 4 of section 258 of the Constitution by the very words used to wit “No judgment shall be” envisages no retrospective application and certainly does not govern judgment given prior to 27th August, 1985. The judgment of Oguntoye J. given on 12th October, 1982, more than three months after final addresses, was a nullity and caught by the authorities Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 5 S.C. 79; Shodipo v. Lemminkainen O. Y (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. pt 8. 547. I also allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 12th October, 1982 and that of Court of Appeal dated 28th May, 1986. I make the same order as to costs as made by my learned brother Nnamani, J.S.C. in the lead majority judgment.
Appeal allowed.
Appearances
Professor A.B. Kasunmu SAN, with him O. O. Ajose-Adeogun For Appellant
AND
Tunde Odugbesan, with him Bode Elemide
Chief F. R. A. Williams SAN with him Dr. B. O. Babalakin and T. E. Williams as Amicus Curiae For Respondent



