LAMIDI ADEGOKE & ANOR v. SABALEMOTU SANNI ADESINA
(2000)LCN/0861(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 5th day of July, 2000
CA/B/102/96
Before Their Lordships
SUNDAY AKINOLA AKINTAN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
SAKA ADEYEMI IBIYEYE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
KUMAI BAYANG AKAAHS Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
- LAMIDI ADEGOKE
2. YAYA ANTHONY – Appellant(s)
AND
SABALEMOTU SANNI ADESINA
(Suing by Ambali Kadiri) – Respondent(s)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT PLEADINGS FILED IN THE CUSTOMARY OR NATIVE COURTS AND TECHNICALITIES HAVE NO PLACE WITH THEIR ADJUDICATION OF CASES, THE ATTITUDE OF THE APPELLATE COURTS TO THEIR DECISIONS IS THAT IT IS NOT THE FORM OF AN ACTION BUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CLAIM THAT IS THE DOMINANT FACTOR.
The position of the law is that since pleadings are not filed in the Customary or Native Courts and technicalities have no place with their adjudication of cases, the attitude of the appellate courts to their decisions is that it is not the form of an action but the substance of the claim that is the dominant factor.
Similarly, the entire proceedings before such courts have to be carefully scrutinised to ascertain the subject matter of the case and the issues raised therein. In doing this, the entire records have to be perused carefully in ensuring exactly what was in dispute in the action before the court. See Olujinle v. Adeagbo (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt.75) 238; Osu v. Igiri (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.69) 221; Ajao v. Alao (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt.45) 802; Akpan v. Utin (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt.463) 634; and Onyah v. Ikalile (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt.406) 150. It follows therefore that in deciding exactly what the claim was in the action instituted at the trial Customary Court in the present case, it is not enough to just hold on to what is shown as the claim in the record of appeal. This is because one needs to take into consideration that what appeared on the record could probably have been written down by the court clerk after the plaintiff must have told him why he wanted to sue the defendants in the case. Such might not necessarily be the exact claim of the plaintiff. Rather, his entire case could later emerge in the course of the hearing. PER AKINTAN, J.C.A.
AKINTAN, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal from the judgment of Edo State Customary Court of Appeal, sitting in Benin delivered on 26th September, 1995 in suit No. CCA/8A/95. The case started at Oredo Area Customary Court where the action was filed. It was, however, transferred to the Ovia South-West Area Customary Court, Iguobazuwa where the trial eventually took place. The present respondent was the plaintiff while the present appellants were the defendants. The plaintiff’s claim against the defendants was for possession of the house at No. 40 Lagos Street, Benin city; an account for all monies collected as rent in respect of the house; and that the 2nd defendant (now 2nd appellant) should vacate the rooms he was wrongfully occupying in the house.
The plaintiff’s case at the trial was that the said house at No.40 Lagos Street, Benin city belonged to his late father, Sanni Adesina who died intestate in 1933. His said father had two houses in all; the one now in dispute in Benin City and another one in Lagos. The man also had issues from two wives. Upon his death intestate his properties, including his two houses, were shared in accordance with the Yoruba customary law of idi igi (i.e. equally among the children according to the number of their mothers). The house at No. 40 Lagos Street, Benin City was given to the plaintiff while the one in Lagos was given to the 1st defendant (now 1st appellant) in line with the afore-mentioned Yoruba customary sharing system of “idi-igi”. This was because the plaintiff and 1st defendant were born by each of the two wives of the deceased. The 1st appellant however refused to give up possession of the house in Benin, hence the respondent had to institute the action. The defendants’ case was that the house in Lagos was acquired by the Lagos State Government and that the compensation paid was shared by the two lines and that the house in Benin was equally shared by the two lines. The portion of the house occupied by the 2nd appellant is part of the portion of the house shared to the 1st appellant’s line. The trial court rejected the defence put up by the defendants and accepted the plaintiff’s version. Judgment was accordingly entered for the plaintiff in respect of the 1st and 3rd legs of his claim. The court therefore held that the house in dispute was in fact shared to the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant was ordered to vacate the part of the house he was occupying. The claim for an account was refused.
The defendants were dissatisfied with the verdict of the trial court. They appealed to the Customary Court of Appeal, Benin City. That Court, after taking submissions from learned Counsel for each of the parties, dismissed the appeal in its judgment delivered on 26th September, 1995. The appellants were still not satisfied with the verdict of the Customary Court of Appeal. They have appealed to this court. The appellants filed two grounds of appeal against the judgment. The parties filed their briefs in this court. The appellants formulated the following single issue as arising for determination in the appeal:
“Whether the trial Area Customary Court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim filed by the plaintiff.”
The same single issue was also adopted in the respondent’s brief.
It is submitted in the appellants’ brief that since the plaintiff’s claim was for possession of the land and building known and situate at No. 40 Lagos Street, Benin City and that by virtue of sections 34(1) & (2) and 39(1) of the Land Use Act, the trial Customary Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action. This is said to be because the property in question is within the urban area and as such only the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. It is further submitted that what was in issue in the case before the court was title to the land and building thereon. The relief claimed could therefore be maintained not in the Customary Court but in the High Court. This is said to be because what was sought from the court was a grant of title to the land.
It is submitted in reply in the respondent’s brief that the claim before the trial Customary Court was that of inheritance upon intestacy for which the court had unlimited jurisdiction. It is argued that since jurisdiction of a court is usually determined by the claim, it was therefore clear from the claim that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim before it. The location of where the property to be inherited is said to be immaterial to the jurisdiction of the court in cases of inheritance.
It is also submitted that section 39(1) of the Land Use Act is irrelevant to the determination of the present appeal because the claim before the trial Customary Court had nothing to do with declaration of title to landed property in Benin City. Reference is made to section 24 of the Land Use Act and it is submitted that that provision is for the recognition of devolution on death intestate or the right to inherit property in accordance with relevant customary law on death intestate.
The only question raised in this appeal, is whether the trial Customary Court has jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff’s claim before the court? It is settled law that jurisdiction is usually determined by the plaintiff’s claim before the court. See Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.117) 517; Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31; and Okonma v. Nwaegbu (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt.225) 622.
The action in the instant case was filed at the Ovia South-West Area Customary Court. The position of the law is that since pleadings are not filed in the Customary or Native Courts and technicalities have no place with their adjudication of cases, the attitude of the appellate courts to their decisions is that it is not the form of an action but the substance of the claim that is the dominant factor.
Similarly, the entire proceedings before such courts have to be carefully scrutinised to ascertain the subject matter of the case and the issues raised therein. In doing this, the entire records have to be perused carefully in ensuring exactly what was in dispute in the action before the court. See Olujinle v. Adeagbo (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt.75) 238; Osu v. Igiri (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.69) 221; Ajao v. Alao (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt.45) 802; Akpan v. Utin (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt.463) 634; and Onyah v. Ikalile (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt.406) 150. It follows therefore that in deciding exactly what the claim was in the action instituted at the trial Customary Court in the present case, it is not enough to just hold on to what is shown as the claim in the record of appeal. This is because one needs to take into consideration that what appeared on the record could probably have been written down by the court clerk after the plaintiff must have told him why he wanted to sue the defendants in the case. Such might not necessarily be the exact claim of the plaintiff. Rather, his entire case could later emerge in the course of the hearing.
The dispute before the trial court as could be seen from the record, was in respect of who was entitled to inherit the house at No. 40 Lagos Street, Benin City among the two issues of the late Sanni Adesina who died intestate in 1933. The two issues are the 1st appellant and the respondent; while the 2nd appellant was the person living in the house on the authority of the 1st appellant. It is clear from the evidence led at the trial that the two houses of the deceased were shared upon his death intestate in accordance with Yoruba customary practice known as “idi-igi.”
The difference in the plaintiff’s case and that of the 1st defendant is that while the plaintiff maintained that the disputed house in Benin was shared to his mother’s children and that the one in Lagos was shared to the 1st defendant mother’s children, the 1st defendant denied that claim and the court rejected the defence he put forward and entered judgment for the plaintiff.
Section 39(1) of the Land Use Act (Cap. 202) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 provides that:
“39(1) The High Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in respect of the following proceedings
(a) proceedings in respect of any land the subject of a statutory right of occupancy granted by the Governor or deemed to be granted by him under this Act; and for the purposes of this paragraph, proceedings includes proceedings for a declaration of title to a statutory right of occupancy;
(b) proceedings to determine any question as to the persons entitled to compensation payable for improvements on land under this Act.”
It is clear from the provisions of section 39(1) of the Land Use Act quoted above, that jurisdiction in proceedings in respect of land the subject of a statutory right of occupancy granted by the Governor or deemed granted by him under the Act is exclusively vested in the High Court. But the claim before the trial Customary Court was not one in respect of land the subject-matter of a statutory right of occupancy granted by the Governor or deemed granted by him. Rather, the dispute was who, between the plaintiff and 1st defendant, who are issues of the deceased owner of the house in dispute, was entitled to inherit the building under the Yoruba customary law and practice.
It is necessary at this juncture to refer to the provisions of section 24 of the Land Use Act. That section provides inter alia that:
Section 24: The devolution of the rights of an occupier upon death shall-
a) in the case of a customary right of occupancy, unless non customary law or any other customary law applies, be regulated by the customary law existing in the locality in which the land is situated; and
(b) in the case of a statutory right of occupancy (unless any non-customary law or other customary law applies) be regulated by the customary law of the deceased occupier at the time of his death relating to the distribution of property of like nature to a right of occupancy.
The effect of the above provision is that the Land Use Act has not abrogated inheritance of land under customary law. It follows therefore that the jurisdiction conferred on the trial Customary Court to adjudicate in matters of this nature in section 20(1) of the Customary Courts Edict 1984 of the defunct Bendel State but still applicable in Edo State remains intact and unfettered by any of the provisions of the Land Use Act.
In the result, I hold that there is no merit in the appeal. I accordingly dismiss it. I hold that the trial Customary Court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim before it. The respondent is awarded N3,000.00 costs.
IBIYEYE, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Akintan, JCA and I entirely agree with his reasoning and conclusion.
I will, however, add some comments by way of elaboration. It is common ground that the only issue in this appeal touches jurisdiction which is fundamental in the assumption of authority by any court with regard to the controversy brought to it by litigants.
The issue of jurisdiction is discernible from the pleadings of parties. Pleadings invariably set out the claims and denials of parties to a cause of action and a perusal of them discloses whether or not the court seised of the matter in dispute has jurisdiction to adjudicate. This is the situation in courts other than Customary and Area Courts where pleadings are not filed. The situation in courts where pleadings are not filed has been lucidly dealt with in the lead judgment and I entirely agree that the mere enumeration of reliefs by parties in the Customary Court as in the instant case, is not enough to identify the true nature of the claim of the plaintiff or complainant. Recourse has to be had to the items of evidence adduced by both the plaintiff/complainant and the defendant in order to ascertain the basis of claim and in which court such claim is tenable.The resultant effect of such indepth consideration of the record of proceedings in the trial court in this matter shows that it touches the issue of inheritance. Both section 24(a) of the Land Use Act Cap. 202 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 and section 20(1) of the Customary Courts Edict 1984 of the defunct Bendel State as applicable in Edo State appear to have provided for the type of court which has jurisdiction on the issue of inheritance. Thus section 24 of the Land Use Act reads:
The devolution of the rights of an occupier upon death shall in the case of a customary right of occupancy, unless non customary law or any other customary law applies, be regulated by the customary law existing in the locality in which the land is situated; and
(b) (not applicable).
Section 20(1) of the Customary Courts Edict 1984 reads:
The jurisdiction and power of a Customary Court in civil causes and matters shall be as set out in the first schedule to this Edict.
Item 5 of the first schedule vests the Area Customary Courts with Unlimited jurisdiction in matters of inheritance upon intestacy under customary law.
(Italics mine for emphasis).
In view of the foregoing provisions and in further view of the fact that the subject matter of the cause of action is the house of an intestate situate in Benin City in Edo State and subject to Bini customary law, it is apparent that section 20(1) of the Customary Courts Edict 1984 of the defunct Bendel State as applicable in Edo State conferred jurisdiction only on the trial Customary Court at Iguobazuwa. In effect, the issue before the trial Customary Court was not on title to land but on inheritance thereby rendering the invocation of section 39(1) of the Land Use Act irrelevant.
I also hold that there is no merit in this appeal and I dismiss it. I abide by the consequential orders including those on costs.
AKAAHS, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother Akintan, JCA with which I entirely agree. He correctly, in my view, identified the cause of action namely, the person entitled to inherit the house at No. 40 Lagos Street. Benin City left behind by Sanni Adesina who died intestate in 1933. The Oredo Area Customary Court and later the Ovie South-West Area Customary Court. Iguobazuwa were seised with jurisdiction to entertain the claim in accordance with section 20(1) Customary Courts Edict 1984 of the defunct Bendel State applicable in Edo State and an appeal would lie to the Customary Court of Appeal. Edo State by virtue of section 247 of the 1979 Constitution since the issue involved a question of Customary Law. Consequently, the appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed. I abide by the order made on costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Appearances
- I. Ukpebor, (holding D. O. Okoh’s brief) For Appellant
AND
- S. Erhonsele For Respondent



