LAGOS STATE GOVERNMENT & ORS v. PASTOR JOSEPH OLAYINKA MARTINS
(2015)LCN/7772(CA)
(2015) LPELR-24580(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 6th day of February, 2015
CA/L/619/2005
RATIO
COURT: JURISDICTION; WHEN CAN THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION BE RAISED
It is trite law that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by a party even on appeal to the Supreme Court. It is also important to note that issues of jurisdiction must be raised timeously and resolved first before embarking on further proceedings. Ukwu v. Bunge (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 518) page 527, Messrs N.V. Scheep v. The M.V. ‘S’ Araz (2000) 12 SC (Pt. 1) page 164; Jeric (Nig.) Ltd. v. UBN Plc (2000) 12 SC (Pt. II) page 133; A-G Lagos State v. Dosunmu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) page 552; Nnonye v. Anyichie (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt. 910) page 623. Where the jurisdiction of a Court is challenged, a Court is entitled, under Section 6 of the 1999 Constitution, to consider the plaintiffs claim before it, in order to determine whether it has the jurisdiction to entertain it. See Adeleke v. O.S.H.A. (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1006) page 608; Egbegbu v. IGP (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 972) page 146. per. UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
ACTION: CAUSE OF ACTION; WHAT IS A CAUSE OF ACTION AND WHEN DOES THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUE
The Courts have held in a plethora of cases that “a cause of action is entire set of circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim. It is the fact or combination of facts, which gives rise to a right to sue and it consists of two elements, viz the wrongful act of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint; and the consequent damage.” See Adesokan v. Adegorolu (1997) 3 NWLR (Pt. 493) page 261; Ajayi v. MILAD, Ondo State (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 504) page 237; Emiator v. Nigeria Army (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) page 362; Agbanelo v. Union Bank (Nig.) Ltd. (2000) 4 SC (Pt. 1) page 233; Oduntan v. Akibu (2000) 7 SC (Pt. II) page 106.
In all cases, the cause of action accrues for the plaintiff’s benefit from the time the breach is committed and not when the damage is suffered. Thus, the period of limitation begins to run from the date the cause of action accrues. Sanda v. Kukawah L.G. (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) page 379; Iweka v. SCOA (Nig.) Ltd. (2000) 3 SC page 21. Where a cause of action accrues, it is also important that the Court should be competent to exercise jurisdiction. per. UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
COURT: JURISDICTION; WHEN IS A COURT COMPETENT
A Court is competent when the Court is properly constituted as regards numbers of the bench and no member is disqualified for one reason or the other; the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction; and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. All these requirements must co-exist conjunctively before jurisdiction can be exercised by the Court. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR page 587; Skenconsult v. Ukey (1981) 1 SC page 6; Magaji v. Matari (2009) 5 SC page 46; Alao v. ACB Ltd. (2000) 6 SC (Pt. 1) page 29; Galadima v. Tambai (2000) 6 SC 141 page 196; Araka v. Ejeagwu (2000) 12 SC (Pt. 1) page 99. per. UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
STATUTE OF LIMITATION: THE EFFECT OF INSTITUTING AN ACTION AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD
Where a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action should be brought; legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. An action instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period is said to be statute-barred. See Ogunko v. Shelle (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt. 868) page 17; Osun State Government v. Dalami (Nig.) Ltd. (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 365) page 438. The Courts have held that time begins to run for the purposes of the Limitation Law from the date the cause of action accrues. See Jalco Ltd. v. Owoniboys Technicals Service Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 391) page 534; Asaboro v. Pen Ocean Oil (Nig.) Ltd. (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt. 971) page 595. per. UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
STATUTE OF LIMITATION: WHEN IS A CAUSE OF ACTION SAID TO BE STATUTE-BARRED
A legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right, but a right generally limited by Statute. Therefore, a cause of action is statute-barred if legal proceedings cannot be commenced in respect of same because the period laid down by the Limitation Law or Act had elapsed. Adeosun v. Jibesin (2001) 14 WRN page 106. per. UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE LAGOS STATE LIMITATION LAW; THE INTERPRETATION OF THE LAGOS STATE LIMITATION LAW
These provisions of the Lagos State Limitation Law, upon which the judgment of the Court was based, also came up for consideration and interpretation by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajibona v. Kolawola (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt. 476) page 22 where Ogwuegbu, JSC held:
“On the reading of the provisions of the Limitation Law of Lagos State as a whole, they do not merely deny the right of action, they completely extinguish an existing right at the expiration of twelve years from the accrued of the right of action.” See also Akibu v. Azeez (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 814) page 643. per. UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
JUSTICE
UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. LAGOS STATE GOVERNMENT
2. LAGOS STATE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
3. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF LAGOS STATEAppellant(s)
AND
PASTOR JOSEPH OLAYINKA MARTINS
(Suing as Proprietors/Owners of Premier College)Respondent(s)
UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Lagos State delivered on 15th of January, 2002 against the Appellants.
The fact of this case is that the respondent, as plaintiff, filed a suit by originating summons in the High Court of Lagos State. The respondent/plaintiff claimed against the appellant as defendants, the following in its amended statement of claim:
“Whereupon the plaintiff claims N300,000,000.00 made up as follows:
(i) Special damage – N149,000,040.00
PARTICULARS OF SPECIAL DAMAGE:
N1,200.00 per student per term is equal to N3,600.00 a year.
There are 45 classes of 40 students per class i.e. N3,600.00×40 (a class) in a year N144,000.00.
N144,000.00 x 45 classes = N6,480,000.00 a year.
N6,480,000 x 23 years of the wrongful take over (1977-2000) = N149,040,000.00.
(ii) General damages – N50,000,000.00
(iii) Compensation – N100,000,000.00
PARTICULARS OF COMPENSATION:
Five school buildings, one science block, science laboratories for Physics, Chemistry and Biology, a Typing Pool, Typing equipment, Typewriters.
(iv) A declaration that:
(a) The Lagos State Education (Private Secondary Institution) Special Provision (Amendment Edict No.10 dated 5th day of December, 1977 is unlawful, invalid, ultra vires, unconstitutional, null and of no effect whatsoever.
(b) The purported take over of the Premier College (Evening School) meant for adult workers pursuant to aforesaid Edict by the Lagos State Government is illegal and contrary to the spirit of the enabling law.”
Pleadings were later ordered. The appellants filed a preliminary objection and challenged the jurisdiction of the Court and stated that the suit was statute-barred. The appellants, as defendants, argued that the cause of action accrued in 1976 or at best in 1977. The learned trial Judge gave a considered ruling and held that there was a substantial cause of action and ordered for pleadings. In that ruling, the learned trial Judge went into some of the substantive issues in the suit which led her to hold that, even though the cause of action accrued in 1976/1977, the statute of limitation does not avail the appellants as defendants.
The suit went on to a full trial and in her considered judgment found for the respondent as plaintiff. Being dissatisfied, the defendants filed a notice of appeal with three grounds. The appellants filed its amended brief on 28th of December, 2012 but deemed properly filed and served on 30th of October, 2013. In it, the Appellants articulated two (2) issues for determination. They are as follows:
“1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right to have held that Premier College (Evening Classes) was not a Private Secondary School covered by Edict No. 13 of 1976 (as amended). (Ground one (1) of the Notice of Appeal).
2. Whether the action of the Claimant/Respondent commenced in 2000 to challenge 1976 or 1977 government take-over and acquisition of his school was statute-barred. (Ground Two (2) of the Notice of Appeal).”
The respondent filed its respondent’s brief on 8th of April, 2011 but deemed filed on 30th of October, 2013. The respondent articulated six (6) issues for determination as follows:
“(i) Is the appellants’ issue No.1 not deemed to have been abandoned when the appellants have not urged any argument in support thereon?
(ii) Is this Court entitled to consider the appellants’ argument in respect of damages awarded by the lower Court when no ground of appeal was raised in the Notice of Appeal?
(iii) Are the appellants entitled to raise fresh issue in respect of their preliminary objection before the lower Court without the leave of this Court?
(iv) Are the appellants entitled to raise the issue of the statute of Limitation against the plaintiff/respondent when same was resolve against them during the interlocutory stage, and when no appeal against the said ruling was lodged?
(v) Was the plaintiff/respondent’s action indeed caught by statute?
(vi) Does the arbitral provision in the Education Law of Lagos State, 1973 oust the jurisdiction of the trial Court to adjudicate over the dispute between the parties; and whether same is applicable in the instance case?”
The appellants’ issue two (2) and the respondent’s issues three and four (3 & 4) are issues on jurisdiction. This is a challenge on the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain this suit as it is constituted. The appellant’s issue two is “Whether the action of the claimant/respondent commenced in 2000 to challenge 1976 or 1977 government take-over and acquisition of his school was statute barred (Ground Two (2) of the Notice of Appeal).”
The learned Counsel to the appellants submitted that where a statute provides for the commencement of an action with a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action, it must be commenced within that period. Anytime outside the statutory period prescribed by the statute, the suit is said to be statute-barred. See W.A.P.C. Plc v. Adeyeri (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 835) page 517. The Court held that:
“The issue of whether or not an action is filed within the time stipulated by law goes to jurisdiction. Any omission to institute proceedings within the statutory time limit deprives the Court jurisdiction. In other words, the application of the provisions of a statute of limitation invariably curtails the jurisdiction of the Court. Once an action is not filed within the prescribed period allowed by the statute, a person who tries to seek a relief is forever barred from approaching the seat of Justice to seek redress.”
Counsel submitted that a claimant with a stale claim may have a right in law but by virtue of the Limitation Law he cannot enforce the right by judicial process. In Eboigbe v. NNPC (1994) 6 SCNJ page 71, the Court held that:
“Where an action is statute-barred a plaintiff who might have had a cause of action loses the right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process because the period of time laid down by the Limitation Law for instituting such an action has elapsed.”
Counsel referred the Court to Section 16(2) of the Limitation Law Cap. L18, Laws of the Lagos State, 2003 which provides thus:
“The following provisions should apply to an action by a person to recover land:-
(a) Subject to paragraph (b) of this subsection, no such action shall be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person bringing in it or, if first accrued to some person from whom he claim, to that person.
(b) If the right of action first accrued to a State authority, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of the period during which the action could have brought by the State authority, or of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to some person other than the State authority which ever period first expires.”
See also Section 8(4) of Limitation Law, Lagos State which provides thus:
“8(4) Subject to the provisions of Section of this Law, an action founded on tort shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.”
Counsel draws the Court’s attention to 1st – 4th reliefs of the respondent. Relief No.4 is praying the Court to declare the acquisition or take over of his school as illegal, null and void. This must be brought within 12 years. Reliefs 1-3 are for damages and compensation being claims in tort and must be brought within six (6) years.
Counsel submitted that to maintain an action for recovery of land or in tort for compensation or damages, time will begin to run from the date the cause of action arose. In computing the time when the statute of limitation begins to run, the writ of summons and the statement of claim would generally be the relevant factors for consideration. In Elabanjo v. Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) page 76 where the court held that:
“The period of limitation is determined by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave rise to the cause action and by comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. If the time on the writ of summons is beyond the period allowed by the Limitation Law, the action is statute-barred.”
Counsel submitted further that in the instant appeal, the respondent’s evening school was taken over by the appellants in 1976/1977. This suit was instituted in 2000, a period of over 24 years after the cause of action accrued.
Counsel referred the Court to paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Respondent’s claim in his amended statement of claim.
“8. The plaintiff avers that, before the next adjourned date, however, knowing fully well that judgment might be given against them, the defendants, in bad faith, and during the pendency of plaintiff’s High Court case, prepared a hush-hush Edict No.16 of 1977 for the forceful take-over of plaintiff’s school. This Edict No.16 of 1977 though made on 2nd December, 1977 was backdated to 1st July, 1976. Plaintiff contends that it was wrong for defendants to forcefully take-over plaintiff’s school during the pendency of this suit.
9. The plaintiff avers that it was defendants’ letter Reference No.LED/CON/ED41/S.1167 dated 9th March, 1978 that brought Edict No.16 of 1977 to plaintiff’s notice; it then became clearer to plaintiff that plaintiff’s school, would not have been taken-over if he had agreed to Mrs. Ladipo’s and Permanent Secretary’s proposal to run the plaintiffs school.”
Counsel argued that parties are bound by their pleadings and any evidence of the party at variance with his averments in his pleadings goes to no issue and should be disregarded by the Court. Oviawe v. IRP (1997) NWLR (Pt. 492) page 126, Oredoyin v. Arowolo (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 114) page 172. Further, Counsel submitted that this issue was raised as a preliminary objection in the lower Court. The trial Judge considered it before commencing the trial but failed to decide this issue but went ahead and ordered the defendants to file its defence. During trial, Exhibit “P6” letter Ref. No. LED/CON/ED/141/5/167 dated 6th of December, 1979 was tendered by the respondent from the appellants. Counsel, therefore, urged the Court to hold that the cause of action accrued in 1976/1977 and is statute barred.
In response, the respondent argued this issue of jurisdiction in its own issue III & IV as follows:
(iii) Are the appellants entitled to depart from the case made out before the lower Court that the respondent’s suit is caught by Section 8(4) of the Limitation Law, Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria, 1994 when no leave of this Court has been sought and obtained?
(iv) Are the appellants entitled to raise the issue of the statute of Limitation against the plaintiff/respondent when same was resolved against them during the interlocutory stage, and when no appeal against the said ruling was lodged?
Learned Counsel submitted that the appellants had raised a preliminary objection praying for the following:
“An order striking out the plaintiff’s originating summons dated 23rd March, 2000 as being statute-barred pursuant to Section 8(4) of the Limitation Law (Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria, 1994).”
Counsel referred the Court to Section 8(4) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State, 1994 Cap. 118 which provides:
“8(4) Subject to the provisions of Section 9 of this law, an action founded on tort shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.”
Counsel argued that the trial Judge considered and gave its ruling. The appellants were not satisfied and raised the same issue of statute of Limitation pursuant to Section 8(4) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State in their final address. The Appellants also relied on Section 16(20) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State Cap. 118, 1994 which is in pari material with Section 6(2) of the Limitation, Laws of Oyo State, 1978 which provides as follows:
“No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued or if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person.”
Counsel argued that the appellants had argued in the lower Court that the respondent action was based on tort and, therefore, the limitation period is six (6) years pursuant to Section 8(4). Also the appellants’ brief argued that the action was on recovery of land which limitation period is twelve (12) years pursuant to Section 16(20). Counsel argued that the appellants cannot argue on Section 16 (20) on appeal without the leave of Court. Counsel, therefore, urged the Court to hold that the final judgment had considered the issue of Statute of Limitation and had overruled the appellants. Therefore, the appellants are bound by issue estoppel and that, that decision is binding on the appellants.
Counsel urged the court to resolve this issue on behalf of the Respondent and dismiss this appeal.
A question of jurisdiction is one that is fundamental and should be determined first by the Court before all the other issues articulated for determination. The issue of jurisdiction was raised in the Court below. The learned trial Judge considered it but did not categorically come to a conclusion on the issue. Learned trial Judge just ordered the appellants, as defendants, to file their defence. This to my mind is a subtle way of overruling the preliminary objection.
However, the appellants in their final argument still raised the issue of Statute of Limitation. The learned trial Judge of course overruled that aspect and determined all the other issues raised during trial. The appellants again in their appeal raised the same issue of the action being statute barred.
It is trite law that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by a party even on appeal to the Supreme Court. It is also important to note that issues of jurisdiction must be raised timeously and resolved first before embarking on further proceedings. Ukwu v. Bunge (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 518) page 527, Messrs N.V. Scheep v. The M.V. ‘S’ Araz (2000) 12 SC (Pt. 1) page 164; Jeric (Nig.) Ltd. v. UBN Plc (2000) 12 SC (Pt. II) page 133; A-G Lagos State v. Dosunmu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) page 552; Nnonye v. Anyichie (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt. 910) page 623.
Where the jurisdiction of a Court is challenged, a Court is entitled, under Section 6 of the 1999 Constitution, to consider the plaintiffs claim before it, in order to determine whether it has the jurisdiction to entertain it. See Adeleke v. O.S.H.A. (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1006) page 608; Egbegbu v. IGP (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 972) page 146.
Respondent, as plaintiff in the Court below, claimed in his affidavit in support of his originating summons the following:
“1. That his evening school was taken over by a Government Edict in 1976.
2. An amendment to the 1976 Edict was made in 1977.”
This invariably means that the cause of action accrued in 1976/1977.
The Courts have held in a plethora of cases that “a cause of action is entire set of circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim. It is the fact or combination of facts, which gives rise to a right to sue and it consists of two elements, viz the wrongful act of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint; and the consequent damage.” See Adesokan v. Adegorolu (1997) 3 NWLR (Pt. 493) page 261; Ajayi v. MILAD, Ondo State (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 504) page 237; Emiator v. Nigeria Army (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) page 362; Agbanelo v. Union Bank (Nig.) Ltd. (2000) 4 SC (Pt. 1) page 233; Oduntan v. Akibu (2000) 7 SC (Pt. II) page 106.
In all cases, the cause of action accrues for the plaintiff’s benefit from the time the breach is committed and not when the damage is suffered.
Thus, the period of limitation begins to run from the date the cause of action accrues. Sanda v. Kukawah L.G. (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) page 379; Iweka v. SCOA (Nig.) Ltd. (2000) 3 SC page 21.
Where a cause of action accrues, it is also important that the Court should be competent to exercise jurisdiction.
A Court is competent when the Court is properly constituted as regards numbers of the bench and no member is disqualified for one reason or the other; the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction; and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. All these requirements must co-exist conjunctively before jurisdiction can be exercised by the Court. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR page 587; Skenconsult v. Ukey (1981) 1 SC page 6; Magaji v. Matari (2009) 5 SC page 46; Alao v. ACB Ltd. (2000) 6 SC (Pt. 1) page 29; Galadima v. Tambai (2000) 6 SC 141 page 196; Araka v. Ejeagwu (2000) 12 SC (Pt. 1) page 99.
In the present case, there is a feature in this case which might prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. The Lagos State Government enacted an Edict in 1976 which was to take over private morning and afternoon secondary schools from private owners. In 1977 there was an amendment to the Edict to include evening secondary schools.
It is not in dispute that the respondent was running a private secondary institution in Lagos State when the Lagos State Education (Private Secondary Institution) Special Provisions Edict No.13 of 1976 (hereinafter referred to as Edict 13 of 1976) was enacted by Government to take over private secondary institutions in Lagos State. The list of the school was under Schedule 1 of the Edict. The respondent’s institution was Premier College, where he was operating morning, afternoon and evening classes in the same premises. However, only Premier College (Morning) and (Afternoon) was named in the Schedule to Edict 13 of 1976. Due to the confusion of whether the evening school (or class) of Premier College was affected by the 1976 Edict, the Government amended the Edict by enacting Lagos State Education (Private Secondary Institution) Special Provision Edict No.16 of 1976 (hereinafter referred to as Edict 16 of 1977) to include the name of Premier College (Evening) in the schedule to the Edict.
It follows, therefore, that the respondent’s schools, morning, afternoon and evening, were caught up with Edict No.13 of 1976 as amended by Edict No.16 of 1977. The Edicts No.13 of 1976 and No.16 of 1977 were the enabling enactments that enabled the Lagos State Government to take over the schools. This is when the cause of action accrued. The respondent, as plaintiff in the Court below, initiated this action in the year 2000. The time lag is a period of 23 or 24 years as the case may be.
The learned Counsel to the appellants had argued that the suit is statute barred pursuant to Section 8(4) of the Limitation Law (Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria, 1994) if the action is brought under tort. If it is so, then the limitation period is six (6) years, becomes applicable.
If the suit is brought to recover the school already taken over by government, the limitation period is 12 years. Which ever one is the case, the suit is caught up by six (6) years or twelve (12) years limitation period.
Where a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action should be brought; legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. An action instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period is said to be statute-barred. See Ogunko v. Shelle (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt. 868) page 17; Osun State Government v. Dalami (Nig.) Ltd. (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 365) page 438. The Courts have held that time begins to run for the purposes of the Limitation Law from the date the cause of action accrues. See Jalco Ltd. v. Owoniboys Technicals Service Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 391) page 534; Asaboro v. Pen Ocean Oil (Nig.) Ltd. (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt. 971) page 595.
The time started running when the 1st Edict No.13 of 1976 was promulgated. The amendment Edict No.16 of 1977 is a subsidiary enactment that takes up strength from the principal Edict No.13 of 1976. It, therefore, means that the cause of action accrued in 1976. Whether the principal claim is on tort or on recovery of premises, the time is six (6) or twelve (12) years. Therefore, whether six (6) or twelve (12) years, the limitation period is long past. 1976-2000 is 24 years.
A legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right, but a right generally limited by Statute. Therefore, a cause of action is statute-barred if legal proceedings cannot be commenced in respect of same because the period laid down by the Limitation Law or Act had elapsed. Adeosun v. Jibesin (2001) 14 WRN page 106. The relevant statute that the Court relied upon is Lagos State Limitation Law Cap. 118, Laws of the Lagos State, 1994 which provides in Sections 16(2)(a) and Section 21 thus:
“16(2) The following provisions shall apply to an action by a person to recover land:-
(a) Subject to paragraph (b) of this subsection; no such action shall be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person bringing it or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims to that person.
21. On expiration of the period fixed by this law for any person to bring an action to recover land, the title of that person to the land shall be extinguished.”
These provisions of the Lagos State Limitation Law, upon which the judgment of the Court was based, also came up for consideration and interpretation by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajibona v. Kolawola (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt. 476) page 22 where Ogwuegbu, JSC held:
“On the reading of the provisions of the Limitation Law of Lagos State as a whole, they do not merely deny the right of action, they completely extinguish an existing right at the expiration of twelve years from the accrued of the right of action.”
See also Akibu v. Azeez (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 814) page 643.
There is no gainsaying that the cause of action accrued in 1976. The respondent, as defendant in the Court below, instituted this suit in the year 2000, a period of twenty-four years. The longest limitation period known to law by Lagos State is twelve years i.e. that as it concerns land.
The respondent had alleged that the Lagos State Government had written them a letter accepting liability as it were. Time, therefore, begins to run, when there is in existence; who can be sued and when all the facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff; to succeed. Wolerem v. Emeruwa (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) page 398; Odubeko v. Fowler. The law does not prohibit parties to a dispute from engaging in negotiation for the purpose of settling the dispute, except where, as a result, there is what can be reasonably regarded as a settlement of the dispute or an admission of liability on the part of the defendant; the limitation time continues to run. See Shell Petroleum Development Company (Nig.) Ltd. v. Farah (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt. 382) page 148.
The limitation period of this suit, long elapsed, the respondent had a cause of action but unfortunately he had nowhere to ventilate it.
This issue is resolved in favour of the appellants. The appeal is meritorious and, therefore, allowed. The judgment of the trial Court given without jurisdiction is, therefore, null and void. The judgment of the lower court delivered on 15th of January, 2002 is hereby set aside.
I make no orders as to costs.
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read in print the thorough judgment prepared by my learned brother, Uzo Ndukwe-Anyanwu, J.C.A., with which I agree and add that negotiations do not stop time from running for the purpose of statute of limitation. See The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited v. Chief Mark Ejebu and Anor. (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1276) 324 at 342 per the lead judgment of Eko, J.C.A., following Egboigbe v. N.N.P.C. (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 346) 649.
In the result, I too agree that there is merit in the appeal which I hereby allow and abide by the consequential order(s) contained in the exhaustive lead judgment prepared by my learned brother, Uzo Ndukwe-Anyanwu, J.C.A.
RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A.: I had read before now in draft the lead Judgment just delivered by my brother UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, JCA.
I agree with the reasoning and conclusion.
I also allow the appeal and abide by the consequential order made as to costs.
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Appearances
A. Salihu – AD
B. Salawu – SSC
W. Osibanjo SSC
M. O. Oladunjoye – SCFor Appellant
AND
Respondent AbsentFor Respondent
