KUNLE YINKA ADEMOLA v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & ANOR (2015)

KUNLE YINKA ADEMOLA v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & ANOR

(2015)LCN/7888(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 4th day of June, 2015

CA/L/78/2011

RATIO

APPEAL: ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION; WHETHER THE ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION MUST ARISE FROM THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND WHAT ARE FRESH ISSUES

It is trite that issues for determination must arise from the grounds of appeal which also must have been fashioned out from the judgment or ruling appealed against, see OBA v. EGBERONGBE (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt.615) 485; SARAKI & ORS v KOTOYE (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt.264) 156 and OMNIA v DYKTRADE LTD (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt.1058) 576. Fresh issue has been described in the case of DIRECT ON PC LTD v SOF TECHNOLOGIES LTD (2011) LPELR – 4042 (CA) as follows:
“For avoidance of doubt, a fresh issue or point of law is a new point of law which was not raised by any of the parties at the trial of the case.”
See also SHONEKAN V SMITH (1964) 1 ALL NLR 168, AKPERE V BARCLAYS BANK LTD (1977) 1 SC 219 at 247, OSINUPEBI v. SAIBU (1983) 1 SC 104; OKOLO v UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt 539) 618; Section 130 and 132(1) of the Evidence Act. Having not been raised in the court below nor pronouncement made on them by the Lower Court, definitely fall within the definition of fresh issues. per. YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.

APPEAL: GROUND OF APPEAL; THE IMPLICATION OF ANY ISSUE NOT DISTILLED FROM THE GROUND OF APPEAL FILED BY THE APPELLANT

Any issue not distilled from the ground of appeal filed by the appellant is incompetent and ought to be discountenanced, see GLOBE FISHING INDUSTRIES LTD V COKER (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt.162) 265; UTB LTD v DOLMETSCH (NIG) LTD (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt.1061) 520 and OBIOHA v DURU (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt.365) 531at 646-647. per. YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.

APPEAL: ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION; WHETHER PARTIES ARE ALLOWED TO INTRODUCE A FRESH ISSUE NOT CANVASSED IN THE LOWER COURT

It is trite that parties are not allowed to introduce or setup one case at the trial court and proceed to argue another on appeal. There should be consistency as there must be orderliness in the pursuit of justice, see AWUSE v ODILI (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt.851) 116 at 161; OLUFEMI V BABALOLA (2003) 4 SCNJ 287; and GOAR V DASUN & ORS (2009) LPELR- 4205 (CA).
However, the rule is not rigid because there are exceptions to it and particularly when the fresh issue touches on jurisdiction.
The court in the case of ALI V. ALBISHIR (2007) LPELR – 8319 (CA) held as follows:
“The general principle is that when a party seeks to file and argue any fresh issue not canvassed in the Lower Court whether that issue pertains to land or otherwise, leave to file and argue the issue must be had and obtained first. But where the point or issue sought to be raised relates to the issues of jurisdiction, the point or issue can properly be filed and argued with or without leave of court even if it is being raised for the first time.”
See also OBIAKOR v STATE (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt.776) 612 at 626 and GAJI v. PAYE (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt.823) 563; UTB V DOLMETSCH PHARMACY (SUPRA) and AYINKE STORES LTD V. ADEBOGUN (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt.1096) 612. per. YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.

COURT: JURISDICTION; HOW IS THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION DETERMINED

COURT: JURISDICTION; THE TWO DIMENSION OF THE JURISDICTION OF A COURT TO ENTERTAIN A MATTER WHICH A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS A PARTY

Generally, where the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party in a matter, the question of jurisdiction is two dimensional, the court in the case of THE GOVERNMENT OF KWARA STATE & ORS v. IREPODUN BLOCK MANUFACTURING COMPANY & ORS (2012) LPELR – 8532 (CA) held as follows:
“The jurisdiction of a court to entertain a matter in which a Federal Government agencies is a party, has two dimensional facts. In this issue, where a Federal Government agency is a party to a proceeding a court is mandated to look at both party and subject matter jurisdictional aspects to it. That is to say, a court has to, in addition to a party being a Federal Government or agency, examine the facts of a matter with a view to determining the subject matter of it. If the res comes within the jurisdictional provisions under Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution as amended, then the Federal High Court will have exclusive jurisdiction. Where the party is a Federal Government agency, where however, the subject matter falls outside the precincts of those provisions, then a State High Court will be vested with jurisdiction notwithstanding that the party involved is a Federal Government agency. The Supreme Court has set a seal on this grey and naggling area in the case of OBIUWEUBI V. C.B.N. (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt.1247) 465. The rationale behind this cardinal principle of law is underpinned by the fact that one of the triumvirate ingredients of jurisdiction is that the subject matter of a case must come within the jurisdiction of adjudicating court and there is no feature therein which will prevent it, the court, from exercising its jurisdiction.”
The settled position therefore is that where the Federal Government or its agencies is a party, the court must examine further the subject matter along the party to determine if the court has jurisdiction. The era of using Federal Government or its agencies as a blanket cover to give Federal High Court jurisdiction on matters which are clearly outside Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution and where it has no jurisdiction is over. It is a court with exclusive jurisdiction on specified matters unlike the High Court which has a general jurisdiction, see AGBASO V IWUNZE (2014) LPELR-24108 (CA) relying on ADETAYO v. ADEMOLA (2010) NWLR (Pt.1215) 169. The appellant tried to distinguish the claim and the case of ADETAYO V ADEMOLA (SUPRA) by contending that the claim in this case challenges executive actions of the Federal Government and its agencies and therefore not a land matter. per. YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.

JUSTICES:

UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

TIJJANI ABUBAKAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

KUNLE YINKA ADEMOLA – Appellant(s)

AND

1. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION
2. MINISTER OF LANDS, HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT – Respondent(s)

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the ruling of the Federal High Court delivered by HON. JUSTICE D.D. ABUTU (as he then was) on the 28th September, 2001 wherein the lower Court accepted an invitation to set aside its judgment delivered on 26th September, 2000. The appellant, dissatisfied with the ruling, filed a 1st Amended Notice of Appeal setting out 3 grounds of appeal.

The brief facts of this appeal are that the appellant was claimant at the Lower Court and judgment was entered in his favour in the absence of the Respondents who later applied asking the court to set aside its judgment given in default of defence and appearance. The court set aside the said judgment, a decision which aggrieved the appellant thus this appeal.

The appellant filed his brief of argument dated 28/1/2013 on the same day but deemed on the 24/2/15 which was relied upon and adopted at the hearing of this appeal.

The Respondents filed a joint Respondents’ brief dated 19/9/2014 deemed on the 24/2/15, relied upon and adopted at the hearing.

The appellant formulated 2 issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether a trial court has jurisdiction to set aside its own judgment given on the merits of the case on the ground that a party seek to raise a defence, after trial that the original suit was statute barred?
2. Whether this Honourable Court should reverse the ruling of learned trial Judge of 26th September 2001 and restore the judgment made on the merits of the case.

The Respondents on their part also distilled 2 issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to hear and make declaration in a matter relating as it did in its judgment sought to be restored by the appellant.
2. Whether judgment delivered without the filing of a defence and non appearance of a party is a judgment on the merit that cannot be set aside by the trial court.

Proferring arguments on the first issue, the appellant contended that the Federal High Court lacks jurisdiction to set aside its own judgment given on the merit. Appellant asked 3 questions namely:
(a) Can a trial court set aside its own judgment delivered on the merit of the case?
(b) In what circumstances, if any, can a Trial Court set aside its own judgment.
(c) Can a trial court set aside its own judgment on the ground that a Respondent alleges that the original suit was statute barred?

On functus officio principle, the appellant submitted that a court cannot revisit its judgment except to make ancillary orders such as stay of execution or instalmental payment, he referred to KADUNA TEXTILES LTD v OBI (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt.621) 138; OYEFOLU & ANOR v. DUROSINMI OYEFOLU & ORS (2001) 7 SCNJ 108; 2001 16 NWLR (Pt.738) 1.

Appellant contended that upon service on the Respondents, they chose not to file a defence and the appellant called evidence and closed its case upon which judgment was entered before they applied to set aside the judgment. That the ground upon which the Lower Court set aside its judgment was that the suit was statute barred. This the appellant argued was beyond the Lower Court because it lacked jurisdiction to set aside a decision on the merit.

Appellant went further to state exceptions to the rule of functus officio which he named as:
(a) To make ancillary order
(b) Where judgment was procured by fraud
(c) Where the decision is a nullity
(d) Judgment made without jurisdiction.

He referred to the following cases:
(i) BERLIET NIGERIA LIMITED V. KACHAKA (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt.240) 478
(ii) SENATOR (DR) UBA V. HON. UKACHUKWU & ORS (2006) ALL FWLR (PT.337) 515
(iii) YAKUBU V. AJAOKUTA STEEL CO. (2002) FWLR (Pt.98) 932 at 940
(iii) FADA & ANOR V. NAOMI & ORS (2002) FWLR (Pt.130) 1681 at 1688.

On a judgment given when a suit is statute barred, the appellant revisited the application of the Respondents before the Lower Court and submitted that statute barred rule is a defence and does not raise any issue of jurisdiction, he relied on ELEBANJO V. DAWODU (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt.1001) 76.

He argued further that it is the claim before the court that determines jurisdiction and it should be examined together with the statute creating or conferring jurisdiction on the Court. That the trial court therefore had jurisdiction to entertain an action for declaration of title, injunction and damages for trespass.

On competence of the court, the appellant referred to MADUKOLU v NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 and SKENCONSULT v UKEY (1981) 1 S.C 6. He conceded to the fundamental nature of jurisdiction and that it can be raised at any stage and even orally as decided in PETROJESSICA ENTERPRISES LTD V LEVENTIS TECHNICAL CO. LTD (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt 244) 675 at 693. He submitted that whether a court is functus officio or not is not a jurisdictional issue because if a court acts when it is functus officio, it has only exceeded jurisdiction and therefore the Lower Court lacked jurisdiction to set aside its judgment. He urged the court to restore the judgment of the Lower Court delivered on 26/9/2000.

On the second issue, the appellant submitted that the Respondents prayed the trial court to consider their twin reliefs namely:
(a) An order for extension of time within which to apply to court for an order setting aside the judgment of 26/9/2000 and;
(b) An order setting aside the said judgment.

Appellant argued that the Lower Court did not advert its mind to the rules of the court in considering the two distinct reliefs which was a wrong exercise of jurisdiction. He contended that no materials were placed before the court to warrant the orders made. The complaint is that the Respondents did not ask that they be heard on the merit because the considerations of such a prayer would have been different. Appellant referred to paragraph 5(b), (c) and (e) of the Respondents’ affidavit in support of the motion which he contended fell short of the requirements to set aside an order of court. That the reasons given were beyond the knowledge of the deponent who is the litigation clerk in the office of the Attorney General of the Federation and could not have known about the mix up of files due to relocation of the Ministry of Justice from Lagos to Abuja.

Appellant argued that there was ample evidence to show that the Respondents were aware that the case was progressing in court as he highlighted in his Appellants brief of argument. He submitted that the trial Judge did not exercise his discretion properly based on the highlighted facts, citing WILLIAMS V HOPE RISING VOLUNTARY FUNDS SOCIETY (1982) 13 NSCC Pages 36 – 43; W.A.P.I.N. v. NIGERIAN TOBACCO COMPANY (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.56) 299, 307 and EVALS v. BAVELS (1937) AC 573 at 482.

Appellant contended that the motion to set aside the judgment was incompetent and finally urged the court to allow the appeal because the Lower Court exercised its discretion wrongly having failed to consider the facts presented and because the judgment was on the merit.

The Respondents in addressing the two issues contended that a court is only competent when it has jurisdiction as held in MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (SUPRA). That when a court lacks jurisdiction no matter how well a suit is conducted it is a nullity ab initio and relied on NWANKWO V YAR’ADUA (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt.1209) 518; RESIDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER & ANOR V NWAOCHA & ORS (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.176) 732 at 760 and SOSSA v. FOKPO (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt.693) 6 at 29.

They argued that it is the claim of the Plaintiff that determines jurisdiction, citing R.T.E.A. & ORS V. N.U.R.T.W & ORS (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt.468) 737 at 743. They submitted that the claim had a declaration of title to land as a relief, this they argued is beyond the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court which cannot hear land matters, citing Section 39 & 41 of the Land Use Act which confers jurisdiction on the State High Courts and that Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution does not have land matters as part of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, they referred to ADETAYO V ADEMOLA (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt.1215) 169; NIGERIA INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL RESEARCH V NATIONAL UNION OF ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt.1208) 328. They argued that the Federal High Court cannot hear the suit.

On the second issue, the Respondents submitted that a judgment in default of defence and appearance cannot be a judgment on the merit and therefore the judgment of the trial court was a default judgment. That a judgment on the merit is only when both sides were heard and the merit of their cases determined, relied on MOHAMMED V HUSSEIN (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt 584) 108 at 130; UTL NIGERIA LTD v. PAMOTEI (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt 103) 244; CARDOSO v DANIEL (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt.20) 1 at 45.

They submitted that the trial court had the jurisdiction to set aside the judgment relying on WILLIAM V HOPE RISING (SUPRA); Order 15 Rule 6; Order 28 Rule 9 of the Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules, 2000.

In reply the appellant challenged the Respondents raising a fresh issue without a cross appeal. He argued that the Respondents by paragraphs 3.1 – 4.3 of the Respondent’s brief of arguments went outside the grounds of appeal without filing a cross appeal or a Respondents Notice and therefore it should be discountenanced.

Appellant contended that issues are distilled from grounds of appeal and any issue outside the grounds of appeal is incompetent relied on GLOBE FISHING INDUSTRIES LTD V COKE (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt.162) 265; ONYIDO v AJEMBU (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt.184) 203. That a Respondent without a cross appeal cannot go outside the grounds of appeal, citing EZE v. OGBONDA (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt.192) 506 at 522.

Responding to the arguments of the Respondents in the alternative, the appellant submitted that the issue of the Lower Court’s jurisdiction on land matters is a fresh issue raised without leave of court and for the first time on appeal as it was not raised at the trial court, he relied on OMNIA (NIG) LTD v DYKTRADE LTD (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt.1058) 576 to urge the court to discountenance issue 1 of the Respondents’ brief of argument.

On the Appellant’s claim before the Lower Court, the appellant contended that Respondents submission on the nature of the claim before the trial court is also flawed and should be discountenanced. On subject matter, appellant relied on TUKUR V GOVERNOR, GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt 117) 517; ADEYEMI v OPEYORI (1976) 9 – 10 S.C. 31 at 49; AKINBIYI v. GOVERNOR OF ONDO STATE (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.140) 525 at 532 to argue that it is the claim that determines jurisdiction. Appellant further argued that the claim before the Lower Court was challenging executive powers of acquisition of land and not simply a land matter, he tried to distinguish it from ADETAYO V ADEMOLA (SUPRA).

He went further to contend that there is party jurisdiction distinct from subject matter and therefore the Federal High Court has jurisdiction, referred to MOBORE PROPERTIES LTD V PEACE COVER NIGERIA LTD & ORS (2014) LPELR – 22586 (CA) to urge the court to hold that because the Respondents are Federal Government agencies, it is only the Federal High Court that has jurisdiction.

On the Respondent’s second issue, the appellant submitted that it is also faulty as the issue before the trial court was not a matter of discretionary power of the court but the question was whether discretionary power was properly exercised in setting aside the judgment of 26th September, 2000.
He reiterated grounds upon which a trial court can exercise its power to set aside its judgment.

He finally urged the court to allow the appeal, set aside the ruling of the Lower Court and restore the judgment of the court delivered on 26th September, 2000.

RESOLUTION:
Both issues formulated by the appellant and adopted by the court shall be determined together. It is important to start from the objection taken by the appellant to some aspects of the Respondents’ arguments which introduced a new issue not taking root from the grounds of appeal. The issue is the contention that the claim or reliefs of the appellant before the Lower Court being one of which is seeking a declaration of title to land cannot be heard or determined by the Federal High Court. That is a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Lower Court which was not taken before that court. It is therefore a fresh issue and introduced without leave of court.

To the issue above, the appellant argued opposing the introduction of the new issue by the Respondents. Arguments of both sides were reviewed earlier in this judgment.

Fresh issue has been described in the case of DIRECT ON PC LTD v SOF TECHNOLOGIES LTD (2011) LPELR – 4042 (CA) as follows:
“For avoidance of doubt, a fresh issue or point of law is a new point of law which was not raised by any of the parties at the trial of the case.”
See also SHONEKAN V SMITH (1964) 1 ALL NLR 168, AKPERE V BARCLAYS BANK LTD (1977) 1 SC 219 at 247, OSINUPEBI v. SAIBU (1983) 1 SC 104; OKOLO v UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt 539) 618; Section 130 and 132(1) of the Evidence Act. Having not been raised in the court below nor pronouncement made on them by the Lower Court, definitely fall within the definition of fresh issues.

The motion upon which the judgment of the Lower Court was set aside did not mention the aspect now introduced even though it challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court on a different ground, which state that the suit was statute barred.

The challenge to jurisdiction of the Lower Court introduced is the one touching on declaration of title to land, and that land matters are not within the ambit of the Federal High Court’s jurisdiction. I therefore agree with the appellant that it is a new issue.

I agree with the appellant that a fresh issue not canvassed at the Lower Court, ordinarily, the party raising it must seek and obtain leave of court before raising and arguing the said issue. A party can only raise and argue a fresh issue where it has filed a cross appeal or Respondents Notice to contend that the judgment should be sustained on other grounds. None of these steps were taken by the Respondents so they cannot ordinarily raise an issue for determination, see EKE V OGBONDA (2000) 18 NWLR (Pt.192) 506 at 522.

It is clear that the fresh issue raised and argued by the Respondents is a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Lower Court and contending that it lacks jurisdiction to determine the claim ab initio. Let us look at the claim before the Lower Court. The appellant by his statement of claim sought the following reliefs:
(a) It is hereby declared that the plaintiff is entitled to the right and occupancy in respect of the parcel of land situate and lying at Yakoya in Ojodu Isheri Ikeja Local Government, Lagos measuring approximately 10.06 hectares (24.85 acres) and more particularly described in file No. PSL 566 attached hereto.
(b) It is further declared that the Federal Government of Nigeria has no right whatsoever to transfer any title or interest in the parcel of land vested in the plaintiff (appellant) as aforesaid to any person whatsoever.
(c) The Federal Government of Nigeria by its agents, servants or privies is hereby restrained from interfering with the Plaintiff’s right or interest in the parcel of land measuring 10.06 hectares situate at Yakoya near Ojodu, Isheri Ikeja Local Government Area, Lagos State.

Basically, the claim or reliefs of the appellant has a principal relief of declaration of title and right to occupancy over a piece of land situate and lying at Yakoya in Ojodu Isheri, Ikeja Local Government, Lagos.

Now, the big question; does the Federal High Court have jurisdiction to determine a suit wherein a declaration of title to land is sought? Jurisdiction is a threshold issue in any adjudication and it is one that the court must clearly be certain to have and not one that should be assumed. Jurisdiction is what the Constitution clothes a court with or what a statute gives in very clear and exact terms. The jurisdiction of the Federal High Court given under the 1999 Constitution is at Section 251(1) (a) – (s) which is a list of exclusive items that the Federal High Court can exercise jurisdiction. Going through it with the finest comb, I could not see land matters mentioned therein.

Jurisdiction is known to be determined by the claim before the court, see MINISTER FOR WORKS V TOMAS (NIG) LTD (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt.752) 740. The jurisdiction of the court will be determined by the subject matter of the claim and not the claim relating to the injunction as argued by the appellant which is an ancillary relief and which depends on the primary claim. See OLORUNTOBA-OJU V DOPAMU (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.1085) 1; NKUMA v. ODILI (2006) LPELR – 2047 (SC); ADEYEMI v OPEYEMI (1976) 1 F.N.L.R 149; SAVANNAH BANK V. PAN ATLANTIC (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt 49) 212; PLATEAU STATE V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt.968) 346. The appellant contended that the claim is one that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction because it questions executive powers and the actions of Federal Government agencies. No matter how it is looked at, the relief is seeking a declaration of title to land; occupancy rights and land is not part of the Federal High Court’s jurisdiction as decided by a plethora of cases. The Appellant argued copiously on party jurisdiction and relied on NABORE PROPERTIES LIMITED v. PEACE COVER NIGERIA LIMITED & ORS (2014) LPELR – 22586 (CA). I agree with the said decision as it concerns items listed under Section 251(1) (a) – (s) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. I did say earlier that land is not mentioned therein. Land matters come under the Land Use Act which has been given a special place in the 1999 Constitution. The apex court too has settled the issue. There is no way party jurisdiction can take preeminence over subject matter and as stated earlier, when it comes to Federal Government and its agencies, party and subject matter are relevant and both must rest in the Federal High court but in all that, land cannot come under the Federal High Court by virtue of extant laws on the said subject.

The appellant further argued that party jurisdiction places the claim within the Federal High Court and that there is a distinction between party and subject matter jurisdiction. The argument may be valid for other claims or subjects but for land even where Federal Government and its agencies is a party, the court with jurisdiction is the State High Court.

Generally, where the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party in a matter, the question of jurisdiction is two dimensional, the court in the case of THE GOVERNMENT OF KWARA STATE & ORS v. IREPODUN BLOCK MANUFACTURING COMPANY & ORS (2012) LPELR – 8532 (CA) held as follows:
“The jurisdiction of a court to entertain a matter in which a Federal Government agencies is a party, has two dimensional facts. In this issue, where a Federal Government agency is a party to a proceeding a court is mandated to look at both party and subject matter jurisdictional aspects to it. That is to say, a court has to, in addition to a party being a Federal Government or agency, examine the facts of a matter with a view to determining the subject matter of it. If the res comes within the jurisdictional provisions under Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution as amended, then the Federal High Court will have exclusive jurisdiction. Where the party is a Federal Government agency, where however, the subject matter falls outside the precincts of those provisions, then a State High Court will be vested with jurisdiction notwithstanding that the party involved is a Federal Government agency. The Supreme Court has set a seal on this grey and naggling area in the case of OBIUWEUBI V. C.B.N. (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt.1247) 465. The rationale behind this cardinal principle of law is underpinned by the fact that one of the triumvirate ingredients of jurisdiction is that the subject matter of a case must come within the jurisdiction of adjudicating court and there is no feature therein which will prevent it, the court, from exercising its jurisdiction.”
The settled position therefore is that where the Federal Government or its agencies is a party, the court must examine further the subject matter along the party to determine if the court has jurisdiction. The era of using Federal Government or its agencies as a blanket cover to give Federal High Court jurisdiction on matters which are clearly outside Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution and where it has no jurisdiction is over. It is a court with exclusive jurisdiction on specified matters unlike the High Court which has a general jurisdiction, see AGBASO V IWUNZE (2014) LPELR-24108 (CA) relying on ADETAYO v. ADEMOLA (2010) NWLR (Pt.1215) 169. The appellant tried to distinguish the claim and the case of ADETAYO V ADEMOLA (SUPRA) by contending that the claim in this case challenges executive actions of the Federal Government and its agencies and therefore not a land matter. The claim of the appellant as highlighted above seeks a declaration or entitlement to certificate of occupancy over the land in question. It also seeks a declaration that the Respondents have no right to transfer title over the said land and furthermore for injunction against the Respondents from taking steps to interfere with appellant’s title and enjoyment of a quiet possession. I do not know if a certificate of occupancy is issued in respect of any other thing other than land and whether transfer of title over land is not within the confines of land matters.

The reliefs are straightforward reliefs touching on land. There is no level of semantics that can transform it to another claim. The alleged challenge to actions of the Federal Government to acquisition are ancillary to the claims touching on title to land. The reliefs all touch on land because the issue of title to the said land is in issue. I do not see how this case can be distinguished from ADETAYO v. ADEMOLA (SUPRA).

Flowing from the above therefore, it is settled that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction in the subject matter of land. The court said jurisdiction is the blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a court of law, without jurisdiction, the action will be like an animal that has been drained of its blood. It will cease to have life and any attempt to resuscitate it without infusing blood into it would be an abortive exercise, see UTIH V ONOYIVWE (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.166) 166.

Lack of jurisdiction removes the competence of the court. It was held by the court thus:
It is well settled in many decision of this court that a court is competent when the subject matter of the case is within jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction.
See GALADIMA V. TAMBAI (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt.677) 1. Being a jurisdictional issue, the trial court should not have determined the case ab initio to even warrant any appeal to be sustained on it. All it did must collapse like a pack of cards and be washed away.

The only duty this court has to do is to strike out Suit No:FHC/L/CS/820/1995 and set aside the ruling of the Lower Court delivered on 28th September, 2001 by HON. JUSTICE D.D. ABUTU. I also strike out this appeal for want of jurisdiction as this court lacks the jurisdiction to determine an appeal from the Federal High Court on land matters.

No order as to cost.

UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft form, the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Yargata Byenchit Nimpar, JCA.

I agree with her reasoning and final conclusions reached in striking out this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.C.A.: It is settled that presence or absence of jurisdiction strikes at the root of any matter, it sustains or nullifies whatever decision is reached by the Court. See: HAMZAT VS. SANNI (2015) 5 NWLR (Pt.1453) 486 at 489.

Jurisdiction is crucial and central to every proceedings, any proceedings conducted without jurisdiction no matter how brilliantly and excellently conducted would be a nullity. See: ELUGBE V. OMAKHARE (2004) 11 – 12 S.C. 66.

I entirely agree with my learned brother that the proceedings at the Lower Court must collapse like pack of cards having been conducted without jurisdiction.

I join my brother NIMPAR JCA in striking out the suit. I also abide by the consequential orders including order on costs.

Appearances

George Etomi, Olugbade Barsan and Oluwatosin Reus (Miss) For Appellant

AND

S.E. Omoragbon – For 1st Respondent
O.N. Ibrahim (State Counsel) – For 2nd Respondent For Respondent