KOFOWOROLA SAHEED v. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE
(2018)LCN/12108(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 31st day of October, 2018
CA/L/808C/2015
RATIO
EVIDENCE: BASIC TYPE OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE AN OFFENCE
“In law, the Prosecution has open to it three basic types of evidence with which to prove the commission of an offence charged against an Accused person beyond reasonable doubt, namely: a: Direct eye witness evidence; b: Confessional statement and c: Circumstantial evidence. See Godwin Igabele V. The State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 975) 103. See also Lori V. The State (1980) 8 11 SC 81; Emeka V. The State (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 734) 666; Peter Igho V. The State (1978) 3 SC 87; Archibong V. The State (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 349.” PER BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: STANDARD OF PROOF
“By Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all shadow of doubt and where the evidence adduced is strong as to leave only a remote probability in favour of the accused person, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. See BAKARE vs. THE STATE (1987) 3 SC 1 or (1987) LPELR (714) 1 at 12-13 (SC). Proof beyond reasonable doubt means proof of an offence with the certainty required in a criminal trial. That certainty is that the offence was committed, which is established by proving the essential ingredients of the offence, and that it is the person charged therewith that committed the offence.” UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU J.C.A
EVIDENCE: WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT CAN EVALUATE EVIDENCE
“It is the law that it is only where the Court below had not properly carried out its sacred duty of dispassionately evaluating the totality of the evidence led and had thus failed in this primary duty that an appellate Court would have the legal justification to intervene and re – evaluate the evidence on the printed record in order to make appropriate findings of facts in line with the evidence led and in the dictates of justice to the parties. So, until an appellate Court arrives at such a conclusion the need for re – evaluation of evidence does not arise since an appellate Court has no business interfering with correct findings of a trial Court. See Williams v. Tinubu (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 755) 200. See alsoAmuneke V. The State (1992) NWLR (Pt. 217)347; Sule Asariyu V. The State (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 709; Nkebisi V. State (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1188) 471; Woluchem V. Gudi (1981) 5 SC. 291; Enang V. Adu (1981) 11-12 SC. 25; Abisi & Ors. V. Ekwealor & Anor (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 302) 643; Igago V. The State (1999) 12 SCNJ 140 @ p. 160; Amala V. State (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 520.” PER BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.
MEDICAL LAW: WHERE MEDICAL EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED
“However, whenever the circumstances revealed in evidence show that the deceased had met his death simultaneously with an attack on him with a lethal weapon or so soon thereafter, then the law is that neither a medical evidence of his death by means of a death certificate nor post mortem report would be essential as being a sine qua non for the proof of both death and cause of death. In such circumstances the Court could infer the cause of death from the proved circumstances. See Oforlete V. The State (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 681)415. See also Tonara Bakuri V. The State (1965) NMLR 163 @ p. 164; Eric Uyo V. Attorney – General of Bendel State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 17) 418; Onwumere V. The State (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 186) 428…” PER BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
KOFOWOROLA SAHEED Appellant(s)
AND
THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE Respondent(s)
BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This is an appeal against the Judgment of the High Court of Lagos State, Lagos Judicial Division; Coram: D. O. Oluwayemi J., in Charge No: LCD/43/2012: The People of Lagos State V. Kofoworola Saheed delivered on 5/3/2015, in which the Appellant as Defendant was convicted for the offence of manslaughter and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment.
The Appellant was dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court below and had promptly appealed to this Court vide a notice of appeal filed on 13/5/2015 on five grounds at pages 212 – 216 of the record of appeal. The record of appeal was transmitted to this Court on 10/8/2015 but was deemed on 29/6/2016. The Appellant’s brief was settled by Olumide Ekisola Esq. and filed on 22/9/2015 but was deemed on 29/6/2016. The Respondent’s brief was settled by Rotimi Odutola Assistant Director Lagos State Ministry of Justice and filed on 23/1/2017 but was deemed on 25/1/2017. The Appellant’s reply brief was settled by Olumide Ekisola Esq. and filed on 7/2/2017.
At the hearing of the Appeal on 4/10/2018, Olumide Ekisola Esq., learned counsel for the Appellant, appearing with Funmilola Osisanya Esq., and M. U. Mustapha Esq., adopted the Appellant’s brief and reply brief as their arguments in support of the appeal and urged the Court to allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence of the Appellant and to discharge and acquit her. The Respondent, though duly served with hearing notice on 17/9/2018, was not represented by counsel but the Respondent’s brief already was deemed as having been argued.
By Information filed on 30/1/2012, the Appellant was charged with the offence of manslaughter contrary to Section 317 (1) of the Criminal Code Laws, CAP 17, Vol. 2, Laws of Lagos State 2003. On 26/6/2012, the Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. However, on 28/4/2014, the charge was amended to read manslaughter contrary to Section 317 of the Criminal Code Law, CAP C17, Laws of Lagos State 2003 pursuant to Section 115 of the ACJL 2011.
BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant was arrested at about 4.00am on 30/6/2011 on a complaint by the PW1 who had reported that there was a scuffle between the Appellant and the Deceased in the deceased’s car at the front of his Company where he was on night duty which resulted in the death of the deceased. The knife used by the Appellant was found in the car and it was alleged that the deceased was stabbed about five times in different parts of his body by the Appellant inside his car. The Appellant upon her arrest was taken to the Police Station at Apapa and subsequently transferred to SCID Panti, Lagos. The matter was investigated and at the conclusion of investigation, the Appellant was charged to Court with the offence of Manslaughter. In her defense the Appellant asserted that she acted in her self defense as a victim or a potential victim of a sexual assault and/or assault on her person and she had acted in fear for her life and her personal safety and it was during the struggle with the deceased that the Deceased sustained injuries from the knife with which he had wanted to harm her with and that probably resulted into his death.
Upon the arraignment of the Appellant on 26/6/2012, she pleaded not guilty and the matter proceeded to trial. In the meantime, the Appellant, upon her application, though vehemently opposed by the Respondent, was admitted to bail by the Court below on 6/8/2012. The Respondent called three witnesses who testified as PW1, one Tony Igwe, PW2, one Woman Police sergeant Bose Akele and PW3, one Corporal Emmanuel John and tendered in evidence eleven exhibits as Exhibits A, B, C, D, E1 – E3, F and H and closed its case. In her defense, the Appellant testified as DW1 and called one witness, her mother, who testified as DW2 and closed her defense. At the close of the case for the parties, the charge was amended on 28/4/2014 to bring it in line with the provisions of Section 115 of the ACJL of Lagos State 2011 and the Appellant took a fresh plea to the amended charge as required by law. Thereafter, the counsel for the parties filed their written addressed, which were adopted on 2/10/2014. On 5/3/2015, the Court below in its judgment found the Appellant guilty of manslaughter, convicted her accordingly and sentenced her to 14 years imprisonment, hence the appeal to this Court. See pages 1 – 5, 143 – 144, 146 – 148, 152 – 156, 158 – 160, 163 – 166, 170 – 172, 173 – 179, 183, 187 – 188, 192 – 211 and 212 – 216 of the record of appeal.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
In the Appellant’s brief, two issues were distilled as arising for determination from four of the five grounds of appeal, namely:
1. Whether the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the offence of Manslaughter against the Appellant in view of failure of the Prosecution to prove by evidence that the Appellant’s stabbing the deceased was the cause of the death?
2. Whether the learned trial judge did not err in the circumstances of this case by failing to hold that Self Defense in the circumstances of this case is a complete defense that entitles the Appellant to an acquittal?
In the Respondent’s brief, two issues were also distilled as arising for determination in this appeal, namely:
1. Whether the Respondent proved the charge of manslaughter beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant?
2. Whether the defense of self defense can avail the Appellant?
I have taken time to review the totality of the evidence, both oral and documentary, led by the parties before the Court below as touching on the charge of manslaughter and the defense of self defense and indeed any other likely and apparent defense in favor of the Appellant. I have also considered the submissions of counsel for the parties in their respective briefs in the light of the findings of the Court below in the judgment appealed against and I am of the view that all the issues identified by the parties are apt but can conveniently be harmonized into just one principal issue for the fair and just determination of this appeal, namely:
“Whether the Court below was right when it held that the defense of self defense did not avail the Appellant and that the Respondent proved the case of manslaughter against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required by law. It is my view that a consideration of this sole issue, encompassing all the issues formulated by the parties, would invariably involve the consideration and resolution of all the issues as formulated by the parties in their respective briefs. I shall therefore, and do hereby, proceed to consider and resolve the sole issue anon. In the meantime, the Appellant having abandoned ground 4 in the Notice of Appeal, the said ground 4 is hereby struck out.
SOLE ISSUE
Whether the Court below was right when it held that the defense of self defense did not avail the Appellant and that the Respondent proved the case of manslaughter against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required by law
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
On his issue one, learned counsel for the Appellant had submitted that it is beyond argument in a criminal charge that the duty of proving the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and such burden is to prove such guilt beyond reasonable doubt and contended that in a charge of manslaughter the Prosecution must prove death of the Deceased, that the killing of the Deceased was unlawful and that the death of the Deceased was caused by the direct act of the accused in circumstances other than that of a murder and urged the Court to hold that on the totality of the evidence adduced by the Prosecution only the first ingredient, that is that the deceased had died, that was made out while it failed to prove the other two most crucial elements of the offence of manslaughter. Counsel relied Ojo V. FRN (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1099) 467 @ pp. 5I1-512.
It was further submitted that looking at the evidence before the Court below it is clear that though the Appellant admitted stabbing the deceased but not the number of five times as ascribed to her by the Court below, the number of times will be seen to be significant when considered in the con and circumstances of which the stabbing took place and contended that the Appellant was in a scuffle with the deceased and was fighting for her life as corroborated by the evidence of PW1 and urged the Court to hold that while some of the wounds found on the body of the deceased may be self inflicted the others may have come about as a result of the struggle between the Deceased and the Appellant, while the Appellant was trying to defend herself after having her life and safety threatened by the Deceased with the knife in the confined space of a car with doors all locked. Counsel relied on Aiguoreghian V. State (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 860) 367 @ pp 408 – 409.
It was also submitted that the co-existing circumstances which weakened or destroyed the inference that the Appellant was solely responsible for the Deceased’s death is the scuffle or struggle between the Appellant and the Deceased in which the Appellant was being held by the neck and was threatened with a knife by the Deceased and being compelled to perform a sexual act against her consent, which evidence was not challenged nor contradicted and contended that such circumstance reasonably raises the possibility that some of the wounds could have been self-inflicted or arose through the struggle but not all may have arisen as a result of the acts of the Appellant and urged the Court to hold that the Prosecution not having identified the particular wound which was the fatal one that led to the death of the Deceased and that such wound was inflicted by the Appellant rendered the case unproved against the Appellant for which she was entitled to be acquitted and discharged.
On his issue two, learned counsel for the Appellant had submitted that the Appellant gave uncontroverted evidence regarding the unfortunate circumstances of the facts of the case and was consistent in relating what happened between her and the deceased both at the first opportunity of making a statement at the police station through Exhibit D and contended that these evidence validly raised the defense of Self Defense which the Court below gravely erred in overruling and urged the Court to hold that on the available evidence the Appellant clearly established the defense of self defense and to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court below and acquit and discharge the Appellant. Counsel referred to Section 286 of the Criminal Code law of Lagos State 2003 and relied on Uwaekweghinya V. State (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 930) 227 @ p. 252.
It was further submitted that the conclusion reached by the Court below refusing the defense of self defense was perverse because it was based on wrong premises in that the Court below had ascribed to the Appellant that she stabbed the Deceased in several places, which was not correct, and had also relied on the fact that the Appellant was up and about at 2.00am and accepted a free ride at 2:00am and was thus a woman of easy virtue, which are all irrelevant to the defense of self – defense even if established to be true since even women of easy virtue have a right of self preservation in the face of imminent danger to their body or person and urged the Court to hold that in law the moral character of the Appellant was irrelevant when considering the applicability of the defense of self defense, which availed the Appellant and to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court below and to acquit and discharge the Appellant, the Respondent having failed to prove its case of manslaughter against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required by law.
RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
On his issue one, learned counsel for the Respondent had submitted that from the evidence led before the Court below it was established that the Appellant was by the road side in the Apapa area of Lagos at about 2.00 am on the date of incident and was picked up by the deceased when she asked for a ride; that the two of them were alone in the car; the Appellant admitted to stabbing the deceased; the photograph of the deceased tendered and admitted as exhibit showed multiple stab wounds on the body of the deceased while the Appellant appeared unruffled with her dress intact without any evidence of her being rough handled by the deceased and contended that in law facts admitted need no further proof.
It was further submitted that going by the essential ingredients of the offence of manslaughter vis a vis the evidence adduced by the Respondent in proof of the charge against the Appellant, all the essential ingredients of the offence of manslaughter were established beyond reasonable doubt as required by law and contended that the Court was correct when it found as proved the offence of manslaughter as charged against the Appellant and to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the Court below. Counsel referred to Section 317 of the Criminal Code Law, Cap C. 17, Vol.2. Laws of Lagos State 2003 and relied onApugo V. State (2006) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 207 @ p. 215.
It was also submitted that in law the commission of an offence can be proved by either of or a combination of eye witness account; circumstantial evidence and or the confessional statement of an accused person and contended that the secrecy with which criminals perpetrate crime has tended to deprive the prosecution in some cases of eye witnesses and urged the Court to hold that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the Respondent pointed irresistibly to the Appellant as the person who unlawfully killed the deceased and to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the Court below.
Counsel referred to the Book: Aguda, Laws of Evidence in Nigeria, 2nd Edition @ p. 4 and relied on Emeka V. State (2001) 6 SC 277 @ p. 235.
It was also submitted that in law it is the absence of intention to kill that distinguishes the offence of manslaughter, for which the Appellant was charged by the Respondent and rightly convicted and sentenced by the Court below, and contended that once there was an intention to kill the offence is murder and urged the Court to hold that the Appellant was on the totality of the evidence led by the Respondent proved to have committed the offence of manslaughter charged beyond reasonable doubt as required by law and was thus properly and rightly convicted by the Court below and to dismiss the appeal and affirm the correct findings and judgment of the Court below. Counsel relied on Jamal V. State (1999) NWLR (Pt. 632) 582; Bakare V. State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 82)581; Audu V. State (2003) NWLR (Pt. 820) 516 @ p. 554.
On his issue two, learned counsel for the Respondent had submitted that going by the legal meaning of the defense of self defense, the Appellant failed to show any entitlement to it in the circumstances of the evidence before the Court below and contended that the Appellant who had confessed to stabbing the deceased was under no threat to her life or any bodily hurt when as the assailant she stabbed the deceased several times all over his body which led to his death and urged the Court to hold that the Court below was right when it held that the defense of self defense did not avail the Appellant and to dismiss the appeal and to affirm the correct findings of the Court below. Counsel relied on John V. The State (2012) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1299); Madu V. The State (2001) 3 NWLR (Pt. 700) 230 @ p. 231; Hassan V. State (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 709) 286 @ p. 307.
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL REPLY SUBMISSIONS
In his reply, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that in law the submissions of counsel cannot take the place of evidence not led by the parties and contended that on the evidence of the Appellant on all that transpired between her and the deceased in his car, leading to his coming out of the car to push the Appellant out, it was incongruous and strange for the Respondent’s Counsel to argue that the Deceased had pushed the Appellant out and the Appellant held on to him while trying to establish that the Appellant was the aggressor who was bent on injuring or even killing the Deceased and urged the Court to discountenance such submissions not founded on the evidence before the Court below. Counsel relied on Buhari V. INEC (2008) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1078) 546 @ pp. 629 – 630; Oduola V. Coker (1981) 5 SC 6; Reynolds Construction Ltd V. Reynolds Brezina Brown (1993) 6 NWLR 9Pt. 297)122; Unity Bank Plc V. Bouari (2008) NWLR (Pt. 1086) 372 @ p. 408; Uwaekweghinya V. State (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 930) 227 @ p. 252.
It was further submitted that Exhibit E1 – E3, being computer generated documents, were not admissible in evidence having not complied with the requirements for admissibility of computer generated evidence under the law and contended that in law a Court of law cannot place reliance on an inadmissible piece of evidence and urged the Court to discountenance and expunge Exhibits E1 – E3 as inadmissible evidence inadvertently admitted by the Court below so that the appeal will be decided on admissible evidence only as required by law and to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court below and acquit and discharge the Appellant. Counsel referred to the New Webster’s Dictionary of English Language (International Edition); Section 258 of the Evidence Act 2011 and relied on Nwaogu V. Atuma (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1364) 117 @ pp. 136 – 137; Kubor V. Dickson (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 534 @ pp. 577 – 578; Buhari V. Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941)1; Ozigi V. UBN (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 333)385; Shittu V. Fasawe (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 946) 671.
RESOLUTION OF THE SOLE ISSUE
My lords, when in an appeal it is alleged that a lower Court had not properly evaluated the evidence led by the parties either before it or as in the printed record, it is simply a call on the appellate Court to consider first whether or not the lower Court had properly evaluated the evidence led before it and if it finds that the lower Court had not, then to proceed to and re-evaluate the evidence in the printed record to determine if the Court below had made correct findings borne out by the evidence as led by the parties. It is the law that it is only where the Court below had not properly carried out its sacred duty of dispassionately evaluating the totality of the evidence led and had thus failed in this primary duty that an appellate Court would have the legal justification to intervene and re – evaluate the evidence on the printed record in order to make appropriate findings of facts in line with the evidence led and in the dictates of justice to the parties.
So, until an appellate Court arrives at such a conclusion the need for re – evaluation of evidence does not arise since an appellate Court has no business interfering with correct findings of a trial Court. See Williams v. Tinubu (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 755) 200. See alsoAmuneke V. The State (1992) NWLR (Pt. 217)347; Sule Asariyu V. The State (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 709; Nkebisi V. State (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1188) 471; Woluchem V. Gudi (1981) 5 SC. 291; Enang V. Adu (1981) 11-12 SC. 25; Abisi & Ors. V. Ekwealor & Anor (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 302) 643; Igago V. The State (1999) 12 SCNJ 140 @ p. 160; Amala V. State (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 520.
However, in carrying its re – evaluation even where it finds that the trial Court had failed to carry out its primary duty to do so properly, it must still be borne in mind by the appellate Court that evaluation and ascription of probative value to the evidence led is ordinarily the turf of the trial Court, and once a trial Court discharges that duty on the strength of the evidence placed before it, unless it arrives at perverse conclusions or findings not supported by the established evidence before it, an appellate Court will not interfere once the conclusions reached is correct, even if the reason which is the pathway to the conclusion or finding turns out to be wrong. This is so because in law an appellate Court is not so much concerned with the correctness or wrongness of the reasons adduced by a trial Court for its decisions or conclusions but rather more concerned with whether the decision reached or conclusion arrived at was correct or wrong; that is the law. See Alhaji Ndayako & Ors. V. Alhaji Dantoro & Ors. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 @ p. 198. See also Abaye V. Ofili (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) 134; Ukejianya V. Uchendu 18 WACA 46.
It is thus the law that an appellate Court which had not seen the witnesses testify and observed their demeanor in the witness stand should respect the views of the trial Court and not to readily substitute its own views for that of the trial Court except where it is shown that the conclusion or finding reached by the trial Court was perverse and for this an appellate Court will readily intervene to re-evaluate the evidence in the printed record if it is shown that the conclusions reached or findings made by the trial Court on the proved evidence before it do not flow from such proved facts or runs contrary to such proved facts and thus perverse. In such a case, the appellate Court is in good a position as the trial Court to intervene to re-evaluate the evidence in the printed record to draw necessary inference and make proper findings on the proved and admitted facts in the record as the justice of the case requires but which the trial Court had failed to do. See Obajimi V. Adeobi (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1075) 1 @ p. 19. See also Owor V. Christopher (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 511) 962 @ p. 992; Sogbamu V. Odunaiya (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 700) 1249 @ p. 1302; Mini Lodge V. Ngei (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 506) 1806 @ pp. 1820 -1821; Sa?eed V. Yakowa (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 692) 1650 @ p. 1681.
Now, the sole issue deals directly with the requirement of the law that an allegation of the commission of a crime must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the Prosecution in order to secure the conviction of an Accused person so charged. To succeed therefore, the Prosecution must lead credible evidence establishing the essential ingredients of the offence charged. In doing so the Prosecution need not call a horde of witnesses since in law the credible and cogent evidence of a sole witness will be sufficient to secure a conviction for an offence no matter the heinous nature of the offences charged in so far as corroboration is not required by law.
Thus, once the essential ingredients of the offence charged is sufficiently established by the evidence put forward by the Prosecution, it is immaterial that a particular witness was not called or that a particular document was not tendered in evidence. SeeAlhaji Muadzu Ali V. The State (2015) 5 SCM 26. See also Odili V. The State (1977) 4 SC 1; Oguonzee V. The State (1998) 5 NWLR (pt. 551) 521; Alonne V. IGP. (1959) 4 FSC 203; Ibodo V. The State (1975) 9 – 11 SC (Reprint) 80; Abeke Onafowokan V. The State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 61) 538. See also Akpabio V. The State (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 359) 635; Idiok V. The State (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1104) 225 @ Pp. 250 251. See also Olayinka V. The State (2007) 4 SCNJ 53 @ p. 73; The State V. Ajie (2000) 3 NSCQR 53 @ p. 66; Adebayo Rasaki V. The State (2014) 10 NCC 1.
In law, the Prosecution has open to it three basic types of evidence with which to prove the commission of an offence charged against an Accused person beyond reasonable doubt, namely: a: Direct eye witness evidence; b: Confessional statement and c: Circumstantial evidence. See Godwin Igabele V. The State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 975) 103. See also Lori V. The State (1980) 8 11 SC 81; Emeka V. The State (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 734) 666; Peter Igho V. The State (1978) 3 SC 87; Archibong V. The State (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 349.
In considering the conclusions and findings reached by the Court below, I am aware that it is the prerogative of a trial Court which sees and hears the witnesses to choose which to believe and to ascribe probative value to such evidence, either oral or documentary. Thus, a trial Court being the master of the facts, must base his inferences, evaluation or assessment and findings on the available evidence adduced before it and therefore, if its findings must stand it must not be premised on extraneous facts or matters or conjectures outside the evidence given at the trial. See Emeka V. The State (2014) LPELR 3472011 (SC); Afolalu V. The State (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1220) 584; Ejeka V. The State (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt. 819) 408; Isibor V. The State (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 758) 241; Iko V. The State (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 221; Buba V. The State (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 355) 195; The State V. Musa Danjuma (1997) 3216 (SC) 1; Arehia V. The State (1982) NSCC 85.
In law conviction for any offence can only be secured based on proof by sufficient, credible and cogent evidence in satisfaction of all the essential elements of the offence(s) charged, failing which an Accused person is entitled to be discharged and acquitted.
However, in proving the guilt of an Accused beyond reasonable doubt, the law does not impose on the Respondent any greater duty than it simply entails, which is proof of all the essential ingredients of the offence(s) charged and not proof beyond all iota of doubt or proof to the hilt. Thus, in a charge alleging one of the gravest of offences, such as manslaughter, and carrying ordinarily the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment upon conviction, the clearest of evidence invoking neither doubt nor mere passion or compassion in the Court is required. See Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011. See also Ajose V. FRN (2011) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1244) 465 @ p. 470; Emmanuel Eke V. The State (2011) 200 LRCN 143 @ p. 149; Deriba V. State (2016) LPELR- 40345 (CA) per Georgewill JCA.
Now, in a count alleging manslaughter, the Respondent, being the prosecution, carried on it the burden, which does not shift, to prove the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt by leading credible evidence to the satisfaction of the Court as establishing all the essential ingredients of the offence of manslaughter to wit: a. That the deceased is dead; b. That the death of the deceased was caused by the unlawful act or omission of the accused; c. That the act or omission of the accused which caused the death of the deceased must have been intentional with the knowledge that injury or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence. It is the absence of intention to kill that reduces the offence to manslaughter since in both murder and manslaughter death of the deceased is the result. See Sections 317 of the Criminal Code Law Cap. C17, Vol. 2, Laws of Lagos State, 2003. See also Abosede V. State (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 448) 270; Ubani V. State (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 224; Kada V. State (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt. 208) 134.
By Section 317 of the Criminal Code Law Cap. C 17 Vol. 2 Laws of Lagos State 2003, the offence of manslaughter is succinctly stated to be as follows:
“A person who unlawfully kills another in such circumstances as not constitute murder is guilty of manslaughter.”
In Apugo V. State (2006) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 207 @ p. 215, the Supreme Court held that to amount to manslaughter, an act
“Must not only be unauthorized, unjustified or not excused by law, it must also result from the direct or indirect act of the accused person. In short, the death must be caused by the unlawful act of the accused.”
Having averted my mind to the applicable principles of law, what then are the pieces of evidence led by the Respondent in proof of the alleged offence of manslaughter against the Appellant and the evidence led in defense by the Appellant on which the Court below reached its conclusions that the Appellant was guilty of manslaughter as alleged by the Respondent and thereby convicting and sentencing her to 14 years imprisonment.
In proof of its case, the Respondent called three witnesses and tendered 11 Exhibits. PW1 was one Tony Igwe. He stated that while on duty with his colleagues on the 30/6/2011 at about 3:34am, he heard a lady shouting for help and when he came out with his colleagues, they met the lady, the Appellant, and a man lying down on the floor covered in his blood and the lady’s cloth soaked in blood. He called Area B, Police Station, Apapa and the Police came and handcuffed the Appellant. He followed them to the Police Station and made his statement. Under cross – examination, he reiterated that he heard a female voice asking for help, but that they did not leave their duty post for fear that she might be aiding armed robbers. He stated that he saw them dragging each other inside the vehicle but that it was still dark at the time they parked in front of his work place. He also stated that he did not know what led to the death of the deceased.
However, the Police took the photograph of the Appellant and the corpse of the deceased. He did not see the knife with the Appellant but when the Police searched the car, they recovered the knife.
PW2 was one Bose Akete a Woman Police Seargent with the Homicide Section, State CID Panti. She stated that the Appellant was alleged to have killed one Patrick Obiyan by stabbing him with a knife and that she recorded the statements of the IPO from Apapa Police Station, the Complainant, one Tony Igwe and others including one Vincent Francis Adaly and the Elder sister to the deceased. She visited the scene of the crime and the body of deceased at the mortuary and served a Coroner Form at LASUTH to enable Post Mortem Examination. She also recorded the statement of the Appellant after she was cautioned. She stated that the Appellant was a prostitute at the time of the crime leaving from a Club to house to another, while in search of a Club and she boarded the deceased cab. The Appellant told her that the deceased passed where she was going and argument ensued and they started fighting. The statement of the Appellant made on 7/7/2011 tendered and admitted as Exhibit A.
She further stated that there were marks of stab on the thigh and hand of the deceased. Under cross – examination, she stated that the Appellant wore a short transparent dress on that day of the incident, tendered in evidence as Exhibit B while her bag was tendered as Exhibit C, and that the car and the knife were brought to SCID, Panti but the car was subsequently returned to the deceased’s family. However, the knife used by the Appellant was longer than the size of her bag.
PW3 was one Corporal Emmanuel John. He stated that on 30/6/2011 at about 4.30 am, a case of murder was reported by one Mr. Tony Igwe and he and his team moved to the scene of the crime, where they met the Appellant sitting on the floor with her cloth stained with blood and a knife beside her and on the other side of the car was the body of the deceased on the floor in his pool of blood with stab of the knife on his back, neck and buttock. He stated that the Appellant was arrested and her statement was obtained under caution and she confessed that she killed the deceased and his investigation revealed that the Appellant was a prostitute, who had left her hotel room for a club and on her way met with deceased who took her in his vehicle. The statement of the Appellant was tendered in evidence as Exhibit D, while photographs taken at the scene of crime were tendered in evidence as Exhibits E – E3. He maintained that the Appellant did not sustain any injury and that he recovered a knife at the scene of crime same, tendered in evidence as Exhibit F. Under cross – examination, he stated that the Appellant was beside the body of the deceased but he did not visit the Hotel room where the Appellant left from. The Statement of IPO was tendered in evidence as Exhibit G and that there were injuries on the body of the deceased. The statement of the PW1 was tendered in evidence as Exhibit H but he cannot remember whether or not the Appellant’s bag could contain the knife and whether she was wearing a tight leggings and a gown.
In her defense, the Appellant testified as DW1. She stated that she was a sales girl with Adebayo Boutique Festac Town and that on 29/6/ 2011 she left her mother’s house for a birthday party and lodged at Oil City Hotel Apapa and the party ended at 9. 00pm. At 1:00am she left for Moranido Club Apapa, looking for a cab to take her and the deceased offered her a ride and when she inquired about the fare, the deceased said she should not worry. However, when they got to where she was going the deceased refused to stop and brought out a knife and threatened her with the knife and drove her to a quite place at Liverpool area and asked her to put off her leggings, which she did, and he then took the leggings and her small bag and threw them on the back seat. She state that he then pulled down his own trouser and asked her to suck his manhood if not he was going to stab her but she told him she wanted to ease herself, so he opened his side of the door and warned her not to do anything funny.
DW1 continued in her testimony that immediately one of her leg was outside, she pressed the horn and the man moved the car and she quickly moved back inside the car and he used the knife to stab her on her leg, but she quickly grabbed the knife from him and was shouting help, help, help but no one came to her aid, until they got to the front of a Company where there was light that she quickly removed the car key and the car stopped. In the meantime, they were both struggling with the knife in the car and two Army Officers came and stopped them from dragging the knife and ordered them out from the car and they both came out of the car, and she saw that she was soaked with blood. It was the Policemen that confirmed that the deceased had died and said that she killed the deceased but she did not know how the deceased was stabbed. She stated that she was stabbed on her hand and leg but though she was not treated the wounds had healed by themselves. Under cross – examination, she stated that the night was the first time she went out in the night and that she was into event planning.
DW2, Mrs. Basirat Olajumoke Towolawi is the mother of the Appellant. She stated that the Appellant is her only child and that her friend was having a birthday party on the 29/6/2011 and she left the house at 6. 00pm and by 9.00pm she called to inform her that the party was an all night affair. However, on 30/6/2011, she received a call from the Apapa Police Station that she should come and when she arrived there she saw injuries on the hands of the Appellant but she was not treated as the wound got healed on its own. Under cross – examination, she stated that the Appellant told her that she was going somewhere in Apapa but did not give her the address and maintained that it was the first time the Appellant went out at night. See pages 152 – 156, 158 – 160, 163 – 166, 170 – 172 and 173 – 179 of the record of appeal.
Now, it was on the strength of the above pieces of evidence, both oral and documentary, that the Court below in its judgment delivered on 5/3/2015, while finding the Appellant guilty of manslaughter, convicting and sentencing her to 14 years imprisonment, held inter alia thus:
The 1st question to be addressed here is whether the deceased actually died?The accused herself did not deny the fact that the deceased has died. I therefore, hold that the deceased, Patrick Odiyan is indeed dead. I shall now examine whether the death of the deceased was caused by the unlawful act or commission of the accused person?Upon close examinations of Exhibit E1 – E3 revealed that the deceased was stabbed several times and even the Defendant confessed that he was stabbed five times?..Be that as it may, there is no dispute as to the cause of death, as the deceased died as a result of injury sustained from the stabbing. The injury sustained by the deceased was caused by the act of the accused person. Where a person is attacked brutally in the process of which he sustained injuries and died immediately or shortly afterwards, it is permissible to infer that the wound inflicted on him caused the death?In view of the evidence, before the Court, I have no difficulty in concluding that the deceased died as a result of the injury he sustained from the stabbing. I now move on to consider whether the accused, acted intentionally knowing death or grievous bodily harm was its consequence. The accused herein said the deceased threatened her with the knife, but she seized same and stabbed him several times.
Considering the evidence before this Honourable Court, the accused person herein did not set out to kill the deceased, but something sudden must have happened, two of them engaged in a fight which resulted into the death of the deceased. It is the unlawful, taking human life without malice and under circumstances falling short of willful, premeditated, or deliberate intent to kill that differentiates murder and manslaughter.
In view of the entire circumstances, I therefore hold that the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused person killed the deceased? The accepted evidence before the Court is that the deceased threatened to stab the accused person if she didn’t suck his manhood. Can stabbing him several places be said to be reasonable force in view of the fact that the accused was picked up at 2:00am. Only a woman of easy virtue will be out at night and accept an offer of free ride at that ungodly hour of the night from a man or anybody. I therefore hold that this defense cannot avail the accused person. The Accused Person is guilty as charged See pages 192 – 211 of the record of appeal.
I have taken time to reproduce and review the totality of the evidence as in the printed record in view of the fact that the position of the law on what a prosecution is required to prove to secure conviction on a charge of manslaughter seems fairly well settled and thus this appeal turns out more on the findings of facts as made by the Court below from the evidence led before it by the parties.
Having considered the evidence as led by the parties vis a vis the essential elements of the offence of manslaughter with which the Appellant was charged, it is clear to me and I so find that the Court below was right, and indeed on firmer ground when it found that the deceased has died and that his death was caused by the act or omission of the Appellant. By these finding, which I affirm as correct, the Respondent had clearly established two of the three essential elements of the offence of manslaughter against the Appellant in the unfortunate death of the deceased on that fateful early morning of 30/6/2011 at about 3:00am.
In coming to the above conclusion, I am aware that in law, the best way of proving the death of the deceased in criminal trials such at the instant one is either a medical certificate of death showing that the deceased is dead and the cause of death or the viva voce evidence of the Medical Doctor who performed an autopsy on the body of the deceased to testify to the fact that the deceased had died and what in his finding was the cause of death of the deceased.
However, whenever the circumstances revealed in evidence show that the deceased had met his death simultaneously with an attack on him with a lethal weapon or so soon thereafter, then the law is that neither a medical evidence of his death by means of a death certificate nor post mortem report would be essential as being a sine qua non for the proof of both death and cause of death. In such circumstances the Court could infer the cause of death from the proved circumstances. See Oforlete V. The State (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 681)415. See also Tonara Bakuri V. The State (1965) NMLR 163 @ p. 164; Eric Uyo V. Attorney – General of Bendel State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 17) 418; Onwumere V. The State (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 186) 428; Nwachukwu V. The State (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt. 782) 543; Aiguoreghian v State (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 860) 367.
In Ben V. State (2006) 16 NWLR (PT.1006) 582, the Supreme Court had held inter alia thus:
“The position of the law in this respect had been stated in numerous cases. It is that in cases where a man was attacked with lethal weapon and he died on the spot, cause of death can properly be inferred that the wound inflicted caused the death. Put in another form, where the cause of death is obvious, medical evidence ceases to be of any practical or legal necessity in homicide case. Such a situation arises where death was instantaneous or nearly so.”
Thus, the only issue left for consideration in this appeal is whether the Respondent proved by credible evidence that the act or omission of the Appellant which caused the death of the deceased was intentional with the knowledge that injury or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence on the face of the plea of self defense by the Appellant, bearing in mind that a successful plea of self defense negatives intention, the mens rea without which the offence of manslaughter, as in the instant appeal, cannot be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the Respondent as required by law.
Now, while on the one hand it was contended for the Appellant that on the evidence of what transpired on that fateful night between the parties, the defense of self defense avails the Appellant who had acted in the face of an imminent grievous bodily injury to her by the knife wielding assailant/cab driver and had thus acted in self defense to save herself from the deceased, it was on the other hand contended for the Respondent that the Appellant acted unreasonably in stabbing the deceased several times that led to his death without any imminent fear or threat of death or any bodily injury to her and had thus acted without any justification leading to the death of the deceased.
My lords, the defense of self defense is an exculpatory defense where it avails an Accused person and thus by its operation negatives the intention or mens rea to cause grievous bodily harm as is required to constitute the third essential element of the offence of manslaughter. By Section 26 of the Criminal Code Law, Cap C17 Laws of Lagos State 2003, it is provided thus:
“If the nature of the assault is such as to cause reasonable apprehension of death or grievous harm, and the person using force by way of defense believes, on reasonable grounds, that he cannot otherwise preserve the person defended from death or grievous harm, it is lawful for him to use any such force to the assailant as is necessary for defense, even though such force may cause death or grievous harm.”
In law to avail oneself of this defense, it must be apparent on the face of the credible evidence led that the Defendant, the Appellant, as in the instant appeal; a. Must have been unlawfully assaulted and must not have provoked the assault; b. The nature of the assault must be such as caused reasonable apprehension of death and grievous harm; c. There must be a belief on reasonable grounds that the accused cannot otherwise preserve his life. See Sampson Nkemji Uwaekweghinya V. State (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 930) 227 @ p. 250. See alsoUmana V. The State (1972) 4 SC 164; Bassey V. The State (1963) 1 All NLR 280; Chukwu V. State (2012) LPELR 9829 (SC); Uwaekweghinya V. State (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 930) 227.
The defense of self defense is by itself a complete defense and thus avails a Defendant in a criminal trial for murder or manslaughter or assault etc once it is shown by credible evidence that the Defendant did not want to kill or grievously hurt or harm or injure the deceased or victim; that he did not want to fight and that he was at all material times prepared to withdraw. See Stephen V. State (1986) 5NWLR (Pt. 46) 979 @ p. 987. See also Nwabe V State (1995) 3 SCNJ 77.
However, to successfully rely on a plea of self defense it must be shown by the person relying on the plea of self defense that he reasonably believed that there was no other way of saving himself from death or grievous bodily harm other than by using such force as he did and that he tried to disengage from the event which led to the application of such force. The issue of disengagement would, in my view, depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case.
Thus sometimes it may be possible for a person being attacked to run away from his assailant and at times it may be impossible for the person being attacked to physically withdraw or save himself except by resort to available means of self defense. In all, one thing seem certain and that is there must some form or measure of proportionality between the threat and the response for the defense of self defense to avail an Accused person charged with for example murder or manslaughter, as in the instant appeal. See Sampson Nkemji Uwaekweghinya V. State (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 930) 227 @ p. 250. See also Umana V. The State (1972) 4 SC 164; Bassey V. The State (1963) 1 All NLR 280; Chukwu V. State (2012) LPELR 9829 (SC).
In Adeyinka Albert Laoye V. The State (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 10) 832 @ pp. 843 – 844 the Supreme Court had considered the issue of proportionality of force used in self defense and opined inter alia thus:
“The degree of force used is only relevant while one is considering the circumstances of the encounter so as to determine whether there were reasonable grounds for the prisoner’s belief that his life is in danger. Once it is agreed that there were such grounds, the amount of force used by the prisoner to preserve his own life becomes immaterial. In a fight to the death, it is only expected that once the prisoner believes on reasonable grounds that his life is in danger he would go all out to preserve his life, and that may entail making sure that the deceased is dead beyond any question.”
In all criminal trials, it is incumbent upon the trial Court to consider all the defenses put up by the accused person either expressly or impliedly as apparent on the evidence and therefore, no matter whether the defense is full of figments of imagination, or is fanciful or bereft of reason and or based on lies or even doubtful, the Court must not be wary to give them due consideration. An Accused person is in law entitled to all the defenses open and available to him on the evidence before the Court whether specifically raised by him or not and thus must be fully considered by the Court. See Ani V. The State (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt. 830)142. See also Green V. Queen (1955) 15 WACA 73; R. V. Bramah (1945) 11 WACA 49; Nwuzoke V. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 72) 529; R. V. Bio (1945) 11 WACA 46 @ p. 48; Asanya V. State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 180) 442; Ekpenyong V. The State (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 295) 513; Grace Boms V. The State (1971) All NLR 335.
In considering a plea of self defense, the Court must take into consideration the fact of whether the deceased was carrying any weapon at the time he was killed by an Accused person who relies on the plea of self defense as such factor is very material to the determination of proportionality or otherwise of the action of the Accused person. See John Mgboko V. The State (1972) LPELR 1872 (SC). See also Stephen V. State (1986) NWLR (Pt. 46) 978; Uwagboe V. State (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1102) 621; Omoregie V. State (2008) LPELR ? 2685 (SC).
Now, agreed the only person alive who was a direct participant in the gory events of the night which the deceased met his untimely death is the Appellant. There is no other direct evidence of what transpired in that car on that fateful night at about 3.00am breaking into the morning of the next day, at a time when majority of the human homo sapiens not involved in any official duty are fast asleep in their beds, yet for self defense to avail the Appellant the evidence on which it was relied upon must be credible and consistent with the circumstances as revealed in the totality of the evidence led by the parties before the Court below and of course believed by that Court.
In other words, it is not enough merely that the Appellant raised the defense of self defense but such a plea must be supported by credible evidence taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances leading to the offence with which the Appellant was charged.
The primary duty to evaluate and appraise the evidence led by both the Respondent, as the Prosecution, and the Appellant, as the Defendant, as to the ingredients of the offence charged, whether or not established and the defenses raised and apparent from the evidence, whether or not made out in favour of the Appellant, was that of the Court below.
My lords, there is no immutable principle of law that once any incident occurs between two persons alone leading to the death of one of them, whatever the other surviving one says as Defendant in a criminal trial for the death of the deceased is the truth and must be taken hook, line and sinker merely because the deceased, the only other person who witnessed the incident leading to his death is no more. In law, in such circumstances as in the instant appeal wherein the only eye witness to the incident is the Appellant, for such evidence to be believed it must be seen to be consistent with the physical evidence and circumstances at the time of the alleged incident.
Thus, a deceased who the evidence showed, as agreed to even by the Appellant, was stabbed about five times at different points in his body by the only surviving other person in the incident, with no evidence of any injury sustained on the other surviving person even if so claimed by the Appellant but was not proved, cannot in my finding, and as correctly found by the Court below, support the defense of self defense merely on the basis that the deceased who could have given his own side of the story was no more and the only surviving person in the incident has said it all as it happened. This is not and cannot be the law. The defense of self defense is a well defined defense in our law and founded on credible evidence of its essentials ingredients and not merely as a matter of course for just the mentioning of it by a Defendant charged with such a heinous offence involving the taking of the life of another person.
I have reviewed, reevaluated and considered the totality of the evidence led by the Respondent and the Appellant, as in the printed record, and considered the findings of the Court below thereon and I am of the firm view that the Court below did carried out its primary duty of proper evaluation and appraisal of the evidence led before it by the parties and did come to the correct finding that the Appellant caused the unlawful death of the deceased in circumstances not amounting to self defense.
My lords, as an aside and merely thinking aloud, I have pondered on the peculiar facts of this appeal and had wondered if the defense of self defense would even avail a Defendant who upon being attacked by an assailant with a knife or gun as the case may be, disarms the assailant by collecting the knife or gun and stabs him three or more times or shoots the assailant three or more times to death after disarming him of the lethal weapon? I think not. It would amount to either at worst a case of murder or at best a case of manslaughter and nothing else! It can never give rise to the defense of self defense to completely exculpate such a Defendant on a charge of either murder or manslaughter.
I am aware of the reference to the fact that the Appellant is a ‘woman of easy virtue’ in the judgment of the Court below, which to my mind was completely uncalled for but since the finding that the defense of self defense does not avail the Appellant was correct, in my finding too, the unfortunate reference to such irrelevant fact by the Court below, though an error of judgment, goes to no avail in favor of the Appellant since the finding that the defense of self defense does not avail the Appellant and this error was thus incapable of overturning the correct finding of the Court below on the issue of the defense of self defense put forward by the Appellant but was not made out by the Appellant.
In law an appellate Court has no business interfering with the correct finding of a trial Court even where the reason adduced and relied upon by the trial Court to arrive at the correct findings turns out to be wrong. See Alhaji Ndayoko & Ors. V. Alhaji Dantoro & Ors. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 @ p. 198, where Edozie, JSC., had pronounced with finality on this vexed issue, thus:
“An appellate Court is only concerned with whether the judgment appealed against is right or wrong not whether the reasons given are right or wrong. Where the judgment is right but the reasons given are wrong, the appellate Court does not interfere. It is only where the misdirection has caused the Court to come to a wrong conclusion that the appellate Court will interfere…” See also Abaye V. Ofili (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) 134; Ukejianya V. Uchendu 18 WACA 46.
Indeed, there was no duty, in the circumstances of the evidence by the parties before the Court below as in the printed record, on the Respondent as Prosecution to prove that there was no injury on the Appellant as that is not part of the constituent elements of the offence of manslaughter and thus being a fact within the personal knowledge of the Appellant, it was incumbent on her to lead credible evidence of any such injury on her which she failed to do. Therefore, in my finding, with or without Exhibits E1 – E3, the Respondent proved that the Appellant was not acting in self defense when she inflicted those fatal five knife stab wounds on the deceased without any lawful justification leading to his instant death right at the scene of the incident.
Here is a young lady of 22 years of age found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced rather than to the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment but had been magnanimously sentenced by the Court below to a mere 14 years imprisonment. However, since there is no appeal against sentence and since an appellate Court has no business interfering with sentence imposed by a trial Court in the absence of any appeal against sentence, I shall not say anything further on the proprietary or otherwise of the 14 years imprisonment imposed on the Appellant by the Court below upon her conviction for manslaughter. But it must be pointed out at once that in law a Court cannot impose a lesser sentence where the mandatory sentence is life. See Onyemachi Remigus Chibuzor V. FRN (2017) LPELR ? 41852 (CA) per Garba JCA @ pp. 14 ? 16. See also Tanko V. State (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1131) 430; Amoshima V. State (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1268) 530; Balogun V. AG. Ogun State (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 512.
In the light of all I have said and found as above, the sole issue is hereby resolved against the Appellant in favor of the Respondent and I hold that the appeal is devoid of any merit and is thus liable to be dismissed. Consequently, it is hereby so dismissed.
In the result, the Judgment of the High Court of Lagos State, Lagos Judicial Division; Coram: D. O. Oluwayemi J., in Charge No: LCD/43/2012: The People of Lagos State V. Kofoworola Saheed delivered on 5/3/2015, in which the Appellant as Defendant was convicted for the offence of manslaughter and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment is hereby affirmed.
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH. J.C.A.: I agree with the lucid judgment prepared by my learned brother, Biobele Abraham Georgewill, J.C.A.
UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.: Under our adversarial criminal justice system, the prosecution has the onus of proving the commission of the crime charged. By Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all shadow of doubt and where the evidence adduced is strong as to leave only a remote probability in favour of the accused person, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. See BAKARE vs. THE STATE (1987) 3 SC 1 or (1987) LPELR (714) 1 at 12-13 (SC). Proof beyond reasonable doubt means proof of an offence with the certainty required in a criminal trial. That certainty is that the offence was committed, which is established by proving the essential ingredients of the offence, and that it is the person charged therewith that committed the offence.
I have carefully considered the Records of Appeal and the briefs of argument filed and exchanged by the parties and it is lucent that the evidence adduced established the offence of manslaughter, which the Appellant was charged with, beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, having been privileged to read the draft of the leading judgment of my learned brother, Biobele Abraham Georgewill, JCA, which has just been delivered, I avow my concurrence to the ineluctable conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit. I also join in dismissing the appeal. The decision of the High Court of Lagos State, Coram Judice: D. O. Oluwayemi, J., in Charge NO. LCD/43/2012 delivered on 5th March 2015, embodying the conviction and sentence imposed on the Appellant is hereby affirmed.
Appearances:
Olumide Ekisola Esq. with him, Funmilola Osisanya Esq. and M. U. Mustapha Esq.For Appellant(s)
The Respondent, though duly served with hearing notice on 17/9/2018, was not represented by counselFor Respondent(s)
