JOSEPH OLANREWAJU v. THE STATE
(2014)LCN/7243(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 28th day of May, 2014
CA/IL/C.103/2013
RATIO
WHETHER EVIDENCE GIVEN RELATING TO THINGS SAID OR DONE BY ONE CONSPIRATOR OR THE OTHER IN THE EXECUTION OR FURTHERANCE OF THE COMMON PURPOSE OF ALL SUCH CONSPIRATORS IS ADMISSIBLE AGAINST ALL OF THEM
It is well settled that evidence given which relates to things said or done by one conspirator or the other in the execution or furtherance of the common purpose of all such conspirators is admissible against all of them – see Samson Aighe & Ors. v. The State (1976) 9-10 S.C. 77. Accordingly, since the evidence of the appellant and his accomplice are independently admissible in respect of the robbery and the learned trial judge had rightly accepted some, such evidence is relevant to explain the participation of the appellant in the conspiracy – see s.11(1) Evidence Act. per HUSSEIN MUKHTAR, J.C.A.
WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY, FOR THE PURPOSE OF LIABILITY TO ESTABLISH THAT THE APPELLANT AND ACCOMPLICE WERE TOGETHER.
For the purposes of liability it is unnecessary to establish that the appellant and his accomplice were together, either in respect of the agreement, or carrying out the purposes of the agreement to commit armed robbery. If is sufficient to show that there was an agreement to carry out an unlawful purpose and that each conspirator was carrying out his assigned task – see R. v. Meyrick & Ribuff (1929) 21 Cr. App. R. 94, R. v. Griffiths (1965) 49 Cr. App. 279 at p.290. per HUSSEIN MUKHTAR, J.C.A.
WHETHER THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL MUST RELATE TO THE ISSUES APPEALED AGAINST.
The law is trite that grounds of appeal must relate to the decision appealed against and issues for determination must each relate to one or more ground(s) of appeal. The significance of this is paramount. Any issue therefore, not arising from the grounds of appeal filed will be struck out by the court. See Fabiyi v. Adeniyi (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 662) 532; Garba v. State (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 661) 378; Chime v. Chime (2001) 3 NWLR (Pt. 701) 527. In the matter of hand the learned appellant’s counsel had completely missed the concept of issue formulation. Issues for determination of appeal should not be formulated in the obstruct but must be related to the grounds of appeal filed, which in turn must be related to the decision appealed against. See Olowosogo v. Adebanjo (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 88) 275 at page 283. per HUSSEIN MUKHTAR, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
HUSSEIN MUKHTAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
JOSEPH OLANREWAJU Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE Respondent(s)
HUSSEIN MUKHTAR, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant herein and one other were arraigned before the High Court of Kwara State (corum A. S. Oyinloye, J) on a two count charge of conspiracy and armed robbery. The Court, after taking evidence rejected the defence of the appellant, found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to death on both counts of conspiracy and armed robbery pursuant to sections 6(a) and 1 (2)(a) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act 2004 respectively on 4th October 2013. The appellant’s disinclination with both convictions and sentences lead to this appeal initiated by filing of a notice predicated upon three main grounds and an omnibus ground as hereunder reproduced:
1. The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that the offence of criminal conspiracy was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
2. The learned trial judge erred in law when he convicted the appellant of armed robbery based on the evidence of a co-accused person.
3. The learned trial judge erred in law when he delivered a ruling in the trial within trial in the absence of the appellant.
4. The judgment is unreasonable, unwarranted and cannot be supported having records to the evidence at the trial.
From the foregoing grounds, the appellant raised the following three issues for determination:
(a) Whether from the totality of the evidence adduced at the trial court, conspiracy was proved beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant. (Ground 1)
(b) Whether the written statement of a co-accused person could be employed to convict the appellant who has not adopted such statement as his. (Ground 2)
(c) Whether criminal trial could be carried on in the absence in the absence of an accused person who has not been excused from the proceedings of the court. (Ground 3)
The learned Attorney-General of Kwara State Kamaldeen Ajibade adopted the same issues for determination as raised by the appellant. Arguments on the three issues have been analytically appraised.
Issue One
Whether from the totality of the evidence adduced at the trial court, conspiracy was proved beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant.
The learned counsel for the appellant I. AbdulAzeez, Esq. argued that the conviction for the offence of conspiracy is unsustainable against the appellant as the learned trial judge unduly relied on the purported confessional statements of the appellant and his accomplice, exhibits 11 and 12, in finding the appellant guilty of conspiracy. The learned trial judge observed thus:
“The law is that a man’s confession is only evidence against him and not against his accomplices and it is a misdirection that may lead to the quashing of the conviction made if a trial court fails to appreciate that position of the law.”
The learned trial judge went further, in the judgment, stating as follows:
“I have carefully read exhibits 11 and 12, which are the 2 confessional statements made by 1st and 2nd accused persons respectively. They contain confessions that implicated each other…. Exhibit 11, on a cursory look implicated the 2nd accused person while exhibit 12 implicated the 1st accused person but that is not the end of the case. The 2 exhibits contain … admission (by each accused person) that frontally established the fact that (each) accused person was involved in the same robbery.” (See pages 112 to 113 of the record).
The learned counsel for the appellant further argued that while Exhibit 11 contain admission that implicated the 2nd accused person, Exhibit 12 similarly implicated the 1st accused person for the some robbery. The common feature in both Exhibits 11 and 12 is that the accused persons did not only implicate each other but both gave frontal admission of their involvement in the plan to carry out the robbery operation and actually participated in the commission of the crime. (See pages 113 to 114 of the record).
It was argued for the appellant that the fulcrum upon which the conviction of appellant for conspiracy rests is verged on the statement of an accomplice which implicated him in the commission of the offence. The learned counsel for the appellant further argued that a confessional statement of an accomplice is inadmissible against a co-accused person unless he adopts same and, in the instant case, he did not. See Fatilewa v. The State (2008) 5 SCNJ p.98 at 105-106.
It was further argued for the appellant that there is dearth of evidence on record either from the prosecution or the appellant that the statement of the co-accused was adopted by him. It was further argued that the only evidence relied upon by the learned trial judge was the said confessional statement of on accomplice to come to the finding that the contents of that statement affirmed the fact that the appellant was a conspirator. It was submitted for the appellant that an extra-judicial statement of a co-accused person must not be confused with evidence which a co-accused person gave on oath. An extra-judicial statement of a co-accused person remains a statement and not his evidence. It is binding on the maker only. It is thus not admissible against his co-accused person. See Suberu v. State (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1197) 586; Ozaki v. State (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 124) p.92; Adebowale v. State (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1379) p.104 at 137.
It was submitted for the appellant that the allusion by the learned trial judge to the fact that the statement of accomplices implicating each other are uncontroverted is irrelevant since the appellant in his evidence denied the said statement.
It was submitted for the appellant that the analysis made by the learned trial judge was tantamount to shifting the burden placed on the prosecution to the appellant. It was submitted that the duty on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt extends to every element of the offence as a precondition to finding the appellant guilty. See Aiguoreghian v. The State (2004) 1 SCNJ 65; Al-Mustapha v. State (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1383) p.350 at 401 to 410.
It was submitted for the appellant, on the foregoing argument, that conspiracy cannot be established from mere conjecture, elicited from inadmissible evidence. See Al-Mustapha v. State (supra) at Pp.399 to 400.
It was finally submitted that the findings of the lower court premised on the statements of the accused persons cannot stand in the fact of the fact that the said documents are not admissible to convict the appellant.
The learned Attorney-General argued for the respondent that the appellant has failed to appreciate the essential ingredients of criminal conspiracy under our criminal jurisprudence.
It was submitted that the appellant counsel’s argument is premised on a settled issue and is no longer in controversy. A confessional statement is only evidence against the maker thereof and not against his accomplice except where of course the accomplice adopts same. See Suberu v. The State (2010) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1176) 494 at 512. It was submitted that the learned trial Judge himself made this a guiding principle in his judgment and did not flout or run afoul of that principle in the judgment under consideration.
The learned Attorney-General argued that, in the instant case, the scenario is wider in the sense that it is not just that one of the accused persons that made a confessional statement, rather both the appellant and his accomplice made confessions that not only implicated each other but went further to confirm that each of them was actually involved in the conspiracy leading to the robbery incident in question that took place on 3rd June 2011 of Offa.
It was submitted that conspiracy as an offence is deducible as a matter of inference from the conduct of parties to a criminal conspiracy. The offence of conspiracy can always be inferred from the circumstances of each case and things said or done by a conspirator in furtherance of common intention. See Osuogwu v. The State (2009) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1123) 523 at 544 paras F-G.
It was further submitted for the respondent that a careful perusal of Exhibits 11 and 12 which were the extra judicial statement of the appellant and his partner in crime clearly reveal the role played by each of the accused persons in the commission of the crime and the collective role played towards the commission of the crime in question.
The Supreme Court in Abacha v. State (2002) 11 NWLR (Pt. 779) per Onu, JSC aptly observed the duty of the court in a charge of conspiracy thus:
“The best evidence of conspiracy is usually obtained from one of the conspirators or from inferences. See this Court’s remarks in the case of Patrick Njovens & Ors v. The State (1973) NWLR 76 at 95. When it is proposed to give evidence of the happenings inside hell, it is only a matter of common sense to call one of the inmates of the place or one whose business is carried out in reasonable propinquity to hell and it must be surprising indeed to find even a lone angel fit and qualified for the assignment. Indeed, it would be preposterous to look for such evidence on other directions …”
The learned jurist further stressed the above principle as follows:
“It is therefore the duty of the court in every case of conspiracy to ascertain as best as it could the evidence of the complicity of any of those charged with that offence.”
It is pertinent to examine the findings of the learned trial judge in his evaluation of evidence especially regarding compatibility between the confessions of the appellant and his cohort. At pages 112-114 of the record, the learned trial judge observed thus:-
“I have carefully read Exhibits 11 and 12 which are the 2 confessional statements made by the 1st and 2nd accused persons respectively, they contained confessions that implicated each other and not that one exhibit implicated a co-accused person simpliciter.”
The learned trial judge also observed that the appellant and his cohort were duly identified by the PW2 and PW3 when an identification parade was conducted on 3/6/2011 of Offa where the two eye-witnesses picked the 2 accused persons as being among the robbers that come and robbed them.
The learned trial judge further observed that more than implicating the appellant and his cohort exhibits 11 and 12 also contained respective confessions implicating them. In other words both exhibits 11 and 12 contain admissions that frontally established the fact that the 2 accused persons were involved in the same robbery.
The learned trial judge, in his analysis of exhibits 11 and 12, also noted that the admission or confession of each accused person binds him. The learned trial judge observed further that both exhibits 11 and 12 are admissible as confessional statements against the 1st and 2nd accused persons respectively as proof of their involvement in the actual plan to carry out robbery operation and their actual participation therein.
As rightly submitted by both counsel, law is that where two or more accused persons are charged jointly with a similar offence(s), a confession made by one of such persons so charged given in evidence shall not be considered against any other accused person unless he adopts same. See Suberu v. State (2010) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1176) 494 at 512 paras A-C; Oyakhire v. State (2006) 40 WRN 197 at 217 (SC).
From the foregoing findings of the learned trial judge one hardly finds any substance in the argument of the appellant that his conviction was based on the confession of his accomplice. The appellant was not only implicated by the confession of his cohort but he tacitly adopted same as his own by his own confession stating the particular role he played in the commission of the crime. Moreover, the evidence of PW2 and PW3, who are the victims of the armed robbery attack were direct, cogent and compelling enough to sustain an irresistible conclusion that the appellant conspired with others to commit armed robbery.
There was sufficient evidence that the appellant was in the conspiracy with his accomplice to commit armed robbery. It is well settled that evidence given which relates to things said or done by one conspirator or the other in the execution or furtherance of the common purpose of all such conspirators is admissible against all of them – see Samson Aighe & Ors. v. The State (1976) 9-10 S.C. 77. Accordingly, since the evidence of the appellant and his accomplice are independently admissible in respect of the robbery and the learned trial judge had rightly accepted some, such evidence is relevant to explain the participation of the appellant in the conspiracy – see s.11(1) Evidence Act.
For the purposes of liability it is unnecessary to establish that the appellant and his accomplice were together, either in respect of the agreement, or carrying out the purposes of the agreement to commit armed robbery. If is sufficient to show that there was an agreement to carry out an unlawful purpose and that each conspirator was carrying out his assigned task – see R. v. Meyrick & Ribuff (1929) 21 Cr. App. R. 94, R. v. Griffiths (1965) 49 Cr. App. 279 at p.290.
Issue one is, for the foregoing appraisal, resolved against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. Ground 1 of the appeal from which the issue was distilled therefore fails.
Issue Two
Whether the appellant’s conviction could be premised upon the statement of a co-accused person who has not adopted it.
The learned counsel for the appellant adopted his entire argument canvassed in respect of issue one. Moreover, the same poser has been adequately dealt with under the foregoing issue one. The PW2 and 3 in their evidence stated inter alia that they recognized the appellant, his accomplice and one T.J. at large, among the assailants that attacked them on 3rd June, 2011.
The learned counsel for the appellant, however, argued that the appellant was not properly identified by the PW2 and 3. That, it was submitted, renders the standard short of beyond reasonable doubt and entitles the appellant to benefit of the doubtful circumstances.
The learned counsel for the appellant argued that even the eye witnesses PW2 and 3 could not have been able to recognize the appellant as one of their assailants in view of the fact that they had not seen him prior the incident of 3/6/2011. It was submitted for the appellant that the courts, in order to guard against mistaken identity must consider the following issues:
(a) Circumstances in which the eye witness saw the suspect or defendant.
(b) The length of time the witness saw the subject or defendant.
(c) The lighting conditions, and
(d) The previous contacts between the accused and the victim.
See Ndidi v. The State (2007) 5 SCNJ 274 at 287.
It was further argued that the PW2 and PW3 could not have identified the appellant of the moment when they were under gun point and visibility was impaired. Also the PW2 and PW3 stated that they did not know the appellant previously which, the appellant’s counsel contended, was a factor that diminished the capacity of the two eye witnesses to identify the appellant.
It was submitted for the appellant that where there is doubt in the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it must be resolved in favour of accused. It was submitted for the appellant that the learned trial judge had failed to appraise the evidence before him correctly before convicting the appellant for the offence of armed robbery. See Ani v. The State (2009) 6 SCNJ 98 at 106-107.
The learned Attorney-General is similarly of the view that issue two is adequately subsumed into Issue one, but for the argument raised by the appellant, he would have simply adopted the argument canvassed in respect of issue one. However, the respondent adopted the same issues raised by the appellant. The argument that the issue is not related to ground 2 and should be discountenanced is therefore incongruous with the issues raised by the respondent.
The testimony of the PW2 under cross examination on page 54 of the record clearly states thus:
“There was light and I saw their faces. They stared at me and I stared back at them. They pointed the guns at me but I looked of them very well. The accused persons behind the counter were many but I could identify the 2 accused persons as people who come to rob me”
In the same vein, PW3 under cross-examination stated thus:
“It was easier for me to recognize the 4 accused persons because the one that pursued me later brought me back to the house …. The 4 of them did not cover their faces”.
It is pertinent that the authority of Ndidi v. The State (2007) 5 SCNJ 274 at 287 cited by the appellant in paragraph 6.4 of his brief is hardly helpful to the appellant’s case due to its distinctive difference with the facts and circumstances of the instant appeal. In Ndidi’s case the Supreme Court per Aderemi, JSC stressed the danger of conviction in the absence of cogent evidence of identity of the accused. The learned jurist observed thus:
“Therefore a trial judge in Nigerian must not only warn himself but must meticulously examine the evidence proffered to see whether there are any weaknesses capable of endangering or rendering worthless any contention that the suspect was sufficiently recognized by the witness. PW1 said the time they came was 1 a.m. The trial judge, it must be remembered, took a judicial notice that it was always dark of that very early hour of the morning. So visibility would normally be blurred of that time. Under cross-examination, she said it was not true that there was no light in Abavo of that time in question. She claimed she told the Police that there was light and that she also told the Police that she carried a small lantern at that material time. According to her, the robbers ordered her to put the small lantern she was carrying down and to quench it. It was her further evidence that of that time and place, the robbers used their own torchlight to pack her belongings. These pieces of evidence by PW1 go to support the findings of the trial judge; that it was dark of that material time. Visibility was blurred. There was definitely a need for the provision of lighting aid to make everything around to be visible. Also waking up by force of that time of the night, one would not immediately gain consciousness and as such one’s ability to be able to recognize things around one would be considerably reduced. There is no evidence as to the time she woke up from her sleep and the time the appellant appeared to her. It is a great surprise that the trial court did not avert its mind to the above crucial issues and neither were any findings made thereon. Tragically, the court below fell into that grave mistake. The quality of evidence proffered in support of the prosecution’s case that PW1 actually saw the appellant of that material time is very poor; it is not reliable. And the poorer the quality of such pieces of evidence, the greater the danger in convicting on them. Indeed, the quality of evidence of the end of the prosecution’s case on the issue of identity or even recognition of the appellant by PW1 was very low and poor that no reasonable tribunal could be heard to convict on it.”
One fundamental difference is the bright lighting conditions of the scene of crime in this case, which assisted the victims in identifying the appellant and his cohorts in the crime. To crown it all, the police conducted an identification parade where the two accused persons were properly identified amongst others without any mistake. (See pages 55-58 of the record).
Furthermore, the Murano Jeep which was robbed from PW2 was recovered from the appellant. All these build a world of digression between the instant case and Ndidi v. The State (supra). In the circumstances of this case, the evidence adduced by the respondent was so overwhelming that leaves no room for reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the appellant. This analysis leads to the resolution of issue two against the appellant and failure of ground 2 from which it was distilled.
Issue Three
Whether criminal trial could be carried on in the absence of an accused person who has not been excused from the proceedings of the court.
It is pertinent to note, on one hand, that the decision appealed against is the judgment of the lower court delivered on 4th October 2013 by Oyinloye, J wherein the appellant was convicted and sentenced to death on both counts of conspiracy and armed robbery. There is no appeal against the ruling in which exhibits 11 and 12 were admitted and from which this issue has been distilled.
The law is trite that grounds of appeal must relate to the decision appealed against and issues for determination must each relate to one or more ground(s) of appeal. The significance of this is paramount. Any issue therefore, not arising from the grounds of appeal filed will be struck out by the court. See Fabiyi v. Adeniyi (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 662) 532; Garba v. State (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 661) 378; Chime v. Chime (2001) 3 NWLR (Pt. 701) 527. In the matter of hand the learned appellant’s counsel had completely missed the concept of issue formulation. Issues for determination of appeal should not be formulated in the obstruct but must be related to the grounds of appeal filed, which in turn must be related to the decision appealed against. See Olowosogo v. Adebanjo (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 88) 275 at page 283.
The foregoing analysis and appraisal clearly show the incompetent nature of issue 3 being completely unrelated to the decision appealed against. There being no appeal against the ruling, the issue distilled from it is reduced to total insignificance and should be struck out.
On the other hand, assuming the issue is competent, it still lacks merit. The learned counsel for the appellant rightly argued that the entire trial ought to be conducted in the appellant’s presence. Conducting the proceedings or any part thereof in the appellant’s absence, including interlocutory ruling, violates the principle of fair hearing and renders the trial a nullity. See State v. Lawal (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354) 565 at 585 to 596.
It was submitted for the appellant that the proceedings of the lower court of 24th May, 2013 held in the absence of the appellant was tantamount a nullity since the trial court did not of anytime excuse the absence of the appellant. It was submitted for the appellant that the law in this respect is sacrosanct on this issue and the court cannot unilaterally proceed with the trial in the absence of the appellant. The grouse of the appellant under this issue is that on the 24th May, 2013 when the learned trial Judge read his ruling admitting the statement of the appellant and his cohort, the appellant was not in court.
The essence of the requirement that an accused person be present throughout his trial is to guarantee fair hearing in judicial process. The Supreme Court per Oputa JSC in Garba v. Unimaid (1986) 2 SC 128 at 271 observed the nature and essence of fair hearing thus:
“To constitute fair hearing whether it be before the regular courts or before tribunals and boards of inquiry, the accused person should know what is alleged against him, he should be present when any evidence against him is tendered, and he should be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict such evidence.”
The learned Attorney-General argued that no right was deprived of the appellant for his absence of a ruling which admitted his statement on the 24/05/2013 by the learned trial Judge when his counsel was there to take the ruling. He submitted that the essence of the presence of an accused person of trial is to ensure fair trial as it has been captured by Oputa, JSC in Garba v. UNIMAID (supra). This is because on a day fixed for ruling, no cross examination is expected before or after the ruling and no evidence is tendered. In fact parties do not partake in ruling other than to listen and unlike in judgment no allocutus is required.
The essence of the presence of an accused throughout his trial is to afford him an adequate opportunity to play his statutory role and liberty to respond of every stage of the proceedings personally or through a legal practitioner of his own choice for the purpose of ensuring fair hearing. In a situation, such as in the instant case, where the entire proceedings were conducted not only in the appellant’s presence but with his full and active participation, one hardly sees what aspect of his right to fair hearing could have been impaired. His only right against the ruling delivered being to appeal against it if he feels dissatisfied is not in any way whittled down by his absence in court when it was delivered. This scenario is quite distinguishable from the facts and circumstances in the case of State v. Lawal (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354) 565 at 595-596 relied upon by the appellant in his brief of argument. In Lawal’s case, the learned Magistrate delivered a judgment which was undated and delivered in the absence of one of the accused persons and in ten (10) months after final address of counsel, which was outside the three months period stipulated by Section 294 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). Thus, in Lawal’s case the scenario was tantamount to a complete violation of the right of the accused person by the trial magistrate and the live issue before the Supreme Court in that case was whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in holding that the appellants ought to have challenged the proceeding and judgment of the trial Magistrate by way of an appeal rather than by prerogative writ of certiorari. The requirement for the accused person to be present throughout the proceedings emanates from the need to allow him respond appropriately to all issues affecting his right during the trial proceedings inclusive of delivery of judgment where he may plead an allocutus.
Where no injustice has occasioned, from the procedure adopted by the trial court as in this case, the appellate court has no business in interfering with the findings of the learned trial judge. More so, when counsel to the accused neither raised any objection to the reading of the court’s ruling nor even appealed against it. Moreover, other pieces of evidence adduced at the trial, which were not discredited, like testimonies of the eye witnesses PW2 and 3, the Murano Jeep stolen by the armed robbers that was found in the possession of the appellant soon after the incident and the physical identification of the appellant by the victims of the robbery amongst several other persons in an identification parade are overwhelming enough to sustain the appellant’s conviction and sentence. The judgment cannot be set aside on ground of mere technicality. Thus while issue three is answered in the affirmative, the mere delivery of ruling in the presence of the appellant’s counsel and in which both the appellant and his counsel could have done nothing other than mere listening did not overreach the appellant Issue 3 therefore ought to be resolved, in the con of this appeal, in the affirmative and against the appellant. However issue 3, as I stated earlier, is incompetent and same is hereby struck out.
Before concluding on the last issue, it is pertinent to observe the absurd nature of the appellant’s reply brief, which opened new arguments on the issues already canvassed. The repetitive submissions of the learned counsel for appellant, in the guise of a reply brief, did not in any way improve his arguments.
It is important to note that a reply brief is meant to give the appellant an opportunity to respond to fresh issues raised in the respondent’s brief, which has not been argued in the appellant’s main brief. It does not reopen another avenue for rearguing issues already canvassed in the main briefs as the appellant did.
The resolution of issues 1 and 2 against the appellant, the double edged appraisal and striking out of the incompetent issue 3, speak volumes of the unmeritorious nature of this appeal. It is only deserving of an outright dismissal. I hereby dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit. The judgment of lower court delivered on 4th October, 2013, including the convictions and sentences, is hereby affirmed.
ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU, J.C.A.: My learned brother, Hussein Mukhtar, JCA gave me the opportunity of reading in draft form, the judgment just delivered.
I am in full agreement with the reasoning and conclusion of my learned brother, and consequently I dismiss the appeal and abide by the consequential affirmation of the conviction and sentence of the appellant as contained in the judgment of the trial court.
UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity to read in advance, the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother HUSSEIN MUKHTAR, J.C.A.
I agree in its entirety that the appeal is devoid of merit and as such should be dismissed. I accordingly, affirm the judgment of the lower Court delivered on 4th October, 2013.
Appearances
I. Abdul-AzeezFor Appellant
AND
The Respondent not represented but served hearing notice on 20/3/2014For Respondent
