JOSEPH IKEOKAFOR v. SUNDAY OBODOEZE
(2018)LCN/11973(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Monday, the 16th day of July, 2018
CA/E/81/2012
RATIO
ACTION: DECLARATORY RELIEF
“Declaratory reliefs are not granted as a matter of course and on a platter of gold. They are only granted when credible evidence has been led by the plaintiff or person seeking the declaratory relief. It is the practice that a declaratory relief will be granted where the plaintiff is entitled to the relief in the fullest meaning of the word. It is a settled requirement of the law that the plaintiff must plead and prove his claim for a declaratory relief without relying on the evidence called by the defendant. Such a declaratory relief is not granted even on admission by the defendant. However, there is nothing wrong in a plaintiff taking advantage of evidence adduced by the defendant which tends to establish the plaintiff’s title. See Anyanru vs. Mandilas Ltd (2007) 4 SCNJ 288, Chukwumah vs. S.P.D.C (Nig) Limited (1993) LPELR-864 SC, Matanmi & Ors vs. Dada & Anor (2013) LPELR-19929, Oguanuhu vs. Chiegboka (2013) 4 SCNJ 693 and Akinboni & Ors vs. Akintope & Ors (2016) LPELR-40184 CA.” PER JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A.
INTERPRETATION: MEANING OF ‘BRIEF’
“A brief has been defined as a condensed statement of the propositions of law or fact which a party or his counsel wishes to establish at the appeal together with reasons and authorities which can sustain them. See Nwokoro & Ors vs. Onuma & Ors (1990) LPELR-2125 SC per Karibi – Whyte JSC at page 15 – 16. It is also the law that a bad, faulty or inelegant brief would not be discountenanced merely because it is poorly written as the Court has a duty to do substantial justice to the parties before it. See Tukur vs. Government of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549 and Akpan vs. State (1992) LPELR-381 p. 11. The Respondent’s brief as pointed out earlier in my view is inelegantly drafted in the sense that it is divided into chapters and may be called a book rather than a brief. Secondly almost all the grounds of appeal are argued under issue 2 not because the issue is formulated from those grounds.” PER JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
OYEBISI FOLAYEMI OMOLEYE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
SAIDU TANKO HUSSAINI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
JOSEPH IKEOKAFOR Appellant(s)
AND
SUNDAY OBODOEZE Respondent(s)
JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This appeal is against the judgment delivered on 28th November, 2011 in the High Court of Enugu State holden at Enugu. The suit commenced at the Awgu Judicial Division but the Hon. Justice B. E. Agbatah who was hearing the matter was transferred to the Enugu Judicial Division before the suit could be determined. He therefore moved with the part heard case to the Enugu Judicial Division.
The Appellant as plaintiff claimed against the Respondent as defendant in the High Court (the Court below) for the following:
(a) A declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to the Customary Right of Occupancy over the said Ukwanwokocha land situate, lying and being at Ifite Village, Amoli, Awgu (South) Local Government Area of Enugu State, as against the defendant.
(b) A perpetual injunction restraining the defendant either in person or through agents, servants, or privies, howsoever constituted, from further trespassing into or interfering with the Plaintiff’s land now in dispute or user thereof in any manner whatsoever, either by way of erection or further erection of any kind of structure or otherwise.
(c) N500, 000.00 only being general damages for trespass committed on the land by the defendant.
The salient facts of the case are as follows: According to the Appellant, in 1968 during the Nigerian Civil War, he pleaded with the grandfather of the Respondent to give him a parcel of land to build on. The grandfather of the Respondent agreed to give him the land on condition that the Appellant gave him another parcel of land in exchange. The Appellant agreed. The Respondent’s grandfather asked the Appellant to give him some money to look after himself because he was an old man. The Appellant gave the Respondent’s grandfather six hundred pounds. Appellant also handed over three parcels of land to the Respondent’s grandfather in the presence of his two sons and three other people in exchange for the land given to him. He (appellant) had been farming on the land given to him by the Respondent’s grandfather undisturbed. However on 12th August, 2002 he came back from work and noticed workers brought on the land by the Respondent.
The workers had cut down some trees on the land and were digging a foundation for a building.
The transaction between the Appellant and the Respondent’s grandfather was put in writing.
The defence of the Respondent is that the Appellant asked for the land for farming purposes. The transaction took place in 1980. No money was paid. The land is family land and the family wants to take the land back.
After hearing evidence adduced by both parties and considering addresses of learned counsel for the parties, the Court below dismissed the claim of the Appellant.
The Appellant immediately proceeded to this Court by an original notice of appeal dated and filed on the 22nd December, 2011. The original notice of appeal contains one ground of appeal. With the leave of the Court, the Appellant filed an amended notice of appeal dated 17th June, 2014 and filed on the 9th June, 2016. The amended notice of appeal contains eight grounds of appeal. From the eight grounds of appeal, the Appellant presented the following four issues for determination:
i. WHETHER THE APPELLANT PROVED HIS CASE AND IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT IN HIS FAVOUR (Distilled from the Omnibus Ground of Appeal)
ii. WHETHER IN VIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT, THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE WAS RIGHT WHEN HE DISMISSED THE APPELLANT’S CASE IN ITS ENTIRETY ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE DID NOT PROVE SALE, GRANT AND/OR GIFT (ABSOLUTE OR INTER VIVOS) (Distilled from Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Further Grounds of Appeal)
iii. WHETHER THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE WAS RIGHT WHEN IN HIS JUDGMENT HE SUO MOTU RAISED THE ISSUES OF SALE, GRANT AND GIFT INTER VIVOS AND PROCEEDED TO BASE HIS DECISION THEREON WITHOUT AFFORDING THE PARTIES THE OPPORTUNITY OF ADDRESSING HIM ON THEM. (Distilled from Ground 7 Further Grounds of Appeal)
iv. WHETHER THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE WAS RIGHT WHEN IN DISMISSING THE APPELLANT’S CASE, HE HELD THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD A BETTER TITLE TO THE LAND IN DISPUTE WHICH STEMS FROM INHERITANCE. (Distilled from Ground 8 of Further Grounds of Appeal)
The Respondent on his own part submitted the following four issues for determination.
1. WHETHER BY THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE APPELLANT AT THE LOW (SIC) COURT, THE APPELLANT CAN BE SAID TO HAVE PROVED HIS CLAIM AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
2. WHETHER BY THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL RAISED BY THE APPELLANT’S COUNSEL IT CAN BE SAID THAT APPELLANT HAS SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED HIS APPEAL AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SET ASIDE.
3. WHETHER THE DEFENDANT BY HIS PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL CHALLENGED OR CONTROVERTED THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE APPELLANT DURING TRIAL TO JUSTIFY THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT.
4. WHETHER THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE WAS RIGHT WHEN IN DISMISSING THE APPELLANTS CASE, HE HELD THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD A BETTER TITLE TO THE LAND IN DISPUTE WHICH STEMS FROM INHERITANCE.
Arguing issues 1 and 2 together, Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant contended that the Court below was wrong when it came to the conclusion that the Appellant did not prove sale, grant and/or gift inter vivos. In coming to that conclusion, the Court below, it was submitted, misconstrued the issues arising from the pleadings and evidence of the parties.
The Court below, it was submitted, failed to evaluate the evidence of witnesses who testified before it.
It was submitted that if the Court below had weighed the evidence before it, it would have seen that the consistent evidence presented by the Appellant and his witnesses relating to the land exchange transaction between the Appellant and the grandfather of the Respondent in 1968 far outweighed that of the Respondent in substance and quality, with regard to the real issue in dispute.
It was contended that in addition to the failure by the Court below to evaluate the evidence of the witnesses and the failure to address the issues raised by the parties before it, the Court below went ahead to formulate for the parties, a case different from the one they had submitted for adjudication.
The Court below, it was submitted, erred when it suo motu introduced the idea of a gift (whether absolute or inter vivos) into the transaction that took place between the parties as an issue to be determined in the case. From the pleadings and evidence, it was argued, there was no question of a gift. The Court, it was submitted, found that the PW1 offered to exchange three parcels of land with the one he requested. The evidence of the exchange, it was submitted, is borne out in the evidence of the parties and their witnesses. The Court was referred to evidence of PW1 at pages 34, 41 and 42, PW3 at 48, DW1 at pages 51 and 52, DW2 at pages 58, 60 and 61 and DW3 at page 63.
The Court below, it was submitted, wrongly imported the notion of a gift as an issue in the case.
It was also submitted that the Court below erred when it embarked upon a consideration of the Appellant’s claim on the basis of an alleged sale transaction.
It was contended that the issue of payment of money was not meant to be part of the land transaction. That it was merely a favour which the Respondent’s grand-father requested from the Appellant, in view of the circumstances of his old age and needs, having already agreed to the exchange of the lands. That the money given by the Appellant to Respondent’s grandfather was not consideration for the exchange of the land. The Court was referred to the evidence of PW3 at page 48 of the record of appeal who was present at the negotiation and took part in it. The transaction, it was argued, is a land exchange transaction with money given out of favour after the parties had agreed to exchange lands.
The Court was referred to the findings of the Court below at pages 131 – 132 of the record of appeal that the Respondent’s grandfather begged for money and yet went ahead to consider the Appellant’s claim as one of sale of land based on an alleged written agreement.
It was submitted that the pleadings and evidence of the Appellant made it clear that:
(a) The land transaction as well as the gift of money by the Appellant to the Respondent’s grandfather had been concluded before the alleged written document.
(b) That the Appellant did not rely on the document as an instrument conferring title on him in respect of the land.
(c) If any document was found to have been executed by the parties, it would at best be a memorandum of an already concluded land exchange transaction and not an instrument intended to confer title over the one parcel of land and the three parcels of land on the Appellant and the Respondent’s grandfather respectively.
(d) The Respondent and his witnesses were emphatic that the exchange transaction was oral and no document was executed.
Despite the foregoing, the Court below, it was contended, heavily relied on the said agreement in coming to the conclusion that the Appellant had not proved grant of the land in dispute and held that the Respondent’s title stemmed from inheritance and that the Respondent had a better title.
The Respondent, it was pointed out, filed no counterclaim. The Court could not therefore find that the Respondent had a better title which stems from inheritance. It was submitted that inheritance is one way of acquiring land which must be specifically claimed or counterclaimed. We were referred to Magaji vs. Matari (2000) 8 NWLR (Pt. 670) 722.
Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that the alleged agreement upon which the Court below based its judgment that the Appellant has no valid title over the land in dispute was never in evidence.
The agreement, it was submitted, was never before the Court below and does not constitute evidence for the purposes of determining the rights of the parties therein.
It was further submitted that there was no evidence upon which the Court below found that there was lack of concurrence of the principal members of the family. The Court below, it was argued, had earlier found that the transaction was between the Appellant and Respondent’s grandfather who on the evidence before the Court below owned the land in dispute. Therefore the Respondent’s grandfather did not need the consent of anybody to enter into the land exchange transaction with the Appellant.
It was submitted that the Court below failed to make pertinent findings of fact on pertinent issues not withstanding that the parties led evidence in respect of their conflicting claims. The Appellant, it was submitted, gave evidence as to facts in a transaction in which he was one of the principal actors. That the evidence of the Respondent and his witnesses were hearsay. None of them was physically present during the transaction that took place.
It was submitted that the Court below did not properly direct itself as to the burden of proof on the Respondent. It was Appellant’s claim that the transaction was a land exchange which granted him title to the land. That the Respondent admitted the transaction but claimed that the transfer had given the Appellant title only for a limited period. It was submitted that having admitted the Appellant?s claim, but insisting on the existence of a varying circumstance, the onus of proof rested with the Respondent to establish such varying circumstance.
It was submitted that the Respondent having conceded or admitted the Appellant’s interest in the land in dispute, the presumption that arises on the pleadings of the parties is that the Appellant, by the said transaction was the owner of the land in dispute. It was submitted that there is no burden on the Appellant to prove what is admitted, rather, it was for the Respondent who was alleging that the Appellant’s interest in the said land had ceased that had the onus of proving same to the satisfaction of the Court.
The burden of proof, it was submitted, is not static. The Court was referred to Section 133 (2) of the Evidence Act, Ifegwu vs. U.B.N (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 602) 1701, Egharevba vs. Osagie (2010) All FWLR 1255 at 1266 and Mani vs. Shanono (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 345) 303.
It was submitted that the Appellant had established by credible evidence that he was in possession of the land from 1968 during the Civil War up until 2002 when the Respondent trespassed thereon. The burden was therefore upon the Respondent to establish that he had a better title than the Appellant who had been in long possession by virtue of the exchange of land transaction.
It was submitted that where evidence that is relevant to the issue in controversy is not sufficiently challenged, contradicted and/or discredited, it is good and reliable evidence to which probative value ought to be ascribed and which ought to influence the judge in the determination of the case before him.
The evidence adduced by the Appellant in this case, it was argued, was not sufficiently challenged by the Respondent particularly the evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW4 which corroborated the evidence of the Appellant that the transaction was in 1968 and not in 1980 as claimed by the Respondent.
It was submitted that Respondent’s testimony and that of his witnesses were self-contradictory and full of inconsistencies. That the Respondent in his evidence at page 55 of the record of appeal contradicted himself. That the DW1 stated that the transaction was between his uncle and the Appellant and that it was between his grandfather and the Appellant as he was told by his uncle.
On issue 3, Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant contended that the Court below in its judgment suo motu raised the issue of sale, grant and gift (absolute or inter vivos) and based its judgment on these issues without first calling on the parties to address it thereon. It was submitted that the said judgment having been decided upon issues other than those set up in the pleadings and canvassed by the parties, is unsupportable in law and ought to be set aside.
The function of a Court, it was submitted, is to decide between the parties on the basis of the case put before it by them. We were referred to Sanni vs. Ademiluyi (2003) FWLR (Pt. 145) 621 at 633.
The Court below, it was argued, found that the Appellant made a monetary gift to the Respondent’s grandfather. However, the Court below did not show how the gift had changed the character of the transaction.
It was submitted that there was no evidence the Respondent’s grandfather intended to make a gift to the Appellant. Therefore the Court below erred when it observed in the judgment that the Old man meant to make a gift to his relation.
Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the agreement referred to by the Court below was not before the Court and therefore, it ought not have relied on it. The Court, it was submitted, ought to limit itself to the evidence before it. We were referred to Ikenne vs. Ofune (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 1, N.B.C vs. Obah (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt. 671) 212 and Anyankpele vs. Nigerian Army (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 209.
It was submitted that the finding by the Court below that the land was family land and required the consent of principal members of the family was contrary to the pleadings and evidence before the Court.
It was submitted that the Court below raised issues on its own and did not hear the parties on them before basing its decision on the points raised; which is a breach of the parties’ right to fair hearing. We were referred to Ejezie & Anor vs. Anuwu & Ors (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 422) 1005 at 1049.
On issue 4, it was submitted that the Court below misconstrued the cases of the parties and thus came to a wrong conclusion when it held that ‘the defendant’s title stems through inheritance, it is indisputable that he has a better title.
It was submitted that from the evidence of PW2 and PW3 the following conclusions can be made:
(i) Acquisition of land by exchange is not only practised, it is a customarily accepted method of acquiring land in Amoli;
(ii) The Appellant exchanged lands with the Respondent’s grandfather;
(iii) The intention of the parties to wholly and permanently transfer title over their respective lands each to – the other, in perpetuity is manifest and understood by parties at the time they entered into the transaction;
(iv) Parties understood the nature of the transaction and entered into it by their own free will;
(v) The exchange conferred on the Appellant title over the land in dispute as at the time of the transaction in 1968. The said land could not have been validly given to the Respondent when he requested from his family land to build his house, more than thirty (30) years later. The land was not part of the estate they inherited from their grandfather.
The Respondent, it was contended, did not inherit the land in dispute as same was no longer available for inheritance by any member of Okorienta Onwuha’s family.
It was submitted that the evidence of PW4 that he was on the land as tenant in 1975 was unchallenged. This was evidence that the Appellant had been on the land before 1980, the year the Respondent said the transaction took place.
The Court was urged to hold that the Respondent did not inherit the land in dispute.
The Respondent’s brief is divided into 8 Chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction; Chapter 2 statement of facts, Chapter 3 Issues for determination, Chapter 4 Argument of the Issues Raised, Chapter 5 Argument of Issue No. II, Chapter 6 Argument of Issue No. I and III, Chapter 7 Argument of Issue No. IV and Chapter 8 Summary of Points Relied upon By the Respondent.
Under Issue 2, Respondent argued separately Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5 6 and 7 together.
It is instructive to note that none of the issues is tied to any of the grounds of appeal.
On issue 1 which he formulated, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Appellant cannot rely on the exchange of land to claim title of the disputed land. Exchange of land under Native Law and Custom of Amoli people, it was submitted, implies that the land shall be used for the purpose for which it was given and at a convenient time the exchange will be extinguished and parties involved in the exchange will reclaim their land. The Court was referred to the evidence of DW1 and DW2. Exchange had never meant transfer of absolute title in land by the parties involved, it was submitted. Appellant, it was submitted, cannot rely on exchange to prove title.
Appellant, it was submitted, is also relying on long possession to claim title to the land. It was submitted that long possession on any land by any one cannot confer title of the said land on the claimant. The Court was referred Oseni vs. Bajulu 40 NSCQR 295.
Learned counsel for the Respondent referred the Court to a document which the Appellant said was signed by Respondent’s grandfather and two others in 1968 as evidence of the transaction which was rejected in evidence. He submitted that since the document was rejected in evidence, the Appellant thereby failed to prove his title to the land. Therefore the Court below was right when it entered judgment in favour of the Respondent.
Evidence adduced by the Appellant, it was submitted, failed to convince the Court below that the Appellant had indeed proved his case.
As I pointed out earlier, learned counsel for the Respondent argued grounds 2 – 7 under issue 2. According to learned counsel for the Respondent, this was to ‘critically examine the grounds of appeal’ and make his submissions on what his opinion is considering the issues raised in the grounds of appeal. That it was intended to enable the Court appreciate fully the arguments of parties.
On the Respondent’s issue 3 formulated by the Respondent, learned counsel for the Respondent maintained that the exchange of land was a temporary arrangement whereby the parties were ready to take back their land when they so desire.
He also maintained that since the agreement/memorandum of understanding was rejected in evidence, the Appellant had no document anymore to sustain his claim to the land.
On issue 4 formulated by the Respondent, learned counsel for the Respondent argued that Appellant at page 38 of the record of appeal claimed that he adopted the method of purchase and exchange of land as one of the accepted traditional methods of acquiring land in Amoli and since as shown earlier, the document was rejected in evidence, the purchase had not been established.
Learned counsel for the Respondent again maintained that exchange of land would not confer title on the Appellant as exchange of land in Amoli is a temporary arrangement as parties agree to exchange their lands with intention to recover same when they so desire.
In Appellant’s Reply Brief of Argument, learned senior counsel pointed out that the Respondent failed to indicate the grounds of appeal to which the issues were predicated. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that a party cannot expect a Court to embark on forensic examination of his issues for determination vis – a – vis the grounds of appeal so as to determine from which ground of appeal his issues for determination stem.
The Court was referred to Egor vs. Ovat (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 755) 281.
It was submitted that issue 3 does not derive from any of the Grounds of Appeal. Any issue for determination must be derived from a valid ground of appeal, it was submitted. The Court was referred to Honika Sawmill (Nig) vs. Hoff (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt. 326) 252, Briggs vs. C.L.O.R.S.N (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 268) 1626 and Dalek (Nig) Ltd vs. Ompadec (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 364) 204.
It was submitted that an issue which is not predicated on a ground of appeal is incompetent because the Court lacks the power to embark on the consideration of issues which are not connected with or arise from a ground of appeal. The Court was referred to Co-operative And Commerce Bank Plc vs. Ekperi (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 355) 412 and Odeh vs. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 424) 1590.
It was submitted that Issue 2 too does not stem from the Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal.
Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that Respondent’s counsel argued the grounds of appeal and particulars thereof under issue 2 and submitted that parties do not argue grounds of appeal but issues for determination properly distilled from a ground or combination of grounds of appeal. The Court was referred to Sheidu vs. State (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 750) 1381. The Court was urged to discountenance the arguments as being incompetent.
It was submitted that the evidence of custom given by DW1 and DW2 was not corroborated by any independent witness. The Court was referred to Oyediran vs. Alebiosu II (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 249) 550 at 558.
The Appellant however called PW2 a traditional ruler who corroborated the testimony of the Appellant as to what the custom is, and firmly established that land can be obtained by exchange.
A brief has been defined as a condensed statement of the propositions of law or fact which a party or his counsel wishes to establish at the appeal together with reasons and authorities which can sustain them. See Nwokoro & Ors vs. Onuma & Ors (1990) LPELR-2125 SC per Karibi – Whyte JSC at page 15 – 16. It is also the law that a bad, faulty or inelegant brief would not be discountenanced merely because it is poorly written as the Court has a duty to do substantial justice to the parties before it. See Tukur vs. Government of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549 and Akpan vs. State (1992) LPELR-381 p. 11. The Respondent’s brief as pointed out earlier in my view is inelegantly drafted in the sense that it is divided into chapters and may be called a book rather than a brief. Secondly almost all the grounds of appeal are argued under issue 2 not because the issue is formulated from those grounds.
It is the issues in the appeal that are arguable not the grounds of appeal and the particulars therein as the Respondent has done in the Respondent’s brief of argument. Inspite of the inelegance of the Respondent’s Brief demonstrated above the Court should still not close its eyes to the entire brief in the interest of justice. See Tukur vs. Government of Taraba State (supra) and Akpan vs. State (1992) (supra).
However, it is the law that issues for determination formulated in a brief must be based on the grounds of appeal. If the issues are not related to any ground of appeal, they become irrelevant and go to no issue. Consequently any argument in a brief in support of such issues will be discountenanced by the Court. Any issue for determination not hinged to or based on a ground of appeal is irrelevant and therefore incompetent and has no value to the appeal and will be ignored by the appellate Court before which the appeal is being heard. See the following decisions of the Supreme Court: Ibator vs. Barakuro (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1040) 475, Latunde vs. Lajinfin (1989) NWLR (Pt. 108) 177, Shitta-Bey vs. A.G. Federation (1998) 10 NWLR (Pt. 570) 392 and Momodu vs. Momoh (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 169) 608.
As pointed out earlier, the Respondent did not tie any of the four issues presented by him for determination to any ground of appeal. However, learned senior counsel for the Appellant has urged the Court to discountenance issues 2 and 3 of the Respondent?s brief because they do not stem from any of the grounds of appeal. I have therefore been compelled to do a forensic examination of the two issues vis – a – vis the grounds of appeal to determine whether or not the two issues do not stem from any of the grounds of appeal contained in the amended notice of appeal. After examining issue 2 vis – a – vis the grounds of appeal, I am in agreement with learned senior counsel for the Appellant that it does not stem from any of the grounds of appeal. I should therefore discountenance it for this reason alone. But that is not the only problem with issue 2. As pointed out by learned senior counsel for the Appellant, Respondent argued the grounds of appeal and the particulars thereof under issue 2.
It is the law and practice in this Court to argue an appeal on the issues formulated and not the grounds of appeal from which the issues have been formulated. See Hunare vs. Nana & Anor (1996) LPELR-1378 SC. For this reason too I should discountenance issue 2 formulated by the Respondent. Issue 2 is to be discountenanced by me. Issue 3, I am afraid does not also stem from any of the grounds of appeal. It is also to be discountenanced by me.
I will therefore determine the appeal on the issues presented by the Appellant for determination.
Declaratory reliefs are not granted as a matter of course and on a platter of gold. They are only granted when credible evidence has been led by the plaintiff or person seeking the declaratory relief. It is the practice that a declaratory relief will be granted where the plaintiff is entitled to the relief in the fullest meaning of the word. It is a settled requirement of the law that the plaintiff must plead and prove his claim for a declaratory relief without relying on the evidence called by the defendant. Such a declaratory relief is not granted even on admission by the defendant. However, there is nothing wrong in a plaintiff taking advantage of evidence adduced by the defendant which tends to establish the plaintiff’s title.
See Anyanru vs. Mandilas Ltd (2007) 4 SCNJ 288, Chukwumah vs. S.P.D.C (Nig) Limited (1993) LPELR-864 SC, Matanmi & Ors vs. Dada & Anor (2013) LPELR-19929, Oguanuhu vs. Chiegboka (2013) 4 SCNJ 693 and Akinboni & Ors vs. Akintope & Ors (2016) LPELR-40184 CA.
On issues 1 and 2, the learned senior counsel for the Appellant argued that the Court below imported the issue of sale into the matter. With respect to learned senior counsel for the Appellant this is not quite correct. It was the Appellant himself both in the amended statement of claim and evidence that sought to introduce the issue of sale. See paragraph 7 of the amended statement of claim. See the evidence of the Appellant (PW1) under cross examination at page 38 of the record of appeal where he claimed to have paid for the land. This is what he said:
”We discussed for two different days before I got the land. I paid for the land on 10/10/68. The man who wrote the agreement said it should bear this date ? the date I paid for the land.”
Although that agreement was not in evidence, the Court below in its judgment at page 132 of the record treated it as if it was an exhibit before it. Even learned counsel for the Respondent in his brief of argument has made heavy weather of the rejection of the agreement in evidence. The agreement having been rejected in evidence, it did not constitute evidence for the purpose of determining the rights of the parties.
I am in agreement entirely with learned senior counsel for the Appellant that from the pleadings and evidence of witnesses for both parties the case revolved around exchange of lands. See paragraphs 2 – 5 of the amended statement of claim of the Appellant and paragraph 3(h) of the amended statement of defence of the Respondent. See the evidence of PW1 at page 34 of the record of appeal where he stated as follows:
”As we were discussing the two sons of the man contributed to the discussion. All of us took part in the discussion and all of us drank the wine. Okorie agreed to give me the land with a condition that I should give him another land in the farm to replace the one he was to give me.”
At page 48 of the record of appeal, the PW3 stated thus:
”Okorie Onwuha asked whether the land he wanted was to be replaced or that he wanted to buy
Obodoeze and Patrick, the children of Okorie Onwuha said that they wanted a replacement.
…..
There was land exchange.”
DW1 at page 51 of the record of appeal stated as follows:
”He told my uncle that he had farmland that he would give our uncle in exchange. Both of them agreed.”
The Court below therefore erred when it found that the Appellant had not proved sale, grant and or gift inter vivos. The case of the Appellant was that there was exchange of lands between him and the grandfather of the Respondent. A cursory look at the evidence reproduced in part above shows that the Appellant led credible evidence in proof of the transaction between him and the Respondent’s grandfather. That both of them exchanged the lands. While the Respondent’s grandfather gave the Appellant the land in dispute, the Appellant gave the Respondent’s grandfather three parcels of land in exchange. As shown above PW3 was present during the transaction between PW1 and Respondent’s grandfather.
The Court below should have disregard the evidence led by the Respondent because as learned senior counsel for the Appellant rightly pointed out, it was hearsay evidence. For example the Respondent (DW1) under cross – examination at page 54 of the record of appeal stated as follows:
”Patrick Okorienta my uncle told me about the transaction.
………
I hold it that Patrick Okorienta told me that the land given to the plaintiff was for farming purposes …”
DW2 under cross – examination at page 59 of the record of appeal stated as follows:
”Women are not invited where land matter is discussed.”
DW3 at pages 62 and 65 of the record of appeal also said:
”My father’s brother … told me … the plaintiff came to ask for land ….
The transaction took place in 1980 … that is what Patrick Okorienta told me.”
It is clear from the foregoing that the defence of the Respondent was demolished under cross – examination. There was therefore nothing to place on his side of the imaginary scale of justice.
As learned senior counsel for the Appellant rightly pointed out, the Appellant testified to facts to which he was a principal actor while the evidence of the Respondent was all hearsay.
At page 132 of the record of appeal, the Court below stated that the sale of family land without the concurrence of the principal members of the family is void. It is not shown in the judgment why the Court below stated this principle of law. If by stating that principle of law the Court meant that the Respondent’s grandfather did not get the consent of the family members before entering into the transaction with the Appellant, I will not hesitate to agree with learned senior counsel for the Appellant that no evidence was led before the Court below to show that the land was family land. The evidence before the Court below was that the land belonged to the Respondent’s grandfather. The issue of consent to exchange it with other parcels of land did not therefore arise. In any case as I have pointed out, the Court below stated the legal principle and left it hanging in the air without applying it to the facts of the case before it.
The Appellant as pointed out above led credible evidence to show that there was exchange of land transaction between Respondent’s grandfather and himself. The Respondent did not lead evidence to show that the Appellant’s interest in the land had ceased. He led no evidence to show that the exchange was for a specific period and what the duration, if any, was. The Appellant had been in possession of the land since the exchange of lands from 1968 during the war to 2002 when Respondent trespassed into it. Evidence of Respondent and his witnesses that the transaction took place in 1980 cannot be sustained since their evidence was all hearsay. Apart from this, from the evidence of PW2 and PW4 the Appellant had been in possession of the law before 1980. PW2 said he met the Appellant in the land in 1976. PW4 said the Appellant leased the land in dispute in 1975 to him. He farmed on it for three years unmolested while he was a teacher in the primary school in the community.
From all that I have stated above, it is clear that issues 1 and 2 should be resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent. The said issues are accordingly resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent.
Learned senior counsel for the Appellant in my view has repeated arguments on issues 1 and 2 under issue 3. As I pointed out earlier, it was the Appellant who sought to introduce the issue of sale in the transaction. However, the issues of grant and gift were introduced by the Court suo motu. All three issues were not borne out by the pleadings and evidence before the Court.
I agree with learned senior counsel for the Appellant that the Court did not show how the money gift by the Appellant to the Respondent’s grandfather changed the character of the transaction.
There is also no evidence that the Respondent’s grandfather ‘meant to make a gift’ to the Appellant as found by the Court below.
I have also earlier observed that no agreement was before the Court below. Therefore the Court below ought not have relied on a document that was not before it.
As pointed out earlier under issues 1 and 2, the finding by the Court below that the land was family land and required the consent of principal members of the family was contrary to the pleaded facts and evidence before the Court.
Issue 3 is therefore resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent.
From the pleadings and evidence before the Court below, the Respondent did not show that he inherited the land in dispute. There was therefore no basis for the conclusion of the Court below that Respondent’s title stemmed through inheritance and that he has a better title to the land. The Respondent nowhere suggested that he inherited the land in dispute. He did not claim to have inherited the land in dispute.
Issue 4 is also resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent.
All four issues having been resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent, the appeal is allowed. The Judgment of the Court below in suit No. HAW/19/2002 delivered on 28th November, 2011 in the High Court of Enugu State holden at Enugu is hereby set aside. In its place is entered judgment in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent in the following terms:
(1) It is hereby declared that the Appellant is entitled to the customary right of occupancy over the said Ukwanwokocha land situate, lying and being at Ifite Village, Amoli, Awgu (South) Local Government Area of Enugu State as against the Respondent.
(2) An order of perpetual injunction is hereby made restraining the Respondent either in person or through agents, servants, or privies, howsoever constituted from further trespassing into or interfering with the Appellant’s land now in dispute or user thereof in any manner whatsoever, either by way of erection or further erection of any kind of structure or otherwise.
(3) Respondent shall pay Three Hundred Thousand Naira (N300, 000.00) only being general damages for trespass to the Appellant.
(4) Appellant is awarded N100, 000.00 costs which shall be paid by the Respondent.
OYEBISI FOLAYEMI OMOLEYE, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft the leading judgment, just rendered by my learned Brother, James Shehu Abiriyi, J.C.A., in this appeal.
I agree fully with His Lordship’s line of reasoning and the conclusion reached in the said leading judgment that the appeal is imbued with merits. I equally allow the appeal and abide by all the consequential orders made therein, including that of costs.
SAIDU TANKO HUSSAINI, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the lucid and well considered Judgment just delivered by my Lord, James Shehu Abiriyi, JCA. My Lord in the said Judgment identified all issues arising from the appeal and ably resolved them. I have nothing to add except to say that the plaintiff/appellant having led evidence to prove his claims, the trial Court ought to have granted his claims. My Lord in the lead Judgment rightly set aside the Judgment delivered at that Court. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed by me.
Appearances:
Chief Mrs. A. J. Offiah, SAN with him, C. Nwanubani, Daniel Aloh, Chioma Orji, Oguguo Ezema and C. UdodimmaFor Appellant(s)
S. O. Ogbonna, Esq. with him, U. OgbonnaFor Respondent(s)



