JONAH ONYEBUCHI EZE V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 27th day of February, 1987
SC.174/1985
JUSTICES
ANDREWS OTUTU OBASEKI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
KAYODE ESO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ADOLPHUS GODWIN KARIBI-WHYTE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
SAIDU KAWU Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
CHUKWUDIFU AKUNNE OPUTA Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
JONAH ONYEBUCHI EZE Appellant(s)
AND
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA Respondent(s)
RATIO
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE DUTY?
What is the meaning of ‘customs and Excise duties’ as contained in Section 7(1)(b )(ii) of the Federal High Court Act 1973. In Earl Jowitt Dictionary of English Law, customs’ is defined among other things as ‘duties charged upon commodities on their importation into or exportation out of the country.’ In words and Phrases Legally Defined Second Edition, ‘Customs duties’ are defined as ‘Duties of Customs or customs duties are duties or tolls payable upon goods imported into this country, as opposed to excise duties, which are payable upon articles produced and consumed at name.’ PER ESO, J.S.C.
THE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT TO ENTERTAIN THE CHARGES
The issue of jurisdiction is one for the Constitution and the Law. Having regard to the limited jurisdiction of the Federal High Court vis-a- vis the unlimited jurisdiction of the State High Court, it must be so plain before the Federal High Court could nimble into the State High Court jurisdiction. That limited jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is not that easy to scale over. PER ESO, J.S.C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE JURISDICTION OF A COUT CAN BE LIMITED BY THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATION ALONE
This view gives the impression that the collecting of Federal Revenue is the predominant jurisdiction exercised by the Federal High Court.
One does not have to go further than a reading of section 7 of the Federal High Court Act No. 13 of 1973 to discover that apart from section 7(1)(a), (b)(ii) no question of the revenue of the Government of the Federation or any organ thereof or of a person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government was referred to. The other paragraphs of sub-section (1)(b)(c)(d) of section 7 relate to taxation of companies, and other bodies carrying on business (c) companies and their operation actions relating to copyrights, patents, trade marks and merchandise marks and (d) admiralty, are surely not matters directly related to or aimed at the garnering of Federal Government of Revenue. That might have been the objective for establishing the court, but the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be cut down by the intention of the legislation alone. It is determined by the specific provisions and the words used in the enabling statute. PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES IN DECIDING THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
I will like us to keep in view some basic principles:
1. In our law every case has to be decided, has to stand or fall, on its facts and all the surrounding circumstances.
2. The use of a case is mainly to establish principles.
3. Many cases decided by this Court viz:-
(i) Jammal Steel Structures Ltd. v. African Continental Bank Ltd, (1973) 1 All N.L.R. (Part 111) 208.
(ii) Bronik Motors Ltd. v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) S.C.N.L.R. 296.
(iii) Alhajl Zanna Buka Umoru Mandara v. The Attorney-General of the Federation (1984) 1 S.C.N.L.R. 311.
(iv) Savannah Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Pan Atlantic Shipping & Transport Agencies Ltd. SC.139/1985 decided on 30th January, 1987 (not yet reported)
(v) Western Steel Workers Ltd & anor. v. Iron & Steel Workers Union of Nigeria & anor. SC.225/1985 decided on 6th February, 1987 (not yet reported), have all established principles which, for the harmonious growth and necessary certainty of the law, one cannot overlook in deciding the issue of jurisdiction in this appeal. PER OPUTA, J.S.C.
ESO, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The point involved in this appeal has been considerably narrowed down, especially by the briefs filed by both learned counsel for the Appellant and the Respondent. However, I would have to state the facts relevant to the issue now before this court.
The issue itself is whether jurisdiction lies in the Federal High Court or the State High Court in regard to the case against the Appellant, Jonah Eze. There were four counts charge against the Appellant, but only two are relevant for the purpose of this appeal. They are counts 3 and 4 and they read as follows-
“COUNT 3:
That you, Jonah Onyebuchi Eze of No. 18 Obun Eko Street, Lagos, in the Lagos Judicial Division on or about the 8th day of September, 1980 at Apapa Port, Lagos, knowingly delivered to a Customs Officer a document produced for the purposes of Customs to wit, a duplicate copy of an expired firearms import licence which is untrue in a material particular and thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 142(1)(a) and punishable under Section 142(3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act No. 55 of 1958.
COUNT 4:
That you, Jonah Onyebuchi Eze of No. 18, Obun Eta Street, Lagos, in the Lagos Judicial Division on or about the 8th day of December, 1980 at Tin Can Island Port, Lagos, knowingly delivered to a Customs Officer a document produced for the purposes of Customs to wit, a duplicate copy of an expired firearms import licence which is untrue in a material particular and thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 142(1)(a)and punishable under Section 142(3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act No. 55 of 1958.”
The charge which, as I said, contained four counts was laid before the Federal High Court, Lagos. However, after protracted hearing and applications, this Court, in the interim, and on 10th June 1983, had given its decision in the case of Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank. As a result of that decision the Complainant, who is now the Respondent in this Court, applied through learned counsel, Mrs Folami, for a transfer of counts 1 and 2 to the Lagos State High Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Federal High Court. On 24th February, 1984, the learned Chief Judge of the Federal High Court, Anyaegbunam C.J., struck out counts 1 and 2. He said-
“I have not, however, found any rule in the Lagos State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1972 which empowers a transfer from the Lagos State High Court to another State High Court. Furthermore, from the contention of learned Senior State Counsel, Mrs Ekpo, it is clear to me that they did not wish to continue with counts 1 and 2. I would therefore strike them out.”
As regards counts 3 and 4, which I have set out supra, the learned Chief Judge held-
“The next points to be decided are in respect of counts 3 and 4 in my earlier ruling on these two counts, I held that I had jurisdiction. I referred to section 142 of C.E.M.A. with particular reference to marginal notes – “untrue declaration, etc,” I said, among other things that:-
“The title of CEMA referred to above is an important part of the Act. It is useful in ascertaining the general scope of the Act. See Jones v. Sherrington (1908) 2 K.B. 539 and Fisher v. Raven (1964) A.C. 210. I have no doubt in my mind that this court has jurisdiction to deal with counts 3 and 4 of the Charge. The documents in question must surely have something to do with duty. After all what is the purpose of submitting these documents to the Customs It is either to show that duty is payable or that the goods are duty free.”
What is the meaning of ‘customs and Excise duties’ as contained in Section 7(1)(b )(ii) of the Federal High Court Act 1973. In Earl Jowitt Dictionary of English Law, customs’ is defined among other things as ‘duties charged upon commodities on their importation into or exportation out of the country.’ In words and Phrases Legally Defined Second Edition, ‘Customs duties’ are defined as ‘Duties of Customs or customs duties are duties or tolls payable upon goods imported into this country, as opposed to excise duties, which are payable upon articles produced and consumed at name.’
It is clear, therefore, that section 7(1)(b)(ii) is, to my mind, within the jurisdiction of this court. I have already said so and I have not heard any new argument to make me shift my ground.
In the result, I overrule the submissions that I have no jurisdiction to entertain counts 3 and 4. I would ask Mr. Dolu Segun to proceed with his defence on count (sic).
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeal. That court, (Ademola, Nnaemeka-Agu and Kutigi J.J.C.A.) in a lead judgment, delivered by Nnaemeka-Agu, dismissed the appeal. Nnaemeka-Agu J.C.A. held that when the two counts that is 3 and 4 aver that the documents delivered by the defendant were “knowingly delivered to a Customs Officer for the purpose of customs”, they amount to an averment that the documents were knowingly delivered for the purposes of ‘Customs duties’.” He then said-
“This to my mind puts the charge as laid squarely within the four corners of the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as adumbrated in Bronik Motors Ltd. v. Wema Bank (supra) and Mandara v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1984) 4 S.C. 8”
Even if the charges were not proved, the learned justice of the Court of Appeal held the view that –
“that will not take the matter out of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. For, if the charge as laid shows that jurisdiction lay in the Federal High Court that jurisdiction cannot be taken away by failure to prove any ingredient of any averment in the charge. ”
There was some caveat though, for it was the view of the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal, that ‘E2’80”
“It would be different if evidence called at the trial shows positively that the documents were not delivered for the purposes averred, but for other purposes which would take the matter out of the jurisdiction of that court of limited jurisdiction.”
Nnaemeka-Agu J.C.A. then examined the submissions of learned counsel for the Appellant in regard to the evidence. He referred to the cross-examination of the 2nd prosecution witness which was as follows
“To import Arms and Ammunition, a dealer must have his licence to import. He must produce to the Customs his licence to import before he clears his goods from the port. He must make sure that his licence is from the Police. Once this is done the importer or his agent can now submit his Bill of Entry which will be accepted by the Customs. We will check from the licence the quantity of goods to be imported. The quantity imported will he endorsed at the back of the licence so as to know when he exhausted the quantity allowed by his licence.”
and then held –
“It appears clear from the above evidence that without the documents it would have been impossible to know the quantity firearms imported by the appellant.”
He went on-
“There was relationship between the quantity of goods endorsed on the licence (that is quantity of goods imported) and the rate and amount of duty payable”
And ended that the evidence showed that in substance it was a purely customs case.
Kutigi J.C.A., in concurring with the judgment, would appear to limit his considerations to the charges before the Court. The learned Justice of the Court of Appeal was of the view that his view accords with the view of this Court in the case of State v. Williams 1978 2 SC.9. A second test Kutigi, JCA held is that –
“the charges herein are in accordance with the law or section of the law which created the offence.”
The defendant has therefore appealed to this Court relying on seven grounds of appeal.
It is more interesting to examine the briefs filed by learned counsel in pursuance of the grounds of appeal. Mr. G.O.K. Ajayi (S.A.N.), learned counsel representing the Appellant, in a full brief, submitted that the only “real issue” to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the evidence led at the trial shows that the documents were delivered for the purposes of customs duties. He dealt extensively on the evidence adduced at the trial and concluded –
“The Appellant submits that the above-quoted evidence for the prosecution shows that the import licence was in fact produced for the primary purpose of satisfying the customs officials that the Appellant had a licence which covered the importation of the arms and ammunition being imported and not for the purpose of discovering whether or not duty was payable.”
Having dealt with the only “real issue”, learned Senior Advocate, strangely enough, dealt with a sub-heading which he termed “THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT COULD NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION THROUGH ARTIFICIALLY FRAMED CHARGES.” With respect,I think this subheading is so important that it would appear to belie the fact that there is only one real issue. With the so called only one real issue, one would have to wait till evidence is led before an objection could be raised to jurisdiction. I do not think so. Indeed, the decision of this Court in The State v. Dr. L.E. Williams (1978) 2 SC.9 which incidentally Mr. Ajayi relies upon heavily, is enough to counter the proposition. Issue of jurisdiction in this case, as in any other case, could be raised at any time, whether at the stage of the charge, evidence or even when judgment is being delivered. In many cases, it is not raised until the matter is on appeal and yet that creates no derogation to its potency.
For his part, Mr. Oladapo, learned counsel for the Respondent, relied on the Williams case and submitted that the charge, as laid, avers that the document, that is an expired Firearms licence was presented to a Custom Officer for purposes of customs which have been held to mean the same thing with customs duty the document is said to be false not in the sense of section 465 of the Criminal Code but under section 142 of the Customs and Excise Management Act. Learned counsel concluded that the decision of this Court in Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) 1 Sc. N.L.R 296 and Mandara v. Attorney General (1984) 1 SC. N.L.R. 311 do not affect the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in this case.
I have already set out the charges in this case. I will now state the facts. They are beautifully, though succinctly recorded, by Nnaemeka-Agu JCA, in his judgment and I will just repeat them.
“The appellant, a licensed importer of firearms, had issued to him by the police, a licence for the importation of firearms dated 8th January, 1976, for 1,050 pieces of firearms with ammunition (See exh.C). No expiry date was stated on the face of the licence. Endorsements thereon showed that he used the licence to import quantities of firearms at various dates from 1976. On the 8th of September, 1980, he imported some quantities of firearms into Apapa Port and presented to Customs Officers at the port a duplicate copy (Exh. A) of the licence (Exh. C) as authority for the importation. He was later arrested and charged on four counts, two contrary to Section 20(d) of the Firearms Amendment Act, 1956, and the other two under Section 142(1)(a) of the Customs and Excise Management Act No. 55 of 1958 (hereinafter called C.E.M.A.) When the issue of jurisdiction was raised at the conclusion of evidence during the trial, the learned Chief Judge of the Federal High Court ruled that he had no jurisdiction to try counts 1 and 2 but that he had jurisdiction to try counts 3 and 4. This appeal relates to his ruling that he had jurisdiction to try counts 3 and 4.
The real problem with the Court of Appeal, as well as the trial Court in this case, is the understanding of the length to which this Court had gone in both the Bronik case (supra) and the Mandara Case (supra) in so far as the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is concerned. This Court made no bone about it. The jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is severely limited to issues of Revenue generating apart from specific jurisdiction conferred upon that Court by the Constitution and the Parliament (at present by a Decree passed by the A.F.R.C.) I think the language employed by Irikefe J.S.C. as he then was, in the Bronik case, though terse, is apt. The learned Justice of the Supreme Court (as he then was) said-
“I must add that the Federal Revenue Court and its successor the Federal High Court derive existence from the need, to have a court for the more effective and expeditious “garnering” of Federal Revenue. In this regard, the Federal High Court differs from the State High Court, which under section 236 of the 1979 Constitution enjoys unlimited jurisdiction, unless jurisdiction is expressly excluded by Statute or the Constitution itself.”
In the same case, I traced the historical background to and the evolution of the Court. I think I will repeat it again here for the purpose of emphasis.
“In 1973 by the Revenue Court Decree 1973 No. 13, the Federal Revenue Court was established to have original jurisdiction in certain specific revenue matters such as taxation of companies, customs excise duties, banking, foreign exchange, currency, and fiscal measures of the Government. The purpose of the Decrees as its title connotes, to provide a separate court to deal with revenue matters. The problem at that time was that it was felt that there was delay by the courts in dealing with the revenue matters of the Federal Government and as there was a necessity to provide expeditious handling by the Courts, the Federal Revenue Court provided the answer. However, with the promulgation of the 1979 Constitution, the Revenue Court ceased to have any place in the scheme of things.”
And so, the Federal High Court was established, inheriting the jurisdiction, on its inception, the jurisdiction of the Federal Revenue Court.
I will therefore examine the issue of jurisdiction, not only on the narrow compass of what evidence was available, but also on the charges as laid. On the evidence available there is no dispute that there was no question of “garnering” revenue in this case. The evidence was that duty was correctly paid. What is left is the forgery, or rather uttering a forged document which charge, though had not been laid under the Criminal Code, carries the same element. I am impressed by the collection of evidence present in Mr. Ajayi’s brief. The Chief Superintendent of Police dwelt on the expired nature of the Firearms licence, and importation of arms without licence. The Appellant was “brought” to the police station for only the offence of unlawful importation of firearms. The Assistant Superintendent of Customs had decided
“There was no loss of revenue.” Correct dues were paid on the items.”
And so, what revenue was there left to be garnered
I hold the view that Nnaemeka-Agu J.C.A., directed himself properly upon the nature of the evidence when he said-
“It does appear to me that Mr. Oladapo is right. P. W.2 said under cross-examination:
“…..To import Arms and Ammunition a dealer must have his Licence to import. He must produce to the Customs his licence to import before he clears his goods out of the port. We must make sure that the licence is from the police. Once this is done the importer or his agent can now submit his Bill of entry which will be accepted by the Customs. We will check from the licence the quantity of goods to be imported. The quantity imported will be endorsed at the back of licence so as to know when he exhausted the quantity allowed by his licence..”
But the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal read the words ‘customs and customs duties’ to be the same and or inter- changeable. The learned Justice relied on Blacks Law’s Dictionary and Earl of Jowitt Dictionary of English law. With respect, there is no need for this exercise. In so far as the evidence goes, no question whatsoever of complaint of customs duty. It is not for the Curt to stretch itself by interpretation to seek jurisdiction for itself or for another court. The issue of jurisdiction is one for the Constitution and the Law. Having regard to the limited jurisdiction of the Federal High Court vis-a- vis the unlimited jurisdiction of the State High Court, it must be so plain before the Federal High Court could nimble into the State High Court jurisdiction. That limited jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is not that easy to scale over.
But even, diverting ones mind to the charge only. The charges are clear and unambiguous. It is-
” Knowingly delivered to a Customs Officer a document produced for the purpose of customs, to wit a duplicate copy of an expired firearms import licence which is untrue in a material particular ..”
What is it that savours of revenue garnering in this charge The document is not a mystery. It is-
“a duplicate copy of an expired firearms import licence.”
What revenue concept surrounds an expired import licence.”
What is the revenue to the Federal Government Why must there be a strain in the interpretative Stance Such strain could be there for the purpose of giving the Federal High Court jurisdiction. If the prosecution complains of revenue why did they not charge the Appellant with its loss or its evation Or even to examine the “material particular” which the charge alleges, there is no suggestion of loss of revenue.
I do not think the words “produced for purpose of customs” should send panic to any court If a document produced for the purpose of customs duty to a customs officer is forged, and the complaint is limited only to forgery or uttering a forged document it is only that complaint that is relevant for the purpose of jurisdiction. Is the forgery for the purpose of evading customs duty If it is so, it must be so charged before a Court with such limited jurisdiction could assume jurisdiction in the matter. It is a different matter if the jurisdiction is not so limited and controlled. This Court has made it clear, as per Sowemimo J.S.C. as he then was, in the Williams case (supra). The learned Justice of the Supreme Court had said –
“In short it is his contention that the documents are so relevant to the proof of the charges contained in the information, that the High Court of Lagos State could not assume jurisdiction because all the offences, if properly laid, would come under Federal Laws. We have given careful consideration to the arguments and submissions of Mr. Sogbesan and to the several sections of both the Exchange Control Act, 1962, and Customs and Excise Management Act- which provides similar or analogous offences to those charged in the information, but are unable to agree with him that in determining jurisdiction with regard to the offences charged in the information, the character of the documents is relevant, except for the purpose of determining punishment.”
The character of the document, that is one produced for purpose of customs, is irrelevant for the determination of jurisdiction.
I have no doubt this appeal must succeed and it is hereby allowed. The judgments and orders of the Court of Appeal and the Federal High Court are hereby set aside. The charges of two counts are hereby struck out. The Appellant is hereby discharged but not on the merit.
OBASEKI, J.S.C: I have had the privilege of a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Eso, JSC. I hereby express my concurrence with the judgment as it fully expresses my opinions on the issues raised in this appeal and I agree that the appeal be allowed.
The chequered history of this case in its journey from the Federal High Court to this Court has been fully set out by my learned brother, Eso, JSC and needs no repetition by me. However, it is worthy of note that the debate in all the courts i.e. Federal High Court, Court of Appeal, and this Court has been on the issue of the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to entertain the charges. The issue has continued to bedevil the courts when the objection was upheld in respect of two counts, counts 1 and 2 and overruled in respect of counts 3 and 4 of the charge preferred against the appellant.
These counts 3 and 4 read as follows:
“3. That you, Jonah Onyebuchi Eze of No. 18 Obun Eko Street, Lagos in the Lagos Judicial Division on or about the 5th day of September, 1980 at Apapa Port, Lagos knowingly delivered to a customs officer a document produced for the purposes of customs, to wit, a duplicate copy of an expired firearms import licence which is untrue in a material particular and thereby committed an offence contrary to section 142(1)(a) and punishable under section 142(3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act No. 55 of 1958.
4. That you, Jonah Onyebuchi Eze of No. 18 Obun Eko Street, Lagos in Lagos Judicial Division on or about the 8th day of December, 1980 at Tin Can Island, Port, Lagos knowingly delivered to a customs officer a document produced for the purposes of customs to wit, a duplicate copy of an expired firearms import licence which is untrue in a material particular and thereby committed an offence contrary to section 142(1)(a) and punishable under section 142(3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act No.55 of 1958. “(Italics mine)
The issues for determination in this appeal formulated by the appellant’s counsel at page 6 of the appellant’s brief read:
“In view of the findings by the Court of Appeal that the charge as laid had something to do with “customs duties” and was therefore within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court but that if evidence showed that the charge in fact had nothing to do with customs duties, it would be taken out of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, the appellant submits that the only real issue to be determined in this appeal is as follows:-
‘Does the evidence led at the trial show that the documents were delivered for the purposes of customs duties or does it show that they were not”‘
The issue for determination is therefore a straight forward issue the resolution of which depends wholly on the facts established by evidence led at the trial. The foundation for the charge preferred against the appellant was the licence to import arms and ammunition Exhibit A. Exhibit C is a duplicate copy of Exhibit A. See evidence of p.w.6 page 51. Exhibit A reads:
FORM 1:
The Firearms Ordinance 1958 (LICENCE TO IMPORT FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION)
‘(1) Licence is hereby granted to Mr. Jonah Eze and Sons of 16 Cooke Road, Benin City to import by sea/by land/by air or inland navigation the firearms and ammunition described in the Schedule hereunder.
(2) This licence is granted subject to the following conditions:
FOR SALE
DATED this 8th day of January, 1976.
Signed
Authorised Police Officer,
Chief Superintendent of Police,
Benin City.”
There was nothing on the face of Exhibit A to show that the Licence has an expiry date. The quality and type of firearms together with the quantity and description of the ammunition covered by the licence are stated in the Schedule to the licence.
Having regard to the charges laid against the appellant, the question that arises is whether Exhibit A qualifies as a document for purposes of customs. Without more, is it a document from which ex facie custom duty can be assessed The answer must be in the negative as it contains no evidence of value.
P.W.7 said in his testimony that the Bills of Lading Exhibits F to F7 were all he needs for his duty and that Exhibit C, the licence to import firearms does not fall within the scope of his duty. He further testified that correct duties were paid on the items. The production of Exhibit A or Exhibit C is necessary to satisfy the customs officer of the valid lawful cover for the importation of the arms and ammunition. See p.w.2 and 3’s evidence. The Bills of Lading and other documents showing the value of the goods are ‘necessary documents for assessment and calculation of custom duties. It will ‘be asking the customs officer to do the impossibility by asking him to assess the custom duties from Exhibit A or Exhibit C. It cannot be a correct view of the evidence to infer and conclude that Exhibit A or Exhibit C was produced for the purpose of customs duties. Since they were not produced for that purpose, no government revenue is involved and the Federal High Court cannot ‘assume jurisdiction in the matter.
The issue for determination in this appeal formulated by the respondent in its brief is slightly different in its con. It reads:-
“The single issue for determination in this appeal is whether the jurisdiction to hear and determine counts 3 and 4 of the charge before the lower court lay with the Federal High Court where the proceedings have been taking place or whether the charge should have been preferred in the State High Court bearing in mind:
(i) that the counts constitute offences contrary to section 143(1)(a) and punishable under section 142(3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1958; and
(ii) the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bronik Motors Limited v. Wema Bank Limited (1983) 1 SC. NLR, 296 in Alhaji Zanna Buka Umoru Mandara v. The Attorney-General of the Federation (1984) 4 S.C.8 and in African Newspapers- of Nigeria Ltd. & Ors. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria
SC.33/1984.”
The respondent is not the appellant and has filed no cross- appeal. It must therefore formulate issues for determination in the appeal with reference to the grounds filed. Evidence was led by both the prosecution (which called 23 prosecution witnesses) and the defence (which called 7 defence witnesses) before the objection to jurisdiction was raised. The mass of evidence led thus provided the materials on which the objection was founded. It would have been futile to have founded the objection on the charge as it stands laid under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1958.
Since evidence had been led before the objection was raised before the Federal High Court, the charge cannot be considered in isolation before arriving at a proper decision. Further, many of the six grounds of appeal referred to the evidence before the court. I therefore prefer the formulation of the issue by the appellant.
Contrary to the charge, the evidence led has not established that the document Exhibit A or Exhibit C was untrue in a material particular or that it was produced for customs duties.
Disregarding the evidence and analysing the charge, the main complaint is one of forgery and uttering. But the appellant was never charged with forgery and uttering under the criminal code, a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. Indeed, the charge was never laid under the Criminal Code as would have been the case. It was laid ostensibly under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1958 to enable the Federal High Court assume jurisdiction.
If the statement of offence and the evidence in support do not bring a matter within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court the laying of the charge under a law the court has jurisdiction to administer will not prevent the jurisdiction of the court from being ousted.
I also hold that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to try the real offence charged.
Since the offences have not been laid under the Criminal Code but under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1958, the proper order will be to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal and the Federal High Court and strike out the two remaining counts, counts 3 and 4 of the charge and I hereby set aside the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Federal High Court and strike out the charge.
The appellant will be and is hereby discharged.
KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the lead judgment of Kayode Eso JSC in this appeal. I agree with the conclusion that this appeal must be allowed.
My brother Kayode Eso J.S.C. in his judgment has given exhaustive reasons for his conclusion. I agree with his construction of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as severely limited by the provisions of section 7 to the matters prescribed therein. I do not however wish to be taken for accepting and therefore disagree with the view that the jurisdiction of the court was “‘limited to issues of Revenue generating apart from the specific jurisdiction conferred upon that court by the constitution and Parliament (at present by a Decree passed by the A.F.R.C.).” This view gives the impression that the collecting of Federal Revenue is the predominant jurisdiction exercised by the Federal High Court.
One does not have to go further than a reading of section 7 of the Federal High Court Act No. 13 of 1973 to discover that apart from section 7(1)(a), (b)(ii) no question of the revenue of the Government of the Federation or any organ thereof or of a person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government was referred to. The other paragraphs of sub-section (1)(b)(c)(d) of section 7 relate to taxation of companies, and other bodies carrying on business (c) companies and their operation actions relating to copyrights, patents, trade marks and merchandise marks and (d) admiralty, are surely not matters directly related to or aimed at the garnering of Federal Government of Revenue. That might have been the objective for establishing the court, but the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be cut down by the intention of the legislation alone. It is determined by the specific provisions and the words used in the enabling statute.
Finally on this point the express provision of section 230(1) of the Constitution 1979 enabling the National Assembly to confer on the Federal High Court in addition to matters relating to Federal Government revenue, such other matters as may be prescribed in respect of which the National Assembly has power to make laws clearly demonstrates the opposite of what is being assumed is the predominant jurisdiction. Undoubtedly jurisdiction over matters involving Federal Government revenue is one of the subject matters prescribed. It is clearly not the only one and indeed not predominant.
I entirely agree with the conclusion, on the surviving charge, of two counts, that the document relied upon in this case is only relevant for the determination whether an offence or what offence has been committed. It may be relevant for determining the jurisdiction of the Court if the offence disclosed is one within the jurisdiction of the Court. In this case, where the complaint against the document is that it is forged, that is the complaint that is relevant for the purpose of the jurisdiction of the court. If however, the forgery is for the purpose of evading customs duty, then it is the Federal High Court that has jurisdiction. See S. 7(1)(b)(ii), and section 7(2) of the Federal High Court Act. Otherwise, as in this case, where the issue of the evasion of the payment of customs duties did not arise and was not an issue then it is not a matter within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
I have no doubt therefore that this appeal must succeed and it is hereby allowed. The judgments and orders of the court below and of the court of first instance are hereby set aside. The charges of two counts are hereby set aside. Appellant is hereby discharged but not on the merits of the case.
KAWU, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, Eso, J.S.C, which has just been delivered. I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and conclusion and it is for reasons in the said judgment that I too would, and hereby allow the appeal. I abide by all the orders made in the lead judgment.
OPUTA, J.S.C.: For six long years this case has been bouncing forward and backward like a tennis ball, from the Federal High Court to the Court of Appeal, then back to the Federal High Court, then back to the Court of Appeal, and as if intent on completing the circuit, it has now reached the Supreme Court , the country’s last and final Court. For all these six years the issue has been the same. For six long years the Courts of the country have been trying to find out which of the two Courts – the State High Court or the Federal High Court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the four count charges preferred against the Appellant. The result of all these six years of waiting, may have at least some marginal advantage to the jurisprudence of this country but one wonders if that advantage can really justify the expenditure in money, in time and effort, in anxiety and worry by all concerned especially the Appellant. This case amply shows the wisdom of the legislators who in Section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act No. 13 of 1973 and Section 22(3) of the Federal High Court (Amendment) Act No. 36 of 1975 gave the Federal High Court and the State High Courts the power to transfer cases improperly filed before them to the appropriate High Court ” Federal or State. It also shows the practical wisdom of this Court’s decision in Savannah Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Pan Atlantic Shipping & Transport Agencia Ltd. & Anor. Suit No. 139/1985 delivered on Friday 30th January, 1987(not yet reported). In that case this Court held that in Admiralty matters, the Federal High Court and the State High Courts have concurrent jurisdiction. This is an improvement on Section 22(2) of Act No. 33 of 1973 as it does away with transfers and enables any of the two Courts to try the case on its merit instead of “wasting” six years (as was done here) “quarrelling” over jurisdiction.
Before venturing into the steep waterfall, into the vexed question of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as opposed to the State High Court. I will like us to keep in view some basic principles:
1. In our law every case has to be decided, has to stand or fall, on its facts and all the surrounding circumstances.
2. The use of a case is mainly to establish principles.
3. Many cases decided by this Court viz:-
(i) Jammal Steel Structures Ltd. v. African Continental Bank Ltd, (1973) 1 All N.L.R. (Part 111) 208.
(ii) Bronik Motors Ltd. v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) S.C.N.L.R. 296.
(iii) Alhajl Zanna Buka Umoru Mandara v. The Attorney-General of the Federation (1984) 1 S.C.N.L.R. 311.
(iv) Savannah Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Pan Atlantic Shipping & Transport Agencies Ltd. SC.139/1985 decided on 30th January, 1987 (not yet reported)
(v) Western Steel Workers Ltd & anor. v. Iron & Steel Workers Union of Nigeria & anor. SC.225/1985 decided on 6th February, 1987 (not yet reported), have all established principles which, for the harmonious growth and necessary certainty of the law, one cannot overlook in deciding the issue of jurisdiction in this appeal.
What are those principles In Jammal Steel Structures’ case supra this Court held inter alia that “the true object and purpose of the Federal Revenue Court Decree No. 13 of 1973, as can be gathered from the four corners of it, is the more expeditious dispatch of revenue cases, particularly those relating to personal income tax, company tax, customs excise duties, illegal currency deals, exchange control measures and the like, which the State, High Courts were supposed to have been too tardy to dispose of especially in recent years.” The Court is not to be oblivious of the history of Act No. 13 of 1973.Although the Court is not at liberty to construe a Statute by the motives which influenced its enactment, yet when the reason for the enactment is known it is the duty of the Court to read the Statute or sections of it in such away as to fairly and accurately carry out that object of the Decree, Act, or Statute and not with a view of extending the Section or the Statute to something that was not intended:- Holme v. Guy (1877) 5 Ch. D. 901 at p.905. The Federal High Court was established for the more expeditious dispatch of revenue cases. One should bear this in mind in construing Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Federal High Court Act of 1973. If a case does not directly affect the revenue of the Federal Government or if no revenue stands to be lost to the Federal Government then the raison d’etre for the-intervention of, and the assumption of jurisdiction by, the Federal High Court will simply not exist. Jammal’s case supra further decided that it was not the legislative intention behind Section 7(1)(b)(iii) of Act No. 13 of 1973 “to clutter up the new Revenue Court with ordinary cases ….. having nothing to do with the Federal Revenue concern, and that all State High Courts and other appropriate Courts must continue to exercise -their jurisdiction in these and similar matters if the Federal Revenue Court must be allowed to concentrate on its essentially revenue protection functions. ” In other words what will actually decide, having regard to s.7(1)(b)(ii) of Act No. 13 of 1973, where a case goes- Federal High Court or State High Court – is its effect on Government revenue and not merely the use of the words “customs and excise duties” in the charge or claim as the case may be.
The next case which laid down some very useful principles which will undoubtedly come in handy in determining which Court has jurisdiction in this case now on appeal is the case of Bronik Motors Ltd. supra. Before the promulgation of Act No. 13 of 1973 the State High Courts exercised unlimited jurisdiction including jurisdiction over all matters set out in Section 7 of the Federal High Court Act. By Section 1(1) of Act No.13 of 1973, a new Court was created to be known as and called “The Federal Revenue Court.” Matters set out in S.7, which before 1973 were under the jurisdiction of the State High Courts were from 1973 vested in the Federal Revenue Court. Section7 did not make the jurisdiction of the new Court exclusive over those matters but Section 8 did. Then came the 1979 Constitution which by its Section 236 made the jurisdiction of the State High Court “unlimited.” Bronik’s Motors case supra considered Sections 236 and 230 of the 1979 Constitution and held that it was the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court that was “limited” and “restricted to the causes or matters connected with or pertaining to the revenue of the Federal Government.” Now on the principle that the greater includes the lesser, it can be argued that the “unlimited jurisdiction” conferred by the 1979 Constitution upon the State High Courts restored their erstwhile jurisdiction before 1973 – a jurisdiction even over matters covered by Section 7 of Act No. 13 of 1973, Bronik’s case supra indirectly and Savannah Bank’s case supra directly held that Section 8 of the Federal High Court Act 1973 limiting the unlimited jurisdiction of the State High Courts is unconstitutional, null and void. The result will then be that at the worst, and in any event, the State High Courts and the Federal High Court had concurrent jurisdiction even over causes and matters set out in Section 7 of Act No. 13 of 1973. It also means that if any cause or matter set out in Section 7 of Act No. 13 of 1973 has nothing at all to do with the revenue of the Federal Government, the Federal High Court will not exercise any jurisdiction over such cause or matter.
Since the case now on appeal deals with the issue of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to try the Appellant on a criminal charge, in the interest of consistency, one is bound to consider seriously any views, be they obiter dicta or rationes decidendi of this Court on that issue. A full Court of seven Justices considered the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in Criminal Proceedings in Mandara’s case supra and held that Section 7(3) of the Federal High Court Act 1973 merely amplifies sub-section (2) thereof and does not create any additional jurisdiction thereto and that the phrase “offences under the provisions of the Criminal Code in Section 7(3) means the offences under the Code which relate to the matters set out in Section 7(1) of the Act.” The underlying concept was aptly expressed by Sowemimo, C.J.N. in his obiter dictum namely -7 “As the former name of the Court is restricted, the Federal Revenue Court although changed to Federal High Court, its jurisdiction as set out in Sub-Section (1) of Section 7 has never been altered. All criminal matters which that Court has jurisdiction to deal with under sub-section (3) must be within the compass of Section 1 ……. It is the duty of our Courts to observe the different jurisdictions which are imposed on those Courts.” Then came the most important pronouncement. “It is our hope that the Federal High Court will continue to deal with revenue cases, except of course, the election petitions in the case of Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections.”
Before tackling the main, and in fact the only issue in this case namely:- which Court – the Federal High Court or the Lagos State Court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain Counts 3 and 4 of the charge against the Appellant, I will like to summarise the principles arising out of all the cases I discussed above as these will be the principles I will apply in resolving the issue now in controversy:-
1. Before 1973 our ordinary normal Superior Courts of record of first instance were the State High Courts.
2. These Courts within their competence exercised unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal causes and matters including causes and matters listed in Section 7(1) of Act No. 13 of 1973.
3. After the establishment of the Federal Revenue Court in 1973 jurisdiction over matters listed in Section 7(1) of the Act was vested in the Federal Revenue Court exclusively by Section 8 of the Act.
4. The whole purpose of establishing “this special Court” as its name implied was to ensure the expeditious dispatch and disposal of cases involving the revenue of the Federal Government. Matters or causes having nothing to do with the revenue of the Federal Government were not to be “smuggled” into the jurisdiction of the Federal Revenue Court.
5. On the coming into force of the 1979 Constitution the State High Courts were granted unlimited jurisdiction by Section 236 and the Federal Revenue Court was re-styled “the Federal High Court” and granted a jurisdiction limited by Section 230 of that Constitution to the former jurisdiction conferred on it by Section 7(1) of the Act which created it, Act No. 13 of 1973, plus any jurisdiction given to it by any specific provisions or sections of the 1979 Constitution, plus any extra jurisdiction that may he conferred on it in future by any enactment of the National Assembly. As at present none was or had been enacted. In actual practice therefore the only jurisdiction properly belonging to the Federal High Court is still that conferred on it by section 7(1) of the 1973 Act.
6. The jurisdiction of the State High Courts being unlimited by Section 236 necessarily includes the jurisdiction over matters set forth in Section (1) of Act No. 13 of 1973. This means that in respect of those matters both Courts, Federal High Court and State High Courts, have concurrent jurisdiction.
7. The Federal High Court has no jurisdiction even over matters coming generally under Section 7(1) unless such matters or causes “relate to the revenue of the Government of the Federation.”
8. Section 7(3) of Act No. 13 of 1973 did not confer any additional jurisdiction on the Federal High Court but rather it merely amplified Section 7(2) which itself relates back to Section 7(1). With the above as guiding principles, I will now examine Counts 3 and 4 charged against the Appellant in order to determine which of the two compelling Courts is the forum competens.
Count 3 charged the Appellant as follows:”
Count 3
That you, Jonah Onyebuchi Eze of No. 18 Obun Eko Street, Lagos, knowingly delivered to a Custom Officer a document produced for the purposes of ‘customs to wit, a duplicate copy of an expired firearms import licence which is untrue in a material particular and thereby committed an offence contrary to S.142(1)( a) and punishable under Section 142(3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act No. 55 of 1958.
Count 4
That you, Jonah Onyebuchi Eze of No. 18, Obun Eko Street, Lagos on or about 8th day of December, 1980 at Tin Can Island Port, Lagos, knowingly delivered to a Custom Officer a document produced for the purposes of Customs to wit, a duplicate copy of an expired firearms import licence which is untrue in a material particular and thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 142(1)(a) and punishable under Section 142(3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act No, 55 of 1958.”
The two counts reproduced above have all the trappings of the offence of uttering false documents under Section 468 of the Criminal Code Cap 42 of 1958,
It ought now to be common ground especially after ….Mandara’s case supra that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to try the Appellant on any offence created and punishable by the Criminal Code. The issue in the appeal now boils down to this ‘Are the two Counts’ 3 and 4 above 180″ in fact charges under the Criminal Code, their appearance suggesting otherwise notwithstanding If the answer to this question is yes then this appeal is bound to succeed and ought therefore to be allowed. If the answer is NO then a further question will arise Are Counts 3 and 4 above strictu sensu causes or matters relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation
Answer to Question No.1
In his Brief of argument, Mr. Ajayi, S.A.N, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the issue of jurisdiction is radical and vital ‘and should not be left to the way a charge is framed. “The Respondent is not at liberty” he contended “knowing that the offence is one which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, to nonetheless frame the charge artificially to look like one in respect of customs duties and thereby confer jurisdiction In the Court which has none.” This Court dealt with a similar issue but in reverse, in the State v. Williams & 2 ors (1978) 2 S.C.9. But a lot has happened since Williams’ case supra was decided. The 1979 Constitution had been promulgated; Bronik and all the other cases (mentioned earlier on in this judgment) that sought to define the respective jurisdictions of the Federal High Court and the State High Courts had been decided. Also in Williams’ case supra the objection to jurisdiction was taken ever before the plea of the accused persons; the objection was taken on the Information. The arguments were therefore understandably confined to the Information only. In the instant case on appeal evidence has been led, the prosecution had closed its case and the defence had gone half way. Here the objection to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court will take cognizance not only of the charges as laid but also of the available evidence led in support to discover whether in substance as opposed to mere form, the charges should have been more appropriately laid under the Criminal Code.
What really was the complaint against the Appellant It is uttering a false document. If any person knowingly and fraudulently utters a false document, he commits an offence under Section 468 of the Criminal Code. The nature of the document forged or falsified may go to punishment but it is otherwise immaterial to the offence disclosed. It does not therefore matter whether the document uttered in this case was a Customs document or an import licence or a document required under the Firearms Regulations. In other words, in determining jurisdiction in regard to the offence or offences charged in the information, the character and nature of the document alleged to be falsified and uttered is irrelevant. But in determining the punishment then the nature and character of the document become most material. The learned trial Chief Judge fully appreciated this when in his ruling on Mr. Ajayi’s submission of No Case, he observed at the end of his ruling:-
“By the combined effect of Section 3(1) of the Firearms Regulations, 1959 and Section 469 of the Criminal Code, it would appear that a prima facie case has been made out for the accused to answer.”
From the above, it is clear that the prima facie case against the Appellant ‘as really a case of uttering, cancelled or exhausted document contrary to ‘Section 469 of the Criminal Code. Therefore if the charges in Counts 3 and 4 were laid under the criminal Code as they ought to have been. then on the authority of Mandara’s case supra the Federal High Court will have no jurisdiction.
But the fact is that the charges against the Appellant were not brought under the Criminal Code. They were all brought under the Customs and Excise Management Act No. 55 of 1958. Mr. Ajayi in his Brief conceded that the offence alleged against the Appellant “is guarded against not only in Section 468 of the Criminal Code, but also in Section 142 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1958.” But he further argued that “the fact that the present charge was laid under the latter provisions (that is under the Customs and Excise Management Act) does not alter the nature of the offence, and cannot confer jurisdiction on the Federal High Court unless the falsity of the document had in some way affected the duty payable.” I agree. This is the point which the Court below, with the greatest respect, missed when it observed on page 264 of the record:-
“Assuming that any ingredient of the offence as charged is not proved that will not take the matter out of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.”
The Federal High Court is a special Court with limited jurisdiction. The limit set on its jurisdiction by Section 7(1)(a) of the Act No. 13 of 1973 (which conferred on it its jurisdiction) is that the cause or matter over which it shall have jurisdiction must “relate to the revenue of the Government of the Federation.” Therefore failure to prove that the uttering of the cancelled or exhausted Import Licence, EX.C in any way affected the revenue of the Federal Government was not just failure to prove an ingredient of the offence charged. No, it was not. It was failure to prove that the Federal High Court was the forum competens; that it was competent to try the case; that the subject matter of the case was within its jurisdiction:- see Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All N.L.R. (Part 4) at p.595. A Court of unlimited jurisdiction stands on an entirely different footing from a Court whose jurisdiction is limited.
Uttering a forged document is an offence against the Criminal Code, whether or not the Federal Government lost any revenue thereby. But the act to constitute an offence triable by the Federal High Court must as contemplated by Section 7(2) of Act No. 13 of 1973 be an offence “in respect of criminal causes and matters arising out of or connected with any of the ,matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by sub-section (I) of this Section” that is to say cause or matter relating to the revenue of the Federal Government.
The Court of Appeal seemed to have appreciated the intimate relationship between the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court and “the revenue the Government of the Federation” when it observed on the same page 264 of the record:-
“It would be different if evidence called at the trial shows positively that the documents were not delivered for the purposes averred, but for other purposes which would take the matter out of the jurisdiction of that Court of limited jurisdiction.”
I am in full agreement with the above assessment of the extent of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. To make it clear and beyond doubt “the purposes averred” referred to above must be purposes “relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation.”
The only issue in this appeal now, is:- For what purpose is an Import Licence tendered Is it tendered as a “revenue collecting document” Or is it tendered to enable the authorities know whether the importer has exceeded the number of volume of arms and ammunition he was authorised by the licence to import This is the general question. There is also a particular question – For what purpose was EX.C tendered If the Appellant had a licence to import arms attracting a lower rate of duty and he used the same licence to import arms attracting higher custom duty then one of his purposes will be to defraud the revenue of the Federal Government. Exhibit C was issued for the importation of double barrel shot guns. It was so used. The particular question does not therefore arise in this case.
Before I tackle the general question, it may be well to observe that the Appellant is standing trial for a criminous if not for a criminal offence. Here the onus is on the prosecution and the standard of proof is not by preponderance of evidence. It is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Again since the Federal High Court is a Court of limited jurisdiction, there is no presumption in its favour that it has jurisdiction. Those asserting that it has – the prosecution in this case – will have to prove that the charges come squarely within its jurisdiction; they will have to prove that EX.C was tendered by the Appellant for the purpose of defrauding the Federal Government of Revenue. What was the evidence before the trial Court on this point – the purpose of EX..C The police witnesses who testified were all agreed that the complaint against the Appellant was that he tendered an expired Import licence. Not one of them mentioned that the Federal Government lost any revenue thereby. It may be an offence to import arms and ammunition without a licence or with an expired licence, but such an offence will not be the concern of the Federal High Court. That should come before the ordinary and normal Courts – the High Courts of the States. It was because of the above that Counts 1 and 2 of the charges against the Appellant were withdrawn and erroneously struck out because the Court of Appeal, again, with respect, erroneously held that there was no constitutional power in the Federal High Court to transfer cases improperly before it to the State High Court inspite of the clear and unambiguous wording of the Section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act 1973 and this Court’s decision in Mokelu v. Federal Commissioner for Works & Housing (1976) 1 N.M.L.R. 329 at p. 333. There is no appeal before us against the striking out of Counts 1 and 2. One should therefore let sleeping dogs lie.
What was the evidence relating to the purpose and function of an Import Licence The p.w.2, Michael Unoka Oji was from the Department of Customs and Excise. He was at the material time Area Administrator, Tin Island. He endorsed the expired Import Licence of the Appellant thus,….. I.C.O. Since we have no reason to doubt the Police please accept.” This of evidence showed that EX.C was more of a Police document than a revenue document. The witness expanciated under cross examination as follows:-
“To import arms and ammunition, a dealer must have a licence .. We must make sure that the licence is from the Police. Once this is done the importer or his agent can now submit his Bill of Entry which will be accepted by the Customs. We will check from the licence the quantity of goods to be imported. The quantity imported will be endorsed at the back of the licence so as to know when he exhausted the quantity allowed by his licence. This method is general for all dealers” (Italics is mine).
This evidence from a high ranking Customs Officer shows that EX.C, expired Import Licence was no more than a security document to present any unauthorised importation of arms and ammunition into the country. It had nothing to do directly with the revenue of the Government of the Federation.
This point is further amplified by the evidence of another Customs Officer, Franklin Omosu, called as the P.WA. He was an Assistant Superintendent Collector of Customs. He made an endorsement on the EX.C.
“Question by Court – Do you know why you endorsed EX.C
Ans: Yes my Lord. The import permit given to Eze had a specific quantity of items to be imported. The purpose of endorsement at the back is to make sure that the quantities were not over imported. I acknowledged the importation of 500 pieces of double barrel shot guns on 6/12/80.EX.C is a duplicate of the import licence.”
from the above evidence, it is clear that EX.C had nothing to do with revenue in the form of customs duty. It was not a Customs document.
But the evidence that brought out the difference between an Import License and a revenue document was the evidence of Nduenso Oko Okon. Okon called as P.W.7. He too was an Assistant Superintendent Collector of Customs and Excise. He collected Bill of entries Nos. 00486 and 00487 These Bills were passed and duties paid on them. The Bill of Entry No. 00486 had 5 cases. Bill of Entry No. 00487 had 8 cases. All contained shot guns. These Bills were tendered as EXS. F to F7 and the witness was emphatic that EXS.F to F7 were “what I needed for customs duty.” Exhibits F to F7 are copied on pages 169 to 182 of the record. Each showed inter alia Quantity Description of Goods: Rate of Duty: Duty. The P.W.7 concluded:”
…….There was no loss of revenue and I then endorsed on EXS.F to F7 “satisfied” as entered.”
The two important Customs witnesses were P.W.2 and P.W.7. Both were positive that EX.C had nothing to do with revenue. Both were agreed that Government of the Federation lost no revenue because of EX. C. In fact,”Counts 3 and 4 did not as much as allege that the Government of the Federation stood to lose or in fact lost any revenue by the Appellant’s use of EX.C. If there is any case at all against the Appellant (and I do not see any) it certainly was not a case “relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation.” That being so the Federal High Court had no business trying the Appellant on this criminal charge. The decision of this Court in Mandara’s case supra will apply.
For all the reasons given above it is my firm view that the Federal High Court had no jurisdiction to try the Appellant on Counts 3 and 4 and that the purported trial of the Appellant before that Court was a nullity. For the above reasons and for the fuller reasons in the lead judgment of my learned brother Eso, J.S.C, with which I am in full agreement, and which I now adopt as mine, I, too, will allow this appeal. I will also abide by all the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.
Appeal Allowed.
Appearances
O. K. Ajayi, SAN (Ayo Ogunsola with him) For Appellant
AND
A. Oladapo DDPP (Federal) (E. O. Williams Dawodu SC with him For Respondent