JOHN CHUKWUKA & ORS. v. NDUBUEZE GREGORY EZULIKE
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 5th day of December, 1986
SC.173/1986
JUSTICES
ANTHONY NNAEMEZIE ANIAGOLU Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
MUHAMMADU LAWAL UWAIS Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
BOONYAMIN OLADIRAN KAZEEM Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
SAIDU KAWU Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
CHUKWUDIFU AKUNNE OPUTA Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
JOHN CHUKWUKA & ORS.
(For Themselves and on Behalf of The People of AMAKA-EZEAHA FAMILY
NDIAKWU – OTOLO, NNEWI Appellant(s)
AND
NDUBUEZE GREGORY EZULIKE
(for Himself and on Behalf of EZULIKE FAMILY OF NDIAKWU-OTOLO, NNEWI) Respondent(s)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROVISION OF ORDER 7 RULE 30 DEPRIVES THE SUPREME COURT OF ANY JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION
Even if it were not drawn up, signed and sealed, the provision of Order 7 rule 30 deprives this Court of any jurisdiction to review the judgment of dismissal for want of prosecution. The inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 6(6)(a) of the Constitution cannot be invoked to save the situation. This Court is therefore unable and incompetent to entertain this application to direct that the appeal be re-entered. Sympathy cannot override the clear provisions of our Rules and it would be in the interest of all if parties and their counsel endeavour to keep to the times set out in the Rules for the doing of any act or taking of any step.IRO OGBU (supra) was approved and followed in SODEINDE BROTHERS (NIG.) LTD v. A. C. B. LTD (1982) 6 S. C. 137. But IRO OGBU (supra) was still being pursued angrily by some Counsel with the drawn dagger of an assassin. The Court, in a final bid to settle the issue, in T. A. YONWUREN v. MODERN SIGNS (NIG.) LTD; JOHN ENEMOH & OPA v. NWANNOLI NWAKONOBI (1985) 2 S.C. 86 (Consolidated) empanelled a full Court which returned the same verdict that this court has no jurisdiction. inherent or pursuant to the 1977 Supreme Court Rules, to reenter an appeal dismissed under Order 9 Rule 7 of the 1977 Rules – a fortiori to re-enter an appeal dismissed under Orders Rule 16 of the 1985 Rules. PER ANIAGOLU, J.S.C.
WHETHER OR NOT AN APPEAL MAY BE DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION IF THE APPELLANT FAILS TO FILE HIS BRIEF WITHIN TIME OR WITHIN TIME ENLARGED BY THE COURT
By Order 6 rule 9 subrule (1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1985, if an appellant fails to file his brief within time or within time enlarged by the Court, the appeal may be dismissed for want of prosecution. Such a dismissal, where the appeal lacks merit is final. The exact provisions are as follows:
(1) If an appellant fails to file his Brief within the time provided for in Rule 5 above, or within the time as extended by the Court the respondent may apply to the Court for the appeal to be dismissed for want of prosecution.
If the respondent fails to file his Brief, he will not be heard in oral argument except by leave of the Court. A dismissal of an appeal under this Rule whether on the application of the respondent or not, where the appellant fails to file his brief shall amount to a dismissal on the merit.
Provided that such dismissal on the merit shall be only where the Court is satisfied, prima facie, on the papers before it that the appeal has no merit (emphasis mine). PER UWAIS, J.S.C.
WHETHER OR NOT A DISMISSAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF THE APPELLANT TO FILE A BRIEF IS FINAL OR CAN BE REVIVED
It has since been decided by this Court (even under the provisions of Order 9 rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1977, which were less stringent than the present Order 6 rule 9 (1)) that a dismissal for want of prosecution following the failure of the appellant to file a brief is final and the appeal so dismissed cannot be revived – Chief Iro Ogbu Ogbu & Ors. v. Chief Ogburu Urum & Anor (1981) 4 S.C. 1; Sodeinde Brothers (Nig.) Limited v. African Continental Bank (1982) 6 SC 137 and T. A. Yonwuren v. Modern Signs (Nig.) Limited (1985) 1 NWLR 245. PER UWAIS, J.S.C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPREME CORT CAN SIT ON APPEAL OVER ITS OWN JUDGEMENT
Furthermore this Court cannot sit on appeal over its own judgment. Its appellate jurisdiction is limited, as per Section 213 subsection (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, to hearing appeal from the Court of Appeal only and no more, No matter how defective ex facie the reasons for judgment are. PER UWAIS, J.S.C.
ANIAGOLU, J.S.C. (Presiding and Delivering the Leading Ruling): A PRELIMINARY OBJECTION has been taken to the motion on notice of the Defendants who, in their application dated 25th August 1986, are seeking for an order of court granting them the following reliefs:
(i) pursuant to Section 31(4) of the Supreme Court Act for an order for extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal to this court from the judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered herein on the 26th day of March, 1984;
(ii) pursuant to Section 213(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, for an order for leave to appeal from the judgment aforementioned on questions other than questions of law alone;
(iii) pursuant to Order 31 rule (1) directing a departure from the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Order 2 rule 31(2) and of Order 6 rule 2(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1985;
(iv) directing the Registrar of the Court of Appeal to correct the defective sentence on p.114 lines 30-31 of the Record of Appeal and
(v) for such further or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make:
The reasons given in the supporting affidavit, sworn to by one Rafiu Azeez-
litigation Clerk in the Chambers of Chief F. R. A. Williams for the Applicants failure to act within time are mainly, contained in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the said affidavit, sworn to by the said Rafiu Azeez, which read as follows:
I am informed by Chief Rotimi Williams and I verily believe that he intended to process the appeal for hearing personally and to prepare the brief or any other relevant papers. I am further informed by Chief Williams and I verily believe that through oversight he did not take necessary steps. It was whilst checking through outstanding appeals before this Court shortly after returning from vacation this year that Chief Williams discovered that nothing has been done about this appeal.
7. I am also informed by Chief Rotimi Williams and I verily believe that upon perusing the Record of Appeal he discovered that although the grounds of appeal raised questions other than questions of law alone no leave to appeal had been sought for or obtained when the Notice of Appeal was filed.
8. To the best of my knowledge information and belief, the Appellants have at all times been anxious to prosecute their appeal and were not aware that there has been anything to be done by them which has been left undone.
The motion was first fixed to be heard in Chambers but it was later ordered to be heard in open Court in order that the Court might have the benefit of oral arguments of Counsel in deciding the legal issues raised in the papers filed.
The preliminary objection was to the effect that the Supreme Court having dismissed the appeal of the Appellants on 12th November. 1985, the Supreme Court was not competent to hear the Appeal a second time and therefore lacked the powers to hear the Appeal again. Therefore, argued Mr. Ezekwe for the Plaintiff, the application of the defendants/applicants asking for extension within which to apply for leave to appeal was an abuse of the process of the Court. The Court, he argued, was functus officio.
The argument of Chief Williams in answer to this preliminary objection ran thus:
The grounds of appeal in support of the Notice of Appeal dated 30th May 1984 filed by the defendants together with the Notice of Appeal were filed without leave of the Court of Appeal or of this Court as required by section 213(3) of the 1979 Constitution. They were invalid. He cited in support of that proposition the decisions of this Court in S. U. OJEME & Ors. v. MOMODU II & Ors. (1981) 3 S.C. 173 at 211 and HARRISON WELLI & Anor. v. CHARLES OKECHUKWU (1985) 2 NWLR 63 at 67. In dismissing Appellants appeal on 12th November 1985 the Supreme Court, he argued, lacked jurisdiction since there was no valid appeal before it. Where a determination is made by a Court without jurisdiction, he continued, it is not necessary to have to do anything about it since it was an act done without jurisdiction. He cited KOFI FORFIE v. SEIFAH (1958) A.C. 59; MACFOY v. U.A.C. LTD. (1962) A. C. 152 at 160. He therefore argued that he was entitled to bring the motion for extension of time as he did and to ignore the determination by the Supreme Court of 12th November 1985 given without jurisdiction.
MR. EZEKWE in reply, drew the Court’s attention to Order 2 Rule 30 and Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985.
In resolving this matter it is necessary to ascertain:
(a) Why this Court dismissed the appeal on 12th November 1985, and
(b) What was the order of the Court
As was pointed out in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Applicants’ affidavit of 25th August 1986, Applicants Counsel
(i) Through oversight….did not take necessary steps and
(ii) no leave to appeal had been sought for or obtained.
The Court was therefore faced with not only a failure of the Applicants to take necessary steps to perfect their appeal, but also, a failure to seek leave of the Court. In the first one, the appeal was incompetent: in the second one, the grounds of appeal were also incompetent and an appeal based on them was not a valid appeal and the Court would not have jurisdiction having regard to several decisions of this Court, to entertain such an appeal. In respect of the first one the Court could dismiss the Appeal; in respect of the second, the appeal could be struck out. There was, therefore, a mixture of reasons, one for which the appeal could be dismissed and the other for which the purported appeal could be struck out. It therefore depended on which reason the Court based its ruling. As it turned out after hearing Counsel for the parties, the Court dismissed the appeal implying that that Order was based upon the failure of the Applicants to take necessary steps in the appeal.
The signed drawn up Order of the Court reads:
UPON READING the Record of Appeal herein and there being no briefs filed and parties absent and unrepresented:
IT IS ORDERED that this appeal be dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to Order 6 Rule 9(1) of the Supreme Court Rules 1985 with no order as to costs.
In the above:
(a) briefs were not filed;
(b) parties and Counsel were absent; and. therefore.
(c) there was a want of prosecution of the appeal.
Under the Rules the appeal could be dismissed for failure to file brief; or for non-compliance with the conditions of appeal; or for want of prosecution.
(See: Order 6 Rule 9(1), Order 8 Rule 8(1) and Order 8 Rules 8(3) respectively).
BIRKETT v. JAMES (1978) A.C. 297 has given detailed analysis of principles for a dismissal of an action for want of prosecution. It is clear from the rightly entitled to dismiss the appeal.
There is one other point. Obviously mindful of the old doctrine: interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium’, the Supreme Court Rules have provided, in Order 8 Rule 16, that: The Court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning or intention. A judgment or order shall not be varied when it correctly represents what the Court decided nor shall the operative and substantive part of it be varied and a different form substituted.
The above Order 8 Rule 16 has identical wordings with Order 7 Rule of the 1977 Rules of the Supreme Court under which CHIEF IRO OGBU and Ors. v. CHIFF OGBURU URUM And Anor. (198l) 4 S.C. 1 was decided. In IRO OGBU (supra) this Court (per Obaseki. J.S.C.) at p.9 stated as follows:
I am aware that since the order of dismissal was delivered by the court, the judgment has been drawn up, signed and sealed.
Even if it were not drawn up, signed and sealed, the provision of Order 7 rule 30 deprives this Court of any jurisdiction to review the judgment of dismissal for want of prosecution. The inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 6(6)(a) of the Constitution cannot be invoked to save the situation. This Court is therefore unable and incompetent to entertain this application to direct that the appeal be re-entered. Sympathy cannot override the clear provisions of our Rules and it would be in the interest of all if parties and their counsel endeavour to keep to the times set out in the Rules for the doing of any act or taking of any step.IRO OGBU (supra) was approved and followed in SODEINDE BROTHERS (NIG.) LTD v. A. C. B. LTD (1982) 6 S. C. 137. But IRO OGBU (supra) was still being pursued angrily by some Counsel with the drawn dagger of an assassin. The Court, in a final bid to settle the issue, in T. A. YONWUREN v. MODERN SIGNS (NIG.) LTD; JOHN ENEMOH & OPA v. NWANNOLI NWAKONOBI (1985) 2 S.C. 86 (Consolidated) empanelled a full Court which returned the same verdict that this court has no jurisdiction. inherent or pursuant to the 1977 Supreme Court Rules, to reenter an appeal dismissed under Order 9 Rule 7 of the 1977 Rules – a fortiori to re-enter an appeal dismissed under Orders Rule 16 of the 1985 Rules.
Chief Williams ingenious argument in the present matter was another way subtle and penetrating of resurrecting the old tirade against IRO OGBU (supra) and YONWUREN (supra). But I should think that the time has come when the tired bones of IRO OGBU (supra) which underwent ceremonial interment on 3rd April 1981, should be allowed to rest in perfect peace, within their congenial surroundings.
I would therefore hold, and hereby hold, that this Court was functus officio after its order of 11th November 1985 dismissing the appeal. The preliminary objection raised by Mr. Ezekwe, of Counsel, was well founded, and consequently the motion of the Applicants dated 25th August 1986 is hereby dismissed with N25.00 costs to the Respondent.
UWAIS, J.S.C.: I have read in draft the ruling read by my learned brother Aniagolu, J.S.C. and I entirely agree that the preliminary objection raised, by Chief Ezekwe, learned Counsel for the respondent is well founded and that the applicants motion is nil abuse of the process of the Court and that it should be dismissed.
By Order 6 rule 9 subrule (1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1985, if an appellant fails to file his brief within time or within time enlarged by the Court, the appeal may be dismissed for want of prosecution. Such a dismissal, where the appeal lacks merit is final. The exact provisions are as follows:
(1) If an appellant fails to file his Brief within the time provided for in Rule 5 above, or within the time as extended by the Court the respondent may apply to the Court for the appeal to be dismissed for want of prosecution.
If the respondent fails to file his Brief, he will not be heard in oral argument except by leave of the Court. A dismissal of an appeal under this Rule whether on the application of the respondent or not, where the appellant fails to file his brief shall amount to a dismissal on the merit.
Provided that such dismissal on the merit shall be only where the Court is satisfied, prima facie, on the papers before it that the appeal has no merit (emphasis mine)
Now the applicants had earlier brought an appeal before this Court. They failed to file brief within the prescribed period and the appeal was dismissed on the 12th November, 1985, pursuant to Order 6 rule 9 Sub-rule (1) quoted above. It has since been decided by this Court (even under the provisions of Order 9 rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1977, which were less stringent than the present Order 6 rule 9 (1)) that a dismissal for want of prosecution following the failure of the appellant to file a brief is final and the appeal so dismissed cannot be revived – Chief Iro Ogbu Ogbu & Ors. v. Chief Ogburu Urum & Anor (1981) 4 S.C. 1; Sodeinde Brothers (Nig.) Limited v. African Continental Bank (1982) 6 SC 137 and T. A. Yonwuren v. Modern Signs (Nig.) Limited (1985) 1 NWLR 245.
In his reply, Chief Williams, learned Senior Advocate for the applicants, has not directly answered the objection raised. Instead he argued that the dismissal of the appeal on the 12th November, 1985 was wrong and that the appropriate order that should have been made by this Court is an order striking out the appeal. His reason for so arguing being that looking at the grounds of the appeal filed, the appeal was incompetent since the grounds involved questions of fact or mixed law and fact and that no leave was obtained in accordance with the provisions of section 213 subsection (3) of the 1979 Constitution. He argued further that where no such leave was obtained, the Court lacked jurisdiction and appeal should have been struck out but not dismissed. He relied in support of the submission of the following decisions of this Court Ojemen v. Chief Momodu II & Ors. (1983) 1 S.C.N.L.R. 188 at pp.203-205 and Welli & Anor v. Charles Okechukwu (1985) 2 NWLR 63 at p 67 and the Privy Council decisions in Kofi Fortie v. Seifah. (1958) A.C. 59 at p. 67 and McFoy v. U. A. C Limited. (1962) A.C. l52 at p.100.
In effect Chief Williams, is asking us to review the decision of 12th November, 1985 which dismissed the appeal; and if we agree to do so we should take the appeal; as struck-out, in which case we should be able to grant his application for, inter alia, leave to appeal out of time, This, if accepted, is indeed a circuitous way to go about dealing with the application. There is no appeal in this Court against the decision of 12th November, 1985, and it is obvious that there cannot be such an appeal since no jurisdiction has been conferred upon this Court to sit on appeal over its own decision, no matter how manifestly wrong that decision may be see Paul Cardoso v. John Bankole Daniel and 11 Ors. (1986) 2 NWLR 1 at p.28 where I observed as follows:
Furthermore this Court cannot sit on appeal over its own judgment. Its appellate jurisdiction is limited, as per Section 213 subsection (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, to hearing appeal from the Court of Appeal only and no more, No matter how defective ex facie the reasons for judgment are. I do not see how a different panel from the original can hold the reasons given on 12th December, 1975, void and of no effect
In addition, by Order 8 rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules. 1985 –
The Court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission, or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning or intention. A judgment or order shall not be varied when it correctly represents what the Court decided nor shall the operative and substantial part of it be varied and a different form substituted.
Consequently, it is clear that we cannot, by the submissions made by Chief Williams, hold that the decision of this Court of 12th November, 1985 is a nullity by virtue of the appeal itself being incompetent and this Court lacking in jurisdiction. However, this is not to say that the Court cannot in a subsequent and different case depart from its decision in a previous case, if the principle laid down for such departure apply Akinsanya v. U.B.A. Limited (1986) 4 NWLR 273 at p. 323. But that is not the same as setting-aside or declaring a nullity the decision in the previous case.
For the foregoing reasons and those contained in the ruling read by my learned brother, Aniagolu, JSC. I too will hold that we are functus officio grant the application. Accordingly, it is dismissed with N25.00 costs to the respondent.
KAZEEM, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft, the ruling just read by my learned brother Aniagolu, J.S.C., and I entirely agree with his reasons and conclusions. However, these are my own views on the matter. This is an application by the Appellants seeking the following prayers namely:
(i) an order for extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal to this Court from the judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 26th March, 1984;
(ii) an order for leave to appeal from the judgment aforementioned on questions other than questions of law alone;
(iii) directing a departure from the requirements of certain rules of this Court; and
(iv) directing the Registrar of the Court of Appeal to correct the defective sentence on page 116 lines 30 to 31 of the Record of Appeal.
The application was made ostensibly to regularize the original Notice of Appeal filed in the matter on 30th May, 1984 which was said to contain grounds of appeal on questions other than question of law for which leave of this Court or the Court below was not previously obtained. In that case the appeal was said to be invalid. But as a matter of fact, the appeal had previously come before this court as Appeal No. SC.18/1985 on 12th November, 1985 when no brief was filed by the Appellants and the time within which to do so had already expired. As a result of that lapse, the appeal was dismissed on that day for want to prosecution pursuant to Order 6 rule 9(1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1977.
Precisely for the above reason, the Respondent filed a Notice of preliminary objection to the hearing of this new application by the Appellants. In support of that application, Mr. Ezekwe learned Counsel for the Respondents cited two previous decisions of this Court namely; Chief Iro Ogbu & Ors. v. Chief Ogburu Urum (1981) 4 S.C. 1 and Yonwuren v. Modern Signs Ors. (1985) 2 S.C. 86; and submitted that once the appeal had previously been dismissed for want of prosecution under Order 9 rule 7 of the 1977 Supreme Court Rules, it cannot be revived again; and there was nothing before the court to which the application for extension of time within which to seek leave can be attached. Learned Counsel also referred us to the provisions of Order 8 rule 16 of the 1985 Rules which forbid the review of any judgment of this Court unless to correct clerical mistakes or slips.
In reply, Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N. learned Counsel for the Appellants referred to the original Notice of Appeal filed on 30th May, 1984 and said that it contained grounds of mixed law and facts and fact simpliciter. He then submitted that in so far as leave of this court or the court below was not obtained before filing it, the appeal was therefore a nullity. He submitted further that in such cases, this court always held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Hence he urged the court to pronounce that appeal a nullity. The decisions in Ojeme v. Momodu (1983) 1 SCNLR 192 at page 203 – 205: and Welli v. Okechukwu (1985) 2 NWLR 63 at p.67 were cited in support of those submissions. It was further argued that although the appeal was dismissed for failure to file a brief, none could have been filed because there was no appeal before the court: and the Court could not have dismissed an appeal which it had no jurisdiction to entertain. Relying on the decisions of the Privy Council in Forfie v. Seifar (1958) A.C. 59 at p.62, and McFoy v. U.A.C. (1962) A. C. at 152 p.160, learned counsel submitted that a Court has an inherent jurisdiction to set aside its judgment which it gave without jurisdiction; and he urged us to set aside the order made on 12th November, 1985, dismissing the appeal.
I think that it is relevant at this stage to note that there is no substantive application before this court to set aside the order of dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution made on 12th November, 1985. The submission now made urging us to do so only emanates from a reply to the preliminary objection taken by the Respondents to the hearing of the application for extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal. Howbeit, it is not disputed that in an appropriate case based on an application before this court, it has an inherent jurisdiction to set aside a judgment which is a nullity: See Obimanure v. Erinosho (1966) 1 All NI.R 250: and Skenconsult (Nig.) Ltd. & Anor. v. Godwin S. Ukey (1981) 1 S.C. 6 at pages 25 – 27. But it is a different matter whether the judgment of dismissal of 12th November, 1985 or the appeal purportedly filed on 10th May, 1984 was a nullity or whether a judgment dismissing an appeal for want of prosecution which was given on 12th November, 1985, can now be set aside.
Firstly in my view, the judgment of 12th November, 1985 cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as a nullity in that it was given in pursuance of the power conferred on this court under Order 6 rule 9 (1) of the 1985 Supreme Court Rules. Moreover, ground 3 in the Original Notice of Appeal filed by the Appellants on 30th May, 1984 was couched as a ground of error of law with the particulars of the error given therein. The question as to whether or not that ground was in fact a proper ground of law could not have been determined until the matter was brought before the court attention for consideration. That of course was never done on 12th November, 1985 when the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution for failure to file a brief by the Appellants. In so far as that was not done at that time, the appeal in my view was prima facie competent, and the contention of learned Counsel for the Appellants that it was a nullity seems to me untenable.
Secondly the issue as to whether a judgment of dismissal of appeal under Order 6 rule 9(1) of the 1985 Rules for want of prosecution for failure to file a brief can be set aside, and the appeal relisted for hearing, has been fully considered and decided in the cases of Iro Ogbu & Ors. v. Chief Ogburu Urum (1981) 4S.C. 1 and the Consolidated Cases of Yonwuren v. Modern Signs & Ors. (1985) 2 S.C. 86. In those cases, this Court had firmly held that a judgment of dismissal for want of prosecution cannot later be set aside; nor can the appeal be relisted for hearing.
In 1981, the matter was first considered and determined by a full Court in Iro Ogbu Case; but it was again raised in 1985 in Yonwuren Case when this Court was urged to depart from its decision in Iro Ogbu’s Case. And after considering all the submissions made by learned Counsel in the three applications (one of which was brought by Chief Williams) I came to the conclusion in the lead Ruling that no inherent jurisdiction could be exercised to revive the appeals that were dismissed for want of prosecution: and that no new facts had emerged from the submissions of learned Counsel for the applicants in the consolidated applications to show that the decision in Iro Ogbu’s Case was either wrongly decided, or that it was rendered per incuriam.
It is however relevant to note that although the decision in Yonwuren’s Case was made under Order 9 rule 7 of the 1977 Rules, the provisions of that Rule are in pari materia with those Of Order 6 rule 9(1) of the 1985 Rules under which the appeal in this matter was dismissed for want of prosecution.
The present submissions by Chief Williams seems to me to be a subtle attempt to re open the matter and in effect to urge this Court to depart from the decision in Yonwuren’s Case which received the concurrence of a full court. In the circumstances, I cannot find anything in the submissions to make this Court depart from its decision in Yonwuren’s Case.
Hence for the above reasons and for the further reasons contained in the lead Ruling of my learned brother Aniagolu, J.S.C. with which I entirely agree, the preliminary objection is hereby upheld and the substantive application for extension of time within which to seek leave is mis-conceived. Accordingly, I will also dismiss the application with N25.00 costs to the Respondents.
KAWU, J.S.C.: I had read in draft the lead Ruling of my learned brother Aniagolu, JSC which has just been delivered. I entirely agree with the Ruling and will respectfully adopt it as mine. The provisions of Order 8 Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985 make it absolutely clear that this Court became functus officio after its order of 12th November, 1985 dismissing the appeal. In my view there is merit in the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Ezekwe and it is hereby upheld. The applicant’s motion dated 25th August, 1986 is hereby dismissed with N25.00 costs to the Respondent.
OPUTA, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of a preview in draft of the lead Ruling just delivered by my learned brother Aniagolu, J.S.C. I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and conclusions. My further comments are merely designed to emphasize the points so ably made in the lead Ruling.
The Applicants who were Defendants in the Court of first instance lost to the Plaintiff in an action for Declaration of title to the Customary Right of Occupancy. Damages for Trespass and Injunction. The Defendants appeal to the Court of Appeal, Enugu Division, was also dismissed. Not satisfied with these two concurrent judgments of the two Courts below against them, the Defendants have now appealed to the Supreme Court of Nigeria. That appeal was also dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to Order 6 Rule 9(1) of the Supreme Court Rules of 1985. This was on the 12th day of November, 1985. In a motion dated 25th day of August 1986 (nine months and thirteen days after the dismissal of their appeal by this Court) the Defendants then applied again to the Supreme Court inter alia for:
(i) Extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal.
(ii) An Order for leave to appeal on questions other than questions of law alone.
(iii) A departure from the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (h) of Order 2 Rule 31(2) and of Order 6 Rule 2(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1985.
When this motion came up for hearing on the 3rd of November, 1986, Chief G. C. Ezekwe, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff/Respondents, raised a preliminary objection in the terms of the Notice of Preliminary Objection he earlier filed pursuant to Order 2 Rule 9(1) of the Supreme Court Rules of 1985 namely that it is abuse of Court process after dismissal of the said appeal to ask for leave to appeal a second time. Chief Ezekwe relied on two decisions of this Court dealing with the jurisdiction, or lack of it, of this Court to entertain this type of motion. Those two cases were:
1. Chief Iro Ogbu and a/hers v. Chief Ogburu Urum and anor. (1981) 4 S.C. 1
2. T. A. Yonwuren v. Modern Sigm (Nig.) Ltd. (1985) 1 NWLR (Part 2) p 245.
In Chief Iro Ogbu’s case (supra) this Court considered in some detail the provisions and subsequent impact of Order 9 Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules 1977 on an application to re enter an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution, and came to a unanimous conclusion that this Court has no jurisdiction inherent or otherwise…. to set aside its judgment and to re’97enter for hearing an appeal that has been dismissed for want of prosecution under Order 9 Rule . Now Order 9 Rule 7 of the 1977 Rules has been essentially and substantially preserved by Order 6 Rule 9 of the Supreme Court Rules of 1985. The 1985 Rules in addition made certain necessary clarifications to any doubts that might have existed under the 1977 Rules as to the cconsequences of failure to file briefs. In the 1985 Rules, under Order 6 Rule 9(1):
dismissal of an appeal under this Rule…. shall amount to a dismissal on the merit.
Put in this forthright and straightforward manner, it is then very much easier to appreciate the impact of the objection of Chief Ezekwe. To ask this Court for an extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal against an appeal which this self’ same Court dismissed on the merit is surely an abuse of the process of the Court. It would have been otherwise if the dismissal was not on the merit.
It is here that the proviso to Order 6 Rule 9(1) of the Supreme Court Rules 1985 will require closer scrutiny. The proviso stipulates:-
Provided that such dismissal on the merit shall be only where the Court is satisfied, prima facie, on the papers before it, that the appeal has no merit.
This presupposes that before dismissing an appeal under Order 6 Rule 9(1) above for want of prosecution, the Court should glance through the Record of Appeal before it and satisfy itself that prima facie the appeal is unmeritorious. The Order of Court dismissing this appeal on the 12th November, 1985 was exhibited as Ex D. Exhibit D started off as follows:-
‘Upon Reading the Record of Appeal herein…It then follows that the Court complied with the proviso to Order 6 Rule 9(1) of the Supreme Court Rules 1985. In any event Chief Williams, S.A.N. did not raise any issue relating to non-compliance with this proviso. One would then safely assume that he conceded that in Ex. D the Court acted, as it was legally expected to act, properly and rightly under Order 6 Rule 9(1) above. Chief Williams batted on an entirely different wicket. His submission was that the appeal before the Supreme Court was a nullity, as no leave was obtained pursuant to S. 213(3) of the 1979 Constitution. I will consider later on whether it was open to him to make such submission.
The next case relied upon by Chief Ezekwe was T. A. Yonwuren Modern Signs (Nig) Ltd supra. That case approved and applied the Court’s earlier decision in Chief Iro Ogbu’s case supra and held that:
(i) The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction under the 1979 Constitution, the Supreme Court Act 1960, and the Rules of the Supreme Court 1977 and under its inherent jurisdiction or powers to entertain an application for re entering an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution.
(ii) The Court has no inherent jurisdiction to set aside an Order of dismissal, it had properly made in exercise of its power, and jurisdiction and re enter the appeal.
As if to further strengthen, fortify and re-emphasise the rationes decidendi of Chief Iro Ogbu’s case and T. A. Yonwuren’s case supra both the Supreme Court Rules 1977 (Order 7 Rule 30) and the Supreme Court Rules 1985 (Order 8 Rule 16) provide:
The Court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to it meaning or intention. A judgment or order shall not be varied when it correctly represents which the Court decided nor shall the operative and substantive part of it be varied and a different one substituted (the italics are mine)
The word ‘shall’ used in Order 8 Rule 16 above is mandatory. The Order of this Court made on the 12th day of November 1985 (dismissing this appeal for want of prosecution) is quite clear and unambiguous. No clerical mistake, or slip or accidental omission has been alleged by Chief Williams, S.A.N. learned Counsel for the Appellants/Applicants. Rather what his motion seeks to get from the back door is not even a variation of the Order of 12th November 1985 but a total nullification and dismissal of the said Order. This, the Court cannot do in all the surrounding circumstances of this case. So far so good for Chief Ezekwe’s preliminary objection which in my view was very well taken.
What was Chief Williams answer He did not as much as quarrel with Ex, D, the Court’s Order of 12th day of November, 1985 dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution, He did not or perhaps could not quarrel with the decisions in Iro Ogbu’s case supra or T. A. Yonwuren’s case supra. He did not ask that these cases should be overruled. If they are not overruled then applying to re enter an appeal dismissed on the merit will be like hitting one’s head against a brick wall. The wall will certainly not give way.
Chief Williams main argument was that the Grounds of Appeal from the Court below, to this Court (Ex. C) being grounds of fact or mixed law and fact, an appeal will constitutionally lie only with the leave of the Court of Appeal or of this Court under Section 213(3) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This leave was neither sought nor obtained. It was then contended that there was no appeal before this Court as the purported appeal was plainly incompetent and should therefore have been struck out, not dismissed. Reliance for the above submission was placed on the following:-
1. Ojemen v. Momodu (1983) 1 SCNLR 188 at pp. 203-205
2. Welli v. Okechukwu (1985) 2 NWLR (Part 5) 63 at p. 67 para. G
3. Forfie v. Seifah (1958) A. C. 59 at p. 67
4. McFoy v. U.A.C. (1962) AC 152 at p. 160
Before considering the relevance or otherwise of the above mentioned authorities, one has to draw a clear line of demarcation between arguments that may be pressed on appeal and those that are permissible in applications for the sole purpose of entering or (as in this case) re-entering an appeal, which has been dismissed for want of prosecution, for hearing. At this stage, it may be necessary to refer to paragraph 12 of the Second Affidavit sworn to by Rufus Chukwuka one of the Defendants viz:-
” Our family and I have been informed by Chief Rotimi Williams and we verily believe that after he filed the Motion herein, he was informed by the officials in the Registry of this Honourable Court that pursuant to a hearing Notice served on Mr. P. O. Balonwu, the above mentioned was listed in this Honourable Court and called on the 12th of November 1985 and it was ordered that the appeal be dismissed for want of prosecution under Order 6 Rule 9(1) of 1985 Rules of the Supreme Court.
It is therefore common ground that this appeal was in fact dismissed for want of prosecution on the 12th day of November, 1985. We cannot close our eyes to this obvious and glaring fact. This fact puts a different complexion to the entire situation.
It is perfectly correct that in Welli v. Okechukwu (1985) 2 NWLR 63 at p.67, Uwais, J.S.C. delivering the lead judgment held:-
‘In my opinion each of the two grounds of appeal raises questions of mixed law and fact, and since no leave was obtained in accordance with the provisions of Section 213(3) of the Constitution the appeal becomes incompetent. In the circumstances, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal. It is for these reasons that I agree that the appeal be struck out (The italics are mine)
Bello J.S.C. and Karibi Whyte, J.S.C. both dissented. Their dissent had nothing to do with the principle of law that if all the grounds of appeal were of fact or mixed law and fact requiring leave under Section 213(3) of the 1979 Constitution and such leave was not obtained, the appeal is incompetent and the Supreme Court will under Section 213(3) have no jurisdiction to entertain it. The dissent in Welli’s case supra was that the first ground of appeal was a ground of law (so held Bello J.S.C. and Karibi Whyte, J.S.C) and hence their dissent.
The question now is How does this case help Chief Williams’ application to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal against an appeal that has in fact been dismissed by the self same Court If Chief Williams had appeared on the 12th of November 1985 and raised this same point, it would have then been. But raising it after the dismissal of this appeal does create its own problems. The jurisdiction of any appellate Court is statutory and this Court (the Supreme Court) has not been given any jurisdiction to re enter an appeal dismissed by it for want of prosecution. Even if the Order of dismissal made on the 12th November 1985 (Ex. D) were wrongly made, that Order definitely cannot be corrected or rescinded or set aside by a motion brought for an extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal under S. 31(4) of the Supreme Court Act; nor by a motion under S. 213(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 for an Order for leave to appeal on questions other than questions of law. Arguments that the Order of 12th November 1985 (Ex. D) was a nullity will be valid before a Court exercising appellate jurisdiction to review that Order. I wonder which Court in the Nigerian hierarchy of Court has appellate jurisdiction to review judgments of the Supreme Court The answer is none. We are then back to square one namely:
1. That this appeal had been dismissed on the 12th November 1985 for want of prosecution.
2. That the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction either under the 1979 Constitution or the Supreme Court Act 1960; or the Rules of the Supreme Court 1985; or under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to entertain an application for re-entering an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution (T. A. Yonwuren v. Modern Signs (Nig.) Ltd. supra refers.)
It is for all the reasons given above and for the fuller reasons given in the lead Ruling of my learned brother Aniagolu, JSC with which I am in entire agreement; and which I now adopt as mine, that I, too, will dismiss the Appellants/Applicants motion. I will abide by all the consequential orders made in the Lead Ruling.
Application Dismissed.
Appearances
Chief F.R.A. Williams, SAN (with him Mr. A. Williams) For Appellant
AND
Chief G. C. Ezekwe For Respondent



