JIMOH DINA v. THE STATE
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 20th day of September, 1984
SC.44/1984
JUSTICES
MOHAMMED BELLO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
AUGUSTINE NNAMANI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
BOONYAMIN OLADIRAN KAZEEM Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
DAHUNSI OLUGBEMI COKER Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ADOLPHUS GODWIN KARIBI-WHYTE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
JIMOH DINA Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE Respondent(s)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT MEDICAL EVIDENCE IS ESSENTIAL WHEN THE CAUSE OF DEATH CAN BE INFERRED FROM SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES
The contention that there was no medical evidence was also rightly rejected as medical evidence though desirable is not essential when the cause of death can be inferred from surrounding circumstances. The deceased was found dead in a pool of blood with matchet cuts and his matchet was lying beside his body. See Tonara Bakuri VS. The State (1965) N.M.L.R. 163. PER NNAMANI, J.S.C.
WHETHER OR NOT AN INVOLUNTARY STATEMENT RAISES THE QUESTION OF ADMISSIBILITY
It is clear on the evidence before the learned trial Judge that appellant was not saying that the statement was not voluntary – in which case the question of admissibility will arise – R v. Onabajo (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 43. He is saying that he did not make any statement at all. In this latter case it will be proper to receive the statement in evidence, and at the end of the case decide whether it was made by the appellant. R v. Igwe (1960) 5 F.S.C. 55. This was the position in this case, and the trial court was right in so doing. It was held the confession was voluntary. A confession is evidence against the person who made it – S.27 (1). It is sufficient if believed for the conviction of the maker. PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.
WHETHER OR NOT CORROBORTAION OF A CONFESSION IS NECESSARY
Corroboration of the confession is merely desirable and not necessary – R v. Omokaro 7 W.A.C.A. 146. PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.
BELLO, J.S.C. (Presiding): The appellant was convicted of the murder of the deceased who was the husband of the appellant’s sister-in-law. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal against that conviction. Both his counsel and the Principal State Counsel have nothing useful to urge in his favour at the hearing of the appeal in this Court.
The conviction was in the main based on the confessional statement of the appellant which he retracted at the trial. The evidence, other than his confession, shows that the appellant had visited the deceased’s house on the material day and there he informed his sister-in-law that he would kill the deceased’s brother whom he had suspected to have caused his wife to desert him. The deceased overheard the conversation and requested the appellant to leave his house. The appellant left the house with threat that the deceased “would see”. Thereafter the deceased went to his farm where he was found dead with matchet wounds on his neck and face.
In his confession, exhibit H, the appellant said:
“It was on Friday the 23/2/79 around 11 a.m. I went to Job’s house to report to his wife that my wife had deserted me and packed her belongings. Job’s wife said that God will provide another woman for me. While I was discussing with Job’s wife, Job was asleep. Job woke from his sleep and told me to get out of his house, and go to my father’s house. He abused me. After abusing me he went out to the farm, after a while I went to meet him in the farm. When I met him in the farm, I told him that it was wrong to abuse me, for I could as well abuse him too. But I did not abuse him in reply. Job pushed me against a motor-cycle and I fell down with the motor-cycle. Job took a stick to beat me then I took a cutlass and struck him thrice with the cutlass and Job fell down. After he fell down, I ran into the farm. On my return journey from the farm I met his senior brother by name, Isaac Adeyemi. He told me that Job had been killed on the farm after saying that, I became afraid. I started to shake. I did not confess to him that I killed him because I was afraid.”
The other confession, exhibit G is in similar terms. I think the trial Judge acted rightly in convicting the appellant of murder in the circumstances of the case. The confession was consistent with the evidence of the appellant’s sister-in-law, PW.1, as to the conduct of the appellant before the commission of the offence and the fatal injuries found on the body of the deceased. He, the trial Judge, also found the confession was freely and voluntarily made by the appellant.
I am satisfied the appeal has no merit. It is accordingly dismissed.
Conviction and sentence are affirmed.
NNAMANI, J.S.C.: The appellant was charged with murder contrary to section and punishable under section 257 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 28 Vol. 1, Laws of Western Nigeria, 1959, in that he murdered one Job Oga. He was convicted by the High Court of the Ilaro Judicial Division, Ogun State and sentenced to death.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, his appeal was dismissed as lacking in substance. The appellant has now appealed to this Court. Having read the records of proceedings carefully, I think that both learned counsel were right in their submissions that there is nothing that can be usefully urged in favour of the appellant. Although at the trial of the appellant in the High Court there was no eye witness of the killing, there were two confessional statements by the appellant to two different police officers which were confirmed before two different police officers and in which he admitted killing the deceased in deceased’s farm with deceased’s matchet. Although at his trial the appellant retracted these statements and denied making any statement to the police, the learned trial Judge found that he made them and that they were positive and direct and sufficient to support the conviction of the appellant. He also sought and found evidence tending to corroborate the confessional statements of the appellant. See R vs. Sykes 8 C.A.R. 232 and Philip Kano & 1 other vs. King (1952) 12 WACA 30 at Page 32. The learned trial Judge in my view properly reviewed the evidence before him and found the appellant guilty. The appellant obviously killed the deceased because he claimed that the deceased was always abusing him and saying that he had squints in his eyes. The learned trial Judge also considered the defence of the appellant which was total denial, as well as the defence of provocation which arose from his statement and rightly rejected them. The contention that there was no medical evidence was also rightly rejected as medical evidence though desirable is not essential when the cause of death can be inferred from surrounding circumstances. The deceased was found dead in a pool of blood with matchet cuts and his matchet was lying beside his body. See Tonara Bakuri VS. The State (1965) N.M.L.R. 163.
At the Court of Appeal, the argument of lack of medical evidence was again taken up but was rejected. Also rejected were contentions about contradictions in the testimonies of the two wives and the failure to call the Bale of Ibeku. I am satisfied that the appeal lacks substance and it is hereby dismissed. The conviction and sentence passed on the appellant are hereby further affirmed.
KAZEEM, J.S.C.: This is a case of murder in which the appellant matchetted the husband of his sister-in-law to death. He had gone to the deceased’s house at about 11a.m. on the day of the incident to report to the deceased’s wife that his own wife (her sister) had packed out of the appellant’s house and left. The deceased’s wife (P.w.1) sympathised with the appellant and prayed that God would give him another wife. It was said that the appellant then threatened to deal with his own senior brother one Abraham Dina whom he thought was responsible for his wife’s desertion. At that stage, the deceased who was inside the room, and apparently heard the threat, emerged from the room, angrily warned the appellant for threatening to kill his senior brother, and having abused him, asked him to leave the deceased’s house. The appellant was very angry at the remarks of the deceased and having threatened to deal with him too left the deceased’s house. The deceased later left for his farm alone, while expecting his two wives (P.w.1 and P.W.3) to join him there later. The appellant realising that the deceased would have gone to his farm went there to meet him and challenged him as to the remarks he had earlier made at his house. It was said by the appellant that the deceased thereupon pushed him against the deceased’s motor bike which fell down. The appellant then became very annoyed, picked up the deceased’s cutlass lying near by, and gave the deceased three matchet cuts which resulted in the deceased’s death. Being afraid of his act, the appellant ran away from the scene.
There was no eye-witness of the actual killing. But the appellant in two different statements to the police confessed to the killing of the deceased; and the two statements were later confirmed before two senior police officers. At the trial, the admissibility of those statements was not challenged. However, in his evidence at the trial, the appellant tried to retract the confession, and he denied either visiting the deceased’s house to report about his wife’s desertion or to visit the deceased’s farm later, let alone to kill him with a matchet.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted at the trial that there was no medical evidence as to the cause of death; but it is already settled law that medical evidence, though desirable, is not essential and where there is no medical evidence as to the cause of death, it is proper for the court to infer the cause of death from the surrounding circumstances: See Kato Dan Adamu v The Kana N.A. (1955) 1 F.S.C. 25 and J. Oamhen v The State (1984) 4 S.C. 1. In this case, the trial Judge found that the appellant’s confession adequately supplied the circumstance from which the cause of death could be inferred. Consequently, the trial Judge accepted the confessions as voluntary and true and found that the appellant could be convicted on the confession alone: See Jimoh Yesufu v The State (1976) 6 S.C. Having also considered the defence of provocation and dismissed it as untenable, the trial Judge found the appellant guilty of the offence of murdering the deceased and he sentenced him to death. The appellant’s appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal in Ibadan was also dismissed. In a further appeal to this court the appellant’s counsel (Chief Debo Akande) and Mr. Bello P.S.C. Ogun State for the State, have nothing to urge in favour of the appellant. Having also read the record as well as the appellant’s confession, I entirely agree that he was rightly convicted. I will accordingly dismiss the appeal, affirm the conviction for murder and sentence of death passed on the appellant.
COKER, J.S.C.: I, too, agree that the appeal should be dismissed as I can see no merit in it. The Appellant in his two statements to the police before the trial confessed, but which in his testimony he retracted, killing the deceased.
The trial Judge carefully considered the evidence of both the prosecution and of the defence and at the conclusion, found him guilty of the murder of the deceased. He came to his decision after considering all possible defences open to him. His appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. Both Messrs Akande and Bello, Counsel for the Appellant and Respondent respectively, are unable to find anything in his favour. I have read the record of appeal and I am unable to find anything which could be usefully said in his favour. The defence was that he retaliated by cutting the deceased on the back and neck because the deceased abused him, calling him one eyed man, and further, that deceased pushed him against his motor-cycle. That cannot in law amount to provocation sufficient to justify dealing the deceased with matchet cuts which resulted in his death. He said he was annoyed because the deceased insulted him and therefore proceeded to the deceased’s farm to meet him with a matchet. Though he said he inflicted the injuries with the matchet belonging to the deceased, his action in proceeding to the farm showed a clear preconceived intention on his part to grievously harm the deceased and that was what he eventually did. He did not say the deceased even attempted to use the matchet on him or that he feared he might assault him with it. In fact, he picked it from the ground. I can find no merit in the appeal which is hereby dismissed. The conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant, and the dismissal of his appeal by the Court of Appeal, are hereby affirmed.
KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.: This is an appeal by the appellant against his conviction for murder in the High Court, which conviction was on appeal to the Court of Appeal affirmed. Appellant has further appealed to this Court. Counsel for the appellant has stated that he has nothing to urge in favour. Similarly counsel for the respondent. It is common ground that appellant’s conviction was based on his confession of the commission of the offence. This is the only point of law of substance worthy of consideration.
The facts of this case are quite simple and short. Appellant on the 23/2/79 called at the house of deceased to complain to the wife of the deceased that appellant’s wife had deserted him. The wife of the deceased is a full blood sister of appellant’s wife. The wife of the deceased, P.w.1 in the trial prayed that appellant would be given another wife by God. Appellant was not satisfied; He alleged that his wife was induced to leave him by his brother and was (sic) threatening that he would do something. On being asked what he would do, he threatened that Ogun would take care of that brother. It was at this point that deceased who was inside the house came out to ask the appellant to leave his house if he was there to threaten to kill his own (appellant’s) brother. The appellant left for his house. This was at about 11 a.m. At about 2 p.m. the deceased left for his farm, and asked his two wives, P.W.1 and another to follow later to take home some maize he had collected. The deceased went on his motorcycle. P.W.1 and her mate arrived at the farm to find the deceased in a pool of his own blood, having been at that time, attacked and matchetted to death by unknown persons. They raised alarm, and the villagers gathered, and efforts were made to trace the perpetrator of this crime. The Bale of the village was informed. The only person known to have any quarrel with the deceased was appellant, who at that time was among the crowd commiserating the deceased’s family. Subsequently, the appellant was suspected of the commission of the offence by P.w.1 and told the Bale of the village. Appellant was handed over to the police. During the investigation of the offence, appellant made two statements to two different police officers, G1 and M, substantially the same and confessing that he killed the deceased. The reasons he gave in each case was that the deceased had always abused him of his defective eye. He had done so on the fateful day and that when he went to ask him in the farm why he behaved in that manner the deceased pushed him down and he fell on the deceased’s motor cycle. Appellant thereupon matchetted the deceased with the knife he found in the hut. At his trial, appellant denied that he made any statement to the police. He also denied that he saw deceased in his farm and that he killed the deceased. The learned trial Judge admitted the confession statements, and disbelieved the evidence of the appellant. The Court of Appeal agreed with the findings of the trial Judge and dismissed the appeal.
It is clear on the evidence before the learned trial Judge that appellant was not saying that the statement was not voluntary – in which case the question of admissibility will arise – R v. Onabajo (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 43. He is saying that he did not make any statement at all. In this latter case it will be proper to receive the statement in evidence, and at the end of the case decide whether it was made by the appellant. R v. Igwe (1960) 5 F.S.C. 55. This was the position in this case, and the trial court was right in so doing. It was held the confession was voluntary. A confession is evidence against the person who made it – S.27 (1). It is sufficient if believed for the conviction of the maker.
Corroboration of the confession is merely desirable and not necessary – R v. Omokaro 7 W.A.C.A. 146. The trial Judge however found corroboration of the confession. The confession of the appellant is conclusive that he killed the deceased. The trial court was right to so hold, and the Court of Appeal in dismissing the appeal and upholding the conviction on that ground. There is clearly no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Appearances
Chief Debo Akande For Appellant
AND
Mr. R. A. Bello, Principal State Counsel, Ogun State For Respondent
