JIGAWA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY & ANOR v. SDP & ORS (2020)

JIGAWA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY & ANOR v. SDP & ORS

(2020)LCN/14579(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(KANO JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Tuesday, September 22, 2020

CA/KN/51/2020

RATIO

PLEADINGS: THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OR A STATUTE FOR THAT MATTER, IS A FUNDAMENTAL FUNCTION OF THE COURTS.

The interpretation of the Constitution or a Statute for that matter, is a fundamental function of the Courts. A Court will look at the provisions of the Constitution as a whole and find the intention of the framer of the Constitution. The Court must give the Constitutional provisions, their ordinary meaning where they are clear and unambiguous, so as to determine the object of a particular provision. So related provisions must be interpreted together – A.G. LAGOS STATE VS. A. G. FEDERATION (2014) (PT. 11) 4 SCNJ 374 AT 410 AND A.T LTD. VS. A. D. H. LTD. (2007) 15 NWLR (PT. 1056) 118 AT 166 – 167. In BRIGADIER MARWA VS. NYAKO & ORS. (2012) LPELR 7837 (SC), Onnoghen JSC (as he then was), referred to the guidelines to the interpretation of the Constitution as elucidated by Obaseki, JSC in A. G. BENDEL STATE VS. A. G. FEDERATION (1981) 10 S. C. 1 as follows:-
“1. Effect shall be given to every word in the Constitution.
2. A construction nullifying a specific clause in the Constitution shall not be tolerated, unless where absolutely necessary.
3. A constitutional power should not be used to attain an unconstitutional result.
4. The language of the Constitution, where clear and unambiguous, must be given its plain and evident meaning.
5. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is an organic scheme of government to be dealt with as an entirety hence particular provisions, should not be severed from the rest of the Constitution.
6. While the language of the Constitution does not change, the changing circumstances of a progressive society for which it was designed, can yield new and further import of its meaning.
7. A Constitutional provision should not be construed in such a way as to defeat its evident purpose.
8. Under the Constitution granting specific powers, a particular power must be granted before it can be exercised.
9. Declaration by the National Assembly of its essential legislative functions, is precluded by the Constitution.
10. Words are the common signs that men make use to declare their intentions to one another, and when the words of a man expresses his intentions plainly, there is no need to have recourse to other means of interpretations of such words.
11. The principles upon which the Constitution was established, rather than the direct operation or literal meaning of the words used should measure the purpose and scope of its provisions.
12. Words of the Constitution are therefore, not to be read with stultifying narrowness.”
But in ISHOLA VS. AJIBOYE (1994) 7-8 SCNJ (PT. 1) 1 AT 35, Ogundare JSC, adopted the above twelve points and gave four points thus:-
1. Constitutional language is to be given reasonable construction, and absurd consequences are to be avoided.

Constitutional powers dealing with the same subject matter are to be construed together.
3. Seemingly conflicting parts are to be harmonized, if possible, so that effect can be given to all parts of the Constitution.
4. The position of an article or clause in the Constitution influences its construction.
“The golden rule of interpretation of Constitutional provisions is therefore that words of the Constitution must, prima facie, be given their ordinary meaning, which means, I must look closely at the words used in the provisions, and assign them their ordinary meanings if the words are not ambiguous”. As held in NAFIU RABIU VS. KANO STATE (1980) 8-11 S.C. 130 AT 149, words are to be given liberal interpretation.
In HON. VICTOR ASSAMS & ORS. VS. SENATOR ARARUME & ORS. (2015) LPELR – 40828 (SC) AT PAGES 12 – 13, Rhodes-Vivour JSC held that:-
“…….the well laid down position for the interpretation of the Constitution, is that once the words used are clear and free from ambiguity, they should be given their natural meaning without embellishment. Provisions of the Constitution must always be interpreted to achieve the obvious ends for which the Constitution was promulgated.”
Ngwuta JSC added his voice in DR. OLUBUKOLA SARAKI VS. F.R. N. (2016) LPELR – 40013 (SC) AT PAGE 100 A – B, when he stated that the provisions of the Constitution “must be interpreted in such a manner as to enhance its purpose. In cases of ambiguity, real or perceived, the provision in question must be construed in such a way as to avoid what is inconvenient or absurd.”
It is thus clear, that a Constitution is meant to convey the intentions of its framers, as stated in its provisions. So the words used therein must be liberally construed in such a way as to find the true intendment and objectives of the Constitution and this can only be done, if the provisions, especially similar ones, are considered as a whole, avoiding ambiguities and unintended results.

Now, it is Section 7(1) of the Constitution that guaranteed the system of local government by democratically elected local government councils in these words:-
“The system of local government by democratically elected local government councils is under this Constitution guaranteed; and accordingly the government of every state shall, subject to Section 8 of this Constitution, ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils.”
By Section 4(6) of the Constitution, the legislative powers of a State shall be vested in the House of Assembly of the State.
Section 7(4) of the Constitution pertains to the right to vote in these words:-
“The Government of a State shall ensure that every person who is entitled to vote or be voted for at an election to a House of Assembly shall have the right to vote or be voted for at an election to a local government council.”
What then are the qualifications for contesting an election as a member of a House of Assembly of a State? It is provided in Section 106 of the Constitution thus:-
“Subject to the provisions of Section 107 of this Constitution, a person shall be qualified for election as a member of a House of Assembly if:-
(a) he is a citizen of Nigeria;
(b) he has attained the age of thirty years;
(c) he has been educated up to at least the school certificate level or its equivalent; and
(d) he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that party.”
It is not controverted, and it was held by the trial Court at page 121 of the record, that the Jigawa State House of Assembly has the Constitutional powers to enact a Law on the Local Government Election. Section 7(1) of the Constitution is very clear on this. So the JSIEC Law, Cap. J19 2012, was enacted. It contains two provisions, Section 52 and 53 on qualification and disqualification for contesting a Local Government Election. The sections are:-
52. “A person shall be qualified to contest for election under this law, if:-
a. he is ordinarily resident in the ward or constituency…or is an indigene of that ward…
b. he produces evidence of tax payment….
c. in the case of councillorship election he is nominated in writing by 20 persons…
d. in the cases of chairmanship election, he is nominated in writing by 30 persons…
e. he is a registered voter in the ward or constituency…
f. he is a registered member of a political party and is sponsored by that party.
g. he has been educated up to at least the school certificate level or its equivalent.
h. in the case of chairman, he is at least 30 years of age and councilor 25 years of age; and
i. he has resigned his employment in the public or civil service at least not later than 30 days before the date of election.”
53. “A person shall not be liable to contest a local government election if:-
a. he has been dismissed from the public or civil service of the Federation or of a State or local government…
b. he has been found guilty of an offence involving narcotic drugs or any other psychotropic substance…
c. he has been adjudged guilty of treason or treasonable felony by a Court or Tribunal in Nigeria;
d. he is an undischarged bankrupt….
e. he is a member of a secret society;
f. he is employed in the public service of the federation, state or local government or private sector and has not resigned thirty days before election.
g. he is adjudged to be a lunatic or declared to be of unsound mind.
h. he has presented a forged certificate…” So, the provisions in Sections 52 and 53 of the JSIEC Law, are on qualification and disqualification for contesting an election to a Local Government Council. It is clear, that they are not contrary to what the Constitution in Sections 106 and 107 has provided for in respect of qualification and disqualification for an election into a House of Assembly of a State. Nothing in Sections 52 and 53 of the JSIEC Law talked about payment of non-refundable fee, showing that such payment is not a qualification or disqualification for contesting an election into the Local Government Councils in Jigawa State.
The JSIEC Law also enacted Section 84. It provides:-
“A person who wishes to contest a local government election shall:-
a. in the case of councillorship election, make payment of a non-refundable fee prescribed by the commission;
b. in the case of chairmanship election, make a payment of a non-refundable fee prescribed by the commission.”
The Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission in pursuance of the Section 84 of JSIEC Law, issued Guidelines and Regulations prescribing for the payment of a non-refundable fee in paragraph 3(k) in these words:-
“Every candidate shall before his nomination paper is delivered to the electoral officer, deposit or cause to be deposited with the commission a non-refundable deposit, in the case of:
i. Chairman of Local Government Council N500,000;
ii. Councillor N200,000.
It is the position of the Respondents, that Section 84 of JSIEC and paragraph 3(k) of the JSIEC Guidelines and Regulations are not only contrary to Section 52 and 53 of the JSIEC Law, but are also inconsistent with Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution.
The provisions in Section 84 of JSIEC Law and paragraph 3(k) of the Guidelines and Regulations for payment of non-refundable deposit only spelt out the procedure to follow in attaining the right to vote or be voted for as enshrined in Section 7(4) of the Constitution. In A.D. VS. P.S.I.E.C (2004) 10 NWLR (PT.880) 19 (CA), the Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission, similar to what the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission has done here, issued guidelines prescribing payment of fees to be paid by the candidates contesting Local Government Elections, N150,000 for Chairmanship Election and N40,000 for Councillorship Election. It was argued that this was unconstitutional, null and void. A declaration was sought that PSIEC, could not prescribe guidelines for the qualification and disqualification of candidates to contest local government election, outside the scope of Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution. This is in pari materia with this appeal. The Appeal Court in A.D. VS. PSIEC (SUPRA) held that the issue of qualification for local government election, rests squarely within the legislative umbrella of the State House of Assembly and that the guidelines made pursuant to the PSIEC Law, were validly made. Further, that Sections 106 and 107 of the 1999 Constitution are not applicable to candidates seeking election into local government councils and the Plateau State House of Assembly, had no reason to import the provisions of the said Sections, into the State Electoral Law and guidelines for election. Obadina JCA in the lead Judgment in that case held that:-
“….it is also clear that Section 7(4) of the Constitution does not talk of qualifications or disqualifications of candidates for local government elections. All Section 7(4) of the Constitution did was to vest in every person who is entitled to vote or be voted for in an election to a State House of Assembly the same right to vote and be voted for in an election to local government councils. Right to vote and be voted for is quite different from qualification for participating in an election. In other words, the right to vote and be voted for is quite different from conditions precedent to taking part in an election. The word “right” as used in Section 7(4) of the Constitution and the word “qualification” used in Section 106 of the Constitution are two different words with two different meanings and capable of two different factual and legal situations. In my view, there is no basis whatsoever for saying that in promulgating the Plateau State Local Government Electoral Law and other matters connected therewith, 2002, the Respondents were enjoined to import and/or comply with the provisions of Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution of 1999. The provision of Section 7(4) of the 1999 Constitution is very clear and unambiguous. Any interpretation giving to Section 7(4) of the 1999 Constitution to the effect that it enjoins the Government of a State to re-enact or lift the provisions of Sections 106 and 107 of the 1999 Constitution into the State Local Government Law is to import into Section 7(4) aforesaid what is not contained in the Constitution.
It is my view and I so hold that the provisions of Section 106 and 107 of the 1999 Constitution apply only to the election into the House of Assembly of a State to be conducted by Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and not the election into local government councils…. The combined effect of Section 7(1) and (4), and 197 and item 22 of the Exclusive Legislative List and items 11 and 12 of the Concurrent Legislative List in Part I and II of the Second Schedule to the Constitution respectively, is that it is the House of Assembly of a State that has power to make laws with respect to the establishment, structure, composition, finance, functions and elections to a local government council.”
The learned Justice of the Court of Appeal based his decision on the case of A. G. ABIA STATE AND 35 ORS. VS. A. G. FEDERATION (2002) 6 NWLR (PT. 763) 264, a Supreme Court decision by Ogundare JSC wherein he held that:-
“Qualification or disqualification of persons as candidates for election as chairman, vice-chairman or councilor of a local government council is a matter of substantive law for the State House of Assembly to determine and not a matter of election procedure for the National Assembly to legislate upon. See also A. G. BENDEL STATE VS. A. G. FEDERATION & ORS. (1982) 3 NCLR 1 AT 66, 73 AND 74.”
It is therefore crystal clear from the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, that it is purely the legislative competence of a House of Assembly to enact a law for the qualification or disqualification of a candidate contesting a local government election. It has every power to do so, and also provide for the procedure to be followed, including conditions precedent, in the said election.
In NWOBODO VS. ENUGU STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION (2017) LPELR – 42782 (CA) Ogunwumiju JCA in the lead Judgment at page 38 considered and applied the case of A.D. VS. P.S.I.E.C. (SUPRA). Both cases and the Supreme Court decisions are in pari materia with this appeal and I am bound to apply and follow them as the attempt by the Respondents to distinguish same, has not been properly made out. Ogunwumiju JCA held:-
“This Court in A.D. VS. P.S.I.E.C specifically approved Section 8 of the Plateau State Local Government Electoral Law 2002 wherein one of the qualifications to be legible for election is that the candidate must have made a payment of non-refundable fees as may be prescribed by the commission. The qualifications and disqualification specified in Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution respectively are not applicable to candidates seeking election to the Local Government Councils. Since the issue of the qualifications or otherwise of Local Government Council candidates are governed by substantive law of the State House of Assembly. This Court held and rightly so, that the imposition of the payment of non-refundable fee for Chairmanship position is not an additional qualification or eligibility requirement. This Court held that the payment of non-refundable fee is only a condition precedent to the exercise of a right to be voted for as conferred by Section 7(4) of the Constitution…..” All the binding authorities have therefore established that a provision in the law of a State Government requiring a candidate contesting a local government election to pay a non-refundable deposit, is not a qualifying or disqualifying provision but a procedural issue in the realm of a State House of Assembly and can not therefore, be said to be unconstitutional. A condition precedent to the exercise of a right, is not a provision removing that right.
In N.D.C.L. VS. ADAMAWA STATE WATER BOARD (2008) LPELR – 1997 (SC), Ogbuagu JSC held thus:-
“A condition precedent is defined as one which delays the vesting of a right until the happening of an event.”
In SHALIM & ANR. VS. GOBANG (2009) LPELR – 3043 (SC), the Supreme Court held that:-
“A condition precedent is something that must be done or must happen in a particular case, before one is entitled to institute an action. It is not of the essence of such a cause of action but it has been made essential by law.”
So, where a right has been conferred, but has been subjected to the occurrence of an event, that occurrence is a condition precedent, and that right cannot vest or accrue, until the condition precedent has been satisfied as provided. The fact here, that a condition precedent has been stated i.e payment of a non-refundable fee before contesting a local government election, did not remove the right to participate in the election as it is not a question of qualification or disqualification. It did not violate Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution or even Sections 52 and 53 of the JSIEC Law. It is only a procedural provision just like pre-action notices, which are required to be served on the prospective defendant before legal proceedings are commenced or instituted against that party. The right to sue is not taken away, but a condition precedent is provided as a procedural measure. Again, another example can be seen where a litigant is given a right constitutionally to appeal against final judgment. The Court imposes a condition specified by Rules of Court made pursuant to the respective Court Act for payment of filing fees before the appeal is filed. This is a condition precedent to the filing of the appeal. It does not take away and is not inconsistent with the Constitutional right to appeal. It is a procedural provision.
I therefore find and hold, that Section 84 of the JSIEC Law and paragraph 3(k) of the Guidelines/Regulations issued by JSIEC, are not on qualification or disqualification for contesting local government elections in Jigawa State. They are therefore neither inconsistent with Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution on qualification and disqualification, nor are they inconsistent with Sections 52 and 53 of the JSIEC Law on qualification and disqualification to contest local government elections in Jigawa State. The authorities are clear and binding not only on this Court, but also on the trial Court which should have applied them. Per ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA, J.C.A.

RATIO

PLEADINGS: THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT

Now, Nigeria is a common law country and the foundation upon which the common law system is erected is the doctrine of judicial precedent. In common law, legal Systems, a precedent or authority is a principle or rule established in a previous legal case that is either binding on or persuasive for a Court or other Tribunal when deciding subsequent cases with similar issues or facts. The general principle in common law legal systems is that similar cases should be decided so as to give similar and predictable outcomes, and the principle of precedent is the mechanism by which that goal is attained. The doctrine of judicial precedent is also commonly referred to as the principle of Stare decisis, and the words originate from the phrasing of the principle in the Latin maxim Stan decisis et non quieta mover: “to stand by decisions and not disturb the undisturbed.”
In a legal context, this is understood to mean that Courts should generally abide by precedent and not disturb settled matters. Its meaning is that when a point of law has been once solemnly and necessarily declared by the decision of a competent Court. it Will no longer be considered open to an examination, or a new ruling by the same Court or Tribunal or by those which are bound to follow its adjudications. In a hierarchical judicial arrangement, it precludes the Judges of subordinate Courts from changing what has been determined by a higher Court. In other words, they should keep the scale of justice even and steady and not liable to waver with every Judge’s opinion – Adesokan Vs Adetunji (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt 345) 540, Okeke Vs Okoli (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt 642) 641, Osakue Vs Federal College Of Education, Asaba (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt 1201) 1.
The doctrine postulates that where the facts in a subsequent case are similar or close as facts in an earlier case that had been decided upon, judicial pronouncements in the earlier case are subsequently utilized to govern and determine the decision in the subsequent case – Nwangwu Vs Ukachukwu (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 662) 674. Thus, where the provisions of a statute or section of a Statute are the same or similar, and the purport, meaning and effect of such similar provisions of the Statute or section had been considered in a previous decision of a competent Court higher up in the judicial hierarchy, then such previous decision becomes a matter of judicial precedent and is binding on the Courts lower in the hierarchy where they are called upon to consider a provision similar to that earlier considered – Nwobodo Vs Onoh (1984) 1 SCNLR 1, University of Lagos Vs Olaniyan (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 156 and Ngige vs Obi (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt 999) 1.
The reasons which underlie this rule were stated by Chancellor Kent, in a much quoted passage from his Commentaries, as follows:
“A solemn decision upon a point of law, arising in any given case, becomes an authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence which we can have of the law applicable to the subject, and the judges are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands unreversed, unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case. If a decision has been made upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in favor of its correctness; and the community has a right to regard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts by it. It would therefore be extremely inconvenient to the public, if precedents were not duly regarded and implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and stability of such rules that professional men can give safe advice to those who consult them; and people in general can venture with to buy and trust, and to deal with each other. If judicial decisions were to be lightly disregarded, we should disturb and unsettle the great landmarks of property. When a rule has been once deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed, unless by a Court of appeal or review, and by the same Court except for very cogent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and if the practice were otherwise, it would be leaving us in a state of perplexing uncertainty as to the law.” (I Kent’s Commentaries at page 475)
Similarly, Judge Cooley observed:
“Even if the same or any other court, in a subsequent case, should be in doubt concerning the correctness of the decision which has been made, there are consequences of a very grave character to be contemplated and weighed before the experiment of disregarding it should be ventured upon. That State of things, when judicial decisions conflict, so that a citizen is always at a loss in regard to his rights and his duties, is a very serious evil; and the alternative of accepting adjudged cases as precedents in future controversies resting upon analogous facts, and brought within the same reasons, is obviously preferable.” (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, page 50)
Nigeria operates a hierarchical judicial arrangement and this Court is next to the Supreme Court, the apex Court, in that arrangement. The operation of the doctrine of judicial precedent prescribes that all previous decisions and judgments of this Court are binding on all Courts lower to it in the judicial arrangement and on this Court itself. The lower Court was thus obligated to follow the decisions of this Court in the cases of Alliance for Democracy Vs Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission supra and Nwobodo Vs Enugu State Independent Electoral Commission supra in resolving the issue presented to it for adjudication in this matter. The lower Court failed to follow these decisions and it, in fact, made no reference to them in the judgment and it resolved the issue as if it was coming up in our legal jurisprudence for the first time.
It is correct that Counsel to the parties did not bring these authorities to the attention of the lower Court in the course of their arguments. This is, however, not an excuse. A Court is not limited to the cases cited by Counsel in determining matters before it and it is obliged to rely on other legal materials such as those derived from personal research – Orugbo Vs Una (2002) 9-10 SC 61, Access Bank Plc Vs Agege Local Government (2016) LPELR 40491 (CA), Federal Housing Authority Vs Olayemi (2017) LPELR 43376(CA). Thus, it behooved the lower Court to conduct its own personal research into the subject matter of the dispute presented to it for adjudication. After all, the saying is that the law lies within the breast of the Court. The adjudicatory duty of a Judge can only be performed optimally when he remains up to date with emerging developments and new trends in jurisprudence. The lower Court would have saved itself the goof it committed in the judgment if it had taken pains to conduct the necessary research and discovered the two previous decisions of this Court on the subject matter of dispute. Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Abubakar Datti Yahaya Justice of the Court of Appeal

Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru Justice of the Court of Appeal

Amina Audi Wambai Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. JIGAWA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY 2. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF JIGAWA STATE APPELANT(S)

And

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 2. HON. ABBA ANAS 3. JIGAWA STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION RESPONDENT(S)

ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the decision of the High Court of Jigawa State, Birnin Kudu, delivered by Honourable Justice A. Y. Suleiman on the 28th November, 2019, granting the reliefs sought for, by the claimants, now 1st and 2nd Respondents.

On the 27th June, 2019, the 1st and 2nd Claimants who are now the 1st and 2nd Respondents, filed an Originating Summons, posing five questions for determination. They prayed for the following reliefs:-
a. A. Declaration that Section 84 of Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission Law Cap. J19 of 2008 is null and void and of no effect whatsoever having contradicted the provisions of Section 7(4) and 106 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). And Section 52 and 53 of Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission Law 2012.
b. A Declaration that Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission lacks power to issue Guidelines comprising additional condition on candidate aspiring to elective positions in Local Government, in addition to those stipulated under Section 106 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).

A Declaration that Jigawa State House of Assembly acted ultravires by empowering Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission to impose additional qualification on candidates aspiring for elective positions in Local Government Election over and above those stipulated under Section 7(4) and 106 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).
d. A Declaration that the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission has no any power outside the powers conferred upon or by the provisions of Section 10(1)(b)(1) of the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission Law 2012.
e. An Order of this Honourable Court directing the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission to forthwith stop the Local Government Election Scheduled to take place on 29th day of June, 2019, pending the hearing and determination of this Suit.
f. An Order of Injunction restraining the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission or any person in that behalf from imposing payment of any non-refundable deposit or collecting or charging any contestant of Jigawa State Local Government Council’s

Election scheduled to hold on the 29th June, 2019.

The matter went to trial at the end of which the Court granted the reliefs prayed for by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, as claimants. Dissatisfied, the Appellants filed an appeal before this Court.

On the 15th June, 2020, the Appellants filed an Amended Appellants brief which was deemed filed on 24th June, 2020. The 1st and 2nd Respondents filed a Joint brief of argument on the 3rd of July, 2020. The Appellants filed a Reply on the 6th July, 2020. The third Respondent has not filed a brief.

The Appellants identified two issues for determination thus:-
1. “Whether Section 84 of the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission Law Cap. J19 Laws of Jigawa State 2012, is contrary to the provisions of the 1999 Constitution (as amended)?
2. Whether the 3rd Respondent (Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission) has power under the law, to issue guidelines to political parties and aspirants, most especially paragraph 3(k) of the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission (JSIEC) guidelines?”

For the Respondents, the two issues they identified are:-
1. “Whether Section 84 of JSIEC Law, Cap. J19 of 2012, does not amount to a duplication of Section 52 and 53 of the same law and thus contradictory and inconsistent with Section 7(1) and (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended)?
2. Whether the trial Court was right to have held that Section 84 of the JSIEC Law 2012, paragraphs 3(i) (k) of the JSIEC Law were wrong, incompetent, by imposing additional qualification on an aspiring candidate for Local Government Council Election contrary to the provisions of the Constitution?”

In view of the grounds of appeal filed, I find the issues identified by the Appellants to be apt and will therefore utilise them in resolving this appeal.

ISSUE ONE
“Whether Section 84 of JSIEC Law Cap. J19 Laws of Jigawa State 2012, is contrary to the provisions of the 1999 Constitution (as amended)?”

Learned Attorney-General Jigawa State Musa Adamu Aliyu counsel for the Appellants, submitted that Section 4(6) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) is the enabling provision for the JSIEC Law. He referred to Item 22, Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Constitution (the Exclusive Legislative List)

and submitted that its combined effect with Sections 7(11), (4) and 197, is what gave the Jigawa State House of Assembly the powers to enact laws with respect to Local Government Elections. He cited A.D. vs. P.S.I. E. C (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt.880) 19 at 36. That it is the Jigawa State House of Assembly that has the power to make laws on qualifications of candidates in Local Government Elections – ATTORNEY-GENERAL ABIA STATE & 35 ORS. VS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL FEDERATION (2002) 6 NWLR (PT. 763) 264; (2002) 3 SCNJ 158 AT 239, and so Section 84 was validly enacted. Counsel argued that the provision imposed a non-refundable deposit to be paid by those contesting Local Government Elections and that this is in order, as the provision applying to candidates contesting States Houses of Assembly Elections, are not applicable to candidates contesting Local Government Elections, as held by this Court in NWOBODO VS. ENUGU STATE ELECTORAL COMMISSION (2017) LPELR – 42782 AT 30 B – D, contrary to the erroneous position taken by the trial Court here, as seen at page 120, paragraph 4 of the Record of Appeal.

Counsel referred again to the case of AD. VS. PSIEC

(SUPRA) which he said held that there is no contradiction between Sections 7(1) (4), 197 item 22 of the Exclusive Legislative List, items 11 and 12 and other relevant provisions of the Constitution and the powers of Plateau House of Assembly to enact the Plateau State Local Government Electoral Law similar to Jigawa State Electoral Commission Law. He urged us to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellants.

Replying, Mr. Adamu Abubakar, learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents argued that at the trial Court, the main issue was the Interpretation of Section 84 of the JSIEC Law Cap. J19 2012 enacted by the Jigawa State House of Assembly pursuant to its powers under Section 7 part II of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended); and to determine whether the said Section 84 and paragraph 3(k) of JSIEC guidelines 2019 issued by the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission did not contradict Section 52 and 53 JISIEC Law and Sections 4(7), 7(4) and 107 of the 1999 Constitution as amended. Counsel submitted, relying on RABIU VS. KANO STATE (1980) 9 11 S.C 130 AND JUSTICE RALIAT ELELU HABEEB VS. A. G FEDERATION & 2 ORS.

(2012) ALL FWLR (PT. 629) 1011, that when interpreting a provision of the Constitution, the Constitution must be read as a whole to determine the object of the provision. He then argued that the provisions of Sections 52 and 53 of the JSIEC Law Cap. J19, contradict Section 84 of the JSIEC Law including paragraph 3(k) of the JSIEC Guidelines 2019 and also contradict the Constitution. That Sections 52 and 53 of JSIEC Law, had specifically provided for the qualification and disqualification of a candidate to a Local Government Election in Jigawa State, and are in line with the powers conferred on the Jigawa State House of Assembly by the Constitution but inconsistent with Section 84 of JSIEC Law, which gave rise to paragraph 3(k) of the JSIEC Guidelines 2019. That Section 84, duplicated Section 52 and 53 and is in conflict with Sections 7(1)(4) and 106 of the Constitution, which provides for the qualification of a contestant to the membership of a State House of Assembly. Counsel argued that by a combined effect of Section 7(1) and 197 and item 22 of the Second Schedule, Part I of the Constitution, State Electoral Law is the

province of a State Government but that by item 11 of the Concurrent Legislative List, powers are given to the National Assembly with respect to the registration of voters and the procedure regulating election to a Local Government Council, which should not be made in such a way as to infringe the provisions of the Constitution. A. G. ABIA STATE VS. A.G. FEDERATION (2002) 3 SCNJ 158. He distinguished the cases of NWOBODO VS. ENUGU STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION (2017) LPELR 042782 CA AND A. D. VS. P. S. I. E. C. (2004) 10 NWLR (PT. 880) 19, from the instant case. He urged us to resolve the issue in favour of the Respondents.

In their Reply, the Appellants submitted that the position taken by the Respondents that Section 84 of JSIEC Law is a duplication of Sections 52 and 53 of the same Law, is not correct. The learned Attorney-General for the Appellants argued, that Sections 52 and 53 of the JSIEC Law provide for qualifications and disqualifications to contest the election and that Section 84 of JSIEC Law did not provide any additional qualification to participate in the election. It only provided for payment of a non-refundable fee from

candidates contesting the election. He emphasized that since this is the case, Sections 52, 53 and 84 of JSIEC Law have not contradicted Sections 7(1) and (4) of the Constitution. He placed reliance on A.D. VS. PSIEC (SUPRA) AT PAGE 48, PARAGRAPHS A – D AND F – G which he said, relied on the Supreme Court case of A.G. ABIA VS. A.G. FEDERATION (SUPRA) which validated the payment of non-refundable fee. He submitted that as the provisions of the Plateau State Local Government Electoral Law 2002 and the Guidelines made are in pari-materia with the extant Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission Law 2012 and the Guidelines, the case of A.D VS. PSIEC is apt and applicable in this appeal.

(2014) (PT. 11) 4 SCNJ 374 AT 410 AND A.T LTD. VS. A. D. H. LTD. (2007) 15 NWLR (PT. 1056) 118 AT 166 – 167. In BRIGADIER MARWA VS. NYAKO & ORS. (2012) LPELR 7837 (SC), Onnoghen JSC (as he then was), referred to the guidelines to the interpretation of the Constitution as elucidated by Obaseki, JSC in A. G. BENDEL STATE VS. A. G. FEDERATION (1981) 10 S. C. 1 as follows:-
“1. Effect shall be given to every word in the Constitution.
2. A construction nullifying a specific clause in the Constitution shall not be tolerated, unless where absolutely necessary.
3. A constitutional power should not be used to attain an unconstitutional result.
4. The language of the Constitution, where clear and unambiguous, must be given its plain and evident meaning.
5. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is an organic scheme of government to be dealt with as an entirety hence particular provisions, should not be severed from the rest of the Constitution.
6. While the language of the Constitution does not change, the changing circumstances of a progressive society for which it was designed, can

yield new and further import of its meaning.
7. A Constitutional provision should not be construed in such a way as to defeat its evident purpose.
8. Under the Constitution granting specific powers, a particular power must be granted before it can be exercised.
9. Declaration by the National Assembly of its essential legislative functions, is precluded by the Constitution.
10. Words are the common signs that men make use to declare their intentions to one another, and when the words of a man expresses his intentions plainly, there is no need to have recourse to other means of interpretations of such words.
11. The principles upon which the Constitution was established, rather than the direct operation or literal meaning of the words used should measure the purpose and scope of its provisions.
12. Words of the Constitution are therefore, not to be read with stultifying narrowness.”
But in ISHOLA VS. AJIBOYE (1994) 7-8 SCNJ (PT. 1) 1 AT 35, Ogundare JSC, adopted the above twelve points and gave four points thus:-
1. Constitutional language is to be given reasonable construction, and absurd consequences are to be avoided.

Constitutional powers dealing with the same subject matter are to be construed together.
3. Seemingly conflicting parts are to be harmonized, if possible, so that effect can be given to all parts of the Constitution.
4. The position of an article or clause in the Constitution influences its construction.
“The golden rule of interpretation of Constitutional provisions is therefore that words of the Constitution must, prima facie, be given their ordinary meaning, which means, I must look closely at the words used in the provisions, and assign them their ordinary meanings if the words are not ambiguous”. As held in NAFIU RABIU VS. KANO STATE (1980) 8-11 S.C. 130 AT 149, words are to be given liberal interpretation.
In HON. VICTOR ASSAMS & ORS. VS. SENATOR ARARUME & ORS. (2015) LPELR – 40828 (SC) AT PAGES 12 – 13, Rhodes-Vivour JSC held that:-
“…….the well laid down position for the interpretation of the Constitution, is that once the words used are clear and free from ambiguity, they should be given their natural meaning without embellishment. Provisions of the

Constitution must always be interpreted to achieve the obvious ends for which the Constitution was promulgated.”
Ngwuta JSC added his voice in DR. OLUBUKOLA SARAKI VS. F.R. N. (2016) LPELR – 40013 (SC) AT PAGE 100 A – B, when he stated that the provisions of the Constitution “must be interpreted in such a manner as to enhance its purpose. In cases of ambiguity, real or perceived, the provision in question must be construed in such a way as to avoid what is inconvenient or absurd.”
It is thus clear, that a Constitution is meant to convey the intentions of its framers, as stated in its provisions. So the words used therein must be liberally construed in such a way as to find the true intendment and objectives of the Constitution and this can only be done, if the provisions, especially similar ones, are considered as a whole, avoiding ambiguities and unintended results.

councils is under this Constitution guaranteed; and accordingly the government of every state shall, subject to Section 8 of this Constitution, ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils.”
By Section 4(6) of the Constitution, the legislative powers of a State shall be vested in the House of Assembly of the State.
Section 7(4) of the Constitution pertains to the right to vote in these words:-
“The Government of a State shall ensure that every person who is entitled to vote or be voted for at an election to a House of Assembly shall have the right to vote or be voted for at an election to a local government council.”
What then are the qualifications for contesting an election as a member of a House of Assembly of a State? It is provided in Section 106 of the Constitution thus:-
“Subject to the provisions of Section 107 of this Constitution, a person shall be qualified for election as a member of a House of Assembly if:-
(a) he is a citizen of Nigeria;
(b) he has attained the age of thirty years;
(c) he has

been educated up to at least the school certificate level or its equivalent; and
(d) he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that party.”
It is not controverted, and it was held by the trial Court at page 121 of the record, that the Jigawa State House of Assembly has the Constitutional powers to enact a Law on the Local Government Election. Section 7(1) of the Constitution is very clear on this. So the JSIEC Law, Cap. J19 2012, was enacted. It contains two provisions, Section 52 and 53 on qualification and disqualification for contesting a Local Government Election. The sections are:-
52. “A person shall be qualified to contest for election under this law, if:-
a. he is ordinarily resident in the ward or constituency…or is an indigene of that ward…
b. he produces evidence of tax payment….
c. in the case of councillorship election he is nominated in writing by 20 persons…
d. in the cases of chairmanship election, he is nominated in writing by 30 persons…
e. he is a registered voter in the ward or constituency…
f. he is a registered member of a

political party and is sponsored by that party.
g. he has been educated up to at least the school certificate level or its equivalent.
h. in the case of chairman, he is at least 30 years of age and councilor 25 years of age; and
i. he has resigned his employment in the public or civil service at least not later than 30 days before the date of election.”
53. “A person shall not be liable to contest a local government election if:-
a. he has been dismissed from the public or civil service of the Federation or of a State or local government…
b. he has been found guilty of an offence involving narcotic drugs or any other psychotropic substance…
c. he has been adjudged guilty of treason or treasonable felony by a Court or Tribunal in Nigeria;
d. he is an undischarged bankrupt….
e. he is a member of a secret society;
f. he is employed in the public service of the federation, state or local government or private sector and has not resigned thirty days before election.
g. he is adjudged to be a lunatic or declared to be of unsound mind.
h. he has presented a forged certificate…”

So, the provisions in Sections 52 and 53 of the JSIEC Law, are on qualification and disqualification for contesting an election to a Local Government Council. It is clear, that they are not contrary to what the Constitution in Sections 106 and 107 has provided for in respect of qualification and disqualification for an election into a House of Assembly of a State. Nothing in Sections 52 and 53 of the JSIEC Law talked about payment of non-refundable fee, showing that such payment is not a qualification or disqualification for contesting an election into the Local Government Councils in Jigawa State.
The JSIEC Law also enacted Section 84. It provides:-
“A person who wishes to contest a local government election shall:-
a. in the case of councillorship election, make payment of a non-refundable fee prescribed by the commission;
b. in the case of chairmanship election, make a payment of a non-refundable fee prescribed by the commission.”
The Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission in pursuance of the Section 84 of JSIEC Law, issued Guidelines and Regulations prescribing for the payment of a

non-refundable fee in paragraph 3(k) in these words:-
“Every candidate shall before his nomination paper is delivered to the electoral officer, deposit or cause to be deposited with the commission a non-refundable deposit, in the case of:
i. Chairman of Local Government Council N500,000;
ii. Councillor N200,000.
It is the position of the Respondents, that Section 84 of JSIEC and paragraph 3(k) of the JSIEC Guidelines and Regulations are not only contrary to Section 52 and 53 of the JSIEC Law, but are also inconsistent with Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution.
The provisions in Section 84 of JSIEC Law and paragraph 3(k) of the Guidelines and Regulations for payment of non-refundable deposit only spelt out the procedure to follow in attaining the right to vote or be voted for as enshrined in Section 7(4) of the Constitution. In A.D. VS. P.S.I.E.C (2004) 10 NWLR (PT.880) 19 (CA), the Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission, similar to what the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission has done here, issued guidelines prescribing payment of fees to be paid by the candidates contesting Local Government Elections,

N150,000 for Chairmanship Election and N40,000 for Councillorship Election. It was argued that this was unconstitutional, null and void. A declaration was sought that PSIEC, could not prescribe guidelines for the qualification and disqualification of candidates to contest local government election, outside the scope of Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution. This is in pari materia with this appeal. The Appeal Court in A.D. VS. PSIEC (SUPRA) held that the issue of qualification for local government election, rests squarely within the legislative umbrella of the State House of Assembly and that the guidelines made pursuant to the PSIEC Law, were validly made. Further, that Sections 106 and 107 of the 1999 Constitution are not applicable to candidates seeking election into local government councils and the Plateau State House of Assembly, had no reason to import the provisions of the said Sections, into the State Electoral Law and guidelines for election. Obadina JCA in the lead Judgment in that case held that:-
“….it is also clear that Section 7(4) of the Constitution does not talk of qualifications or disqualifications of candidates for local government elections.

All Section 7(4) of the Constitution did was to vest in every person who is entitled to vote or be voted for in an election to a State House of Assembly the same right to vote and be voted for in an election to local government councils. Right to vote and be voted for is quite different from qualification for participating in an election. In other words, the right to vote and be voted for is quite different from conditions precedent to taking part in an election. The word “right” as used in Section 7(4) of the Constitution and the word “qualification” used in Section 106 of the Constitution are two different words with two different meanings and capable of two different factual and legal situations. In my view, there is no basis whatsoever for saying that in promulgating the Plateau State Local Government Electoral Law and other matters connected therewith, 2002, the Respondents were enjoined to import and/or comply with the provisions of Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution of 1999. The provision of Section 7(4) of the 1999 Constitution is very clear and unambiguous. Any interpretation giving to

Section 7(4) of the 1999 Constitution to the effect that it enjoins the Government of a State to re-enact or lift the provisions of Sections 106 and 107 of the 1999 Constitution into the State Local Government Law is to import into Section 7(4) aforesaid what is not contained in the Constitution.
It is my view and I so hold that the provisions of Section 106 and 107 of the 1999 Constitution apply only to the election into the House of Assembly of a State to be conducted by Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and not the election into local government councils…. The combined effect of Section 7(1) and (4), and 197 and item 22 of the Exclusive Legislative List and items 11 and 12 of the Concurrent Legislative List in Part I and II of the Second Schedule to the Constitution respectively, is that it is the House of Assembly of a State that has power to make laws with respect to the establishment, structure, composition, finance, functions and elections to a local government council.”
The learned Justice of the Court of Appeal based his decision on the case of A. G. ABIA STATE AND 35 ORS. VS. A. G. FEDERATION

(2002) 6 NWLR (PT. 763) 264, a Supreme Court decision by Ogundare JSC wherein he held that:-
“Qualification or disqualification of persons as candidates for election as chairman, vice-chairman or councilor of a local government council is a matter of substantive law for the State House of Assembly to determine and not a matter of election procedure for the National Assembly to legislate upon. See also A. G. BENDEL STATE VS. A. G. FEDERATION & ORS. (1982) 3 NCLR 1 AT 66, 73 AND 74.”
It is therefore crystal clear from the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, that it is purely the legislative competence of a House of Assembly to enact a law for the qualification or disqualification of a candidate contesting a local government election. It has every power to do so, and also provide for the procedure to be followed, including conditions precedent, in the said election.
In NWOBODO VS. ENUGU STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION (2017) LPELR – 42782 (CA) Ogunwumiju JCA in the lead Judgment at page 38 considered and applied the case of A.D. VS. P.S.I.E.C. (SUPRA). Both cases and the Supreme Court decisions

are in pari materia with this appeal and I am bound to apply and follow them as the attempt by the Respondents to distinguish same, has not been properly made out. Ogunwumiju JCA held:-
“This Court in A.D. VS. P.S.I.E.C specifically approved Section 8 of the Plateau State Local Government Electoral Law 2002 wherein one of the qualifications to be legible for election is that the candidate must have made a payment of non-refundable fees as may be prescribed by the commission. The qualifications and disqualification specified in Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution respectively are not applicable to candidates seeking election to the Local Government Councils. Since the issue of the qualifications or otherwise of Local Government Council candidates are governed by substantive law of the State House of Assembly. This Court held and rightly so, that the imposition of the payment of non-refundable fee for Chairmanship position is not an additional qualification or eligibility requirement. This Court held that the payment of non-refundable fee is only a condition precedent to the exercise of a right to be voted for as conferred by Section 7(4) of the Constitution…..”

All the binding authorities have therefore established that a provision in the law of a State Government requiring a candidate contesting a local government election to pay a non-refundable deposit, is not a qualifying or disqualifying provision but a procedural issue in the realm of a State House of Assembly and can not therefore, be said to be unconstitutional. A condition precedent to the exercise of a right, is not a provision removing that right.
In N.D.C.L. VS. ADAMAWA STATE WATER BOARD (2008) LPELR – 1997 (SC), Ogbuagu JSC held thus:-
“A condition precedent is defined as one which delays the vesting of a right until the happening of an event.”
In SHALIM & ANR. VS. GOBANG (2009) LPELR – 3043 (SC), the Supreme Court held that:-
“A condition precedent is something that must be done or must happen in a particular case, before one is entitled to institute an action. It is not of the essence of such a cause of action but it has been made essential by law.”
So, where a right has been conferred, but has been subjected to the occurrence of an event, that

occurrence is a condition precedent, and that right cannot vest or accrue, until the condition precedent has been satisfied as provided. The fact here, that a condition precedent has been stated i.e payment of a non-refundable fee before contesting a local government election, did not remove the right to participate in the election as it is not a question of qualification or disqualification. It did not violate Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution or even Sections 52 and 53 of the JSIEC Law. It is only a procedural provision just like pre-action notices, which are required to be served on the prospective defendant before legal proceedings are commenced or instituted against that party. The right to sue is not taken away, but a condition precedent is provided as a procedural measure. Again, another example can be seen where a litigant is given a right constitutionally to appeal against final judgment. The Court imposes a condition specified by Rules of Court made pursuant to the respective Court Act for payment of filing fees before the appeal is filed. This is a condition precedent to the filing of the appeal. It does not take away and is not

inconsistent with the Constitutional right to appeal. It is a procedural provision.
I therefore find and hold, that Section 84 of the JSIEC Law and paragraph 3(k) of the Guidelines/Regulations issued by JSIEC, are not on qualification or disqualification for contesting local government elections in Jigawa State. They are therefore neither inconsistent with Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution on qualification and disqualification, nor are they inconsistent with Sections 52 and 53 of the JSIEC Law on qualification and disqualification to contest local government elections in Jigawa State. The authorities are clear and binding not only on this Court, but also on the trial Court which should have applied them. Issue No. 1 is resolved in favour of the Appellants and against the Respondents.

ISSUE NO. 2
Whether the 3rd Respondent (Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission) has power under the law to issue guidelines to political parties and aspirants most especially paragraph 3(k) of the JSIEC Guidelines?

Learned Attorney-General, counsel for the Appellants submitted that Section 66 of the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission Law Cap. J19 Laws of Jigawa State 2012

donated the power to issue the guidelines and that the imposition of a non-refundable fee is constitutional and valid. He placed reliance on A. D. VS. P.S.I.E. (SUPRA) AT PAGE 44 PARAGRAPHS B-E. He also submitted that Section 84 of the JSIEC Law and paragraph 3(k) of the Guidelines are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. He urged us to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellants.

On the part of the Respondents, it was submitted that it is Section 106 of the Constitution that laid down the criteria for qualification of election into the State House of Assembly, which by Section 7(4) of the Constitution should apply to the criteria for qualification into Local Government Council Election. Counsel argued that since there is nothing in the Electoral Act 2010 where a candidate for an election to the State House of Assembly is enjoined as a condition to make a non-refundable deposit to the Electoral body, since no law imposed payment of non-refundable fee by candidates contesting election into President, Vice-President, Senate and Members of House of Representatives, Governors and members of the

States Houses of Assembly, it is oppressive to make that condition in respect of candidates contesting local government election. He submitted that the trial Court was right when it held that additional qualification comprised by Section 84 of JSIEC Law and Paragraph 3(k) of the Guidelines are excessive.

This issue No. 2 has been addressed whilst resolving issue No. 1. Section 66 of the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission Law Cap. J19, Laws of Jigawa State 2012 provides:-
“The Commission may, subject to the provisions of this law, issue guidelines and make rules or regulations for the conduct of the Local Government Elections in the State.”
As stated earlier in this Judgment, the Supreme Court decision in A. G. ABIA STATE & 35 ORS. VS. A. G. FEDERATION (SUPRA) held that:-
“Qualification or disqualification of persons as candidates for election as Chairman, Vice-Chairman or Councillor of a local government council, is a matter of substantive law for the State House of Assembly to determine….”
This therefore puts paid to any suggestion, that the Jigawa State House of Assembly had no right to

enact legislation on qualification or disqualification of persons as candidates for election into local government councils. Section 66 of the JSIEC Law has therefore been validly enacted. Again, paragraph 3(k) of the Guidelines was issued by the Commission with enabling powers donated by Sections 64 and 66 of the JSIEC Law.
The paragraph imposes the payment of a non-refundable fee by a candidate seeking to contest a local government election. This Court in NWOBODO VS. ESIEC (SUPRA) approved and followed its earlier decision in A. D. VS. PSIEC (SUPRA) where it was held that a provision made by PSIEC for the payment of non-refundable fee by candidates seeking to contest local government election (a similar provision to the case at hand), was valid and constitutional as it was only a condition precedent to exercise the right conferred by Section 7(4) of the Constitution. I am bound by the decisions. There is nothing invalid or unconstitutional in Section 84 of the JSIEC Law and paragraph 3(k) of the Guidelines.
It is immaterial that there is no similar provisions in the Electoral Act. That does not affect the validity or constitutionality of the

Jigawa State provisions. Whether the imposition is excessive or not, is a matter of opinion. It might be argued that it is a means of raising revenue for the State Government and this is not unconstitutional. The trial Judge was wrong in failing to follow the judicial precedents binding on him. Issue No. 2 is thus resolved in favour of the Appellants and against the Respondents.

The result is that this appeal is adjudged to be meritorious. I allow it and I set aside the decision of the trial High Court, Birnin Kudu, Jigawa State, delivered on 28th November, 2019 in SUIT NO.JDU/42/A/2019.
Costs of N50,000 awarded to the Appellants against the 1st and 2nd Respondents only.

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading before now the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Abubakar Datti Yahaya, JCA. His Lordship has ably considered and resolved all the issues in contention in the appeal. I agree with the reasoning and abide by the conclusions reached therein.

The issue before the lower Court in this matter was whether the provisions of the Section 84 of the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission Law, Cap J19, Laws of Jigawa State 2012

which imposed the payment of a non-refundable fee on any person desirous of contesting for the position of Councilor or Chairman in a Government Election, and the Guidelines issued pursuant thereto by the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission stipulating the sum of N500,000.00 for a contestant for office of Chairman and N200,000.00 for a contestant for Councillorship position were not at variance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and were thus unconstitutional, null and void. Now, this issue is not new and the constitutionality of similar provisions in the Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission Law and Enugu State Independent Electoral Commission law had been similarly challenged and this Court in the cases of Alliance for Democracy Vs Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt 880) 19 and Nwobodo Vs Enugu State Independent Electoral Commission (2017) LPELR held that the provisions were constitutional.

Now, Nigeria is a common law country and the foundation upon which the common law system is erected is

the doctrine of judicial precedent. In common law, legal Systems, a precedent or authority is a principle or rule established in a previous legal case that is either binding on or persuasive for a Court or other Tribunal when deciding subsequent cases with similar issues or facts. The general principle in common law legal systems is that similar cases should be decided so as to give similar and predictable outcomes, and the principle of precedent is the mechanism by which that goal is attained. The doctrine of judicial precedent is also commonly referred to as the principle of Stare decisis, and the words originate from the phrasing of the principle in the Latin maxim Stan decisis et non quieta mover: “to stand by decisions and not disturb the undisturbed.”
In a legal context, this is understood to mean that Courts should generally abide by precedent and not disturb settled matters. Its meaning is that when a point of law has been once solemnly and necessarily declared by the decision of a competent Court. it Will no longer be considered open to an examination, or a new ruling by the same Court or Tribunal or by those which are bound to follow its

adjudications. In a hierarchical judicial arrangement, it precludes the Judges of subordinate Courts from changing what has been determined by a higher Court. In other words, they should keep the scale of justice even and steady and not liable to waver with every Judge’s opinion – Adesokan Vs Adetunji (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt 345) 540, Okeke Vs Okoli (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt 642) 641, Osakue Vs Federal College Of Education, Asaba (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt 1201) 1.
The doctrine postulates that where the facts in a subsequent case are similar or close as facts in an earlier case that had been decided upon, judicial pronouncements in the earlier case are subsequently utilized to govern and determine the decision in the subsequent case – Nwangwu Vs Ukachukwu (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 662) 674. Thus, where the provisions of a statute or section of a Statute are the same or similar, and the purport, meaning and effect of such similar provisions of the Statute or section had been considered in a previous decision of a competent Court higher up in the judicial hierarchy, then such previous decision becomes a matter of judicial precedent and is binding on the Courts lower in

the hierarchy where they are called upon to consider a provision similar to that earlier considered – Nwobodo Vs Onoh (1984) 1 SCNLR 1, University of Lagos Vs Olaniyan (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 156 and Ngige vs Obi (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt 999) 1.
The reasons which underlie this rule were stated by Chancellor Kent, in a much quoted passage from his Commentaries, as follows:
“A solemn decision upon a point of law, arising in any given case, becomes an authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence which we can have of the law applicable to the subject, and the judges are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands unreversed, unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case. If a decision has been made upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in favor of its correctness; and the community has a right to regard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts by it. It would therefore be extremely inconvenient to the public, if precedents were not duly regarded and implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and stability

of such rules that professional men can give safe advice to those who consult them; and people in general can venture with to buy and trust, and to deal with each other. If judicial decisions were to be lightly disregarded, we should disturb and unsettle the great landmarks of property. When a rule has been once deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed, unless by a Court of appeal or review, and by the same Court except for very cogent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and if the practice were otherwise, it would be leaving us in a state of perplexing uncertainty as to the law.” (I Kent’s Commentaries at page 475)
Similarly, Judge Cooley observed:
“Even if the same or any other court, in a subsequent case, should be in doubt concerning the correctness of the decision which has been made, there are consequences of a very grave character to be contemplated and weighed before the experiment of disregarding it should be ventured upon. That State of things, when judicial decisions conflict, so that a citizen is always at a loss in regard to his rights and his duties, is a very serious evil; and the alternative of accepting

adjudged cases as precedents in future controversies resting upon analogous facts, and brought within the same reasons, is obviously preferable.” (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, page 50)
Nigeria operates a hierarchical judicial arrangement and this Court is next to the Supreme Court, the apex Court, in that arrangement. The operation of the doctrine of judicial precedent prescribes that all previous decisions and judgments of this Court are binding on all Courts lower to it in the judicial arrangement and on this Court itself. The lower Court was thus obligated to follow the decisions of this Court in the cases of Alliance for Democracy Vs Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission supra and Nwobodo Vs Enugu State Independent Electoral Commission supra in resolving the issue presented to it for adjudication in this matter. The lower Court failed to follow these decisions and it, in fact, made no reference to them in the judgment and it resolved the issue as if it was coming up in our legal jurisprudence for the first time.
It is correct that Counsel to the parties did not bring these authorities to the attention of the lower Court in the course of their

arguments. This is, however, not an excuse. A Court is not limited to the cases cited by Counsel in determining matters before it and it is obliged to rely on other legal materials such as those derived from personal research – Orugbo Vs Una (2002) 9-10 SC 61, Access Bank Plc Vs Agege Local Government (2016) LPELR 40491 (CA), Federal Housing Authority Vs Olayemi (2017) LPELR 43376(CA). Thus, it behooved the lower Court to conduct its own personal research into the subject matter of the dispute presented to it for adjudication. After all, the saying is that the law lies within the breast of the Court. The adjudicatory duty of a Judge can only be performed optimally when he remains up to date with emerging developments and new trends in jurisprudence. The lower Court would have saved itself the goof it committed in the judgment if it had taken pains to conduct the necessary research and discovered the two previous decisions of this Court on the subject matter of dispute.

The appeal is meritorious and I agree that it should succeed. I too hereby set aside the judgment of the High Court of Jigawa State, sitting in Birm Kudu,

delivered in Suit No JDU/42/A/2019 by Honorable Justice A. Y. Suleiman on the 28th of November, 2019. In its stead, I substitute an order dismissing the claims of the first and second Respondents before the lower Court. I abide by the order on costs in the lead judgment.

AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A.: I have read the illuminating and well articulated judgment of my learned brother ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA JCA. My Lord has ably and aptly considered and resolved the issues in this appeal. I lend my support to his reasoning and conclusions.

The burning issue in this appeal pertains to the issue of the Constitutionality or otherwise of the provision of Section 84 of the Jigawa State Independent Electoral Commission Law, (J.S.I.E.C.) CAP J19 of 2008 vis-a-vis the provision of Sections 7(4), 106 and 107 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Niger 1999 (as amended).
In other words, whether the enactment of Section 84 by the J.S.I.E.C. Law 2008 imposing the requirement of payment of a non-refundable fee on candidates seeking to contest the Local Government Council Election amounts to an additional requirement over and

above the requirements prescribed by Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution and therefore unconstitutional as vehemently argued by the learned Counsel to the Respondent.
This issue posed by the Respondents in this appeal is simple and straight forward and does not require the splitting of hairs. It is to me a matter well settled.
Ours is a system built on the doctrine of judicial precedent otherwise known as “stare decisis” which is well rooted in our jurisprudence. Similar cases with similar facts (or law) should be decided similarly to produce similar and a predictable outcome. Once a rule of law has been established for the first time by a superior Court, it becomes binding and ought to be followed by all Courts. Judges are obliged to respect the precedent already established by previous decisions, and to stand by what has previously been decided and not to deport therefrom. Therefore once an issue has been decided by a competent Court, it is no longer open for argument or for a new ruling. See ATOLAGBE vs. AWUNI & ORS. (19997) 7 SCNJ, AT 20, 24, 35; DINGYADI 7 ANOR VS. INEC & ORS. (2010) 7 – 12 SCP. 105.

This same issue in this appeal fell for determination of this Court in the case of A.D. VS. PLATEAU STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION (P.s.1.E.C.) (2014) 10 NWLR (PT. 880) 19 where as in this appeal, the Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission (P.S.I.E.C.) issued guidelines mandating candidates wishing to contest the Local Government Council Election to pay a non refundable fee. That was challenged on the similar ground that the State cannot promulgate such law nor can the P.S.I.E.C. issue such guidelines in addition to and outside the provisions of Sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution. In validating the Constitutionality of that law and the guidelines made thereunder, this Court relying on the Supreme Court decision in A.G. ABIA & ORS. VS. A.G.F. (2002) 6 NWLR (PT. 763) 264 per Ogundare JSC, held that Sections 106 and 107 of the 1999 Constitution apply only to election to the House of Assembly but not to election into the Local Government Council which is within the province of the Legislative competence of the State House of Assembly. Speaking later through Ogunwumiju JCA. In NWOBODO VS. ENUGU STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION (2007) LPELR –

42782 on the same issue and following the precedent already established, this Court emphatically restated the law, thus:
“…. this Court also held that the provisions of Sections 106 and 107 of the 1999 Constitution are not applicable to candidates seeking election to the Local Government Council and the Plateau State House of Assembly had no reason to import the provisions of the said Section into the State Electoral Law and guidelines for election.”
The facts and the law under construction in this appeal are on all fours with those of A.D. vs. P.S.I.E.C. (SUPRA). By our well respected doctrine of stare – decisis, where the facts (or the law) in a subsequent case are similar or close to the facts in an earlier case that had been decided, the judicial pronouncements in the earlier case are subsequently utilized to govern the decision in the subsequent one. See SHEKA VS. BASHARI (2013) LPELR – 21403 (CA)
In the words of judge Henry Bracton of the Kings Bench of England, it is good to proceed “from precedent to precedent” if similar things take place, they should be adjudged in a similar way.
Indeed beyond being good, it is a mandatory

requirement that from “precedent to precedent” a matter already adjudged and pronounced upon, on similar facts, should subsequently be adjudged and pronounced upon similarly except where the two can be distinguished. As the law under construction in this appeal is similar to the ones previously pronounced upon in the earlier cases, we are bound by the previous pronouncements and it is for us simply a case of “we are and remain bound by our previous pronouncements and those of the apex Court.” Accordingly, we are bound by and adopt the judicial pronouncements made in the earlier cases of A.G. ABIA STATE & ORS VS. AFG (2002) 6 NWLR (PT. 763) 264 (SUPRA); A.D. VS. P.S.I.E.C. (SUPRA) and NWOBODO VS. ENUGU STATE I.E.C. (SUPRA) which interpreted the similar provision.
We therefore find nothing in Section 84 of the J.S.I.E.C. Law, 2004 and paragraph 3 (k) of the guidelines made thereunder that is unconstitutional, nor do we find Sections 52 and 53 of the same Law unconstitutional or a duplication of Section 84.

In view of this and the further reasons in the leading judgment, I also find merit in this appeal and allow same. I set aside the decision of

the lower Court, the Jigawa State High Court Birnin Kudu in Suit No. JDU/42/1/2019 delivered on 26/11/2019 and abide by the other consequential order to cost.

Appearances:

Dr. Musa Aliyu, A.G. Jigawa with him, Aliyu Hassan, Senior State Counsel (SSC), Ministry of Justice
For Appellant(s)

Adamu Abubakar with him, Dahiru Garba Muhammad for the 1st & 2nd Respondents

3rd Respondent absent For Respondent(s)