JENRADE v. SANI & ORS (2020)

JENRADE v. SANI & ORS

(2020)LCN/14184(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, May 21, 2020

CA/J/177/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Adzira Gana Mshelia Justice of the Court of Appeal

Tani Yusuf Hassan Justice of the Court of Appeal

Boloukuromo Moses Ugo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

MOBOLAJI JENRADE APPELANT(S)

And

ALHAJI ABDULLAHI SANI 2. MINISTRY OF LANDS, SURVEY AND TOWN PLANING 3. GOVERNOR OF PLATEAU STATE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT A SUBSISTING RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY IS GOOD AGAINST ANY OTHER RIGHT

The law is settled, where there is a subsisting right of occupancy, it is good against any other right. Therefore the grant of another right of occupancy over the same piece of land will be merely illusory and invalid. As long as the previous or earlier title or right of occupancy over piece of land subsists, no other rival or competing title of right of occupancy can simultaneously exist over the same piece of land. Two right of occupancy cannot subsist in respect of the same property or else there will be anarchy- Orianzi Vs. Rivers (2017) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 224 at 236. See also Kari Vs. Ganaram (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt. 488)380. PER HASSAN, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT WHERE TWO CONTESTING PARTIES TRACE THEIR TITLE IN RESPECT OF THE SAME PIECE OF LAND, THE LATTER IN TIME CAN MAINTAIN AN ACTION AGAINST THE PARTY WHO FIRST OBTAINED GRANT OF THE LAND

The principle of law has always been that where two contesting parties trace their title in respect of the same piece of land, the latter in time of the two parties cannot maintain an action against the party who first obtained grant of the land. See Tewogbade Vs. Obadina (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 338) 326 and Olumide Vs. Ajayi (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 517) 433.
The issue is resolved in favour of the 1st respondent and against the appellant. PER HASSAN, J.C.A.

TIMELINE FOR THE DELIVERY OF COURT JUDGEMENT

Section 294(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides:
“Every Court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses and furnish all parties to the case or matter with duly authenticated copies of the decision within seven days of delivery thereof.”
Section 294(5) stipulates thus:
“The decision of a Court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provision of sub-Section (1) of this section unless the Court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal from or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.” PER HASSAN, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT

An appellate Court would only interfere if the appellant has satisfied it that, by the non-compliance, it has suffered a miscarriage of justice. See UBA Plc. Vs. GAP Consultants Ltd. (2017)11 NWLR (Pt. 1577) 357 at 365; Okon Vs. State (2018)12 NWLR (Pt. 1634) 558 at 563; Ukiri Vs. EFCC (2018)1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 155 at 163; Atungwu Vs. Ochekwu (2013)14 NWLR (Pt. 1375) 605 and Odi Vs. Osafile (1985)1 NWLR (Pt.1)18. PER HASSAN, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC DOCUMENT MUST BE CERTIFIED BEFORE IT CAN BE ACCEPTED BY THE COURT

It is settled law that before a copy of a public document can be tendered and accepted by the Court, it must be certified. SeeEmeka Vs. Chuba Ikpeazu (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 345; Jimoh Vs. Min. FCT (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1664) 45 at 55; Tabik Invest. Ltd. Vs. GTB (2011)17 NWLR (Pt. 1276) 240 at 262, and Lorapuu Vs. State (2020)1 NWLR (Pt. 1706) 391 at 400. PER HASSAN, J.C.A.

TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appeal is against the judgment of Plateau State High Court of Justice, Jos delivered on the 18th of September, 2017 in Suit No: PLD/J/111/2011 by Honourable Justice P.D. Damulak (C.J).

The appellant as plaintiff at the lower Court instituted an action by a writ of summons and statement of claim dated the 24th day of March, 2011 against the respondents as defendants therein claiming jointly and severally as follows:
i. A declaration that the plaintiff is the beneficial owner and entitled to a grant of right of occupancy over all that property constituting of an area of 6,318.29 Square meters situated at Zaria Road, Mile 7 Jos in Bassa Local Government Area of Plateau State part of which was purportedly granted to the 1st defendant or whosoever by the 2nd and 3rd defendants.
ii. A declaration that the purported grant of right of occupancy No. PL 1559 over an area of 0.34 acres being part of the larger plot belonging to the plaintiff is illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
iii. An order of Court setting aside the purported grant of R. of O No. PL1559 to the

Defendant or whosoever by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants same having been granted illegally and without complying with the process of land.
iv. An order of Court of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st Defendant from taking any step or further steps or in any way laying claim to ownership of the property or doing any act detrimental to the plaintiff’s exercise of ownership of the property or doing any act detrimental to the plaintiff’s quite enjoyment of the property.

The 1st defendant/respondent filed a statement of defence and counter claim on the 2nd day of April, 2012 with leave of the Court. The 1st Defendant/counter claimant claimed against the plaintiff/appellant at the lower Court as follows:
1. An order restraining the plaintiff, his agents, heirs servants or any other person howsoever called claiming through him from laying claim to the land.
2. Cost of this counter claim.

The 2nd and 3rd respondents did not appear or file statement of defence before the lower Court.
The trial Court foreclosed their defence. Thus issues were joined only between the appellant and the 1st respondent.

The facts of the case are that, the plaintiff/appellant sometimes in 1993 acquired land situated at Zaria Road, Mile 7 Jos in Bassa LGA of Plateau State through a sale agreement between one Mr. Yohanna Ayuba and the plaintiff/appellant, whereby the plaintiff/appellant obtained a Bassa Local Government Change of Ownership and obtained the requisite documents. The plaintiff/appellant applied for a Statutory Right of Occupancy from the 2nd and 3rd respondents having paid the requisite fee. In November, 2010, he received a letter from the firm of Shanding Danboyi & Co. that he trespassed into the land in dispute, consequent upon which he instituted the action against the respondent before the lower Court.

At the trial, the plaintiff/appellant called three witnesses while the 1st respondent also called three witnesses. Exhibits were tendered. In a considered judgment dated the 18th day of September, 2017 the plaintiff/appellant’s claim was dismissed by the trial Court.

Dissatisfied with the judgment, the appellant appealed to this Court. The Notice of Appeal filed on the 14th of November, 2017 contained eight grounds with their particulars.

The appellant’s brief settled by O.E. Akanbi Esq. was dated and filed on 30th April, 2019 but deemed filed on the 9th day of October, 2019. Five issues were distilled therein as follows:
1. “Whether the Evidence adduced by the plaintiff/appellant in this case was sufficient to establish ownership of the subject matter to entitle the plaintiff/appellant to judgment.” (Grounds 1, 2 and 5)
2. “Whether in view of Section 44 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) the plaintiff/appellant has obtained title to the property in question.” (Grounds 6 & 8)
3. “Whether the judgment delivered by the trial Court outside the statutory 90 days after written addresses were adopted by the parties have occasioned miscarriage of justice.” (Ground 4)
4. “Whether the trial Court was right in admitting exhibits “C” and “D” tendered by the 1st defendant/respondent.” (Ground 3)
5. “Whether the Court was right in applying the principle in Adegbite Vs. Amosu (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1536) 415 in view of the circumstances of this case.”

Learned counsel for the appellant adopted the brief and urged

the Court to allow the appeal.

The 1st respondent’s brief dated 6th August, 2019 and filed on 7th August, 2019 was deemed filed on 9th of October, 2019. The brief settled by A.G. Adama has also five issues identified for determination:
“i. Whether from the totality of evidence adduced before the trial Court, the Court was right in dismissing the case of the plaintiff/applicant due to lack of locus standi and lack of credible evidence in favour of the 1st defendant/respondent.
ii. Whether in view of Section 44(1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) there was a valid acquisition of the said land by the 2nd and 3rd respondents and transferred valid title to the 1st respondent.
iii. Whether the judgment delivered outside the 90 days specification offends any law and occasioned injustice to the plaintiff/appellant
v. Whether the trial Court was right in admitting exhibits “C” and “D” tendered by the 1st defendant/respondent.
vi. Whether the trial Court was right in applying the principle in Adegbite Vs. Amosu (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1536) 415 to the present

suit.”

The issues formulated by the parties are similar. I shall consider the appellant’s issues formulated for determination of this appeal while issues one and two will be taken together.
ISSUE ONE
“Whether the evidence adduced by the plaintiff/appellant in this case was sufficient to establish ownership of the subject matter to entitle the plaintiff/appellant to judgment.”
ISSUE TWO
“Whether in view of Section 44 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) the plaintiff/appellant has obtained title to the property in question.”

It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant on issue one, that one of the ways of proof of title to land is by production of title document. He relied on the sale agreement executed between the appellant and Mr. Yohanna Ayuba admitted as exhibit “A” and the case of Ibikunle Vs. Lawani (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 580 at 593-594 para G-E and Idundun Vs. Okumagba (1976) 9-10 SC 277.

That the plaintiff/appellant’s case is premised on exhibit “A” and quiet and long possession he had been enjoying since he purchased the property in 1993.

Referring to the witness statement on oath of the 1st defendant/respondent paragraphs 14 and 15, it is submitted that the 1st defendant/respondent was never in possession of the land before the plaintiff/appellant. Referring to page 146 lines 5-8 of the record, it is submitted that the trial Court’s holding by relying heavily on paragraph 13 of the 1st defendant/respondent witness statement on oath was wrong, as the trial Court failed to avert its mind to the evidence elicited from the 1st defendant/respondent witness under cross-examination at page 113 lines 18-21 when he said that his deposition in paragraph 13 of his statement on oath was based on what Gabriel told him, which is hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible. He referred to Zaki Vs. Magayaki (2002) FWLR (Pt. 135) 798, and urged the Court to resolve in favour of the appellant.

On issue two, counsel referred to Section 44 of the Constitution to submit that payment of compensation is a condition precedent for any acquisition by government for public purpose. He relied on Goldmark Nig. Ltd. Vs. Ibafon Co. Ltd. (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1308) and ELF Pet (Nig.) Ltd. Vs. Umah (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt.

1014).

He referred to the evidence of DW3 where he testified that the land in exhibit “H” falls within the uncompensated area. Exhibit “H” is the file No. PL1559. That failure of the Plateau State Government to pay compensation makes the said acquisition null and void in view of the provision of Section 44(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and the Supreme Court decision in Goldmark Nig. Ltd. Vs. Ibafon Co. Ltd. (supra) at page 358 para E-H. That it is trite, an act which is void in law is a nullity and nothing can be placed on it to stand. The Court was referred toUAC Vs. Mcfoy (1962) AC 158.

Counsel argued that the allocation to the 1st defendant/respondent by the 2nd and 3rd respondents is of no moment because a man cannot give what he does not have in line with the Latin Maxim “Nemo dat quad non Habeat”. That Plateau State Government could not have allocated the said property to David Akanbi& Co.

It is finally submitted on this issue that the customary owner of the land only exercised his right by selling the property to the plaintiff/appellant, which evidence was corroborated by PW2 the son of

Yohanna Ayuba the predecessor in title.

Relying on the case of Lawson Vs. Ajibulu (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) 614, it is submitted that acquiring land from one citizen and transferring same to another citizen is not acquisition for public purpose. He referred to the evidence of the respondent who testified as DW1, that the land in dispute was earlier allocated to David Lade Akanji & Co. by 2nd and 3rd respondents and David Lade Akanji & Co. transferred title to him, after meeting the requirements of the 2nd and 3rd respondents. Counsel argued that purported acquisition by the Plateau State Government and the subsequent allocation to David Lade Akanji & Co. and subsequently to the 1st defendant/respondent cannot amount to public purpose as held by the trial judge. He relied on Lawson Vs. Ajibulu (supra) and urged the Court to resolve in favour of the appellant.

For his part, learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the plaintiff/appellant failed woefully to establish his case and the evidence of his witnesses is not credible. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that the plaintiff/appellant’s claim is that compensation was

not paid to the customary owner upon acquisition by the 2nd and 3rd respondents which entitled him to a valid title. He said under cross-examination, plaintiff/appellant admitted that the Certificate of Occupancy No. 0017713 issued to him by Bassa Local Government was revoked for the reason that it was issued in error in place of Certificate of Occupancy No.1559. Counsel contended that the valid and subsisting title therefore is the Certificate of Occupancy No.1559 bestowed on the 1st defendant/respondent. He also referred to the evidence of PW2 under cross-examination who said that he does not know the land in dispute claimed by the appellant.

It is submitted on behalf of the 1st respondent that the onus is on the plaintiff/appellant to discharge that compensation was not paid by the 2nd and 3rd respondents to customary owner whom the appellant derived his title, to be entitled to judgment. The Court was referred to Aiyetoro Comm. Trad. Co. Ltd. Vs. N.A.C.B Ltd. (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 834) 346; Vulcan Gases Ltd. Vs. G.F Ind. A-G (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 719) 610 and Bongo Vs. Gov. Adamawa State (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1339) 403 among others, to submit that

plaintiff/appellant failed to adduce evidence to substantiate his pleaded facts in paragraphs 14 and 15 of his statement of claim at page 10 of the record. That it is trite that pleaded facts not supported by evidence go to no issue.

Relying on the case of Adelekan Vs. C.B.N (2017)11 NWLR (Pt. 1575) 1, it is submitted that it is incumbent on the customary owner who voluntarily submitted his land to the 3rd respondent to challenge the non-payment of compensation but he did not. That the plaintiff/appellant having failed to discharge the burden placed on him cannot rely on the weakness of the defence. Counsel referred to Agbi Vs. Ogbeh (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 65 SC; Alhaji Otaru & Sons Ltd. Vs. Idris (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 606) 330 at 342 para A-B and Imam Vs. Sheriff (2005)5 NWLR (Pt. 914) 80 at 186-187 paras H-B, 215 paras E-F among others.

On issue two, the submission of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent is that Section 44(1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution was duly complied with by the 2nd and 3rd respondents. That where compensation was not paid, the remedy available to the owner as provided by Section 44(1)(b) of the Constitution is to resort to a

Court of law or tribunal or both having jurisdiction to claim the assessment and payment of same and not to resort to self-help by trespassing into the very land he voluntarily surrendered to the Government. That learned counsel for the appellant does not appreciate the provision of Section 44(1)(b) when he embarked on a voyage of misinterpretation and misapplication. Counsel submitted that by law, the grounds upon which acquisition of land by government is vitiated are:
(a) Where notice for compulsory acquisition was not given to the owner of the land.
(b) Where the compulsory acquisition is not for overriding public interest.

That in the instant case, none of the above is applicable. He referred to the evidence of DW3 under cross-examination where he stated that exhibit “H” falls within the uncompensated area but that the land owner has the right to ask for compensation of the land. He urged us to discountenance the submission of appellant’s counsel on this issue as unfounded. The case of Goldmark Nig. Ltd. Vs. Ibafon Co. Ltd. (supra) was referred to.

Learned counsel finally submitted on his issue that the legal

principle of “Nemodat quad non Habeat” relied by the appellant applies to the customary owner whom the plaintiff claimed to have derived his title and therefore cannot give any valid title to the plaintiff/appellant, same having been acquired by the 2nd and 3rd respondents, and the title claimed by the plaintiff/appellant having been revoked.

The issue of identity of the land in an action for declaration of title to land is very fundamental. The onus is on the plaintiff seeking for the declaration to establish the precise identity of the land he is seeking the declaration. But where the area of land in dispute is well known to the parties, the question of proof of the identity of the land does not arise. In such a situation it cannot be contended that the area claimed of the land in dispute is uncertain. It must be emphasized that in an action where the plaintiff claims a declaration of title to land fails to give the exact extent and identity of the land he is claiming, his action should be dismissed – Per Musdapher JSC (of blessed memory) in Gbadamosi Vs. Dairo (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1021) 282.

In the instant appeal, the land in

dispute is said to be purchased by the appellant from one Yohanna Ayuba, the sale agreement executed is exhibit “A”. The land is situated at Zaria Road, Mile 7 Jos in Bassa Local Government Area of Plateau State. The said Yohanna Ayuba sold the land to the appellant as customary owner of the land. The appellant testified before the lower Court as PW1. His evidence is to the effect that having purchased and paid for the land, he sought and obtained consent of the Bassa Local Government for change of ownership of the land. He applied for grant of Right of Occupancy over the property from Bassa Local Government Council. Following the grant of the Local Government title, the appellant applied for statutory grant of Right of Occupancy from the 2nd and 3rd Respondents.

Further in his evidence, PW1 said sometimes in 1996 he made a complain of trespass on the disputed land to Bassa Local Government against One Mr. David Lade Akanji. The matter was investigated and referred to the 2nd respondent who invited the parties in relation to the application made for statutory Right of Occupancy, but Messrs D.L. Akanji & Co. refused to honour the

invitation.

In November, 2010 PW1 (appellant) said the firm of Shanding Danboyi & Co. wrote a letter dated 24th November, 2010 on behalf of the 1st respondent alleging trespass on the disputed land against him. He instructed his counsel to reply to the letter and also to conduct a search on the title granted to D.L. Akanji & Co. vide Certificate of Occupancy No. PL1559 whereof it was found that the Certificate of Occupancy was granted in 1989, over part of the property measuring 0.34 acres. Under cross-examination, PW1 (appellant) admitted that the Certificate of Occupancy issued to him by Bassa Local Government was revoked because it was issued in error in place of Certificate of Occupancy No. PL1559.

Exhibit “E” is a file No. PL25215. In it is the notice of Revocation from Bassa Local Government addressed to the appellant. It reads:
BS/LGL/VOL. 1/16 19th June, 1996.
Engr. Mobolaji Jenrade,
R & Angwan Rimi Quarters,
Plateau State,
Jos.
REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY NO. 001713:
I am directed to inform you that the Local Government Authority has revoked the Certificate of Occupancy issued to

you in respect of a piece of land covering an area of 0.59 hectares along Zaria Road.
It was later discovered that the Certificate of Occupancy was erroneously issued in defiance of the State Certificate of Occupancy which was issued to one Mr. David Lade Akanji since 1988.
I. Abubakar
For: Chairman
Bassa Local Government Counsel
CC: Mr. David Lade Akanji
Managing Director,
D.L. Akanji & Co. (Nig.) Ltd.
Akanji House
13 Wamba Street Jos
Plateau State.

PW2, Simon Ayuba who witnessed the transaction between the appellant and Yohanna Ayuba is the son of Yohanna Ayuba. Under cross-examination he said he does not know the subject matter of this suit.

DW1 is the 1st respondent. He gave evidence as to how he acquired the land in dispute through purchase from one David Lade Akanji who was the original allotee of the land in dispute. He tendered a Deed of Assignment dated 23rd September, 2009 which is exhibit “B”.

The Certificate of Occupancy issued to David Lade Akanji dated 16th day of February, 1988 in respect of Plot No. 1559 is exhibit “C”. The Assignment of the Right of

Occupancy to the 1st respondent in respect of plot No. PL1559 dated 23rd September, 2010 is exhibit “D”. The revocation letter issued to the appellant and copied to the 1st respondent is exhibit “E”. On the 1st of April, 1995, the office of David Lade Akanji & Co. wrote a letter to the Director General, Bureau for Lands, Survey and Town Planning Jos Plateau State with regard to unauthorized occupation of the Land covered by Certificate of Occupancy No.PL1559 issued in 1989. The said letter of complaint is contained in the file exhibit “H”. The response of Bureau for Lands acknowledging the receipt of the letter is exhibit “F”. The letter written to the appellant for trespass by the 1st respondent’s counsel is dated 24th November, 2010.

Under cross-examination, the 1st respondent confirmed that he bought the land from the Director of the company Gabriel Akanji of David Lade Akanji & Co. He said his lawyer told him that the land in dispute was acquired by Plateau State Government.

DW2, a staff of Ministry of Lands and Survey said under cross-examination that the land in dispute falls under the

uncompensated lands but the land owner has the right to ask for compensation.

DW3, a traditional ruler in Bassa Local Government confirmed the land in dispute to belong to Akanji family having produced documents on the layout allocated by the State Government to the family.

The appellant’s case is that having purchased the land in dispute from the customary owner, he is the beneficial owner and entitled to a grant of Right of Occupancy over the land.

The sale agreement in 1993, executed between the appellant and

Yohanna Ayuba does not confer legal title on the appellant compared to the statutory right of occupancy granted to the appellant’s predecessor in title.

At the time of the issuance of exhibit “C” to David Lade Akanji dated 16th day of February, 1988, the legal interest over the property was in the Plateau State Government and not the appellant who was never granted a statutory right of occupancy over the property. Therefore upon the grant of statutory right of occupancy to the appellants predecessor in title, whatever interest the appellant had in the property is automatically extinguished.

These are matters of evidence. The appellant’s counsel made heavy weather on non-payment of compensation to the customary owner of the property from whom he bought same. The appellant’s claim was not based on non-payment of compensation to the customary owner. His case is that he was entitled to right of occupancy over the disputed property, which I think he has not successfully established.

The Certificate of occupancy issued to the appellant by Bassa Local Government of Plateau State in respect of the land in dispute was

revoked. The reason given for the revocation was that it was erroneously issued in defiance of the State Certificate of Occupancy which was issued to one Mr. David Lade Akanji since 1988 which fact was admitted by the appellant under cross-examination.

At the time the customary right of occupancy was granted to the appellant in 1995 the respondent’s right of occupancy issued in 1988 to the original allotee was subsisting in the land since it had not been revoked, hence the revocation of the appellant’s customary right of occupancy was issued in error.

On issue two, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that compensation was not paid to the customary title owner of the land in dispute which renders the

Plateau State Government’s acquisition of the land in valid.

Section 44 of the Constitution relied by the appellant’s counsel reads:
44(1) “No movable property or any interest in immovable property shall be taken possession of compulsorily and no right of occupancy interest in any such property shall be acquired compulsorily in any part of Nigeria except in the manner and for the purpose prescribed by a law that, among other things:-
(a) Requires the prompt payment of compensation thereof;
(b) Gives, to any person claiming such compensation a right of access for the determination of his interest in the property and the amount of compensation to a Court of law or Tribunal or body having jurisdiction in that part of Nigeria.”
The appellant’s complaint is that since the customary owner of the land in dispute was not compensated by the Plateau State Government after acquiring the land, the non-payment of compensation is invalid and he is entitled to a right of occupancy over the land.
However the Supreme Court in the case of Adegbite Vs. Amosu (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1536) 405 at 415 held thus:

“No one has competence or locus standi in a claim of ownership over land which has been acquired by the government for public purposes.
Once the disputed land is acquired by the Federal Government, all existing rights are extinguished.
Consequently a claimant has no locus standi to institute a case.”
In line with the above decision of the Supreme Court, the appellant lacks the locus standi to institute the action. There is no evidence that the customary owner was not paid compensation apart from the appellant’s assertion. Even if that was the case, the customary owner from whom the appellant derived his title, has the right to resort to Court for the payment of his compensation from the Government. There is no evidence before the Court that he demanded for the payment but was not paid.
However for what it is worth, Section 44(1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provided for a party to seek redress in the Court of law for the payment of compensation from the Government.
DW2 said under cross-examination that the party who was not paid after acquiring his property has the right to ask for compensation.

Where this is not done it does not lie on the mouth of the party to complain.
In any case, the issue is resolved in favour of the 1st respondent and against the appellant.

ISSUE THREE
“Whether the judgment delivered by the trial Court outside the statutory 90 days after written address were adopted by the parties have occasioned miscarriage of justice.”
Appellant’s counsel contended that failure of the trial judge to deliver judgment within the ninety days as provided by Section 294 (1) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) has resulted to improper evaluation of evidence of DW1 (1st respondent) having lost track on the case due to lapse of time and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

Learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted in response that there is no miscarriage of justice and appellant has failed to establish the miscarriage of justice that occasioned. That the assertion is unmeritorious but calculated to survive the suit by all fabricated means as the appellant lacks the locus standi to maintain the suit. That by the provision of Section 294(5) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended)

the judgment shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with Section 294(1) of the Constitution. He relied on Kolawole Ind. Co. Ltd. Vs. A.G Fed (2012) 225 at 229; Wagbatsoma Vs. FRN (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt.1621)198 at 204; Zenith Plastic Ind. Ltd. Vs. Samotech LTD. (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1620) 165 at 169 and Mainstreet Bank Capital Ltd. Vs. NIG. RE (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1640)423 at 431.

The appellant’s grouse is that the trial Court breached Section 294(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) when it delivered its judgment outside the statutory period of 90 days provided by Section 294(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).

Appellant’s counsel submitted that the respective counsel adopted their written addresses on the 15th of May, 2017 and judgment was delivered on 18th September, 2017.

of the decision within seven days of delivery thereof.”
Section 294(5) stipulates thus:
“The decision of a Court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provision of sub-Section (1) of this section unless the Court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal from or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.”
Learned counsel for the appellant argued that because of the delay in delivering the judgment, the learned trial judge did not properly evaluate the evidence of DW1 having lost track of the case due to lapse of time. The learned trial judge in believing the evidence of DW1 (1st respondent) stated in his judgment at page 146 of the record “Furthermore, it is stated by the 1st respondent that the dispute between David A. Akanji & Co. and the plaintiff resulted in the invitation by the Ministry of Land to the traditional ruler of the area where the name of Yohanna Ayuba was not mentioned. This fact was not refuted by the plaintiff. In the light of this I tend to find that the

contention by the plaintiff is doubtful or shrouded in doubt.”
DW1 gave evidence on 24th day of November, 2016 and according to the record, judgment was delivered on 18th September, 2017. So between the periods, the 1st respondent testified and when the learned trial judge considered the evidence was ten months. From the period when addresses were adopted on 15th May, 2017 to September, 2017 when judgment was delivered is four months. In my view, the length of time is not too long for the learned trial judge to have forgotten of the impression she formed when DW1 testified.
In any event, it is the evidence of the appellant that he purchased the land in dispute from one Yohanna Ayuba and the traditional ruler of the area DW3, denied knowledge of the transaction and does not know the said Yohanna Ayuba, that made the learned trial judge to doubt the appellant. This material fact was not disputed by the appellant. I therefore cannot see the miscarriage of justice that was occasioned on the appellant by the delivery of the judgment outside the ninety days prescribed by Section 294(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).
Therefore delivery of

judgment outside 90 days required by Section 294(1) given Section 294(5) of the same section does not ipse facto nullify the judgment.
An appellate Court would only interfere if the appellant has satisfied it that, by the non-compliance, it has suffered a miscarriage of justice. See UBA Plc. Vs. GAP Consultants Ltd. (2017)11 NWLR (Pt. 1577) 357 at 365; Okon Vs. State (2018)12 NWLR (Pt. 1634) 558 at 563; Ukiri Vs. EFCC (2018)1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 155 at 163; Atungwu Vs. Ochekwu (2013)14 NWLR (Pt. 1375) 605 and Odi Vs. Osafile (1985)1 NWLR (Pt.1)18.
In the instant case, the appellant did not adduce evidence of miscarriage of justice occasioned to him in any respect. Issue three is resolved in favour of the 1st respondent and against the appellant.

ISSUE FOUR
“Whether the trial Court was right in admitting exhibits “C” and “D” tendered by the 1st defendant/respondent.”
Learned counsel for the appellant referred to exhibit “C” the Certificate of Occupancy No. PL1559 and exhibit “D” the Right of Occupancy and argued that the documents are public documents within the meaning of

Section 102 of the Evidence Act, 2011, as such only Certified True Copies of the documents are admissible in law in the absence of the original by virtue of Sections 87 and 104 of the Evidence Act. That the said Certificate of Occupancy exhibit “C” and the Right of Occupancy exhibit “D” are photocopies and do not satisfy the requirement of the law. That the best evidence of public document is the Certified True Copy of same. He referred to Dana Impex Ltd. Vs. Awukam (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt. 968) 544 at 562 para D-E.

Relying on the case of Alao Vs. Akano (2005)11 NWLR (Pt. 935) 160 at 178 para D-E, it is submitted that a document that is inadmissible in evidence cannot be admitted, even where there was no objection or where the parties consent to its admissibility. That assuming without conceding that the documents are admissible, proper foundation ought to have been led in tendering them pursuant to Section 87 and 89 of the Evidence Act, for the said documents to be properly admitted.

The Court was urged to expunge the documents in view of the decision in Egbenighe Vs. Achi (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1250) 56 at 78 para B-C and Kubor Vs. Dickson

(2013)4 NWLR (Pt. 1345)539 at 579 para D-G.
We are urged to resolve the issue in favour of the appellant.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the trial Court was right in admitting exhibits “C” and “D” the Certificate of Occupancy and the Right of Occupancy.

He said the documents were pleaded and tendered for their relevancy to the case in proof of the 1st respondent’s entitlement to the land in dispute.

It is submitted that the documents were in custody of the 1st respondent and proper foundation was laid in tendering same. That Section 102 of the Evidence Act, 2011 contemplates a secondary document of a public document kept for the general use of the public, but a document issued to a private individual needs no certification. The Court was referred to IBB Ind. Ltd. Vs. Mutunci Co. Ltd. (2012)97 and Kyari Vs. Alkali (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 725)412 and urged to resolve in favour of the respondent.

Learned counsel for the appellant argued that exhibits “C” and “D” being public documents within the meaning of Section 102 of the Evidence Act 2011, it is only

the certified copies of the documents that are admissible. The contention of the respondents counsel is that exhibits “C” and “D” having been pleaded and relevant to the issue in controversy are admissible in evidence.

There is no doubt exhibits “C” and “D” the Certificate of occupancy and the Right of Occupancy tendered by 1st respondent are photocopies. In the absence of the original document, only a properly certified copy is admissible as secondary evidence but no other kind of secondary evidence will be admitted. In the instant case exhibits “C” and “D” tendered are secondary evidence. They are not certified and therefore are not properly admitted as required by Section 102 of the Evidence Act.

The issue is resolved in favour of the appellant and against the 1st respondent.
ISSUE FIVE
Whether the Court was right in applying the principle in Adegbite Vs. Amosu (2016)15 (Pt. 1536) 415.”
This issue has become academic.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “Academic” as an issue, which does not require answer or adjudication by a Court of law because it is not necessary. A suit becomes academic when the questions placed before the Court for determination are no longer live issues in the subject matter of the suit. See Ijaodola Vs. Unilorin Governing Council (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1638)32 at 34-35; Angadi Vs. P.D.P (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt.1641)1 at 6 and Odedo Vs. INEC (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1117) 554 at 600. In the instant case, the complaint of the appellant has already been taken care of in issue two formulated by the appellant. Therefore to determine if the trial Court was right in applying the principle in Adegbite Vs. Amosu (supra) is an academic exercise and Courts should not engage in an academic exercise, since no purpose will be served. The issue is accordingly struck out.

The appeal succeeds in part with regard issue four, on

the admissibility of uncertified public documents only.

The appeal fails substantially and it is dismissed, all other issues having been resolved in favour of the 1st respondent and against the appellant. A cost of N50,000.00 is awarded in favour of the 1st respondent and against the appellant.

ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA, J.C.A.: I read in advance the leading Judgment of my learned brother, Hassan, J.C.A. just delivered. I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at that the appeal ought to be dismissed as it lacks merit. I too dismiss the appeal and abide by the consequential orders contained in the lead Judgment inclusive of costs.

BOLOUKUROMO MOSES UGO, J.C.A.: I am in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion of my learned brother TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.; including his order as to costs. I have nothing to add.

Appearances:

T.O Oyegbile, with him, Joseph Rengkat, O.E. Akanbi and O.F. Ezeokafor For Appellant(s)

A.G. Adama – for 1st Respondent For Respondent(s)