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JAPAUL MINES AND PRODUCTS LIMITED v. SALROD NIGERIA LIMITED (2019)

JAPAUL MINES AND PRODUCTS LIMITED v. SALROD NIGERIA LIMITED

(2019)LCN/13699(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 25th day of July, 2019

CA/C/292/2017

 

JUSTICES

OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

JAPAUL MINES AND PRODUCTS LTD. Appellant(s)

AND

SALROD NIGERIA LTD Respondent(s)

RATIO

THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING

The law is equally settled that fair hearing or the lack thereof is fundamental to the competence of a Court?s proceedings and the jurisdiction of the Court itself. The principle of fair hearing is therefore fundamental to all Court procedure and proceedings like jurisdiction, the right to fair hearing is both a fundamental and a constitutional right of every party to a dispute who is to be afforded an opportunity to present his case to the adjudicating authority without let or hindrance from the beginning to the end. It also envisages that the Court or Tribunal hearing a case should be fair, impartial and without showing any degree of bias against any of the parties. Thus, every party must be given equal opportunity of presenting his case. See ENL CONSORTIUM LTD V S.S. (NIG) LTD (2018) 11 NWLR (pt 1630) 315 OGLI OKO MEMORIAL FARMS LTD V NIGERIAN AGRICULTURAL AND COOPERATIVE BANK LTD (2008)12 NWLR (pt 1098) 412, MOHAMMED V KANO N.A. (1968) 1 ALL NLR 424 ADIGUN  V ATT. GENERAL OF OYO STATE (supra) and OLAYIOYE V OYELARAN (2019)4 NWLR (pt 1662) 342 at 372. PER SHUAIBU, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A DEFENDANT WHOSE AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT DISCLOSE A GOOD DEFENCE WILL FAIL TO STOP THE COURT FROM ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IN FAVOUR OF THE PLAINTIFF

A defendant whose affidavit does not disclose that he has a good defence to an action on the merits or disclose sufficient facts to entitle him to defend the action generally will fail to stop the Court from entering summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff. See OGUNJUMO V ADEMOLU (1995)4 NWLR (pt 389)254, UTC (NIG) LTD  V PAMOTEI (1989) 2 NWLR (pt 103 244, OBARO V HASSAN (supra) and OKORO V OKORO (2018) 16 NWLR (pt 1646) 506 at 518. PER SHUAIBU, J.C.A.

MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the High court of Cross ? River State delivered by Hon. Justice Michael Edem on the 6th day of June, 2016. The respondent as claimant before the trial Court took out a writ under the undefended list wherein she claimed against the defendant (now appellant) as follows: –
(a) AN ORDER directing the defendant to pay the claimant the sum of N5,905,000.00 (Five Million, Nine Hundred and Five Thousand Naira) only, being outstanding amount due from the supply of 66,000.00 (Sixty Six Thousand) litres of AGO) (Diesel) to the defendant.
(b) 5% interest on the said sum of N5,905,000.00 (Five Million, Nine Hundred and Five Thousand Naira) only, from the 1st of June, 2016 till the day of judgment and thereafter 10% interest rate on the judgment sum from the date of judgment until the entire judgment sum is liquidated.

After hearing the motion Exparte on the 15th day of February, 2016, leave was accordingly granted to the respondent to place the suit on the undefended list and fixed the 23rd day of March, 2017 as the return date for

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hearing. On being served, appellant filed a notice of intention to defend together with affidavit setting out a defence on the merit. But in a considered ruling, the then acting Chief Judge, Michael Edem held that the defendant has no defence on the merit against the action and went ahead to enter judgment for the claimant as per its writ of summons.

Dissatisfied with the said decision, appellant appealed to this Court on 12/6/2017. The appellant notice of appeal at pages 38 ? 41 of the record of appeal contains five grounds of appeal.

At the hearing of the appeal on 13/5/19 Mr. David Obande on behalf of the appellant adopted and relied on the appellant?s brief of argument and appellant?s reply brief respectively filed on 21/11/17 and 6/5/19 but deemed as properly filed 18/3/19 and 13/5/2019 in urging this Court to allow the appeal. Effiom Ayi Esq. adopted and relied on the respondent?s brief of argument filed on 5/4/19 and deemed on 13/5/19 in urging this Court to dismiss the appeal.

Distilled from the five grounds of appeal, learned counsel for the appellant formulated three issues for the determination of this appeal

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as follows: –
1. Whether the learned trial judge prejudged the matter when he proceeded to enter the judgment without considering the appellant?s affidavit of intention to defend thereby breaching the appellant?s right to fair hearing.
2. Whether the learned trial judge erred in law when he failed to comply with the provisions of the Rules of the High Court of Cross River State (Civil Procedure) Rules which required transfer of the suit to the General cause List despite the appellant?s defence raising serious triable issues that ought to be determined by the trial Court.
3. Whether it was right in law for the learned trial judge to assume jurisdiction over the suit on the 15th of February 2017 when the originating processes had not been filed.

?Learned counsel for the respondent on his part formulated two issues namely: –
1. Whether the right of fair hearing of the appellant was breached when the learned trial judge after considering his defence (which disclosed no defence on the merit) proceeded to judgment without transferring the suit to the general cause list.
2. Whether a writ of summons under the undefended

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list procedure should be filed before the application or order for its issuance by the Court or registrar as the case may be.

Before proceeding to consider the argument of learned counsel on both sides on their respective formulations, it is pertinent to state, albeit briefly the facts, of the case as disclosed in the record of appeal.

By a Local Purchase Order (LPO) dated 12th of April, 2016 and 18th May, 2016, the respondent was contracted by the appellant to supply a total of 66,000.00 (Sixty-Six Thousand) litres of diesel at a price of N129.00 and N156.00 per litre respectively totaling N9,405,000.00 (Nine Million, Four Hundred and Five Thousand Naira. That the said supply was delivered and received by the appellant as evident in the copies of the invoices dated 14th April and 23rd May, 2016 Exhibits EA3 and EA4 respectively. When the appellant refused and or neglected to pay the respondent vide a letters of 2nd August, 2016 and 26th August, 2016 Exhibits EA5 and EA6 demanded for payment of the sum owed the respondent.
?
On response to the respondent?s letter of 2nd September, 2016, Exhibit EA7 appellant proposed mode of installmental

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payment wherein between 11th October and 20th December, 2016 the appellant paid a total of N3,500,000.00 leaving outstanding balance of N5,905,000.00 which formed the basis of the respondent?s claim before the trial Court.

I now come back to the respective argument of counsel in support of their various formulations.

Arguing the first issue, learned counsel for the appellant referred copiously to the remarks made by the learned trial judge in submitting that he had prejudged the matter without hearing the appellant and thereby denying the appellant fair hearing. He referred to Section 36 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and the cases of ESHENAKE V GBINIJE (2006)1 NWLR (pt 961) 228 at 249 EJIKE V NWAKWALA (1984) 12 SC 301 at 341 ? 342, ADIGUN V A.G. OYO STATE & ORS (1987) 1 NWLR (pt 53) 678 and GOVERNOR IMO STATE  V  NWAUWA (1997) 2 NWLR (pt 490) 675 to contend that had the trial judge not shut his eyes to the appellant?s defence he would have reached a verdict that was fair to both parties.
?
He further submitted that the

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observations of the trial judge in which he viewed the steps taken by the appellant as ?illegal cause? would clearly convey to an unbiased onlooker the impression that the trial judge had predetermined the case.

On the second issue, learned counsel submitted that once a notice of intention to defend is filed, the Court is duty bound to consider whether same discloses a defence on the merit or raises triable issues. Therefore, the learned trial judge had no discretion on whether the matter ought to be transferred to the general cause list or not once the deposition revealed triable issues and a defence on the merit.

In further contention, learned counsel argued that the appellant?s affidavit in support of his intention to defend sufficiently proved that there were facts in dispute between parties and that the matter will be contested if it goes to trial. He thus submitted that the case was not qualified to be placed and determined under the undefended list, having disclosed arguable and triable issues. He referred to OLU-IBUKUN V OLU IBUKUN (1974)2 SC 41, F.S.B. INT?L LTD  V IMANO (NIG) LTD (2000)

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11 NWLR (pt 679) 620, ACB LTD V GWAGWADA (1994) 4 SCNJ (pt 11) 268 and AKWA IBOM STATE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, AFAHA NSIT V MRS. EKAETTE EKONG (2008) LPELR ? 8446.

On the third issue, learned counsel submitted that before a Court can assume jurisdiction over a matter, the writ of summons must not be issued under undefended list procedure until the Court order is obtained. Therefore, the writ of summons in this case that was filed on 21/2/2017 shows that the Court lacked jurisdiction substantively when it made the orders culminating to the present undefended list on 15/2/2017. Thus, the failure to make an application to issue the writ of summons was a failure to invoke the jurisdiction of Court and renders the proceedings incompetent. He relied on Order 7 Rule 1 of the Cross River State High court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2008 and the authorities in the cases of MANGU MASHINGIL & ORS V CHIEF JETHRO M. AKUN & ORS (2013) LPELR ? 21922, and EKULO FARMS LTD & ANOR ? V ? UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC OBA (2006) LPELR 1101.

He finally urged the Court to resolve all the three

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issues in favour of the appellant and to allow the appeal.

On his first issue, learned counsel for the respondent contended that what emerged from the affidavit of the appellant was nothing but a sham defence aimed at dribbling and frustrating the respondent and cheating it out of the judgment it was entitled to. He thus submitted that the appellant?s deposition as contained in the notice of intention to defend are bereft of particulars and that it is not enough to depose that she paid the sum claimed but that there must be proof of such payment. Thus, the appellant should not be allowed to frustrate the recovery of the respondent?s money. He referred to OKOLI V MORECAB FINANCE (NIG) LTD (2007) ALL FWLR (pt 369) 1164, ABDULLAHI V BUHARI (2004) 17 NWLR (pt 902) 278, GENERAL OIL LTD  V F.S.B INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC (2005) ALL FWLR (pt 277) 1007 and ADO V MEKARA (2009) 9NWLR (pt 1047) 506.
?
Still in argument, learned counsel submitted that the right to fair hearing of the appellant cannot be said to have been breached because the learned trial judge proceeded to judgment after

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considering the ill fated defence of the appellant. Thus, once an opportunity is given to a party, it is entirely up to him to seize the opportunity and adequately state his own side of the story. And should he fail to take advantage afforded to him, he cannot complain of breach of fair hearing. The appellant was given opportunity to file a notice of intention to defend and the trial Court had considered same before arriving at the conclusion that a defence on the merit had not been made out. He referred to JALOBON INVESTMENT (NIG) LTD V OYUS INTERNATIONAL COMPANY (NIG) LTD (2015) ALL FWLR (pt 788) 829 to contend that the appellant cannot complain of denial of fair hearing.

On the second issue, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that what ignites and or invokes the jurisdiction of a Court in an undefended list procedure is the Exparte application and not the writ of summons. That the writ of summons in the instant case accompanied the application of 22nd December, 2016 which was granted on the 15th of February but was filed on 21st of February,2017. Thus, the trial Court have unfettered jurisdiction and that the trial Court had

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complied with the applicable law. He referred to Order 10 Rule 1 of the Cross River State High Court (civil Procedure) Rules 2008 and the cases of OBARO  V  HASSAN (supra) and BAYERO  V MAINASARA & SONS LTD (2006) LPELR 7587.

I have carefully considered the argument of counsel on both sides as regards to the above formulations. It is however, my considered view that the appeal can conveniently be determined upon the appellant?s issues one and three. For the sake of clarity, the said issues are reproduced hereunder as follows: –
1. Whether the learned trial judge prejudged the matter when he proceeded to enter the judgment without considering the appellant?s affidavit of intention to defend, thereby breaching the appellant?s right to fair hearing.
2. Whether it was right in law for the learned trial judge to assume jurisdiction over the suit on the 15th of February, 2017 when the originating processes had not been filed.
?
The appellant?s complaint on the first issue is that the learned trial judge instead of considering its affidavit in support of the notice of intention to defend, had

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descended to the arena and thereby prejudging the case in favour of the respondent.

The right of a person to a fair hearing is so fundamental to our concept of justice that it could neither be waived nor taken away by a statute, whether expressly or by implication. See BAMGBOYE V UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (1999) 10 NWLR (pt 622) 290.

Fairness of proceedings requires among other things that a person who is tainted by likelihood of or actual bias should not take part in the decision making process and thus an adjudicator is under a duty to act fairly.

The appellant?s grievance stemmed from the remarks made by the learned trial judge at page 35 of the record of appeal as follows:-
That perjury is the first opening key to the affidavit. Then the entire affidavit is not worth the ink expended in doting the ?is? and crossing the ?t?. The credibility of the defence if any is vanished being founded in crime of perjury.”
He continued at page 36 of the record of appeal that ?
So in this undefended list issue of contract of supply in contest before me, I will

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never credit the defendant with any credibility having proved himself incredibility personified with morbidity phobia for simple truth. In the result, I have no difficult in believing the claimant that the defendant has no defence whatever under the sun, moon, and star let, alone a defence on the merit against this action.”

I have stated right from the onset that the action giving rise to this appeal is an undefended list procedure wherein the appellant as defendant filed a notice of intention to defend. The rules of Court dealing with cases to be put on the undefended list are designed to ensure quick dispensation of justice.

The law is equally settled that fair hearing or the lack thereof is fundamental to the competence of a Court?s proceedings and the jurisdiction of the Court itself. The principle of fair hearing is therefore fundamental to all Court procedure and proceedings like jurisdiction, the right to fair hearing is both a fundamental and a constitutional right of every party to a dispute who is to be afforded an opportunity to present his case to the adjudicating authority without let or hindrance from the beginning to the

12

end. It also envisages that the Court or Tribunal hearing a case should be fair, impartial and without showing any degree of bias against any of the parties. Thus, every party must be given equal opportunity of presenting his case. See ENL CONSORTIUM LTD V S.S. (NIG) LTD (2018) 11 NWLR (pt 1630) 315 OGLI OKO MEMORIAL FARMS LTD V NIGERIAN AGRICULTURAL AND COOPERATIVE BANK LTD (2008)12 NWLR (pt 1098) 412, MOHAMMED V KANO N.A. (1968) 1 ALL NLR 424 ADIGUN  V ATT. GENERAL OF OYO STATE (supra) and OLAYIOYE V OYELARAN (2019)4 NWLR (pt 1662) 342 at 372.

The question to be asked here is whether the appellant was given equal opportunity of presenting his case and whether the learned trial judge was fair, impartial and did not show any degree of bias against the appellant.

The appellant had averred in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the affidavit setting forth a defence on the merit at pages 29 to 31 as follows:-
2. The defendant denies the claim in its entirety.
3. According to the 1st relief endorsed on the Writ of summons, the sum of N5,905,000.00 is sought from

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the defendant for the supply of 66,000 litres of AGO. 66,000 litres of AGO could not cost 5,905,000.00. The defendant will lead evidence at the trial that the true cost of 66,000 litres of AGO will be in the neighborhood of N9,400,000.00.
4. The defendant further vehemently denies that she agreed with claimant to pay 5% interest on the sum of N5,905,000.00 for the supply of 66,000 litres of AGO or any interest at all. Furthermore, the defendant cannot allegedly receive AGO on the 23rd May 2016 to be allegedly paid for one month after the submission of invoice as averred in paragraph 4 and 5 of the supporting affidavit and attract the purported interest (not agreed by the parties) 8 days later on the 1st June, 2016 instead of the one month alleged for payment to take place. (Paragraph 4 of supporting affidavit).
5. The defendant will contend at the trial that this suit is not consistent with the requisite firmness with which an action is brought.
6. The defendant will further contend that there was no writ of summons before the Court on the 15th February 2017 when this matter was placed on the undefended list.
7. The defendant will show at

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the trial that the writ was filed on the day captured by the cashier?s receipt information at the right bottom corner of the writ which shows 21/2/2017.
8. The defendant will contend therefore that this action is not competent.
9. That defendant will rely on other facts forming further grounds of incompetence of the originating process to wit?
a. Order 10 Rule 1 of the High Court Rules provides for only one sort of application and it is for the ?Issue of a Writ of Summons
b. No such application has been made in this case because there was no writ until the 21/2/2017.
c. The order to place the matter on the undefended list, presupposes that there existed a writ but in this case, there was no writ at the material time.
10. The defendant shall demand proof of the contract agreement alleged in paragraphs 5 of the supporting affidavit and that it restricted the time of payment for the supply of AGO to the defendant.
11. The defendant also vehemently deny Exhibit EA7 of the claimant dated 2/9/16 alleged to have been written by the defendant as our Mr. Olugbenga Jegede did not sign that letter and

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neither is the signature on that document that of Mr. Olugbenga.
12. The said letter is also said to have been written ?without prejudice?.
13. That I know that the defendant did buy AGO from SALROD Nig Ltd and paid for it. The sum N3.5 million admitted by the claimant was the last payment of that transaction. Furthermore, the stamp on Exhibits EA3 and EA4 are only made on paid bills only.
14. The defendant shall prove at the trial that the claimant did not authorize this action and will show that claimant?s managing Director could not have signed Exhibit EA7 of the claimant dated 2/8/16 filed in this case and sign the verifying affidavit and supporting affidavit authorizing this suit.
15. That the defendant has a good defence to this action and most respectfully urge this Honourable Court to send this matter to the general cause list for claimant to prove his claims.

Although, the general approach of the Courts is that some liberality should be brought to bear by the trial Court while considering whether to grant leave to a defendant in an action filed against him, the defendant must depose to facts which disclose

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the existence of triable issues in his affidavit in support of his notice of intention to defend. Thus, having shown intention to defend unless the affidavit evidence proffered by the defendant does not qualify as a defence on merit, the undefended list procedure cannot be justifiably embarked upon. See MACAULAY V NAL MERCHANT BANK LTD (1990) 4 NWLR (pt 144) 283, JIPREZE V OKONKWO (1987)3 NWLR (pt 62) 737, G.M.O. NWORAH & SONS LTD V AKPUTA (2010) LPELR ? 1296 and AGWUNEME V EZE (1990) 3 NWLR (pt 137) 242.

Discerning from the affidavit in support of the appellant?s notice of intention to defend, does the defendant show a bona fide defence on the merit against the backdrop of the earlier admission in Exhibit EA7? The law is clear that if a defendant decides to go on stage to contest an application for summary judgment, he cannot rely on a sham defence. A defendant must therefore show bona fide or good evidence to the claim on the merits and not engage in manipulative and delaying tactics. To show that he has a good defence to the claim the defendant must disclose facts to satisfy

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the Court. To achieve this, he is required to condescend upon particulars and thereby implying a true and real disclosure of facts which the Court can readily discern good defence. See NISHIZAWA LTD  V  JETHWANI (1984) 12 SC 234 and SANUSI  V  COTIA (2000) 6 SC (pt 111) 43 at 58 ? 59.

In the light of the respondent?s claim, the appellant?s affidavit in support of the notice of intention to defend did not disclose a defence on the merit and the learned trial judge was justified when he concluded at page 36 of the record that:-
?Wherefore and on the spotless face of the admission of the defendant tacitly expressed in Exhibit EA7, being its reply to the claimant?s letter of demand and with the combined effect of Exhibits EA3 and EA4 attached to claimant?s supporting affidavit which are liability burden against the defendant; I hold that the defendant is liable. His defence if any charitably so called is as meaningful as one hiding behind his fingers. His notice of intention to defend is a euphemism for notice intention to run away from the truth and murder good faith a veritable

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ingredient in mechanism.”

A defendant whose affidavit does not disclose that he has a good defence to an action on the merits or disclose sufficient facts to entitle him to defend the action generally will fail to stop the Court from entering summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff. See OGUNJUMO V ADEMOLU (1995)4 NWLR (pt 389)254, UTC (NIG) LTD  V PAMOTEI (1989) 2 NWLR (pt 103 244, OBARO V HASSAN (supra) and OKORO V OKORO (2018) 16 NWLR (pt 1646) 506 at 518.

In the instant case, it would have been unjust to allow the appellant to renege from his admission of indebtedness to the respondent by relying on frivolous and sham defence just to further delay the recovery of what had fallen due. I also subscribe to the submission of learned counsel for the respondent that having been given ample opportunity to present his case by filing notice of intention to defend in an undefended list procedure, the appellant cannot be heard to complain of denial of fair hearing.
?The test of real likelihood of bias is that there must be circumstance from which a responsible man would think it

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likely or probable that the decision maker would or did infact, favour one side unfairly. See OLUE V ENENWALI (1976)2 SC 23 and BAMGBOYE V UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (supra).
In the instant case, the parties were given equal opportunity to ventilate their cases and indeed none was denied fair hearing. The fuss of the appellant is mainly on the language used in describing the processes filed by the appellant. In the process of deciding a matter or resolving an issue, the judge is at liberty to make comments that is usually harmless and made by the way. Such views or comment are considered in law as obiter dictum or simply dicta ? things said by the way. They do not constitute the decision of the Court. At any rate, the prop or foundation of a judgment is not relevant. The most important thing is the correctness of the judgment. See ADEDAYO V PDP (2013) 17 NWLR (pt. 1382) 1 STANBIC IBTC PLC V L.T.G.C. LTD (2019)3 NWLR (pt 1659) 374 and EASTERN PLASTICS LTD V SYNCO W.A. LTD (1999)1 NWLR (pt 587) 456.
The first issue is therefore resolved against the appellant.

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The second issue questions the jurisdiction of the trial Court alluding to the fact that the originating process is fundamentally defective and void. I have stated elsewhere in this judgment that the action that gave rise to this appeal is predicated on an undefended list procedure. The relevant provision of the rules of Court governing the said proceeding is Order 10 Rule 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2008 of Cross River State which state as follows:- ?Whenever application is made to a Court for the issue of writ of summons in respect to a claim to recover a debt or liquidated money demand and such application is supported by an affidavit setting the grounds upon which the claim is based and stating that in the deponent?s belief there is no defence thereto, the Court shall, if satisfied that there are good grounds for believing that there is no defence thereto enter the suit for hearing in what shall be called the ?undefended list? and mark the writ of summons accordingly and enter thereon a date for hearing suitable to the circumstances of the particular case.” By the above procedure, the action is

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generally commenced by the plaintiff/claimant for issuance of a writ of summons by the registrar of the High Court concerned. The application is usually made exparte, though it could be made by ordinary application, whereby the other party is not to be involved at that stage of the proceedings. The application is to be supported by an affidavit to which the proposed claim against the defendant must be attached with any other document considered relevant and available to the applicant as exhibit. The judge shall order that a writ of summons be issued by the Registrar and to be marked as ?undefended list? after having taken the application and the Court; upon consideration of all the bundle of documents filed, is satisfied that the case is one fix to be brought under the undefended list. Thus, the writ of summons initiated pursuant to this rule and under this procedure cannot be issued by the Registrar prior to the presentation and consideration of the application for issuance of same by the Court, otherwise it goes without saying that such writ of summons which is issued before the Court?s order so to do becomes incompetent and shall be liable

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to be declared a nullity by the Court. See CASH AFFAIRS FINANCE LTD V INLAND BANK (NIG) LTD (2000)5 NWLR (pt 658) 568 at 587, IDRIS V  ARCHIBONG (2001)9 NWLR (pt 718) 447 at 457 and 459, EQUITY BANK OF NIGERIA LTD V  HALILCO (NIG) LTD (2006)7 NWLR (pt 980) 568 and OBARO V HASSAN (supra).
In the instant case, the writ of summons as shown in the Court?s order at page 16 of the record of appeal accompanied the application of 22nd December, 2016 which was granted on the 15th of February, 2017. I therefore totally agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that it was the motion Exparte that ignites the undefended list procedure being supported by affidavit in support of the said application to issue the writ of summons under the undefended list. It is when the application has been granted by the Court that the Registrar would proceed to issue the writ of summons with endorsement that the suit shall be heard under the undefended list procedure. The respondent?s action was properly initiated and the trial Court had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the matter.

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It is instructive to emphasis that the whole purpose of the rules of Court is to ensure that the affairs of the Court are carried out in an orderly manner with reasonable degree of certainty that prescribed acts have been duly complied with by the parties in the interest of justice. Thus, interest of justice will frown on the parties and the Court being enslaved to rules which are intended to promote justice. I also resolved the second issue against the appellant.

On the whole, the appeal is bereft of any merit and it is accordingly dismissed. The respondent is damnified in costs which I assess and fix at N50,000,00.
?
OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.: I had the singular privilege to read, in draft, the leading judgment delivered by my learned brother; Muhammed L. Shuaibu, JCA. I endorse, in toto, the reasoning and conclusion in it. I, too, penalise the appeal with a deserved dismissal. I abide by the consequential orders decreed in it.

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.: I was given the privilege of reading in advance the draft copy of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, MUHAMMED

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LAWAL SHUAIBU, JCA and I agree with the resolution of the issues formulated for determination in the appeal.
I also agree that the appeal is devoid of merit and must be dismissed.
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I also abide by the other orders made there in the lead judgment.

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Appearances:

David Obande, Esq.For Appellant(s)

Effiom Ayi, Esq. with him, Immaculata IronbarFor Respondent(s)

 

Appearances

David Obande, Esq.For Appellant

 

AND

Effiom Ayi, Esq. with him, Immaculata IronbarFor Respondent