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JACOB TERKAA YANGE v. DEBORAH MUSA (2018)

JACOB TERKAA YANGE v. DEBORAH MUSA

(2018)LCN/11904(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Wednesday, the 11th day of July, 2018

CA/S/12/2017

 

RATIO

COURT AND PROCEDURE: A PERVERSE DECISION

“A perverse decision of a Court can arise in several ways. It could be because the Court ignored the facts or evidence, or that it misconstrued the thrust of the case presented, or took irrelevant matters into account which substantially formed the basis of its decision, or went outside the issues canvassed by the parties to the extent of jeopardizing the merit of the case, or committed various errors that faulted the case beyond redemption. See UDENGWU V. UZUEGBU (2003) 7 SC 64 at 69.” PER MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, J.C.A.

 

 

JUSTICES

HUSSEIN MUKHTAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

JACOB TERKAA YANGE – Appellant(s)

AND

DEBORAH MUSA – Respondent(s)

 

MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading judgment):

The appellant and the respondent were cohabiting as husband and wife peacefully until the 8th day of February, 2015 when owing to momental differences and frictions, resolved to end the relationship peacefully. Consequently, the couple reduced the terms of their separation into writing which was voluntarily executed and witnessed by a counsel before a commissioner for oaths. Prior to the said voluntary separation, the marriage was blessed with a son named Harry Jacob Yange whose custody was mutually given to the husband herein after referred to as the appellant.

In spite of the terms of separation voluntarily executed by the couple, the Applicant herein filed a motion on notice in the Kebbi State High Court in Suit No. KB/HC/M.115/2015 against the respondent claiming the following reliefs: –

1. An order of this honorable Court awarding Deborah Musa the legal guardianship of Harry Jacob.

2. An order of this honourable court directing Jacob Terkaa Yange to join hand with Deborah Musa for the upkeep of Harry Jacob.

1

3. An order of this honourable Court allowing Jacob Terkaa Yange to see Harry Jacob at will within a reasonable time.

4. Any other order that this Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance of this case.

The motion was supported by 22 paragraphs affidavit deposed to by one Elizabeth Fidelis litigation Secretary in applicant?s firm of solicitors. Paragraphs 7 – 19 of the affidavit in support of the said motion on notice read as follows: –

7. The applicant and respondent married on 12th July, 2014 at the U.M.C.A Kanya Danko Wasagu Local Government, Kebbi State.

8. The applicant and the respondent before their church wedding in 2014 had a baby boy on 8th August, 2012 and was named Harry.

9. The applicant and the respondent on 10th February, 2015 agreed to separate and a separation agreement was written to that effect. A copy of which is attached here as EXHIBIT A.

10. The applicant and the respondent after their separation agreed that HARRY (their son) should stay with his mother for his proper upkeep.

11. HARRY is a 3years old born on 8th August, 2012.

12. While HARRY (their son) was staying with the applicant, the applicant enrolled him in Demonstration Nursery and primary school Kamba. A copy of his cash receipt is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

13. HARRY started his school and the applicant always brings him to the respondent whenever he requested to see his son.

14. Sometimes in April, 2015 before the Easter vacation, the respondent requested to see his son (HARRY) and the applicant brought him to the respondent.

15. Immediately after the Easter break, the applicant came to the respondent to take the boy who will be resuming to school, but on arrival the respondent told her that, he took the boy to Benue State.

16. All effort by the applicant to see how the respondent will bring her son to Birnin Kebbi in a place that both parents will have access to him proved abortive.

17. And since then the respondent has been in Birnin Kebbi abandoning the applicant’s child in an unknown place.

18. The applicant’s child had since the respondent deserted with him was not enrolled in any school and had lost the last four (4) months without any formal training.

19. It is not certain whether the applicant’s child is still alive or not because the respondent refused to disclose his whereabouts.

In opposition, the respondent filed a counter affidavit of 23 paragraphs. Paragraphs 5 – 12 of the counter affidavits read thus: –

5. That sometimes in January 2015, I caught the applicant exchanging lover/romantic messages with her boyfriend whom she claimed was her boss.

6. That I confronted the said boyfriend on phone and he profoundly apolozied, contending that the applicant never informed him that she was married.

7. That following the applicant?s consistent adulterous conduct which makes harmonious co-habitation impracticable in spite of my appeals, we resolved to live separately to allow tempers to cool before resuming habitation.

8. That the agreement to separate was reduced to writing by which the terms were spelt out. A copy of the said agreement is herein annexed and marked as ‘JTY’.

9. That by the terms of Exhibit ‘JTY’ the custody of HARRY the only child of the marriage was awarded to one with the right of access to him by the applicant at reasonable times upon reasonable notice.

10. That I left Birnin Kebbi to my home town Gboko shortly before the general elections of 2015 and has since stayed home.

11. That I had taken Harry relocating to my home town.

12. That I had started my relocation plans to Gboko to the knowledge of the applicant since last year.

Paragraphs 15 – 20 of the said counter affidavit states as follows: –

15. That Harry Yange (our son) is staying with me in my house in Gboko town to the knowledge of the applicant.

16. That the applicant knows my house (both private and family) in Gboko as she had regularly visited and stayed there during our courtship and after the marriage.

17. That contrary to the depositions in paragraphs 12 to 19 of the supporting affidavit Harry has been enrolled in school at Gboko and my temporary stay here is for the purpose of answering the ‘charges’ levelled against me by the applicant in this application and similar case filed in the magistrate Court.

18. That the applicant has unhindered access to Harry at all times upon reasonable notice in terms with Exhibit ‘JTY’.

19. That our son Harry is in excellent hands and I am in a better position to enhance his welfare.

20. That the applicant who is staying alone and always on official assignment cannot look after Harry very well.

In view of the conflicting affidavit evidence, the lower Court called for oral evidence wherein both parties testified as PW1 and DW1 respectively and upon consideration of the evidence presented and listing to the argument of counsel of both sides, learned trial judge found at page 93 of the record of appeal as follows: –

”It was my finding that the child Harry, was born before the actual traditional rights. It was also my finding that Harry was born before the blessing of the church. Consequently, neither the Act apply nor the customary law of custody. Sure Harry was born outside the wedlock.”

In view of the above findings, learned trial judge at page 94 of the record of appeal concluded that-

”I am unable to grant 1 the 2nd and 3rd orders as there is no acknowledgement before me and no medical evidence of DN1 to suggest so. I limited myself to the custody of a child born outside wedlock only, not the legal status of the child born outside wedlock.”

Miffed by the above, appellant appealed to this Court through a notice of the appeal containing five grounds of appeal.

In the appellant’s brief of argument deemed filed on 17/01/2018, settled by Abubakar Abdullahi, Esq. three issues were distilled for the determination of this appeal as follows: –

1. Whether the learned trial judge was right to have assumed jurisdiction to hear the case as constituted before him after coming to a conclusion that the marriage of the parties was under native law and culture. (Distilled from ground 1).

2. Whether the findings of the learned trial judge that Harry Terkaa Yange was born outside the wedlock is supported by the evidence before the Court and if not whether the award of custody of the child in favour of the respondent is not liable to be set aside for being perverse. (Distilled from grounds 4 and 5).

3. Whether the learned trial judge was right to have resorted to common law principles to resolve the issue of custody of child under customary marriage without first demonstrating that the custom is repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience. (Distilled from ground 2 and 3).

Before delving into the argument of counsel in respect of the above formulation, it is pertinent to state here that the respondent has failed and or neglected to file any brief in spite of proof of service of the appellant’s brief on her and that the prescribed time for filing respondent’s brief has long expired. That being the position, the respondent will not be heard on this appeal.

Proffering argument on issue No.1, learned appellant’s counsel referred to Section 270 and 272 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) as well as Sections 13 and 17 of the Kebbi State High Court Law 1996 and submitted that the lower Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter relating to any marriage, family status or guardianship under customary law. He further submitted that the role of a judge is to interpret the law and not to fill the lacuna created by the legislature, as the Courts do not have the power to make laws. He referred to KAYDEE VENTURES LTD V. MINISTER, FCT (2010) 7 NWLR (Prt 1192) 204.

On issue No. 2, learned counsel contended that from the evidence before the lower Court both parties agreed that Harry was born on 8/8/2012.

He specifically referred to the evidence of the respondent as PW1 that before Harry was born, the bride price was paid. He thus submitted that payment of bride price constituted marriage under Native law and custom.

On issue No.3, he submitted that Courts are empowered to enforce customary law or customs that are not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience. He referred to Section 34 of the High Court Laws of Kebbi State to the effect that the lower Court fell into grave error by resorting to common law to an issue that was adequately covered by customary law without applying the repugnancy test.

Issue of jurisdiction is fundamental as it touches on the competence of the Court. Jurisdiction remains a threshold issue. Being the livewire of any determination by the Court, it should be considered and determined first before anything else since no matter how well considered the Court?s decision is, it will come to naught once the Court lacks the competence to try and determine the issue before it. See MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341, SKENCONSULT LTD V. UKEY (1981) 1 SC 6 and A.G. LAGOS STATE V. DOSUNMU (1989) NWLR (Prt 111) 552.

Issue No. 1 challenges the jurisdiction of the lower Court to hear and determine issue relating to custody of a child who is a product of a customary marriage. Jurisdiction of a Court is statutorily conferred by statute, the Constitution or a lesser legislation. Where same is vehemently canvassed as does the appellant herein, a Court’s jurisdiction is determinable in the light of what is set out in the enabling law vis-a-vis the claim before the trial Court.

The jurisdiction of the State High Court is specifically conferred by Section 272 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). It read as follows: –

272 (1) subject to the provision of Section 251 and other provisions of this section, the High Court of a State shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue, to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.

(2) The reference to civil or criminal proceedings in this section includes which originates in the High Court to be dealt with by the Court in the exercise of its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction.

Also the provisions of Section 17 (b) of the Kebbi State High Court Laws, 1996 reads: –

”17 (1) (b) subject to the provisions of the Land Use Act and any other written law, the High Court shall not exercise original jurisdiction in any suit or matter which-

(b) Is subject to the jurisdiction of Area Court relating to marriage, family status, guardianship of children, inheritance or the disposition of property on death.”

In ADEYEMI V. OPEYORI (1976) 7 – 10 SC 31, the Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 28 of the Native Courts Ordinance which is in pari materia with Section 17 of Kebbi State High Court Laws held that the High Court shall not exercise original jurisdiction in any matters which is subject to the jurisdiction of a customary Court relating to marriage, family status, guardianship of children and inheritance or disposition of property on death.

However, the High Court is not precluded from adjudicating thereon merely because in the course of such adjudication, it becomes necessary to make some casual or incidental inquiry into any of the matters classified to the proviso aforesaid.

It is well known that jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the plaintiff’s claim and in the instant case the applicant’s claim which was reproduced elsewhere in this judgment clearly and unequivocally relates matters to which jurisdiction of the High Court of a State is ousted. The only issue that came for determination was the custody of a child of the union between the applicant and the respondent. Learned trial judge had appreciated the facts and at page 90 of the record of appeal held as follows:-

”I have gone through the contents of the affidavit and counter affidavit, written addresses and exhibits in this case; in a narrow compass the pivot or land pin of this application is the custody of a child as a result of being at loggerhead for long and bitterly opposed to each other which culminated into separation.”

At page 91, he went further and found thus:

”From all said by the parties viva voice (sic), the marriage is not strictly under the marriage Act, it has been held that celebration of a church marriage merely gives divine blessing to the customary law. It is not one in accordance with Marriage Act.”

Learned trial judge had concluded at page 93 of the record of appeal that: –

”Learned counsel for the respondent was saying I don’t have jurisdiction, which I don’t believe for the simple reason that we don’t have customary Court in kebbi state. We have only sharia Court which cannot adjudicate on a non-Muslim without a written consent from the parties, it is a correct statement of law that if a relief or remedy is provided for by any written law (or by common law) in equity for that matter, that relief or remedy, if properly claimed by the party seeking? To do so would be patently unjust as the Court would always like to do substantial justice between the parties rather than shut door of justice against the parties on mere technicalities.”

In view of the above, I cannot but agree completely with the submission of the learned appellant’s counsel that the only reason why the learned trial judge assumed jurisdiction was simply because there was no customary Court in kebbi state. If a Court has no jurisdiction in any matter, it cannot exercise judicial power to adjudicate. If a Court has no jurisdiction, it cannot exercise the powers granted to it by the Constitution or law to enable it exercise the jurisdiction.

If a Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a matter, whatever merit the matter may have under other laws cannot be enquired into as erroneously done in this case. In fact, the only jurisdiction, it can exercise is jurisdiction to enquire into the question whether it has jurisdiction. See BARCLAYS BANK OF NIGERIA LTD V. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (1976) 1 ALL NLR 409 AT 421.

In A.G. LAGOS STATE V. DOSUNMU (Supra), the Supreme Court was very emphatic that it is futile to set down issues, deliberate on evidence led, resolve points of law raised, if the Court that is seized of the matter is devoid of jurisdiction. The sub-stratum of a Court is no doubt, jurisdiction. Without it the ‘Laboures’ therein, that is both litigants and counsel on the one hand and the judge on the other hand, labour in vain.

It is therefore my respectful but firm view that the learned trial had labored in vain as he cannot under whatever guise assume the jurisdiction that is exclusively reserved for Customary Court.

Having resolved that the trial Court lacked jurisdiction to delve into the matter, the consequential order is to strike out the suit and no more. But being an intermediate Court, I will proceed to determine the remaining issues.

Issue No. 2 questions the evaluation of the evidence by the trial judge in arriving at the conclusion that the child Harry Terkaa was born outside the wedlock and thereby giving custody of the child to the respondent herein.

In his findings, learned trial judge has held that the marriage was under a customary law but that the child Harry was born outside the wedlock. The question here is did the above findings supported by evidence? The answer is obvious in the negative. While testifying, the respondent at page 59 of the record of appeal she said: –

”Jacob Terkaa was my husband a father of the child. When we started he approached me for marriage in the course of the relationship we slept together, on 12th July, 2014 we did the blessing of the marriage at U.M.C.A Church Kanya Danko/Wasagu Local Government.”

In his evidence at pages 66 – 67 of the record, the appellant said-

”Deborah Musa is my wife, I know her since 2010 we traditionally got married 2011, and we had 2 stages the 1st was introduction to know her family members and secondly may give me list which I bought with box. The third one was the payment of bride price when we were married traditionally we started living together as husband and wife we have a child 2012, his name is Harry Jacob Yange. In 2014 we went to the Church for blessing. Our intention was for the church wedding, but the Church said since we are already married and we are living together and we are having child, they cannot wed us they can only pray for us….”

From the above, the trial judge has clearly failed to discern the real question which he was to consider and decide. And once a Court has misapprehended the nature of the case in respect of which it is to give a dispassionate and rational decision, the chances are that the decision otherwise reached will be perverse.

A perverse decision of a Court can arise in several ways. It could be because the Court ignored the facts or evidence, or that it misconstrued the thrust of the case presented, or took irrelevant matters into account which substantially formed the basis of its decision, or went outside the issues canvassed by the parties to the extent of jeopardizing the merit of the case, or committed various errors that faulted the case beyond redemption. See UDENGWU V. UZUEGBU (2003) 7 SC 64 at 69.

In the instant case, the learned trial judge had ignored the facts and evidence and also committed various errors that faulted the case beyond redemption. This invariably resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

Issue No. 3 questions the propriety of resorting to the common law principles in resolving the issue of custody of a child from customary law.

In general, under most systems of customary law in Nigeria the father of a legitimate child or legitimated child has absolute right to custody of the child. However, customary law recognizes that the absolute right of the father will not be enforced where it will be detrimental to the welfare of the child. See page 260 of family law in Nigeria by E.I. Nwogugu.

In the instant case, the custody of the child was given to the mother notwithstanding the findings of the trial Court that the marriage that produced the child was a customary marriage. Learned trial judge resorted to the common law principle that a mother has a right to the custody of an illegitimate child to the exclusion of the natural father of the child. I have earlier held the view that the trial judge had ignored the facts and evidence in the finding that the child was an illegitimate child. And having found that the marriage was under the customary law and custom, there was apparently no basis in resorting to the common law principles. A judgment of the Court must demonstrate that the Court understood the case before it and elicit an open and full consideration of the issues properly raised by the parties and supported by evidence. See POLYCARP OJOGBUE V. AJIE NNUBIA (1972) 1 ALL NLR (Prt 2) 226 at 231.

In the instant case, the conclusion reached by the trial Court did not reflect and justify proper understanding and full consideration of the issues properly raised by the parties and supported by evidence presented.

In the result, all the three issues are resolved against the respondent. The appeal is meritorious and it is accordingly allowed. However, in view of the absence of jurisdiction of the trial Court, the entire proceedings before it are hereby set aside and struck out for want of jurisdiction.

Parties are to bear their respective costs.

HUSSEIN MUKHTAR, J.C.A.: I have had the honour of reading in advance, the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Muhammed Lawal Shuaibu, JCA. I agree with the entire reasoning therein for the conclusion that the appeal has merit. It is accordingly allowed.

I also subscribe to the consequential orders made in the judgement.

FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity of reading the draft of the Judgment of my learned Brother MUHAMMED L. SHUAIBU, JCA just delivered and I am in agreement with his reasoning and conclusions in allowing the appeal as meritorious. I abide by the consequential orders made thereto.

 

Appearances:

B. B. OrpimFor Appellant(s)

A. A. Fingillah with him, O. O. Olusemo and T. O. Ohuwatayo, HB of Hussaini ZakariyyaFor Respondent(s)