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JACKSON v. STATE (2022)

JACKSON v. STATE

(2022)LCN/16925(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(YOLA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Monday, June 27, 2022

CA/YL/158C/2021

Before Our Lordships:

Chidi Nwaoma Uwa Justice of the Court of Appeal

Jamilu Yammama Tukur Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mohammed Lawal Abubakar Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

SUNDAY JACKSON APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

 

RATIO

THE BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

The issues formulated by the parties are similar, I would utilize those formulated by the Appellant in determining the appeal and would resolve the issues in reverse order. It is trite that in a criminal trial, the prosecution is duty bound to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this duty, there are several ways to do so:
1. The confessional statement of the accused person.
2. Circumstantial evidence.
3. Evidence of an eye witness (Direct Evidence).
4. By the combination of all or any of the above methods.
The degree of proof is well settled, it needs not reach certainty but, it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. See ABDULLAHI UMAR VS. THE STATE (2014) LPELR – 23190 (SC) P. 34, PARAS. C – E, AHMED VS. STATE (2001) LPELR – 262 (SC) AJAYI VS THE STATE (2013) 9 NWLR (PT. 1360) PG. 589, HASSAN VS. STATE (2017) 5 NWLR (PT. 1557) PG. 1 and SMART VS. STATE (2016) 9 NWLR (PT. 1517) PG. 447. When the ingredients of any offence the accused is charged with has been proved, then the prosecution is said to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. See also Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011.
PER UWA, J.C.A.

THE INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENCE OF CULPABLE HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE WITH DEATH

The Appellant was charged and convicted for the offence of Culpable Homicide Punishable with death contrary to Section 221 (a) of the Penal Code Cap. 98 Laws of Adamawa State, 1997. The following ingredients must therefore be proved beyond reasonable doubt for a conviction:
a. That the death of a human being has actually occurred.
b. That such death has been caused by the accused.
c. That the act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as:
i. The accused knew or had reason to know that death would be the probable and not only the likely consequence of his act; or
ii. That the accused knew or had reason to know that death would be the probable and not only the likely consequence of any bodily injury which the act was intended to cause.
See HABIBU USMAN VS. THE STATE (2013) LPELR – 20586 (SC) P. 6, PARAS. A – F, STATE VS. DANJUMA (1997) LPELR – 3216 (SC) PP.  23 – 24, PARAS. G – A, PAUL VS. STATE (2019) LPELR – 47386 (SC) P. 7, PARAS. B – F and ZUBAIRU VS. STATE (2021) LPELR – 54227 (CA) PP. 13 – 14, PARAS. B – C.
PER UWA, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW ON CONFESSIONAL STATEMENTS

A confessional statement unequivocally confesses to the commission of the offence charged. See MAGAJI VS. NIGERIAN ARMY (2008) LPELR – 1814 (SC) P. 38, PARA. A, OFORDIKE VS. STATE (2019) LPELR – 46411 (SC) PP. 15 – 16, PARAS. A – E and YESUFU VS. STATE (1976) 6 SC 167. The statement is clear and precise that he the appellant committed the crime charged. The statement was voluntarily made, it is the best evidence which the trial Court could rightly rely on to convict the accused, which the trial Court did after a trial within trial which confirmed that the statement was voluntarily made. See IBEME VS. THE STATE (2013) 10 NWLR (PT. 1362) 333, SOLOLA & ANOR VS. STATE (2005) 11 NWLR (PT. 937) 460 and FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA VS. IWEKA (2013) 2 NWLR (PT. 1341) 258. PER UWA, J.C.A.

CONDTIONS THAT MUST BE PRESENT BEFORE AN ACCUSED PERSON IN A HOMICIDE MATTER CAN RELY ON SELF-DEFENCE

On the first issue of the defence of self defence raised by the Appellant, for the defence to avail the accused person the following conditions must be fulfilled which must co-exist:
(a) The accused must be free from fault in bringing about the encounter.
(b) There must be present an impending peril to life or of great bodily harm.
(c) There must be no safe or reasonable mode of escape by retreat and
(d) There must have been a necessity for taking life.
For the defence to avail an accused person, he must not be the aggressor in the first instance. He must have acted in good faith without premeditation and intention of doing more harm than necessary and the act of the deceased must be sufficient to excite in the accused a reasonable apprehension of imminent danger of death or grievous harm to justify using appropriate defence. See AKPAN VS. THE STATE (1994) 9 NWLR (PT. 368) 347. Also, a plea of self-defence must be tied to evidence for it to succeed. See ADAJE VS. STATE (1979) LPELR – 70 (SC) P. 12, PARAS. A – B. No doubt, the deceased was the aggressor as narrated by the Appellant in his confessional statement, from Exhibits “B1” and “B2”, therefore, that condition was fulfilled. The second condition of there being in existence an impending peril to life or of great bodily harm, this condition was not fulfilled.

THE DEFINITION OF A CONFESSION

A confession is an admission by an accused person of having committed the crime, where as in this case, it was freely given; it is enough to prove the guilt of the Appellant. It is the best evidence. See AKINWUNMI AKINKUNMI VS. THE STATE (2022) LPELR – 57285 (SC) P. 44, PARAS. D – E and KAMILA VS. STATE (2018) LPELR – 43603 (SC) PP. 16 – 18, PARAS. F – C, SAMA’ILA VS. STATE (2021) LPELR – 53084 (SC) P. 30, PARAS. B – F, KOPA VS. STATE (1971) LPELR – 1702 (SC) PP. 3 – 4, PARA. E. 

The law is that a Court can convict solely on the confessional statement of an accused person. See ACHABUA VS. STATE (1976) LPELR – 63 (SC) P. 8, PARAS. A – C. PER UWA, J.C.A.

CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The High Court of Adamawa State in its judgment delivered by Fatima Ahmed Tafida, J on the 10th February, 2021 (hereafter referred to as the trial Court) convicted and sentenced the Appellant to death for the offence of Culpable Homicide Punishable with death contrary to Section 221 (a) of the Penal Code Cap. 98 Laws of Adamawa State, 1997.

At the trial, the Respondent called two (2) witnesses and tendered two (2) Exhibits, the Medical Report showing the cause of death of the deceased (Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘B’) and the confessional statement of the Appellant (Exhibits ‘B1’ and ‘B2’). The Appellant who was dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court appealed to this Court.

The Appellant distilled the following two (2) issues for the determination of the appeal thus:
1. “Whether the learned trial judge was not in grave error to have refused the defendant defence to wit self-defence and to substitute her opinion for what was not stated before her (Grounds 1 & 2) of the Notice of appeal.
​2. Whether the conviction and sentence of the defendant can be sustained under Section 221 of the Penal Code Laws of Adamawa State.”

The Respondent on her part distilled the following two (2) issues for the determination of the appeal thus:
1. “Whether the Respondent had proved the charge of Culpable Homicide Punishable with Death to warrant the trial Court into convicting and sentencing the Appellant to death by hanging.
2. Whether the defense of self-defense made by the Appellant was proved at the trial Court to warrant this Honourable Court to exonerate him from the said charge against him.”

In arguing the appeal, the learned counsel S.A. Akanni Esq., adopted and relied on his brief of argument filed on 10/12/21 and a reply brief filed on 23/2/22, in urging this Court to allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence of the Appellant. In arguing his first issue, reference was made to the case of OBINNA OCHI VS. THE STATE (2018) LPELR – 45064 in highlighting the ingredients to be proved by the prosecution to ground a conviction for the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death. Reliance was placed on the case of LAOYE VS. THE STATE ​(1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 10) PAGE 832. It was submitted that the only evidence of what transpired is the statement of the Appellant and his oral evidence before the Court, pages 15 – 17 and 76 – 78 of the printed records of appeal.

It was submitted that the appellant was under a serious apprehension of his life being taken (death) having been stabbed twice on his leg and the back of his head, the stabbing at the back of his head was confirmed by the trial Court at page 77 of the records of appeal. It was argued that the deceased was the aggressor and the act of the Appellant on the deceased was not intentional. It was argued that self defence was well made out by the Appellant, Sections 23, 24 and 59 of the Penal Code Laws of Adamawa State and Section 33 (2) (a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) were referred to. It was alleged that the trial Court did not consider the self defence put forward by the Appellant which led to the death of the deceased.

In arguing his issue two, the learned counsel highlighted the provisions of Section 221 of the Penal Code, Laws of Adamawa State which is in pari materia with the Penal Code of the then Northern Nigeria, Cap. 89, 1963, 4th Edition in respect of what has to be proved to secure a conviction. It was submitted that the trial Court admitted the statement of the Appellant as Exhibits B1 and B2, page 53 of the records and his testimony in his extra Judicial Statement at page 77 of the records, the contents being more or less the same. It was concluded on this issue that it was the frustration of the deceased who did not see those that killed his cow in the farm that led to his attack on the Appellant.

In response, the learned counsel to the Respondent, N.J. Atiku Esq., Senior State Counsel I of the Adamawa State Ministry of Justice, adopted and relied on his brief of argument filed on 15/2/22 in urging us to discountenance the argument of the learned counsel to the appellant, dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the trial Court. The two issues were argued together. It was submitted that the prosecution is duty bound to prove the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt through any of the following means:
1. Confessional statement of the Defendant.
2. Circumstantial Evidence.
3. Evidence of an eye witness.
See OKUNAYA VS. STATE (2020) 2 NWLR (PT. 1709) PAGE 476, DURU VS. STATE (2017) 4 NWLR (PT. 1554) at 24 PARAGRAPHS F – H and ABIRIFON VS. THE STATE (2013) 5 NWLR (PT. 1372) at 596. The learned counsel outlined what has to be proved in a charge of Culpable Homicide punishable with death as follows:
(a) That the death of a human being has occurred.
(b) That such death was caused by the accused.
(c) That the act was done with the intention of causing death or done with the intention of causing bodily injury as:-
(i) The accused knew or had reason to know that death would be the probable and not only the likely consequence of his act; or
(ii) The accused knew or had reason to know that death would be the probable and not only the likely consequence of any bodily injury which the act was intended to cause.

It was submitted that the evidence of the PW1 (Dr. Nuhu Tari) was to the effect that someone died. It was submitted that the PW2 (ASP. Victor Alfred) proved that the Appellant caused the death of the deceased (Ardo Buba Bawuro) through the confessional statement of the appellant, Exhibits B1 and B2 and that the act was with the intention of causing death or done with the intention of causing bodily injury which was proved.

On the issue of self defence raised by the Appellant, for it to avail the Appellant, the following conditions to be fulfilled were given as follows:
a. The accused must be free from fault in bringing about the encounter.
b. There must be present, the danger to life or great bodily harm.
c. There must be no safe or reasonable mode of escape by retreat.
d. There must have been a necessity for taking life.
See JEREMIAH VS. THE STATE (2012) 14 NWLR (PT. 1320) PAGE 248. It was submitted that for self defence to avail, the Appellant, the deceased must be the aggressor which was proved with the evidence of the Appellant before the trial Court. It was submitted that the existence of impending peril to life or great bodily harm of the Appellant was not proved. See F.R.N. VS. MAMU (2020) 15 NWLR (PT. 1747) PAGE 313. It was argued that a confessional statement alone is sufficient to ground a conviction as long as it was voluntarily made, direct, positive and unequivocal. See BLESSING VS. F.R.N. (2015) 13 NWLR (PT. 1475) PAGE 9. It was submitted that a confessional statement is the best evidence against the accused person to ground a conviction. See ADAMU VS. THE STATE (2017) 16 NWLR (PT. 1592) PAGE 366. It was submitted that the Appellant on recovering the dagger from the deceased, ought to have run away or inflicted injury on the deceased, on his legs or arms rather than the neck. But, that stabbing the deceased on the neck could have been the probable and not likely consequence of his act. Further, that for the self defence to avail the Appellant, there must be evidence to which it could be tied to. See AMINU VS. STATE (2020) 6 NWLR (PT. 1720) P. 206. It was concluded that the Appellant did not tender any medical report to corroborate the fact that he the Appellant sustained injuries and was treated.

It was argued that the Appellant in his confessional statement did not state that he was pursued by the deceased and stabbed, the stabbing was said to be an afterthought.

In his reply, the learned counsel to the appellant submitted that the respondent had the greater burden of proving the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt. See STATE VS. NJOKU (2010) 6 NWLR (PT. 1720) PAGE 206 and Section 36 of the Constitution (as amended) which presumes a defendant to be innocent until the contrary is proved by evidence adduced by the prosecutor and/or under cross-examination. It was submitted that it is true that a confessional statement could ground a conviction but, that in the present case the alleged confessional statement is not unequivocal, there is a “but” which is the defence of self-defence put forward by the appellant. See UWAEKWEGHINYA VS. STATE (2005) ALL FWLR (PT. 529) PAGE 1911 PAGE 1930, PARAS. E – F. It was submitted that a confessional statement does not excuse the prosecution from the burden of proof. See BABANGIDA VS. F.R.N. (2017) ALL FWLR (PT. 914) PAGE 1028at PAGE 1043, PARAS. D – F. Further, that the Appellant was not cross-examined on the possible means of escape. See SHEHU VS. STATE (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 523) PAGE 1841, at PAGE 1866, PARA. G. It was argued that the trial Court saw the wounds where the Appellant was stabbed. See Section 127 (1) (a) of the Evidence Act, 2011. It was submitted that a medical report was therefore irrelevant. It was concluded that the learned counsel to the Respondent agreed that the deceased was the aggressor.

The issues formulated by the parties are similar, I would utilize those formulated by the Appellant in determining the appeal and would resolve the issues in reverse order. It is trite that in a criminal trial, the prosecution is duty bound to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this duty, there are several ways to do so:
1. The confessional statement of the accused person.
2. Circumstantial evidence.
3. Evidence of an eye witness (Direct Evidence).
4. By the combination of all or any of the above methods.
The degree of proof is well settled, it needs not reach certainty but, it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. See ABDULLAHI UMAR VS. THE STATE (2014) LPELR – 23190 (SC) P. 34, PARAS. C – E, AHMED VS. STATE (2001) LPELR – 262 (SC) AJAYI VS THE STATE (2013) 9 NWLR (PT. 1360) PG. 589, HASSAN VS. STATE (2017) 5 NWLR (PT. 1557) PG. 1 and SMART VS. STATE (2016) 9 NWLR (PT. 1517) PG. 447. When the ingredients of any offence the accused is charged with has been proved, then the prosecution is said to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. See also Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011.

The Appellant was charged and convicted for the offence of Culpable Homicide Punishable with death contrary to Section 221 (a) of the Penal Code Cap. 98 Laws of Adamawa State, 1997. The following ingredients must therefore be proved beyond reasonable doubt for a conviction:
a. That the death of a human being has actually occurred.
b. That such death has been caused by the accused.
c. That the act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as:
i. The accused knew or had reason to know that death would be the probable and not only the likely consequence of his act; or
ii. That the accused knew or had reason to know that death would be the probable and not only the likely consequence of any bodily injury which the act was intended to cause.
See HABIBU USMAN VS. THE STATE (2013) LPELR – 20586 (SC) P. 6, PARAS. A – F, STATE VS. DANJUMA (1997) LPELR – 3216 (SC) PP.  23 – 24, PARAS. G – A, PAUL VS. STATE (2019) LPELR – 47386 (SC) P. 7, PARAS. B – F and ZUBAIRU VS. STATE (2021) LPELR – 54227 (CA) PP. 13 – 14, PARAS. B – C.

There is no doubt that the death of a human being Ardo Buba Bawuro has occurred. The PW1 Dr. Nuhu Tare, who examined the body and wrote the coroner’s report in his evidence in Court, confirmed the death of the deceased. There was no contrary evidence whatsoever that Ardo Buba Bawuro is still alive. The medical reports showing the cause of death of the deceased were admitted in evidence as Exhibits “A” and “B”.

There is also no doubt that the death of the deceased was caused by the Appellant. The PW2 (ASP Victor Alfred) recorded the statement made by the Appellant which was confessional in nature, which was admitted in evidence as Exhibits B1 and B2 after a trial within trial was conducted. In the Appellant’s statement to the police at pages 15 – 17 the Appellant partly stated as follows:
“On Tuesday 27/01/15 at about 11.10 hrs I left my village and was cutting thatching grasses in a bush located in Kodanti village of Numan LGA when the deceased Alh. Buba Baruwo as identified attacked me after loosing (sic) sight of some persons he alleged to be persuing (sic) for killing his cattle. He attacked me in frustration and wanted to stab me with a dagger then we engaged in a wrestling encounter, I succeeded in seizing the dagger from him which I used to stabbed (sic) him trice on his throat. When the deceased collapsed and was rolling down in pool of his blood, I took to heels (sic) and escaped my facing cap and sickle fell down at the scene, I also threw away the knife immediately on the same spot before I escaped. I informed my mother when I got home and she narrated the incident to her younger brother as I was told custody (sic). I was identified to be the suspect when the cap I abandon (sic) in the bush was presented to our community for identification. I committed the crime alone and was not instigated by anyone to commit the offence. I know he will definately die because I stabbed him on the throat trice with intention to kill him.”
(underlined mine for emphasis)

The Appellant in his statement to the police admitted killing the deceased. 

A confessional statement unequivocally confesses to the commission of the offence charged. See MAGAJI VS. NIGERIAN ARMY (2008) LPELR – 1814 (SC) P. 38, PARA. A, OFORDIKE VS. STATE (2019) LPELR – 46411 (SC) PP. 15 – 16, PARAS. A – E and YESUFU VS. STATE (1976) 6 SC 167. The statement is clear and precise that he the appellant committed the crime charged. The statement was voluntarily made, it is the best evidence which the trial Court could rightly rely on to convict the accused, which the trial Court did after a trial within trial which confirmed that the statement was voluntarily made. See IBEME VS. THE STATE (2013) 10 NWLR (PT. 1362) 333, SOLOLA & ANOR VS. STATE (2005) 11 NWLR (PT. 937) 460 and FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA VS. IWEKA (2013) 2 NWLR (PT. 1341) 258.

The third ingredient of the offence, that the act was done with the intention of causing death or done with the intention of causing bodily injury as:
(i) The accused knew or had reason to know that death would be the probable and not only the likely consequence of his act; or
(ii) The accused knew or had reason to know that death would be the probable and not only the likely consequence of any bodily injury.

From the statement of the Appellant, the deceased was said to have attacked the Appellant in the farm, both wrestled and the appellant succeeded in seizing the dagger from the deceased and stabbed him thrice on his throat; the deceased collapsed and rolled in the pool of his own blood, the Appellant thereafter took to his heels and ran away. The Appellant stabbed the deceased three times and on the throat which is a very delicate part of the body from where blood vessels flow to the rest of the body even from a layman’s view. As rightly argued by the learned Senior State Counsel, a reasonable person ought to know that stabbing a person around the neck region, even once, death would be a probable and the likely consequence of his act, the Appellant knew this and stated so in his statement when he stated thus:
“I knew he will definitely die because I stabbed him on the throat trice with intention to kill him.”

The Appellant’s intention was to kill the deceased and he succeeded in doing so, the multiple stabs on the throat was to ensure that the deceased died. The Appellant had successfully disarmed the deceased but, went ahead to stab him three times on the neck, not on the arm or leg that would have immobilized the deceased from further attacking him which would have probably spared the deceased’ life. The learned Senior State Counsel was right to have submitted that the throat is a sensitive part of the human body and that a reasonable person ought to know that stabbing a person around that region even once, death would be a probable and not a likely consequence of his act. It was argued by the learned counsel to the Appellant that it was the deceased that assaulted the defendant in the first place without any provocation from the Appellant. The only evidence of what transpired at the scene is that of the Appellant who admitted that he stabbed the deceased three times on the throat and that he intended to kill the deceased. Even though the Appellant in his testimony in Court testified that the deceased would have killed him but, a man who had been disarmed, wrestled down and weak could not be said to have been in a position to kill the Appellant if the Appellant had not killed him. The Appellant’s second issue is resolved against him.

On the first issue of the defence of self defence raised by the Appellant, for the defence to avail the accused person the following conditions must be fulfilled which must co-exist:
(a) The accused must be free from fault in bringing about the encounter.
(b) There must be present an impending peril to life or of great bodily harm.
(c) There must be no safe or reasonable mode of escape by retreat and
(d) There must have been a necessity for taking life.
For the defence to avail an accused person, he must not be the aggressor in the first instance. He must have acted in good faith without premeditation and intention of doing more harm than necessary and the act of the deceased must be sufficient to excite in the accused a reasonable apprehension of imminent danger of death or grievous harm to justify using appropriate defence. See AKPAN VS. THE STATE (1994) 9 NWLR (PT. 368) 347. Also, a plea of self-defence must be tied to evidence for it to succeed. See ADAJE VS. STATE (1979) LPELR – 70 (SC) P. 12, PARAS. A – B. No doubt, the deceased was the aggressor as narrated by the Appellant in his confessional statement, from Exhibits “B1” and “B2”, therefore, that condition was fulfilled. The second condition of there being in existence an impending peril to life or of great bodily harm, this condition was not fulfilled.

A confession is an admission by an accused person of having committed the crime, where as in this case, it was freely given; it is enough to prove the guilt of the Appellant. It is the best evidence. See AKINWUNMI AKINKUNMI VS. THE STATE (2022) LPELR – 57285 (SC) P. 44, PARAS. D – E and KAMILA VS. STATE (2018) LPELR – 43603 (SC) PP. 16 – 18, PARAS. F – C, SAMA’ILA VS. STATE (2021) LPELR – 53084 (SC) P. 30, PARAS. B – F, KOPA VS. STATE (1971) LPELR – 1702 (SC) PP. 3 – 4, PARA. E. 

The law is that a Court can convict solely on the confessional statement of an accused person. See ACHABUA VS. STATE (1976) LPELR – 63 (SC) P. 8, PARAS. A – C.

The Appellant in his statement to the police, stated that at the time, his life was in danger when the deceased was armed with a dagger but, he was able to disarm the deceased of his dagger, he was therefore out of danger. The incident was in the bush not an enclosure where there was no chance of escape, the Appellant having disarmed the deceased of the dagger could have run away with the dagger or thrown it away and taken to his heels. When the appellant disarmed the deceased, his life was no longer threatened; it was no longer a necessity to stab the deceased on the throat not once but, three times. The deceased had no other weapon that would have endangered the Appellant’s life. On the other hand, the Appellant could have stabbed the deceased on the arm, leg, back, shoulder anywhere else but, the throat to weaken the deceased or to be able to escape from the deceased. A single stab on the throat being a sensitive part of the body is enough to have envisaged that death was a probable and not only a likely consequence of his act. Further, when the Appellant disarmed the deceased, he no longer posed a threat on the life of the Appellant who alleged that he had sustained injuries at the back of his head and his leg.

At page 91 of the printed records of appeal, the trial Court held thus:
“The Defendant having disarmed the deceased had the opportunity to escape from the scene which is in his farm or even throw (sic) away the knife far from the reach of both of them.
Self-defence will only avail an accused who reacted spontaneously to an unprovoked attack in order to avoid the said attack against him and to defend himself from further attack. See the case of FAMAKINWA VS. STATE (2016) 11 NWLR (PT. 1524) P. 538.
….
In the instant case, the Defendant having disarmed the deceased person, he had the opportunity to escape because it was in an open field with no barriers stopping him, and for him to stab the deceased on the throat not once but three times, that goes to show that the Defendant intended to kill the deceased and not trying to escape for his life.”

I am at one with the above view of the trial Court, it is unassailable. I hold that the defence of self defence cannot avail the Appellant. The first issue is resolved against the Appellant.

The two issues having been resolved against the Appellant, the appeal is without merit and it is hereby dismissed. I affirm the conviction and sentence of the trial Court in its judgment delivered on 10th day of February, 2021.

JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft the copy of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, JCA. I am in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion of my lord dismissing the appeal and affirming the decision of the lower Court. I have nothing further to add.

MOHAMMED LAWAL ABUBAKAR, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft, lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Chidi Nwaoma Uwa, JCA in the matter. I entirely agreed with the issues and conclusion that the appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed.
I have nothing to do more.

Appearances:

  1. A. Akanni Esq. with him D. N. Shiklam Esq. For Appellant(s)
  2. J. Atiku, State Counsel I, Adamawa State Ministry of Justice. For Respondent(s)