LawCare Nigeria

Nigeria Legal Information & Law Reports

J.O. AMAWO & ANOR VS ATTORNEY-GENERAL NORTH CENTRAL STATE & 2 ORS-1973

J.O. AMAWO & ANOR VS ATTORNEY-GENERAL NORTH CENTRAL STATE & 2 ORS

(1973) LCN/1696(SC)

In the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Friday, June 15, 1973


Case N
umber: SC. 217/1973

RATIO

 WORDS AND PHRASES: ESTOPPEL BY RES JUDICATA

Estoppel by res judicata is a defence of estoppel and can only be so set up or pleaded. At the stage of the proceedings at which it was here canvassed there had been no order for pleadings and no such pleadings had been filed. The plaintiffs have not yet stated their case and therefore there can be no suggestion of a defence being filed to that case.

We think it well established that where there should be pleadings res judicata should be properly set up as a plea in defence, and the particulars of such a plea should also be included in such a way as should be sufficient to apprise the plaintiff of the matters being relied upon as estopping him from litigating or relitigating a particular issue or case. Where there are no pleadings it is of utmost necessity that the evidence be clearly identified in order to establish and to make it clear the purpose of the evidence and what it is intended to establish by the evidence. In the present case neither of those courses was adopted and we are in agreement with learned counsel for the appellants who had rightly complained before us that in the determination of the application on res judicata the proceedings was misconceived to the detriment of the plaintiffs .

What we say in a nutshell is that where pleadings are filed res judicata being a plea should be raised as such. Where pleadings are not filed then it should be raised by evidence at the earliest opportunity. In Spencer Bower: Res Judicata (2nd edition) page 345 paragraph 410, the following statement of the procedural law and with which we are in full agreement, is set out:-

“The pleading in which the estoppel must be raised, if it is pleadable at all, is that which answers the first pleading on the opposite side manifesting an unmistakable intention to canvass the merits of the res judicata and containing allegations contradictory of any question of law or issue of fact thereby determined. If the statement of claim (or declaration, or bill, in former times) sets out a matter of this character, then the defendant must plead the estoppel in his plea, answer, or defence; if such matter first appears in a plea, or defence, then it is for the plaintiff to plead the estoppel in his replication or reply; if the challenge is not made until the replication or reply, the defendant must take it up in his rejoinder.” PER B. A. COKER, J.S.C.

JUSTICES:

COKER, CHIEF JUSTICE, NIGERIA

FATAYI-WILLIAMS, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT

IRIKEFE, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT

 

APPELLANTS

J.O. AMAWOMRS V.E. ALAKA

 

RESPONDENTS

ATTORNEY-GENERAL NORTH CENTRAL STATE & 2 ORS

 

 

 

COKER, JSC. (Delivering the judgement of the Court)

This appeal is against the Ruling of Bello S.P.J. (High Court, Kaduna, North-Central State) in Suit No. NCH/31/1972 by which the plaintiffs claim against the present 3rd defendant, Alhaji Tijani Hashim was dismissed with costs. In the action instituted by the plaintiffs (now appellants), the writ was endorsed as follows:- “The Plaintiffs claim against the Defendants, jointly and in the alternative is for a declaration of this Honourable Court that the Certificate of Occupancy No. 14468 granted to Alhaji Hashim is null and void and of no effect whatsoever in the Law in so far as it relates to Plot M4 Ahmadu Bello Way which is covered by a Certificate of Occupancy No. 3380 of 13th April, 1933.” The plaintiffs in the action were – (i) J. O. AMAWO; (ii) MRS. V. E. ALAKA. They are the present appellants before us; the respondents before us are the defendants to the action, and they are – (i) THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, NORTH-CENTRAL STATE; (ii) THE ADMINISTRATOR, KADUNA, CAPITAL TERRITORY; (III) ALHAJI TIJANI HASHIM. Soon after the writ was filed in court and the action entered, the plaintiffs filed an application in the court asking for an Interim Injunction to restrain “the 3rd defendant/respondent by himself, his agents and/or servants or otherwise from entering on the land and building in dispute”. The motion was fully argued on both sides and eventually dismissed by the court. Later learned counsel on behalf of the 1st and the 2nd defendants i.e. The Attorney-General and the Administrator of Kaduna Capital Territory filed a motion for an order ‘under Order 28 of the old Supreme Court Rules (applicable in the North-Central State) to dismiss the action and for such further or other order as this honourable Court deem fit.” The application was supported by an affidavit stating that the 1st defendant as Attorney-General represents the government of the North-Central State and that the 2nd defendant is the Kaduna Local Authority, that the provisions of the Petition of Rights Law Cap. 95 have not been complied with and that no Statutory Notices of the intention to commence the proceedings had been served on those defendants. That motion was dated the 1st of July, 1972; on the 5th of July, 1972, another motion was filed on behalf of the 3rd defendant Alhaji Tijani Hashim, asking for an Order that this mater be dismissed as “it is sub judice an abuse of the process of the court, vexatious and scandalous and for further Order or Orders as this Court may deem fit to make under the circumstance.”

This application was accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by Mr. Dahiru Musdapher a legal practitioner of Kano and it contains a number of facts concerning a previous litigation between one of the plaintiffs and the present 3rd defendant and indeed attaching as an exhibit to the said affidavit a copy of the Statement of Defence which the present 1st plaintiff had filed as a defendant to that action. Both motions were eventually argued together and the motion on behalf of the Attorney-General was dismissed. Up to the time that the motions were argued, no order for pleadings was sought or made and it is obvious that the facts canvassed in and by the several applications were based on the affidavits before the court. There is no appeal before us against the dismissal of the application by the 1st and 2nd defendants but we must observe that Order 28 of the old Supreme Court Rules under which that application was brought postulates that there should have been filed a Statement of Claim on behalf of the plaintiff or plaintiffs before the order can apply. Order 28 of the Supreme Court Rules provides as follows :- ORDER XXVIII DISMISSAL OF SUIT ON GROUNDS OF LAW “1. Where a defendant conceives that he has a good legal or equitable defence to the suit, so that even if the allegations of the plaintiff were admitted or established, yet the plaintiff would not be entitled to any decree against the defendant, he may raise this defence by a motion that the suit be dismissed without any answer upon questions of fact being required from him. 2. For the purposes of such application, the defendant shall be taken as admitting the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations, and no evidence respecting matters of fact, and no discussion of questions of fact, shall be allowed. 3. The court, on hearing the application shall either dismiss the suit or order the defendant to answer the plaintiff’s allegations of fact, and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just.” It is obvious from the wording of this order that a Statement of Claim at least must have been filed before the order can be invoked. Rule 1 clearly speaks of “the allegations of the plaintiff” being admitted or established. Rule 2 requires that for the purposes of an application under the Order “the defendants shall be taken as admitting the truth of the plaintiffs’ allegations” and when we come to Rule 3, we find that if the court is satisfied that the application was properly made under that order then the court shall dismiss the plaintiffs’ action and if on the other hand the court is not so satisfied it will then order “the defendant to answer the plaintiff’s allegations of fact.” We think it proper to point out that the whole of Order 28 required that some sort of pleading should have been filed before it can be invoked. PAGE| 4 In the course of the argument of the present motion facts were freely referred to by both sides which had not yet been pleaded and were not contained in the affidavits and a situation was manifestly created whereby momentous issues of facts were raised and decided merely on affidavits. In the same way, the application by the 3rd defendant was argued by the learned counsel for 3rd defendant Mr. Kaloma Alli. The notes taken by the learned trial Judge of the argument reads as follows:- “Kaloma: I associate myself with Mr. Salami. I would argue my motion that the case is res judicata. Refers to the writ, affidavit and certified copy of judgment of the High Court. Suit in the former suit was between 1st Plaintiff and 3rd Defendant.” As stated before, all sides argued the motion accordingly and at the end of the day, the learned trial Judge acceded to the prayer of the 3rd defendant and his application and dismissed the plaintiff’s case as against that of defendant with costs. Hence this appeal. Before us on appeal, it was submitted that the entire proceedings were misconceived and that in any case res judicata was not established. Learned counsel for the 3rd defendant resisted this submission and argued firstly that an application of the type he had brought could have been rightly brought at any stage of the proceedings, even before the filing of pleadings, and also that res judicata was established inasmuch as the 1st plaintiff had as defendant in an earlier action instituted by the 3rd defendant as plaintiff defended his occupation of the land and building concerned as one of the children of the late Pa Ogunshina whose children the two plaintiffs are. Learned counsel for the 3rd defendant was unable to refer us to any authorities on the propriety of the procedure adopted by him but he contended strenuously that the authorities on which learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied for disproving res judicata did not apply to the present case. We have already set out the nature of the order sought on the application of the 3rd defendant. The application was to have the case dismissed on the grounds that “it is sub judice, an abuse of the process of the court, vexatious and scandalous”.

We easily concede the possibility of instituting an application of this type at any stage of the proceedings, where the particular ill complained of is manifest or apparent on the record. Every court has the inherent jurisdiction to stop an abuse of its process, and indeed to prevent the institution or continuation before it of any proceedings which are manifestly vexatious or scandalous or both. These characteristics stultify the action from its inception and we scarcely require further extrinsic facts to demonstrate their destructive effects. In this case however, the application in fact argued was one for dismissing the plaintiff’s action in limine on the grounds of estoppel by res judicata. That was the motion argued by learned counsel for 3rd defendant and it is right to say that nothing else was argued in respect of the motion as worded. PAGE| 5 There is no record of any amendment either having been sought or granted of the motion, although we were informed by Mr. Kaloma Alli, learned counsel for the 3rd defendant that the application was in fact amended. It was little realised that a great difference exists between the