ISIYAKU v. FRN (2020)

ISIYAKU v. FRN

(2020)LCN/14187(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(IBADAN JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, May 20, 2020

CA/IB/47C/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju Justice of the Court of Appeal

Joseph Shagbaor Ikyegh Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ebiowei Tobi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

MOHAMMADU ABUBAKAR ISIYAKU APPELANT(S)

And

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

DEFINITION OF CAPITAL OFFENCE

The Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edition, 1990) defines capital offence in relation to crime at Pg. 209 thus:
“One in or for which death penalty may, but need not necessarily, be imposed.”
My Lady Sankey JCA in Alaya v. the State (2007) 16 NWLR Pt. 1061 Pg. 483 at 517 defined “Capital Offences” as:
“Capital offences denote the specie of offences attracting the maximum penalty of death. As herein used however, it is restricted in meaning to capital crimes of non-political nature such as murder and armed robbery… “
In Torri vs. The National Park Service (2011) LPELR – 8142, the Supreme Court held as follows:-
“The charge against appellant does not carry death sentence to which the law requires that the trial Judge ought to enter a plea of not guilty even though an accused pleads guilty. In the instant case, the offences charged carry terms of imprisonment and or fine. The same thing applies to the argument that appellant ought to have been given adequate time and facility to prepare for his defence which as stated earlier, does not exist as appellant admitted the charge by pleading guilty thereto.” PER OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.

WHEN A SUMMARY TRIAL CAN BE CONDUCTED

When a summary trial can be conducted had received judicial interpretation. In Ralph Uwazuruike & Ors vs. AGF (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 691) Pg. 520, the Supreme Court held in interpreting Section 277 of the CPA that summary trials are short and fast. Cases tried summarily are disposed off in a prompt and simple manner. The proof of evidence attached to the charge usually contains a scanty summary of the evidence the prosecution wishes to rely on probably because the procedure in summary criminal trial at the Magistrates Court is supposed to be short and fast. Also the procedure of summary trial is used at the High Court where the Defendant has pleaded Guilty to the charge. Section 285 (2) of the CPA is similar to Section 274 (1) & (2) of ACJA 2015. In essence, where a Defendant pleads Guilty to an offence, and the Court is satisfied that he intends to admit the offence and show no cause why he should not be convicted, the Court may summarily proceed to conviction and sentence. From the facts already set forth, it is apparent that the Court was rightly satisfied that the Appellant at trial pleaded Guilty to the offence and the Court was right to proceed to summary trial. SeeRabe vs. FRN(2018) LPELR -46338 (SC). PER OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Federal High Court sitting in Ibadan delivered by Hon. Justice J.O. Abdulmalik on 11/10/2017 wherein the Appellant and two other defendants who pleaded respectively to one count charge each of transporting Indian Hemp without lawful authority contrary to and punishable under Section 11 (b) of the NDLEA Act 2004 were convicted and respectively sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. The Appellant being dissatisfied with the conviction and sentence has appealed to this Court relying on the amended notice of appeal filed on 24/1/2020 deemed filed on 30/1/2020. The amended Appellant’s brief filed on 24/1/2020 deemed filed on 30/1/2020 identified four issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether the conviction and sentence of the Appellant based upon the entering of a “plea of guilty” in the circumstances of the offence contained in Count 1 of Charge No. FHC/IB/66C/2017 is wrong in law and therefore, occasioned a miscarriage of justice?
2. Whether, the adoption of summary trial procedure to capital offence in the circumstances of the

Appellant charged in Count 1 of Charge No. FHC/IB/66C/2017 without providing facility is contrary to Section 36(6)(b) of the Constitution.
3. Whether, there was any statement made, by the Appellant in the circumstances of this case, amounting to confession to warrant the conviction and sentence of the Appellant by the Lower Court.
4. Whether the Trial Judge was right in entering the “plea of guilty” for the accused when the essential ingredient of the offence that will make the accused to understand the nature of the criminal charge against him is completely omitted in the sole count as charged?

The Respondent in the Respondent’s brief filed on 16/4/19 deemed filed on 28/5/19 in this Court, was settled by J.N. Sunday Esq. Director, of Prosecution, Legal Services NDLEA and R.J. Hinmikaiye Esq. At the hearing of the Appeal, learned Respondent’s counsel stated that they had no need to amend the brief in consequence of the Appellant’s amended brief. Counsel identified one sole issue for determination to wit:
Whether from the facts and circumstances of this case, the Learned Trial Judge was right in adopting a summary trial procedure in

convicting and sentencing the Appellant herein to 15 years imprisonment.

I have read the record of Appeal and the briefs of counsel on both sides. I am of the view that the issue as crystallized by my humble self below will suffice to address all the complaints raised by the learned Appellant’s counsel against the judgment of the trial Court. The issue is set out as follows:-
Whether, in the circumstances of this case the learned trial judge was right in the whole procedure adopted in convicting and sentencing the Appellant.

It is my humble view that the Appellant’s issues were merely repetitive of the same complaints albeit couched in different phrases.

Learned Appellant’s Counsel submitted in the main that it was wrong for the learned trial judge to have entered a plea of ‘Guilty’ for the Appellant at trial since the offence charged is a capital offence and the Court in accordance with the mandatory provision of Section 274(3) of the Administration of Criminal Justices Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as ACJA 2015) which states that the Court should enter a plea of “Not Guilty” even where the Defendant enters a plea of “Guilty”. Counsel

argued that failure to enter a plea of “Not Guilty for the Appellant has led to a gross miscarriage of justice and a conviction based on a faulty plea is wrong in law. Counsel citedDada vs. The State (2013) 2 NWLR Pt. 1337 Pg. 59 at 78; S.I. Farms Ltd. vs. NDIC (2014) All FWLR Pt 758 Pg. 971 at 982; John Shoy International Ltd. vs. Abuja Environmental Protection Board (2013) 8 NWLR Pt 1357; State vs. Yusuf & 6 Ors. (1989) 1 CLRN 268 at 278; Kajubo vs. The State (1988) 1 476.

Counsel argued that the essential ingredient of the offence that would make the Appellant understand the charge against him were completely missing in the sole count leveled at trial against the Appellant. Counsel argued that the two essential elements of the offence of unlawful possession of Indian Hemp is missing from the charge proffered against the Appellant. Counsel argued that the two most important ingredients of unlawful possession of Indian Hemp knowing it to be Indian Hemp was not included in the charge nor was it proved by the prosecution. Counsel cited Ugwanyi vs. FRN (2012) 3 MJSC (Pt. 11) Pg. 111 at page 123.

Counsel argued that the charge was unclear and the

Appellant was not sure of what he pleaded to as sufficient particulars of the offence were not given. Counsel cited Medical & Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (MDPDT) vs. Dr. John Ememlu Nicholas (2011) 2 MJSC 67 at 95; Abacha vs The State (2002) 9 MJSC Pg. 1 at 32; Odeh vs. FRN (2008) 13 NWLR Pt. 1103 Pg. 1 at 25; Oyekan vs. Akinjide (1965) 1 NMLR 200 at 204; Kim vs. The State (1992) 4 NWLR Pt. 233 Pg. 17 at 51.

Learned Appellant’s counsel insisted that the procedure adopted had worked to the detriment of the Appellant to the extent that the statement volunteered by the Appellant was not tendered before the trial Court to form part of the evidence or defence at the trial to be considered by the Court on behalf of the Appellant contrary to the decision of the Supreme CourtOgudo vs. The State (2011) 12 MJSC (Pt. 1) Pg. 108 at 140. Counsel urged this Court to invoke Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011 against the prosecution for failing to produce the statement of the Appellant he made to the police. Counsel insisted that this failure has led to miscarriage of justice against the Appellant.

Learned Appellant’s counsel submitted that

by Section 221 of the ACJA 2015, the Appellant had no option of raising an objection to an incompetent or erroneous charge and the Appellant had to wait till the Appellate stage to raise an objection, Counsel argued that the prosecution should have amended the charge at the material time before judgment pursuant to Section 216 (1) (2) (3) (4) and 217 (1) and (2) of the ACJA 2015. Counsel argued that the importation of the word “transportation” into the charge instead of “possession” vitiated the charge against the Appellant Counsel argued that the charge being vague, incompetent and lacking in material particulars prejudiced the Appeal and led to miscarriage of justice.

Learned Appellant’s counsel also argued that the procedure for summary trial as provided in Section 350 (1) (b) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 and Section 33 (2) of the Federal High Court Act 2004 is contrary to Section 36 (6) of the 1999 Constitution. Counsel urged the view that in compliance with Section 36 (6) of the Constitution, there can be no difference between the procedure to ensure that the defendant is given adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence

when there is summary trial or trial by information, Counsel cited Okoye vs. C.O.P. (2015) 4 – 5 MJSC 34 at 41 and insisted that the Appellant even when subjected to summary trial should have been provided with all facilities necessary for his defence including the proof of evidence. Counsel urged this Court to strike out the provisions of Section 350 (1) (b) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act and Section 33 (2) of the Federal High Court Act 2004 as provisions inconsistent and thus contrary to Section 36 (6) (b) of the 1999 Constitution, as they made a clear distinction as to non-provision of facilities or proof of evidence for the use of the Appellant when there is summary trial. Counsel argued finally that there is no record of an admission of guilt by the Appellant since the statement he made admitting guilt at the time of his arrest was not tendered in Court. Counsel submitted that a faulty plea is a nullity and cannot stand.

Learned Respondent’s counsel argued that the Learned Appellant’s counsel misconceived the law by arguing the erroneous point that the Appellant was charged with and convicted for a capital offence. Learned

Respondent’s counsel argued that the offence of unlawful transportation of 90.8 Kilograms of cannabis for which the Appellant was charged, convicted and sentenced at trial is punishable with a maximum term of life imprisonment pursuant to Section 11 (b) of the NDLEA Act 2004. Counsel submitted that a capital offence connotes one with the death penalty as sanction and that such penalty as death penalty is not contemplated as punishment for the offence. Counsel submitted further that flowing from that argument, the procedure adopted by the learned trial judge cannot be said to be wrong. Counsel argued that every step taken by the learned trial judge was legally and constitutionally sustainable pursuant to Section 26 of the NDLEA Act and Section 251 (1) (m) of the 1999 Constitution.

Learned Respondent’s counsel argued that Section 33 (2) of the Federal High Court Act properly provided for summary trial and that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to conduct summary criminal trial so long as the said trial does not result in the circumstances to deprivation of fair hearing or other violations of the constitution. Counsel submitted that Section 356 (1)

(2) of ACJA which deals with summary trial and it is expected that the Appellants having pleaded guilty, the trial would be short and fast and should be disposed of in a prompt and simple manner. Counsel cited FRN vs. Ibori (2014) ALL FWLR Pt. 735 Page 272, Ralph Uwazuruike & Ors vs. Att. Gen. Fed (2013) All FWLR Pt 691, Pg. 520. Learned Respondent’s counsel argued that Section 356 (4) does not make it mandatory that where the Defendant is charged with a capital offence and he/she pleads Guilty, the Court must enter a plea of Not Guilty. Counsel submitted that the contention that a plea of Not Guilty should have been entered for the Appellant is misconceived. Counsel argued that in the light of the Record of Appeal before this Honourable Court, it is clear that at the time of arraignment, the Appellant herein, pleaded and indeed clearly intended to plead guilty to the charge.

Counsel argued that the plea was properly recorded when the Court was satisfied that the Appellant understood the nature of the charge. Counsel cited FRN vs. Mohammed (2014) ALL FWLR Pt. 730 page 1234 at 1255 – 1256. Counsel further submitted that in summary trials once an accused

person pleads guilty he is presumed to have admitted in substance the veracity of the facts alluded in the charge and it becomes unnecessary for the prosecution to lead any evidence to prove the charge that the accused has already admitted. Counsel further cited:
Okewu v. F.R.N. (2012) All FWLR (Pt.625) 205; Timothy v. F.R.N. (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 639) 1006; F.R.N. vs. Mohammed (supra); and Nkie v. F.R.N. (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 754) 178 at 188 to 189.

Counsel reminded us that the learned trial judge was careful to require the prosecution to call two witnesses and tender exhibits to prove the case of the prosecution even though the Appellant had hitherto pleaded “Guilty.”

The Respondent submitted that the Trial Court property exercised jurisdiction under Section 26 of the NDLEA Act Cap N30 LFN 2004 and adopted the right procedure for summary trial under the combined provisions of the Federal High Court Act and the CPA to convict the Appellant before awarding the sentence of 15 years under Section 11 (b) of the NDLEA Act. This is especially considering the quantity of drugs (90.8 Kilograms of Cannabis Sativa) involved in the offence. In fact, by

requiring the Prosecution to call two (2) witnesses and tender exhibits in proof of its case, the Learned Trial Judge far exceeded the minimum standard required of him in such cases where a Defendant pleads guilty.

OPINION
Let me give a very brief recap of the facts, before I go into the law. As we all know, facts are the fountain head of law. The Appellant’s counsel has not challenged the record, so I am bound by the facts as contained on the face of the Record of proceedings. The Appellant was charged on a sole count in the specifics as follows as contained on Pg. 1 of the Record:
That you MOHAMMADU ABUBAKAR ISIYAKU, Male, Adult, on or about the 10th day of June, 2017 being a passenger in an articulated vehicle with registration number KTG 528 XA at LAUTECH area along Ogbomoso – Ilorin Expressway in Oyo State within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court without lawful authority TRANSPORTED 90.8. Kilograms of Cannabis Sativa otherwise known as Indian Hemp which is a narcotic drug similar to Cocaine, Heroin or LSD and thereby committed an offence contrary to and punishable under Section 11 (B) of the NDLEA ACT CAP N30 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.

The Appellant was charged to Court on 6/7/2017 when he pleaded Guilty to the charge. On that day, the Appellant was represented in Court by B, O. Ogunjinmi Esq., of counsel.

On that said 6/7/17, the case for review of facts was adjourned to 11/10/17, more than 3 (three) months later. The Appellant with others were then remanded in prison custody. On 11/10/17, the prosecution called 2 (two) witnesses for review of facts. At that point, 3 months later after the plea, the Defendant did not change his plea. The then Appellant’s counsel Mr. B.O. Ogunjinmi did not object to the admissibility of the three Exhibit Forms and the 2 bags of dried weed substance which were taken out of the total of 9 bags bf packed weeds which the Appellant was transporting and which Were recovered from him. The certificate of Test Analysis Form, the Packing of Substance Form and the Request for scientific Aid Form had been issued in the presence of the Appellant during investigation and he had thumb printed them.

In fact, the Appellant’s counsel stated categorically on Pg. 8 of the Record that “The 1st Defendant, having confirmed the Exhibit tendered, I

will not cross-examination (sic) the prosecution witness 1.”

The implication of the above is that it is factually wrong for counsel to say that the Appellant did not plead Guilty to the essential ingredients of the offence. The evidence of P.W.1 on Pg. 6 of the record is to the effect that he conducted the tests on the substance in the presence of the Appellant who signed all the necessary forms. The Appellant confirmed on Pg. 8 that he thumb printed all the forms and wrote his own name in Arabic. The witness took samples from the nine bags and conducted a field test with the aid of a United Nation Drug Testing kit. The Appellant thumb printed the forms after agreeing with the result of the test. The prosecution proved that the Appellant knew he was transporting Indian Hemp.

The Appellant’s counsel at the trial Court never objected to the plea of Guilty entered by his client after the charge was read to him in the language he understood. The learned counsel was perhaps not learned enough to know and advice his client that the plea of “Guilty” could have been changed by the Appellant at trial at any time before the finding of Guilty and conviction of

the Appellant. The Appellant was at liberty to change his plea after the facts had been stated to his hearing and the hearing of his counsel.

The facts having been rehashed, let us look at the law in view of Appellant’s counsel’s complaints.

Learned Appellant’s counsel’s first complaint is that the offence of transportation of Cannabis Sativa otherwise known as Indian Hemp being an offence attracting life sentence is a capital offence for which the plea of Not Guilty should have been entered for the Appellant inspite of his plea of Guilt.
I agree with learned Respondent’s counsel that the unnecessary emphasis expended by the Appellant’s counsel on this argument is the misconception of said learned Appellant’s counsel of the legal meaning of “Capital offence.” The Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edition, 1990) defines capital offence in relation to crime at Pg. 209 thus:
“One in or for which death penalty may, but need not necessarily, be imposed.”
My Lady Sankey JCA in Alaya v. the State (2007) 16 NWLR Pt. 1061 Pg. 483 at 517 defined “Capital Offences” as:
“Capital offences denote the specie of offences attracting the maximum penalty

of death. As herein used however, it is restricted in meaning to capital crimes of non-political nature such as murder and armed robbery… “
In Torri vs. The National Park Service (2011) LPELR – 8142, the Supreme Court held as follows:-
“The charge against appellant does not carry death sentence to which the law requires that the trial Judge ought to enter a plea of not guilty even though an accused pleads guilty. In the instant case, the offences charged carry terms of imprisonment and or fine. The same thing applies to the argument that appellant ought to have been given adequate time and facility to prepare for his defence which as stated earlier, does not exist as appellant admitted the charge by pleading guilty thereto.”
I have to agree with the submission of learned Respondent’s Counsel that the offence of unlawful transportation of 90.8 kilograms of Cannabis punishable with a maximum term of life imprisonment under Section 11 (b) of the NDLEA Act Cap N30 LFN 2004 for which the Appellant stood trial and was convicted and sentenced to fifteen (15) years imprisonment by the trial Court does not fall within the scope of the meaning of capital

offence within the context of Nigerian jurisprudence. This is in view of the fact that death penalty is neither prescribed nor contemplated as punishment for the offence. The learned trial judge was thus right to have entered the plea of Guilty as pleaded by the Appellant at trial.
I would humbly state my humble view of the submission of learned Respondent’s Counsel on Pg. 8 Particularly Paragraph 4:12 of the brief, wherein the Respondent’s Counsel had argued that by the purport of Section 356 (4) of ACJA, the trial Court is not mandated to enter a plea of Not Guilty even where the Defendant is charged with a capital offence. I would humbly not agree with that proposition. While Section 356 (1) & (2) of ACJA state that where the Defendant pleads Guilty, the Court shall proceed to sentence, Section 356 (4) states that notwithstanding a plea of “Guilty” by the Defendant, where the offence is a capital offence in which death is the sanction, the Court shall proceed to trial (NOT PROCEED TO SENTENCE) indicating that witnesses e.c.t and the whole gamut of a criminal trial would follow till determination of the charge against the Defendant. Section 274 (3) of ACJA,2015

is clear on that point of law. It serves counsel well to actually read the extant law on an issue before propounding arguments.

The Appellant’s counsel also complained about the summary procedure of trial adopted by the learned trial judge. Now Section 33 (1) & (2) of the Federal High Court Act 2004 provides as follows:-
“Subject to the provision of this Section, Criminal proceedings before the Court shall be conducted substantially in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the provisions of that Act Shall, with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this Act, have effect in respect of all matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Court.”
Section 33 (2) then provides:
“Notwithstanding the generality of Subsection (1) of this section, all criminal causes or matters before the Court shall be tried summarily.”
Section 26 of the NDLEA Act and Section 251 (1) (m) of the 1999 Constitution (As Altered) grant exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal High Court to try drugs related offences. Section 356 of the ACJA 2015 which we are enjoined by

Section 33(1) of the Federal High Court Act to follow provides for summary trials as follows:-
“(1) At the commencement of the hearing, the Court shall state or cause to be stated to the defendant the substance of the complaint, and shall ask him whether he is guilty or not guilty.
(2) Where the defendant pleads guilty and the Court is satisfied that he intends to admit the offence and shows no cause or no sufficient cause why sentence should not be passed, the Court shall proceed to sentence.
(3) Where the defendant pleads not guilty, the Court shall direct all witnesses to leave the Court and upon such direction, the provisions of Section 212 of the Evidence Act, 2011 shall apply, but failure to comply with the provisions of this subsection shall not invalidate the proceedings but would affect the weight of the evidence given by the witness who fails to leave the Court on the direction being given.”
(4) Notwithstanding the provision ofSubsections (1), (2) and (3) in capital offences the Court shall proceed with the trial irrespective of the plea by the defendant.
…
(8) The defendant shall take his plea in the dock, except the

judge directs otherwise (Emphasis added).
I am of the humble view that a thorough reading of the Record shows that the learned trial judge complied with the law in summarily trying the Appellant who had pleaded Guilty to the charge. When a summary trial can be conducted had received judicial interpretation. In Ralph Uwazuruike & Ors vs. AGF (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 691) Pg. 520, the Supreme Court held in interpreting Section 277 of the CPA that summary trials are short and fast. Cases tried summarily are disposed off in a prompt and simple manner. The proof of evidence attached to the charge usually contains a scanty summary of the evidence the prosecution wishes to rely on probably because the procedure in summary criminal trial at the Magistrates Court is supposed to be short and fast. Also the procedure of summary trial is used at the High Court where the Defendant has pleaded Guilty to the charge. Section 285 (2) of the CPA is similar to Section 274 (1) & (2) of ACJA 2015. In essence, where a Defendant pleads Guilty to an offence, and the Court is satisfied that he intends to admit the offence and show no cause why he should not be convicted, the

Court may summarily proceed to conviction and sentence. From the facts already set forth, it is apparent that the Court was rightly satisfied that the Appellant at trial pleaded Guilty to the offence and the Court was right to proceed to summary trial. SeeRabe vs. FRN(2018) LPELR -46338 (SC).

Learned Appellant’s counsel complained that the Appellant was not given sufficient time and facilities to prepare for his defence before the learned trial Court proceeded summarily to try him contrary to Section 36 (6) of the 1999 Constitution. Counsel insisted that the Appellant should have been given the proof of evidence relating to particulars of evidence the police wanted to adduce against him at trial. The issue of whether time and sufficient facilities were granted the Appellant to make an adequate Defence now arises. In the first instance, the Appellant had three months while represented by counsel to prepare for his defence by asking for more particulars or that more papers where needed from the prosecution. With the greatest respect, this argument is an indictment on the integrity and competence of the counsel who represented the Appellant at trial and who

was present in Court when the Appellant pleaded to the charge and who did not request for what he – counsel felt were the necessary facilities or advice the Appellant to plead Not Guilty. Be that as it may, there is nothing in the application of the Law and rules of procedure adopted by the learned trial Court that derogate from the dictates of the Constitution regarding fair trial.

Counsel also objected to the wording of the charge and insisted that the Appellant should have been charged with “possession” of the prohibited substances rather than “transportation” of the substances as contained in the charge. He submitted that this confused the Appellant.
Section 11 (b) of the NDLEA Act provides as follows:
Any person, who without lawful authority
(b) Export, transports or otherwise traffics in the drugs popularly known as cocaine, LSD, heroine or any other similar drugs shall be guilty of as offence and liable on conviction to be sentenced to imprisonment for life.”

This is quite different from Section 11 (d) of the NDLEA Act, which in turn provides as follows:-
(d) Knowingly possesses or uses the drugs popularly known as cocaine,

LSD, heroine or any other similar drugs by smoking, inhaling or injecting the said drugs shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not less than fifteen years but not exceeding 25 years.

The letters of the specific law – Section 11 (b) speaks of transportation and the Appellant was charged with transportation. Wherein lies the complaint or confusion? It was not that the charge read 11 (d) which is possession and the wording said transportation.

Perhaps if learned counsel had taken the time to read the bare words of the statute, he would not have stirred a storm in a teapot with asinine arguments about the Appellant haven been wrongly charged.

The case of Torri v. National Park (supra) is quite clear on the provisions of Section 161 (2) of the CPC which is the same as Section 356 of the ACJA 2015. Okoro JSC in Nkie vs. FRN (supra) stated as follows:-
“From the clear and unambiguous words of Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act herein before reproduced, where an accused person pleads guilty to an offence before a Court of law and the Court is satisfied that he intended to admit the truth of all the

essentials of the offence with which he is charged the Court shall convict and sentence him accordingly… This Court in Raymond S. Dongtoe vs. Civil Service Commission, Plateau State (2001) FWLR (Pt.50) 1639, (2001) 4 SC (Pt. 11) 43, held that after plea of guilty by the accused before the Court exercising jurisdiction in respect of criminal offences, the Court must formally proceed to conviction without calling upon the accuser to prove the commission of the offence by establishing the burden of proof required by law…”
Counsel for the Appellant had complained that there was no proof that the Appellant pleaded guilty since his confessional statement was not tendered. That argument is absurd to say the least. According to Pg. 3 of the Record, one Mr. lwenger Emmanuel Ternenge, Court Registrar, interpreted the charge to the Appellant who stated that he understood the charge and pleaded Guilty to it. From that point, there was no need to tender any extra judicial statement of the Appellant, having made an unequivocal plea of ‘Guilty’ before the trial judge. See Uwazuruike vs. AGF (supra).

I am of the humble view that there is absolutely no merit in

this appeal. I affirm the conviction and sentence of the Appellant in charge No. FHC/IB/66C/2017 as enrolled in the judgment of Hon, Justice J.O. Abdulmalik delivered on 11/10/2017. Appeal Dismissed.

JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.: I have been privileged to read in draft the succinct judgment prepared by my learned brother, Ogunwumiju, J.C.A. (Hon. PJ) with which I agree with nothing extra to add.

EBIOWEI TOBI, J.C.A.: My Lord, Helen M. Ogunwumiju, JCA afforded me the privilege of reading in draft the leading judgment just delivered wherein this appeal was dismissed for lacking in merit. I also see no merit whatsoever in this appeal.

The Appellant was charged for the transportation of Indian Hemp without lawful authorization contrary to and punishable under Section 11(b) of the NDLEA Act 2004. When the charge was read over to the Appellant and in the presence of his counsel, Mr. Ogunjinmi, he pleaded guilty to the charge. Following his plea of guilty, the lower Court in line with ACJA 2015, NDLEA Act 2004 and the Federal High Court Act 2004 conducted summary trial and convicted the Appellant sentencing him to 15 years imprisonment.

This appeal is challenging the judgment from several angles which in my opinion, have no legal substance. My Lord Ogunwumiju, JCA has exhaustively addressed each of the issues raised in this appeal and has shown that they are not helpful or support the case of the Appellant. I do not intend to repeat them here as that will not achieve any useful purpose. I am however, inclined to make one or two comments on some elementary legal issues that the Appellant counsel surprising in my view made heavy weather of when there was no need for that.

The Appellant who is described as an adult in the charge, in the presence of his counsel, entered a plea of guilty and participated in the summary trial. He never changed his plea until judgment was delivered. The Appellant is now raising the issue that he never understood what he was pleading guilty to. This is too late in the day and appears to me as an after-thought. The legal implication of the plea of guilty is that, the Appellant admits that the charge was read over to him, he understood saint and admits to have committed the offence. In such a situation, the plea is valid in law. In Okewu vs. FRN (2012) 2 S.C (Pt. 11)

1; (2012) LPELR-7832 (SC), the Apex Court per Ariwoola, JSC at page 19 held as Follows:
“It is trite law, that to give a plea is for an accused person to formally respond to a criminal charge, either of “guilty”, “not guilty” or ‘no contest’ See: Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition page 1268.
Therefore it is now settled that a plea of guilt is valid if made in a very unambiguous and unequivocal way and the same is received by a trial Court/Tribunal not laboring under the misapprehension of what the law is. See: Emma Amanchukwu vs. The FRN (2009) 2-3 SC (Pt. 1) 93 at 106 per Ogbuagu, JSC.”
Similarly, in Timothy vs. FRN (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1344) 213 at 237, the apex Court held:
“After a plea of guilty, the trial Judge may proceed to convict and sentenced the accused person based on the plea of guilty and the evidence before the Judge.”
The Appellant having pleaded guilty in Court and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment cannot turn around after judgment to now change his plea. That is too late and not acceptable in law.

Another elementary point which the Appellants counsel should have known which for

whatever reason the counsel of the Appellant did not seem to appreciate is, the kind of offence or offences that constitute capital offence. The Appellant counsel had submitted that the offence the Appellant was charged for is a capital offence and therefore the lower Court should have entered a plea of not guilty. My lord in the lead Judgment has shown that capital offences by our law are offences which carry death sentence. See Sunday vs. FRN (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1662) 211. The law is settled that if the offence the Appellant is charged with was a capital offence, the Court would have entered a plea of not guilty in spite of the Appellant’s plea of guilty. In FRN vs. Mohammed (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1413) 551, the apex Court drove home this point in these words:
“In a non-capital offence, where the accused person pleads guilty to the charge, the Court is at liberty to adopt a summary trial procedure and convict and sentence the accused person based on the facts presented by the prosecution. The law does not require a full trial in the circumstance. On the other hand, in the case of a capital offence, even where the accused pleads guilty to the charge by

convention, the Court would enter a plea of not guilty, whereupon a full trial would be conducted.”
The offence for which the Appellant was charged under the NDLEA Act carries a life sentence and not a death penalty. This means therefore that the offence the Appellant was charged with not being a capital offence, the lower Court was right in accepting the plea of guilty the Appellant entered before it and was right in conducting a summary trial and subsequently the conviction and sentencing of the Appellant.

In the circumstance and for the fuller reasons in the Lead judgment of my learned brother, Helen M. Ogunwumiju, JCA. I also dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit and uphold the judgment of the Federal High Court sitting in Ibadan delivered by Hon. Justice J.O. Abdulmalik on 29/11/2017.

Appearances:

Abiodun Ogunjimi, with him, M.I. Johnson, B.O. Ogunjimi Esq. and O.O. Ayanlade For Appellant(s)

R.J. Hinmikaiye Ass. Director NDLEA For Respondent(s)