ISAIAH & ORS v. LAGOS STATE TASK FORCE ON ENVIRONMENT & SPECIAL OFFENCES UNIT & ORS (2020)

ISAIAH & ORS v. LAGOS STATE TASK FORCE ON ENVIRONMENT & SPECIAL OFFENCES UNIT & ORS

(2020)LCN/14738(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Tuesday, November 24, 2020

CA/LAG/CV/1109/2019

RATIO

JURISDICTION: IMPORTANCE OF JURISDICTION OF COURT

The law compels the Courts to accord primier attention to issue of jurisdiction, which is numero uno in adjudication, when raised in any proceedings, see Okwu v. Umeh (2016) NWLR (Pt. 1501) 120; Brittania-U (Nig.) Ltd. v. Seplat Pet. Co. Dev. Ltd. (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 541; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193. I will obey this legal commandment so as not to insult the law.

Jurisdiction, a mantra in adjudication, connotes the authority/power of a Court to determine a dispute submitted to it by contending parties in any proceeding, see Ajomale v. Yaduat (No. 1) (1991) 5 SCNJ 172; Mobil Pro. Co. Untltd. v. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1; Ndaeyo v. Ogunnaya (1977) 1 IM SLR 300; Ebhodagbe v. Okoye (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 472; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 144; A.-G., Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017)1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 210; Isah v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 175; Angadi v. PDP (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 1.
A Court of law is invested with jurisdiction to hear a matter when: “1. it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and 2. the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and

the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction”, see Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (2006) 2 LC 2081961) NSCC (vol. 2) 374 at 379, per Bairamian F. J., Tukur v. Taraba State (1997) 6 SCNJ 81; Dairo v. UBN (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1029) 164; Okereke v. Yar’Adua (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100); Saraki v. FRN (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc. (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1549) 282; Bello v. Damisa (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1550) 455; Osi v. Accord Party (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1553) 387. The three ingredients must co-exist in order to infuse jurisdiction in a Court.

Where a Court is drained of the jurisdiction to entertain a matter, the proceeding germinating from it, no matter the quantum of diligence, dexterity, artistry, sophistry, transparency and objectivity injected into it, will be marooned in the intractable web of nullity, see Elugbe v. Omokhafe (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 319; Lokpobiri v. Ogola (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1499) 328; Garba v. Mohammed (supra); Isah v. INEC (supra).

Nota bene, the case-law has endorsed, in toto, a statement of claim as the major barometer to be used by the Court to measure the presence or absence of its jurisdiction, see Ikine v. Edjerode (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446; A.D.H. Ltd. v. A.T. Ltd. (2006) NWLR (Pt. 989) 635; Oni v. Cadbury (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 87; B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Yar’adua v. Yandoma (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 213; Akpamgbo-Okadigbo v. Chidi (No. 2) (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 124; Isah v. INEC (supra); Lau v. PDP (supra); Azubuogu v. Oranezi (supra); Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386; A.-G, Fed. v. A.-G., Anambra State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 314; Roe Ltd. v. UNN (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 420; F.U.T., Minna v. Olutayo (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 176; A.-G., Lagos State v. Eko Hotels (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 518. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

ACTION: NATURE OF AN ACTION COMMENCED BY DINT OF ORIGINATING SUMMONS/MOTION

In an action commenced by dint of originating summons/motion, as in this case, the affidavit in support serves as the statement of claim, see Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28; PDP v. Ezeonwuka (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 187; Lau v. PDP (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 60; Owuru v. Adigwu (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 1; CBN v. Aribo (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 130. Relief, too, is one of the determinants of jurisdiction of Court, see Onwudiwe v. FRN (2006) 10 NWLR (Pt. 988) 382; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114; PDP v. Oranezi (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 245; Gbileve v. Addingi (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1433) 394. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

CLAIM: RULES APPLICABLE WHERE THE MAIN CLAIM IS NOT A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

It is trite and elementary law, that where the main/primary right/claim is not a fundamental right, or where a fundamental right is an ancillary to another claim, then it is improper to seek relief in a Court under the sanctuary of fundamental right procedure as such a situation impinges on the jurisdiction of the Court, see Sea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd. v. Anigboro (supra); WAEC v. Adeyanuju (supra); Tukur v. Govt., Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517; Jack v. UNAM (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208; Amale v. Sokoto Local Govt. (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1292) 181; Emeka v. Okoroafor (2017) 11 NWLR (pt. 1577) 410, Nwachukwu v. Nwachukwu (2018) 17 NWLR(pt. 1648) 357. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

RIGHTS: JUDICIAL FORMULA TO GUAGE THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF MAIN OR ANCILIARY RIGHTS

Interestingly, the case-law has since evolved/invented the acceptable judicial formula which the Courts use, as the yardstick/template, to gauge the presence or absence of main or anciliary rights. In Sea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd v. Anigboro (2001) 3 NWLR (Pt.696) 159, Karibi-Whyte, JSC, incisively and insightfully, declared:
The correct approach in a claim for the enforcement of fundamental rights is to examine the reliefs sought, the grounds for such relief, and the facts relied upon. Where the facts relied upon disclose a breach of the fundamental right of the applicant as the basis of the claim, there is here a redress through the enforcement of such rights through the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979. However, where the alleged breach of right is ancillary or incidental to the main grievance or complaint, it is incompetent to proceed under the rules. This is because the right, if any, violated, is not synonymous with the substantive claim which is the subject-matter of the action. Enforcement of the right per-se cannot resolve the substantive claim which is in any case different. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

COURT: JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT OF A STATE TO THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT

My noble Lords, it is now settled law, beyond any per adventure of doubts, that the High Court of a State and the Federal High Court share concurrent jurisdiction in a matter bordering on enforcement of fundamental rights as donated and ordained in Section 46 (1) of the Constitution, as amended, irrespective of the parties therein, see Jack v. UNAM (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt.865) 208; F.U.T, Minna v. Olutayo (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 1761; Recently, in EFCC v. Wolfgang Reinl (2020) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1730) 489 at 514 and 515 the Supreme Court, per Kekere – Ekun, JSC, re-echoed the inflexible position of this law in these illuminating words:
…So long as the enforcement of the applicant’s fundamental right is the main claim in the suit and not an ancillary claim, the Federal High Court and State High Courts, including the High Court of the FCT, have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain it. See Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (supra). PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Obande Festus Ogbuinya Justice of the Court of Appeal

Jamilu Yammama Tukur Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ebiowei Tobi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. MR ISAAC ISAIAH 2. MR PHILLIP ADEBAYO 3. MR JIMOH AFOBAJE (Suing For Themselves And On Behalf Of The Oto-Awori Butcher Slaughter Slab Association) APPELANT(S)

And

THE LAGOS STATE TASK FORCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND SPECIAL OFFENCES UNIT 2. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND COOPERATIVES 3. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE 4. ATTORNEY- GENERAL OF LAGOS STATE RESPONDENT(S)

OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal probes into the correctness of the decision of the Federal High Court of Nigeria, Lagos Division (hereinafter addressed as “the lower Court”), coram judice; C.J. Aneke, J., in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1361/2013, delivered on 27th March, 2015. Before the lower Court, the appellants and the respondents were the applicants and the respondents respectively.

The facts of the case, which transformed into the appeal, are amenable to brevity and simplicity. The appellants were meat butchers/sellers at Oto-Awori in Ijanikin Badagry, Lagos State, for about 15 years as at 2013, without any hindrance or disturbance. They had Oto-Awori Butchers Association. On 10th September, 2013, heavily armed police men and task force officials, with their black maria vehicles, stormed the appellants’ business premises and arrested, tortured and detained them including their customers. They also impounded their five live cows and three vans laden with meat. They destroyed their secretariat, shades and stands and took away their N9.5m. The appellants claimed that they carried on their

business with the licence and approval of the Lagos State Government and paid their levies as required by the Local Government Levies Law of Lagos State. They alleged that the actions of the respondents’ agents caused them lots of economic losses. Sequel to these, the appellants beseeched the lower Court, via an originating motion filed on 2nd October, 2013 under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009, and tabled against the respondents the following reliefs:
a. A. DECLARATION that the arrest and detention of the applicants and other thirty (32) butchers by the agents of the 1st, 2nd and third Respondents from the 10th of September to 14th September 2013 at the instigation of the 2nd Respondent is wrongful, illegal, unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void as it violates the Applicant’s fundamental rights as enshrined under Sections 34, 35, 36, 43 and 44 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
b. A DECLARATION that the forceful demolition and destruction of the Applicants Secretariat by the agents of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents without any order of the Court is wrongful, illegal,

unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void as it violates the Applicant’s fundamental rights as enshrined under Sections 36, 43 and 44 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
c. A DECLARATION that the forceful seizure, confiscation and impounding of the Applicants five (5) live Cows and three (3) meats laden vans on the 10th of September 2013 by the agents of the Respondents without any order of the Court is wrongful, illegal, unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void as it violates the Applicant’s fundamental rights as enshrined under Sections 36, 43 and 44 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
d. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the respondents, jointly and severally their officers, agents, servants, privies or howsoever called and connected from arresting, intimidating, harassing, humiliating, detaining or disturbing the applicants and their colleagues in any manner whatsoever on any fact connected with or related to the facts of this case.
e. AN ORDER COMPELLING the Respondents jointly and severally to pay the sum of N100, 000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) to the

Applicants and their colleagues being general and exemplary damages unlawful arrest and wrongful demolition and destruction of the applicants Secretariat without any order of the Court.
f. Cost of action assessed at N400,000, (Four Hundred Thousand only
g. SUCH FURTHER ORDER OR OTHER ORDERS as this Honourable Court deem fit.

In reaction, the respondents joined issue with the appellants and denied liability by filing a notice of preliminary objection, a counter affidavit and a written address. The appellants filed a further affidavit. The lower Court duly heard the suit. In a considered judgment, delivered on 27th March, 2015, found on pages 112 – 134 of the record, the lower Court upheld the preliminary objection and declined jurisdiction to determine the suit.

The appellants were aggrieved by the decision. Hence, on 16th April, 2015, the appellants lodged a 3-ground notice of appeal, copied at pages 135 – 139 of the record, and prayed this Court for:
a) AN ORDER ALLOWING the appeal and setting aside the Judgment of the lower Court by Honourable Justice C.J ANEKE of the Federal High Court, Lagos delivered on the 27th

day of March 2015.
b) AN ORDER hearing the Appellants fundamental rights suit on the merit and granting all the reliefs/claims sought by the Appellants in the Originating Motion dated 24th day of September, 2013.

Thereafter, the parties, through counsel, filed and exchanged their respective briefs of argument in line with the procedure for hearing civil appeals in this Court. The appeal was heard on 15th October, 2020.

During its hearing, learned appellants’ counsel, O.E. Ogungbeje, Esq., adopted the appellants’ brief of argument, filed on 27th May, 2020 but deemed properly filed on 28th May, 2020, and the appellants’ reply brief, filed on 24th June, 2020, as representing his arguments for the appeal. He urged the Court to allow it. Similarly, learned respondents’ counsel, Hameed Oyenuga Esq., adopted the respondents’ brief of argument, filed on 15th June, 2020, as forming his reactions against the appeal. He urged the Court to dismiss it.

In the appellants’ brief of argument, learned counsel distilled two issues for determination to wit:
1. WHETHER THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE WAS RIGHT WHEN HE DECLINED

JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE APPELLANTS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT SUIT AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS.
2. WHETHER THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE WAS RIGHT WHEN HE REFUSED AND FAILED TO HEAR THE APPELLANTS SUBSTANTIVE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS SUIT ON THE MERIT AND GRANT THE RELIEFS SOUGHT THEREIN.

In the respondents’ brief of argument, learned counsel crafted two issues for determination viz:
1. Whether the trial Court was right when it declined jurisdiction to entertain the Appellants suit commenced under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure).
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he refused and failed to hear the Appellants’ suit on the merit and grant the reliefs sought therein.

A close look at the two sets of issues shows that they are identical in substance. In fact, except for the excision and change in a few words, the respondents’ issues are a replica/clone of the appellants’. For this reason of sameness, l will decide the appeal on the issues formulated by the appellants: the indisputed owners of the appeal. In this wise, the appellants’ issue one is sufficient to determine the

appeal.

Arguments on the issue:
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the lower Court and the High Court have concurrent jurisdiction to hear fundamental right matter. He relied on Jack v. UNAM (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865); FUTA Minna v Olutayo (2017) LPELR – 43827 (S.C); 208; NDIC v Governing Council of ITF (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1305) 252; Order 2 Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 (the FREPR). He asserted that the current approach to determine whether a matter would fall under fundamental right procedure was stated in Sea Trucks (Nig) Ltd v. Anigboro (2001) LPELR – 3025 (SC). He stated that the appellants relief showed that the suit constituted a breach of their fundamental rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution, as amended.

On behalf of the respondents, learned counsel contended that the appellants’ suit as constituted robbed the lower Court of jurisdiction to hear it. He highlighted the fundamental nature and ingredients of jurisdiction. He cited Ohakim v Agbaso (2010) LPELR – 2359; Utih v Onyivwe (1991) INWLR (Pt. 166) 166; A-G, Lagos v Dosumu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 552;

Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341. He enumerated the process to be considered in determining jurisdiction of Court. He referred to Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31; Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt.1025)427. He posited that the appellants’ main claims were the removal of their slaughter slab, demolition of their secretariat and detinue of their cows and vans which did not fall under fundamental rights but incidental to them. He explained that it is a condition precedent that the main claim must be under fundamental right for a Court to have jurisdiction. He relied on Ezenyika v. Governor of Imo State (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 361) 151; Uzoukwu v. Ezeonu II (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 200) 708: WAEC v. Akinkunmi (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1091) 151; Gafar v. Govt of Kwara State (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt.1024) 375, Tukur v. Govt of Taraba (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt 510) 549; Tukur v Govt. of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (pt 117) 517; Sea Trucks Nig. Ltd v. Anigboro (2001) 3 NWLR (Pt. 696) 159; WAEC v. Adeyanju (2008) LPELR – 3467 (SC); Abdulhamed v. Akar (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt. 966) 127.

Learned counsel conceded that the High Court in that State under

Section 46 (1) of the Constitution, as amended, meant the High Court or the Federal High Court. He explained that for the lower Court to have jurisdiction the fundamental right matters must be in relation to the items in Section 251(1) of the Constitution, as amended, that it would exercise jurisdiction. He cited Gafar v. Government of Kwara State (supra); Adetona v. Igele General Enterprises Ltd (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 542; Abdullahi v. Komolafe (2019) LPELR – 46519 (CA).

On points of law, learned appellants’ counsel urged the Court to follow its decision in Adu v. Lagos State Task Force on Environment and Special Offences Unit (unreported) Appeal No. CA/L/972/2014, delivered on 23rd February, 2016.

Resolution of the issue:
In total loyalty to the injunction of the law, I will settle issue one first. The hub of the issue is plain. It centres on the jurisdiction of the lower Court to hear the suit which mothered this appeal. The law compels the Courts to accord primier attention to issue of jurisdiction, which is numero uno in adjudication, when raised in any proceedings, see Okwu v. Umeh (2016) NWLR (Pt. 1501) 120; Brittania-U (Nig.) Ltd. v. Seplat Pet. Co. Dev. Ltd.

(2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 541; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193. I will obey this legal commandment so as not to insult the law.

the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction”, see Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (2006) 2 LC 2081961) NSCC (vol. 2) 374 at 379, per Bairamian F. J., Tukur v. Taraba State (1997) 6 SCNJ 81; Dairo v. UBN (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1029) 164; Okereke v. Yar’Adua (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100); Saraki v. FRN (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc. (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1549) 282; Bello v. Damisa (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1550) 455; Osi v. Accord Party (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1553) 387. The three ingredients must co-exist in order to infuse jurisdiction in a Court.Where a Court is drained of the jurisdiction to entertain a matter, the proceeding germinating from it, no matter the quantum of diligence, dexterity, artistry, sophistry, transparency and objectivity injected into it, will be marooned in the intractable web of nullity, see Elugbe v. Omokhafe (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 319; Lokpobiri v. Ogola (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1499) 328; Garba v. Mohammed (supra);

Isah v. INEC (supra).

Lau v. PDP (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 60; Owuru v. Adigwu (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 1; CBN v. Aribo (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 130. Relief, too, is one of the determinants of jurisdiction of Court, see Onwudiwe v. FRN (2006) 10 NWLR (Pt. 988) 382; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114; PDP v. Oranezi (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 245; Gbileve v. Addingi (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1433) 394.

Now, the marrow of the appellants’ chief agitation, indeed the foremost on the killer issue, is pegged on the lower Court’s declination to entertain their suit, which was commenced under the canopy of fundamental rights procedure, on the footing of want of subject-matter jurisdiction. In reaching at the ultimate finding, the lower Court was highly influenced by the defence erected by the respondents, that the appellants’ claimed rights and main reliefs were incidental and outside the firmament of fundament rights procedure. The respondents greeted the appeal with the same defence before this Court. It is trite and elementary law, that where the main/primary right/claim is not a fundamental right, or where a fundamental right is an ancillary to another

claim, then it is improper to seek relief in a Court under the sanctuary of fundamental right procedure as such a situation impinges on the jurisdiction of the Court, see Sea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd. v. Anigboro (supra); WAEC v. Adeyanuju (supra); Tukur v. Govt., Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517; Jack v. UNAM (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208; Amale v. Sokoto Local Govt. (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1292) 181; Emeka v. Okoroafor (2017) 11 NWLR (pt. 1577) 410, Nwachukwu v. Nwachukwu (2018) 17 NWLR(pt. 1648) 357.

through the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979. However, where the alleged breach of right is ancillary or incidental to the main grievance or complaint, it is incompetent to proceed under the rules. This is because the right, if any, violated, is not synonymous with the substantive claim which is the subject-matter of the action. Enforcement of the right per-se cannot resolve the substantive claim which is in any case different.
I have, in due fidelity to the desire of the law, consulted the record: the spinal cord of the appeal. My first port of call is the residence of the appellants’ reliefs, grounds for the reliefs and facts in the affidavit which colonise pages 5-12 of the record. I have perused them with a fine tooth comb. Admirably, they harbuour no ambiguity. I have also, married them with the inelastic positions of the law catalogued above. The raison d’etre for the juxtaposition is not far-fetched. It is to ascertain if the appellants’ suit, as displayed in their reliefs, grounds or facts, obeyed or flouted the law on main or incidental claim within the ambit of fundamental right procedure.

A resume of the crux of the appellants’ case, decipherable from the facts in the affidavit and the grounds for reliefs, is that they were unlawfully arrested, tortured, detained, their secretariat, shades illegally destroyed and their live cows and vans impounded by the respondents. The appellants’ first declaratory relief is anchored on their wrongful arrest and detention by the respondents contrary to their fundamental rights as guaranteed by Sections 34, 35, 36, and 43 of the Constitution, as amended. Their second and third declaratory reliefs orbit around the illegitimate demolition of their secretariat and confiscation of their live cows and vans in violation of their fundamental rights as entrenched in Sections 36, 43 and 44 of the Constitution, as amended. The fifth relief is weaved on a claim for compensation. That is cognisable under Section 35 (6) of the Constitution, as amended, see Jim-Jaja v. C.O.P, Rivers State (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 225; FBN Plc v. A-G., Fed (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt 1617) 121; Muhammed v IGP (2019) 4 NWLR (pt 1663) 492. Thus, the appellants’ claims are hinged on their rights to dignity of human person, personal liberty, fair

hearing and acquire/own immovable property anywhere in Nigeria as enshrined in Sections 34,35,36,43 and 44 of the Constitution, as amended, respectively. The fundamental rights of the Nigerian citizenry are warehoused in Chapter IV which encompasses Sections 33-45 of the Constitution, as amended.
It stems from these that the appellants’ principal claims, as chronicled above fall squarely, within the commodious four walls of fundamental rights. The fourth relief is a supplication for an order of injunction. In the eyes of the law, an injunctive claim has no independent life of its own. Its success or failure is parasitic on that of the declaratory relief, see Fagunwa v. Adibi (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 903) 544. Put differently, it is bears/wears the hallmark of tributary relief that is tied to the apron strings of the main claim. A Court that is equipped with jurisdiction to hear the main claim is clothed with the vires to try the auxiliary relief and vice versa. This traces its pedigree to the Latin Maxim. Accesoruim non-ducit sed sequitus suum principale, id est, that which is incidental does not lead, but follows its principal, see

Tukur v. Govt of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 7) 517. It follows that the appellants’ claims, as amply demonstrated above are deeply rooted in the allegation of breach of their fundamental rights. This brief legal anatomy on main and accessory claims, done in due obeisance to the law, with due reverence, clearly punctures/deflates the respondents’ defeasible defence of categorisation of the appellants’ claim as incidental to fundamental rights. It is disabled from its birth.

the applicant’s fundamental right is the main claim in the suit and not an ancillary claim, the Federal High Court and State High Courts, including the High Court of the FCT, have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain it. See Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (supra).
This magisterial pronouncement, which is housed in an ex cathedra authority is another clincher that drowns the respondents’ seemingly dazzling contention on the absence of jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the appellants’ suit. It confirms absolutely that the lower Court is the appropriate forum competent for the determination of the appellants’ action which is anchored on the infractions of their fundamental rights.
In the interest of emphasis, a fundamental right action is peculiar and special with its own rules for its adjudication, see Onyekwuluje v. Benue State Govt., (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1484) 40 per Peter-Odili, JSC. Put differently, it is to a large extent, sui generis. The jurisdiction donated to the lower Court by the prescription of Section 46 (1) of the Constitution, as amended, displayed earlier, is a special jurisdictional while the

one under Section 251 (1) of the selfsame Constitution, as amended, is general jurisdiction. It is a notorious principle of law, that where there is a special provision in a statute/legislation, a later general provision, in the same law, is not to be interpreted as derogating from what has been specially provided for individually save an intention to do so is unambiguously declared. In the Latin days of the law, it was encapsulated in the Maxims: Generali specialibus non derogrant: general things do not derogate from special things; or Specilia generalibus derogrant- special things derogate from general one, see Schroder & Co. v. Major & Co. Ltd.(1989) 2 SCNJ 210/(1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 101) 1; Tukur v. Govt., of Gongola State (supra), Abubakar v. Nasamu (No. 1) 2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1330) 40; Adebayo v. PDP (2013) 17 NWLR (pt. 1382) 1; A-G, Lagos State v. A-G. Fed. (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1412) 217; Ardo v. Nyako (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1416) 591; Jombo United Co. Ltd. v. Leadway Ass. Co. Ltd. (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1536) 439; PDP v. Umeh (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1579) 272; A.-G., Bauchi State v. A.-G., Fed (2018) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1648) 299. This ageless principle of law, with due

reverence, exposes the poverty of the respondents’ alluring contention that the lower Court’s jurisdiction to hear fundamental right matter is fixated by its jurisdictional provision in Section 251(1) of the Constitution, as amended. It is lame!

At the bottom of page 133, lines 24 – 28 of the record, the lower Court declared that the appellants claims:
are also merely incidental and/or ancillary to the subject matter being the alleged wrongful demolition of the Secretariat and operation of slaughter slabs which are actions in tort and/or trespass that are not within the subject matter jurisdiction of this Honourable Court.

In the light of the above juridical survey, done in consonance to the law, the lower Court’s ultimate proclamation/finding, with due respect, is a serious defilement of the law and an assailable one. It will smell of judicial sacrilege to allow it to stand and command any validity. In the end, l have no choice than to resolve the sole issue in favour of the appellants and against the respondents.

On the whole, having resolved this singular issue in favour of the appellants, the fortune of the

appeal is obvious. It is imbued with merit. Consequently, l allow the appeal. The judgment of the lower Court, delivered on 27th March, 2015, in suit No. FHC/L/CS/1361/2013, filed by the appellants is hereby set aside. The suit is remitted to the Honourable Chief Judge of the Federal High Court of Nigeria for reassignment to another Judge other than C.J. Aneke J., for trial de novo. The parties shall bear the respective costs they expended in the prosecution and defence of the fruitful appeal.

JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JCA, and adopt the judgment as mine with nothing useful to add.

EBIOWEI TOBI, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the leading judgment of my learned brother, Obande Festus Ogbuinya, JCA, and I am in agreement with the analysis of the issues submitted to this Court by counsel to the respective parties for determination. I also agree with the conclusion contained therein. On my part, I have nothing more to add.

Appearances:

O.E. OGUNGBEJE, ESQ. For Appellant(s)

HAMEED OYENUGA, ESQ. DIRECTOR CIVIL LITIGATION, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, LAGOS STATE For Respondent(s)