INLAND BANK (NIG.) PLC. V. RUHANTI (NIG.) ENTERPRISES LTD. & ORS.
(2010)LCN/3787(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 13th day of May, 2010
CA/A/4/2003
RATIO
COURT: JURISDICTION; IMPORTANCE OF JURISDICTION OF COURT
Jurisdiction of a court is a matter of law and it is vested on a court by the Constitution and the statute establishing the court. Therefore, there is no need for a court to go outside the enabling laws in search of jurisdiction. Arjay Ltd. v. Airline Management Support Ltd, (2003) 7 NWLR (pt.820) 577 at 635 (SC).
A Court is competent to adjudicate when:-
(a) it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and
(b) the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and
(c) the case comes before the court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
Any defect in the competence of the court is fatal and the proceedings are a nullity however well conducted and decided as such defect is extrinsic to the adjudication. Rossek v. A.CB. Ltd (1993) 8 NWLR (pt. 312) 382; Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 234; Skenconsult v. Ukey (1981) 1 SC 6; Adeigbe v. Kushinro (1965) NMLR at page 284.
It is in the interest of the best administration of justice that, where the issue of jurisdiction is raised in any proceedings before any court of law, it should be dealt with at the earliest opportunity and before trial or consideration of any other issues raised in the case as anything done without or in excess of jurisdiction by any court established under the Constitution is a nullity. Odessa v. F.R.N. (NO.2) (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt. 934) at 558 – 559 per Mohammed J.C.A; Onyema v. Oputa (1987) 3 NWLR (pt. 60) 259; Attorney General Federation v. Sode (1990) 1 NWLR (pt.128) 500; Nalsa & Team Associates v. NNPC (1006) 3 NWLR (pt. 439) 621.
Jurisdiction is the threshold of an adjudicating body. Where no jurisdiction can be found, no jurisdiction can completely be handled. Thus, once a court has no jurisdiction to entertain a matter, if it proceeds to hear the matter, no matter how brilliantly conducted, the decision is void and of no effect; and an appeal court shall have no hesitation to declare it null and void.
Umanah v. Attah (2005) 12 NWLR (pt.938) 103 at 116; I.K. Martins v. U. P. L. (1992) 1 NWLR (pt. 217) 322; N.D.I.C. v. CBN (2002) 7 NWLR (pt. 766) 272. PER MARY U. PETER-ODILI, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION: JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT OF STATE AND THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT
Judges of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja ought to be circumspect before deciding whether or not it is wise and correct to exercise jurisdiction in matters outside the territory of the Federal Capital Territory.
By the Nigerian Constitution, each State of the Federation is independent of the other and the jurisdiction of each State is limited to matters arising in its territory. Thus, Courts ought to bear in mind that jurisdiction is not to be assumed, but must be based on constitutional provisions that established the court. Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt. 843) 310 (SC).
I shall refer to the views of Salami J.C.A (as he then was).
The jurisdiction of a High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja is confined to the area of the court vis-a-vis the nature or the clam, before it.
Thus, an order granted by a State High court or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory does not go beyond the territorial boundary of such a State or of the Federal Capital Territory.
In this case, even if the federal Capital, territory High court had jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s Claim, any order made by it would be effective only within the territory of the Federal Capital Territory and the respondent’s members outside the territory would not have been bound by it and would have been entitled to ignore it”.
See F.G.N. v. Oshiomhole (2004) 3 NWLR (pt.860) 305 at 324 – 325; Dalhatu v. Twaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt.843) 310; Abubakri v Smith (1973) 3 ECSLR 536; Co-operative Development Bank Plc v. Joe Golday Co. Ltd. (2000) 14 NWLR (pt. 688) 506 at 548.
By virtue of Section 251 (i) (d), (e) (f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil cases and matters arising from banks, banking, other financial institutions, including any action between one bank and the other, any action by or against the Central Bank of Nigeria arising from banking, foreign exchange, coinage, legal tender, bill of exchange, letter of credit, promissory note and other fiscal measures, provided that the jurisdiction shall not extend to dispute between an individual customer and his bank in respect of transactions between the individual customer and the bank. The proviso to Section 251(i),(d),e,(f) of the 1999 Constitution has the following implications:-
(a) to that the State High Court shall have jurisdiction in the circumstances indicated in the proviso;
(b) that the Federal High Court shall not have exclusive jurisdiction as given to it under the main section, when it comes to matters falling within the circumstances of the proviso;
(c) that the fact that the Federal High Court’s exclusive jurisdiction in Section 251 (i) (d) shall not apply to matters falling within the circumstances of the proviso does not entirely remove jurisdiction therein from the Federal High Court and the State High Court have and can exercise concurrent jurisdiction in such circumstances Co-operative Development Bank Plc v. Golday Co. Ltd. (2000) 14 NWLR (pt. 688) 506 at 549
By the combined provisions of Sections 180, 189 (i) and 390 (i) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 dealing with operation of and relating to Companies and Allied Matters and Section 251 (I) (d) (e) (f) of the Constitution of the Federal, Republic of Nigeria 1999, the only court having original exclusive jurisdiction in respect of causes and matters arising from the operation of any Act or Decree in relation to Companies and Allied Matters and any other common Law regulating the operation of Companies, is the Federal, High Court. Ceramic Manufacturers Nigeria Plc v. Nigeria industrial Development Bank (1999) 11 NWLR (pt. 627) 383 at 396 per Obadina J.C.A.
The Federal High court is competent to entertain an action for the appointment of receiver or a receiver and manager by virtue of section 7(1)(c)(i) of the Federal High Court Act which permits the Federal High Court to assume jurisdiction in matters arising from the Companies and Allied Matters Act. Ceramic Manufacturers Nig. Plc v. Nigeria Industrial Development Bank (1999) 11 NWLR (pt. 627) 383 at 390 – 391 per Salami J.C.A (as he then was).
However, the appointment of a receiver and his duties, powers and liabilities are governed by or provided for in Sections 387, 388, 389 and 400 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap 59, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990; see Ceramic Manufacturers Nig. Plc. v. N.I.D.B. (1999) 11 NWLR (pt. 627) 383.
The proviso to Section 251(i) (d) of the 1999 Constitution would also apply where in a customer/banker relationship the customer is a bank. Consequently in such a situation, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court would be exempted. Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria v. NDIC (1999) 2 NWLR (pt. 591) 333 at 362 – 363.
It cannot be ignored the role of the 1999 Constitution vis-a-vis this matter of the jurisdiction as is contested here in relation to the High court of FCT, Abuja as against the Federal High Court which the Appellant contends should be the appropriate forum. See Section 257(i) of the 1999 Constitution.
The High court of a State has unlimited jurisdiction in civil matters under Section 255 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 except where the jurisdiction is expressly ousted by the clearly worded proviso. Onyenucheya v. Military Administrator Imo state (1997) 1 NWLR (pt. 482) 429 at 442 F.C.D.A. V. Sule (1994) 3 NWLR (pt. 332) 257. PER MARY U. PETER-ODILI, J.C.A.
BANKING LAW: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CUSTOMER OF A BANK AND A BANK CUSTOMER
Generally, a customer of a bank is someone who has an account with a bank, or without having an account the relationship of banker and customer exists. In the latter case, some money transaction must connect the banker and the customer, but must arise from the nature of a contract Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. V. Integrated Timber & Plywood Producers Ltd. (2000) 12 NWLR (pt. 680) 99 (CA).
A bank customer is any person having an account with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to collect items and includes a bank carrying an account with another bank as to letters of credit, a buyer or other person who causes an issuer to issue credit or a bank which procures issuance or confirmation on behalf of that bank’s customer. See Union Bank Nigeria Plc. V. I.T.P.P. Ltd. (supra) at 110. PER MARY U. PETER-ODILI, J.C.A.
COURT: CONTEMPT; MEANING AND NATURE OF CONTEMPT OF COURT
A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction remains valid and binding unless and until it is set aside by an appeal court or by the Lower Court itself where it acted without jurisdiction and there is an unqualified obligation on every person against whom it is given to obey it unless and until it is so set aside. This is because to hold otherwise is to clothe a party against whom an order has been made with the discretion to decide, in his wisdom, that the judgment is invalid and not binding on him and this will amount to an invitation to anarchy. Therefore, anyone who knows of an order, valid or invalid, null, regular or irregular cannot be allowed to disobey it. Per Ogundare J.S.C. Rossek v. A.C.B. Ltd (1993) 8 NWLR (pt.312) 382 at 434; Aladegbemi v. Fasanmade (1998) 3 NWLR (pt. 81) 129: Williams v. Sanusi (1961) 2 SCNLR 129; Ojiako v. Ogueze (1962) 1 SC NLR 112; Adebayo v Johnson (1969) All NLR 176 at 194; Ajao v. Alao (1986) 5 NWLR (pt. 45) 802 at 823; Yonwuren v. Modern Signs (1985) 1 NWLR (pt. 2) 244; Odiase v. Agbo (1972) 1 All NLR 170 at 176; Melifonwu v. Egbuji (1982) 9 SC 145.
The common law principle applied in our courts is that an applicant cannot whilst continuing in contempt of court is heard to be seeking the favour of the court. In such a case the contempt must be purged before the party could make any application to the court. Per Karibi-White J.S.C. Odogwu v. Odogwu (1992) 2 NWLR (pt. 224) 539 at 556.
“The fact that a party to a cause who had disobeyed an order of court was not of itself a bar to his being heard, but if his disobedience was such that, so long as it is continued, it impeded the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or enforce the order which it might make, then the court might in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment was removed. The case in hand is a classic case where the disobedience of the party has impeded the course of justice”.
Per Wali J.S.C in F.A.T.B. v. Ezegbu (1992) 9 NWLR (pt. 264) 132 at 146 -147.
The principles enshrined in the law of contempt are there to uphold and ensure the effective administration of justice. They are the means by which the law vindicates the public interest in the due administration of justice. The law of contempt does not exist for the sake of the personal aggrandisement of the judge, nor is it there to protect the private rights of parties or litigants. Fame Publications Ltd. v. Enconium Ventures Ltd. (2000) 8 NWLR (pt.667) 105 at 111; Atake v. Attorney General Federation (1982) 11 Sc 153; Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. v. Assan (1995) 8 NWLR (pt. 412) 129.
When contempt of court is committed whether ‘in facie curiae’ or ‘ex facie curiae’, it must be dealt with by the Court before proceeding to the substantive suit. This must be so if the dignity, integrity, respect and authority of the Court are to be restored and protected. Per Aderemi J.C.A (as he then was). Fame Publications Ltd. v. Encomium Ventures Ltd. (2000) 8 NWLR (pt. 667, 105 at 111; Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. V. Assan (1995) 8 NWLR (pt. 412) 129.
A person who is in contempt of a subsisting court order is not entitled to be granted court’s discretion to enable him continue with the breach.
Indeed, it is a serious matter for anyone to flout a positive order of court of competent jurisdiction and then turn around to seek a discretionary remedy from court while still in contempt of such court order. Lawal-Osula v. Lawal-Osula (1995) 3 NWLR (pt. 382) 128 at 143 F.A.T.B. Ltd v. Ezegbu (1992) 9 NWLR (pt. 264) 132; Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (pt. 18) 621; Odogwu v. Odogwu (1992) 2 NWLR (pt.225) 539; Tewogbade & Sons Ltd. v. Governor of Oyo State (1991) 2 NWLR (pt.171) 52; Oyeyemi v. Irewole Local government (1993) 1 NWLR (pt. 270) 462.
From even the summation of the trial Court, clearly there was a direct confrontation or efficiency by the Appellants on the institution of the entire Court System or Rule of Law.
The rules embodied in the law of contempt of court are intended to uphold and ensure the effective administration of justice. They are the means by which the law vindicates the public interest in due administration of justice. The law does not exist to protect the personal dignity of the court which is offended; it is the fundamental supremacy of the law which is challenged. It also does not exist to protect the private rights of parties or litigants. Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. v. Assan (1995) 8 NWLR (pt. 412) 129 at 143 – 144 per Uwais J.S.C (as he then was).
It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom, an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it unless and until that order is discharged or set aside on appeal. This extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. Therefore, I see no solace for the Appellant/contemnor, as the administration of justice in its full power and authority cannot be equated to or even play second fiddle to the principle of jurisdiction of a court simplicity which in the circumstance is of a narrow scope as the full matter of rule of Law or administration of justice which is at risk. The situation is indeed so grave that it has to be accorded the full weight of respect and honour due to the concept of the Rule of Law which the affront seeks to short-circuit. See Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd v. Assan (supra). PER MARY U. PETER-ODILI, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
HON. JUSTICE MARY U. PETER-ODILI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
HON. JUSTICE JIMI OLUKAYODE BADA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
HON. JUSTICE ABDU ABOKI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
INLAND BANK (NIG.) PLC. Appellant(s)
AND
1. RUHANTI (NIG.) ENTERPRISES LTD.
2. MAJOR-GENERAL TIMOTHY SHELPIDI
3. NATIONAL ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FUND Respondent(s)
MARY U. PETER-ODILI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Claim against the Appellant as endorsed in their writ of summons are as follows:-
1) An order that the loan facility of US $1,090,000 (One million, Ninety Thousand, United States
Dollar) only the 1st Defendant obtained from the 3rd Defendant for the establishment of a Liquified Petroleum Gas Bottling Plant at Bauchi, Bauchi State should be repayable at $422.00 to one United States Dollar.
2) A further order on the 2nd Defendant to produce the 1st Plaintiff’s Statement of Account No. 08010081194 with their branch to establish his liability to the Defendants.
3) A declaration that the appointment of NASSIR ABDU DANGIRI by the 2nd Defendant as a Receiver of the 1st Plaintiff is void and of no effect.
4) A perpetual order restraining the Defendants from selling the 2nd Plaintiffs property situated at plot No. 167 DP42 behind Dass Park, New G.R.A. Bauchi, Bauchi State, covered by a Certificate of Occupancy No. BA/11/265 and also from selling the 1st Plaintiffs liquified Petroleum and Bottling Gas (LPG) Plaint in Bauchi.
5) An order declaring as void the loans given to the 1st Plaintiff as it is contrary to Central Bank of Nigeria lending rate.
The 1st and 2nd Respondents also filed a Motion Ex-parte together with a supporting affidavit dated the 7th day of February, 2002 and a Motion on Notice together with a supporting affidavit dated 7th day of February, 2002.
The Motion Ex-parte was moved on 11th day of February, 2002 and three orders were granted which are:-
(1) The two defendants, their privies or any other Persons acting on their behalf are restrained from selling 1st Plaintiff’s liquefied plant in Bauchi, Bauchi State including 2nd Plaintiff property situate at Plot No. 167 DP 42 behind Dass Motor Park, New G.R.A. Bauchi, Bauchi State pending the determination of the Motion on Notice.
(2) The appointment of Nassir Abdu Dangiri as a Receiver of the 1st Plaintiff by the defendant was suspended pending the determination of the Motion on Notice.
(3) Leave was also granted to the Plaintiff to issue and serve the Writ of Summons and other court process on the 2nd defendant outside the jurisdiction of this Court at Plot No. 19/23 Joss road, Bauchi.
On being served with the court processes the Appellant filed a memorandum of appearance and a Motion on Notice seeking the following:-
a) An order discharging the Ex-parte orders granted by the lower Court/ and
b) An order striking out/ dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction.
On 7/3/2002, the Appellant through her counsel moved her Motion on Notice dated the 15th day of February, 2002. The Respondents could not reply but instead asked for time to settle the matter out of court and on that application, the matter was adjourned on several occasions. When the matter came up on 30th October, 2002, counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondents informed the court that the appellant had forcefully taken over possession of the subject matter of the suit contrary to the order of the court and that forms 48 and 49 had been issued against the Appellant. There was argument as to which motion comes first i.e whether the Court should entertain the issue of jurisdiction first or the Motion for committal.
On 2/12/2002, the Lower Court; Coram S.E. Aladetoyinbo ruled that the issue of contempt should be taken first.
Being dissatisfied with the Ruling of the Court below delivered on 3/12/2003, the Appellant has appealed to this Court on three grounds and later by leave of Court, 5 additional grounds of appeal.
FACTS:-
Through customer/banker relationship, the 1st Respondent applied for $1,090,000 and N8 million National Economic Reconstruction Fund loan (hereinafter referred to as NERFUND LOAN). And since NERFUND does not deal with customers directly, the 1st Respondent was directed by the 3rd Respondent to nominate a Bank through whom the loan will be disbursed.
In compliance with that order, the 1st Respondent nominated the Appellant and the NERFUND LOAN was processed and granted to the 1st Respondent through the Appellant. The 1st Respondent did not execute any agreement in respect of the NERFUND LOAN with the 3rd Respondent. Rather the agreement to grant the NERFUND LOAN was executed between the Appellant and the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
The NERFUND LOAN was granted to the 1st Respondent and as security for the loan; the 1st Respondent executed an all assets Debenture over her liquified Petroleum Gas (LGP) Bottling Plant in Bauchi while the 2nd Respondent who is the alter ego and the directing mind of the 1st Respondent provided his landed property covered by Certificate of Occupancy No. BA/11/265 situated at Bauchi as additional security for the loan and a third plant Deed of Legal Mortgage was created by the 1st and 2nd Respondent in favour of the Appellant.
Now, when the 1st and 2nd Respondents defaulted on the terms of the All Assets Debenture and the Third Party Deed of legal mortgage executed by them in favour of the Appellant, the Appellant in the exercise of the powers contained in the two agreements mentioned above exercised her power of appointment of Receiver over the assets of the 1st Respondent by appointing NASSIR ABDU DANGIRI as the Receiver of the assets of the 1st Respondent while the 2nd Respondent’s property was advertised for sale.
Mr. Dangiri, learned Counsel for the Appellant on the day of hearing adopted their appellant’s Brief filed on 18/10/05 wherein were couched two issues for determination viz:-
1) Whether the High Court of the federal Capital Territory, Abuja has jurisdiction to hear and determines the reliefs claimed by the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
2) Whether the Learned Trial Judge was correct in holding that issue on contempt takes precedence over issue of jurisdiction.
Learned Counsel for the respondents, Mr. Esene adopted their Brief filed on 9/11/06 and deemed filed on 11/11/06 in which they adopted the two issues framed by the Appellant.
ISSUE NO. 1:
Whether the High Court of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja has jurisdiction to hear and determine the reliefs claimed by the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
Mr. Dangiri, learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that it is a fundamental principle that jurisdiction is determined by the Plaintiff’s claim or demand and not by a defendant’s answer. He cited Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) All NLR 575; Attorney-General of the Federation v. Attorney General of Abia State (2001) 11 NWLR (pt. 725) 690; Attorney-Genera I of Ogun State v. Coker (2003) 6 WRN 109; Anyah v. Iyayi (1993) 9 SCNJ 53; Arjay Ltd v. A.M.S. Limited (2003) 7 NWLR (pt. 820) 577.
For the Appellant were raised three questions which are:-
1) Why should the 1st and 2nd Respondents go to High Court of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja to sue for a cause of action or subject matter that are situated at Bauchi.
2) Why should the 1st and 2nd Respondents go to High Court of Federal Capital Territory in respect of matter connected with the operation of Companies incorporated under the companies and Allied Matters Act or matters relating to the validity of the appointment of a Receiver?
3) Why should the Lower Court make an order against a person who is not a party to the proceedings?
Mr. Dangiri stated that since the court’s jurisdiction is challenged, it is always neater and better to settle the issue one way or the other before proceeding with the case since the issue of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter. That, it is a radical and crucial question of competence. He cited Attorney General Lagos State v. Dosumu (19989) All NLR 504 at 512; Attorney General Ogun State v. Coker (supra); Lakanmi v. Adene (2003) 10 NWLR (pt. 828) 353 at 367;Lead Merchant Bank Ltd. v. P.T.F. (2005) All FWLR (pt.270) 2082 at 2088; Attorney General Anambra State v. Uba (2005) All FWLR (pt. 277) 909.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant further contended that the High court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja has no jurisdiction over subject matters situated within Bauchi. He cited Sections 257(1) (2) of the 1999 Constitution; Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt. 843) 310; Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) All NLR 581; Essang v. Aureaol Ltd. (2002) 23 WRN 155 at 170; F.G.N. v. Oshiomhole (2004) 3 NWLR (pt. 860) 305.
Mr. Dangiri stated on that the trial Judge was not right in making an order restraining the Receiver from exercising his powers when the Receiver was not a party to the proceedings. He referred to Awoniyi v. ARMOC (2001) 6 SCNJ 146; Attorney-General Federation v. ANPP (2003) 18 NWLR (pt. 851) 182; Adenuga v. Odumero (2003) 8 NWLR (pt. 821) 163.
He further submitted that by Order 10 Rule 1 of the High court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (Civil Procedure Rules) Cap 511 Laws of the Federation 1000, suits relating to land must be commenced where the land is situate. He cited Iyanda v. Laniba II (2003) 1 NWLR (pt. 801) 267 at 292; Dalhatu v. Turaki (supra); Turaki v. Dalhatu (2003) FWLR (pt 170)1378.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant said the Abuja High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain matters relating to the operation of companies incorporated under the Companies And Allied Matters Act. Also the Abuja High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain matters relating to the validity of the appointment of a receiver which is only within the domain of the Federal High Court. He cited Farine v. Coker (2003) 7 WRN 23 at 32; Section 251(i) (e) of the 1999 Constitution; Sections 387, 388,389 and 400 of CAMA; Ceramics Manufacturing (Nig.) Plc v. NIDB (1999) NWLR (pt. 627) 383); Tanarewa (Nig.) Ltd. v. Plastic Farm Ltd. (2003) 14 NWR (pt. 840) 355 at 373 – 378; Kadzi Int. Ltd. v. Kano Tannery Co. Ltd. (2004) 4 NWLR (pt. 864) 575 – 577; Tanarewa (Nig.) Ltd. v. Arzi (2005) 5 NWLR (pt. 919) 593.
That the jurisdiction of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja has been made subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. He cited Section 251(i) and other provisions of the 1999 Constitution; Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (supra) ; Oke v. Oke (1974)All NLR 443; Aqua Ltd. v Ondo State Sports Council (1988) 10-11 SCNJ 26.
Mr. Dangiri went on to say that if the Lower Court’s jurisdiction is ousted in respect of 1st and 2nd Respondents’ claim, then the court cannot exercise judicial powers in respect of those claims. That therefore the exparte orders granted by the court must be a nullity and they cannot stand.
He referred to Tukur’ case (supra); Dangtoe v. C.S.C. Plateau (2001) FWLR (pt. 50) 1639; Western Steel. Works Ltd. v. Iron & Steel Workers Union (N0.1) (l986) 3 NWLR (pt. 30) 617 at 625; SPDC Ltd. v. Isaiah (2001) FWLR (pt. 56) 608; Tiza v. Begha (2005) All FWLR (pt. 272) 200; Nwude v. Chairman EFCC (2005) All FWLR (pt. 276) 740; P.C.N. v. N.A.P.P.M.D. (2005) All FWLR (Pt 276) 772; M.P.A. v. Eyamba (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt.939) 4-9 at 438; Okike v. L.P.D.C. (2005) All FWLR (pt.274) 337; Odessa v. F.R.N. (N).2 (2005) 10 NWLR (pt. 934) 528; Futech Yola v. Futuless (2005) 12 NWLR (pt 938) 175; Umanah v. Attah (2005) 12 NWLR (pt. 938) 103.
In response, learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents, Mr. Esene submitted that the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory has jurisdiction to entertain Respondents’ claim as the doctrine of lex situs does not apply to the suit. That the reasons being that what gave rise to the proceedings was a loan facility granted to the 1st Respondent by the 3rd entire claims of the 1st and 2nd Respondents at the Lower court belongs to the 3rd Respondent and not the Appellant. That the 1st Respondent merely opened an account with the Appellant for the purpose of faceting the loan.
Mr. Esene said, the relationship between the Appellant and the 1st and 2nd Respondents is that of a banker and customer relationship. That the Proviso to Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution would not apply as in such a situation the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is exempted. He cited FMBN v. NDCC (1999) 2 NWLR (pt. 591) 333; Afribank (Nig) Pl v. K.C.G. (Nig.) Ltd. (2001) 8 NWLR (pt. 714) 87.
Learned Counsel for 1st and 2nd Respondents further submitted that, a proviso does not set out to allocate power or jurisdiction but to create exemptions or relax limitations. He said the proviso to paragraph (d) of Section 230(i) of the 1979 Constitution as amended now to Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution has singled out matters on banker/customer relationship from the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court and has allowed any other court to assume jurisdiction. He referred to Onyenucheya v. Military, Administrator Imo State (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 482) 429; Ali v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1997) 4 NWLR (PT.498) 192; Oamen v. Owena (1993) 8 NWLR (pt.311) 358; Co-operative Dev. Bank Plc v. Joe Golday Co. Ltd. (2000) 14 NWLR (pt. 688) 506; New Nigeria Bank Plc. V. Odiase (1993) 8 NWLR (pt. 310) 238; U.B.N. Plc v. I.T.P.P. Ltd. (2000) 12 NWLR (pt. 680) 99; Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (pt. 117) 517; Egbuziem v. URC (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt330) 23.
With the granting of the Amendment of the Notice and Grounds of Appeal, there came to be eight (8) grounds of Appeal which I shall quote below, without the particulars thus:-
GROUND ONE:
Learned Trial Judge erred in Law when he refused to determine whether he had jurisdiction to entertain the suit before him after his jurisdiction was challenged by the appellant.
GROUND TWO:
The Learned Trial Judge erred in law when he held that he will hear and determine the issue of contempt first before determining whether he has jurisdiction to entertain the suit or not.
GROUND THREE
The Learned Trial Judge erred in law by not following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of SPDC Ltd. v. Isaiah (2001) FWLR (pt. 56) 608 that issue of jurisdiction once raised must be addressed by the court one way or the other.
GROUND FOUR:
Learned Trial Judge erred in law by entertaining the suit.
GROUND FIVE:
Learned Trial Judge erred in law in granting the Ex-parte orders in favour of the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs/Respondents.
GROUND SIX:
Learned Trial Judge erred in law when he restrained the Receiver from exercising his functions.
GROUND SEVEN:
Learned Trial Judge erred in law as he lacked the competence to entertain the suit because leave of the Receiver was not obtained before the suit was filed.
GROUND EIGHT:
Learned Trial Judge erred in law by granting the ex-parte orders to the 1st and 2nd Respondents when he lacked the competence to entertain the suit
This issue of jurisdiction as a question raised in Issue No. 1 would not have been considered if it was other than jurisdiction since the Lower court Coram: S.E Aladetoyinbo J, and not entered into it. But jurisdiction whenever raised even on appeal as at this appellate stage has to be taken in hand without much ado.
Jurisdiction of a court is a matter of law and it is vested on a court by the Constitution and the statute establishing the court. Therefore, there is no need for a court to go outside the enabling laws in search of jurisdiction. Arjay Ltd. v. Airline Management Support Ltd, (2003) 7 NWLR (pt.820) 577 at 635 (SC).
A Court is competent to adjudicate when:-
(a) it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and
(b) the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and
(c) the case comes before the court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
Any defect in the competence of the court is fatal and the proceedings are a nullity however well conducted and decided as such defect is extrinsic to the adjudication. Rossek v. A.CB. Ltd (1993) 8 NWLR (pt. 312) 382; Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 234; Skenconsult v. Ukey (1981) 1 SC 6; Adeigbe v. Kushinro (1965) NMLR at page 284.
It is in the interest of the best administration of justice that, where the issue of jurisdiction is raised in any proceedings before any court of law, it should be dealt with at the earliest opportunity and before trial or consideration of any other issues raised in the case as anything done without or in excess of jurisdiction by any court established under the Constitution is a nullity. Odessa v. F.R.N. (NO.2) (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt. 934) at 558 – 559 per Mohammed J.C.A; Onyema v. Oputa (1987) 3 NWLR (pt. 60) 259; Attorney General Federation v. Sode (1990) 1 NWLR (pt.128) 500; Nalsa & Team Associates v. NNPC (1006) 3 NWLR (pt. 439) 621.
Jurisdiction is the threshold of an adjudicating body. Where no jurisdiction can be found, no jurisdiction can completely be handled. Thus, once a court has no jurisdiction to entertain a matter, if it proceeds to hear the matter, no matter how brilliantly conducted, the decision is void and of no effect; and an appeal court shall have no hesitation to declare it null and void.
Umanah v. Attah (2005) 12 NWLR (pt.938) 103 at 116; I.K. Martins v. U. P. L. (1992) 1 NWLR (pt. 217) 322; N.D.I.C. v. CBN (2002) 7 NWLR (pt. 766) 272.
Judges of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja ought to be circumspect before deciding whether or not it is wise and correct to exercise jurisdiction in matters outside the territory of the Federal Capital Territory.
By the Nigerian Constitution, each State of the Federation is independent of the other and the jurisdiction of each State is limited to matters arising in its territory. Thus, Courts ought to bear in mind that jurisdiction is not to be assumed, but must be based on constitutional provisions that established the court. Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt. 843) 310 (SC).
I shall refer to the views of Salami J.C.A (as he then was).
The jurisdiction of a High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja is confined to the area of the court vis-a-vis the nature or the clam, before it.
Thus, an order granted by a State High court or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory does not go beyond the territorial boundary of such a State or of the Federal Capital Territory.
In this case, even if the federal Capital, territory High court had jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s Claim, any order made by it would be effective only within the territory of the Federal Capital Territory and the respondent’s members outside the territory would not have been bound by it and would have been entitled to ignore it”.
See F.G.N. v. Oshiomhole (2004) 3 NWLR (pt.860) 305 at 324 – 325; Dalhatu v. Twaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt.843) 310; Abubakri v Smith (1973) 3 ECSLR 536; Co-operative Development Bank Plc v. Joe Golday Co. Ltd. (2000) 14 NWLR (pt. 688) 506 at 548.
By virtue of Section 251 (i) (d), (e) (f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil cases and matters arising from banks, banking, other financial institutions, including any action between one bank and the other, any action by or against the Central Bank of Nigeria arising from banking, foreign exchange, coinage, legal tender, bill of exchange, letter of credit, promissory note and other fiscal measures, provided that the jurisdiction shall not extend to dispute between an individual customer and his bank in respect of transactions between the individual customer and the bank. The proviso to Section 251(i),(d),e,(f) of the 1999 Constitution has the following implications:-
(a) to that the State High Court shall have jurisdiction in the circumstances indicated in the proviso;
(b) that the Federal High Court shall not have exclusive jurisdiction as given to it under the main section, when it comes to matters falling within the circumstances of the proviso;
(c) that the fact that the Federal High Court’s exclusive jurisdiction in Section 251 (i) (d) shall not apply to matters falling within the circumstances of the proviso does not entirely remove jurisdiction therein from the Federal High Court and the State High Court have and can exercise concurrent jurisdiction in such circumstances Co-operative Development Bank Plc v. Golday Co. Ltd. (2000) 14 NWLR (pt. 688) 506 at 549
By the combined provisions of Sections 180, 189 (i) and 390 (i) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 dealing with operation of and relating to Companies and Allied Matters and Section 251 (I) (d) (e) (f) of the Constitution of the Federal, Republic of Nigeria 1999, the only court having original exclusive jurisdiction in respect of causes and matters arising from the operation of any Act or Decree in relation to Companies and Allied Matters and any other common Law regulating the operation of Companies, is the Federal, High Court. Ceramic Manufacturers Nigeria Plc v. Nigeria industrial Development Bank (1999) 11 NWLR (pt. 627) 383 at 396 per Obadina J.C.A.
The Federal High court is competent to entertain an action for the appointment of receiver or a receiver and manager by virtue of section 7(1)(c)(i) of the Federal High Court Act which permits the Federal High Court to assume jurisdiction in matters arising from the Companies and Allied Matters Act. Ceramic Manufacturers Nig. Plc v. Nigeria Industrial Development Bank (1999) 11 NWLR (pt. 627) 383 at 390 – 391 per Salami J.C.A (as he then was).
However, the appointment of a receiver and his duties, powers and liabilities are governed by or provided for in Sections 387, 388, 389 and 400 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap 59, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990; see Ceramic Manufacturers Nig. Plc. v. N.I.D.B. (1999) 11 NWLR (pt. 627) 383.
The proviso to Section 251(i) (d) of the 1999 Constitution would also apply where in a customer/banker relationship the customer is a bank. Consequently in such a situation, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court would be exempted. Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria v. NDIC (1999) 2 NWLR (pt. 591) 333 at 362 – 363.
It cannot be ignored the role of the 1999 Constitution vis-a-vis this matter of the jurisdiction as is contested here in relation to the High court of FCT, Abuja as against the Federal High Court which the Appellant contends should be the appropriate forum. See Section 257(i) of the 1999 Constitution.
The High court of a State has unlimited jurisdiction in civil matters under Section 255 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 except where the jurisdiction is expressly ousted by the clearly worded proviso. Onyenucheya v. Military Administrator Imo state (1997) 1 NWLR (pt. 482) 429 at 442 F.C.D.A. V. Sule (1994) 3 NWLR (pt. 332) 257.
Generally, a customer of a bank is someone who has an account with a bank, or without having an account the relationship of banker and customer exists. In the latter case, some money transaction must connect the banker and the customer, but must arise from the nature of a contract Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. V. Integrated Timber & Plywood Producers Ltd. (2000) 12 NWLR (pt. 680) 99 (CA).
A bank customer is any person having an account with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to collect items and includes a bank carrying an account with another bank as to letters of credit, a buyer or other person who causes an issuer to issue credit or a bank which procures issuance or confirmation on behalf of that bank’s customer. See Union Bank Nigeria Plc. V. I.T.P.P. Ltd. (supra) at 110.
I have had to go back to the claims of the Plaintiffs/1st and 2nd Respondents and in the main what is at play is the customer/banker relationship. This is so since it is the Plaintiff’s claim that determines jurisdiction of court. Where jurisdiction of court is challenged, the court has jurisdiction to decide if in fact it has jurisdiction to hear the claims, and this is done by examining the plaintiff’s claim. Umanah v. Attah (2005) 12 NWLR (938) 103 at 118 per Muhammad J.C.A (as he then was);
Anyah v. Iyayi (1993) 7 NWLR (pt. 305) 290; Attorney General,Kwara State v. Wanah (1995) 7 NWLR (pt. 405) 120; Anigboro v.Sea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd. (1995) 6 NWLR (pt. 399) 35.
Having considered the claims of the plaintiff, it is clear that prayers 3 & 4 which deal with the declaration on the appointment of the receiver and the other against the perpetual Injunction restraining on the property in Bauchi, Bauchi State, are ancillary to the main claims in prayers 1, 2, and 5 which are the substance of the dispute as they are matters of banker and customer, and within the jurisdiction of the High Court Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. In dealing with the matter therefore he could fully determine even those areas which have merely fallen in, within the course of events. The matters cannot be handled piecemeal and therefore I answer the question raised on this jurisdiction in the affirmative and in favour of the Respondents. That is to say that the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
ISSUE NO. 2:
Whether the Learned Trial Judge was correct in holding that issue of contempt takes precedence over issue of jurisdiction.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental and goes into the competence of the Court or Tribunal. That issue of jurisdiction must be settled first before the court would go into punishing the Appellant for contempt since the court has to see whether it can in fact exercise that power or not. He cited Ibrahim v. Geye (2002) 13 NWLR (pt. 784) 272, Dalhatu v. Turaki (supra); Ebhodaghe v. Okoye (2004) 18 NWLR (pt.905) 472 at 487; Omokhodion v. F.R.N. (NO.2) (2005) 10 NWLR (pt.934) 568 at 613; Ani v. Nna (1996) 4 NWLR (pt.440) 297; Attorney General Ogun State v. Coker (supra) AT 132; Eligbe v. Omokhafe (2004) 12 SCNJ; Afro Continental v. Co-operative Association (2003) 1 SCNJ 530 at 538; NDIC v. SBN Plc. (2003) 1 NWLR (pt. 801) 311; Saleh v. Monguno (2003) 1 NWLR (pt. 801) 221.
Learned Counsel for the Respondents’ 1st and 2nd, said the trial Court was right in dealing with the issue of contempt first. That, there is an obligation on every person on whom an order of court is made to obey it, unless and until it is discharged. That this law is intended to uphold and ensure the effective administration of justice. That a person, who has committed a civil contempt by disobeying a Court Order may be subject to the rule that a party in contempt cannot be heard or take proceedings in the same cause until he has purged himself of the contempt.
He cited Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. v. Assen (1995) 8 NWLR (pt. 412) 129; F.A.T.B. v. Ezegbu (1992) 9 NWLR (pt 264) 132; Military Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (pt. 18) 621; Lawal-Osula v. Lawal Osula (1995) 3 NWLR (pt. 382) 128; Odogwu v. Odogwu (1992) NWLR (pt. 225) 539; Ifeadi v. Atedze (1995) NWLR (pt. 394) 196, Rossek v. African Continental. Bank Ltd. (1993) 8 NWLR (pt 312) 382; Fame Publication Ltd. v. Enconium Ventures Ltd. (2000) 8 NWLR (pt. 667) 105 at 111; Onuaguiuchi v. Ndu (2000) 1 NWLR (pt. 679) 519; COP v. Omunakwe (1999) 2 NWLR (pt. 590) 190.
The Ruling of the trial High Court basis of this appeal is as follows:-
“This matter came up on the 25th day of July, 2002, counsel to the Plaintiff and the two Defendants informed the court one after the other that this matter will be settled out of court, the proposal to settle this matter out of court had been made by parties earlier before 25th day of July, 2002. As a result of this proposal to settle this matter out of court, the matter was further adjourned to 30th day of October ,2002 for report of settlement.
On the 30th day of October, 2002, when the case came up, the Pontiff’s counsel had already filed forms 48 and 49 contempt proceedings against the defendants alleging that the Defendant had taken over the subject matter of this suit contrary to the order of the court dated 11th day of February, 2002.
The question for determination is whether to continue with the motion filed by the defendants challenging the jurisdiction of the court or to continue with the contempt proceedings, in other words which one should the court take first, motion that the court lacks jurisdiction or contempt proceedings filed by Plaintiff counsel.
The Court has examined the submissions of Plaintiff and Defence Counsel and came to the following conclusions:-
(a) It appears that counsel to the Defendants missed the point, the issue before the court is not whether the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on this matter or not, the issue is that whether the court should take the contempt proceedings first before taking the is issue of jurisdiction. The court hereby refers to the case of COP v. Omunakwe 1999 2 NWLR part 590 page 193 where the Court of Appeal held:
“The rule that an objection to jurisdiction must be entertained early in the proceedings does not mean that when contempt is committed, whether ex-facie curiae, or facie curiae, it must not be dealt with summarily by the court before proceedings to the substantive suit An act of contempt of court must be dealt with first so as to Protect the dignity, authority and integrity of the court on the authority of Omunakwe’s case the court hereby affirm that the contempt proceedings against the defendants will be heard first. This is the ruling of the court.
(sgd.)
Hon. Justice S.E. Aladetoyinbo
(Presiding Judge)
3/12/2002.
That is a summary of the submissions of counsel on either side and the Ruling subject of this Appeal. This Court is not unmindful of the fact that a decision of a trial court on appeal is not to be taken lightly. This is because the decision of a trial court on issues which are particularly within its knowledge should not be disturbed by an appellate court unless there is clear proof that the decision is wrong. Oto v. Adojo (2003) 7 NWLR (pt.820) 636 at 671 (CA); Efe v. State (1976) 11 Sc 75; Emariezu v. Ovuie(1977) 2 SC 31.
A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction remains valid and binding unless and until it is set aside by an appeal court or by the Lower Court itself where it acted without jurisdiction and there is an unqualified obligation on every person against whom it is given to obey it unless and until it is so set aside. This is because to hold otherwise is to clothe a party against whom an order has been made with the discretion to decide, in his wisdom, that the judgment is invalid and not binding on him and this will amount to an invitation to anarchy. Therefore, anyone who knows of an order, valid or invalid, null, regular or irregular cannot be allowed to disobey it. Per Ogundare J.S.C. Rossek v. A.C.B. Ltd (1993) 8 NWLR (pt.312) 382 at 434; Aladegbemi v. Fasanmade (1998) 3 NWLR (pt. 81) 129: Williams v. Sanusi (1961) 2 SCNLR 129; Ojiako v. Ogueze (1962) 1 SC NLR 112; Adebayo v Johnson (1969) All NLR 176 at 194; Ajao v. Alao (1986) 5 NWLR (pt. 45) 802 at 823; Yonwuren v. Modern Signs (1985) 1 NWLR (pt. 2) 244; Odiase v. Agbo (1972) 1 All NLR 170 at 176; Melifonwu v. Egbuji (1982) 9 SC 145.
The common law principle applied in our courts is that an applicant cannot whilst continuing in contempt of court is heard to be seeking the favour of the court. In such a case the contempt must be purged before the party could make any application to the court. Per Karibi-White J.S.C. Odogwu v. Odogwu (1992) 2 NWLR (pt. 224) 539 at 556.
“The fact that a party to a cause who had disobeyed an order of court was not of itself a bar to his being heard, but if his disobedience was such that, so long as it is continued, it impeded the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or enforce the order which it might make, then the court might in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment was removed. The case in hand is a classic case where the disobedience of the party has impeded the course of justice”.
Per Wali J.S.C in F.A.T.B. v. Ezegbu (1992) 9 NWLR (pt. 264) 132 at 146 -147.
The principles enshrined in the law of contempt are there to uphold and ensure the effective administration of justice. They are the means by which the law vindicates the public interest in the due administration of justice. The law of contempt does not exist for the sake of the personal aggrandisement of the judge, nor is it there to protect the private rights of parties or litigants. Fame Publications Ltd. v. Enconium Ventures Ltd. (2000) 8 NWLR (pt.667) 105 at 111; Atake v. Attorney General Federation (1982) 11 Sc 153; Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. v. Assan (1995) 8 NWLR (pt. 412) 129.
When contempt of court is committed whether ‘in facie curiae’ or ‘ex facie curiae’, it must be dealt with by the Court before proceeding to the substantive suit. This must be so if the dignity, integrity, respect and authority of the Court are to be restored and protected. Per Aderemi J.C.A (as he then was). Fame Publications Ltd. v. Encomium Ventures Ltd. (2000) 8 NWLR (pt. 667, 105 at 111; Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. V. Assan (1995) 8 NWLR (pt. 412) 129.
A person who is in contempt of a subsisting court order is not entitled to be granted court’s discretion to enable him continue with the breach.
Indeed, it is a serious matter for anyone to flout a positive order of court of competent jurisdiction and then turn around to seek a discretionary remedy from court while still in contempt of such court order. Lawal-Osula v. Lawal-Osula (1995) 3 NWLR (pt. 382) 128 at 143 F.A.T.B. Ltd v. Ezegbu (1992) 9 NWLR (pt. 264) 132; Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (pt. 18) 621; Odogwu v. Odogwu (1992) 2 NWLR (pt.225) 539; Tewogbade & Sons Ltd. v. Governor of Oyo State (1991) 2 NWLR (pt.171) 52; Oyeyemi v. Irewole Local government (1993) 1 NWLR (pt. 270) 462.
From even the summation of the trial Court, clearly there was a direct confrontation or efficiency by the Appellants on the institution of the entire Court System or Rule of Law.
The rules embodied in the law of contempt of court are intended to uphold and ensure the effective administration of justice. They are the means by which the law vindicates the public interest in due administration of justice. The law does not exist to protect the personal dignity of the court which is offended; it is the fundamental supremacy of the law which is challenged. It also does not exist to protect the private rights of parties or litigants. Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. v. Assan (1995) 8 NWLR (pt. 412) 129 at 143 – 144 per Uwais J.S.C (as he then was).
It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom, an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it unless and until that order is discharged or set aside on appeal. This extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. Therefore, I see no solace for the Appellant/contemnor, as the administration of justice in its full power and authority cannot be equated to or even play second fiddle to the principle of jurisdiction of a court simplicity which in the circumstance is of a narrow scope as the full matter of rule of Law or administration of justice which is at risk. The situation is indeed so grave that it has to be accorded the full weight of respect and honour due to the concept of the Rule of Law which the affront seeks to short-circuit. See Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd v. Assan (supra).
It is in regard to the above stated principles, judicial authorities and the situation on ground that I answer this question under Issue 2 in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant, to the effect that the learned trial Judge was indeed correct to have set out to deal with the contempt proceedings before entering into any other matter including that of the jurisdiction of the Court.
This appeal lacks merit as I cannot also encourage a direct confrontation to the Judicial System in its safeguarding of the society. I dismiss the appeal. I award 1450,000.00 costs to the 1st Respondent, and N50,000.00 to the 2nd Respondent, costs to be paid by the Appellant.
JIMI OLUKAYODE BADA, J.C.A.: I read before now the lead Judgment of my Lord, MARY U. PETER-ODILI, J.C.A just delivered and I agree with my Lord’s reasoning and conclusion.
I am also of the view that this appeal lacks merit and it is dismissed by me.
ABDU ABOKI J.C.A.: I have read before now the Lead Judgment of my learned brother MARY U. PETER-ODILI J.C.A. just delivered, reached that this appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed
I abide by the consequential order as to costs.
Appearances
N. A. Dangiri fFor Appellant
AND
E. I. Esene
3rd Respondent absent and not represented even though counsel was served on 7/4/2010.For Respondent
