INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION v. EMMANUEL JIME & ORS (2019)

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION v. EMMANUEL JIME & ORS

(2019)LCN/13710(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 26th day of July, 2019

CA/MK/EP/GOV/9/2019

RATIO

COURT: DUTY OF A COURT WHEN A MOTION HAS BEEN BROUGHT BEFORE IT

Relying on the cases of PDP vs Peterside (supra); Mobil Prod. Ltd. Vs Monokpo (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt.852) 346; Okeke-Oba vs Okoye (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt.364) 605 and Anyaoha vs Obioha (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt.1404) 445 at 465, it is submitted that, it is not only essential but mandatory for a Court before which a motion has been brought to hear and determine it at the appropriate time. PER TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.

DISCRETION BY TRIBUNALS: DUTY OF TRIAL COURTS: WHEN COURTS CAN INTERFERE

It is finally submitted that although the decision appealed against pertained to exercise of discretion of the Tribunal, the appellate Court should not allow the failure of justice arising from inappropriate exercise of discretion to persist without intervening to correct it. Counsel referred to Nzeribe vs Dave Eng. Co. Ltd. (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt.361) 124 at 148; University of Lagos vs Aigoro (1985), NWLR (Pt 1) 143 at 148 and Enekebe vs Enekebe (1964) 1 ALL NLR 102 at 106 among others. That the exercise of the discretion of the tribunal in this case qualified to be interfered with. We are urged to allow the appeal. PER TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.

FAIR HEARING: RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING SHOULD NOT BE DENIED PARTIES

Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that a person shall be entitled to fair hearing in the determination of his civil rights and obligations. The Court or Tribunal shall give each party before it an opportunity to be heard on any issue calling for a decision or determination. SeeMgbenwelu vs Olumba (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt.1558) 168 at 1177; T.E.S.T. Inc vs Chevron Nig. Ltd. (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt.1576) 187 at 194 and Fapa Co. Ltd. Vs O.W.C. Ltd. (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt.1579) 169 at 173.
In the instant case the appellant?s right to fair hearing was not breached in any way as it was duly heard on its application which was responded to. PER TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

TANI YUSUF HASSAN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

JOSEPH EYO EKANEM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) Appellant(s)

AND

1. EMMANUEL JIME
2. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC)
3. SAMUEL IORAER ORTOM
4. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP) Respondent(s)

TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The 1st and 3rd respondents contested the election to the office of Governor of Benue State on the 9th day of March, 2019. The election was inconclusive and a supplementary election was conducted on the 23rd of March, 2019. At the end of election, the 3rd respondent of Peoples Democratic Party was declared the winner. The 1st respondent of the All Progressive Congress along with the 2nd respondent filed a petition before the Election Tribunal on the 12th of April, 2019 against the appellant, the 3rd and 4th respondents. In response to the petition the appellant filed a reply on the 5th of May, 2019. The petitioners (1st and 2nd respondents) herein filed a reply to the appellant?s reply by attaching witness statements on oath said to be unrelated to the petitioners reply and which was also said to introduce evidence on the petition which was not originally filed along with the petition within the stipulated time allowed for filing a petition.

?The appellant who is not happy with this development filed an application dated 25th May, 2019 and filed on the 26th day of May,

2019 reflected at pages 575-590 of the main record.

The motion prayed the Honourable Tribunal for an Order striking out the petitioners? (1st and 2nd respondents) reply to the appellant?s reply to the petition in its entirety or more particularly paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of the petitioners? reply to the appellant?s reply dated and filed on the 12th of May, 2019 including the four witness statements on oath attached thereto for being incompetent.

There are grounds upon which the application was predicated. The application is supported by an affidavit and a written address.

The 1st and 2nd respondents as petitioners therein filed a counter affidavit and a written address dated the 28th of May, 2019 to the appellant?s application as shown at the pages 592-602 of the main record. The appellant filed a reply on point of law on 31st May, 2019 reflected at pages 604-611 of the main record.

After the argument of both counsel on the application the Tribunal adjourned for ruling. On the 8th of June, 2019, the Tribunal in its decision, deferred

the ruling on the motion to be considered along with the final judgment in the petition. The ruling of the Tribunal deferring to final judgment gave rise to this interlocutory appeal.

There were two notices of appeal filed by the appellant dated 14th June, 2019 and 17th June, 2019. However, the appellant abandoned the one filed on 14th June, 2019 and relied on the notice of appeal filed on the 17th day of June, 2019 containing three grounds of appeal with their particulars at pages 371-376 of the supplementary record.

The appellant?s brief dated and filed on the 1st day of July, 2019 identified a sole issue for determination as follows:
?Whether the Tribunal exercised its discretion appropriately when it deferred the ruling on the Appellant?s Motion on Notice urging the striking out of the Petitioners/1st and 2nd Respondents? Reply which had been fully argued till the final determination of the petition in this case.?

Learned Counsel for the appellant adopted the brief, he urged the Court to allow the appeal. The 1st and 2nd respondents? brief dated and filed on the 5th of July, 2019, also has a sole

issue distilled for determination thus;
?Whether having regards to the state of the law regarding an election petition, the Honourable Trial Tribunal was not right in its ruling that decision on the Application of the Appellant will be delivered alongside the final Judgment on the Petition.?
Learned Senior Counsel adopted the brief and urged the Court to dismiss the appeal.
The 3rd and 4th respondents did not file any brief.

The 1st and 2nd respondents? brief dated and filed on the 5th of July, 2019 incorporated therein a Notice of Preliminary objection predicated on the following grounds:
1. The Supplementary Record(s) of Appeal purportedly compiled and transmitted before this Honourable Court on the 25th day of June, 2019 is incompetent and therefore renders the record incomplete.
2. This Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal on an incomplete Record.
3. The Appellant?s Brief of Argument was filed outside the statutory time allowed for filing same and thus incompetent.
4. There is no appealable decision of the Tribunal to warrant the current appeal.
5. The current

appeal (even if there is an appealable decision which is not conceded) is most undesirable.
6. The appeal is a flagrant abuse of the process of the Honourable Court.
7. The appeal is liable to be dismissed or struck out with substantial cost against the appellant.

The appellant in its reply brief filed on the 8th of July, 2019 responded to the preliminary objection. However the 1st and 2nd respondents? senior counsel on the date of the hearing of the appeal the 23rd July, 2019 applied to withdraw prayers 1, 2 and 3 of the preliminary objection and the argument on the said grounds in paragraphs 4.1 – 4.7 at pp 3-5 of their briefs be discountenanced. After adopting the argument on the subsisting grounds, he urged the Court to uphold the preliminary objection.

Pursuant to the withdrawal of grounds 1, 2 and 3 of the preliminary objection the appellant also withdrew its argument on the said grounds at pp 2-8, paras. 2.14 to 2.17 of its reply brief and urged the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection on the subsisting grounds 4-7.

It is necessary at this stage to determine the preliminary objection before considering the

interlocutory appeal.

Preliminary objection
Learned Senior Counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents in his argument in support of the preliminary objection on grounds 4-7 submitted that although the Honourable Tribunal heard the Appellant?s application that culminated into this appeal, no adverse ruling against the appellant was delivered as the Tribunal deferred the ruling to be delivered along with the substantive petition at the stage of judgment. Learned senior counsel argued that as the ruling on the application is still being awaited, there is no genuine grievance worthy of being appealed against by any of the parties.

Submitting further that, a decision is not appealable when the Court or Tribunal had not pronounced on the entitlement of parties as in this appeal. Relying on the case of: Mobil Prod. (Nig.) Unltd vs Monokpo (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) 346 at 399 paras. A-C, it is submitted that the Tribunal has not decided on the entitlement of the parties to the reliefs on the application to give rise to this appeal. The cases of: Visafone Comm. Ltd vs. Musical Copyright Society of Nig. Ltd (2011) LPELR 9063

Automatic Telephone and Electric Co. Ltd vs. Fed. Military Govt. of Nig. (1963) 1 All NLR 423 at 429. Deduwa vs Okorodudu (1976) 1 NMLR 236 and ANPP vs Haruna (2003) 14 NWLR (Pt. 841) 546 at 565 among others were referred to.

That the comment or position of the Tribunal to deliver its ruling on the application alongside the substantive petition is an orbiter dictum which does not constitute a decision on the application. That where an opinion is expressed obiter, such an opinion is not appealable. He relied on: OnafowoKan vs Wema Bank Plc (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 12 60) 24 at 56-57.

It is finally submitted that the appeal is an abuse of Court process because there is no right of appeal, as the decision of the Tribunal being appealed against is not appealable. The Court was referred to: Kennedy vs. INEC (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 1123) 614 at 632 and Globe Fishing Ind. Ltd vs. Coker (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 162) 265.

Learned counsel for the appellant in response to the preliminary objection raised by the 1st and 2nd respondents argued that the contention of the senior counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents that the decision of the Tribunal deferring ruling on a fully argued motion

does not constitute an appealable decision is misconceived. Referring to the decision of this Court in People?s Democratic Party vs Dakuku Adol Peterside (2015) LPELR 41645 and Peoples Democratic Party vs. Alex Otti (2015) 25788, it is submitted that decisions of the Court deferring rulings on argued applications are appealable and we are urged to so hold and dismiss the preliminary objection. That the decision of the Tribunal to defer the ruling on the application is a decision in itself and it is appealable. Appellant?s counsel referred to Section 318 of the 1999 Constitution on definition of decision.

It is also contended that by the provision of Section 246(1)(c) of the 1999 constitution (as amended) the appellant is conferred with the right of appeal and this appeal does not run against the provision of the constitution as contained in the 4th Alteration. That the appellant has stated the adverse effect on it of the decision to defer the ruling, as deferring the ruling occasioned a miscarriage of justice against the appellant. With regard to the 1st and 2nd respondents argument that the appeal is undesirable and an abuse of Court

process, appellant?s counsel submitted that the contention of the 1st and 2nd respondents are based on a misconception of facts and also misconceived the law. That the 1st and 2nd respondents failed to appreciate the nature and scope of the appeal which is essentially about the time to deliver the ruling. It is argued that the appeal cannot be termed an abuse of Court process. We are urged to overrule the preliminary objection and dismiss same.

It is clear from grounds 4 and 5 of the objection, the complaint of the 1st and 2nd respondents is that this appeal is undesirable because there is no decision on the application of the appellant that requires the filing of this appeal. It is argued that deferring the ruling on the application to be taken along with the substantive petition is not appealable. It is correct as submitted by the appellant?s counsel that by virtue of Section 246(1)(c) of the 1999 of the Constitution (as amended), the appellant has a right of appeal on the decision of the Tribunal. However the decision complained of, in this appeal is on the exercise of discretion of the Tribunal deferring the ruling on the application of

the appellant to be taken along with judgment of the substantive petition. Since the appellant?s desire was to have the argued motion ruled upon, and the Tribunal deferred same, the appellant is entitled to challenge the decision by way of an appeal because it is a decision on its own. The decision is therefore appealable, Part 11 second schedule of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides in Section 318 (1), ?decision? means, in relation to a Court, any determination of that Court and includes judgment, decree, order, conviction, sentence or recommendation. The pronouncement of the Tribunal deferring the ruling is no doubt a decision and it is therefore appealable. The contention of the 1st and 2nd respondents? counsel that the decision is obiter and not appealable is a misconception of the law. This is because obiter dicta are mere observations of the Court which is not the case in the instant appeal.

On the issue of the appeal being an abuse of Court Process, learned Senior Counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents submitted that as there is no right of appeal, the decision of the Tribunal

not being appealable, the appeal filed is frivolous and amounts to an abuse of process. I have already stated above that the decision of the Tribunal is appealable and the appellant has a right of appeal. The submission of the objector in this regard will not hold. This Court in PDP vs Peterside (supra) and PDP v Otti (supra) dismissed similar objections as in this appeal. I also dismiss the preliminary objection for lacking in merit. This is in line with the principle of stare decisis which is well rooted in Nigerian jurisprudence that decisions of Court settled should be strictly followed to avoid confusion. See Aghedo vs Adenomo (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt.1636) 264 at 275-276 and Dakan vs Asalu (2015) 13 NWLR (pt.1475) 47.
The preliminary objection lacks merit and it is dismissed.

THE APPEAL
The sole issue formulated by the appellant and the 1st and 2nd respondents are similar. I adopt the appellant?s issue in resolving the interlocutory appeal.
ISSUE ONE
(i) Whether the Tribunal exercised its discretion appropriately when it deferred the ruling of the appellant?s Motion on Notice urging the striking out of the petitioners/1st

and 2nd Respondents Reply, which had been fully argued till the final determination of the petition in this case.?

Learned counsel contended that while it is generally in the discretion of the Court or Tribunal to decide when to hear and deliver a ruling in respect of motions or applications filed before it, the exercise of such discretion in election petitions are constrained by the requirement of paragraph 49 of the 1st Schedule of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) (which prescribes that motions be heard during pre-hearing sessions except with leave of the Tribunal in extreme circumstances) and the necessity to deliver the Ruling within the constitutionally prescribed time of 180 days for hearing of the election.

Appellant?s counsel argued that the Tribunal in deferring the ruling in respect of the appellant?s motion which had been fully argued failed to exercise the discretion to deliver the ruling at the appropriate time and therefore did not exercise the discretion judicially and judiciously which occasioned a miscarriage of justice on the appellant. That what is incumbent on the Tribunal is to determine an application it

has heard one way or the other before determining the substantive matter, for parties to know their fate.

It is submitted that a delay of delivery of ruling till final determination of the substantive case endangers an injustice to the party who brought the application and represents a wrongful exercise of discretion.

Submitting further that the consequence of delaying ruling on the motion of the appellant was that it subverted the purposes of pleadings by introducing uncertainty into the state of pleadings of the parties in that it was not known whether the petitioners Reply formed part of the pleadings defining the issues to be tried when hearing opens. That the unfairness of the exercise of discretion of the Tribunal to the delay of delivering ruling on the application to

strike the petitioners? Reply and the accompanying four witness statements on oath was that it robbed the appellant of advantages given to it by law in the preparation and presentation of its case. It is submitted further that a ruling one way or the other should be delivered before the trial commences so that the appellant goes for trial, certain with the issues and evidence that is allowed to be led.

Learned Counsel for the appellant referred to Section 285(6) of the 1999 Constitution as amended by the 2nd alteration which prescribes limits to the time when petitions may be tried and appeals heard.

qualified to be interfered with. We are urged to allow the appeal.

For his part, Counsel to the 1st and 2nd respondents submitted that the resolve of the Tribunal to defer its ruling on the appellant?s motion to the final judgment is in consonance with the relevant provisions of the law particularly Sections 36(1); 285(8) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended); paragraph 47(1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) and paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). Counsel contended that a combined reading of the above provisions leaves no one in doubt as to the proper procedure adopted by the Tribunal in the circumstance of this case. That contrary to the submission of the appellant?s Counsel that the Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to suspend delivery of its ruling on the application that had been argued before it, when the application does not challenge the competence of the election petition, Counsel referred to ruling of the Tribunal at pp 623-624 of the record where the Tribunal held that postponing the ruling on the application, will not in any way lead

to denial of fair hearing or miscarriage of justice. That the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to defer its ruling on an application till delivery of its final judgment is ordained and circumscribed by the provisions of the law. It is argued on behalf of the 1st and 2nd respondents that the appellant?s contention that the application ought to have been ruled upon at the pre-hearing stage is highly misconceived, as the authorities relied upon have no binding precedent since the enactment of the Fourth Alteration Act, 2017 which amended the provisions of Section 285 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. It is submitted that the clear wordings of Section 285 are on all fours with the decision of the Tribunal, as the law allows the Tribunal to suspend its ruling and deliver it at the stage of final judgment, and we are urged to so hold.

With regard to the issue of appropriate time contended by the appellant?s counsel, learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents submitted that the law amply allows a Court to deliver its ruling at an appropriate time, and that in the circumstances of this case, the appropriate time the Tribunal exercised its

discretion was the time of final judgment.

It is submitted further that the appellant?s application purportedly sought to cure the paragraphs of the petitioners/1st and 2nd respondents? reply and witness statements on oath attached, unless the appellant is confident that its application will be granted as a matter of course, it will be too early to conclude that the paragraphs of the petitioners reply or the statements on oath attached to same constitute a mischief. That if the appellant had considered the provisions of Section 285(8) of the Constitution (as amended) it would not have concluded or argued in that direction.

Referring to paragraph 47(1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), it is submitted that it was passed to avoid situations where quality time will be expended on interlocutory application that can still be resolved at the end of trial without any miscarriage of justice done to any of the parties especially in litigation which life span has already been restricted by law.

Also referring to Paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act to be read in conjunction with

Section 285(8) of the Constitution and paragraph 47(1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act (as amended) and the cases of PDP vs Otti (supra); Belgore vs Ahmed (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt.1355) 60 at 92-93; PDP vs INEC (2012) 7 NWLR (Pt.1300) 538 and 599 and Aregbesola vs Omisore No. CA/AK/EPT/GOV/05/237/2014 delivered on 9th September, 2014, it is submitted that the above decision of Aregbesola vs Omisore applies to the situation of the application under reference, as the holding of the Court therein went beyond a situation where the call is merely to strike out paragraphs of replies and or witness statement on oath, to include that even if the challenge is to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, same must be taken along with the petition. That the trial Tribunal therefore perfectly applied the said principle and law to defer the ruling on the appellant?s application to the final judgment of the petition.
?
On the submission of the appellant?s counsel that the deferment of the ruling constitutes a breach of fair hearing, Learned Senior Counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents submitted that the argument is most misconceived, misplaced and a display of ignorance

of the position and operation of the sui generis nature of the election matters. That being an election matter, the ordinary rules of procedure in civil cases do not always serve to effectuate its purpose. Counsel referred to Egharevba vs Eribo (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt.1199) 411 and Ehva vs O.S.I.E.C. (2006) 11-12 SC 102.

Also referred is Orji vs Onyemere (2015) LPELR 25652. That the Tribunal in the instant case in exercising its discretion judicially and judiciously expressed its fairness, consistency and transparency of purpose when delivering its ruling to defer a similar application before it at page 618 of the record alluded to similar treatment of previous applications. It is submitted that the appellant has no basis to cry foul or breach of fair hearing nor complain about the discretion of the trial tribunal on the exercise of its discretion in the circumstances of this case.
?
It is also the contention of the Counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents that apart from filing a counter affidavit to the appellant?s motion, the 1st and 2nd respondents merely filed their reply to the appellant?s response to their petition and no new facts were

stated in their reply as contemplated by the appellant. The Court was referred to Ngige vs Akunyili (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt.1323) 343 at 385 and Nmaduabu vs Nwosu (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt.1212) 623 at 645.

That the appellant?s refusal to abide by the Orders of the Tribunal and its tacit avoidance of the provisions of Section 285(8) of the Constitution is a clear indication of partisan role which should not be the case as stated by this Court in INEC vs Orji (2009) LPELR 4320 (CA), because its position is to remain as neutral as possible in election cases, since its primary responsibility is to conduct free and fair election regardless of who wins.

In contending also that the discretion available to the Tribunal to defer its ruling till final judgment, being anchored on the need to manage the scarce time and resources, it is also deeply rooted in the undoubted powers of the Tribunal to expunge inadmissible evidence which were earlier admitted but ought not to have been admitted while writing judgment. The case of George vs Dominion Flour Mills (1963) 1 SCNLR 117 and Hashidu vs Goje (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt.843) 352 among others were referred to.

It is finally submitted that the tribunal on the strength of the provisions of Section 285(8) of the Constitution (as amended by the 4th alteration) coupled with decided authorities had the discretion to deliver its ruling on the application under consideration to the time of judgment. We are urged to so hold and resolve in favour of the 1st and 2nd respondents.

The complaint of the appellant in this interlocutory appeal is on the exercise of discretion of the trial Tribunal deferring its ruling on the application of the appellant to final judgment in the petition of the 1st and 2nd respondents. The appellant in conceding that there is no compulsion on a Court or Tribunal to deliver its ruling immediately on an application which it heard, submitted that the exercise of discretion by the trial Tribunal in this case was not judiciously and judicially exercised as it caused a miscarriage of justice and denial of fair hearing to the appellant. Also that the mischief sought to be arrested by the application i.e. striking out of the paragraphs in the 1st and 2nd respondents reply and witnesses statements on oath attached to the reply has been defeated by deferring

the ruling on the application. The appellant argued that these paragraphs in 1st and 2nd respondents reply and the witnesses statements on oath are new issues to the petition which assertion the 1st and 2nd respondents denied.

With regard to the assertion of denial of fair hearing by deferring the ruling on the application of the appellant, denial of fair hearing does not arise in the circumstance of this case. This is because the appellant by its own showing admitted that its application and the counter affidavit of the 1st and 2nd respondents were duly argued before the Tribunal. It follows therefore, deferring the ruling to the final judgment does not amount to denial of fair hearing.
Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that a person shall be entitled to fair hearing in the determination of his civil rights and obligations. The Court or Tribunal shall give each party before it an opportunity to be heard on any issue calling for a decision or determination. SeeMgbenwelu vs Olumba (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt.1558) 168 at 1177; T.E.S.T. Inc vs Chevron Nig. Ltd. (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt.1576) 187 at 194 and Fapa Co. Ltd. Vs O.W.C. Ltd. (2017) 12 NWLR

(Pt.1579) 169 at 173.
In the instant case the appellant?s right to fair hearing was not breached in any way as it was duly heard on its application which was responded to.

On the crux of the matter which is deferring the ruling on the application of the appellant to the final judgment of the petition, a Court or Tribunal has the inherent power to determine an application heard before it immediately or adjourned the ruling on the application to a later date. A Court or Tribunal is possessed of this discretionary power which is expected to be exercised judiciously and judicially. The appellant?s motion and the counter affidavit of the 1st and 2nd respondents were argued before the trial Tribunal. The Tribunal in its ruling delivered on the 8th day of June, 2019 had this to say:
?We have now considered it to be expedient and appropriate to defer our ruling on the application i.e. the determination of the application until after we have heard the substantive petition on its merit, i.e., until the stage of final judgment. We are satisfied that postponing the determination of the application until after we have heard the

substantive petition on its merit cannot amount, in any way, to denying the 1st respondent/applicant fair hearing bearing in mind the fact that 180 days within which this election petition must be determined cannot be enlarged.?
By the above pronouncement of the trial Tribunal, it is my view that it exercised its discretionary power judicially and judiciously taken into consideration the nature of the case before it. The appellant must appreciate the fact that election matters are time bound, sui generis. Therefore any interlocutory application that will cause a delay in the disposal of the matter must be avoided. The provision of Section 285 (8) of the Constitution 4th Alteration reads: –
?Where a preliminary objection or any interlocutory issue touching on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or Court in any pre-election matter or on the competence of the petition itself is raised by a party, the Tribunal or Court shall suspend its ruling and deliver it at the stage of final judgment.”
The provisions of Section 285(8) of the Constitution must not be construed to exclude the inherent power of the Tribunal as argued by the appellant.

That is why the appellant in its motion reflected at page 575 of the record was said to be brought pursuant to Section 47 of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Honourable Tribunal. Since the Tribunal has the inherent jurisdiction to exercise its discretion, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to challenge this inherent power of the Tribunal, by deferring its ruling to the final judgment.
Although the trial Tribunal exercised its discretion under its inherent power without making reference to any provision of the law, it will be correct to say that the provision under Section 285(8) of the Constitution subscribes the right of the Tribunal to suspend ruling and deliver at final stage of judgment. Counsel must appreciate the fact that a Court or Tribunal is in control of its proceedings and therefore not subjected to dictation by any of the parties to the litigation.
It is my conclusion that the Tribunal exercised its discretion judiciously and judicially by deferring is ruling at the appropriate time. The decision of the Tribunal cannot be faulted taking into consideration the nature of the case it

was laced with. This Court will not interfere with the discretion of the Tribunal which was properly exercised.

I wish to add that although INEC the appellant in this appeal is a party in the matter, I am inclined to say that its position is a neutral and nominal party, its brief of argument therefore would have no adverse effect either way in deciding this appeal. The end result is that the appeal lacks merit and it is liable to be dismissed. The appeal is frivolous and an abuse of Court process. The practice of splitting appeal arising from the same judgment and between the same parties is not in the interest of speedy dispensation of justice as held by the Supreme Court Aghedo vs Adenomo (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1636) 264 at 277. This practice must be discouraged. See also Ogolo vs Fubara (2003) 1.1 NWLR (Pt. 831) 231 and Garuba vs Omokhodion (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1269) 145. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The Ruling of the Tribunal delivered on the 8th day of June, 2019 is hereby affirmed
Parties to bear their costs.

JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.: I had the advantage of reading before now the lead Judgment of

my learned brother, Tani Yusuf Hassan, J.C.A. just delivered. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion therein.

Before going into the substance of the Appeal, it is well to state upfront that the finding in the lead Judgment in respect of the preliminary objection to the competence of the Appeal by the 1st and 2nd Respondent, accords with my reasoning on same. I therefore adopt the finding in dismissing the objection.

The facts leading to this Appeal have already been succinctly set out in the lead Judgment. It is therefore unnecessary to rehash same here. Suffice it to state that the crux of the Appeal is the dissatisfaction of the Appellants with the decision of the Tribunal to defer the rendering of a Ruling on the application seeking an Order striking out several paragraphs of the Reply of the 1st and 2nd Respondents to the Answer of the Appellant to the Petition, as well as the Witness Statements on Oath attached thereto. The crux of the Appellants? submissions in their Brief of argument is anchored mainly on the contention that the Tribunal wrongly exercised its discretion in deferring the Ruling on the application, and that such exercise

of discretion was both un-judicial and injudicious. Learned Counsel therefore urged the Court to intervene by directing the Tribunal to deliver its Ruling immediately.

The decision taken by the Tribunal which is now complained against was indubitably rendered in the exercise of its discretion under the Inherent powers imbued upon it by Section 6(6) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). It provides thus:
?(6) The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section –
(a) Shall extend, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, to all inherent power and sanctions of a Court of law?
This provision has been the subject and cynosure of judicial interpretation and attention over the years both by this Court and by the apex Court such that its true meaning and intendment is not left to conjecture, speculation or supposition. The inherent jurisdiction of the Court is to assist the smooth delivery of justice when it promotes the ends of justice. It is that power which a Court of law exercises for the purpose of delivering substantial justice

in matters in which it is seised with jurisdiction. It supplements the statutory powers of the Court and is dictated by the need for the Court to fulfill itself in order to meet the ends of justice. It is also exercised in the interest of justice, where necessary, in a particular case.
Additionally, the inherent jurisdiction or inherent power of a Court is that which is not expressly spelt out by the Constitution or in any statute or rule; but which can, of necessity, be invoked by any Court of record to supplement its express jurisdiction and powers. It is a most valuable adjunct to the express jurisdiction or powers conferred on our Courts of record by the Constitution. Courts in proper cases, use their inherent jurisdiction to control persons, for instance, in cases of contempt of Court; to control processes, such as when they strike out actions which are frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process; and to control lower Courts or Tribunals, such as when they order stay of proceedings. Instances which Courts have properly exercised their inherent powers are in-exhaustive. In Nwaogu V Atuma (2012) LPELR-19647(SC), the Supreme Court, per Nwuta, JSC

held:
?Inherent power is inborn in the Court. It enables the Court to deal with diverse matters over which it has intrinsic authority such as procedural rule making, regulating the practice of law and general judicial housekeeping…Inherent powers of the Court of law are powers which enable it effectively and effectually to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it.?
The nature and essence of the inherent power of the Court is further described in the case of Ogwuegbu V Agomuo (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt.509) 144, 173 thus:
?The inherent power of the Court is that power which is itself essential to the very existence of the Court as an Institution and to its ability to function as such an institution. An inherent power has to be inherent in the sense that it forms an essential and intrinsic element in the whole process of adjudication. It is innate in a Court and is not a subject of specific grant by the Constitution or by legislation. That is why inherent powers of a Court cannot be taken away or abridged by legislation, for he who gave, he only can take away. This explains Section 6(6) (a) of the 1979 Constitution (now 1999) which

merely recognized and stated the obvious – that the inherent powers of a Court of law exist “notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution? by such powers were no granted by the Constitution. As soon as the Court is established, all its inherent powers adhere and attach to it. Inherent powers of the Court are therefore those powers that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice in the court.”
See also Ajose V IGP (2016) LPELR-40065(CA) 8; Universal Oil Ltd V NDIC (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 254; Tubonemi V Dikibo (2005) LPELR-7519(CA) 21; Akilu V Fawehinmi (No. 2) (1989) LPELR-339(SC) 136; Erisi V Idika (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 66) 503, Adigun V AG Oyo State (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 56) 197.

It is therefore in view of the wide-ranging powers of the Court under its inherent jurisdiction that the submission of the Appellants must be situated. It is instructive that even the Constitution (supra) by Section 285(8) thereof provides thus:
?Where a preliminary objection or any other interlocutory issue touching on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or Court in any pre-election matter or on the competence of the petition

itself is raised by a party, the Tribunal or Court shall suspend its Ruling and deliver it at the stage of final judgment.?
This provision brings to the fore the premium which the Constitution places on the speedy determination of proceedings below Courts and Tribunals in election matters which is sui generis. Thus, in all other interlocutory applications. apart from those expressly set out in the provision, Tribunals ought to take their bearing from the urgency attached to the timely disposition of election petitions. This can be done by a Tribunal in the exercise of their inherent jurisdiction to fulfill itself in order to meet the ends of justice in a particular case.
It is in this vein that I have therefore given an in-depth look at Section 285(8) of the Constitution (supra) in conjunction with Section 6(6) (a) of the Constitution. For the avoidance of doubt, the intendment of the lawmaker in Section 285(9) is not to restrict the Court or Tribunal from giving full vent to the exercise of its inherent powers/jurisdiction vested in it by the same Constitution. By a literal and strict interpretation of Section 285(8) it is mandatory on the

Tribunal to defer until final Judgment its Ruling on any interlocutory application which touches on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or on the competence of the petition. The reason for this is not far-fetched. This provision was clearly introduced into the Constitution by its Fourth Alteration to cure the mischief wherein elections matters before Courts and/or Tribunals have been bogged down by the sheer weight of the series of interlocutory applications filed by parties, specifically in the area of challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court/Tribunal, and/or the competence of the petitions, causing Tribunals to serially determine these issues at the very expense of the petition itself, which may end up Lapsing in view of the limited time within which Tribunals have to deliver their Judgments. By this provision, it is no longer within the realm of the inherent powers of the Court or Tribunal to exercise any discretion on whether or not to deliver its Ruling on such an interlocutory application instantaneously or to defer it to be delivered alongside the final Judgment of the Court/Tribunal It ‘shall? defer its Ruling on such interlocutory applications

as specified within Section 285(8) of the Constitution (supra).
It is therefore for these same reasons that I am of the opinion that the Tribunal was undoubtedly right when it deferred its Ruling on the application till the end of trial to be delivered alongside its Judgment. Given the circumstances in which the Tribunal has done so, as expressed in its Ruling, to wit: the constraints of time wherein it must hear and determine the Petition within 160 days from the date of the declaration of the result of the election (Section 285(6) of the Constitution). I also agree that by giving the parties before it ample hearing before deferring its Ruling. The Tribunal exercised its inherent jurisdiction judicially and judiciously after according them a fair hearing. This Court is therefore loath to interfere with such a judicious exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion. See the decisions of this Court in Orji V Onyemere (2015) LPELR-25652(CA) 36-40; and lkpeazu V Otti (2015) LPELR-25646(CA).
This is more so that in the spirit of the Legal maxim, Ubi jus ubi remedium, where The Tribunal delivers its Ruling at the end of trial in favour of the Appellants?

application, it can still expunge the so-called fresh matters/evidence introduced vide the contested Reply to the Answer to the Petition and the additional Witness Statements on oath of the Respondent (as Petitioner). Thus, the Appellant will lose nothing as all the pleadings and evidence challenged by the Appellants in their application will be discountenanced However, where the Tribunal rules against the application, then it would have rightly heard the evidence brought in vide the said Reply, and there would be no dilemma faced by both the parties and the Tribunal on account of the fact that time allotted for the hearing of the Petition, to wit: 180 days, has run out. If however, the Tribunal had issued its Ruling on the application at the interlocutory stage and ruled in favour of the application, it would have prevented the Respondent from adducing the evidence contained in its Reply and therefore shut him out of the Judgment seat because nothing more can be done outside the time prescribed by the Constitution. As a result, where an appellate Court is of a contrary view in respect of the application, irreparable damage would have been inflicted on the

party who has been forever shut out from fully presenting his case, and the appellate Court would be presented with a fait accompli. Thus, all things considered. I am satisfied that the Tribunal exercised its discretion to defer its Ruling till Judgment both judicially and judiciously, contrary to the contention of the Appellant.

This, it is for these reasons, and for those sufficiently set out in the lead Judgment, that I too dismiss the Appeal and affirm the decision of the Tribunal, I abide by the Order for costs in the aforesaid judgment.

ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read, in draft form, a copy of the Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Tani Yusuf Hassan, JCA dismissing this appeal. I completely agree with his reasoning and conclusion, which I hereby adopt as mine. I will only make few comments in support.

Upon heating arguments on the application of the Appellant seeking to have struck out certain paragraphs of the Reply of the 1st and 2nd Respondents as Petitioners before the Tribunal, the Tribunal ruled that it would defer its decision on the application until the final

judgment. The 1st and 2nd Respondents in one of the grounds of their preliminary objection to the competence of this appeal contended that the order of the Tribunal to deter its ruling was not an appealable decision as the Tribunal had not pronounced on the entitlement of the parties to the reliefs on the application. There had been no decision on the complaint of the Appellant. The ruling of the Tribunal thereon was described as a mere comment made obiter.

The question is whether the ruling of the Tribunal was indeed a mere passing remark made obiter or whether it was a decision that was appealable. In answering this question. it would be expedient to examine established definitions of the relevant words or phrases.
Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition at page 467 defines a decision in these terms:
“A judicial or agency determination after consideration of the facts and the law; esp., a ruling, order or judgment pronounced by a Court when considering or disposing of a case.” It also defines an appealable decision thus, page 467:
“A decree or order that is sufficiently final to receive appellate review (such as an order granting

summary judgment), or an interlocutory decree or order that is immediately appealable…”
The Section 318 of the 1999 Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, (as amended), defines a decision as any:
“any determination of that Court and includes judgment, decree, order, conviction, sentence or recommendation.” On the other hand, obiter dictum which in Latin simply means something said in passing. As explained by Nweze JSC, in Omisore & Anor v Aregbesola & Ors (2015) LPELR- 24803(SC) at page 34:
“In Legal Theory, an obiter dictum, in contradiction to the ratio decidendi of a case, is a Judge’s passing remarks which do not reflect the reasoning of the Court or ground upon which a case is decided…”
And as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, page 1177, it is:
“A judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case…”
See also: National Democratic Party v. INEC (2012) LPELR- 19722-(SC); K. R. K. Holdings (Nig). Ltd v. FBN & Anor (2016) LPELR-41463 (SC).
Therefore, an appealable decision is one that is sufficiently final to

receive appellate review. To have a clearer picture, a follow up question would be; when would a decision be said to be sufficiently final? The agreed judicial position has been that a decision is final when there has been a final determination of the rights of the parties to the action; Omonuwa v Oshodin & Anor (1985) LPELR-2654(SC); Gomez & Anor v Cherubim and Seraphim Society & Ors (2009) LPELR- 1331(SC); General Electric Company v. Akande & Ors (2011) LPELR 9356(SC). Stretching this further, when the Court determines an interlocutory matter and no other issue arises from the same interlocutory matter for further decision, the decision thereon is sufficiently final to receive appellate review. In Igunbor v Afolabi & Anor (2001) LPELR-1454 (SC) at pages 27 – 29, the Supreme Court.
Karibi- Whvte. J S.C elucidated:
?The determination of the question whether an order is interlocutory or final has never been one of mean difficulty. The test has been to look at the nature of the order made rather than the nature of the proceedings resulting in the order. What has to be considered is whether the order has finally determined

the rights of the parties in the proceedings in issue appealed against, and not whether the rights of the parties in the substantive action have been finally disposed of- See Omonuwa v Oshodin (1985) 2 NWLR (PT10) 924, U.B.A. Plc v Akinsanya (1986) 4NWLR (Pt 33) 273, (1986) 7 SC 233. Ude V Agu (1961) 1 SCNLR 98; Ojom v Odunsi (1964) NMLR 12; Western Steel Works Ltd v. Iron and Steel Workers Union of Nigeria (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 30) 617.
A final order or judgment at law is one which brings to an end the rights of the parties in the action. It disposes of the subject matter of the controversy or determines the litigation as to all parties on the merits. On the other hand, an interlocutory order or judgment is once given in the process of the action or cause, which is only intermediate and does not finally determine the rights of the parties in the action. It is an order which determines some preliminary or subordinate issues or settles some step or question but does not adjudicate the ultimate rights of the parties, in the action.
However, where the order made finally determines the rights of the parties, as to the particular issue disputed, it is a

final order even if arising from an interlocutory application. For instance, an order of committal for contempt arising in the course of proceedings in an action is a final order- See Toun Adeyemi V. Theophilus Awobokun (1968) 2 ALL NLR 318.
The instant case as rightly submitted by appellant?s counsel, is an interlocutory motion by the appellant to be joined as co-administrators with the respondent. The order of the learned trial Judge granting the application determined the rights of the parties in the application. It is an order which did not require something else to be done in answer, and without any further reference to itself or any other Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The order of the learned trial Judge is therefore a final order. An appeal on the said order is as of right under Section 220(1) of the Constitution 1979.” (Emphasis mine)
In this instant case, the dispute was whether the application of the Appellant should be immediately determined, arguments, having been heard thereon, and not deferred to be delivered alongside the final judgment on the petition. The Tribunal exercised its discretion in deciding to defer its

decision on the application. There was nothing further to add to this decision by the Tribunal to defer its pronouncement on the application. That exercise of discretion by the Tribunal was sufficiently final on the issue of whether a decision should immediately be given on the Appellant’s application or whether the decision on the said application should be deferred. The decision to so defer was an exercise of discretion by the Tribunal and final in the circumstance. Until set aside, it has the force of law to the effect that the Tribunal would pronounce on the application of the Appellant together with its final judgment at the conclusion of the substantive petition. The ruling of the Tribunal was not a mere passing remark made obiter. It was a decision within the meaning of Section 318 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) See also: PDP v Peterside & Ors (2O15) LPELR-41645 (CA); PDP V Otti & Anor (2015) LPELR-25788(CA).
By virtue of the provisions of Section 246(1) (c) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), an appeal shall lie as of right from the decisions of the Governorship Election Tribunal. An appeal on the decision of the Tribunal could

therefore be rightly entertained by this Court. For this reason and for the more comprehensive reasons given by my learned brother, I also dismiss the preliminary objection.

On the substantive appeal, it is customary for trial Court proceedings to be completely concluded before its decision can be subject matter of appeal. This rule guards against multiple appeals arising out of the same case. It is certainly more efficient to have only one appeal arising from a case in which all of the issues in controversy can be raised and determined holistically. Therefore most appeals emanate from final judgments. There is no doubt, however, that an appeal may arise from a decision made by the trial Court on an interlocutory issue. The aggrieved party may decide to have their complaint resolved by the appellate Court to enable the lower Court proceed with its discretion. This course is usual in matters where a miscarriage of justice may result otherwise. In the instant appeal, however, I do not see any miscarriage of justice that the Appellants would suffer. This appeal largely has arisen out of an apprehension that the lower Tribunal may take into account alleged

fresh facts to which they would have had no opportunity to respond. But, a decision arising from the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal to aid their case management cannot be upturned on mere apprehension which has not been founded. I therefore see no merit in this appeal.

For this reason and for the fuller reasons given by my learned Brother, I also dismiss this appeal. I abide by the orders made in the lead Judgment.

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Tani Yusuf Hassan, JCA. His Lordship has ably considered and resolved the issued contention in this appeal. I agree with the reasoning and abide the conclusion reached therein.

I feel a bit agitated by this appeal. The Appellant is the Independent National Electoral Commission and the appeal arose out of the election petition filed by the first and second respondents to challenge the return of Samuel Ioraer Ortom as the winner of the Governorship election that took place in Benue State on the 9th and 23rd of March, 2019 and conducted by the Appellant. The Appellant is the

first respondent on the petition and it responded thereto in challenge the case of the first and second Respondents. The Appellant went further to file an application praying for the striking out of portions of the Reply filed by the first and second Respondents to its Reply to the petition and of the additional witness statement on oath accompanying the Reply.

Similar applications were filed Samuel Ioarer Ortom and the Peoples Democratic Party are the second and third respondents respectively to the petition. The lower Court delivered different Rulings on the three applications stating that it deemed it expedient to defer its decision on the application till the time of final judgment. Samuel Ioraer Ortom appealed against the Ruling of the lower Court on his application and his appeal is Appeal No. CA/MA/EP/GOV/04/2019. The Peoples Democratic Party also appealed against the ruling on its own application, its appeal is Appeal No: CA/MK/EP/GOV/05/2019. The Appellant filed the present appeal against the Ruling of the lower Court on his application. The complaints in these appeals are practically the same.
?
My understanding is that the Independent National Electoral Commission who conducted the election being challenged in the lower Court must be neutral in the agitations over how the elections is conducted.

Speaking on the need for the Appellant to be neutral on election issues, the Supreme Court in Attorney General of the Federation V. Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (PT 1041). I stated thus:
“The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) by its statutory existence is an independent body with constitutional powers to conduct elections in Nigeria. It must not only be an umpire, it must be seen, in the eyes of reasonable men, to be an impartial umpire in the conduct of an election, INEC must never by act of omission or commission place itself in a position where imputation of partiality in favour of one party against one will be leveled against it. Neutrality must be the watchword of the body, must always remain fair and focused.”
Thus, the expectation is that INEC will maintain a neutral stance in all litigations where participants in elections are challenging the outcome of the elections and not indulge in filling objections to the petition and appeals to Rulings and judgments – Akpan Vs Etim (2017) LPELR 43728 (CA). In Independent National Electoral Commission Vs. Oshiomole (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1132) 607 at 665A, Umatu Abdullahi, PCA (as he then was)

made the point that:
“INEC’s expected to be and must be seen as an impartial umpire. ‘Impartial’ means not supporting one person or group more than another; unbiased. They are necessary parties and must therefore be joined as respondents to the petition, but that does not mean that they should go as far as they did in this petition, to indulge in filing objection to the petition and filing appeals against the ruling and judgment of the tribunal.”
In Agugu v Mimiko (2009); 7 NWLR (PT 1140) at 44 B, Usman Abdullahi, PCA (as he then was) speaking again on what should be the role of INEC in an election petition, reiterated thus:
“…the only appeal outstanding for consideration is that of the second respondent/appellant who can really claim to be an aggrieved party. The other appellants are nominal parties who have no state as to the outcome of the appeal. It is none of their business to decide the person whom the electorate elect and consequently declared by the Court to be the winner and person returned. The primary functions of these purported appellants are to ensure that there is fairness and security at the election. Public policy demands that

the two institutions do not descend into the arena, and theirs is to tend the rope in the interest of peace and stability in the land. Thus, they should learn to remain neutral and strive to attain the aura of neutrality bestowed on them by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. I commend to these appellants the attitude of the Nigerian Army and the Nigerian Navy, who were equally joined as respondents but did not enter the fray to further complicate proceedings that were already complicated.”
Again in Independent National Electoral Commission v Orji (2009) LPELR 4320(CA), Shoremi, JCA, commented that:
“I am not unmindful of the fact that INEC by its statutory existence is an independent body with constitutional powers to conduct election in Nigeria. The function of INEC by statutory provisions is one of an umpire in the conduct of an election. The body should never place itself in a position where imputations may be concluded that it supports one party or the other in an election. Unproved and unsubstantiated allegations will be made against it. INEC should remain fair and focused no matter the provocation…
I will however add that though the

right of appeal is a constitutional right of the Appellants, but this right by INEC should be sparingly exercised. This is in the interest of our electoral process that INEC and its officials should remain as neutral as possible in election regardless of who wins.”
Also in Garba v Usman (2009) LPELR- 12726(CA), this Court per Alaba-Aji, JCA (as he then was) stated:
“INEC has the exclusive power to conduct elections and declare results and it does not share the power with anyone. Its mandate is to see that elections are free and fair and to that extent, it must therefore be seen or expected to be seen as impartial umpire. It does not therefore lie in INEC to be seen to indulge in filing objections and cross appeals as in the instant case in respect of election petitions where they are supposed to be seen as impartial umpire but they appear to have derailed in their role as impartial umpire.”
?In the light of these statements of the Courts, the question is what exactly is the Appellant in this appeal seeking to achieve by the appeal? This is the reason for my agitation. How will the Appellant be affected by the outcome of the petition before the

lower Court to warrant its filing an objection to the Reply of the first and second Respondents and this appeal against the Ruling of the lower Court deferring its decision on the objection? What is its business with and what does it stand to lose, whichever way the petition in the lower Court is decided? It is not a question of whether or not the Appellant possesses a right of appeal, but whether the right of appeal has been exercised with sobriety, propriety and to achieve a meaningful purpose. In Independent National Electoral Commission V. Otti (2016) LPELR 40056(SC), Galadima JSC, made the point thus:
“My lords, permit me to make this comment in the light of what has been the recent trends of events in respect of the stance of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). In an election petition they readily take over the case of a party who lost at the Court below to prosecute the appeal. This appeal is one such example. Is INEC not expected to be neutral and discharge its statutory responsibility in all election matters? Does it want to cry itself coarse more than the bereaved?”
?With respect, I am unable to make any sense of and/or

see the purpose for the descent into the fray that the Appellant embarked upon in the lower Court and which it has continued up to this Court. This Court is already inundated with so much work that has put its scarce resources, both human and material, under severe strain and it is most unfair of the Appellant to add a meaningless and purposeless appeal to its tasks. The expectation is that the Appellant, being an institution always in the midst of legal tussle, will assist and support the great efforts being made by the Court to bring about a more efficient, cost effective and robust judicial system that promotes and achieves timely resolution of disputes and not that it will make itself part of the problem. It is hoped that the Appellant will ensure that it does not constitute itself into a cog in the wheel of the progress and desist its lawyers from embarking on unnecessary objections and appeals in matters in which it has nothing at all to lose or gain by their outcome.
?
I agree that there is no merit in this Appeal and I hereby dismiss same. I affirm the decision contained in the Ruling of the Governorship Election Tribunal of Benue State delivered in

Petition No: EPT/BN/GOV/01/2019 by the Chairman and Members of the Tribunal in respect of Motion No EPT/GOV/01/MB/2019 on the 8th of June, 2019. I abide by the order on costs in the lead judgment.

JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in advance the lead judgment of my learned brother, Hassan JCA. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion therein that the appeal lacks merit. I accordingly dismiss the same and abide by the order as to costs in the lead judgment.

Appearances:

Uyi Igunma, Esq. with him, Genesis Francis Nguewese Tine TurFor Appellant(s)

K.K. Eleja, SAN with him, Professor B. A. Omipidan, A.A. Adeleke, Esq., A.B. Eleburuike, Esq. and Kehinde Pele for 1st and 2nd Respondents.
John Shishi, Esq. with him, Comfort Ada Ocheme Apeh, Esq., Victor Iorshenge, Esq., B.C. Abee Esq., Alfred Tijah, Esq., Professor Agbo Johnson Madaki
S.A. Udaga, Esq., Emeka Okoro, Esq., Chief P.S. Ochijele and P.S. Abaagu, Esq. for 3rd Respondents.For Respondent(s)

Appearances

Uyi Igunma, Esq. with him, Genesis Francis Nguewese Tine TurFor Appellant

AND

K.K. Eleja, SAN with him, Professor B. A. Omipidan, A.A. Adeleke, Esq., A.B. Eleburuike, Esq. and Kehinde Pele for 1st and 2nd Respondents.
John Shishi, Esq. with him, Comfort Ada Ocheme Apeh, Esq., Victor Iorshenge, Esq., B.C. Abee Esq., Alfred Tijah, Esq., Professor Agbo Johnson Madaki for 3rd Respondents.
S.A. Udaga, Esq., Emeka Okoro, Esq., Chief P.S. Ochijele and P.S. Abaagu, Esq.For Respondent

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