IMONKHUEDE OHIKHUARE v. AMB. ALHAJI SHEHU OTHMAN MALAMI & ORS
(2013)LCN/6657(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 13th day of December, 2013
CA/A/370/2012
RATIO
CONDITIONS TO BE SATISFIED IN ADDUCING FRESH OR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL.
In an application to adduce fresh or additional evidence on appeal, the following conditions must be satisfied by an applicant:
(a) The evidence sought to be adduced must be such as could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial;
(b) The evidence should be such as if adduced would have an important effect on the whole case; and
(c) The evidence must be credible in the sense that it is capable of believed.”
See: Comfort Asaboro v. N. G. D. Aruwji & Anor (1974) All NLR 127; Ogbatan v. Awudu (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt.829) 451 and Ilorin South Local Government v. Michael Sunday Afolabi (2003) 6 NWLR (Pt.846) 274. Per MOORE A. A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH TINE TUR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOORE A. A. ADUMEIN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
IMONKHUEDE OHIKHUARE Appellant(s)
AND
1. AMB. ALHAJI SHEHU OTHMAN MALAMI
2. HON. MINISTER, FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY
3. FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
4. MOHAMMED HABIB ALIYU
5. SIR EMEKA C. OFFOR Respondent(s)
JOSEPH TINE TUR, J.C.A. (Delivering the Lead Ruling): The subject matter under contention was formerly known as plot No.865 (now plot No.1809) within the Cadastral Zone “A04”, situate in Asokoro, Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory. Ambassador Alhaji Shehu Othman Malami, OFR (1st respondent) by an irrevocable power of attorney, appointed one Sir. Emeka Offor (5th respondent) to take possession, manage and administer the said property on behalf of the Ambassador. The 2nd and 3rd respondents subsequently revoked the plot in favour of one Mohammed Habib Aliyu (4th respondent). This suit was commenced by the 1st respondent in the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja on 9th March, 2010 against (1) Minister of the Federal Capital Territory (2) Federal Capital Development Authority and (3) Mohammed Habib Aliyu claiming declaration and injunctive reliefs against the named defendants. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the original statement of claim pleaded that:
“1. The plaintiff is a retired Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He is resident at No.25 N’djamena Street, Wuse II, Abuja, FCT.
2. The 1st and 2nd defendants administer land in the FCT. The 3rd Defendant is a natural person to whom the 1st defendant purportedly re-allocated plot No.865 (now plot No.1809) within Cadastral Zone “A04″, Asokoro, Abuja, FCT.”
On the 8th day of June, 2010 Mr. Imonkhuede Ohikuare applied, to be joined as the 4th defendant in the suit on the grounds that he derived title since the year 2000 from Mohammed Habib Aliyu (4th respondent). That he had long developed it, hence he had an interest in the subject matter in dispute. The application was granted on 1st July, 2010 and Mr. Imonkhuede Ohikuare became the 4th defendant in the suit. Both the writ of summons and the statement of claim were duly amended to reflect the joinder. Paragraph 14 of the Amended Statement of claim sought the following reliefs against the 1st -3rd respondents:
“14. WHEREOF the plaintiff claims against the Defendants jointly and severally as follows:
(i) A declaration that the Notice of Revocation of Undeveloped plots within Federal Capital City dated the 5th day of October, 2005 and signed by Oni, O.A. for the Minister (FCT) in respect of plot No.865 (now plot No.1809) within Cadastral Zone “A04”, Asokoro, Abuja, FCT is null.
(ii) A declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to a new/recertified Certificate of Occupancy in respect of plot No.865 (now plot No.1809) within Cadastral Zone “A04”, Asokoro, Abuja, FCT.
(iii) An order of Court setting aside the Notice of Revocation of Undeveloped plots within Federal Capital City dated the 5th day of October, 2005 and signed by Oni, O.A. for the Minister (FCT) in respect of plot No.865 (now plot No.1809) within Cadastral Zone “A04” Asokoro, Abuja, FCT.
(iv) An order of Court mandating the 1st defendant to issue to the plaintiff a new/recertified Certificate of Occupancy in respect of plot No.865 (now plot No.1809) within Cadastral Zone “A04”, Asokoro, Abuja, FCT.
(v) An order of Court setting aside any allocation to the 3rd Defendant by the 1st Defendant of plot No.865 (now plot No.1809) within Cadastral Zone “A04”, Asokoro, Abuja, FCT.
(vi) An order of Court setting aside the purported sale of plot No.865 (now plot No.1809) within Cadastral Zone “A04”, Asokoro, Abuja, FCT by the 3rd Defendant to the 4th Defendant for being null and void ab initio.
(vii) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants by themselves, their agents or privies from inhibiting or disturbing plaintiff’s possession and equanimity over plot No.865 (now plot No.1809) within Cadastral Zone “A04”, Asokoro, Abuja, FCT.
(viii) The sum of N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) only against the Defendants jointly and severally for their wrongful conduct against the plaintiff in respect of plot No.865 (now plot No.1809) within Cadastral Zone “A04″, Asokoro, Abuja, FCT.”
After pleadings were exchanged and the statement of claim amended the matter proceeded to trial. At the close of hearing, learned counsel submitted written addresses. On the 17th May, 2012 judgment was delivered by the learned trial Judge as follows: “At this juncture, I wish to consider the reliefs sought by the plaintiff and it is my firm view that this Court cannot grant relief No.viii as there was no evidence in support of it. Accordingly, the said relief is hereby refused and not granted as prayed. And I so hold. In the sum the suit of the plaintiff succeeds in part in reliefs (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) only. No order to the cost.” See page 405 lines 7-13 of the printed record. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal against the judgment on 23rd May, 2012. During the pendency of the appeal an application was brought to this Court by one Sir Emeka Offor on 9th April, 2013 to be joined as a party interested/respondent on the grounds he had an equitable interest in the property by virtue of an irrevocable power of attorney executed in his favour by the 1st respondent. That the judgment of the lower Court had since been executed in his favour and he was in possession of the subject matter in dispute. The application was granted by the Appeal Court. Sir Emeka Offor became the 5th respondent in the substantive appeal. On 18th June, 2013, Paul Erokoro, SAN, filed a motion on notice supported by affidavit praying for the following reliefs:
“1. Leave to adduce in this appeal, further or additional evidence, which was not available during the trial in the High Court, namely:
(i) Letter dated the 25th day of September, 2012, from Sylvester Imhanobe & Co. Solicitors to Ambassador Shehu Othman Malami, the Plaintiff/1st Respondent, addressed to Mr. Jeph C. Njikonye, Counsel on record to the 1st Respondent.
(ii) The 1st Respondent’s further affidavit filed in this appeal on the 3rd October, 2012, to which is attached as Exhibit “REF2” a letter dated 4th February, 2009, from Sylvester Imhanobe & Co. addressed to the Chairman, Chrome Group, identified as Emeka Offor in paragraph7 of the said affidavit.
(iii) The 1st Respondent’s Better Counter Affidavit filed in this appeal on the 12th of October, 2012, to which is attached as Exhibit “Rl”, the Irrevocable Power of Attorney executed by the 1st Respondent in 2005 or earlier, by which the 1st Respondent appointed Sir Emeka Offor his lawful attorney with respect to the disputed property, with irrevocable power to manage and superintend over the said property and in particular “to commence, prosecute, defend, answer and or oppose all actions and other legal proceedings and demands touching on the Certificate of Occupancy and or its development/improvement.
(iv) Motion on Notice for Joinder together with the affidavit in support, filed in this Court on the 9th of November, 2012 by Emeka C. Offor to which is attached Exhibit “ECO1”, the Irrevocable Power of Attorney aforesaid, and contains the admission that the 1st Respondent had executed an agreement of sale in favour of Sir Emeka Offor, over the property before the 1st Respondent’s interest was revoked in 2005.
(v) Motion on Notice dated and filed on the 12th of November, 2012 by the 1st Respondent for substitution of his name in the appeal with that of Emeka C. Offor.
(vi) 1st Respondent’s letter dated Friday, 11th January, 2013 addressed to the Presiding Judge (Presiding Justice) of this Honourable Court wherein he admitted that he had sold the disputed property to Sir Erneka C. Offor before the alleged revocation of his interest in 2005, which said revocation constituted the cause of action in this matter.
2. An order admitting as further or additional evidence in these proceedings, the documents described in paragraph 1(i)-(vi) above, marked Exhibits “IMO6”, “IMO7”, “IMO8”, “IMO9”, “IMO10” and “IMO10A” respectively, in the affidavit in support of this application.
3. Leave to amend or further amend the Notice of Appeal by the addition of more Grounds of Appeal and in particular Grounds 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.
4. Leave to raise the following fresh issues of law, which arise from the additional evidence sought to be adduced:
i. The trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter;
ii. The 1st Respondent had no locus standi to commence the action, as he had, prior to the commencement of the suit, executed an instrument under seal by which he irrevocably divested himself of the power to sue in respect of the land in dispute;
iii. The proceedings were vitiated by fraudulent misrepresentation;
iv. The entire suit was an abuse of court process.
5. Extension of time within which to file the Appellant’s Brief of Argument.
6. Leave to amend and further amend the Appellant’s Brief of Argument to include new issues derived from the additional grounds of appeal and the further evidence being adduced.
7. Leave to deem the Amended or Further Amended Notice of Appeal, as well as the Amended or Further Amended Appellant’s Brief already filed and served, as having been properly filed and served, the appropriate filing fees having been paid.
And for any other Orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.
FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that the grounds upon which this application is brought are as follows:
(a) Extension of time is required to file the Appellant’s Brief of Argument.
(b) Leave of this Honourable Court is required to adduce further or additional evidence, raise fresh issues of law, amend the Notice of Appeal, amend the Appellant’s Brief of argument and for the said processes to be deemed as having been properly filed and served.
(c) Exhibits “IMOG”, “IM07”, “IMOS”, “IMO9”, “IMO10” and “IMO10A” sought to be admitted as further evidence became available to the Applicant after the appeal had already been entered in this Honourable Court.
(d) Exhibits “IMOG” and “IMO10A” shows that the land in dispute had been sold by the Plaintiff/1st Respondent to one Emeka Offor before the 1st Respondent’s title was revoked, and 5 years before the commencement of this suit and also shows that the 1st Respondent was not the owner of the land at the time he commenced the suit and at the time he gave evidence in court, in which said evidence he testified that he was the owner of the land, while concealing the sale to the said Emeka C. Offor. The letters also show that it was not the 1st Respondent that executed the judgment of the lower court during this pendency of the appeal, but rather the said Emeka Offor who did so, and put himself in possession. As stated by the 1st Respondent in Exhibit “IMO10A”, the property in dispute belongs absolutely to Sir Emeka C. Offor and the 1st Respondent does not have any interest in the property.
(e) Exhibit “IM07” shows that an earlier suit filed by the 1st Respondent in 2007 was to recover possession of the land in dispute for the said Emeka C. Offor, who had earlier purchased it from the 1st Respondent.
(f) Exhibit “IMO9″ is a motion supported by an affidavit filed by the said Sir Emeka Offor seeking to be joined as a party in this appeal, in which it is admitted that before the commencement of this suit in the lower court, the 1st Respondent had executed a sale agreement and irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the said Emeka Offor who is now in possession of the property in dispute.
(g) The further evidence sought to be adduced is relevant, as it will show that:-
(i) There was no proper plaintiff at the trial Court, wherefore that court had no jurisdiction to hear the suit;
(ii) The proceedings at the lower court were vitiated by fraudulent misrepresentation;
(iii) The proceedings were an abuse of court process;
(iv) As the case was tried and decided on equitable principles, the above issues are highly relevant.”
E. M. Asawalan Esq., who represented the 2nd and 3rd respondents and Yakubu Madeh, Esq., for the 4th respondent had no objection to the granting of the remedies set out on the motion paper.
ISSUE 1, 2 AND 4:
The details of the submission by the learned silk appearing for the appellant are contained in the written address of Paul Erokoro, SAN. Reference was made to Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act of 2004 and Order 4 rule 2 of the Court of Appeal rules 2011 as conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal to grant these remedies, citing Ehinlawon vs. Oke (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1113) 357; Okoro vs. Egbouh (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt.1001) 1 at 18 and Uzodinma vs. Izunso (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1275) 30 at 54-55. The learned silk drew attention to the fact that the affidavits and documents sought to be used on appeal came into the knowledge of the applicant/appellant after the delivery of judgment by the learned trial Judge. Some constituted admissions by agents of the respondents that the plot in dispute did not belong to the 1st respondent as falsely claimed in the lower Court hence leave ought to be granted the applicant to call fresh evidence in the course of hearing this appeal. The learned silk cited Section 21(1) and 83(3) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and Law of Evidence in Nigeria, 2006 edition, page 258, by Sebastine Tor Hon (SAN); Suleiman vs. VAC (2003) FWLR (Pt. 161) 1750; Seismograph Service (Nig) Ltd v. Eyuafe (1976) 9-10 SC (reprint) 86 at 91 and a host of other authorities in support of the argument.
The learned silk further submitted that the granting of leave to adduce fresh evidence will have an important effect on the outcome of this appeal. This is because the land in dispute had been sold by the 1st respondent to the 5th respondent before this suit was instituted. The 1st respondent’s title to the land had been revoked five years before the commencement of this suit. The 1st respondent could not have been the owner of the land in dispute at the time the suit was filed in the trial Court. At the time the 1st respondent testified in Court these facts were concealed from the appellant and the Court below. Documents also showed that it was not the 1st respondent that executed the judgment after its delivery but the 5th respondent/interested party. This was during the pendency of the appeal. 1st respondent had entered into possession. The learned silk referred to Exhibit “IMO1OA” by the 1st respondent showing he no longer had any interest in the land in dispute.
The learned silk further referred to other exhibits numbered “IMO6”-“IMO10” and “IMO10A” as the documents the appellant/applicant was seeking to tender as evidence on appeal if leave is granted. It was argued that the use of these exhibits will not lead to the calling of witnesses. The learned silk contended that if leave was granted to call fresh evidence it will be shown that the lower Court lacked the jurisdiction to have entertained the suit. That the 1st respondent had no locus standi to have commenced this action at the lower Court as he had prior to the institution of the suit executed an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of Chief Emeka Offor under seal. The proceedings were therefore vitiated by fraudulent misrepresentation constituting an abuse of Court process. The learned silk cited circumstances where leave was granted to parties to raise fresh issues on appeal such as Direct on PC Ltd. (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt.1256) 442; Agbiti vs. Nigerian Navy (2011) 4 NWLR (Pt.1236) 175. It was contended that lack of jurisdiction can be raised as a new issue on appeal, citing Oshatoba vs. Olujitan (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt.655) 159 and Attorney-General of Oyo State vs. Fairlakes Hotel Ltd. (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt.92). The learned silk urged that reliefs 1, 2 and 4 on the motion paper should be granted the applicant.
RELIEFS 3, 6 AND 7:
The learned silk drew this Court’s attention to the fact that this Court made an order joining Sir Emeka Offor as the 5th respondent in this appeal on 4th day of June, 2013 hence the Court is bound to admit additional evidence supporting his purchase of the land from the 1st respondent, citing Order 6 rule 15 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011 which empowers an appellant, upon application being granted by the Court, to amend the Notice of Appeal at any time as circumstances would warrant. Reference was made to Apugu vs. Nwoke (2010) 1 NWLR (Pt.1176) 600 at 611; Unity Bank Plc vs. Bouvi (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.1086) 372 at 399; Oloro vs. Falana (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt.1275) 207. That the power to amend the Notice of Appeal can be done suo motu by this Court, citing F.A.T.B. vs. Ezegbu (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt.367) 149. The need to amend the Notice of Appeal arose because of the new issues that had arisen which were not available to the applicant at the time the initial notice of appeal was filed.
RELIEF 5:
The learned silk sought to have time extended to file the appellant’s brief of argument because Counsel was engaged at the Election Petition Tribunals, time being of essence under Section 285(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. The tribunals had to sit on a day to day basis. This made it impossible for the learned silk to have settled the appellant’s brief of argument within the statutory period. It was contended that Order 7 rule 10(1) and (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011 is authority for time to be extended for the applicant to file a brief of argument, citing Ede vs. Mba (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt.1278) 236. That good ground existed for the exercise of this power in favour of the appellant/applicant. The learned silk urged that this application should be granted.
Udechukwu, SAN, appearing for the 1st and 5th respondents opposed the application by filing a counter affidavit on 20th February, 2013 and a written address on 8th July, 2013. In the written address filed by the learned silk, the following facts were conceded, namely, that the 5th respondent was joined in the appeal by an order of this Court made on the 4th of June, 2013. In paragraph 1.1 of the written address filed on 27th February, 2013 the learned silk further admitted, and I quote, that, “…Both the 1st and 5th Respondents have conterminous, ommon (sic) and mutual interest in the suit.” That by an irrevocable power of attorney (Exhibit “R1”) the 1st respondent had appointed the 5th respondent to be his attorney with powers to take possession of, manage and administer the property in dispute. The substantive suit was commenced when the appellant laid claim to the property. The 1st respondent testified in proof of the claim and judgment was given against the appellant in favour of the 1st respondent. Nevertheless, the learned silk identified the following issues for determination in the written address:
“(i) Whether the 1st respondent’s Better Counter Affidavit of 12th October, 2012 with Exhibit “R1″ thereto, the letter dated 25th September, 2012 authored by Sylvester Imhanobe & Co. and the 1st respondent’s letter dated 11th January, 2013 addressed to the Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeal are admissible as further or additional evidence in this appeal.
(ii) Whether the 1st Respondent’s further affidavit filed on the 3rd October, 2013; Motion on Notice for Joinder with affidavit in support, filed in this Court on the 9th of November, 2012 by Emeka C. Offor and Motion on Notice dated and filed on the 12th of November, 2012 by Sylvester Imhanobe are admissible in this appeal as further or additional evidence.
(iii) Whether the Appellant/Applicant’s prayers 3, 6, and 7 on the Motion paper are not incompetent.
(iv) Whether the Appellant/Applicant’s Motion on Notice dated and filed on 14th January, 2013 is not an abuse of Court processes as it pertains to prayers 3, 5, 6 and 7 thereto in view of the pendency of the Appellant/Applicant’s earlier Motion on Notice dated and filed on the 20th of September, 2012.”
ISSUE ONE:
It was argued by the learned silk that to grant leave to adduce fresh evidence on appeal, this Court has to be satisfied that there are facts in the pleadings to sustain the fresh evidence. This is because cases are tried in the lower Court on pleadings, and matters not pleaded are irrelevant, citing Adimora vs. Ajufo (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 80) 1 at 12; Kuti vs. Jibowu (1972) 6 S.C 147 at 172; Onwumere vs. Agwunedu (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 62) 673; Dina vs. N.N.N. Ltd (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 22) 353 and Obasi vs. Onwuka (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 364 at 372. That fresh evidence must be that which can support the pleaded facts otherwise the pleadings will have to be amended to introduce the fresh facts. The learned silk referred to Comfort Asaboro vs. A.G.D. Aruwaji & Anor (1974) 4 SC 90-91 as laying the conditions that must co-exist for this kind of application to be granted. It was argued that the 1st respondents’ Better Counter Affidavit of 12th October, 2013 and exhibit R1 thereto, dated 25th September, 2012 authored by Sylvester Imhanobe & co, and the 1st respondent’s letter of 11th January, 2013 addressed to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal are inadmissible as to constitute additional evidence in this appeal. That Sylvester Imhanobe, Esq. was not Counsel in the Court of Appeal and his letter cannot be received in evidence as proof of its contents unless he is called and cross-examined, citing Ojukwu vs. Governor of Lagos State & Ors (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.10) 806 at 818. The letter of 25th September, 2012 was not useful for the determination of this appeal, argued the learned silk. In paragraph 2 of the 1st respondent counter-affidavit it was deposed that Sylvester Imhanobe was the applicants Kinsman and he could have authored the letter as part of his gimmicks in this appeal. 1st respondent’s letter of 11th January, 2013 was also inadmissible on the grounds of public policy, citing Lababedi vs. Odulana (1974) NCLR (ALR) 458; Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and UBA Plc v. BTL Ind. Ltd (2005) 22 WRN 1 at 15-16; Ude vs. Nwara (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt.278) 638 at 665; Awojugbagbe Light Ltd vs. Chinukwe (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt.390) 383 at 425-426. The learned Counsel urged this Court to examine the contents of the documents sought to be put in as fresh evidence; that they speak for themselves, citing Ezeigwe vs. Audu (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt.1097) 158 at 175.
It was further argued that though a power of attorney was conferred on the 5th respondent that does not divest the 1st respondent of the locus standi to sue in respect of the land covered by the power of attorney. Reference was made to Ude vs. Nwara (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt.278) 638 at 665 paragraph “A”-“B”. That no legal title had passed to the 5th respondent by virtue of the power of attorney as title still remained in the 1st respondent, argued the learned silk, citing Awojugbagbe Light Ltd vs. Chinukwe (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt.390) 383 at 424-427; Vulcan vs. Gesellchaft (2001) 26 WRN 1 at 26-27; Amadi vs. FRN (2008) 7 WRN 38 at 60; Melwani v. F.S.I Ltd (2002) 10 WRN 1 at 19; Agwaramgbo vs. Nakande (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt.672) 341 at 366; Oshola vs. Finnih (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt.178) 192 at 197; Ajuwon vs. Adeoti (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.132) 271. The learned silk urged the Court to resolve issue one in favour of the 1st and 5th respondents.
ISSUE TWO:
The learned silk argued that no authority was cited in support of the fact that processes used at the interlocutory stage of an appeal could be admitted as fresh evidence on appeal. The 1st respondent’s Better Counter Affidavit filed on 3rd October, 2013; motion on notice for joinder with affidavit in support filed on 9th November, 2012 by the 5th respondent and motion on notice filed on 12th November, 2012 by Sylvester Imhanobe could not be admissible as further or additional evidence argued the learned silk. That Exhibit “IMO7” was struck out on 27th February, 2013 having been withdrawn by the appellant’s learned silk. Exhibit “IMO9” was also struck out on 17th February, 2013. It was made by a non-party to this appeal in the Court below, same as Exhibit “IMO10” which is a motion on notice yet to be heard. The learned silk’s contention was that affidavits used in interlocutory proceedings are not admissible unless with the consent of the parties, citing Aderounmu vs. Aderunmu (2002) 48 WRN 145 at 155. Not only that, opposition is being raised against their admissibility; they are therefore not relevant to the determination of the issues in controversy in this appeal, citing Adams vs. Umar (2009)21 WRN 81 at 177; UBA Plc vs. BTL Ind Ltd (supra) and Obasi vs. Onwuka (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt 61) 364) at 372. Learned silk urged that issue two be resolved in favour of the 1st and 5th respondents.
ISSUE THREE:
The learned silk took objection to reliefs 3, 6 and 7 in the motion paper on the grounds that they were not specific prayers. That a prayer for leave to “amend or further amend” is not a specific prayer and is incompetent and ought to be struck out. The reason is that an applicant is bound by the prayers he seeks in the motion paper; likewise the Court of Appeal. The incompetent prayers cannot be cured by this Court, argued the learned silk, citing Ayamboye vs. Balogun (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.151) 392 at 413; Commissioner of Works Benue State vs. Devcon Development Consultants Ltd. (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.83) 407 at 420. This is because reliefs 3, 6 and 7 are predicated upon un-pleaded facts, and the lower Court never made any pronouncement on them. They are outside the contemplation of Section 240 and 242 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. The learned silk cited Metal Construction W/A Ltd vs. Migliore (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.126) 299 at 311. It was argued that the grounds upon which the application is brought is not anchored on the decision of the lower Court, nor to any ground of appeal, argued the learned silk, citing Saraki vs. Kotoye (1992) 11-12 SCNJ (Pt.1) 26 at 43. The learned Senior Counsel urged that issue three be resolved in favour of the 1st and 5th respondent.
ISSUE FOUR:
The contention of the learned SAN is that the applicant’s motion on notice filed on 14th January, 2013 is an abuse of Court process in view of the pendency of the applicant’s motion filed on the 20th September, 2012. Counsel referred to the remedies sought in another motion of 27th February, 2013. It was argued that when the matter came up in Court, the appellant withdraw eight of the applications but failed to withdraw that filed on 20th September, 2012. As the prayers in the two motions were the same, the applicant had intended to achieve the same result in both applications. Consequently, the present application is clearly an abuse of Court process, citing Umeh vs. Iwu (2008) 41 WRN 1 at 36-37; T.S.A Ind. Ltd vs. F.B.N (No.1) (2012 14 NWLR (Pt.1320) 326 at 345. The learned silk urged that on the whole this application should be dismissed.
REPLY ADDRESS:
The learned silk appearing for the appellant submitted in the reply address filed on 18th June, 2013 that no law required that a party seeking to adduce additional evidence has to call witnesses to testify and be subjected to cross-examination. Besides, there was no need for such an exercise in this appeal as the additional evidence is to be used to merely contradict the case of the 1st respondent in the lower Court. That the appellant’s motion of 20th September, 2012 was withdrawn on 27th February, 2013 along with other motions. But if it was not, that was due to inadvertence on the part of the learned silk who now gave notice of its withdrawal, citing Oyegion vs. Nzeribe (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt.1194) 577.
ISSUE TWO:
The learned Counsel cited Obasi vs. Onwuka (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.61) 364 as supporting the reasons for the applicant seeking these reliefs. It was contended by the learned silk that the averment of Mr. Sylvester Imhanobe as a kinsman of the appellant/applicant cannot constitute valid evidence before this Court as that was denied in paragraph 7(i) of the appellant’s further affidavit filed on 7th March, 2013.
On the issue of public policy Senior Counsel contended that the 1st respondent had admitted that he deceived the lower Court into giving him judgment. Therefore he cannot rely on equitable doctrines, citing Adejumo vs. Ayantegbe (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.110) 417. That Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act, 2011 was inapplicable because there was no dispute as to the contents of Exhibits “IMO6”-“IMO10”. The authorities cited by the learned silk for the 1st and 5th respondents did not apply. That they rather showed that a donor of an irrevocable power of attorney cannot sue de hor the grantee.
ISSUE THREE:
The learned silk contended that paragraph 3.14 of the 1st respondent’s written address had no statutory or judicial backing precluding the admissibility of Exhibits “IMO9” and “IMO10” on the grounds they were not made by a party to the appeal. That is not a requirement in Asaboro vs. Aruwaji & Anor. (supra). That in Aderonumu vs. Aderouni (supra) there was no prayer to use an affidavit in the interlocutory application to bolster one of the party’s case in the substantive suit hence the Supreme Court deprecated what the learned trial Judge had done in the circumstances. This was not the same as in this application. It was submitted that the fact that a process was withdrawn and struck out does not mean that when a person swore to an affidavit that constituted perjury, he cannot be prosecuted, citing Osafile vs. Odi (No.1) (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.137) 130 at 178 paragraphs “E”-“F”.
ISSUE FOUR:
The learned silk argued that the prayers on the motion paper are not vague, citing the definition of what is “vague” in Nuhu vs. Ogule (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt.852) 251 at 266. The prayer for “leave to amend and further amend” arose due to the fact that the appellant had filed notices of appeal and briefs of argument titled “Amended” and “Further Amended” as clearly stated in paragraph 7(i) of the appellant’s Further Affidavit in support of this application. The authorities cited by the learned silk are inapplicable; besides, the prayers were in the alternative. Moreover, it was contended by the learned silk that a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court below can be raised on appeal, notwithstanding the learned trial Judge had not pronounced on it in the judgment. The grounds of appeal to be argued on appeal related to the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the claim as the 1st respondent had no locus standi to institute the suit. The issue need not to have been pleaded in the lower Court, citing Adesanya vs. President (1979) 12 NSCC 146 at 151.
REASONS FOR RULING:
I am aware that this is an interlocutory application. The substantive appeal is still pending. I shall therefore try to avoid a situation where I may be lured into commenting on issues affecting the substantive appeal. See Motune vs. Gambo (1983) NCLR 237 at 242; Kufeji vs. Kogbe (1961) 1 All NLR (Pt.1) 113 at 114; Iweka vs. SCOA (2000) 3 SC 3 at 24-25.
Having examined the facts, oral and documentary and considered the arguments adumbrated by the learned silk representing the appellant/applicant and the 1st and 5th respondents coupled with the fact that the learned Counsel representing the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th respondents have no objection to the granting of the remedies sought by the applicant, I am of the humble opinion that the power and authority to grant an application for an appellant to adduce fresh or additional evidence on appeal is provided by statute. But firstly, I shall refer to Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004 which provides as follows:
“15. The Court of Appeal may, from time to time, make any order necessary for determining the real question in controversy in the appeal, and may…, and generally shall have full jurisdiction over the whole proceedings as if the proceedings had been instituted in the Court of Appeal as Court of first instance and may rehear the case in whole or in part or may remit it to the Court below for the purpose of such re-hearing…”
In the determination of an application under the provisions of Section 15 of the Act (supra), this Court has to assume the position of the trial Court and to ask itself whether, if the fresh evidence sought to be adduced on appeal, be it oral or documentary, were available, where pleadings were ordered, filed and exchanged, would the facts or documents have been pleaded? If the answer is yes, it follows that this Court would be acting within the ambit of its jurisdiction to allow the oral and documentary evidence to be admitted at the appeal stage. But where, at the time of the institution of the suit, the oral or documentary evidence was not available up to the hearing and delivery of judgment, it would have been impracticable for a party to have pleaded and tendered same in the trial Court. Alternatively, it could be that at the time the suit was filed the party was not aware of the existence of such documentary or oral evidence to have relied on it to bolster or enhance his case at the trial Court. Another situation could have arisen whereby the oral or documentary evidence was available but concealed in such a manner that no amount of diligent search or investigation could have led to the discovery of such facts as to be pleaded. It may be that the party affected could not establish his claim in the lower Court and it was dismissed, or that judgment was entered against the defendant. In either of these situations happening, a party may have to appeal against the judgment or decision and call further evidence or raise fresh issues to show there was a miscarriage of justice.
It is settled law that a trial is not at an end if there is a pending appeal. See Eyeshan vs. Sanusi (1984) 4 SC 115 where Obaseki, JSC held at pages 134-135 as follows:
“Generally speaking, a judgment delivered by the trial Court in a case after the conclusion of the evidence and final addresses brings an action to an end. But if an appeal is filed and pending against the judgment, the action is not at an end. Although the successful party has a judgment in his favour, the Court of Appeal will and has power to rehear the matter. This is further emphasized by Section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act, 1976. The provision of Section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act expressly provides that the Court of Appeal shall have full jurisdiction over the whole proceedings as if the proceedings had been instituted in the Court of Appeal as Court of first instance and may rehear the case in whole or in part. That section also disposes of the issue raised by the respondent as to the competence or jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to entertain the application. It is true that the issue raised was as to the competence of the Court of Appeal to entertain the application under Order 3, rule 23 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1981. The issue of competence cannot be separated from the issue of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal Act, 1976 defines the powers of the Court of Appeal and sets out the procedure as far as was necessary. The Court of Appeal Rules, 1981 are complementary to the Court of Appeal Act.”
See also Polini vs. Gray (1879) 12 Ch.D. 438 at 446 per Cotton L.J.
Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004 is a “mine sweeper”; it “sweeps” away miscarriage of justice that might have occurred in the Court of trial due to the failure of the appellant to adduce relevant evidence that might have tilted the judgment in his favour, if the evidence were available, pleaded, tendered and made use of by the learned trial Judge. In Section 15 of the Act, the draftsman employed the word “may” to show that the application of the provision involves the exercise of a judicial discretion by the Court of Appeal in determining when to grant or refuse leave to an appellant to adduce additional or fresh evidence, or to raise fresh issues on appeal. In Chief P.I. Mokelu vs. Federal Commissioner For Works and Housing (1976) 1 NMLR 329, Madarikan, JSC held at page 333 that:
‘”May” is an enabling or permissive word. In that sense, it imposes or gives a discretionary or enabling power. But where the object of the power is to effectuate a legal right, “may” has been construed as compulsory or as imposing an obligatory duty.
The principle to be drawn from decided cases on the construction of the word “may” appears to be quite clear. The word “may” gives a power, and the important question is in what causes, where a Judge has a power given by the “may”, it becomes his duty to exercise it. When a statute confers a power or authority on a judge to act in a certain case, it is imperative on him to exercise the power or authority when the case arises and its exercise is duly called for. (See MacDoughall vs. Patterson (1851) 138 E.R. 673).’
Order 4 rules 1-5 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011 reads as follows:
“1. In relation to an appeal, the Court shall have all the powers and duties as to amendment and otherwise of the High Court, including without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing words, in civil matters, the powers of the High Court in civil matters to refer any question or issue of fact arising on the appeal for trial before, or inquiry and report by, an official or special referee.
In relation to a reference made to an official or special referee, anything, which can be required or authorized to be done by, to, or before the High Court, shall be done by, to, or before the Court.
2. The Court shall have power to receive further evidence on question of fact, either by oral examination in Court, by affidavit, or by deposition taken before an Examiner or Commissioner as the Court may direct, but, in the case of an appeal from a judgment after trial or hearing of any cause or matter on the merits, no such further evidence (other than evidence as to matters which have occurred after the date of the trial or hearing) shall be admitted except on special grounds.
3. The Court shall have power to draw inferences of fact and to give any judgment and make any order, which ought to have been given or made, and to make such further or other order s as the case may require, including any order as to costs.
4. The powers of the Court under the foregoing provisions of this Rule may be exercised notwithstanding that no notice of appeal or Respondent’s notice has been given in respect of any particular part of the decision of the Court below, or by any particular party to the proceedings in that Court, or that any ground for allowing the appeal or for affirming or varying the decision of that Court is not specified in such a notice; and the Court may make any order, on such terms as the Court thinks just, to ensure the determination of the merits of the real question in controversy between the parties.
5. The powers of the Court in respect of an appeal shall not be restricted by reason of any interlocutory order from which there has been no appeal.”
If the facts – oral and documentary now being sought to be raised before this Court had come into the possession of the applicant during the proceedings in the lower Court, I believe, upon an application been brought, the lower Court could have granted leave to amend the statement of defence to plead those facts – oral and documentary, in the interest of justice. The Court of Appeal has the powers to do likewise. See Order 4 rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011.
Upon granting leave in such circumstances the Court assumes the position of the lower Court and draws inferences of fact, gives any judgment, and makes any order, which the lower Court ought to have given or made including any order as to costs. In that case the judgment on appeal becomes that of the trial Court. See Oyefeso vs. Tola (1968) NMLR 317. What Order 4 rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011 aims at is for the Court of Appeal to “…make any order, on such terms as the Court thinks just, to ensure the determination of the merits of the real question in controversy between the parties.” Order 4 rule 5 of the Rules (supra) empowers the Court of Appeal not to be restricted by reason of any interlocutory order from which there has been no appeal. That is to say, the fact that the lower Court had determined an issue in an interlocutory application but that has not been included in a notice of appeal or the respondent’s notice, etc, is not to hinder the Court of Appeal from granting reliefs to ensure that the real questions in controversy between the parties are determined on the merit.
As granting leave to adduce further evidence or raise fresh issues involves the exercise of judicious discretion, this power has to be properly invoked by taking into consideration the peculiar or special facts and circumstances of each case. If that is not so, the exercise of the discretion can be interfered with by an appellate Court. See Maxwell vs. Kevin (1927) All E.R. 335; Saffeidine vs. Commissioner of Police (1965) NMLR 116; Demurin vs. Asuni (1967) 1 All NLR 94 at 101 and Ugboma vs. Olise (1971) All NLR 8. That being the case, the authorities cited by the learned silk can only be a guide in determining whether to grant or refuse this application. The power and authority to raise fresh issues on appeal may, if not restrained, be subject of abuse, hence, over the years, justices sitting in the appellate Courts have fashioned safeguards by providing conditions to be fulfilled by an appellant before such applications are granted. I shall refer to the case of British Airways Plc vs. Amadi (2012) 2 NWLR (Pt.1283) 21 at 41 where this Court held that:
“The power conferred on this Court under Order 4 calls for the exercise of the Court’s discretion which must be exercised judiciously. Being a discretionary power, each case is determined in line with the facts peculiar to the case. The Courts in an effect to exercise their discretion judicially and judiciously have set down certain principles to guide the appellate Court in deciding whether to grant leave to call further evidence or not. The principles were enunciated in the case of Asaboro vs. Aruwaji (1974) 1 All NLR (Pt.1) 140 SC per Coker, JSC where his Lordship set out the principles to consider when further evidence on appeal is sought.
They are as follows:
(i) The evidence sought to be adduced must be such that could not have been with reasonable diligence obtained for use at the trial.
(ii) The evidence should be such that if admitted would have an important, not necessary crucial effect on the whose case, and;
(iii) The evidence must be such that is apparently credible in the sense that it is capable of being believed and it need not be incontrovertible – see UBA Plc vs. BTL Ind. Ltd. (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt.933) 356 at 370-371.”
At this stage the Court is concerned only with the admissibility of the fresh issues, new facts and documents exhibited to this application, but certainly not the weight to attach to them. The issue of weight will only be considered after the facts and documents have been admitted in evidence. Admissibility is governed by relevance and the purpose the evidence is to serve. See Musa Sadau vs. State (1968) 1 All NLR 124 at 129; Agunbiade vs. Sasegbon (1968) NMLR 223 at 226; ACB Ltd. vs. Gwagwada (1994) 4 SCNJ (Pt.2) 268 at 277; Ayeni vs. Dada (1978) 3 SC 35 at 61; Omega Bank Nig. Plc vs. OBC Ltd. (2005) 1 SC 150 at 179 and Attorney-General of Oyo State vs. Fairlakes Hotel Ltd. (1989) 12 SCNJ 1 at 20-21.
Therefore the argument by the learned silk appearing for the 1st and 5th respondents involving the weight or credibility to attach to the additional evidence or fresh issues sought to be put in, if leave is granted, is premature and untenable.
Furthermore, the provisions of Order 4 rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011 is in two parts. The first part applies when there was pleaded in the Court below some evidence but the appellant wants the Court of Appeal to, “…receive further evidence on questions of fact, either by oral examination in Court, by affidavit, or by deposition taken before an Examiner or Commissioner as the Court may direct…” This presupposes that the pleaded facts were insufficient or deficient for the appellant to have obtained judgment in the lower Court, in which case, an application is brought praying that the Court of Appeal should, “receive further evidence.” “Further” means, “to a greater extent or degree… You use further to introduce a statement that relates to the same general topic and that gives additional information or makes an additional point.” See Collins Cobuild Advanced Learner’s English Dictionary, 5th edition, 2006, page 591.
The learned silk who appeared for the 1st and 5th respondents missed the point upon which the learned silk appearing for the appellant/applicant seeks to be granted leave to raise fresh issues and adduce additional evidence on appeal. What the appellant seeks is to adduce fresh issues and additional evidence within the second part of Order 4 rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules, namely, that the fresh issues/facts/document exhibited came into existence and to his knowledge after the judgment was delivered and Notice of Appeal had been filed. For example, some facts, including documents, were only known when Sir Emeka Offor applied to be joined as a co-respondent in this appeal. Other information and documents came to the knowledge of the appellant through the agents of the 1st and 5th respondents from the documents filed in the Registry of this Court. Therefore the objection to the granting of this application by the learned silk on behalf of the 1st and 5th respondents is not well-founded.
It was further argued that if leave is granted and evidence is adduced it will establish that (i) the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit; (ii) the 1st respondent had no locus standi to commence the action, as he had, prior to the commencement of the suit, executed an instrument under seal by which he irrevocably divested himself of the power to sue in respect of the plot in dispute (iii) the proceedings were vitiated by fraudulent misrepresentation and (iv) the entire suit was an abuse of Court process. The answer to some of the above issues lies in the case of Duchess of Kingston’s Case (1775-1802) All E.R. Rep.623 where De Grey C.J., held in the House of Lord at pages 629 to 630 that:
“…Although it is not permitted to show that the Court was mistaken, it may be shown that they were misled. Fraud is an extrinsic, collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of Courts of justice. Lord Coke says, it avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal. In civil suits all strangers may falsify, for covin, either fines, or real or feigned recoveries; and even a recovery by a just title, if collusion was practiced to prevent a fair defence; and this, whether the covin is apparent upon the record, as not essoining, or not demanding the view, or by suffering judgment by confession or default; or extrinsic, as not pleading a release, collateral warranty, or other advantageous pleas…
In the proceedings of the ecclesiastical Court the same rule holds. In Dyer there is an instance of a second administration, fraudulently obtained, to defeat an execution at law against the first; and the fact being admitted by demurrer, the Court pronounced against the fraudulent administration. In another instance, an administration had been fraudulently revoked; and the fact being denied, issue was joined upon it; and the collusion being found by a jury, the Court gave judgment against it.
In the more modern cases, the question seems to have been, whether the parties should be permitted to prove collusion; and not seeming to doubt but that strangers might. So that collusion, being a matter extrinsic of the cause, may be imputed by a stranger, and tried by a jury, and determined by the Court of temporal jurisdiction.
If fraud will vitiate the judicial acts of the temporal Courts, there seems as much reason to prevent the mischiefs arising from collusion in the ecclesiastical Courts, which, from the nature of their proceedings, are at least as much exposed, and which we find have been, in fact, as much exposed, to be practiced upon for sinister purposes, as the Courts in Westminster Hall…”
It seems to me therefore if there is an allegation that a party in the lower Court obtained judgment by fraud or collusion, an Appeal Court can grant leave that fresh evidence or argument should be raised on appeal which, if proved, may vitiate the entire judgment or proceedings. Moreover, one of the issues raised involves the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the subject matter in dispute. This issue was not raised in the lower Court to enable the learned trial Judge to pronounce on it. Indeed, the issue of jurisdiction could not have been raised in the lower Court because the facts/documents that could have been utilized to raise the argument came to the knowledge of the appellant only after judgment was delivered, and in the course of interlocutory applications in the Court of Appeal by the 5th respondent. Therefore, leave of this Court is required to raise the issue of jurisdiction and to incorporate same in the additional grounds of appeal. See Oshatoba vs. Olujitan (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt.655) 159 at 172 paragraphs “B”-“D”; Ajibade vs. Pedro (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt.241) 257 at 262; Arowolo vs. Adimula (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt.212) 753. Moreover, the Court of Appeal granted an order for the joinder of Sir Emeka Offor as the 5th respondent in this appeal. There is the need to amend the Notice of Appeal to reflect the joinder and the proper parties. This will also necessitate the filing of a new brief of argument. See Order 18 rule 3(1) and (3) of the Rules.
Leave is therefore granted the appellant to file and argue additional grounds of appeal and to amend the brief of argument in line with the prayers in the motion paper. For avoidance of doubt, I grant reliefs 1(i)-(vi); 2-4(i)-(iv) and 5-7 on the motion paper in favour of the appellant/applicant. The appellant/applicant is entitled to N50,000.00 cost against the 1st and 5th respondents.
ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA, J.C.A.: I have had the opportunity of reading before now, the lead judgment of my learned brother Tur JCA, just delivered, to which I entirely agree with. Clearly, the joining of the 5th respondent as a party in this appeal, during its pendency, and the facts which came to light after the judgment of the trial court was delivered on the 17th of May 2012, are such that fresh issues and additional evidence would have to be adduced. There is also the necessity to amend the Notice of Appeal and grounds, to reflect the joinder and the additional grounds 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. Such amendment would therefore entail the amendment of the briefs so that the comprehensive issues would be addressed, especially the issues of jurisdiction and the alleged collusion.
The judicial system in this country recognises that jurisdiction goes to the root of the competence of a court to adjudicate upon a matter and as such, it is crucial to allow litigants to raise the issue at any state of the proceedings of a court. Once a court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a matter, then a solid foundation is laid, and other things would be built upon. But once there is lack of jurisdiction, then any decision or order made by a court in respect of the subject matter, would be a nullity and so a complete waste of the precious time of the court.
We therefore need to be addressed as to whether the trial court here, had the jurisdiction to entertain the matter as presented or not.
I therefore allow the appeal also, and I abide by the Orders made in the lead judgment, including the Order as to costs.
MOORE A. A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A.: I read before now the ruling just delivered by my learned brother, Joseph Tine Tur, JCA. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion of my learned brother.
In an application to adduce fresh or additional evidence on appeal, the following conditions must be satisfied by an applicant:
(a) The evidence sought to be adduced must be such as could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial;
(b) The evidence should be such as if adduced would have an important effect on the whole case; and
(c) The evidence must be credible in the sense that it is capable of believed.”
See: Comfort Asaboro v. N. G. D. Aruwji & Anor (1974) All NLR 127; Ogbatan v. Awudu (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt.829) 451 and Ilorin South Local Government v. Michael Sunday Afolabi (2003) 6 NWLR (Pt.846) 274.
The appellant/applicant amply satisfied the conditions required for granting an application of this nature.
It is for these reasons and the very comprehensive and elaborate reasons given by my learned brother that I also grant appellant/applicant’s application as it is very meritorious.
I abide by the order as to costs.
Appearances
Paul Eroko, SAN, S. I. Ameh, SAN, Femi Falana, SAN, Adams Imuekemhe, Esq., Okwudili Anozie, Esq., Liborous Oshoma, Esq., Samuel Ogale, Esq., A.G. Negedu, Esq., Michael Ajara, Esq., Ifeyinwa Arum (Miss), Esq., Kingsley Odey, Esq., Jamila Jubril (Miss), Esq., B. A. Gbadeyan, Esq., Chinonso Anozie, Esq., Victoria Agu (Miss), Esq., Z. Akubo, Esq., Olakutan Olatigbe (Miss), Esq., F. U. Emmanuel, Esq. – for the Appellant/ApplicantFor Appellant
AND
Chief U. N. Udechukwu, SAN, Abimbola Kayode, Esq., J. C. Njikonye, Esq., Olarewaji Salawu, Esq., Olatunyi Ikpegbu (Mrs), Esq., Nkechi Aniebonam (Miss), Esq. – For 1st & 5th Respondents
E.M. Asawalam, Esq. – For 2nd and 3rd Respondents.
Yakubo Madeh, Esq. with Miss Vallari Aaron – For 4th Respondent.For Respondent
