IHENACHO NKEM v. THE STATE OF LAGOS
(2018)LCN/12267(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Monday, the 10th day of December, 2018
CA/L/802C/2017
RATIO
CRIMINAL LAW: ELEMENTS OF MANSLAUGHTER
“The essential elements of the offence of manslaughter which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt are: 1. That the deceased had died. 2. That the killing was unlawful. 3. That the death of the deceased was caused by the act of the accused. 4. That the accused unlawfully killed the deceased under one of the six circumstances enumerated in Section 316 of the Criminal Code. See Edoho v. State (2004) 5 NWLR Part 865 17 @ 22 cited by learned counsel to the Prosecution.”PER TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A.
APPEAL: WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT CAN INTEREFER WITH THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
“The law is well settled to the effect that the appellate Court does not interfere with findings of facts made by a trial Court if such findings are supported by evidence on record. Adegboyega Ibikunle v. The State (2007) 1 S.C.N.J. 207; Oguonzee v. The State (1998) LPELR -2357 ( SC); (1998) 5 NWLR (pt.551) 521; Durugo v. The State (1992) 7 NWLR (pt.255) 525 @ 535; (1992) 9 S.C.N.J.46. Therefore, the findings of the learned trial judge reproduced above, which in my considered opinion, are unassailable, are hereby affirmed by me.” PER TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: BURDEN OF PROOF
“The law has remained well settled to the effect that the burden of proof in criminal cases rests squarely on the prosecution to prove the case against an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. Hence it is statutorily provided in Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 that: ‘If the commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding, civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.'” PER TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: WAYS TO PROVE EVIDENCE
“The burden of proof on the Prosecution is to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. See S. 138 of the Evidence Act 2011, Williams v. State (1992) NWLR (pt. 261) 515, Ogundiyan v. The State (1991) (pt. 181) 519. There are three ways to prove the guilt of an accused, they are: 1.By the confessional statement of the accused person. 2.Circumstantial evidence. 3.Evidence of eyewitnesses to the crime. I shall now evaluate the evidence before the Court in the light of the above laid down elements and ways to prove the guilt accused person.” PER TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
IHENACHO NKEM Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE OF LAGOS Respondent(s)
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
The appellant was arraigned and prosecuted for the offence of Involuntary Manslaughter of his wife, Regina Ihenacho, on 23rd April, 2013, contrary to Section 222 of the Criminal Law of Lagos State. The prosecution called three witnesses and in his defence, the appellant testified for himself and called one witness who testified for him. At the end of the trial, learned counsel for the parties filed and exchanged their written addresses which were adopted before the learned trial judge, at the Lagos State High Court, Holden in Ikeja Judicial Division. In his judgment, delivered on 13th March, 2017, the learned trial judge found the appellant guilty, convicted and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. The appellant, piqued with the judgment against him filed a Notice of Appeal, containing ten grounds of appeal, on 21st April, 2017.
In order to activate the prosecution of the appeal, the appellant was armed with the appellant’s brief of argument, dated and filed on 4th August, 2017. It was prepared by A. J. Owonikoko, Esq., SAN., Spurgeon Ataene, Oluwashola Keshinro, T.P. Olatunde – Fashogbon and R.A. Wosu. The respondent’s brief of argument, settled by O.A. Olugasa, which was dated 17th October, 2017 and filed on 23 October, 2017, was deemed filed by the Court at the hearing of the appeal, on 18th November, 2018. The appellant’s reply brief, dated and filed on 23rd March, 2018, was deemed filed on 18th November, 2018.
The appellant’s learned senior counsel, nominated four issues for the determination of the appeal. They are, to wit:
1. Whether the Trial Court rightly discountenanced and expunged the uncontested evidence in chief of the Original PW2 and accredited the contradictory evidence of a substitute investigation Police Officer (New PW2) to convict the Appellant for Involuntary Manslaughter.
2. Whether the Trial Court rightly admitted and relied on medical and photographic evidence proffered by prosecution in convicting the Appellant.
3. Whether there was sufficient and substantial evidence before the Trial Court to enable the Trial Court reach a justifiable conclusion that the treatment allegedly meted out the Appellant to the Deceased caused her caused her death.
4. Whether in the circumstances of the case and evidence before Trial Court, the sentence imposed on the Appellant was excessive.
The respondent’s learned counsel, adopted the same issues listed above, for the determination of the appeal. In my consideration and determination of the appeal, I adopt issues 3 and 4. Therefore, the two issues are re-couched and re-numbered, thus:
1. Whether there was sufficient and substantial evidence before the trial Court to enable it reach a justifiable conclusion that the death of the deceased Regina Ihenacho, was caused by the appellant.
2. Whether in the circumstances of the case, the sentence imposed on the appellant, was excessive.
This, I have the discretionary power to do. Okereke v. The State (2016) LPELR – 26059 – (SC); Kayode v. The State (2016) LPELR – 40028 (SC); The State v. Abdullahi Sani (2018) 1 S.C.N.J. 257 @ 282.
A brief recap of the learned senior counsel to the appellant’s submissions are that the learned trial judge took into consideration, extraneous matters, relied on inadmissible evidence, failed to apply the necessary presumptions available to the appellant, made perverse findings not borne out of the evidence placed before him and wrongly concluded that the prosecution, had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant. And that the conviction and sentence slammed on the appellant, in the circumstances, is unwarranted. He urged that the appeal be allowed and the conviction with the sentence passed on the appellant, be set aside. However he argued in the alternative to the effect that if the conviction of the appellant, is sustained, then the sentence imposed on him should be reduced. He referred to several authorities, such as Adebiyi v. The State (2016) 8 NWLR (pt. 1515) 459 @ 474, Ibeh v. The State (1997) 1 NWLR (pt. 484) 632 @ 650, Sale v. The State (2016) 3 NWLR (pt. 1499) 392 @ 423 amongst others.
On his part, the respondent’s learned counsel, submitted that it is trite law that the guilt of an accused person may be proved by confessional statement(s); circumstantial evidence or by direct evidence from eyewitnesses to the commission of the offence. He placed reliance on Ikechukwu Okoh v. The State (2008) LPELR- CA/A/185/06. He further submitted that there was sufficient evidence proffered and placed before the Court below, which it relied upon to convict the appellant. He insisted that the findings made by the learned trial judge were borne out of the pieces of evidence placed before him and that no inadmissible evidence nor any extraneous matter was relied upon by the learned trial judge in convicting the appellant. He was emphatic in his submission to the effect that the learned trial judge properly evaluated the evidence placed before him and thereby came to the right decision that the prosecution’s case against the appellant, was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Resolution:
The Information upon which the appellant was charged and arraigned for prosecution at the Court below is that:
“IHENACHO NKEM (M) is charged with the following offence
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE
Involuntary Manslaughter Contrary to Section 222 of the Criminal Law of Lagos State 2011
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
IHENACHO NKEM (M) on the 23rd day of April 2013, at about 2200hrs at No. 3, Calvary Close, Mbeno Shashi Lagos, in the Lagos Judicial Division did unlawfully kill one Regina Ihenacho ( F).”
The law has remained well settled to the effect that the burden of proof in criminal cases rests squarely on the prosecution to prove the case against an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. Hence it is statutorily provided in Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 that:
“If the commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding, civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.”
There are a basket full of decided authorities of the Supreme Court and this Court which gave judicial stamp of imprimatur to the above statutory provision of the Evidence Act. Just a few of those authorities, will suffice.The State v. Sani (2018) 1 S.C.N.J. 257 @ 285; Henry Chukwu v. The State (2013) 4 NWLR (pt.1343) 1 @ 15; Mbang v. The State (2012) 6 S.C.N.J.395; Chukwuma v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2011) 13 NWLR ( pt. 1264) 391 @ 408; Ebeinwe v. The State (2011) LPELR – 985 (SC).
In the instant case, the learned trial judge, at pages 182 to 183 of the record of appeal, correctly stated the requirements for the prove by the prosecution, of the offence of involuntary manslaughter upon which the appellant was arraigned, prosecuted , convicted and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. This is how his Lordship approached it, to wit:
“Section 222 of the Criminal Law of Lagos State pursuant to which the Defendant stands charged provides as follows:-
A person who unlawfully kills another in circumstances which does not constitute murder is guilty of manslaughter if he causes death:
(1) By an unlawful and dangerous act; or
(2) With gross negligence or reckless disregard for human life.?
The essential elements of the offence of manslaughter which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt are:
1. That the deceased had died.
2. That the killing was unlawful.
3. That the death of the deceased was caused by the act of the accused.
4. That the accused unlawfully killed the deceased under one of the six circumstances enumerated in Section 316 of the Criminal Code?.
See Edoho v. State (2004) 5 NWLR Part 865 17 @ 22 cited by learned counsel to the Prosecution.
Manslaughter is the unintentional killing of a human being, such a killing is not permitted but accidental, in the sense that it is not intentional. SeeEjeka v. State (2003) 7 NWLR Part 819 p. 408 (SC).
The burden of proof on the Prosecution is to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. See S. 138 of the Evidence Act 2011, Williams v. State (1992) NWLR (pt. 261) 515, Ogundiyan v. The State (1991) (pt. 181) 519.
There are three ways to prove the guilt of an accused, they are:
1.By the confessional statement of the accused person.
2.Circumstantial evidence
3.Evidence of eyewitnesses to the crime.
I shall now evaluate the evidence before the Court in the light of the above laid down elements and ways to prove the guilt accused person.
(1)That the deceased died.
The Prosecution were able to prove the death of the deceased Regina Ihenacho by the evidence of the PW1, her sister, who saw the body of the deceased. PW 2, the IPO, from State CID, Panti who visited the residence of the deceased and took corpse of the deceased to the mortuary where it was deposited and took photographs of the corpse – Exhibit P4 (a), (B), (c), (d), (e) & (e) as well as the testimony of PW3, the consultant pathologist who conducted post mortem examination of the deceased after the corpse was identified as being that of Regina Ihenancho.
The first ingredient is therefore established.”
I agree entirely with his Lordship. Now, was it the appellant, who killed his wife – Regina Ihenacho? The determination of the complicity of the appellant in this matter is most crucial. The PW1, was the star witness for the prosecution. She was the younger sister of the deceased Regina and lived in the same house with her and the appellant and the two children of the couple. She was at home on the fateful evening of 24th April, 2013 when her sister returned into the house and begged her to plead with the appellant, not to kill her – the deceased. That the appellant had returned into the house before the deceased and had asked about his useless wife. She further testified to the fact that on the return of Regina into the house, the appellant apparently angry, went out, to his car and brought out cable wire with which he started flogging the wife – Regina, who defecated twice on herself. And that even though Regina pleaded with the appellant to take her to the hospital, the latter refused. He instead later took her to the bathroom to bathe and massage her, but all that was to no avail because Regina had passed off and died.
The appellant, in his defence denied beating his wife, but that she was beaten by 419ers, fraudsters whom she was a victim of earlier in the day and who hypnotized her, forced her to take some concoctions and thereafter, took her to a United Bank for Africa from where she withdrew the sum of N200, 000 and gave it to them before they took her away and later dropped her off by a road side. He also testified to the fact that upon the return of his wife into the house at about 11.32pm on the fateful late evening, she staggered into his arms, vomited blood, so he had to carry her to the bathroom and clean her up and in the process; he observed some red marks on her back. He also said that she defecated on the long chair. Furthermore, the appellant testified to the fact that when he wanted to take Regina to the hospital, she refused and said that she would be fine, so he massaged her with Aboniki balm, gave her Ibrofem and took her to the room where he laid her down and sat down watching her. However, according to him, he discovered in the morning at about 7am that she was no longer breathing and he tried to resuscitate her, to no avail. He had to inform his father and his friend- DW2, of the trouble in his hand.
In his evaluation of the pieces of evidence proffered before him, the learned trial judge believed the account of the events of the fateful evening as narrated by the PW1 and not that by the appellant. At pages 185-187 of the record of appeal, he did the evaluation thus:
“Learned counsel to the Defendant submitted severally in his written address that from the evidence of the PW3, the consultant pathologist and Exhibit P. 2, the statement of PW1 and the testimony of the Defendant/DW1 that the deceased?s death was a result of concoctions she drank during her ordeal with fraudsters.
PW1 stated in her testimony that when she was leaving home the next morning after the deceased had died, the Defendant told her that if anyone asks who flogged my sister, I should say it is 419. She stated under cross examination that the deceased did not explain the issue of 419 to her as ?she did see her enter.”
In her statement recorded at State CID Exhibit P2, she stated in part as follows:
:It was on 24/4/2013 at about 20.00hrs, I was in the house when my sister Regina Edet came back and was overhearing my sister Late Regina Edet crying and begging her husband, Ihenancho Nkemakolom that he should please not kill her, that it was 419 people that collected the money from her, but the husband Ihenancho refused and went to his car and brought out a cable wire and started flogging her”.
Contrary to the submission of learned counsel to the Defendant, the Court does not find any contradiction in the testimony of PW1, regarding the issue of 419. Contrary to the submission of learned counsel, PW1 never denied knowledge of 419. She testified that the deceased did not explain the issue of 419 to her and this was what she stated in her statement recorded at the Police station when she said she overheard the deceased telling her husband that it was 419 people that collected the money from her. There was no evidence before the Court that the deceased was poisoned, PW3, the pathologist gave no such evidence neither was any elicited under cross examination. Also whilst PW3 testified that the Deceased sustained Injuries from flogging on her Arms, Abdomen, thigh and groin, the Defendant stated in his statement and testimony that the deceased sustained injuries on her back, that he saw red marks on her back. The Court finds this evidence to be unbelievable and it did not contradict the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses.
The Court finds the evidence before it that it was established that the death of the deceased was caused by the excessive flogging she received at the hands of the Defendant as witnessed by the PW1 and seen by the PW3 on the deceased’s body.
The excessive flogging of the deceased by the Defendant was clearly caused as a result of the money lost by the deceased to 419ers’s which the Defendant proceeded to punish her for.
The unlawful act here was the excessive flogging by the Defendant.
I did myself, painstakingly peruse the pieces of evidence proffered by the PW1 and PW 3 read together with Exhibit P2 vis-a- vis the evidence of the appellant – DW1 and I am satisfied with the thorough evaluation by the learned trial judge of those pieces of evidence. I did not see any perversity in his findings which were clearly borne out of those pieces of evidence placed before him.
The law is well settled to the effect that the appellate Court does not interfere with findings of facts made by a trial Court if such findings are supported by evidence on record. Adegboyega Ibikunle v. The State (2007) 1 S.C.N.J. 207; Oguonzee v. The State (1998) LPELR -2357 ( SC); (1998) 5 NWLR (pt.551) 521; Durugo v. The State (1992) 7 NWLR (pt.255) 525 @ 535; (1992) 9 S.C.N.J.46. Therefore, the findings of the learned trial judge reproduced above, which in my considered opinion, are unassailable, are hereby affirmed by me.
Let me say a word with respect to the contention of appellant’s learned senior counsel, touching on the expunged evidence of the former PW2,- Inspector Emmanuel Mbilla, one of the Police Investigating Officers in this case, who initially gave evidence, but could no longer be procured by the prosecution, to complete his evidence. It was the repeated unavailability of the said witness and when the trial of the case got stalled on that account, that the other Investigating Police Officer in the case, testified as the new PW2. Thereafter, on the application of the Prosecution, which was not opposed by the appellant’s counsel at the trial, the learned trial judge expunged the former PW2’s inconclusive evidence from the record. That was what happened at the proceedings of 4th May, 2015 at page 102 of the record of appeal. Where is the alleged fault of the learned trial judge in the said inconclusive evidence of the former PW2, having been expunged at the instance of the prosecution which was consented to by the appellant’s counsel?
I see no fault with the expurgation by the learned trial judge, of the former PW 2’s inconclusive evidence, in the circumstances. I also considered the learned senior counsel’s submission that the evidence placed before the Court below was scanty, in other words, that there is no reasonably sufficient evidence upon which the appellant was convicted by the learned trial judge. It is the law and it has remained well settled that the prosecution is not obliged to call a host of witnesses in order to prove a charge against an accused person, if in its opinion, the evidence of a sole witness would suffice to prove its case. Therefore, as a matter of law, the evidence of a single witness, if believed, as that of the PW1, in the instant case, can effectively establish, even a case of murder. Bello Shurumo v. The State (2010) 12 S.C.N.J. 47 @ 59; Usufu v. The State (2007) 3 NWLR ( pt.1020) 94; Garko v. The State (2006) 6 NWLR (pt.977) 524; Effiong v. The State (1998) 8 NWLR (pt.562) 362; Obue v. The State (1976) 2 S.C.141, Sunday Modupe v. The State (1988) 4 NWLR (pt. 87) 130 @ 137.
The principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, in criminal trials, was espoused by his Lordship, Mohammed, J.S.C. (as he then was) in Chukwuma v. FRN (2011) 13 N.W.L.R. (pt. 1264) 391 @ 408, thus:
“The burden of proof in our adversarial system of criminal Justice is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. In the process, the requirement of the law is that the prosecution has the duty to prove all the essential elements of an offence as contained in the charge. The law places the burden on the prosecution to produce vital material evidence and witnesses to testify during the proceedings before a trial Court comes to the conclusion that an offence had been committed by an accused person. The prosecution does not require a magic wand in order to attain to its proof to be beyond reasonable doubt. All the prosecution is required to do simply is put forward to the Court, evidence which is so strong, compelling and convincing against the accused such that it leaves no reasonable man in doubt as to the probability of the accused person, committing the alleged offence.”
In the instant case, I am of the considered and firm opinion that the evidence of the prosecution?s star witness, the PW1, is not only very strong, but also compelling and convincing as to the fact that it was the appellant who flogged the late Regina to death. The evidence proffered by the appellant, except for his denial of flogging the late Regina on the fateful evening, in most respects, are in agreement and tandem with that of the PW1. For example, both of them are agreed as to the fact that the deceased defecated involuntarily on herself and that the appellant took her to the bathroom to clean her up and even massaged her body before returning her to the living room. Now, what could have caused the late Regina to have defecated on herself as she did on the fateful night? Could it not have been because of the tortuous flogging she received from the hand of the appellant?
I am in agreement with the inference drawn by the learned trial judge, to the effect that it was the dastardly flogging of Regina by the appellant with cable wire, which pissed and passed her off, that she involuntarily defecated on herself. To my mind, no reasonable tribunal, would have believed the cock and bull story by the appellant to the effect that it was some fraudsters, who beat up Regina earlier in the day. I am satisfied that the PW3?s evidence which revealed the injuries sustained by Regina on her arms, abdomen, thigh and groin had taken the wind out of the sails, of the appellant?s narration. It is said that nothing can be said and done against the truth, but for the truth. The appellant was simply an untruthful and callous wife barterer. Indeed, his dastardly torture of his wife to death, smacks of a madding aggressiveness. His intemperate and irrational action on the fateful night, was no less than the action of an incensed aggressor!
The learned senior counsel to the appellant, furthermore submitted that there is no conclusive evidence by the Consultant Pathologist- the PW 3, as to the cause of death.
The learned trial judge had found that from the evidence of PW3, the manner of death was conclusive, but not the cause of death. He however held at page 187 of the record of appeal, that:
“Where medical evidence is inconclusive, the law entitles the Court to examine and draw necessary influences from the evidence. See Edoho v. State (2004) 5 NWLR Part 685 p. 17 @25.”
I am in complete agreement with his Lordship. The law is well settled that medical report as to cause of death is not indispensable and hence not sine qua non, in all cases of murder or culpable homicide. Therefore, a Court can infer the cause of death from the evidence and circumstances of the case at hand. So, where the cause of death is obvious from the circumstances of the case, which is believed and satisfactory to the trial Court, medical report/evidence as to cause of death then becomes dispensable. John Ogbu & Anor v. The State (2007) 2 S.C.N.J. 319 @ 341; Oforlete v. The State (2000) 7 S.C.N.J. 162; Bwashi v. The State (1992) 6 S.C. 93; Lori v. The State (1980) 8-11 S.C. 81.
In the circumstances of the instant case, the PW1, gave satisfactory evidence to the effect that on the fateful night of the incident which culminated in the death of her sister, the late Regina, that it was the appellant who flogged her with cable wire to the extent that she involuntarily defecated twice, on herself and the fact that she was carried by the appellant to the bathroom and cleaned up, who also massaged her and rubbed a local ointment on her body, which the appellant admitted, except the fact that he said, he did not beat her with cable wire; coupled with the PW 3’s evidence that there were lacerations and abrasions on the two arms and abdomen, 4 injuries on the left arm and 4 on the right arm, 2 injuries on the abdomen and 2 in the groin and an abrasion on the thigh of the late Regina. Furthermore, the PW 3 found a portion peeling of the skin and also laceration, a cut by a blunt object on the deceased body. He said that he “found the cause of death as as-physical”. He was emphatic when he concluded his evidence in chief at page 116 of the record of appeal, that:
“The marks on the deceased body from violence can also cause as-physical death.”
My Lords, I do not know what else that was expected to be heard from the PW 3, that he did not say as to the cause of death of the deceased Regina. Therefore, I am clearly at one and on the same page with the learned trial judge, that it was the flogging of the late Regina, and the injuries she sustained therefrom, at the hand of the appellant, which caused her death. To hold otherwise, to my mind, would be tantamount to a person looking to see the legs of a snake that crawls on the ground, but does not walk on the unseen legs! I am of the considered and firm opinion that the prosecution’s case was proved beyond reasonable doubt, against the appellant.
With respect to the appellant’s learned senior counsel’s contention to the effect that the sentence imposed on the appellant, by the learned trial judge, is excessive and that it ought to be reduced by this Court, the law is well settled and trite that this being an appellate Court, it does not ordinarily interfere with and tamper with the exercise of discretion by a trial Court, on a sentence imposed on a convict, unless it is shown that the vexed sentence is manifestly excessive in the circumstances or wrong in principle. In Adeyeye v. The State (1968) 1 ALL NLR 239 @ 241, the revered learned Law Lord, Adetokunbo Ademola, CJN., admonished that:
“It is only where a sentence appears to err in principle, that this Court will alter it.
If a sentence is excessive or inadequate, to such an extent as to satisfy this Court that when it was passed there was failure to apply the right principles, then this Court will intervene.”
Further see: Blessing Toyin Omokuwajo v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2013) LPELR- 20184 (SC); Henry Odeh v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2008) 13 NWLR (pt. 1103) 1; (2008) LPELR – 2205 ( SC); Karumi v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2016) LPELR- 40473 (CA).
In the instant case, the appellant has not demonstrated that the sentence imposed on him by the learned trial judge was in error or that it was on a wrong principle. The contention that the learned trial judge was wrong when he relied on his knowledge and preconception as regards the prevalence of domestic violence in the country while imposing the sentence in question on the appellant, is unmeritorious and misconceived. It has no basis in law. The learned trial judge was eminently entitled to and had the power, as he rightly did, by starting the factor which influenced his decision in the exercise of his discretion when he imposed the sentence of 15 years imprisonment on the appellant. Iortim v. The State (1997) 2 NWLR (pt.490) 711; Peter Ushie v. The State (2012) LPELR- 9705 (CA).
In sum, the two issues discussed in this appeal, are each resolved against the appellant. The appeal has no onions. It is bereft of merits and consequently dismissed. The judgment rendered by R.I.B. Adebiyi, J., of the Lagos State High Court of Justice, Ikeja Judicial Division, on 13th March, 2017 in re-charge No: LCD/337/2013, is hereby affirmed. The conviction of the appellant and the sentence imposed upon him are affirmed, accordingly.
BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.:I had the privilege of reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, JCA just delivered with which I agree and adopt as mine. I have nothing more to add.
ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege in draft, the leading judgment just delivered by my learned brother TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, JCA and I agree with the reasoning and conclusion contained therein.
The events culminating in the trial of the Appellant at the lower Court is undoubtedly an unfortunate one. The facts on record shows the disheartening end to the life of the deceased, who was not only defrauded by fraudsters but was fatally punished by the Appellant, her husband, who callously battered and dastardly flogged her with cable wire. The law is well settled that any person who causes the death of another is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, as the evidence will show that the killing of the deceased is not pre-meditated but accidental. It presupposes the unintentional but unlawful killing of the deceased. See FAMAKINWA v STATE (2016) LPELR – 40104 (SC); APUGO v STATE (2006) LPELR – 25391 (SC); NJOKU v STATE (2012) LPELR – 20608 (SC).
The evidence of PW1, the deceased sister is material, compelling and sufficient on the fact that the death of the deceased was caused by the excessive flogging levelled on her by the Appellant. The duty of the prosecution is to prove the offence of manslaughter, the Appellant was charged with, against reasonable doubt and this can be done through a single witness. The law is long settled that a trial Court can rely on the evidence of a sole witness and convict an accused on such evidence, where it is credible, as there is no rule of law or practice mandating the prosecution to call a particular number of witness(es) in proof of the guilt of an accused person. SeeESENE v STATE (2017) LPELR – 41912 (SC); OSAREREN v FRN (2018) LPELR 43839.
After reviewing the evidence on record, the grounds contained in the notice of appeal, as well as the issues formulated by counsel in this appeal and the arguments canvassed by the respective counsel, I come to the conclusion, in the same term as the leading judgment, that the appeal lacks merit. I have no cause to disturb the conviction and sentence of the Appellant by the trial Court. The appeal is hereby dismissed.
Appearances:
A. J. Owonikoko, SAN with him, Sholanke Keshinro, Esq., A. Ezemba, Esq. & Miss T.Y. Odusote
For Appellant(s)
Y.A. Sule, Esq. (Principal State Counsel, Min. of Justice, Lagos State)For Respondent(s)
