IBE v. OKONKWO & ANOR (2020)

IBE v. OKONKWO & ANOR

(2020)LCN/14126(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, April 17, 2020

CA/A/691/2013

Before Our Lordships:

Abdu Aboki Justice of the Court of Appeal

Stephen Jonah Adah Justice of the Court of Appeal

Peter Olabisi Ige Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

CHIJIOKE C. IBE APPELANT(S)

And

1. LOUIS OKONKWO (Doing Business Under The Name And Style Of Castle Estate) 2. MRS FUNMI FLORA OBANDO RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

THE CONCEPT OF LOCUS STANDI

The locus standi or standing to sue is a principle evolved or designed to ward off litigants or those who are mere jesters who have no genuine complaints or justiciable action from the hallowed precincts of our Courts or Tribunals. Some persons approach the Court this days in matters in which they have no iota or jot of interest thus abusing the Court process of Court. It is put in place to curb or terminate an action initiated by interlopers. See SUNDAY ADEGBITE TAIWO VS. SERAH ADEGBORO & ANOR (2011) 11 NWLR (PT. 1259) 562 AT 572 F-H where RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC said:-
“Locus standi means standing to sue or competence of a party to sue. An objection to a plaintiff’s locus standi attacks his competence to sue as to whether he has any legal or equitable interest to protect. The rule about locus standi developed primarily to protect the Courts from being used as playground by professional litigants, or and meddlesome interlopers, busy bodies who really hove no real stake or interest in the subject matter or the litigation.”
An objection that a person has no locus standi to institute, maintain an action or a matter is a direct challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court or a Tribunal to entertain the action or the suit. The legal concept of standing or locus standi predicated on the postulate or pedestal that a person whose civil rights and obligations have not been affected or likely to be affected on any subject matter has no right to approach the Court for redress or remedy in any suit or action. See PACERS MULTI DYNAMICS LTD VS. THE M. V. “DANCING SISTER” & ANOR (2012) 1 SCM 128 at 142G -I to 143 A per RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC.
A Court or Tribunal is by the connotation and denotation of locus standi enjoined to strictly ensure that a claimant before it possesses capacity or legal competence to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal to adjudicate upon such matter. See the cases of:-
1. ADEKOLA MUSTAPHA V CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION (2019) 7 (PT. 2) SCM 114 AT 124H TO 125 A – H per OKORO, JSC who said:-
“The concept of locus standi denotes legal capacity to maintain an action in a Court of law. It is a party’s standing to sue or competence of a party to sue. Whenever a party’s standing to sue is in issue or is challenged in a case, the question to be determined is whether the person whose standing is in issue is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable. See Olowosago V. Adebanjo (1988) 4 NWLR (pt 88) 275, Oloriode V. Oyebi (1984) 1 SCNLR 390, Adesanya V. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor (1981) 5 SC 112. To say that a person has no locus standi means that he has no right to appear or be heard in such and such a proceeding. See Earl Jowitt: Dictionary of English Law, page 1110. Put more succinctly, the word “locus is a derivative of Latin, literally denoting the place or position where something exists or is done. In legal parlance, the term locus standi (a place of standing) denotes the right of a person to bring an action or to be heard in a given forum, especially a Court or tribunal. See Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition 2004 at 960. This Court has done a lot of work in making this principle clear and simple to every discerning mind. In Inakoju & 17 Ors V. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 SC (pt 1) page 1 at 85-86 paragraphs 40 – 45, (2007) 1 SCM, 1 this Court, per Tobi, JSC (of blessed memory) defined Locus Standi in the following words:-
“Locus Standi or standing is the legal right of a party to an action to be heard in litigation before a Court of law or Tribunal. The term entails the legal capacity of instituting or commencing an action in a competent Court of law or Tribunal without any inhibition, obstruction or hindrance from any person or body whatsoever.”
In order to determine whether a plaintiff has the locus standi or standing/capacity to sue, it is resolved by perusing the plaintiffs statement of claim or affidavit in support of an Originating summons which defines the extent of the plaintiffs cause of action. Like jurisdiction, locus standi is a threshold issue which must be taken and determined at the earliest opportunity. In Attorney General of Anambra State V. Attorney General of Federation (2007) 5 – 6 SC 192 at 280 – 281, this Court threw some more light on a party who is endowed with locus standi or capacity sue thus;-
“What I am minded to emphasize upon here is that no other person excepting the person on whom is vested the aggregate of the enforceable rights in a cause has the standing to sue. And so the point must be made that where a person has brought an action claiming a relief which on the facts of the matter is referable to another as in this matter, then cannot succeed for want of locus standi simply because there is no dispute between them.”
2. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF CROSS RIVER STATE VS FRN & ANOR (2019) (PT. 3) SCM 1 AT 31H TO 32 A – E per ARIWOOLA, JSC who said:-
“Generally, in Nigeria, it is a constitutional requirement that in order to enable a person maintain an action before a Court or Tribunal, and this is limited to the prosecution of matters relating to the civil rights and obligations of the plaintiff, be that plaintiff a person, a group of persons, a statutory body, a government, an authority or any other juristic person, there must exist in such plaintiff the standing to sue. In other words, standing will only be accorded to a plaintiff who shows that his civil rights and obligations have or are in danger of being violated or adversely affected by the act complained of. See; Section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended); Adesanya vs. The President of Nigeria (supra); Kayode Bakare Ors vs. Ajose-Adeogun & Ors (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1403) 320; (2014) 1 SCNJ 255; (2014) All FWLR (Pt.737) 611.
Ordinarily, when a party’s standing to sue is in issue, in on action, the question that arises is whether the person whose standing is being challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue but not whether the issue is indeed justiceable. See; Buraimoh Oloriode & Ors vs. Oyebi & Ors (1984) 5 SC 16: (1984) SC NLR 390.
It is trite law that it is only the person in whom is vested the aggregate of the enforceable rights in a cause that has the standing to sue. Therefore, where a person commences an action to claim a relief which on the facts of the matter is enforceable to another person, then the former person cannot succeed, for want of locus standi. The reason being that there is no dispute between them. In the instant case, the facts deposed to in the affidavits filed in support of the Originating Summons did not show that the plaintiff had vested in it any enforceable right to s the defendants. See; Oloriode vs. Oyebi (Supra): Egolum vs. Obasanjo (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt.611) 423: A.G Anambra Vs. A.G Federation (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1047) 4 at 94, (2007) 12 SCM (Pt.1), 1.”
The law thus enjoins the Court to examine the Statement of Claim where the action is begun by Writ of Summons or where the Suit commenced vide Originating Summons the Affidavit in Support of Originating Summons in order to determine whether the Plaintiffs have locus standi to institute the action herein. The issue of locus standi has nothing to do with the merit of the case or whether the Plaintiffs have the chance to succeed at the trial, It is an issue of jurisdiction. See MR. SUNDAY ADEGBITE TAIWO VS. SERAH ADEGBORO & ANOR (2011) 11 NWLR (PART 1259) 562 AT 599 H TO 580 A – B per RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC who held:-
“A Plaintiff satisfies the Court that he has locus standi if he is able to show that his civil right and obligations have been or are in danger of being infringed. There must be a nexus between the claimant and the disclosed cause of action concerning his rights or obligations and locus standi is determined by examining only the Statement of Claim. Furthermore, in determining whether a party has locus standi the chances that the action may not succeed is an irrelevant consideration.” PER IGE, J.C.A.

THE TESTS IN DETERMINING THE LOCUS STANDI OF A PARTY

I have closely examined the entire Further Amended Statement of Claim particularly the paragraphs set out above and I am of the solemn view that the Respondents have sufficient interest in the land in dispute meaning that their rights and obligations have been affected and threatened. They therefore have right and locus standi to institute and maintain the action leading to this appeal against the Appellant. See BARBUS & COMPANY (NIG) LTD & OR VS MRS GLADYS OYIBOKA OKAFOR-UDEJI (2018) 11 NWLR (PART 1630) 298 AT 311 F – G per OKORO, JSC who also held:-
“The expression “locus standi”, denotes legal capacity to institute proceedings in a Court of law. It is used interchangeably with terms like “standing” or “title to sue”. A person has locus standi to sue in an action if he is able to show to the satisfaction of the Court that his civil rights and obligations have been or are in danger of being infringed. There are two tests for determining if a person has locus standi. They are: –
1. The action must be justiciable.
2. There must be a dispute between the parties. There ought to be a liberal approach in applying the test. See Ojukwu V. Ojukwu & Anor (2008) 12 SC (Pt. 111) page 1, (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 439, Attorney General Kaduna State V. Hassan (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 8) 483, Adesanya V. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor (1981) 550 page 112, (1981) LPELR- 147 (SC); (1981) 2 NCLR 358, Thomas & Ors V. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669. Emezi V. Osuagwu & Ors (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 939) 340.” PER IGE, J.C.A.

PRINCIPLES IN THE DETERMINATION OF A NECESSARY PARTY TO A SUIT

This Court had laid down some guiding principles in the determination of a necessary party in a suit. I refer to the case of Carrena & Anor V. Arowolo & 2 Ors (2008) 6-7 SC (Pt.1) 66. (reported as Carrena V. Akinlase (2008) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1107) 262 at p. 280, paras. D-E) as follows:-
(i) that the presence of such party is necessary for the effectual adjudication of the matter in dispute:
(ii) that the plaintiff’s claim against the existing defendants also affects the party sought to be joined; and/or
(iii) that his interest is the same or identical with that of the existing defendants.
Indeed there is nothing that would change the situation of things in this instance being a boundary dispute between the Offa Community and the Erinlie Community, which dispute cannot be effectively determined by any Court in the absence of their traditional rulers who are the custodians of the land.”
3. ALHAJI BAPAKAT ALAFIA & ORS V. GBODE VENTURES NIG LTD & ORS (2016) 4 SCM 1 AT 16 H – I per GALADIMA, JSC. PER IGE, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF TITLE TO LAND MUST BE PROVEN ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PLAINTIFF CASE

It is true and trite that the Plaintiff in a case for declaration of title to land must rely on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence, There is an exception to the general principle of law relating to burden or onus of proof in a claim for declaration of title to land. See:-
1. MR AUDU OTUKPO V. APA JOHN & ANOR (2012) 7 NWLR (PART 1299) 357 AT 376 H – 377A per ONNOGHEN, JSC who said:-
“It is settled law that a Plaintiff in an action for declaration of title to land must succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defence though where the case of the defence support that of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff can take advantage of same in establishing his claim. See Woluchem V. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 294 Mogaji V. Cadbury Nig. Ltd (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 393.”
2. NELSON NWOSU ONWUGBUFOR & ORS V. HERBERT OKOYE & ORS (1996) per IGUH, JSC who said:-
“It must however be emphasized that the applicable principle is that a Plaintiff when claiming declaration of title must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence although where any aspect of the defendant’s case supports the Plaintiff’s case, the plaintiff will not be deprived of the advantage of such support. See Kodilinye V. Mbanefo Odu 2 WACA 336 at 337, Cobblah V. Gbeke 12 W.A.C.A. 294; Akinola V. Oluwo (1962) 1 All NLR 224 At Page 225. Nwogbogu V. Chief Nnoli Ibeziako (1972) 1 All NLR (Pt. 2) 137.”
3. KABURU PADA V. WOYA GALADIMA & ANOR (2018) 3 NWLR (PART 1607) 436 AT 456 per SANUSI, JSC who said:-
“It is noted by me, that both lower Courts have found that the identity of the land in dispute was not in controversy. It is equally on established law that in a claim of declaration of title to land, a plaintiff has the onus to prove his case based on the evidence he adduces at the trial and not to rely or capitalise on the weakness(es) in the defendant’s case even though he can always take advantage of the evidence of the defence which supports his case. See Tukuru V. Sabi (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 913) 544; Ojo V. Anibire (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 628) 630. See also Uchendu V. Ogboni (1999) 4 Sc (Pt. II) 1; (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 603) 337 and Akinola V. Oluwo (1962) 1 SCNLR 352.” PER IGE, J.C.A.

MEANS OF PROVING TITLE TO LAND IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF LND

ALHAJI WAHAB ARIJE V. MUSTAPHA ARIJE & ORS (2018) 16 NWLR (PART 1644) 67 AT 88D – E per KEKERE-EKUN, JSC who said:-
“The law is settled, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, that a claim for declaration of title may be proved in anyone of the following ways:
1. By traditional evidence;
2. By production of documents of title duly authenticated and executed.
3. By acts of ownership extending over a sufficient length of time numerous and positive enough as to warrant the inference of true ownership.
4. By acts of long possession and enjoyment.
5. By acts of possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of such adjacent or connected land would in addition be the owner of the land in dispute.
Idundun V. Okumagba (1976) 9 – 10 SC 227 @ 246: Nkado V. Obiano (1997) 5 SCNJ 33 @ 47; (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 503) 31: Owhonda V. Ekpechi (2003) 9 – 11 SCNJ 1 @ 6; (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 849) 326. It is equally trite that the onus is on the claimant to establish his title upon a preponderance of the evidence or on the balance of probability. He must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence, except where the defendant’ case supports his case. See: Kodilinye V. Odu (1935) 2 WACA 336 @ 357; Onwugbufor V. Okoye (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 424) 252; Shittu V. Fashawe (2005) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 107; (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 946) 671: Nruamah & Ors V. EBUZOEME & Ors (2013) 1 SC 31 @ 55-56; (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1372) 474.” PER IGE, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A POWER OF ATTORNEY IS AN INSTRUMENT OF TRANSFER

The law is trite that mere registration of Irrevocable Power of Attorney or issuance of Certificate of Occupancy in favour of a person does not automatically vests the land contained in the Power of Attorney or Certificate of Occupancy in the person where there is evidence or document showing that the land comprised in the irrevocable power of attorney or the Certificate of Occupancy had earlier on been sold to another person for valuable consideration as in this case on appeal. The Power of Attorney or Certificate of Occupancy remains moribund and liable to be struck down and declared null and void by the Court seised of the matter. See:-
ALHAJI ABACHA MOHAMMED KOLO V. ALHAJI MOHAMMED LAWAN (2018) 13 NWLR (PART 1637) 495 AT 516 H TO 517 A – C per ARIWOOLA, JSC.
2. T. LAWAL OWOSHO & ORS V. MICHAEL ADEBOWALE DADA (1984) 7/8 SC 149 AT 165 – 166 per ANIAGOLU, JSC who said:-
“In the instant case, there was no need, having regard to the state of the pleadings, for the respondent/plaintiff to apply to recall the plaintiff in order to tender the deed of conveyance registered as 69/69/1433 which had been admitted specifically by the 7th defendant and deemed to be admitted by the 1st to 6th defendants in the pleadings.
With all due respect to Mr. Bashua, counsel for the appellants, he had conceived the matter erroneously when he kept on harping, in his submission before us, that the learned trial Judge could not set aside a deed of conveyance which was not before him. He argued as if a setting aside of a deed of conveyance would entail a physical tearing up, or destruction, of the deed before it could be said to have been set aside. The particulars of the deed were before the Court and were admitted. All that would have happened would have been for a Judgment of a Court setting aside the deed (in the instant case, deed registered as No. 69 at page 69 in Volume 1433 of the Lagos Lands Registry) to be affixed to the deed in the Land Registry by the Registrar, or for the record of the Court’s Judgment to be made on the deed and the cancellation would then be effective. Mr. Bashua must have felt that he had reached his El Dorado when the plaintiff did not produce his deed of conveyance, and this must have been responsible for his taking the unwise step not to call any evidence at the close of the plaintiff’s case. Clearly, that was a mistaken failure to appreciate the state of the pleadings in this case.
It must be pointed out that the matters in issue were not the terms of the deed of conveyance in which case it would be necessary that the document should be produced in order that the Court might determine the precise contents of the document. That the plaintiff pleaded was that the 1st to 6th defendants purported to convey the estate which was already vested in him to the 7th defendant. The 7th defendant had admitted that it was that estate which was conveyed to him by the deed of conveyance registered as 69/69/1433 of the Lagos Land Registry.” PER IGE, J.C.A.

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja contained in the judgment delivered by the Hon. Justice A. A. I. BANJOKO on 18th June, 2013.

The Plaintiffs now Respondents in this appeal had by virtue of their FURTHER AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM on pages 208 – 214 of the record sought for the following reliefs at the Court below viz:-
“(a) A declaration that the purported registration of a Power of Attorney in favour of the Defendant in respect of the said Plot 1360, Gudu, District,, Abuja wrongful, ultra vires, null and void, same not emanating from the lawful holder of interest in the said plot.
(b) An order of this Court nullifying the purported registration of a Power of Attorney in favour of the Defendant in respect of Plot 1360 same not emanating from the lawful holder of interest in the said plot.
(c) Order of this Court mandating the Defendant to handover/transfer to the 1st Plaintiff the letter conveying the approval of the application for Certified True Copy of the letter of allocation (in respect of Plot 1360) currently in

unlawful possession of the Defendant.
(d) An Order of the Court declaring the Defendant to be in trespass of Plot No. 1360, Gudu District, Abuja.
(e) The sum of Five Hundred Thousand Naira (500,000.00) only as general damages.
(f) An Order of Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendant from further acts of trespass.”

Pleadings were duly exchanged and the Respondents as Plaintiffs called five (5) witnesses while the Defendant called three witnesses. After the adoption of written addresses by learned Counsel to the parties the learned trial Judge gave considered judgment on 18th June, 2013 wherein he granted all the reliefs sought by the Respondents.

The Appellant was dissatisfied and has by his Notice of Appeal dated 13th September, 2013 and filed on 16th September 2013, appealed to this Court on five grounds. By the leave of this Court the Appellant added two additional grounds of appeal. The seven (7) grounds of appeal as contained in the AMENDED NOTICE AND GROUNDS OF APPEAL filed on 3/6/2014 and deemed properly filed on 15th February, 2017 are hereby without their particulars set out as follows:-

“2. PART OF THE JUDGMENT COMPLAINED OF
The whole decision.
3. GROUNDS OF APPEAL
A.ERROR IN LAW
The Learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that the issue is that at this date in March 2008, the donor on record Dr. Wen Musa Ibrahim no longer had any legal interest and therefore the irrevocable power of attorney between him and Mr. Ibe Christopher Chijioke is hereby null and void and of no effect.”
B. ERROR IN LAW
The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that the plaintiffs have successfully proved that they obtained a better and earlier title from Dr. Wen Musa Ibrahim.
C. ERROR IN LAW
The learned trial judge erred in law when he granted the plaintiffs’ claim for injunction, notwithstanding his earlier view that the plaintiffs never sought for title to the land and that the issue of title was not before the Court.
D. ERROR IN LAW
The Learned trial judge erred in law when he granted the plaintiff’s claim for declaration and nullified the registration of the power of attorney donated by Dr. Wen Muso Ibrahim to the appellant.
E. The learned trial judge erred in law when he assumed jurisdiction and

proceeded to hear and determine the suit notwithstanding that the respondents (as plaintiffs) had no locus standi to institute and prosecute the suit.
F. The learned trial judge erred in law when he assumed jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant all the reliefs sought therein, notwithstanding that proper parties were not before the Court.
G. The entire judgment of the learned trial judge is against the weight of evidence.”

The Appellant’s Brief of Argument was filed on 3rd of June 2014. It was dated same date. The said Appellant’s Brief of Argument was deemed properly filed and served on 15th February, 2017 while the Respondents Brief of Argument was filed on 18th May, 2017 and deemed properly filed on 21st January, 2020.

The Appellant’s Learned Counsel CHRIS EZUGWU, ESQ nominated four issues for the resolution of the appeal namely: –
“ISSUE NO. 1
Whether the respondents have any or sufficient interest in Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja to invest in them the locus standi to institute this suit and confer on the Court below the jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit?
ISSUE NO. 2
Whether the suit

as placed before the Court below was properly constituted so as to confer the Court below with the jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit?
ISSUE NO. 3
Whether the trial Court was right to hove granted the respondents a declaration and an order nullifying the registration of a power of attorney donated by Dr. Wen Musa Ibrahim in favour of the appellant over Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja.
ISSUE NO. 4
Whether, having regard to the cause of action below, the state of the parties’ pleadings and the totality of the evidence proffered thereto, the respondents were entitled to judgment granting them any of the reliefs sought?”

The learned Counsel to the Respondent IKE NZEKWE, ESQ adopted the issues distilled by the Appellant. The Court will utilize the four issues formulated by the Appellant to determine the appeal. I will however take issues 1 and 2 together.
ISSUES 1 AND 2
“ISSUE NO.1
Whether the respondents have any or sufficient interest in Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja to invest in them the locus standi to institute this suit and confer on the Court below the jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit?<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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ISSUE NO. 2
Whether the suit as placed before the Court below was properly constituted so as to confer the Court below with the jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit?

In respect of issue I the learned Counsel to the Appellant stated that at all times material to this suit, the legal title n the subject matter of this action – Plot 1360 GUDU DISTRICT ABUJA was fully vested in one Dr. WEN MUSA IBRAHIM, a fact which learned Counsel to the Appellant said the Respondents admitted in paragraph 29 of their Further Amended Statement of Claim contained on pages 208 – 214 of the record. He also reiterated the reliefs sought in the said Statement of Claim.

That the only nexus, the 1st Respondent have with the land in dispute appears to him to be what he called “the purported transfer to him by one Mr. Maximus Oliobi of what he believes was Mr. Obiobi’s interest in Plot 1360 Gudu District, Abuja.”

That the alleged transfer is evidenced by a Sale Agreement dated 24th January, 2008 between Mr. Obiobi and 1st Respondent Exhibit “C” contained on page 13 – 15 of the record. Likewise according to learned Counsel to the Appellant the 2nd

Respondent claimed to have derived her title in Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja by virtue of three receipts which were admitted as Exhibits A – A3 also copied on pages 24 – 26 of the record issued to her by 1st Respondent as evidence of sale of the land in dispute to 2nd Respondent.

He submitted that for a person to validly institute and maintain an action in Court he must have requisite locus standi or legal capacity to sue independent of the merit of case. He relied on the cases of:
1. OWODUNNI V. REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF C.C.C. SC (2000)10 NWLR (PT. 675) 315 AT 338;
2. THOMAS V. OLUFOSOYE (1986) 1 NWLR (PART 18) 669 AT 691.

The learned Counsel to the Appellant then took the Court through the facts pleaded in the Respondent’s Further Amended Statement of Claim aforesaid. That a person who has no title like Maximus Oliobi has no title to pass to 1st Respondent. He relied on the case of ANGBASO V. SULE (1996) 7 NWLR (PART 461) 479 AT 491.

That the purported interest of the 1st and 2nd Respondents in Plot 1360 GUDU DISTRICT ABUJA are both founded on void transactions and cannot give the Respondents locus standing and that the Court have no

jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit. He urged the Court to resolve issue 1 in favour of the Appellant

In respect of issue 2 which is tied to ground F of the grounds of appeal the learned Counsel to the Appellant contended that all the persons who are necessary for the proper and effectual and complete adjudication and settlement all questions in the suit must be present relying on PEENOK INVESTMENT LTD VS HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL LTD (1982) 1 SC 1 AT 11.

That the Respondent conceded that the title to Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja is in DR WEN MUSA IBRAHIM. That the Respondents did not sue as agents or Attorneys of MR OLIOBI but sued in their own right seeking for a declaration challenging the validity of the Power of Attorney registered by DR IBRAHIM in favour of the Appellant over the property in dispute.

He relied on the case of OGHENE LTD V AMORUWA (1986) 3 NWLR (PT. 32) 856. That in the absence of DR WEN MUSA IBRAHIM and MR MAXIMUS OLIOBI the action is not properly constituted.

That is the duty of the Plaintiff to bring on board all the parties whose presence is crucial for effectual resolution of the suit. That having regard to the

material before the lower Court it ought to have ordered the joinder of DR WEN MUSA and MR MAXIMUS OLIOBI as parties to the proceedings. He relied on the case of CHIGA V UMARU (1986) 3 NWLR (PT. 29) 460 and ORDER 10 RULE 2 of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004 and the case of OKAFOR V NNAIFE (1974) 3 SC 60 AT 67.

Learned Counsel saw it as strange’ that the lower Court which find it unnecessary made incisive comments on it. He concluded by arguing that the lower Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action. He relied onPLATEAU STATE V AG. FED (2006) 3 NWLR (PT. 967) 346 AT 423.
He urged the Court to resolve issue 2 in Appellant’s favour.

In his response to submissions under issue one dealing with the locus standi of the Respondents IKE NZEKWE, ESQ for the Respondents submitted that a Plaintiff will have locus standi in a matter if he has a special right or sufficient interest in the performance of the duty sought to be enforced or where his interest is adversely affected. That all these will depend on the facts in each case. He relied on the case of NYAME VS FRN (2010) 7 NWLR (PART

1193) 344 AT 400 E – H.

He stated that it is necessary to examine the Respondents FURTHER AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM which he stated clearly show in paragraphs 5, 6, 18, 19, 20, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 thereof, the interest of the Respondents in the subject matter of this suit. That the paragraphs show that Respondents were put in possession after payment of purchase price to one MAXIMUS OLIOBI who had earlier acquired equitable interest in the land from allottee one DR. WEN MUSA IBRAHIM. That the legal estate acquired in the subject matter was and is enough to give them locus standi. That the equitable interest acquired is as good as the legal estate whether registerable instrument has been registered or not in respect of same. That MAXIMUS OLIOBI was put in possession of the land by the original owner. He relied on the following among other cases cited viz:
1. NSIEGBE V MGBEMENA (2007) 10 NWLR (PT. 1042) 364 AT 397 D – G;
2. ADEWOLE V DADA (2003) 4 NWLR (PT. 810) 233 AT 379 E – F;
3. ECHERE V EZIRIKE (2006) 12 NWLR (PART 994) 386 AT 407 C – D;
4. AMAKOR V OBIEFUNA (1974) 3 SC 67 AT 75 – 76.

That the evidence before the Court show

that the Respondents had acquired an equitable interest or alternatively have been in continuous possession of MAXIMUS OLIOBI who got the land from original allottee whom he described as the predecessor in possession to the Plaintiff/Respondents. He referred to evidence of the Respondents and evidence of DW1 and DW2 and paragraph 5 and 6 of Defendant (Appellant) who testified as DW2.

He stated that the cases relied upon by Appellant’s learned Counsel are not on point. He urged the Court to hold that Respondents have locus standi.

In response to the submissions of learned Counsel to the Appellant on issue 2, the Respondent’s learned Counsel while conceding that a Court must have jurisdiction over a matter, he stated that proper parties must be identified. Before an action can succeed according to him the parties to it must be shown to be proper parties to whom rights and obligations arising from the cause of action attach. He relied on the cases of: –
1. COTECNA INT’L LTD V CHURCHGATE (NIG) LTD (2010) 18 NWLR (PT. 1225) 346 AT 396 E – H;
2. ABUBAKAR V B. O. & A. P LTD (2007)18 NWLR (PART 1066) 319 AT 361 B – C.

That the Respondents have right of action in that a wrongful act has been committed against the interest of the Respondent giving rise to the institution of the action against the Appellant. He adopted his submissions in paragraph 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 of Respondents’ Brief under issue 1.

On whether the failure on Respondent’s part to join DR MUSA WEN IBRAHIM and MAXIMUS OLIOBI denied lower Court of jurisdiction, the Respondents learned Counsel argued that a Plaintiff has right to choose the person or persons against whom he wishes to proceed. He relied on the cases of:-
1. SAPO VS SUNMONU (2010) 11 NWLR (PT. 1205) 374 AT 399 H:
2. ALHAJI AYORINDE & ORS V ALHAJI ONI (2000) 3 NWLR (PART 649) 348 AT 368.

He also submitted that cases relied upon by the Appellant are not of any help to him. That in the present case the facts are that the Defendant/Appellant trespassed to the plot of land which Respondents/Plaintiff was in possession. That the proper person to be sued was the Appellant and not a third party. That even where relevant or interested parties are not joined the action would not fail relying on CAMEROON AIRLINES V OTUTUIZU (2011) 4

NWLR (PT. 1238) 512 AT 546 A. He contended that Appellant is the proper person to sue in this action and urged the Court to resolve issue 2 in favour of Respondents against the Appellant.

real stake or interest in the subject matter or the litigation.”
An objection that a person has no locus standi to institute, maintain an action or a matter is a direct challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court or a Tribunal to entertain the action or the suit. The legal concept of standing or locus standi predicated on the postulate or pedestal that a person whose civil rights and obligations have not been affected or likely to be affected on any subject matter has no right to approach the Court for redress or remedy in any suit or action. See PACERS MULTI DYNAMICS LTD VS. THE M. V. “DANCING SISTER” & ANOR (2012) 1 SCM 128 at 142G -I to 143 A per RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC.
A Court or Tribunal is by the connotation and denotation of locus standi enjoined to strictly ensure that a claimant before it possesses capacity or legal competence to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal to adjudicate upon such matter. See the cases of:-
1. ADEKOLA MUSTAPHA V CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION (2019) 7 (PT. 2) SCM 114 AT 124H TO 125 A – H per OKORO, JSC who said:-
“The concept of locus standi denotes legal capacity to maintain an action in a

Court of law. It is a party’s standing to sue or competence of a party to sue. Whenever a party’s standing to sue is in issue or is challenged in a case, the question to be determined is whether the person whose standing is in issue is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable. See Olowosago V. Adebanjo (1988) 4 NWLR (pt 88) 275, Oloriode V. Oyebi (1984) 1 SCNLR 390, Adesanya V. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor (1981) 5 SC 112. To say that a person has no locus standi means that he has no right to appear or be heard in such and such a proceeding. See Earl Jowitt: Dictionary of English Law, page 1110. Put more succinctly, the word “locus is a derivative of Latin, literally denoting the place or position where something exists or is done. In legal parlance, the term locus standi (a place of standing) denotes the right of a person to bring an action or to be heard in a given forum, especially a Court or tribunal. See Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition 2004 at 960. This Court has done a lot of work in making this principle clear and simple to every

discerning mind. In Inakoju & 17 Ors V. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 SC (pt 1) page 1 at 85-86 paragraphs 40 – 45, (2007) 1 SCM, 1 this Court, per Tobi, JSC (of blessed memory) defined Locus Standi in the following words:-
“Locus Standi or standing is the legal right of a party to an action to be heard in litigation before a Court of law or Tribunal. The term entails the legal capacity of instituting or commencing an action in a competent Court of law or Tribunal without any inhibition, obstruction or hindrance from any person or body whatsoever.”
In order to determine whether a plaintiff has the locus standi or standing/capacity to sue, it is resolved by perusing the plaintiffs statement of claim or affidavit in support of an Originating summons which defines the extent of the plaintiffs cause of action. Like jurisdiction, locus standi is a threshold issue which must be taken and determined at the earliest opportunity. In Attorney General of Anambra State V. Attorney General of Federation (2007) 5 – 6 SC 192 at 280 – 281, this Court threw some more light on a party who is endowed with locus standi or capacity sue thus;-
“What I

am minded to emphasize upon here is that no other person excepting the person on whom is vested the aggregate of the enforceable rights in a cause has the standing to sue. And so the point must be made that where a person has brought an action claiming a relief which on the facts of the matter is referable to another as in this matter, then cannot succeed for want of locus standi simply because there is no dispute between them.”
2. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF CROSS RIVER STATE VS FRN & ANOR (2019) (PT. 3) SCM 1 AT 31H TO 32 A – E per ARIWOOLA, JSC who said:-
“Generally, in Nigeria, it is a constitutional requirement that in order to enable a person maintain an action before a Court or Tribunal, and this is limited to the prosecution of matters relating to the civil rights and obligations of the plaintiff, be that plaintiff a person, a group of persons, a statutory body, a government, an authority or any other juristic person, there must exist in such plaintiff the standing to sue. In other words, standing will only be accorded to a plaintiff who shows that his civil rights and obligations have or are in danger of being violated or adversely

affected by the act complained of. See; Section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended); Adesanya vs. The President of Nigeria (supra); Kayode Bakare Ors vs. Ajose-Adeogun & Ors (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1403) 320; (2014) 1 SCNJ 255; (2014) All FWLR (Pt.737) 611.
Ordinarily, when a party’s standing to sue is in issue, in on action, the question that arises is whether the person whose standing is being challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue but not whether the issue is indeed justiceable. See; Buraimoh Oloriode & Ors vs. Oyebi & Ors (1984) 5 SC 16: (1984) SC NLR 390.
It is trite law that it is only the person in whom is vested the aggregate of the enforceable rights in a cause that has the standing to sue. Therefore, where a person commences an action to claim a relief which on the facts of the matter is enforceable to another person, then the former person cannot succeed, for want of locus standi. The reason being that there is no dispute between them. In the instant case, the facts deposed to in the affidavits filed in support of the Originating Summons did not show that

the plaintiff had vested in it any enforceable right to s the defendants. See; Oloriode vs. Oyebi (Supra): Egolum vs. Obasanjo (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt.611) 423: A.G Anambra Vs. A.G Federation (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1047) 4 at 94, (2007) 12 SCM (Pt.1), 1.”
The law thus enjoins the Court to examine the Statement of Claim where the action is begun by Writ of Summons or where the Suit commenced vide Originating Summons the Affidavit in Support of Originating Summons in order to determine whether the Plaintiffs have locus standi to institute the action herein. The issue of locus standi has nothing to do with the merit of the case or whether the Plaintiffs have the chance to succeed at the trial, It is an issue of jurisdiction. See MR. SUNDAY ADEGBITE TAIWO VS. SERAH ADEGBORO & ANOR (2011) 11 NWLR (PART 1259) 562 AT 599 H TO 580 A – B per RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC who held:-
“A Plaintiff satisfies the Court that he has locus standi if he is able to show that his civil right and obligations have been or are in danger of being infringed. There must be a nexus between the claimant and the disclosed cause of action concerning his rights or obligations and locus standi

is determined by examining only the Statement of Claim. Furthermore, in determining whether a party has locus standi the chances that the action may not succeed is an irrelevant consideration.”

Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29. 30. 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Further Amended Statement of Claim read as follows:-
“4. The 1st Plaintiff avers that a bout early, 2008 one MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI for valuable consideration transferred to the 1st Plaintiff all his interest in respect of plot No. 1360 situate within Gudu District, Abuja, which has Right of Occupancy No. MFCT/LA/NS 354
5. The 1st Plaintiff further avers that sometime in 2004, DR. MUSA WEN IBRAHIM the original allottee of the said plot No.1360 for valuable consideration had transferred to MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI all his interest in the said plot No. 1360.
6. The 1st Plaintiff avers that pursuant to the said payment DR. MUSA WEN IBRAHIM executed the following documents in favour of MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI (a) Sale Agreement (b) A Power of Attorney (c) Deed of Assignment and (d) Application for Consent to

Assign.
7. The 1st Plaintiff further avers that DR. MUSA WEN IBRAHIM handed over to the said MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI, the original Letter of Allocation and also put him in possession of the plot.
8. The 1st Plaintiff avers that MR MAXIMUS OLIOBI owns the said plot with an existing plantation on the plot when the entire area was bushy and without any infrastructure.
14. The 1st Plaintiff avers that MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI acting through his friend made money available to the solicitor for the said job.
18. The 1st Plaintiff avers that MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI as a result of a business transaction owed him – the 1st Plaintiff some money.
19. The 1st Plaintiff avers that at about December, 2007 he had a meeting in a Hotel in Abuja with MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI and two other persons to discuss how the debt will be paid.
20. The 1st Plaintiff avers that in the meeting MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI agreed to off-set the debt he owed the 1st Plaintiff, by transferring to him all the interest that he had in the said Plot No. 1360.
21. The 1st Plaintiff further avers that he accepted the offer and in consummation thereof MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI in early January 2008 put

him in possession and executed the following document in favour of the 1st Plaintiff (i) Sale of Land Agreement.
22. The 1st Plaintiff avers that he took possession and employed a labourer to take care of the plantation pending development.
23. The 1st Plaintiff avers that he demanded and received from MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI, Affidavit for the loss of title these documents executed for him by the said DR. MUSA WEN IBRAHIM: (i) Deed of Assignment (ii) Sale Agreement and (iii) an Application for Consent to Assign.
24. The 1st Plaintiff avers that MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI subsequently instructed the Solicitor handling the registration to hand over to the 1st Plaintiff all the documents in his possession in respect of the said plot and also to introduce the 1st Plaintiff to the Desk Officers handling all the applications in respect of the plot in Abuja Geographic Information Systems to enable him take over the process.
25. The 1st Plaintiff avers that pursuant to the instruction mentioned in paragraph 24 above he went to the Solicitor’s Office in Maitama, Abuja, and collected from the Solicitor Original Copies of Newspaper Publication, Police

Extract issues to MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI for the filing of Power of Attorney and Receipt for Recertification of the Letter of Allocation.
26. The 1st Plaintiff avers that on receipt of the said letter titled “SAVE OUR SOUL” by the Abuja Geographic Information Systems Memoranda were written by one Mr. John Irabor to Acting Drector (Lands) on the 2nd day of November. 2008 and by the Acting Director (Lands) to the Minister, recommending among other things that approval should be given for issuance of Certified True Copy of Letter of Allocation to enable Maximus Oliobi do his recertification. We shall rely on the said Memoranda at the trial.
27. The 1st Plaintiff further avers that the Solicitor introduced him and his Counsel, to the desk officers handling all applications and processes pertaining to the plot in Abuja Geographic Information Systems office.
28. The 1st Plaintiff avers that the plot was reinstated before MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI transferred all his said interest to him, but the letter of reinstatement and the sold Certified True Copy of the Letter of Offer was not ready.
29. The 1st Plaintiff avers that the letter of reinstatement

which he later collected from issuing authority was issued in the name of Dr. Musa Ibrahim Wen because Mr. Maximus Oliobi’s interest was not registered.
30. The 1st Plaintiff avers that when he went to collect the letter of Approval for issuance of the Certified True copy CTC of letter of Right of Occupancy or letter of Offer he was informed by the desk officer – Balogun Tijani that the sold Solicitor to Mr. Maximus Oliobi who applied for the approval signed and collected the said letter of Approval. We shall rely on the copy of the above letter showing that the original was collected by the Solicitor at the trial.
35. The 1st Plaintiff avers that at about the 10th day of February, 2008 MR. VICTOR AGBANA approached him on behalf of the 2nd Plaintiff and agreed to purchase all his interest in respect of plot No. 1360 for the sum of fourteen million Naira (N14,000,000) only to be paid in installments.
36. The 1st Plaintiff further avers that the said amount mentioned on paragraph 35 was paid by MR. VICTOR AGBANA on behalf of the 2nd Plaintiff in three installments on the following dates; 19th and 20th day of February, 2008, and on the 7th day

of March, 2008.
37. The 1st Plaintiff avers that he agreed with MR. VICTOR AGBANA and actually put the 2nd Plaintiff In possession of the Plot on payment of the first installment.
38. The 1st Plaintiff avers that receipts acknowledging the said payments were issued and given to MR VICTOR AGBANA, with a promise to hand over to him all other relevant document and the Certified True Copy of the Letter of Allocation when it is ready.
39. The 1st Plaintiff avers that MR VICTOR AGBAN on behalf of the 2nd Plaintiff took over and employed a labourer to work on the plantation on the plot.
40. The 2nd Plaintiff avers that MR VICTOR AGBANA acting on my behalf at about November 2008, disengaged the labourer, cleared part of the plantation and dropped a container on the plot and molded bags of Cement inside It in readiness of developing the plot.
41. The 2nd Plaintiff avers that MR. VICTOR AGBANA informed her that the Defendant in March 2009 entered the plot and cleared part of the plantation she had preserved.”

I have closely examined the entire Further Amended Statement of Claim particularly the paragraphs set out above and I am of the

solemn view that the Respondents have sufficient interest in the land in dispute meaning that their rights and obligations have been affected and threatened. They therefore have right and locus standi to institute and maintain the action leading to this appeal against the Appellant. See BARBUS & COMPANY (NIG) LTD & OR VS MRS GLADYS OYIBOKA OKAFOR-UDEJI (2018) 11 NWLR (PART 1630) 298 AT 311 F – G per OKORO, JSC who also held:-
“The expression “locus standi”, denotes legal capacity to institute proceedings in a Court of law. It is used interchangeably with terms like “standing” or “title to sue”. A person has locus standi to sue in an action if he is able to show to the satisfaction of the Court that his civil rights and obligations have been or are in danger of being infringed. There are two tests for determining if a person has locus standi. They are: –
1. The action must be justiciable.
2. There must be a dispute between the parties. There ought to be a liberal approach in applying the test. See Ojukwu V. Ojukwu & Anor (2008) 12 SC (Pt. 111) page 1, (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 439, Attorney General Kaduna State V. Hassan

(1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 8) 483, Adesanya V. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor (1981) 550 page 112, (1981) LPELR- 147 (SC); (1981) 2 NCLR 358, Thomas & Ors V. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669. Emezi V. Osuagwu & Ors (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 939) 340.”

On whether the action is properly constituted, the main argument of the Appellant is that a Plaintiff who initiates an action has the legal duty to bring to Court person whose presence is crucial for the effectual decision in the suit.
To learned Appellant’s Counsel, failure to join the original allottee of the land in dispute as a party to this action renders the action improperly constituted and incompetent.
It is trite law that any action that is improperly Constituted cannot donate or bestow on the Court jurisdiction to hear and determine the action. In other word, all necessary or indispensable parties to on action must be made party or joined to the suit so as to render it competent and grants jurisdiction to the Court seised of the matter. No dispute can be resolved or adjudicated upon in the absence of an indispensable or necessary

party. At the commencement of an action or trial a properly constituted action must contain the Plaintiff and a Defendant with capacity to defend the action. See: –
1. YESUFU AMUDA & ORS V. TIJANI O. AJOBO & ORS (1995) 7 NWLR (406) 170 AT 182 per OGUNTADE, JCA later JSC (RTD) who said:-
“There is however a fundamental aspect to the matter which affected the Jurisdiction of the lower Court. When proper parties are not before a Court, the Court is without Jurisdiction to adjudicate. See Onwunalu V. Osademe (1971) 1 All NLR (Pt.1) 14; Ekpere & Ors V. Aforije (1972) 1 All NLR 220: and Oloriade V. Oyebi (1984) 1 SCNLR 390.”
2. MR. ABDULGANIYU ADENIRAN & ANOR V. HRH OBA ABDULGANIYU AJIBOLA IBRAHIM & ORS (2019) 8 NWLR (PART 1673) 98 AT 118 G- H TO 119 A – B per PETER-ODILI, JSC who said:-
“In a nutshell, the failure of the appellants to join the Olofa of Offa in this appeal is fatal and it cannot be covered by what the appellants now respondents to this preliminary objection are positing that the Oba Mustafa Olawore Ariwojoye II died in the course of the appeal at the Court below whereby an application by the same

appellants to have his name struck out was made and done by the appellant Court. That the Olofa at that time died did not mean the extinction of the either the title or stool of Olofa which remained indestructible and the appellants’ ought to have brought an application for substitution with the new occupant of the stool as the interest of the Offa community was at stake and whoever was on seat as the Olofa would represent the community in the said dispute with the other community. This Court had laid down some guiding principles in the determination of a necessary party in a suit. I refer to the case of Carrena & Anor V. Arowolo & 2 Ors (2008) 6-7 SC (Pt.1) 66. (reported as Carrena V. Akinlase (2008) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1107) 262 at p. 280, paras. D-E) as follows:-
(i) that the presence of such party is necessary for the effectual adjudication of the matter in dispute:
(ii) that the plaintiff’s claim against the existing defendants also affects the party sought to be joined; and/or
(iii) that his interest is the same or identical with that of the existing defendants.
Indeed there is nothing that would change the situation of things

in this instance being a boundary dispute between the Offa Community and the Erinlie Community, which dispute cannot be effectively determined by any Court in the absence of their traditional rulers who are the custodians of the land.”
3. ALHAJI BAPAKAT ALAFIA & ORS V. GBODE VENTURES NIG LTD & ORS (2016) 4 SCM 1 AT 16 H – I per GALADIMA, JSC.
Where the facts contained in the pleadings of the parties to on action are such that the matter can conveniently and effectually be adjudicated upon without the joinder of a third party or a person who may be interested in the subject matter of an action, the non joinder or failure to join such other person will not vitiate the hearing of the matter and the jurisdiction of the Court seised of the matter will not be affected, especially where there is competent Plaintiff and Defendant who has interest in the matter sufficient enough to invoke Section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended. The Court will in such circumstance proceed to hear and determine the suit or action on the basis of the parties in dispute before the Court. This is made clear in the cases

of:-
1.AYORINDE & ORS VS ONI & ANOR (2000) 3 NWLR (PT. 649) 348 AT 368 per KARIBI-WHYTE, JSC who had this to say:-
“The situation in the instant appeal is different from the case relied upon in the submission by learned counsel to the Appellants, where a necessary party to an action, for one reason or the other was not joined, the non-joinder will not render the judgment a nullity. It is a correct proposition of law that where an action is properly constituted, with a plaintiff with legal capacity to bring the action, a defendant with capacity to defend, and a claim with cause of action against the defendants, and the action has satisfied all pre -conditions for instituting the action, the fact that a necessary party to the action has satisfied all pre-conditions for instituting the action, the fact that a necessary party to the action has not been joined, is not fatal to the action and will not render the action a nullity. See Oladeinde & Anor V. Oduwole (1962) WNLR 41.
Where the nature of the evidence before the Court is such that the case of the parties before it can be determined in the absence of those not joined, it can proceed to

do so. It is only in those cases where it will not be right and the Court cannot properly determine the issues before it in the absence of the parties whose participation in the proceeding is essential for the proper, effectual and complete determination of the Issues before it, will it be necessary to insist on the joinder of such necessary parties.”
2. CHIEF MAXI OKWU & ANOR V. CHIEF VICTOR UMEH & ANOR (2016) 1 SCM 129 AT 144 E – I per OKORO, JSC who said:-
“From the above provision, it is clear that non joinder of a necessary party in a suit is an irregularity that does not affect the competence or jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate on the matter before it. The provision allows the Court to hear the matter as regards the rights and interest of the parties actually before the Court.
Also, that such non-joinder would not defeat the cause or matter. See Leonard Okoye & Ors V. Nigerian Construction Furniture Co. Ltd & Ors (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt 1991) 501. Laibru Ltd V. Building & Civil Engineering Contractors (1962) 1 ALL NLR 387 (1962) 2 SCNLR 118, Union Beverages Ltd V. Pepsi Cola Int. Ltd. (1994) 3 NWLR (pt. 330)

1, Azuh V. UBN Plc (2014) 11 NWLR (pt. 1419) 580 at 610 – 611, Green V. Green (1987) NWLR (Pt 61) 481.”
There are extensive facts in the pleading of the Respondents to the effect that DR WEN MUSA IBRAHIM the original allottee of the land in dispute sold all his interest in the subject matter to one MAXIMUS OLIOBI who in turn sold the land in dispute to the 1st Respondent. There are no reliefs being claimed or sought against any of the said personalities.
The two persons aforesaid are not indispensable parties nor are they necessary parties to this suit.
The Appellant had the opportunity and right to have applied to the Court below to have the two persons mentioned joined as parties. The Appellant also had the opportunity of calling any of the two persons as witnesses to support the Defendant/Appellant’s case at the lower Court.
Better still, the Appellant could have brought them in, in a Counter Claim as Defendants which in law is an independent action with the same attributes as the Plaintiffs’ action (Respondents).
Afterall the Appellant as Defendant pleaded in paragraphs 7 – 24 of his Amended Statement of Defence

as facts mentioning the said personalities.
In any event issues that were strongly joined on pleadings are as to whether the Plaintiffs or the Appellant were the prior purchasers or whether it was Appellant who first acquired the interest of DR WEN MUSA IBRAHIM in Plot 1360 the subject matter of this suit.
The finding of the learned trial Judge on the constitution of the parties cannot be faulted. The action is properly constituted and the lower Court rightly assumed jurisdiction in the matter.
Issues one and two are resolved against the Appellant.

ISSUES 3 AND 4
ISSUE NO. 3
Whether the trial Court was right to have granted the respondents a declaration and an order nullifying the registration of a power of attorney donated by Dr. Wen Musa Ibrahim In favour of the appellant over Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja. (Grounds A and D).
ISSUE NO. 4
Whether, having regard to the cause of action below, the state of the parties’ pleadings and the totality of the evidence proffered thereto, the respondents were entitled to Judgment granting them any of the reliefs sought?” (Grounds B, C and G).

Under issue 3, the learned Counsel to the Appellant contended that there were no sufficient materials available to the trial Court to have granted the Respondents their claims for declaration and that the registration of the Power of Attorney in favour of the Appellant over Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja was wrongful, ultra vires, null and void. He referred to the Further Amended Statement of Claim and the Reply to the Statement of Defence to the effect that 1st Respondent bought the said plot of land from MR MAXIMUS OLIOBI who they claimed had earlier bought the property from the original owner DR WEN MUSA IBRAHIM and that the property was later sold to 2nd Respondent before the alleged trespass on the said land by the Appellant. Learned Counsel then referred to the finding of lower Court nullifying the Power of Attorney registered in favour of the Appellant.

Learned Counsel stated further that the nullified Power of Attorney was tendered as Exhibit “P” and could be found on pages 63 – 67 of the record of appeal. That it was duly registered.

He submitted that the party claiming such declaration must provide credible evidence and place sufficient materials before the

Court. That the burden does not shift even where the Defendants defence is weak. That the Respondents did not prove their entitlement to declaration made in their favour and that no evidence was led to show that MAXIMUS OLIOBI was vested with any interest in the properly in dispute save for what learned Counsel to the Appellant called “The uncertified police extract dated 13/06/06 (Exhibit G) at page 22 of the record, and uncertified affidavits of loss dated 08/01/08 and 14/07/05 respectively (Exhibits D & H) at pages 16 and 23 of the record wherein Mr. Oliobi claimed to have lost the title document of the property and the alleged Instruments of transfer of interest in the property between him and Dr. Ibrahim and the title holder of the disputed property.”
He relied on the cases of:-
1. AYANRU V. MANDILAS LTD (2007) 10 NWLR (PT. 1043) P. 462 AT PP. 477 – 478:
2. BELLO V. EWEKA (1981) 1 SC 63 AT 74:
3. ALAO V. AKANO (2005) 4 SC P. 25 AT 30 among others.

That even if it is conceded that the aforesaid documents Exhibits G, D and H could vest the land they are not certified as required by Evidence Act hence no subject matter

passed to the Respondents. He relied on:-
1. Section 102 of the Evidence Act:
2. ANUFORO V. OBILOR (1997) 11 NWLR (PT. 530) 661 AT 679:
3. ONOCHIE V. ODOGWU (2006) 6 NWLR (PART 975) 65 AT P. 84.

That notwithstanding that the Respondents who pleaded a Power of Attorney made by DR WEN MUSA IBRAHIM in favour of MAXIMUS OLIOBI in 2004 in paragraph 6 of Further Amended Statement of Claim failed to tender the same, the lower Court went on voyage of discovery in his judgment pages 483 – 484 to believe the existence of the Power of Attorney allegedly made in favour of MAXIMUS OLIOBI.

That it is curious that the Respondents failed to call the DONOR of the said Power of Attorney leaving it to speculations, according to Appellant’s learned Counsel. That the lower Court was in grave error in making findings in favour of the Respondents on Exhibits D, G AND H respectively. He relied on the cases of:-
1. ORHUE V. NEPA (1998) 5 SCNL 126 AT 140:
2. IRAGUNIMA V. UCHENDU (1996) 2 NWLR (PT. 428) 30 AT 53-54.

That it is curious that the learned trial Judge who found that the legal title in Plot 1360 remained at all times in DR. WEN

MUSA IBRAHIM would turn round and grant a declaration voiding the registration of a Power Attorney the (DR WEN) executed in favour of the Appellant on what he described as purported ground that at the time he executed it he no longer had any legal interest in the property.
He relied on the case of AKAPO V. HAKEEM HABEEB (1992) 6 NWLR (PT. 247) 226 AT 297.
He urged the Court to resolve issues 3 in favour of the Appellant.

In reply to the submissions made on issue 3 by learned Counsel to the Appellant, the Respondent’s learned Counsel submitted that the lower Court was right to have nullified the purported registration of the Power of Attorney alleged to have been donated by DR WEN MUSA IBRAHIM in favour of the Appellant over Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja. He submitted that the act of registration of an instrument will not confer a better title. That a registerable instrument will be accepted for registration even where the terms are not consistent with a deed in relation to the same land registered earlier. He relied on the cases of:-
1. AYINLA V. SIJUWOLA (1984) NSCC 301 AT 311 and
2. ASHIRU V. OLUKOYA (2006) 11 NWLR (PT. 990) 1 AT 25 B – H.

The learned Respondents Counsel then went into the summary of evidence on pages 12 – 14 of the Respondents’ Brief of Argument and reproduced Exhibit “L” which is a letter written by one BARRISTER CHUKWU EWEKA EZE on behalf of MAXIMUS OLIOBI (predecessor of 1st Respondent) to the Director Abuja Geographic Information Systems Abuja soliciting for recertification of documents relating to the land in dispute in favour of MAXIMUS OLIOBI.

The Respondent’s learned Counsel also took liberty and quoted profusely the findings of the trial Court on Exhibit “L” the said letter written by Barrister EZE who testified as DW1 for Appellant at the trial.

He stated that the learned trial Judge alluded to Exhibit “L” and found that its contents was evidence that the Appellant has knowledge of the interest of the Respondents on the plot in dispute. Learned Counsel to Respondents relied on page 490 of the record of appeal to further submit that the Appellant did not appeal against the specific findings of the lower Court. That only a bonafide purchaser for value of a legal estate for value without notice can take priority over someone who had acquired a

prior equitable interest over the same property relying on the case of OHIAERI V. YUSSUF (2009) 1 NWLR (PT. 1137) 207 AT 328B – C. That the Notice acquired by BAR. EZE who acted for Appellant is also imputed to the Appellant.

That the competing interest created will rank in order of their creation. He relied on ILONA V. IDAKWO (2003) 53 AT 91 C-D.

He acknowledged that when a claim for trespass is accompanied with a claim for injunction, the title of the parties to the land in dispute is put in issue automatically. He relied on OYENEYIN V. AKINKUGBE (2010) 4 NWLR (PT. 1184) 265 AT 284 F – G. He further submitted that while ascertaining the person with better title a Court can nullify spurious and fraudulent documents presented by a party in dispute. That because the Respondents acquired title to the land before the purported transfer to Appellant the trial Court rightly nullified the registration of the Power of Attorney made in favour of Appellant after the equitable interest in the land had been passed to MAXIMUS OLIOBI and the Respondents. He relied on numerous cases including:
1. UKEJIANYA V. UCHENDU (1950) 13 WACA 45:

ABAYE V. OFILI (1986) 1 NWLR (PT. 15) 134 and
3. LEBILE V. REG. TRUSTEES OF C & S (2003) 2 NWLR (PART 804) 399 AT 421 E – F.

In specific response also to the submission of Appellant’s Counsel to the effect that Respondents only traced their title or interest to MAXIMUS OLIOBI without showing any nexus with the original owner DR WEN IBRAHIM. Learned Counsel to the Respondents drew attention to Appellant’s Witness Statement on Oath and Cross Examination wherein he said Appellant admitted that MR MAXIMUS OLIOBI was the Agent of DR MUSA WEN IBRAHIM and that the admission defeats the arguments proffered by the Appellant’s Counsel in paragraph 3.10 and 3.11 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument.

That Respondents paid to DR IBRAHIM’S AGENT MAXIMUS OLIOBI first before Appellant who paid into the same agent 3 months after the same Agent had on behalf of original owner sold the property to Respondents.

That whether through possession or payment for the land Respondents were first in time. He relied on ILONA V. IDAKWO supra.

He submitted that Exhibit D is an original document which does not need certification under the Evidence

Act.

He urged the Court to affirm the decision of the lower Court nullifying the said Power of Attorney made in favour of Appellant on the ground that Appellant had prior knowledge of Plaintiffs interest in the land and are first in time to acquire interest in Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja. He urged the Court to resolve issue 3 against the Appellant.

Under Issue 4, the learned Counsel to the Appellant submitted that having regard to the cause of action, the state of the pleadings of the parties and the totality of evidence led the Respondent were not entitled to judgment on any of the reliefs sought.

That the lower Court erred and was heavily influenced by its earlier finding that the case before it has nothing to do with title to land as according to him the trial Court held that Respondents did not seek for title to Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja. He relied on page 482 paragraph 3 of the record of appeal.

That since the Respondents had claimed for trespass and injunction thereby putting title in issue. And Appellant also claimed that he was in possession of the land in dispute. That having found that the lower Court had no title to the land

in dispute it ought not to have granted the Respondents claims for damages and injunction. That the claim for trespass postulates that the Plaintiff is the owner of the land in dispute or that prior to the trespass he has exclusive possession of the land. That injunction cannot be granted in favour of a person who could not establish better title to the land. That the onus on the Plaintiff was not discharged. He relied on the following cases:-
1. ODUKWE V. OGUNBIYI (1998) 6 SC 72 AT 87- 88:
2. OGBUOKWELU V. UMEANAFUNKWA (1994) 4 NWLR (PT. 341) 676 AT 692:
3. OGUNLEYE V. ONI (1990) 2 NWLR (PART 135) 745 AT 774:
4. OLUWI V. ENIOLA (1967) NWLR 339 AT 340.

That there was no evidence that the land was ever vested in any of the Respondents by DR WEN MUSA IBRAHIM who the Court according to learned Counsel to Appellant said had legal title to land in dispute.

That MAXIMUS OLIOBI had no title to confer on 1st Respondent and that this purported sale of the land to 1st Respondent vide Exhibit C is void as he had nothing to sell. He relied on AKERELE V. ATUNRASE & ORS (1969) NSCC 180 AT 185 – 186.

Learned Counsel to the Appellant

also contended that Exhibit C is a registerable instrument by virtue of Section 22(1) of the Land Use Act same has not been registered. He relied on the case of AWOJUGBAGBE LIGHT INDUSTRIES LTD V. CHINUKWE (1995) NWLR (PART 1390) 379 AT 435.

That failure to obtain consent of FCT Minister renders Exhibits C void even if it had been executed by the holder of Plot 1360, DR WEN MUSA IBRAHIM and that Exhibit C was wrongfully admitted and has no probative value. He relied on the case of ETAJATA & ORS V OLOGBO (2007) 6 SC (PT. 11) 1.

Learned Counsel to Appellant stated that Appellant had by averments in paragraphs 7 – 22 of his Amended Statement of Defence laid claim and ownership to the land in dispute. That where two parties are laying claim to the same land the party who can show that title is in him owns the land.

That having regard to Exhibit P contained on pages 63 – 67 of the record, the Legal Owner made Power of Attorney in favour of the Appellant.

To the Appellant’s learned Counsel “equitable right of possession and occupation of the property ought to be ascribed to the appellant over and above the respondents who have no

material before the Court to support a grant of any interest by Dr. Ibrahim.”

That the burden of proving sufficient interest in Plot 1360 Gudu District rests squarely on Respondents as according to him they would be the losers if no evidence was presented to trial Court. He relied on Section 132 Evidence Act Cap E14 LFN 2011 (sic) and AGU V. NNADI (2002) 12 SC (PT. 1) 173 AT 789.
He submitted that all reliefs granted to Respondents ought to be set aside.
That the order that Letter of Allocation in respect of Plot 1360 be handed over to the 1st Respondent is tantamount to divesting DR WEN IBRAHIM of his title over the property even when he was not a party to the proceeding at the trial Court. He relied on ATUNRASE V. SUNMOLA (1985) NWLR (PT. 1) 105 AT 124.
He finally urged the Court to allow the appeal.

Responding under issue 4, learned Counsel to the Respondents submitted that the lower Court was right in granting all the reliefs the Respondents sought at the lower Court having regard to the totality of evidence led by the five witnesses called by the Plaintiffs/Respondents. He referred to pages 103, 104, 105- 115 of the record

of appeal.

That the evidence they gave was not shaken under cross examination. That their evidence was corroborated by Exhibit “L” written by DW1 who wrote Exhibit “L”, Bar. Eze.
That the case presented by Respondents at the trial was not shaken or challenged by the Appellant.

That Appellant called two witnesses and that evidence of DW1 was rejected by the lower Court. As for the evidence of Barrister Chukwuemeka Eze as the trial Court found DW1’s evidence to be most unreliable and unworthy of credit. That the lower Court declared that the DW1 was NOT a witness of truth. He relied on page 1486 of the record. That he accepted (DW1) that he handled the purchase transaction about the land in dispute on behalf of Appellant.

He reproduced the evidence of Appellant who testified as DW2 under cross examination and submitted that his evidence was hearsay and thus has no evidential value. That there was no evidence on the other side of the scale and as such Respondent case will be proved on minimal evidence. He relied on the cases of:-
1. NWABUOKU V. OTTIH (1961) 2 SCNLR 232:
2. BURAIMOH V. BAMGBOSE (1989) 3 NWLR (PT. 109) 352.

ADEWUYI V. ODUKWE (2005) 14 NWLR (PT. 945) AT 491A.
He adopted his submissions under issue 3.

That the lower Court fully appreciated the law and principle relating to situation where disputants to a piece of land obtained their title from a common vendor. He relied on page 492 of the record of appeal.

As to whether Appellant was in possession of the land in dispute the learned Counsel to the Respondent stated that the Appellant did not plead possession and cannot at appellate level introduce issue that he was put in possession as he sought to do here.

On the argument of Appellant that MR MAXIMUS OLIOBI do not have any interest in the land in dispute, the learned Counsel to the Respondents stated that it is strange that Appellant who pleaded and gave evidence that MR MAXIMUS OLIOBI is the Agent of DR MUSA WEN IBRAHIM can turn round in another breath to suggest that Respondents who were put in possession by MR OLIOBI do not have any interest in the subject matter of this suit.

He submitted that the unchallenged evidence before the trial Court show that MR. OLIOBI acquired interest in the subject matter of this suit in 2004 and was put in

possession by predecessor in title and the possessor is in law deemed to be continued by the successors in possession. He relied on ADEWOLE V. DADA (supra).

On the submission of learned Counsel to the Appellant to the effect that Exhibit C tendered by the Respondents is a registerable instrument that was inadmissible because it was not registered. He submitted that Exhibit C is only Evidence of payment of Purchase Price and not evidence of transfer of title. He relied on the case of AKINDURO V. ALAYA (2007) 15 NWLR (PT. 1057) 312 AT 331 G – H. That there is unchallenged evidence of witnesses to the Respondents to the effect that 1st Respondent paid purchase price of the said plot 1360 to MAXIMUS OLIOBI.
That Exhibit “C” is the evidence of the said payment.

On whether it was wrongful for the trial Court to order the Appellant to hand over to the 1st Respondent the letter conveying the approval of application for the Certified True Copy of the Letter of Allocation in respect of the Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja. Learned Counsel to the Respondents argued that Appellant cannot raise such issue without an appeal or ground

challenging the said decision of the lower Court.

In conclusion, the learned Counsel to the Respondents urged this Court to dismiss the appeal and uphold the judgment of trial Court.

Now on page 489 last paragraph, the learned trial Judge held as follows:-
“The question now arises as to whether there was any interest to transfer to the Defendant at the time of sale, whether legal or equitable. The question must be asked whether by this date, in March 2008, the vendor had any title retained by him or reclaimed by him. The issue is that at this date March 2008 the Donor on record, Dr. Wen Musa Ibrahim no longer had any legal interest and therefore the Irrevocable Power of Attorney between him and Mr. Ibe Chjioke Christopher is hereby null and void and of no effect.”

The trial Judge according to the learned Counsel to the Appellant had no materials or evidence before him to have made such pronouncement in that the onus was squarely on Respondents and not on the Appellant to establish the claim to declaratory reliefs.

It is true and trite that the Plaintiff in a case for declaration of title to land must rely on the strength of his own case

and not on the weakness of the defence, There is an exception to the general principle of law relating to burden or onus of proof in a claim for declaration of title to land. See:-
1. MR AUDU OTUKPO V. APA JOHN & ANOR (2012) 7 NWLR (PART 1299) 357 AT 376 H – 377A per ONNOGHEN, JSC who said:-
“It is settled law that a Plaintiff in an action for declaration of title to land must succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defence though where the case of the defence support that of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff can take advantage of same in establishing his claim. See Woluchem V. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 294 Mogaji V. Cadbury Nig. Ltd (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 393.”
2. NELSON NWOSU ONWUGBUFOR & ORS V. HERBERT OKOYE & ORS (1996) per IGUH, JSC who said:-
“It must however be emphasized that the applicable principle is that a Plaintiff when claiming declaration of title must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence although where any aspect of the defendant’s case supports the Plaintiff’s case, the plaintiff will not be deprived of the advantage of such support. See

Kodilinye V. Mbanefo Odu 2 WACA 336 at 337, Cobblah V. Gbeke 12 W.A.C.A. 294; Akinola V. Oluwo (1962) 1 All NLR 224 At Page 225. Nwogbogu V. Chief Nnoli Ibeziako (1972) 1 All NLR (Pt. 2) 137.”
3. KABURU PADA V. WOYA GALADIMA & ANOR (2018) 3 NWLR (PART 1607) 436 AT 456 per SANUSI, JSC who said:-
“It is noted by me, that both lower Courts have found that the identity of the land in dispute was not in controversy. It is equally on established law that in a claim of declaration of title to land, a plaintiff has the onus to prove his case based on the evidence he adduces at the trial and not to rely or capitalise on the weakness(es) in the defendant’s case even though he can always take advantage of the evidence of the defence which supports his case. See Tukuru V. Sabi (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 913) 544; Ojo V. Anibire (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 628) 630. See also Uchendu V. Ogboni (1999) 4 Sc (Pt. II) 1; (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 603) 337 and Akinola V. Oluwo (1962) 1 SCNLR 352.”
4. ALHAJI WAHAB ARIJE V. MUSTAPHA ARIJE & ORS (2018) 16 NWLR (PART 1644) 67 AT 88D – E per KEKERE-EKUN, JSC who said:-
“The law is settled, as rightly submitted by

learned counsel for the appellant, that a claim for declaration of title may be proved in anyone of the following ways:
1. By traditional evidence;
2. By production of documents of title duly authenticated and executed.
3. By acts of ownership extending over a sufficient length of time numerous and positive enough as to warrant the inference of true ownership.
4. By acts of long possession and enjoyment.
5. By acts of possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of such adjacent or connected land would in addition be the owner of the land in dispute.
Idundun V. Okumagba (1976) 9 – 10 SC 227 @ 246: Nkado V. Obiano (1997) 5 SCNJ 33 @ 47; (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 503) 31: Owhonda V. Ekpechi (2003) 9 – 11 SCNJ 1 @ 6; (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 849) 326. It is equally trite that the onus is on the claimant to establish his title upon a preponderance of the evidence or on the balance of probability. He must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence, except where the defendant’ case supports his case. See: Kodilinye V. Odu (1935) 2 WACA 336 @ 357;

Onwugbufor V. Okoye (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 424) 252; Shittu V. Fashawe (2005) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 107; (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 946) 671: Nruamah & Ors V. EBUZOEME & Ors (2013) 1 SC 31 @ 55-56; (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1372) 474.”

The parties to this appeal agreed that the property in dispute was originally allocated to one DR. MUSA WEN IBRAHIM in 2002 and that MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI was his Attorney or Agent. The avowed position of the 1st Respondent was that MAXIMUS OLIOBI purchased the property IN DISPUTE Plot 1360 situate at GUDU DISTRICT, ABUJA sometime in 2004. The Respondents pleaded in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim that all documents relating to the sale and transfer of the property were handed over to MAXIMUS OLIOBI by DR MUSA WEN IBRAHIM and that the said MAXIMUS OLIOBI took all necessary steps to effect change of ownership and transfer of the land to himself at the ABUJA GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS FCT ADMINISTRATION. That the documents relating to the land in dispute got lost and MAXIMUS OBI the predecessor-in-title of the 1st Respondent enlisted the services of BARRISTER CHUKWUEMEKA EZE (DW1) of IVORY CHAMBERS, Legal Practitioners and

Consultants Abuja to pursue the registration of title to the land in dispute in favour of MAXIMUS OLIOBI in October 2007. The history of sale of the land by MAXIMUS OLIOBI to 1st Respondent and later to 2nd Respondent as per the evidence of Plaintiffs witnesses at the trial was amply captured on pages 12 – 16 of the Respondents’ Brief of Argument.

The entire case of the Appellant at the trial was tied to and dependent on the role played by the aforesaid Emeko Eze (DW1) who apart from acting for the predecessor-in-title of the 1st Respondent also found it convenient in 2008 to be the Agent of the Appellant for the negotiation of sale of the land in dispute to Appellant knowing fully well that he had in 2007 written a letter Exhibit “L” on behalf of MAXIMUS OLIOBI as the owner of the property in dispute the said MAXIMUS OLIOBI having purchased same in 2004 from the original allottee DR MUSA WEN IBRAHIM. The Appellant’s case also rested primarily on the evidence of Barrister Chukwuemeka Eze who testified for Appellant as DW1. The evidence of Appellant (DW2) was about all he was told concerning the land by DW1, Chukwuemeka Eze. Esq.

The case of the Respondents is clearly a claim to prior equitable interest in the land in dispute found on the fact that the person with the legal estate in the property DR MUSA WEN IBRAHIM had in 2004 sold the entire interest or right of occupancy to MAXIMUS OLIOBI who sold the land to the 1st Respondent for valuable consideration in January, 2008. It was the position of the Respondent that as at 13th March 2008 when the original allottee purported to sell the said land to the Appellant he had nothing to sell to the Appellant on the maxim of NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET. The transfer of the land and vesting of same in MAXIMUS OLIOBI was with the knowledge and active participation of Barrister Chukwuemeka Eze. The same Chukwuemeka spearheaded and participated in the purported sole of the land in dispute to the Appellant over five years after the land was sold to MAXIMUS OLIOBI who sold the land to 1st Respondent in January 2008 to the knowledge of Barr. Chukwuemeka Eze who testified as DW1 for Appellant at the trial.

In order to bring to the fore the eminent facts showing that the land was sold to MAXIMUS OLIOBI by DR. WEN MUSA IBRAHIM who purportedly transferred the

land to Appellant vide Exhibit “P” the alleged Irrevocable Power of Attorney made in favour of Appellant on 13/3/2008 three months after 1st Respondent had acquired equitable interest in the property it is necessary to reproduce in full Exhibit “L” written by Barr. Chukwuemeka Eze who testified for the Appellant as DW1. The letter/document Exhibit “L” reads:-
“October 22, 2007
The Director
Abuja Geographic Information Systems
Abuja
Sir,
SAVE OUR SOUL
RE-FILE NO NS 354 PLOT 1360 GUDU DISTRICT RECERTIFICATION OF TITLE DOCUMENTS
We act as solicitors to Maximus Oliobi and have his instructions to write you.
Our client acquired the above property sometimes in 2004.
Before they could register their Interests on the property, the file got missing thereby halting the registration of their interests.
It was during the period of search for the file that the Honourable Minister directed that all Title documents holders should recertify them.
When the registration of our client’s interest became thorny they were advised to pay the mandatory fees for recertification and a temporary file opened for the

processing of the his (sic) documents.
Copies of the receipts of payment for the registration of power of attorney and recertification fees are hereby attached.
Our client was also further advised to cause to be advertised in 3 national dailies the loss of his right of occupancy. The copies of the advertisement in the 3 Newspapers and the affidavits and police reports are hereby attached.
He also submitted the copies of his documents for temporary recertification.
However, after persistent visit to get the power of attorney registered and get document from your organization showing that he had complied with the re- certification process he has cause to believe that there is deliberate attempt contrived to deprive him of his plot.
This is more so as the development control department have refused to process his drawings for approval on the ostensible reason that he could not provide any acknowledgement from AGIS showing that he re-certified his documents. We therefore urge that in the light of above circumstance, of which we have no control, to appeal that you do the processing of recertification in the name of our client MAXIMUS OLIOBI

who will then pay the attendant regulation fee.
We look forward to your prompt and effective response to our plight.
Thanks
Yours faithfully
For IVORY CHAMBERS
CHUKWUEMEKA EZE, ESQ.”

There is no doubt that the Appellant and his Agent Chukwuemeka, Esq who incidentally was also Agent of MAXIMUS OLIOBI who sold the land to 1st Respondent earlier in time knew and are deemed to have NOTICE that the land in dispute belonged to MAXIMUS OLIOBI since 2004 when he bought the same from the original and legal owner DR. MUSA WEN IBRAHIM. In effect as at 13/3/2008 when he purportedly gave Irrevocable Power of Attorney to the Appellant, DR. MUSA WEN IBRAHIM had already divested himself and fully disposed his interest in the land to MAXIMUS OLIOBI as could be seen in Exhibit “L” written by the DW1 on behalf of the said MAXIMUS OLIOBI. Barrister Chukwuemeka Eze acted for the Appellant. He had knowledge of the sale to MAXIMUS OLIOBI while he wrote Exhibit “L” in IVORY CHAMBERS and signed the letter as acting for MAXIMUS OLIOBI way back in October, 22, 2007. Notwithstanding that he claimed that he wrote the letter on the instruction of his

principal. The fact remains that he had knowledge of the earlier purchase of the land by MAXIMUS OLIOBI from DR. MUSA WEN IBRAHIM. The Appellant is bound by the Notice and knowledge of an earlier sale of the land all known to his Agent Chukwuemeka Eze, see:-
1. ALHAJA JURADAT ANIMASHAUN V. G. A. OLOJO (1990) LPELR – 491 (SC) where the Supreme Court per OBASEKI, JSC said on pages 17 – 19 thus:-
“what is the meaning of a ‘bona fide’ purchaser of the legal estate for value without notice?’ ‘Bona fide’ is defined as
“In good faith, honestly, without fraud, collusion, or participation In wrong doing.”
Purchaser for value
‘Purchaser’ in its technical sense does not necessarily imply purchaser for value. ‘For value’ are Included to show that value must be given to earn the immunity from equitable claimants. Value means any consideration in money, money’s worth (e.g. other lands, stocks and shores or services or marriage. (See Le Neve V. Le Neve (1747) 1 Ves Sen 64: Wh & T. 157 Willoughby loughby V. Willoughby 1 TR. 763. Of a Legal estate.
As Courts of equity break in upon the common law,

when necessity and conscience require it, still they allow superior force and strength to a legal title to estate.
See Wortley V. Birkhead (1754)2 Ves Sen 571 at 574 per Lord Hardwicke, LC. Without Notice, he must have no notice of the existence of equitable interest. He must have neither actual notice nor constructive notice nor imputed notice.
A person has actual notice of all facts of which he has (or has had) actual knowledge however that knowledge was acquired.
Constructive Notice.
The Court of Chancery insisted that purchaser should inquire about equitable interests with no less diligence that about legal interest which they could ignore only at their own peril. The motto of English conveyance Is caveat emptor; the risk of encumbrances is on the purchaser who must satisfy himself by a full investigation of title before completing his purchase. A purchaser would be able to plead absence of notice only if he had made all usual and proper inquires, and had still found nothing to indicate the equitable interest.
In the instant appeal, if the appellant had visited the site of the land, plot 27 before completing the purchase, she would

have found that the respondent was already in possession of the land and then further enquires would have revealed that her vendors had already sold the plot and collected the purchase price from the respondent.
Imputed Notice
There is a third category of notice known as imputed notice. If a purchaser employs an agent, such as a solicitor, any actual or constructive notice (Re Aims Corn Charity (1901) 2 Ch, 750) which the agent receives imputed to the purchaser. There Is no evidence that any agent acted for the appellant.
Since plot 27 was already sold to the defendant/respondent and who was put in possession before the appellate bought and received the conveyance Exhibit A assuming that the plan attached to Exhibit A correctly describes the property, she bought subject to the equitable interests in the land acquired by the respondent.
In view of all I have said above, I found no merit In the appeal and for the above reasons. I dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal.”
(Underlined mine)
2. DR. BENJAMIN OHIAERI V. ALHAJI B. I. YUSSUF & ORS (2009) LPELR – 2361 SC 1 AT 20 – 22 per TABAI, JSC

who said:-
“Thus even if it is accepted that the 3rd respondent sold the property evidenced in exhibit “A” without the consent or concurrence of the 4th respondent, it remains a valid sale variable only at the instance of the said 4th respondent. I hold on conclusion therefore that exhibit “A” remains a valid agreement of sale of the land in dispute and which has created an equitable interest in favour of the 2nd respondent and which equitable interest ranks as high as and can even supersede a subsequent legal estate created in favour of another person over the same land. The next question is that of determining the priority of the equities as between the 2nd respondent and the appellant. The appellant claims to have acquired his lead estate over the property for value and without notice of the 2nd respondent’s equitable interest thereon. The settled principle is that only a subsequent bonafide purchaser of a legal estate for value without notice that can take priority over someone who had acquired a prior equitable interest over the some property. This is the principle in Animashaun V. Olojo (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 154) 111 at 121.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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There is no gainsaying the fact that the appellant bought the property for value. The evidence is that he paid N1,000,000.00 to the same 3rd respondent. But can he be said to have bought the property bonafide and without notice. In Animashun V. Olojo (supra) purchase “without notice” was explained to mean that the purchaser must have no notice of the existence of the equitable interest, that is, that he must have neither actual notice, nor constructive notice, nor imputed notice. It was also held that if the purchaser employs an agent such as a solicitor, any actual or constructive notice which the agent receives is imputed to the purchaser.
In this case the uncontroverted evidence is that the same Chief Ladi Williams who brought the 2nd and 3rd respondent together and indeed facilitated the sale of the property to the 2nd respondent was also the agent of the appellant and facilitated the conveyance of the property by the 3rd and 4th respondents to the appellant. Therefore the notice actual or constructive of the prior equitable interest by Chief Ladi Williams is imputed to the appellant. On this issue, the learned trial Judge in his judgment at page 231

of the record had this to say.
“In spite of the search conducted at the Land Registry at the instance of the 3rd defendant, no encumbrance was found, yet the knowledge of the earlier sale to the plaintiffs’ is impliedly imputed to the 3rd defendant through the role of Chief Rotimi Williams Chambers.”
I think I have every cause to endorse the above reasoning and conclusion. The knowledge of Chief Ladi Williams and indeed Chief Rotimi Williams Chamber about the prior sale to the 2nd plaintiff/respondent is, in law, imputed to the appellant. The result is that he cannot claim protection under the doctrine of innocent purchaser for value without notice. He had notice or notice imputed to him and so the defence does not avail him. In view of the foregoing considerations therefore I resolve the first issue in favour of the respondent.
With respect to the 2nd issue of whether the agreement for sale between the 3rd respondent and the plaintiff/respondent can found an action in specific performance, the answer, in my view is again in the affirmative. An action for specific performance arise once there exists a contract coupled with

circumstances which make it equitable to grant a decree of same. This being a contract for the sale of land attracts a greater justification for a decree of specific performance because as opposed to other types of contract, the land may have a special and peculiar value to the purchaser. The plaintiffs/ respondents have therefore every justification to claim for specific performance. With respect to the 3rd respondent, she must do equity for “equity looks on that as done which ought to be done”. Put In another way, equity imputes on her an intention to fulfill an obligation and the obligation is for her to specifically perform. The result is that I also resolve the 2nd issue in favour of the respondents.
On the whole I do not fancy any reason to disturb the decision of the two Courts below which I therefore affirm. This appeal stands dismissed and is accordingly dismissed for lack of merit. I assess the costs of this appeal at N50,000.00 in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents.” (Underlined mine)

I agree with the finding of the learned trial Judge on pages 490 – 491 of the record of appeal where he found as follows:-

“The Defendant, who engaged Barrister Eze claiming him as his agent, clearly had notice of the existence of the interest of Mr. Oliobi and the other Plaintiffs generally, and cannot be said to be an innocent purchaser for value. Since in his examination in chief, he stated that he never went to AGIS and stated that it was Barrister Eze who conducted the search and later told him that there was not caveat on the land with the land being genuine. He also stated that it was Barrister Eze his lawyer, who helped in recertifying the documents at AGIS. From this, it can be deduced that there could not be a registered interest for Oliobi at the time of this search, for the simple reason that it is same Barrister Eze was in process, or rather was under a legal duty to process the Certified True Copies of Letter of Allocation, Power of Attorney, Sales Agreement for Mr. Oliobi. This processing had to be completed first before any other interest, apart from the original allottee could be registered.
So, Barrister Eze who was formerly in the middle of both parties was under a solemn duty as an agent to both, and especially as a legal practitioner to have informed the

Defendant of the Plaintiffs interest. To have kept quiet, withdrawn his brief from Oliobi, and to have swapped parties was most unprofessional and extremely distasteful and totally unbecoming.
The most persuasive evidence which corroborated the Plaintiff is actually a document written by the defence witness No. 2. In it, he announced that he was acting for Maximus Oliobi, and further stated that the said Oliobi had acquired the property sometime in 2004. He also confirmed the loss of the file by stating that fact in this letter, and attributed this loss to be the reason for halting the registration of their interest. There is also evidence adduced in this letter that they paid for the registration of the Power of Attorney and recertification fees and advertised in the Newspapers and referred to the Police Report and affidavits. The letter revealed that PW4 had attempted to get his development plan but was stalled because he could not provide the acknowledgment from AGIS of recertification. He also confirmed the PW4 as settling the local inhabitants and finally directed the processing of the re-certification in the name of MAXIMUS OLIOBI. He annexed the

copies of the AGIS receipts for the Power of Attorney and Recertification and the newspaper clippings.
The Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has indeed proven their entitlement to the land based on their equitable interest and their acquisition was legal. The fact of the loss of title documents is not the fact that they never existed. The Plaintiffs have proved the fact that they were in possession and also proved a superior right to possession over the defendant.”

There is no doubt that the Respondents actually led credible evidence and produced relevant documentary evidence with probative value showing that the Respondents acquired valid equitable interest in the property in dispute ever before the Appellant purportedly acquired interest in the property. The Appellant was/is fully aware of the prior interest of the Respondents in the land Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja. The mere fact of Registration of the purported Power of Attorney Exhibit “P” spuriously and fraudulently made in his favour cannot under any guise defeat the prior interest of the Respondents and their predecessor in title MAXIMUS OLIOBI. The said Irrevocable Power of Attorney

given by DR. MUSA IBRAHIM to MR. IBE CHIJIOKE CHRISTOPHER is a fluke and it is null and void. As at the time he gave out the purported Power of Attorney he has no scintilla of interest, legal or equitable in the said Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja again having sold same to MAXIMUS OLIOBI in 2004. The lower Court was perfectly in order in nullifying Exhibit “P” and vacating its unlawful or illegal effect. Exhibit “P” does not exist in the eyes of the law, see:-
1. NAPOLEON S. ORIANZI V. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL RIVERS STATE & ORS (2017) 6 NWLR (PT. 1561) 224 AT 273 C – H per GALINJE, JSC who said:-
“In Olukoya V. Ashiru (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 322) 1479 at 1514 paras, E-H: (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 1, this Court held that an equitable owner in possession cannot be overridden by a subsequent grantee of a legal estate. This is what my brother, Ogbuagu, JSC, 38, paras. F-H who read the lead judgment said:
“As rightly submitted in the respondent’s brief at page 8, the Jalingo Local government having lawfully granted the land in dispute to the respondent, in 1981, it was left with nothing to grant to the appellant subsequently in 1983 during the

subsistence of the grant to the respondent… so that, if there is proof that money was paid for the land coupled with an entry into possession it is sufficient, to defeat the title of a subsequent purchaser of the legal estate, if and provided that the possession, is continuously maintained… Thus, if even it is coupled with possession, it cannot be overridden by a legal estate”.
See Ogbu & 4 Ors V. Ani & Ors (1994) 78 SCNJ (Pt. II) 363: (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 335) 128; Soremekun V. Shodipo (1959) LLR 30: Orasanmi V. Idowu (1959) 4 FSC 40; (1959) SCNLR 97; Oshodi V. Balogun & Ors. (1934) 4 WACA 1.
Clearly the right of occupancy available to the appellant over the disputed property was not automatically extinguished by Section 5(2) of the Land Use Act by the purported sale and subsequent grant of a statutory right of occupancy over the same property to the 3rd and 4th respondents. To allow such an injustice, is to allow those in authority to benefit from their wrong actions. Rivers State Government cannot determine a contract in which it is a party and then take certain benefit arising therefrom leaving the party aggrieved without any

remedy.”
At page 284 C – G, AUGIE, JSC said as follows:-
“In Tewogbade V. Obadina (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 338) 326 at pp. 347-348 paras. H-A this Court per Iguh, JSC, hit the nail right on the head, as follows-
“Where two contesting parties trace their title in respect of the same piece of land to the same grantor, the applicable principle of law has always been that the latter in time of the two parties to obtain the grant cannot maintain an action against the party who first obtained a valid grant of the land from such a common grantor. The reason is obvious as a grantor having successfully divested himself of his title in respect of the disputed piece or parcel of land by the first grant would have nothing left to convey to a subsequent purchaser under the elementary principle of nemo dot quod non habet as no one may convey what no longer belongs to him.”
2. ALHAJI ABACHA MOHAMMED KOLO V. ALHAJI MOHAMMED LAWAN (2018) 13 NWLR (PT. 1637) 495 AT 516 E – H TO 517 A – C per ARIWOOLA, JSC who said:-
“The law is that the plaintiff in an action for declaration of title is required to satisfy the Court by credible evidence but not by admission in

the pleadings of the defendant, of his right to the declaration he claims. See: Bello V. Eweka (1981) 1 SC 101. The reason being that the grant of a declaration by the Court is discretionary. See: Kodilinye V. Odu 2 WACA 336: Akinola & Ors V. Oluwo & Ors (1962) WNLR 135: (1962) 1 SCNLR 352; Sunday Temile & Ors V. Temide E. Awani (2001) 9 SCM 150 at 165; (2001) 12 NWLR (Pt. 728) 726. It is the appellant who relied on the Certificate of Occupancy (exhibit C) granted to him by the Borno State Government in 1996 that needed to have provided credible evidence to prove his said title on the Certificate of Occupancy.
Generally, a Certificate of Occupancy properly issued to a holder presupposes that the holder is the owner in exclusive possession of the land it relates to. The said certificate also raises the rebuttable presumption that at the time of its issuance, there was not in existence, a customary owner whose title has not been revoked. In which case, where it is proved by evidence that someone else has a better title to the said land before the issuance of the certificate of occupancy, the said certificate becomes void and shall be liable to be

revoked. See; Grace Madu V. Dr. Betram Madu (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 296: (2008) 2-3 SC (Pt. 11) 109; (2008) LPELR – 1806 SC.
In the instant case, the only root of the title upon which the appellant based his claim to ownership of the land in dispute is the grant by the Borno State Government, which gave him a Certificate of Occupancy. Whereas, there was in existence a prior purchase by the respondent. It is a misconception, to say the least for the appellant to contend that the respondent ought to have tendered his document as evidence of purchase of the land after he had called his vendor who gave uncontroverted and credible evidence of his root and sale to the respondent. In other words, there is ample evidence that DW1 – the vendor to the respondent, had customary right of occupancy which, before the coming Into force of the Land Use Act in 1978, he had passed on to the respondent legally. The subsequent right of occupancy purportedly granted by the State Government to the applicant will be void not having caused a revocation of the originally deemed grant. Otherwise, the subsequent grant will be in breach of the provisions of the Land Use Act and

shall be liable to be declared void.
Ordinarily, and there is no doubt, that an owner of land under the native law and custom is entitled to transfer his absolute interest in the land to another and grant exclusive possession of same. See: Aboderin V. Morakinyo (1968) NMLR 179.”
At pages 521H TO 522 A – C GALINJE, JSC also said:-
“In the instant case the respondent bought from a deemed grantee of the disputed land. The fact that appellant had a certificate of statutory right of occupancy Issued under the Land Use Act 1978 is not a conclusive evidence of any right, interest or valid title to the disputed land.
In Alhaji Goni Kyari V. Alhaji Ciroma Alkali & Ors (2001) 5 SCNJ 421 at 426: (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 724) 412 at pages 439-440 pares. H-A, this Court held:-
“Mere tendering of an instrument of title to land such as a deed A of conveyance or a Certificate of Statutory or Customary Right of Occupancy in Court does not automatically prove that the land therein purportedly conveyed, granted or transferred by the instrument becomes the property of the grantee. The existence of a certificate of occupancy is merely a prima facie

evidence of title to the land it covers and no more. Mere registration does not validate spurious or fraudulent instrument of title or transfer or grant which in law is patently invalid or ineffective”.
See Prince Ngene V. Chike Igbo & Anor (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt. 651) 131. The appellant was granted statutory right of occupancy in 1995 through exhibit C, at the time he was granted that right of occupancy in 1995, there existed customary right of occupancy deemed to have been granted to the respondent which right had not been extinguished. The Borno State Government therefore had nothing to grant to the appellant”.
All the documents tendered by the Respondents make them stronger in law as the documents support their claims. What is more Exhibit “O” lends credence to the fact that the property was sold to MAXIMUS OLIOBI and that a Power of Attorney was actually made in MAXIMUS OLIOBI’S favour by DR. MUSA WEN IBRAHIM. As a matter of fact the FCT Administration Abuja Geographic Information System (AGIS) to which Chukwuemeka Eze, Esq wrote Exhibit “L” on behalf of MAXIMUS OLIOBI had already processed the application Exhibit “L” written on

behalf of MAXIMUS OLIOBI by Chukwuemeko Eze, Esq.

The findings of the learned trial Judge on the conduct of Chukwuemeka Eze, Esq and the rejection of his evidence as DW1 were not appealed against by Appellant. On page 485 of the record learned trial Judge heavily came down on DW1 and the evidence of the Appellant which she outrightly rejected.
The Appellant must be taken to have accepted the findings of the lower Court; see:-
1. APC V. HON. D. I. KARFI & ORS (2018) 6 NWLR (PT. 1616) 479 AT 519 H per Eko. JSC who said:-
“On 11th March 2015, the three appellants herein lodged their appeal to the Court of Appeal (the lower Court) challenging the decision of the Federal High Court. INEC, in spite of the orders of the Federal High Court directing it not to recognize or otherwise deal with the candidate of the APC, 1st appellant, in the general election and/or placing the 3rd appellant or any other candidate of the APC on the ballot in consequence of the inconclusive primary election of 2nd December, 2014, did not appeal the decision of the Federal High Court. I need only re-state or emphasize the trite principle of law that decisions of

Court not appealed against remain valid, binding, subsisting and taken as acceptable between the parties until the decision is set aside. See Akere V. Governor, Oyo State (2012) 50 11 NSCQR 345 at 414 – 415; (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1324) 240; LSDPC V. Purification Tech. Ltd. (2012) 52 I NSCQR 274 at 309.”
2. MRS AISHA ABDURAHAMAN & ANOR V. MRS SHADE THOMAS (2019)12 NWLR (PART 1685) 107 AT 124H TO 125 A – C per EKO, JSC who said:-
“Neither in the notice of appeal nor in their brief did the appellants make any attempt, albeit feeble, to attack the foregoing decision, that crucially was fatal to their case. The law, as re- stated by Musdapher, JSC, in Jimoh Michael V. The State (2008) LPELR-1874 (SC) page 7: (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt 1104) 361, is that where there is an appeal on some points only in a decision, the appeal stands or falls on those points appealed against only, while the other points or decision not appealed remain unchallenged. Such point or decision unchallenged is taken as acceptable to the parties, particularly the appellant. In other words, a finding or decision of the Court below not challenged on appeal must not rightly or

wrongly; be disturbed by the appellate Court: Oshodi V. Eyifunmi (2000) LPELR – 2805 (SC); (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 298; Nwabueze V. Okoye (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 91) 664. And as I stated elsewhere: a party to the proceeding who does not appeal a particular adverse finding or decision, or who takes no steps to have it reviewed is deemed to accept the verdict against him: Ezerioha & Ors V. Ihezuo (2009) LPELR-4122 (CA). A finding of fact or point in a decision not appealed persists and remains binding on the parties to the suit.”
All the said findings against the Appellant are consistent with the evidence on record and militate greatly against the appeal of the Appellant.

The learned Counsel to the Appellant stated there was no evidence on record by Respondents to show that any interest was vested in MAXIMUS OLIOBI over the property save for uncertified Police Extract dated 13/06/2006 Exhibit “G” and uncertified Affidavit of Loss dated 08/01/08 and 14/07/2005, Exhibits D and H where allegations of transfer of interest in the properly between MAXIMUS OLIOBI and DR IBRAHIM the holder of title to the disputed land.

I have to say straight away

that the arguments have no basis and they are grossly misplaced and not supported by the printed record.

First on the allegation of non certification of Exhibits “G” and “H” the Exhibits were tendered at the trial without objection from Appellant’s learned Counsel.
Secondly, Exhibits G, D and H are originals of public documents and they are admissible in evidence without any further assurance under the Evidence Act, 2011, Sections 85, 86 and 102 of the Evidence Act.
There is no legal impediment preventing original of a public document from being tendered in evidence. In other words an original of a public document is legally admissible in evidence.
It is the best evidence of a public document. It does not require certification, see:-
1.GAMBO IDI V. THE STATE (2018) 4 NWLR (PART 1610) 359 AT 386 C – H TO 387 A – B per OGUNBIYI, JSC who said:-
“Also on the admissibility of exhibit B, which the appellant’s counsel submits is wrongful for absence of certification, I hold the view that the argument is totally misconceived. In other words, and as rightly posited by the respondent’s counsel, the document exhibit

B tendered and admitted at the trial is original in nature and requires no certification as held in the case of PDP V. INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1437) 525. Also the case of Daggash V. Bulama (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 892) 144.
Section 85 of the Evidence Act has stated clearly that documents may be proved by either primary or secondary evidence, and that the primary evidence is the document itself whilst the secondary evidence is the certified true copy of the original, where the document is a public document within the meaning of the Act.
I have stated earlier that exhibit B was the original document rendered at the trial in line with the case of Tabik Invest. Ltd. V. Guaranty Trust Bank Plc (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1276) 240. It is the appellant’s argument that the Court must not consider the originality of exhibit B, but rather that it is subject to the exception to the general rule and thus relegating it to a position of being secondary document.
As rightly submitted and argued by the respondent’s counsel, Section 83 of the Evidence Act provided for admissibility of documentary evidence. The case of Tabik Investment Ltd V. GTB Plc supra, cited by

the appellant is to the extent that documents emanating from the Nigerian Police, especially documents to be used in Court are public documents, which only certified true copies are admissible in evidence. The foregoing requirement does not refer to the document contained in the case diary, which is a subject and result of investigation. By Section 127(1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, contents of a case diary which includes exhibit “B” (which was a document obtained in the course of investigation) are a primary document. They are original as provided in Section 83 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended) and are admissible in evidence. Therefore the reliance made on the case of Tabik Inv. Ltd. V. GTB by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant does not help their case.
Further still and contrary to the contention argued on behalf of the appellant, is the case of Kwara State Ministry of Agriculture V. S.G.P Nig Ltd (1998) 11 NWLR (Pt. 575) at 583 per Ogebe, JCA wherein it was held that:-
“A public document is admissible as primary evidence without certification.”
2. ISA KASSIM V. THE STATE 2017 per EKO, JSC who

said:-
“I will come anon to the interpretation of these provisions of the Evidence Act, 2011. Before then, suffice that I mention that the Courts are not unanimous on whether: where original copy of a document forming part of public record is available, the secondary evidence of it, as opposed to the original and primary evidence of it, is the only legal evidence admissible in evidence and it is illegal to prove its contents by the production of the original copy. Galadima, J.C.A. (as he then was), for instance had, in Chief Sunday N.A. Uzor (Suing by his Attorney, Mr. Solomon Iwebuzor) V. Delta Freeze Nig. Ltd. & Ors (2010) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1217) 553 at 574 paras. C -G queried the prudence of insisting on the certified true copy of a public document when the original is available as the primary evidence of the contents. His Lordship states –
“That I should hold that exhibit ‘B’ being primary evidence under Section 94 is admissible without the need for certification by virtue of Sections 93 and 96 of the Evidence Act. With due respect to the learned trial Judge he was in error in holding that exhibit B ought to have been certified. It

does not require to be certified.”
The said Exhibits G, D and H were properly admitted and accorded probative value. They amply supported the oral evidence of PW1 – PW5 all showing that the original allottee of Plot 1360 DR. MUSA WEN IBRAHIM no longer has any legal or equitable interest in the land in dispute having sold same to MAXIMUS OLIOBI in 2004. The Power of Attorney Exhibit executed in favour of Appellant on 13/3/2008 was and it is null and void and of no effect whatsoever. The nullification of the registration of the said Power of Attorney was rightly done by the lower Court. The Respondents proved their entitlement to the land based upon their prior acquisition of the land and the loss of the documents relating to the land as testified to by Respondents witnesses is fully supported.

Exhibit “P” did not convey any interest to the Appellant. It remains a nullity as DR WEN MUSA IBRAHIM has alienated and disposed off his entire interest in the land to MR. MAXIMUS OLIOBI in 2004 whether the Power of Attorney was made irrevocable in favour of MAXIMUS OLIOBI or was not tendered is besides the relevant issues. The question is whether by the

oral and documentary evidence before the lower Court the Respondents proved their case as postulated on their Writ of Summons and pleadings. The lower Court’s findings that he believed the oral evidence given by Plaintiffs witnesses and that the pieces of evidence given by them were fully supported by all documentary evidence tendered by the said Plaintiffs/Respondents witnesses cannot be faulted.

The existence of the Power of Attorney made in favour of MAXIMUS OLIOBI was alluded to in the letters Exhibits F and L written ON 22-10-2007 on behalf of MAXIMUS OLIOBI by DW1, Barrister Chukwuemaka Eze, Esq who wrote in the letter all the facts pleaded by the Respondents.

Exhibit “O” attests to the assertion in Exhibit “L” made by DW1 while acting for MAXIMUS OLIOBI who sold the land in January, 2008 to the 1st Respondent.
The findings of the learned trial Judge on pages 483 – 484 cannot also be faulted.

Now the learned Counsel to the Appellant argued in paragraphs 3.24 – 3.25 of Appellant’s Brief of Argument as follows:-
3.24 My Lords, it is also intriguing and curious that the trial Court which severally in its judgment affirmed

that legal title over Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja remained, at all times material to this suit, vested in Dr. Wen Musa Ibrahim would in the same breadth grant a declaration voiding the registration of a power of attorney he executed in favour of the appellant on the purported ground that at the time he executed it, he no longer had any legal interest in the property. The trial Court, for instance, asserted in paragraph 2 at page 480 of the record:
“Without doubt, It can be clearly seen that whatever documentation relating to the land is firmly in the name of Dr. Wen Musa Ibrahim and so legal title is vested on him statutorily through the Right of Occupancy offered him by the duly authorizing body…“
3.25 The trial Court did not anywhere in its judgment find or pronounce that the power of attorney (page 63 – 67 of the record) duly registered and admitted a Exhibit P was not executed by Dr. Ibrahim, the certified holder of title over the disputed property.”

There is no doubt a gross misconception on the part of Appellant’s learned Counsel to the findings or decision of the learned trial Judge. What the learned trial

Judge has plainly said is that though the legal Estate and documents relating to its allocation pertaining to Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja are still in the names of Dr. Musa Wen Ibrahim in the Lands Registry of FCT Administration that is ABUJA GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS (AGIS) Abuja, the fact remains that Dr. Wen Musa Ibrahim has sold his interest in the land to MAXIMUS OLIOBI in 2004 and that MAXIMUS OLIOBI had engaged the services of DW1 in 2007 to take legal steps to have the documents of the land changed to MAXIMUS OLIOBI and that prompted Exhibit “L” asking the FCT Administration, Abuja Geographic Information Systems (AGIS) to do the recertification in the name of MAXIMUS OLIOBI who has acquired equitable interest that was as good as Legal Estate in the land in dispute.

Occupancy had earlier on been sold to another person for valuable consideration as in this case on appeal. The Power of Attorney or Certificate of Occupancy remains moribund and liable to be struck down and declared null and void by the Court seised of the matter. See:-
ALHAJI ABACHA MOHAMMED KOLO V. ALHAJI MOHAMMED LAWAN (2018) 13 NWLR (PART 1637) 495 AT 516 H TO 517 A – C per ARIWOOLA, JSC.
2. T. LAWAL OWOSHO & ORS V. MICHAEL ADEBOWALE DADA (1984) 7/8 SC 149 AT 165 – 166 per ANIAGOLU, JSC who said:-
“In the instant case, there was no need, having regard to the state of the pleadings, for the respondent/plaintiff to apply to recall the plaintiff in order to tender the deed of conveyance registered as 69/69/1433 which had been admitted specifically by the 7th defendant and deemed to be admitted by the 1st to 6th defendants in the pleadings.
With all due respect to Mr. Bashua, counsel for the appellants, he had conceived the matter erroneously when he kept on harping, in his submission before us, that the learned trial Judge could not set aside a deed of conveyance which was not before him. He argued as if a setting aside of a deed of

conveyance would entail a physical tearing up, or destruction, of the deed before it could be said to have been set aside. The particulars of the deed were before the Court and were admitted. All that would have happened would have been for a Judgment of a Court setting aside the deed (in the instant case, deed registered as No. 69 at page 69 in Volume 1433 of the Lagos Lands Registry) to be affixed to the deed in the Land Registry by the Registrar, or for the record of the Court’s Judgment to be made on the deed and the cancellation would then be effective. Mr. Bashua must have felt that he had reached his El Dorado when the plaintiff did not produce his deed of conveyance, and this must have been responsible for his taking the unwise step not to call any evidence at the close of the plaintiff’s case. Clearly, that was a mistaken failure to appreciate the state of the pleadings in this case.
It must be pointed out that the matters in issue were not the terms of the deed of conveyance in which case it would be necessary that the document should be produced in order that the Court might determine the precise contents of the document. That the

plaintiff pleaded was that the 1st to 6th defendants purported to convey the estate which was already vested in him to the 7th defendant. The 7th defendant had admitted that it was that estate which was conveyed to him by the deed of conveyance registered as 69/69/1433 of the Lagos Land Registry.”

Another issue contended is that having regard to the cause of action, parties pleadings and the evidence the Plaintiffs now Respondents are not entitled to the reliefs granted to the Respondents. I have carefully read the pleadings of the parties, the cause of action, evidence, oral and documentary, the addresses of learned Counsel to the parties and the judgment of lower Court. I am of the firm view that the case of the Respondents at the lower Court was/is well founded, proved and established by overwhelming evidence.

I am not unmindful of the Argument of the Appellant in paragraphs 4.15 and 4.16 wherein he argued:-
“4.15 Besides Exhibit C is a registrable instrument by virtue of Section 22(1) of the Land Use Act and having not been registered is void. See the case of Awojugbagbe Light Industries Ltd V. Chinukwe (1995) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 390) p.379 at p.435

wherein the Court held that:
“S.22(1) of the Land Use Act prohibits the holder of a statutory right of occupancy from alienating his right of occupancy or any part thereof by assignment, mortgage, transfer of possession, sublease or otherwise without the consent of the governor first had and obtained. Section 26 of the Act expressly provides that any transaction which purports to confer on or vest in any person any interest or right over land other than in accordance with the provisions of S.22(1) shall be null and void”.
4.16 We therefore submit that the sale of land Agreement (Exhibit C) relied upon by the 1st respondent as evidence of his interest in Plot 1360 Gudu District Abuja is void, the consent of the Minister of FCT having not been obtained. And it would still have been void in the circumstances even if it has been executed by the title holder, Dr. Wen Musa Ibrahim. The trial Court wrongly admitted Exhibit C and also wrongly ascribed probative value to it. In the case of Etajata & 2 Ors V. Ologbo (2007) 6 SC (Pt 11) P.1 where the trial Court admitted an unregistered sale of land Agreement and relied on same during the proceedings,

the Supreme Court held at p.30 that;
“…although the learned trial judge admitted the document i.e. Exhibit A in evidence (without objection from the defendants) such mere admission of a document which otherwise was inadmissible and even though the opposing party did not object, cannot confer any right on the learned trial judge to ascribe any probative value to that document”.

Yes Exhibit “C” is a Registerable Instrument the lack of registration of it does not render it void. It remains an agreement or contract for sale of land which could be pleaded as receipt of purchase of the land in dispute coupled with possession. Section 22 of Land Use Act cannot render it void because the section does not prohibit making or entering into agreement of sale of land. The duty lies on the holder transferring his interest to apply for the consent of the Governor and as in this case the Honourable Minister of FCT. All these have been shown to have been vigorously pursued by MAXIMUS OLIOBI who engaged the DW1 to pursue recertification of documents in respect of the land to be made in MAXIMUS OLIOBI’s name per request contained in Exhibit “F” and

“L” and by Exhibit “O”. There is active indications that the documents of the land were being processed in the name of MAXIMUS OLIOBI.
Further the sale to 1st Respondent or 2nd Respondent remains valid and was prior to the purported sale to the Appellant. Section 22 of Land Use Act is of no moment to the case of the Appellant, see:-
1. AYODELE KORO & ORS V. ALHAJA RISHAT ISHOLA & ORS (2018) 15 NWLR (PART 1641) 77 AT 98 G – H TO 99 A – C per KEKERE-EKUN, JSC who said:-
“Sections 22 (1) and 26 of the Land Use Act provide:
22(1) It shall not be lawful for the holder of a statutory right of occupancy granted by the governor to alienate his right of occupancy or any part thereof by assignment, mortgage, transfer of possession, sublease or otherwise howsoever without the consent of the Governor first had and obtained.
26. Any transaction or any instrument which purports to confer on or vest in any person any interest or right over land other than in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall be null and void.
It has been held by this Court that Section 22(1) of the Land Use Act, 1978 does not prohibit the holder of a

statutory right of occupancy from entering into some form of negotiation which may end with a written agreement for presentation to the Governor for his consent, so long as such written agreement is understood and entered into “subject to the consent of the Governor”.
See: Awojugbagbe Light Ind V. Chinukwe (supra) at 435 – 436, G – A. It was also held that there will be no contravention of Section 22(1) by the mere fact that such agreement was executed before being forwarded to the Governor for his consent. As rightly observed by the Court below, it is clearly stated in the 4th recital in exhibit 2 that the agreement was entered into subject to the Governor’s consent. The deposit of the document with the bank as security for a loan merely created an equitable mortgage. See: Yaro V. Arewa Const. Ltd. (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1063) 333; Usenfowokan V. Idowu & Anor. (1975) LPELR-3426 (SC) 1 @ 8 – 11. This explains the effort of the bank, as stated by DW4, to obtain the Governor’s consent on Sule Raji’s behalf, in order to properly secure its interest. PW3, a Lands Officer in the Governor’s office, who testified on behalf of the

appellants and who processed the application for the Governor’s consent to exhibit 2, testified that all the prerequisites for its grant were met.”
Exhibit “C” was properly pleaded and relied upon by the Respondents and the Court below. SeeMOSES BENJAMIN & ORS V. MR ADOKIYE KALIO & ANOR (2018) 15 NWLR (PART 1641) 38 AT 52 C – E per EKO. JSC who said:-
“Even if Section 20 of the Rivers State Law, Cap. 74 were applicable in the circumstances of this case I will still rule in favour of the position adopted by the respondent: that an unregistered “registrable land’ Instrument Is admissible in evidence to prove, not only the payment and receipt of the purchase price, but also the equitable interest of the purchaser in the subject land. That has been the entrenched position in our jurisprudence until evidence was lifted into the exclusive legislative list in the second schedule to the Constitution as can be seen from the following cases, among others) – Savage V. Sarrough (1937) 13 NLR 141; Ogunbambi V. Abowab (1951) 13 WACA 22: Fakoya V. St. Paul’s Church, Shagamu (1966) 1 All NLR 74; Oni V. Arimoro

(1973) 3 SC 163: Bucknor-Maclean V. Inlaks (1980) 8 – 11 SC 1; Okoye V. Dumez (Nig.) Ltd. (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt 4) 783: Obijuru V. Ozims (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.6) 167 etc. The totality of all I had stated under this sub-issue is that the Land Instrument, exhibit was properly pleaded and admitted in evidence. The trial Court was right in acting on it as a piece of legal evidence before it. The lower Court had no difficulty affirming the position of the trial Court on this.”

Consequently issues 3 and 4 are hereby resolved against the Appellant.
In the result the Appellant’s appeal has no merit and the Appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed in its entirety.

The judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja delivered on 18th day of June, 2013 (Coram BANJOKO J.) is HEREBY AFFIRMED.
The Appellant shall pay Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira (N250,000.00) costs to the Respondents.

ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.: I agree.

STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Peter Olabisi Ige, JCA.

My learned brother has comprehensively dealt with all

the issues distilled in this appeal. I agree with the reasoning and the conclusion which I adopt as mine. I too, find the appeal lacking in merit and I dismiss it. I abide by the consequential orders inclusive of the order as to costs as made in the lead judgment.

Appearances:

A. EZE holding brief of CHRIS EZUGWU, ESQ For Appellant(s)

IKE NZEKWE, ESQ For Respondent(s)