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I. P. D. ABAYE V. IKEM UCHE OFILI & ANOR.(1986)

I. P. D. ABAYE V. IKEM UCHE OFILI & ANOR.

In The Supreme Court of Nigeria

On Friday, the 17th day of January, 1986

SC.49/1984

 

JUSTICES

KAYODE ESO   Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

AUGUSTINE NNAMANI   Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

MUHAMMADU LAWAL UWAIS   Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

ADOLPHUS GODWIN KARIBI-WHYTE   Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

SAIDU KAWU   Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

  1. P. D. ABAYE Appellant(s)

AND

  1. IKEM UCHE OFILI
    2. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF RIVERS STATE Respondent(s)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPREME COURT CAN ALLOW A FRESH POINT OF LAW TO BE RAISED WHERE SUCH POINT WAS NOT RAISED AT THE TRIAL OR APPEAL COURT

It is now settled that this Court, as a Court of last resort, will allow a fresh point of law to the raised before it, even if such point was not taken in the courts below – see Stool of Abinabina v. Eyimadu, 12 W.A.C.A. 171 at p.173; Djukpan v. Orovuyovbe & Anor., (1967) All N.L.R. 134 at pp. 136-139;Fadiora v. Gbadebo & Ors. (1978) 1 L.R.N. 97 at pp.108-9, and Ejiofodomi’s case (Supra) at pp. 113-6. However such leave is subject to the conditions that – (1) We have before us all the evidence which is needed to completely support the new contention and (2) no satisfactory explanation could have been given by the respondents in the lower courts to counter the contention; see Fadiora’s case (supra) on pp.108-9. PER UWAIS, J.S.C.+

PROOF OF OWNERSHIP OF LAND

It is settled that there are five ways in which the ownership of land can be proved – see Idundun v. Okumagba, (1976) 9-10 S.C. 227 at pp.246-250; Piaro v. Tenalo & Anor. (1976) 1 F.N.R. 229 at p.234 Mogaji v. Cadbury Nig. Ltd., (1985) 2 N.W. L. R. 393 at p.431. One of such ways is by the production of authenticated documents. PER UWAIS, J.S.C.

THE JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE COURT OF APPEAL

There is no doubt that the Court of Appeal, being a superior court of record under the 1979 Constitution of the Federation of the Republic of Nigeria, has sufficient powers to make the consequential order. These powers are derived from different sources. The provision of section 6 subsections (3) and (6) (a) of the Constitution read:
“(3) The courts to which this section relates established by this Constitution for the Federation and for the States specified in subsection (5)(a) to (f) of this section shall be the only superior courts of record in Nigeria; and save as otherwise prescribed by the National Assembly or the House of Assembly of a State, each court shall have all the powers of a superior court of record.”
“(6) The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section –
(a) shall extend notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law;”
Section 16 of the Federal Court of Appeal, Act, 1976 provides in part-
“16. The Court of Appeal may from time to time make any order necessary for determining the real question in controversy in the appeal “
And Order 3 rule 23 of the Federal Court of Appeal Rules, 1981 states:
“23. The Court shall have power to give any judgment or make any order that ought to have been made, and to make such further or other order as the case may require “. PER UWAIS, J.S.C.

WHETHER OR NOT A FOREIGN LAW MUST BE PLEADED

In Benson and Abejude v. Ashiru (1967) N.M.L.R. 364, Brett J.S.C. delivering the judgment of this Court said:-
“As a general rule, foreign law is a question of fact and must be pleaded, but section 73(1)(a) of the Evidence Act required the High Court of Lagos (this also applies to the High Court of Anambra State) to take judicial notice of all laws or enactments and any subsidiary legislation made thereunder having the force of law or herefore in force or hereafter to be in force, in any part of Nigeria, and it is unnecessary to plead matters of which the court takes judicial notice. Bullen and Leake p.91 appears from Koop v. Bebb (1951) 84 C.L.R. 629 that the courts in the different States of Australia similarly take judicial notice of the law in force in the other States.”
(Italics mine)
Where the law in question is foreign law, a question of fact arises. It must be pleaded. Expert evidence may be led and a decision arrived at by the court of trial without inviting the foreign country concerned. The court may refuse to enforce the decision of a foreign court where the domestic tribunal finds suo motu the foreign court has no jurisdiction. See Pembeton v. Hughes (1899) 1 Ch. 781 as per Lord Lindley M.R. But where the law is that of another State in the Federation a judicial notice of that law is taken. PER ESO, J.S.C.

THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A NEW POINT OF LAW CAN BE TAKEN AND CONSIDERED ON APPEAL

The conditions under which new points of law can be taken and considered on appeal have often been stated. These are (i) That the point of law raised will be argued on the same facts as were relied upon in the court below (ii) That the point if argued in the court below would have been decisive. It is for these reasons that the issue of jurisdiction is allowed to be argued at any stage of the trial or appeal. This is because if it is valid it is unanswerable. – See Shonekan v. Smith (1964) All NLR.168.
In Fadiora v. Gbadebo (1978) 3 SC. at pp.248, it was held that a court of last resort may refuse to entertain a question of law raised before it for the first time if it is satisfied that the Court below would have been in a more advantageous position to deal with the matter. – Moola (M.E.) Sons Ltd. Official Liquidator v. Burjorjee (1932) 48 TLR.279. The Court below is only in a more favourable position in dealing with findings of facts which are based on oral testimony and credibility of witnesses. It is not in a more advantageous position where the issue is one for the interpretation of law where the facts are before the Court of appeal. See The Tasmanial )1880) 15 App. Cas.223. PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.

UWAIS, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): In this appeal the 1st respondent was the plaintiff in an action which he brought against the appellant in the Rivers State High Court, sitting at Port Harcourt. His claim as per the writ of summons reads as follows:
“(a) Declaration that the Plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the possession/occupation of a piece or parcel of land described as Plot 295 Oromineke Layout otherwise known as No. 5, Emekuku Street, Diobu – Port Harcourt by virtue of Deed of Lease dated 3rd January, 1979 and registered as No. 38 at 83 Volume 77 of the Lands Registry in the Office at Port Harcourt.
(b) Order for possession of the said property for the use and benefit of the Plaintiff.
(c) Injunction to restrain the Defendant, his family, agent and otherwise from further occupation of the said premises.
(d) N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira) being special and general damages for loss of use since 1st August, 1978.
(e) Any other reliefs the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance.”
Pleadings were filed and exchanged. When the case came up for hearing before the learned trial judge it was agreed between learned counsel for the parties, that is the appellant and the 1st respondent that the issues joined in the pleadings could be tried without oral evidence being adduced. In consequence, therefore, 2 documents were admitted in evidence by consent of both the learned counsel for the said parties. These documents are a deed of lease and a letter written to the defendant from the Rivers State Ministry of Lands and Survey. The documents were admitted as exhibits A and B respectively.
The issues joined between the parties are contained in paragraphs 3, 4. 5, and 8 of the statement of claim and paragraphs 3, 4, 10, 11 and 12 of the statement of defence. Since oral evidence was dispensed with at the trial, I think, it is necessary to quote the paragraphs in question. Those from the statement of claim read thus:
“3. The Plaintiff is the Lessee and therefore owner of Plot 295 Oromineke Layout otherwise known as No.5. Emckuku Street, Port Harcourt by virtue of Deed of Lease dated 3rd January, 1979 and registered as No. 83-83-77 of the Lands Registry in the Office at Port Harcourt. The Deed of Lease aforesaid will be tendered in evidence and relied upon at the trial of the suit.
4. The defendant having been discovered to occupy the said plot being an abandoned property and affected by the Abandoned Property (Custody and Management) Edict 1969 of Rivers State Government was written to by the ministry of Lands and Survey. Lands Division, Port Harcourt informing him that the said property has been purchased by the Plaintiff and to pay rents to the Plaintiff as the Landlord thereof. The copy of the said letter will be founded upon at the hearing of this suit.
5. Inspite of the said letter from the said Ministry the defendant declined to acknowledge the Plaintiff as the Leasee and owner of the property aforesaid and has attempted to challenge the Plaintiffs ownership of the property.”
6. The Plaintiff will state in evidence at the trial of this suit that apart from the said letter from the Ministry of Lands and Survey. Port Harcourt, the Plaintiff addressed many letters to the defendant asking him to vacate the said premises for the use of the Plaintiff, in addition to personal appeal to the defendant. The defendants have always been as adamant to these requests and protests and have threatened violence to the body of the Plaintiff if plaintiff dared to move into the said property.”
And those from the statement of defence as follows:
“3. The Defendant denies paragraphs 3, 7 and 10 of the Statement of Claim and avers that the lease of plot 295 Oromineke Layout otherwise known as No.5 Emekuku Street, Port Harcourt had been cancelled by the Rivers State Government Notice No. 452 published in Volume 4 of the Rivers State of Nigeria Extra-ordinary Gazette, No. 56 of 1st of November, 1972 and it has not been de-acquired.
4. In answer to paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim the Defendant says that the property was not an abandoned property when he moved into it in October, 1974 as the Principal of the Government Teacher College Rumuokuta and it was allocated to him as a Government Staff quarters.
10. The Defendant will contend at the trial that the Deed of Lease referred to in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim is null and void, not having granted or conveyed any interest in land to the Plaintiff as it purported to have done.
11. The Defendant will further contend that the Plaintiff’s claim is misconceived in that assuming as it was being suggested in paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim that the Defendant is the Plaintiff’s tenant (which is denied) the Plaintiff is still not entitled to possession or occupation of the property.
12. The Defendant will aver at the trial that the plaintiff’s claim in any case does not disclose any case for the award of possession, injunction and damages against Defendant, the plaintiff not having shown that he committed any tort or breach of contract known to law.”
In his judgment, the learned trial Judge found that although the property in dispute could have been at one time an abandoned property as defined under the Abandoned Property (Custody and Management) Edict 1969, it ceased to be so as from 1st November, 1972, by reason of the fact that it was shown in a Gazette Notice as having been acquired by the Rivers State Government for public purpose. The Gazette in question is the Rivers State Extraordinary Gazette No. 56 of 1st November, 1972. The learned trial Judge therefore came to the conclusion that since the property in dispute was not an abandoned property at the time it was sold to the Plaintiff by the Abandoned Properties Implementation Committee, the plaintiff did not acquire any title. He furthermore held that the content of exhibit B which indicates that the plaintiff purchased the property in question from the Abandoned Properties Implementation Committee is hearsay and cannot therefore amount to a proof of sale by the Committee. On the deed of lease, exhibit A, the learned trial Judge was of the view that the effect of the acquisition by the Rivers State Government is that the property must be put into use by the Government for a public purpose. The State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict, 1972 which empowered the then Military Governor of Rivers State to acquire state land compulsorily did not define the words “public purpose”, but provided that they had the meaning assigned to them under Section 2 of the Public Lands Acquisition Law, Cap. 105 of the Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 1963. After examining section 2 of the Law, the learned trial Judge observed as follows:
“The position then in Law is that where a lease of land required for public purpose has been validly cancelled under the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict, 1972 by publication of such cancellation in the Gazettes by the Military Governor (now Governor) the property whose lease has been so cancelled reverts to the State who (sic) in turn must use it for a public purpose that falls within one of the above categories which appear in Section 2 of the Public Lands Acquisition Law.”
Relying on the decisions in Chief Commissioner Eastern Provinces v. Ononye, 17 N.L.R. 142 and Ereku & Ors. v. Military Governor, Mid-Western State of Nigeria, (1974) 10 S.C. 163, the learned trial Judge came to the following conclusion:
“The law then, I believe, is that unless the purpose of acquisition falls within one or the other of the provisions of section 2 of the Public Lands Acquisition Law defining “public purposes”, a land purported to be acquired by Government under this law, and for that matter, the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict, 1972 does not vest in the government and since it has not vested in the Government the powers of disposition afforded by the State Lands Laws (sic) cannot be validly exercised over such a parcel of land purported to have been acquired.
Applying this test to the land in question and the cancellation of its lease I fail to see how, without more, a purpose of sale just to an individual can fall within any of the public purpose enumerated,”
Finally, before dismissing the plaintiffs claim, the learned trial Judge rejected the argument that the provisions of Section I of the Abandoned Properties Act, 1979 would save the transfer of the land in dispute to the plaintiff. The rejection was based on the following grounds.
(a) That the words “abandoned property” were not defined by the Act.
(b) That the Act did not provide where and when the” Abandoned Properties Implementation Committee” mentioned therein “was legally constituted”.
(c) And that Exhibit A was not executed by the Abandoned Property Implementation Committee referred to in the Act.
The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the learned trial judge to the Court of Appeal. The decision of the trial court was reversed by the Court of Appeal which found that the facts of the present case are different from those relied upon by the learned trial Judge to dismiss the plaintiffs claim. In the words of the Court of Appeal (per Phil-Ebosie, J.C.A.) –
“In both cases it was held that the acquisition for granting a lease to commercial company was not for public purpose. The Position in the case before us seems different. The Rivers State Government has already acquired the plot. The certificate of title had been given to the Government. The purpose of the acquisition judging from the fact that the area is in a layout and there are several residential buildings on it, is for the Government to carve the said land into plots and lease them to individuals for the creation of their own personal houses. This purpose in my opinion falls within the definition of public purpose as defined in section 2 of the Public Lands Acquisition Law. That purpose is still subsisting and if the Rivers State Government after cancelling the original lease of one of the plot by virtue of section 3(1) of the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict, 1972, and subsequently leased the same plot to another individual, the second lease in my view will be within the original public purpose for which the Layout was originally acquired.”
The Court of Appeal considered further the view of the trial court that the defendant had a right to challenge the lease granted to the plaintiff since the plaintiff had put his title in issue. It then observed as follows (per Phil-Ebosie. J.C.A.)-
“It is pertinent however at this stage to ask what interest had the respondent (i.e. defendant) in plot leased to the appellant to entitle him to challenge the lease by the Rivers State Government. As pleaded by him the premise was only allocated to him as Staff Quarters. The allocation if there was one, has not conferred any other right in him other than the right to occupy the premises at Government pleasure. This does not confer any property right on the appellant to challenge the Government’s right to lease its property to anyone it wishes with respect. I disagree with the lower court’s view that the respondent had a right to challenge the lease since the appellant (i.e. plaintiff) had put his title in issue as this would amount to challenging the Government’s right to dispose of its own property.”
In the event, the Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiffs appeal. It is from that decision that the defendant has appealed to this Court. At the instance of this Court the Attorney-General of the Rivers State was joined as 2nd Respondent to the appeal.
The appellant originally filed three grounds of appeal with the notice of appeal. He had, however, abandoned two out of those, namely grounds 1 and 3. The remaining ground complains that the Court of Appeal took into consideration extraneous matters with regard to the acquisition of the property in dispute and by so doing, it came to the wrong conclusion.
With the leave of the Court, the appellant filed three additional grounds of appeal. These read:
“1. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law in not affirming the Judgment of the High Court and dismissing the claim of the Plaintiff/Respondent for a different reason, having regards (sic) to the position of the law at all times relevant to the proceedings both at the High Court and the Federal Court of Appeal.
Particulars
(a) The State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972 under which the lease of Plot 295 Oromineke Layout otherwise known as No.5 Emekuku Street, Port Harcourt was cancelled by virtue of the publication contained in the Rivers State Government Notice No. 452 of Volume IV of the Rivers State of Nigeria Extra-ordinary Gazzette No. 56 of 1st November, 1972 is void for inconsistency with the provision of the 1963 Federal Constitution by virtue of Section 31 thereof.
(b) The purported cancellation of the lease or acquisition remains void and the property in question remains vested on the original lessee L.E. Egu or in the alternative on the Abandoned Property Authority established under the Rivers State Abandoned Property (Custody and Management) Edict, 1969.
(c) The lessor in Exhibit A had not got the property in question to pass to the Plaintiff/Respondents as it had purported to do. Nemo dat non quod habet. (sic)
(d) What the Federal Court of Appeal has to decide is whether the decision of the trial Judge was right; not whether his reasons were.
2. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law in holding that with respect to the claim for possession the issue between the parties was purely one of trespass and not of rents.
Particulars
(a) There is no claim for trespass before the Court below.
(b) From the pleadings it was clear the Defendant/Appellant was in occupation of property.
(c) EXHIBIT ‘E’ relied on as notice to quit is not a proper notice emanating from the Plaintiff/Respondent as Landlord.
3. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law in ordering the Appellant to vacate the premises in question when from the pleadings and submissions at the High Court, that Court had no jurisdiction to order recovery of possession.
Particulars
(a) The Defendant/Appellant having been in occupation of the premises before the issue of EXHIBIT ‘A’ becomes Plaintiff/Respondent’s tenant if EXHIBIT ‘A’ was valid.
(b) Appellant is entitled to 30 days notice and 7 days notice under Sections 17 and 18 of the Rivers State Rent Control and Recovery of Residential Premises Edict No. 1 of 1979. No such notice was issued to the Appellant.
(c) By Section 15 of the 1979 Edict every Court in the Rivers State was enjoined to conform to the provisions of the Edict.”
Now I propose to deal first with additional ground 1. This ground of appeal has given a new complexion to the case. The issue of the inconsistency or invalidity of the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict, 1972 vis-a-vis the 1963 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was not raised in the Court of Appeal or the High Court; so that neither the decision of the High Court nor the Court of Appeal was based on the point. Similarly the question of the lease remaining vested in Mr. L. E. Egu or in the alternative the Abandoned Property Authority by reason of the invalidity of the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict, 1972 was not raised before nor considered by the lower courts. Chief Ofodile, learned counselor the 1st respondent and Mr. Addai-Mensah for the 2nd respondent have submitted that the appellant should not be allowed to argue the ground of appeal because the particulars thereof mark a departure from his pleadings. They cited in support of their arguments Ejiofodomi v. Okonkwo (1982) 11 S.C. 74 at pp. 113-116 and Enang v. Adu, (1981) 11 S.C. 36. For his part, Mr. Olukole learned counsel for the appellant contended that the ground of appeal has raised substantial points of law which are within the scope of the general issue in the case. He cited Ejiofodomi’s case (supra) and Akpene v. Barclays Bank & Anor., (1977) 1 S.C. 47 at pp. 58-9 to buttress his contention and added that no new evidence need be adduced to support the points raised by the ground of appeal.
It is now settled that this Court, as a Court of last resort, will allow a fresh point of law to the raised before it, even if such point was not taken in the courts below – see Stool of Abinabina v. Eyimadu, 12 W.A.C.A. 171 at p.173; Djukpan v. Orovuyovbe & Anor., (1967) All N.L.R. 134 at pp. 136-139;Fadiora v. Gbadebo & Ors. (1978) 1 L.R.N. 97 at pp.108-9, and Ejiofodomi’s case (Supra) at pp. 113-6. However such leave is subject to the conditions that – (1) We have before us all the evidence which is needed to completely support the new contention and (2) no satisfactory explanation could have been given by the respondents in the lower courts to counter the contention; see Fadiora’s case (supra) on pp.108-9. In the present case it is clear from Gazette Notice No. 452 which was published in the Rivers State Extraordinary Gazette No. 56 of 1972 that Mr. L.E. Egu was previously the lessee of the property in dispute but his lease was compulsorily acquired with effect from 1st November, 1972, by virtue of the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict, 1972. Mr. Olukole is relying on the decision of this Court in Peenok Investments Limited v. Hotel Presidential Limited, (1982) 12 S.C. 1 to show that the 1972 Edict is null and void and to contend that the lease granted to the 1st respondent subsequent to the acquisition of the land in dispute by Rivers State Government is void. In other words, the lease granted to Mr. L. E. Egu remains extant. On the face of these facts, we thought the appellant could argue the additional ground of appeal and hence our reason for allowing him to do so.
Now it is true that this Court decided in Peenok’s case (supra) at pp.28-31, that the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict, No. 15 of 1972 was null and void, because it was inconsistent with the provisions of section 31 subsection (2) (a) and (b) of the 1963 Constitution of the Federation, Act No. 20 of 1963. The question then is: can the appellant rely on that decision to defeat the claim of the 1st respondent At this stage it needs to be pointed out that at the time this case was instituted in the High Court and up to the 2nd April, 1980 when the judgment of the High Court was given, the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict, 1972 had not been declared null and void. So that the point now being raised by the appellant was not available to him in the High Court. Also on the date the 1st respondent was granted lease of the property in dispute, which is 1st January, 1978, the Edict in question was operative. It was whilst the 1st respondent’s appeal was pending in the Court of Appeal that our decision in Peenok’s case was delivered. Through out the argument of the appeal before that court no reference was made to the decision and when the Court of Appeal came to give its judgment it did not advert to it. In the circumstances, has the decision any bearing on the present case
It is settled that there are five ways in which the ownership of land can be proved – see Idundun v. Okumagba, (1976) 9-10 S.C. 227 at pp.246-250; Piaro v. Tenalo & Anor. (1976) 1 F.N.R. 229 at p.234 Mogaji v. Cadbury Nig. Ltd., (1985) 2 N.W. L. R. 393 at p.431. One of such ways is by the production of authenticated documents. The 1st respondent produced exhibit A which showed that the land in dispute had been leased to him for 50 years with effect from 1st January, 1978. The lease was granted by the Military Governor of Rivers State on behalf of the Rivers State Government. Surely this is a sufficient proof of ownership for the purpose of the declaration sought by the 1st Respondent for the possession of the property in dispute. The appellant in his defence did not claim ownership of the-property, rather, he claimed that the property was allocated to him as Government Staff Quarters, and drew the red herring that the lease granted to the 1st respondent by the Government of Rivers State was not valid as it was not granted for a “public purpose” as provided under section 2 of the Public Acquisition Law Cap. 105, Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 1963. As if that in itself is not enough, the appellant is now even challenging the validity of the ownership of the land by the Government of Rivers State that allocated the property in dispute to him to occupy. He is doing so, by fighting the cause of Mr. L.  E.Egu even though he has no mandate from Mr. Egu.
I think it will be a dangerous precedent, capable of resulting in chaos, to hold that if a case is contested on the basis of the applicability of a particular statute, when the statute is operative, then, if at a later date the Statute became repealed, the right acquired under it also becomes extinguished. It is to avoid such absurdity and preserve the certainty and predictability of law that section 6 subsection (2) of the Interpretation Act, 1964 provides that when an enactment expires, lapses or ceases to have effect, the provisions of subsection (1) thereof should apply, as if the enactment remains operative.
The provisions in paragraphs (b)(c) and (e) of the subsection read thus:
“6. (1) The repeal of an enactment shall not-
….
(b) affect the previous operation of the enactment or anything duly done or suffered under the enactment;
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability accrued or incurred under the enactment;
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding,. or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment may be imposed, as if the enactment had not been repealed. ”
It follows, therefore, that the appellant cannot rely on the decision in Peenok’s case to contend that the grant of lease made to the 1st respondent by the Government of Rivers State is null and void since the States Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict, 1972 was declared void in December, 1982. To my mind any action rightly taken under the Edict before the 3rd December, 1982, when the decision of this Court in Peenok’s case was given, remains valid at all time by virtue of the provisions of section 6 of the Interpretation Act, 1964; unless of course, it is specifically declared invalid by a competent court of law in any proceedings where the validity of the Edict is directly in issue as in the Peenok’s case. In Kay v. Goodwin, (1830) 6 Bing. 576 at p. 582, Tindal C.J. said:
“The effect of repealing a statute is to obliterate it completely from the records of the Parliament as if it had never been passed; and it must be considered as a law that never existed except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst it was an existing law.”
See also the decision in Hamilton Gell v. White, (1922) 2 K.B. 422 and Free Lanka Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ranasinghe, (1964) A.C. 54 at pp. 550-553. Additional grounds 2 and 3 may be considered together. Mr. Olukole has argued that the appellant was a statutory tenant of the 1st respondent and if the 1st respondent wanted to regain possession of the property in dispute he would have to bring his claim before a Rent Tribunal which was set up under the Rivers State Rent (Control and Recovery of Residential Premises) Edict, 1979, and not in the High Court. His contention is based on the premise that section 36 subsection (4)(1) of the Rent (Control and Recovery of Residential Premises) Edict 1979 vested the Tribunal with jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, including the Court of Appeal, to determine issues of recovery of residential premises between landlord and tenant. I am unable to agree with the submission. The issue joined on the pleadings is whether the property in dispute was allocated to the appellant by the Government of Rivers State for his occupation. Paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim averred –
“The defendant is resident at Ndele where he is occupying the principal’s quarters provided for him by the Federal Government of Nigeria and has unlawfully obstructed the plaintiff from the occupation of the said property to which the plaintiff is entitled by virtue of paragraph 3 above.”
The appellant traversed as follows in paragraphs 3 and 9 of the Statement of defence –
“3. The defendant denies paragraphs 3, 7 and 10 of the Statement of Claim.”
“9. In further answer to paragraph 7 of the statement of claim, the defendant says that he is not resident at Ndele but lives with his (sic) members of his family at No.5 Emekuku Street, Port Harcourt from where his wife who is a teacher goes to her school at Holy Rosary Girls’ Secondary School and from where his children as day students attend Secondary and Teacher Training College in Port Harcourt. ”
As no evidence was led by either party in proof of the averments in the pleadings, the issues of fact joined were not resolved by the trial court. The appellant did not therefore prove that he was in occupation of the property in dispute as a tenant of the Government of Rivers State. Secondly, in paragraph
11 of his statement of defence, the appellant categorically denied that he was a tenant of the 1st respondent. The paragraph reads –
“11. The Defendant will further contend that the plaintiffs claim is misconceived in that assuming as it was suggested in paragraph 4 of the statement of claim that the Defendant is the Plaintiffs tenant (which is denied), the plaintiff is still not entitled to possession or occupation of the property.”
In view of the denial, the appellant cannot now argue in utter disregard of his pleadings. It is trite law that parties are bound by their pleadings and they will not be allowed to deviate from them – George & Ors. v. Dominion Flour Mills Ltd., (1963) 1 All N.L.R. 71 at p. 77 and Enang & Ors. v. Adu, (supra) at p.36. Since the appellant denied that he was a tenant of the 1st respondent, and there was no finding by the lower courts confirming that he was his tenant, he cannot now be heard to say that he is such a tenant in order to be able to argue that the Court of Appeal, in making the order for him to vacate the property in dispute, lacked jurisdiction. The order which the Court made was consequential to its finding that the 1st respondent proved his case against the appellant. For this is what the Court said (per Phil-Ebosie, J.C.A.) –
“In respect of the first three reliefs, judgment will be and is hereby entered for the appellant in the terms of his writ. It is hereby ordered that the respondent (now appellant) do vacate the premises at plot 295 in Oromineke Layout otherwise known as No.5 Emekuku Street, Diobu, Port Harcourt forthwith or with immediate effect.”
There is no doubt that the Court of Appeal, being a superior court of record under the 1979 Constitution of the Federation of the Republic of Nigeria, has sufficient powers to make the consequential order. These powers are derived from different sources. The provision of section 6 subsections (3) and (6) (a) of the Constitution read:
“(3) The courts to which this section relates established by this Constitution for the Federation and for the States specified in subsection (5)(a) to (f) of this section shall be the only superior courts of record in Nigeria; and save as otherwise prescribed by the National Assembly or the House of Assembly of a State, each court shall have all the powers of a superior court of record.”
“(6) The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section –
(a) shall extend notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law;”
Section 16 of the Federal Court of Appeal, Act, 1976 provides in part-
“16. The Court of Appeal may from time to time make any order necessary for determining the real question in controversy in the appeal “
And Order 3 rule 23 of the Federal Court of Appeal Rules, 1981 states:
“23. The Court shall have power to give any judgment or make any order that ought to have been made, and to make such further or other order as the case may require “
Learned counsel for the appellant complained that the Court of Appeal was wrong in holding that the dispute between the Appellant and the 1st respondent was based on trespass and not a claim of rent. With respect, I do not, after carefully reading the judgment of the Court of Appeal, see where the Court of appeal made such a finding. The only occasion when the Court made reference to trespass was when it was considering the appellant’s submission in the High Court that the jurisdiction to hear the claims of the 1st respondent was vested in the Rent Tribunal. This is the remark made by the Court of Appeal:
“Before I allow this appeal it may be necessary to touch briefly the second arm of the defend, (sic), which was that the provisions of the Rent Restrictions and Recovery of Premises of the Rivers State (sic) were applicable in this case and so the appellant’s action was brought in the wrong court. With respect I also do not agree. As the learned counsel for the appellant rightly submitted in his address the issue between the parties here was purely one of trespass and not of rents. Besides the plot was no longer an abandoned property, that law was inapplicable. In conclusion I hold that the defence is of no merit.”
That is the con in which the Court of Appeal made the remark. It did not specifically find, nor do I understand it to say that the claim of the 1st respondent was founded on trespass. This view is strengthened by the fact  that in allowing the appeal the Court granted the first three reliefs sought by the 1st respondent in the High Court. These are – (1) a declaration that the plaintiff was the owner of the property in dispute and that he was entitled to possession and or occupation of it; (2) an order for possession of the property by the plaintiff; and (3) injunction to restrain the defendant, his family or agent from further occupation of the property. The 2nd additional ground of appeal therefore fails.
It remains now to deal with the only original ground of appeal argued by Mr. Olukole. The ground complains that the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal took extraneous matters into consideration with regard to the acquisition of the property in dispute and therefore came to the conclusion. This may well be so, but the question is: has the appellant suffered any mis-carriage of justice as a result of the misdirection In his brief of argument learned counsel quoted parts of the lead judgment of the Court of Appeal to which the complaint in the ground of appeal relates. The first extract reads:
“It was not shown in the pleadings who allocated the quarters to him (defendant) nor was any document containing the allocation by any authority of the Rivers State pleaded or tendered. It is (sic) therefore not be unlikely that the Respondent (defendant) could have commandeered the premises for his own use.”
and the second states:
“The position in the case before us seems different. The Rivers State Government had already acquired the plot. The certificate of Title had been given to the Government. The purpose of the acquisition judging from the fact that the area is a layout and there are several residential buildings on it, is for the Government to carve the said land into plots and lease them to individuals for the creation of their own personal houses. ,.
The submission in respect of the first quotation is that the defendant pleaded the allocation of the premises to him and that no reply was filed by the plaintiff in rebuttal of the averment. It is true that the defendant averred the allocation, but as I have earlier indicated in this judgment, the fact remains and it must be remembered that the plaintiff joined issue with the defendant on the averment in question, and it was not proved, since no evidence was adduced by the defendant at the trial. Although the observation made by the Court of Appeal may not be correct. it was justified in drawing the inference from the conflicting pleadings of the parties and no miscarriage
of justice is shown to have resulted from the inference. ”
As regards the second quotation, learned counsel complained that it was not supported by the pleadings and Exhibits A and B. It is clear that the Rivers State Government acquired the property in dispute. It was the appellant that produced the Gazette Notice that established that fact. But there was no evidence whatsoever or any averment in support of the rest of the observation made by the Court of Appeal. The misdirection clearly relates to the nature of the action brought by the 1st respondent. The distinction as to whether it was an action in trespass or a claim for arrears of rent, is only relevant for the determination of the forum which had the jurisdiction to hear the case. As it has already been shown that it is the High Court and not the Rent Tribunal that had the jurisdiction, I do not think that the appellant had suffered any miscarriage of justice by reason of the misdirection.
On the whole, I am of the opinion that this appeal has failed and it must be dismissed. It is hereby dismissed with N300.00 costs to the 1st respondent. The decision of the Court of Appeal is therefore confirmed and the case is remitted to the High Court for the assessment by Okara, J. of the quantum of damages which the 1st respondent is entitled to.

ESO, J.S.C.: I have had the advantage of a preview of both the lead judgment delivered today by my learned brother, Uwais, J.S.C., and also the dissenting opinion of my learned brother, Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C  I agree with the lead judgment of my brother Uwais, J.S.C. and indeed, I have only decided to write these few lines having regard to the main disagreement in  the two judgments, that is the effect of the decision of this Court in the case of Peenok Investments Limited v. Hotel Presidential Limited (1982) 12 S.C. 1 which decision rendered null and void the Rivers State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict No. 15 of 1972 as being inconsistent with the provisions of section 31(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution of the Federation 1963.
Another point I intend to deal with, but both judgments are even agreed upon this, is the attitude of this Court to issues of law not canvassed in the courts below.
Meanwhile, I will only summarise the facts. The plaintiff based his claim for declaration as owner on a deed of lease dated 3rd January, 1979 and registered as No. 83 at page 83 VoL. 77 of the Lands Registry in the Lands Office at Port Harcourt Rivers State after a purchase of the property from the Abandoned Properties Implementation Committee which was set up under the Abandoned Property (Custody and Management) Edict, 1969 of the Rivers State.
It was the contention of the defendant that the Abandoned Properties Committee had nothing to sell as the land had been acquired by the Rivers State Government on 1st November, 1972 for public purpose. This acquisition was made under the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972 the edict which was declared null and void by this Court in the Peenok case.
The learned trial Judge held the view that the sale to the Plaintiff could not constitute public purpose. He said
“I fail to see how, without more, a purpose of sale just to an individual can fall within any of the public purposes enumerated.”
When the matter got to the Court of Appeal, that Court reversed the decision of the High Court. It held that the purpose of the acquisition was public and the sale to the Plaintiff thereafter must be valid.
Phil-Ebosie, J.C.A., who delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal, held –
“The Rivers State Government has already acquired the plot.
The certificate of title had been given to the Government. The purpose of the acquisition judging from the fact that the area is in a layout and there are several residential buildings on it, is for government to carve the said land into plots and lease them to individuals for the creation of their own personal houses. This purpose in my opinion falls within the definition of public purpose as defined in section 2 of the Public Lands Acquisition Law.”
The Court of Appeal then dwelt on the fact that the defendant was only allocated the plot to stay in as government quarters, a fact that would not entitle him to challenge the right of the owner or confer ownership upon him.
The defendant then appealed to this Court. His grounds of appeal are  well set out in the lead judgment and I do not intend to set them out here. The first point that agitates my mind is the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff, that is the Respondent in this Court, that the Appellant should not be allowed to argue the voidity of the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972 as this was not raised in the courts below. In Samuel Fadiora v. Festus Gbadebo & Ors. 1978 3 S.C. 219 Idigbe JSC., dealt with the rule of practice before a court of last resort. The learned Justice of the Supreme Court held:-
“The other point, however, for our consideration is that this Court is a Court of last resort and the rule of practice is that when a question of law is raised for the first time in a court of last resort it is generally not only competent but expedient in the interest of justice for the court to entertain the question This rule of practice, however, is subject to the qualification that the court of last resort may refuse to entertain the question of law sought to be raised for the first time if it is satisfied that the court below would have been in a more advantageous position to deal with the matter.”
In this case the Court below could not have been in more advantageous position to deal with the matter. The matter which is being raised as a result of our decision in the Peenok case.
I hold the view that this Court has duty to settle issues finally. A point of law that was not raised in the lower court but raised in the Court may be the final arbiter of the case. Except the court below would have been in a more advantageous position to deal with the matter of law and for my part, I am in doubt if ever such situation exists except the Court below would have to examine the issues of fact which the Court of last resort has no advantage of, before coming to a just decision on the issue of law, a court of last resort is always best placed to examine issues of law.
I agree with my learned brother, Uwais J.S.C., and my learned brother Karibi- Whyte J.S.C., that the ground of appeal which the plaintiff/appellant sought to argue is competent.
A more serious point is the effect of our decision in the Peenok case. In nullifying the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972 No. 15 what happened to all the interests affected by the Edict before its nullification” It was as a result of that Edict that the Plaintiff was able to acquire his title and this he did before the judgment of this Court in the Peenok case.
The principles of law arising in the Peenok case are entirely identical with what has happened in the instant case. In the former case reliance was placed on the same Edict No. 15 of 1972 that is the (Canceillation of Leases) Edict No. 15 of 1972 and this Court in a judgment subscribed to by all members of the full court – Irikefe, J.S.C. as he then was, Bello, Idigbe, Obaseki, Kayode Eso, Nnamani and Uwais J.J.S.C. held on 3rd December, 1982 that the Edict was void as being inconsistent with the 1963 Constitution. There is however no problem about declaring the Edict void in the instant case. The argument surrounding it is whether the declaration by this Court on 3rd December, 1982 has a retrospective effect in the sense that all the transactions thereunder from the date of the promulgation of the Edict in 1972 up to the date of this Court’s declaration are also void.
In so far as nullifying statues for unconstitutionality is concerned, the English authorities are not, really of any help, notwithstanding dicta from some Judges that statutes could be nullified. The general attitude of the English Court to interpretation of Statues is that statutes are not to be treated void. This dates back to Blackstone in his commentaries (See 1.BI. Comm.91):-
“If Parliament would positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable there is no power in the ordinary forms of the Constitution that is vested with authority to control it.”
However, Coke as far back as the 17th Century, in Dr. Bonham’s case (1610) 8Co. Rep. 114 had been of the opinion that when an Act of Parliament was against common right and reason, or when the Act was repugnant, or it is impossible of performance, the common law had a duty to control it The expression “unconstitutional” was never seen in the American or Nigerian sense. The reason however, is not far fetched. The two countries have written Constitutions while the English tradition had never permitted a written Constitution. Hence the courts in England could not possess the same sense as the Nigerian and the American courts of declaring statutes “unconstitutional”.
The Courts preferred to use such words as “not binding”. if it is contrary to reason” – see 1 Bl Comm. 91. And, it is for this reason that the sense is more of repeals of Statutes rather than declarations of Acts unconstitutional.
In such repeals, the Statute is obliterated completely as if it had never been passed, as a law that never existed, yet, all actions which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded under these “never existed” Acts are saved. Lord Tenterden in Surtees v. Ellison (1829) 9 B & C 750 put the matter with some considerable clarity. He said
“It has long been established that, when an Act of Parliament is repealed, it must be considered (except to transactions past and closed) as if it had never existed.”
This was ever before the Interpretation Act 1889 (U.K. Legislation) came out with certain savings. Section 38(2) of the Act listed out acts which remain extant notwithstanding the repeal of a Statute. When a right has accrued to an individual under a Statute, that right is saved notwithstanding the repeal of such Statute. Of course, a contrary intention must not have been indicated in the repealing Statute. For in Lewis v. Hughes 1916 1 KB 831 it has been held that the expression that the repealed Act shall cease to have effect does not  ipso show a contrary intention.
Our own Interpretation Act is in the same vein. It enacts [Interpretation Act, 1964]
S.6 – (1) The repeal of an enactment shall not
…..
(b) affect the previous operation of that enactment or anything duly done or suffered under the enactment;
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability accrued or incurred under the enactment
….
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding, or remedy in  respect of any such right, privilege obligation, liability, penalty for failure or punishment and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, for failure or punishment may be imposed as if the enactment had not been repealed.
(2) When an enactment expires, lapses or otherwise ceases to have effect the foregoing subsection shall apply as if the enactment had not been repealed”
With some strain, one may, as by way of interpretation, apply subsection (2) of section 6 of the Interpretation Act 1964 to Acts declared unconstitutional in the sense that after such declaration such Acts “cease to have effect,” but in my respectful view such interpretation by gymnastic is not necessary. An Act is valid until declared void by a court of law. This has always been the law. If for nothing else, it accords with common sense. The whole essence of law is that, for it to be just, it must be certain. No one can acclaim a society to be just if the society lives under a law which blows hot and cold.
When an Act of Parliament is passed, it is deemed to be valid until such Act of Parliament is repealed or nullified for unconstitutionality. The actions, rights, interests, and detriments, under such act, until repeal or annulment, must be valid. What happens if the Statute remains unrepealed or unchallenged for one hundred years With all respect, I think it must be preposterous to conclude that all the rights and benefits, profits or detriments for the 100 years also become void. That is chaos. That with respect, savours of the law of the jungle, certainly not, in my respectful view, one fit for a just society.
What happens to Conflict of laws and International Law I would like to believe that transactions under foreign Acts which affect individuals, corporations or governments in another country would remain valid notwithstanding the nullification of the Acts by the foreign country in succeeding years. If it is otherwise such uncertainty will lead to upheavals, domestic and international. It may cause wars.
With respect; we do not have to travel far before we come to judicial pronouncements on this issue. I said precisely the same thing in the Peenok case, in regard to validity of Laws of other States in International Law – Public or Private. I think, I will have to repeat that again. In the Peenok case, there was no dissent but as there is one in this case I crave your Lordships’ indulgence to repeat what I said in that case:
“Again, in this country, could the courts of one State treat the legislation of another State void on the principle of what is void needs not be set aside’ For this proposition, reference is usually made to the dictum of Lord Denning in Macfoy v. U.A.C. (1961) 3 W.L.R. 1405. Let us examine that dictum properly. Coker J.S.C., reading the judgment of this court in Alhaji Y.S.O. Bello etc. v. The Diocesan Synod of Lagos etc. (1973) 3 E.C.S.L.R., P. 330, approved of the dictum of Lord Denning in the Macfoy case, for as the learned Justice of the Supreme Court said, and I agree, prima facie, what is void needs not be set aside for ex nihilo venit. Lord Denning’s dictun in the Macfoy case, has run thus –
“If an act is void, then it is in law a nullity. It is not only bad but incurably bad. There is no need for “an order of court to set it aside. It is automatically null and void without more ado, though it is sometimes convenient to have the court to declare it to be so.”
Macfoy case was a statement of claim delivered during the court’s long vacation and it was in that sense that this court approved of the dictum of Lord Denning M.R. in the Alhaji Y.S.O. Bello case (Supra). I do not think that the principle enunciated in this dictum by the much respected English Master of the Rolls, valid as it is in the case where it was enunciated, should be extended to Legislation and cover a proposition that a court in one State of the Federation can suo motu treat the law enacted by another State as void and proceed to act on that conclusion without proper trial of its validity by hearing the State that enacted the legislation.
Our Evidence Act provides for the court to take judicial notice of certain facts. Section 73(1)(a) of the Act provides-
“73(1) The court shall take judicial notice of the following facts:
(a) all laws or enactments and any subsidiary legislation made thereunder having the force of law now or heretofore in force, in any part of Nigeria”
(Italics mine for emphasis)
It is the duty of the High Court of Anambra State which tried this case to take judicial notice, not only of the existence of Edicts 15 and 17 of 1972 of the Rivers State in question, but also as Edicts having force of law in the Rivers State. In other words the court should take judicial notice of the Edicts as valid Edicts. Prima facie they remain valid until set aside or declared void. In Benson and Abejude v. Ashiru (1967) N.M.L.R. 364, Brett J.S.C. delivering the judgment of this Court said:-
“As a general rule, foreign law is a question of fact and must be pleaded, but section 73(1)(a) of the Evidence Act required the High Court of Lagos (this also applies to the High Court of Anambra State) to take judicial notice of all laws or enactments and any subsidiary legislation made thereunder having the force of law or herefore in force or hereafter to be in force, in any part of Nigeria, and it is unnecessary to plead matters of which the court takes judicial notice. Bullen and Leake p.91 appears from Koop v. Bebb (1951) 84 C.L.R. 629 that the courts in the different States of Australia similarly take judicial notice of the law in force in the other States.”
(Italics mine)
Where the law in question is foreign law, a question of fact arises. It must be pleaded. Expert evidence may be led and a decision arrived at by the court of trial without inviting the foreign country concerned. The court may refuse to enforce the decision of a foreign court where the domestic tribunal finds suo motu the foreign court has no jurisdiction. See Pembeton v. Hughes (1899) 1 Ch. 781 as per Lord Lindley M.R. But where the law is that of another State in the Federation a judicial notice of that law is taken. As I have earlier pointed out until the Edicts in question here are avoided by the Courts, they have the force of law as enactments validly made by the Rivers State government for when the courts take judicial notice of them they are presumed to be valid.”
I do not intend to go into the other issues raised as they have been treated in detail in the judgment of my learned brother Uwais J.S.C. to the lead judgment. I will also dismiss the appeal and I abide by all the orders made in the judgment of my said learned brother Uwais J.S.C.

NNAMANI, J.S.C.: I had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Uwais, J.S. C. and I agree with his reasoning and conclusions.
In many ways this is a strange case. The appellant herein, who was the defendant in the trial court has no proprietary interest in the property the subject of the dispute in this suit and yet he has contested this through 2 courts to this Court. He did not, and could not be heard to claim title to the property. He merely alleged that the property was allocated to him by the Rivers State Government as government quarters. Although in paragraph 4 of his statement of defence the appellant averred .
“that the property was not as abandoned property when he moved into it in October 1974 as the  principal of the Government Teachers College Rumuokuta and it was allocated to him as a Government Staff Quarters”
no document was produced to substantiate this allocation, Since there was an agreement between the parties not to lead oral evidence but to tender by consent any material documents. the appellant would have tendered his authority for the allocation if any was in existence. By Exhibit B which was tendered by consent of the parties, the Rivers State Government wrote to the appellant in these terms :
“Government of the Rivers State of Nigeria.
Ministry of Lands and Survey.
Lands Division,
Moscow Road.
P.M.B.5031.
Port Harcourt.
19th January, 1979.
Our Ref. RSL/5604/12.
The Secretary,
Property Administration Unit,
Ministry of Lands and Survey,
22, Station Road,
Port Harcourt.
LEASE OF PLOT 295 IN OROMINEKE LAYOUT (NO. 5 EMEKUKU STREET) PORT HARCOURT
1directed to inform you that the property at the above address has been purchased by Mr. Ikem Uche Ofili of 11-13 Aba Road, Port Harcourt from the Abandoned Properties Implementation Committee.
2. A lease of this property has also been granted to Mr. Ikem Uche Ofili by the Rivers State Government. The lease is dated 3rd January, 1979 and registered as No. 83 at page 83 in Volume 77 of the Lands Registry, Port Harcourt.
3. Would you please inform all persons occupying this building about the change in the ownership of the property; and at[“ice them to negotiate terms with the owner.
4. This property has ceased to be abandoned and is no longer under the control and management of your office. A copy of this letter has been endorsed to Mr. Ikem Uche Ofili.
5. Please advise the tenants to pay rents to the Landlord as from 21st July, 1978.
(Sgd.) A. I. URIRI
for Chief Land Officer
Our Ref: PAU/ACCM/EKK.5/28
Property Administration Unit,
Ministry of Lands and Survey,
Port Harcourt.
25th January, 1979
Copy to:
The Tenants,
No.5 Emekuku Street,
D/Line,
Port Harcourt.
Above for your information
You are advised to pay rents
to Mr. Ikem U. Ofiti with effect
from 21st July, 1978.
(Sgd.) S. S. Ofuru,
for Permanent Secretary.
Ministry of Lands and Survey'”
(Italics mine)
In the absence of evidence, even if it could be conceded that the property was allocated to the appellant, it could be inferred from Exh. B that he got the right of occupation or user from the Property Administration Unit above. Yet when the Rivers State Government that allegedly put him in occupation informed him of the change of ownership of the property he went all out to contest the issue.
The second strange aspect of this case is the changes which have occurred in the appellant’s case as between the High Court and this Court, leaving the impression that the appellant was intent on catching on any straw in an attempt to remain in perpetual occupation of the disputed property. In the High Court, the substance of the appellant’s case can be gleaned from paragraph 3 of his Statement of Defence in which he averred as follows:'”
The Defendant denies paragraphs 3, 7 and 10 of the Statement of Claim and avers that the lease of Plot 295 Oromineke Layout otherwise known as No.5 Emekuku Street Port Harcourt had been cancelled by the Rivers State Government Notice No. 452 published in Vol. 4 of the Rivers State of Nigeria Extra-Ordinary Gazette, No. 56 of the 1st November, 1972 and it has not been de-acquired”
The argument of the appellant there was that the lease of the property in question had been cancelled pursuant to Section 3 of the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972. In that case the property had been re-acquired by the Rivers State Government and having not been de-acquired, it could not be conveyed to the respondent since this would be contrary to a public purpose as provided in the State Land Law. In this Court, although we granted him leave to argue it, following the cases of Fadiora v. Gbadebo & Ors. (1978) 1 L.R.N. 97 at 108-9 and Djukpan v. Orovuyovbe & Anor. (1967) All N.L.R. 134 at pp.136-139, the appellant now contended that, following the decision of this Court in Peenok Investmems Ltd. v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (1982) 12 SC.1 the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972 was null and void. The lease in question was therefore never cancelled. He abandoned his previous argument based on acquisition of the plot by the Rivers State Government and now argued that the leasee was still L.E. Egu or the property now rested with the Abandoned Property Authority established under the Rivers State Abandoned Property (Custody and Management) Edict, 1969 since there was nothing to show that the Authority had earlier released the property to L.E. Egu. In either ease, he argued, the Rivers State Government had no property to convey in Exhibit A.
Finally on this point, although he had in paragraph 11 of his Statement of Defence in the High Court denied that he was a tenant of the respondent, in this Court he contended that he was a statutory tenant such that the appellant could only recover possession from him through proceedings in a Tribunal and not in the High Court. He referred to Section 36(1) of the Rivers State Rent Control and Recovery of Residential Premises Edict (No. 1) of 1979.
I have made references to these strange aspects of this case merely to emphasise that this is a Court of justice committed as stated in its many decisions to doing substantial justice between the parties.
It is not my intention to repeat the reasons already given by my learned brother with which I agree. I can only make comments for purposes of emphasis.
The main claim of the respondent against the appellant was for
“(a) Declaration that the Plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the possession/occupation of a piece and parcel of land described as Plot 295 Oromineke Layout otherwise known as No.5, Emekuku Street, Diobu-Port Harcourt by virtue of Deed of Lease dated 3rd January, 1979 and registered as No. 83 at 83 Volume 77 of the Lands Registry in the Office at Port Harcourt”
I agree with my Lord Uwais that as between the parties that claim can be settled with Exhibit A tendered by consent of the parties. Exhibit A was the lease of the property dated 3rd January, 1979, executed by the Rivers State Government in favour of the respondent and registered as per the particulars set down above. This Court in Idundun v. Okumagba (1976) 9-10 S.C. 227 at 246 set down the five ways by which ownership can be established. One of them is the production of an authenticated document of title as done by the respondent herein. The appellant significantly has not raised any title in rebuttal- he merely claimed the property was allocated to him by the authority that executed Exhibit A.
He further challenged the validity of Exhibit A relying first on the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972 and later on Peenok’s case supra. Admittedly in Peenok’s case delivered in December 1982 this Court declared the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972 null and void, but that case was not available throughout the proceedings in the High Court. I also agree with the lead judgement that by virtue of Section 6 of the Interpretation Act 1964, the action of cancellation of the original lease of Plot 3 Oromineke Layout must remain valid although the Edict had been declared null and void. (As to affect of repeal of a statute generally See Re Mexican and South American Co. Grisewood & Smith’s Case, De Pass’s Case (1859) De G & J.544) – where it was held that a repealed Act is as if it had never existed except as to transactions past and closed; See also Chang Jeeng v. Nuffield (Australia) Proprietary Ltd. 101 C.L.R. 629, 637). If therefore the full effect of Peenok’s case is not acceptable here, the property in dispute as at November 1972 had reverted to the Rivers State Government, or in the language of the appellant, had been re-acquired.
It was his further contention that in that case the Rivers State Government had no power to execute Exhibit A since the land therein dealt with had not been de-acquired and could not be conveyed to an individual this not being for a public purpose. Reliance was placed on Chief Commissioner Eastern Provinces v. Ononye & 3 Ors. 17 N.L.R. 142 and Chief Ereku and Ors. v. Military Governor of Midwestern State of Nigeria (1974) 10 S.C. 59. Indeed the learned trial Judge relied very heavily on Ereku’s case. It is my view that those cases do not apply in the circumstances of this case. In Ononye’s case the land had been acquired for the purposes of a commercial company. It was held by Waddington J. sitting at the Onitsha High Court that acquisition of land for the purpose of granting a lease to a commercial company was not a public purpose within the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance (Cap. 88). Significantly, Ereku’s case was similar. The land was acquired by the Mid Western State Government for the use of a private commercial undertaking and it was held not to be for a public purpose.
In the instant case, there is no question of any land being acquired for the purposes of the respondent. All that is being contended is that to convey the plot to him would be contrary to public purpose as defined by the Public  Lands Acquisition Law, Cap. 105, Laws of Eastern, Nigeria, 1963. “Public Purpose” is therein defined as “includes a public purpose as hereinafter defined in so far as such purpose relates to any matter with respect to which the Government of Eastern Nigeria has power to make law and also –
(a) for exclusive Government use or for general public use” In the Peenok case (supra) I said at p. 135 of the report –
“It seems quite clear to me that a perusal of the Public Lands acquisition law shows that it is directed to the acquisition of community land, land in rural communities, undeveloped land or more specifically land which is not already state land. The definition of “Lands”, “Local Community” recognised “head chief” in the law appear to me to strengthens this opinion. It is only after such acquisition that such land comes to be administered under the State Lands Law.”
That administration definitely includes the conveyance of plots out of such publicly acquired land to individuals. In Exhibit A the location of the property in dispute is shown as –
“OROMINEKE LAYOUT PORT HARCOURT Plot No. 295 shown on Plan No. ELD. P.51 deposited under Regulation 3(a) of Land Instruments Registration Regulations made under Section 32 of Land Instruments Registration Law, Cap. 72.”
OROMINEKE LAYOUT in Plan ELD p. 51 is clearly State Land for Plot 295 therein had been conveyed to Mr. L. E. Egu before the lease was cancelled by the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972.
Although there was no direct evidence to the effect that the land comprising this layout was publicly acquired for the purpose of conveying plots therein to individuals. I think that from the materials tendered in the High court, it would not be far fetched if one made that inference. OROMINEKE LAYOUT is State land, administered under the State Lauds Law, and from which a plot, plot 295 presently in dispute was conveyed to L.E. Egu. The Layout must have been a publicly acquired land for the purpose of conveying plots of land therein to individuals. In those circumstances, I do not see how the conveyance of the same Plot 295 to the respondent could be contrary to public purpose. On the contrary I think it was in compliance with it. It is in these circumstances that I would, with respect, hold that the remarks of the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal on this aspect of the case were not entirely based on extraneous matters but seem to me to state the true position. Phil-Ebosie, J.CA, said in the lead judgment:
“The Rivers State Government had already acquired the plot.
The certificate of title had been given to the Government. The purpose of the acquisition judging from the fact that the area is a layout and there are several residential buildings on it, is for the Government to carve the said land into plots and lease them to individuals for the creation of their own personal houses. This purpose in my opinion fall within the definition of public purpose as defined in Section 2 of the Public Lands Acquisition Law. That purpose is still subsisting and if the Rivers State Government after canceling the original lease of one of the plots by virtue of Section 3(1) of the State Lands (Cancellation) of Leases Edict 1972, and subsequently leased the same plot to another individual, the second lease in my view will be within the original public purpose for which the layout was originally acquired.”
Finally, I would wish to comment on the appellant’s unwillingness to respect the orders of courts of competent jurisdiction. On 31st January, 1983 when the Court of Appeal delivered judgement in this matter, it made an order in these terms:
“It is further ordered that the respondent do vacate the premises at plot 295 in Oromineke Layout otherwise known as No.5 Emekuku Street. Diobu. Port Harcourt forthwith or with immediate effect”
As at 21st October, 1985, when this appeal was taken by this Court the appellant was still in the premises having treated that order with contempt. It might he appropriate at this stage to remind the appellant and those who may wish to follow him of the provisions of Section 251 subsections (1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 as amended by Decree No. 1 of 1984 and Decree No. 17 of 1985. The provisions are-
“251(1) The decisions of the Supreme Court shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Supreme Court
(2) The decisions of the Court of Appeal shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal.
In his book “Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa”, Professor Ben Nwabueze quoted with approval a remark by Alexander Hamilton that:”
The judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power (It) has no influence over either the sword or the purse. No direction either of the strength or the wealth of the society; can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely Judgment’s………ibid p.225.
The Courts are weak and have only judgments. But they remain without argument the main bulwark against authoritarianism in a society which espouses the Rule of Law. To ignore judgments and orders of courts is to lay a sure foundation for despotism and anarchy.
For these reasons and for the more detailed reasons given by my learned brother, Uwais, J.S.C. this appeal deserves to fail and does fail. It is accordingly dismissed. I endorse the orders made by my learned brother Uwais. J S. C.

KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading the lead judgment of my learned brother M.L. Uwais, J.S.C. dismissing the appeal. I have been unable after considerable cogitation to reconcile the reasons given for the decision with my understanding of the law on the opinions expressed on the issues raised in this appeal. Our views being so irreconcilably different I have considered it necessary to express my dissent from the lead judgment at some length.
This is an appeal to this court by the Appellant who was the defendant in the court of first instance i.e. High Court, Port-harcourt and respondent in the Court of Appeal, at Enugu. Judgment was given in favour of the appellant in the High Court. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision. Respondent in this Court, who was Plaintiff in the High Court brought
an action against the Appellant as Defendant, seeking as follows-
PARTICULARS OF CLAIM
“(a) Declaration that the Plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the possession/occupation of a piece or parcel of a land described as Plot 295 Oromineke Layout otherwise known as Plot No.5, Emekuku Street, Diobu – Port Harcourt by virtue of Deed of Lease dated 3rd January, 1979 and registered as No. 83 at 83 Volume 77 of the Lands Registry in the Office at Port Harcourt.
(b) Order for possession of the said property for the use and benefit of the Plaintiff.
(c) Injunction to restrain the Defendant, his family, agent and otherwise from further occupation of the said premises.
(d) N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira) being special and general damages for loss of use since 1st August, 1978.
(e) Any other reliefs the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. ”
It seems clear from the claim that Plaintiff was not only claiming as the owner of the piece or parcel of land, described as Plot 295 Oromineke Layout, otherwise known as No.5, Emekuku Street, Diobu, he was also seeking an order for possession of the said property for his use and benefit. Simply put. Plaintiff is seeking a declaration of title of ownership and possession of the land and building constituting 5, Emekuku Street. Diobu. He also claimed for an injunction to restrain the defendant, his family, agent, from further occupation of the premises, and N50,000.00 being special and general damages for loss of use since 1st August, 1978.
The action was on the consent of the parties tried only on the pleadings which were ordered, filed, and exchanged. It was agreed that the issues involved were entirely those of law. The relevant paragraphs of the pleadings in the action in respect of which issues were joined are as follows STATEMENT OF CLAIM
“3. The Plaintiff is the Lessee and therefore owner ‘” Plot 295 Oromineke Layout otherwise known as No.5, Emekuku Street, Port-Harcourt by virtue of Deed of Lease dated 3rd January, 1979 and registered as No. 83-83-77 of the Lands Registry in the Office as Port-Harcourt. The Deed of Lease aforesaid will be tendered in evidence and relied upon at the trial of the suit.
4. The defendant having been discovered to occupy the said plot being an abandoned property and affected by the Abandoned Property (Custody and Management) Edict 1969of Rivers State Government was written to by the Ministry of Lands and Survey, Land Division, Port Harcourt informing him that the said property has been purchased by the Plaintiff and to pay rents to the Plaintiff as the Landlord thereof. The copy of the said letter will be founded upon at the hearing of this suit.
5. Inspite of the said letter from the said Ministry the defendant declined to acknowledge the Plaintiff as the Lessee and owner of the property aforesaid and has attempted to challenge the Plaintiff’s ownership of the property.
8. The Plaintiff will state in evidence at the trial of this suit that apart from the said letter from the Ministry of Lands and Survey. Port Harcourt, the Plaintiff has addressed many letters to the defendant asking him to vacate the said premises for the use of the Plaintiff, in addition to personal appeal to the defendants, the defendant has always been adamant to these requests and protests and have threatened violence to the body of the Plaintiff if plaintiff dared to move into the said property.
STATEMENT OF DEFENCE
“3. The Defendant denies paragraphs 3, 7 and 10 of the Statement of Claim and avers that the lease of Plot 295 Oromineke Layout otherwise known as No.5 Emekuku Street Port Harcourt has, been cancelled by the Rivers State Government Notice NoA52 published in Volume 4 of the Rivers State of Nigeria extra-ordinary Gazette. No.56 of 1st of November, 1972 and it has not been de-acquired.
4. In answer to paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim the Defendant says that the property was not abandoned property when he moved into it in October 1974 as the Principal of the Government Teacher College Rumuokuta and it was allocated to him a, a Government Staff quarters.
10. The Defendant will contend at the trial that the Deed of Lease referred to in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim is null and void, not having granted or conveyed any interest in land to the Plaintiff as it purported to have done”.
The net effect of the settlement of issues on the pleadings of the parties is that the following matters were in issue and had to be established by the Plaintiff. First, Plaintiff’s title to Plot 295 Oromineke Layout, otherwise known as 5, Emekuku Street, Diobu. Secondly, that the property, subject matter of the litigation is an abandoned property. Plaintiff’s main contention on paragraph 4 of this statement of claim, was that the property was an abandoned property and was sold to him by the Abandoned Property Implementation Committee. For this contention, he relied on Exhibit ‘A’ which was a conveyance to him of the property in dispute by the Rivers State Government. He also relied on Exhibit “B”, a letter from the Ministry of Lands of the Rivers State stating that Plaintiff was owner of the property in dispute. was also contended that the property in dispute having been acquired by the Government of the Rivers State, ceased to be an Abandoned Property and that the Rivers State Government could validly transfer title thereto to the Plaintiff. It was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff that the case of Chief Commissioner v. Ononye & 5 Ors. 17 NLR 14 relied upon by the Defendant was not applicable to this case. It was argued on behalf of the Plaintiff that sections 1 of Decree No.90 of 1979 applied to the sale of the property in this case if it is regarded as an Abandoned Property.
With respect to possession, counsel submitted that the action having been founded on trespass, the claim for possession and injunction properly lay in the High Court. The issue it was contended was as between a person with a right of possession and another who has no such right.
The defendant on his part contended that Plaintiff had no valid title vested in him by virtue of Exhibit “A “, because the Lease upon which Plaintiff relied was invalid. The reasoning was that since Exhibit “A” was based on Edict No. 15 of 1972, namely the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict, it cannot be valid. Counsel went on to contend that on the cancellation of the Lease in respect of 5 Emekuku Street, the property vested in the Rivers State Government as acquired for public purposes. It followed therefore on the authority of Chief Commissioner v. Ononye & 5 Ors. 17 NLR 142 and Ereku v. Mid- Western State Government, (1974) 10 SC.59 that such property cannot be sold to an individual for his commercial benefit.
It was submitted further that at the time of the sale, of the property in dispute, the Abandoned Property Implementation Committee had nothing to sell, the property being not at the time an abandoned property.
Counsel cited and relied on U.A.C. Ltd v. Macfoy (1961) 3 All ER.1I69 at p.1172. It was further submitted that if the declaration was refused all other claims must also be refused. Counsel, then argued in the alternative that if the declaration was granted, the defendants would necessarily become tenants of the Plaintiff, who can only succeed by bringing his action in the proper tribunal. It was contended, that the Rent Tribunal and not the High Court was the proper forum.
The learned trial judge accepted the contention of the defendant and dismissed the claim of the Plaintiff. He held that Plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence of his ownership and his right to occupy the property in dispute in this suit which is Plot 295, Oromineke Layout or 5 Emekuku Street, Port Harcourt.
It seems clear from the arguments of counsel on both sides and the trial Judge that both parties and the court accepted and relied on the validity of Edict No. 15 of 1972 State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict. The question of the property being an Abandoned Property and validly disposed of under the provisions of the Abandoned Property (Custody and Maintenance) Edict No.8 of 1969 did not seem to have been pursued. Counsel to the Plaintiff relying on the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict (supra) argued that the lease having reverted to the  State, was validly conveyed to the Plaintiff, and that the limitation relating to public purposes under the Public Lands Acquisition Law was not applicable. It was argued the sale to Plaintiff was for a public purpose. The defendant similarly relying on the validity of the cancellation of the lease contended that the State Government could not validly vest any title in the lessee. It is therefore obvious that the question of the validity of the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict was not directly in the Gild was not distinctly raised in argument. What was ill issue was whether the Rivers State Government validly conveyed any estate or title to the Plaintiff in respect of the property in issue. Of course the issue of the validity of the conveyance inevitably puts in issue the question of the validity of the enabling State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict No.15 of 1972. The fact that it did not occur to counsel and the Court to consider the issue is a different matter to be discussed later in this judgment.
After citing and discussing the judgments in Ereku v. Governor, Mid-Western State of Nigeria (1974) 10 S.C. 59 the learned trial judge stated, at p.27.
“the law then I believe is that unless the purpose of section 201 the Public Lands Acquisition Law defining “public purposes”, a land purported to be acquired by Government under this law, and, for that matter, the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972 does not vest in the Government and since it has not vested in the Government the powers of disposition afforded by the State Land Laws cannot be validly exercised over such a parcel of land purported to have been acquired. Applying this test to the land in question and cancellation of its lease I fail to see how, without more, a purpose of sale just to an individual can fall within any of the public purposes enumerated”.
The learned trial judge considered the question whether the Abandoned Property Implementation Decree applied to validate the transfer. He criticised the decree, pointing out its defects in not providing for a definition of Abandoned Property. He pointed out that no where in the Decree” the Implementation Committee constituted. He held that the Committee is to where shown to be the grantor. Exhibit B he regarded as hear-say. There was therefore no evidence before the Court that the Committee had dealt with the property in any way.
The two grounds on which the Court refused the declaration were stated as follows:
“I have come to the conclusion that the purpose of acquisition of the property concerned in this suit being not one that fell within the definition of public purpose in section 2 of the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict cannot he valid and cannot vest the property in the State and as such the State Government cannot legally or properly dispose of it. I have also come to the finding that since the instrument purporting to transfer the property, namely Exhibit A herself, was in no way executed by the Abandoned Property Implementation Committee the provisions of
the Abandoned Properties Decree 1979 cannot come to its aid to validate its purported act of vesting of rights in the property in the plaintiff’ .
It seems clear from the submission of counsel to the Plaintiff that Plaintiff abandoned the contention that the property in dispute was an abandoned property and Plaintiff acquired it in that capacity. The only contention before the trial judge was that the original lease having been validly, cancelled a valid allocation of the property was made to him. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The grounds of appeal were filed, which were argued together.
The grounds of appeal are as follows:
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
I. Error-In-Law: The Learned Trial Judge was clearly in error when he held as follows:-
“The property having ceased to he an abandoned property to any individual for his commercial benefit” and came to an erroneous conclusion.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR:
(1) The Defendant did not specifically deny the averment made by the Plaintiff that the property was an abandoned property in 1978 when the Plaintiff obtained a lease of the plot.
II.Error-In-Law: The Learned Trial Judge was clearly in error in failing to give effect to Exhibit” A” in favour of the Appellant.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR:
(1) The Defendant was not a party to Exhibit “A”.
(2) The Defefendant did not seek to set aside Exhibit “A”.
(3) The Defendant had no better title than the Plaintiff.
III. The judgment is not supported by the evidence.
Chike Ofodile SAN as Counsel in the High Court assumed that the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict was valid and therefore validly cancelled the Lease of the original Lessor. He therefore argued that since the Lease thereby reverted to the State, the State can under powers in s.2(g) of the Public Lands Acquisition Law, allocate the same to another. He distinguished Ereku & Ors. v. Military Governor Mid-Western State (1974) 10 SC.59. In the Court of Appeal also the issue of the property in dispute being an abandoned was never in issue since it was abandoned. He submitted that respondents were trespassers. That trespass commenced on the refusal to vacate on the receipt of Exhibit B.
Counsel for the respondent repeated his argument in the Court below.
In the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the facts leading to the litigation were summarily stated at pp.52-53. The Court criticised the respondent’s pleadings for omitting to aver who allocated the property in dispute to him. The Court however ignored the fact that averment in the pleading that the property was allocated to defendant was not disputed and no issue was joined with respect thereto. The Court was clearly in error to consider a matter not in issue between the parties.
The Court correctly stated the case of the respondents. It went on the assumption that the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict No.15 of 1972 was valid, and the State Government had validly acquired the plot in dispute. It was held that the acquisition of the plot by the Rivers State Government falls within s.2(g) of the Public Lands Acquisition Law. The Court observed at 55 as follows ‘
“If the Rivers State Government after cancelling the original lease of one of the plots by virtue of section 3(1) of the State Lands (Cancellation) of leases Edict, 1972, and subsequently leased the same plot to another individual, the second lease in my view will be within the original public purpose for which the Layout was originally acquired”.
Here too, the Court and Counsel did not advert to the issue whether the enabling law, the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict No. 15 of 1972 is itself valid. The Court of Appeal then at p.56 questioned the locus of the defendant; and his interest in the plot leased to the appellant.
The Court said that his only right if any, was one to occupy the property at the pleasure of the Government. This did not vest in him any proprietary right to entitle him to challenge the Government’s right to lease property. The Court also lamented that the Rivers State Government was not made a party to the case. The reason for this suggestion seems to follow from what the Court said, at p.56, lines 23-25.
“It may be asked whether it was not necessary to consider the Government’s reasons for the lease before holding that the lease was wrong. It seems to me that the lower court had a duty to hear the Rivers State Government in this matter before entertaining the defence of the respondent”.
The Court of Appeal rejected the contention that the claim for possession was brought in the wrong Court. The Court held that the issue was one of trespass and not of rent. Further the property being no longer abandoned the Rents Edict was inapplicable.
Respondent has appealed to this Court, first on three grounds, and later by leave of this Court, filed three additional grounds of appeal. It is pertinent to what will be discussed hereafter and in view of the course of this appeal to set out the original grounds of appeal which are as follows – GROUNDS OF APPEAL
1. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law in not holding that the property subject matter of this suit is not capable of any disposition by the Rivers State Government to any private person when the same has been acquired by the Rivers State Government for public purpose.
2. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law in taking into consideration extraneous matters as regards the acquisition of the property in question and thereby came to a wrong conclusion.
3. The Judgment of the learned Justices of Appeal is against the weight of evidence.
It is interesting to observe that the 2nd Respondent was not a party in the High Court and Court of Appeal. He was made a party by order of this Court. The additional grounds of appeal filed with the leave of this Court are as follows –
“1. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law in not affirming the Judgment of the High Court and dismissing the claim of the Plaintiff/Respondent for a different reason, having regards (sic) to the position of the law at all times relevant to the proceedings both at the High Court and the Federal Court of Appeal.
PARTICULARS
(a) The State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972 under which the lease of Plot 295 Oromineke Layout otherwise known as No.5 Emekuku Street, Port Harcourt was cancelled by virtue of the publication contained in the Rivers State Government Notice No.452 of Volume IV of the Rivers State of Nigeria Extra-ordinary Gazette No.56 of 1st November, 1972 is void for inconsistency with the provision of the 1963 Federal Constitution by virtue of Section 31 thereof.
(b) The purported cancellation of the lease or acquisition remains void and the property in question remains vested on the original lessee L.E. Egu or in the alternative on the Abandoned Property Authority established under the Rivers State Abandoned property (Custody and Management) Edict, 1969.
(c) The lessor in Exhibit A had not got the property in question to pass to the Plaintiff/Respondent as it had purported to do. Nemo dat quod non habet
(d) What the Federal Court of Appeal has to decide is whether the decision of the trial Judge was right; not whether his reasons were.
2. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in. law in holding that with respect to the claim for possession the issue between the parties was purely one of trespass and not of rents.
PARTICULARS
(a) There is no claim for trespass before the Court below.
(b) From the pleadings it was clear the Defendant/Appellant was in occupation of property.
(c) EXHIBIT ‘B’ relied on as notice to quit is not a proper notice emanating from the Plaintiff/Respondent as Landlord.
3. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law in ordering the Appellant to vacate the premises in question when from the pleadings and submissions at the High Court, that Court had no jurisdiction to order recovery of possession.
PARTICULARS
(a) The State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972 under which the lease of Plot 295 Oromineke Layout otherwise known as No.5 Emekuku Street, Port Harcourt was cancelled by virtue of the publication contained in the Rivers State Government Notice No.452 of Volume IV of the Rivers State of Nigeria Extra-ordinary Gazette No.56 of 1st November, 1972 is void for inconsistency with the provision of the 1963 Federal Constitution by virtue of Section 31 thereof.
In his brief of argument and oral elaboration before us, counsel for the appellant abandoned Ground 1, of the original ground of appeal, relying on the additional ground I, but on a different point of law. Counsel abandoned ground 3 of the original ground of appeal because the ground involved a question of fact and no leave was obtained either in the court below or in this Court. Appellant has before this Court to argue original ground 2 and the three additional grounds of appeal.
The objection of Counsel to the respondent Chief Chike Ofodile S.A.N. for the 1st Respondent and Mr. Addai-Mensah for the 2nd Respon dent was that the issue in the additional ground 1, was being raised for the first time in the Court, and that it was neither raised in the Court of first instance nor in the Court of appeal and that on the decided cases of this Court the point should not be countenanced – The recent decision of this Court in Ejiofodomi v. Okonkwo (1982) 11 SC.14 at p.96 was cited and relied upon. It was also argued that to allow the point to be argued would enable a departure from the pleading of the parties – Enang v. Adu (1981) 11-12 SC.36 was relied upon for this proposition. It was also submitted that none of the two courts below had expressed their views on this point. Finally it was submitted that appellant was not the proper person to challenge the validity of the Edict as unconstitutional and void, not being an original owner or lessee of the property in issue. The cases of Ereku v. Government of Mid-Western State (1974) 10 SC.59, Ononye v. Commissioner Eastern Provinces 17 NLR. 142 and Bello (1973) 3 SC.103 Peenok v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (1982) 12 SC. 1 were cited and relied upon.
In his reply Mr. Olukole for the Appellant submitted that the ground of appeal raised substantial grounds of law, and since no new evidence was required the court had the discretion to entertain it. He cited and relied on Akpene v. Barclays Bank & Anor. (1977) 1 SCA7, 58-59.
The gravemen of the issues to be decided in this appeal is the question whether Exhibits “A” and “B”, relied upon by the respondent as evidence of ownership of 5 Emekuku Street, Diobu, actually have that effect.
Appellant has contended all along from the trial Court to this court. that Exhibit” A” did not vest any title in the respondent. This argument was accepted in the trial Court, but rejected in the Court of Appeal. The reason relied upon in the Court below was that although the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict No.15 of 1972 which purportedly cancelled the original lease of 5 Emekuku Street, validly did so, the subsequent allocation of that plot was not for a public purpose, consequently the Lease Exhibit “A” made by Rivers State Government pursuant thereto was invalid.
The Court of Appeal, rejected that argument and held that the reversion of the plot having been valid by virtue of the operation of the cancellation of Leases Edict the lease to respondent under the State Lands Law was for a public purpose, and therefore valid. The property in question having reverted to the state as State Land under the State Lands Law.
Before this Court, Counsel has sought leave to support his contention on the same ground but for the reasons not argued in the Court of Appeal. He now contends that the Lease Exhibit A, is invalid, not on the ground of public purpose, but on the ground of incompetence of the Lessor to grant the lease because the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict, being in conflict with the provisions of s.31 of the Constitution 1963 by reason of the inconsistency is void, and therefore the original lease remains unaffected. Consequently, the Rivers State Government could not vest ownership of 5, Emekuku Street, on the respondent.
The respondent’s contention before us which has already been stated was that this point was being raised for the first time in this Court, and that the Court below has not expressed any view on it, and that this Court ought not to countenance the new reasons, which is a departure from the pleadings.
I shall summarily dismiss the contention that the new point of law raised on facts admitted on the pleadings could not be entertained because the courts below had not expressed any opinion on the point. Stricto sensu, the rule of having the opinion of the courts below on a point raised for the first time in the Court of Appeal should be more properly confined to issues of fact or mixed law and fact where the role and discretion of the Court below is overriding and authoritative. It is generally not desirable to extend the rule to grounds based on points of law, the determination of which will settle the matter finally. It is conceded that a court’s decision should only be reversed on errors made in the adjudication of a case. A court cannot strictly be said to have erred unless the issue was before it. However where the arguments before the Court below required a determination of the issue now before the appellate court, it cannot correctly be said that it was not an issue before the court below.
Where the new point raised on appeal had been raised and determined in a subsequent case on appeal this, determination will be accepted as the opinion of the appellate court if the matter had come before it. It will therefore not be correct to contend that merely because the point of law was implicit but was not distinctly raised in the courts below in the earlier case, the decision of the Appellate Court in the subsequent case where the matter had been distinctly raised and determined will not be binding in the case before the Court. This proposition is supported by the Southern Rhodesian case of Runyowa v. The Queen (1967) 1 AC.26 decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The facts were that appellant was charged with two others with attempting to set fire on a building in contravention of section 334(1) of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act 1960. He was convicted and sentenced to death. On appeal, to the Privy Council after a new Constitution had been introduced with a provision in section 60 thereof prohibiting inhuman treatment, it was raised on appeal that section 37 of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, C.39 which made the death penalty mandatory for the offence with which appellant was charged contravened section 60 of the Constitution. This point had been decided in Gundu & Sambo v. Hayward & A.-G. of Southern Rhodesia C.A. No.256 of 1985 before appellants appeal came before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that there was no contravention of the Constitution. This point of law was raised for the first time in the Privy Council. The Privy Council observed that even where a point of law was not raised in the Courts below and was raised for the first time before it, where the precise point had been raised in another case and considered by the appellate court, such point of law may be allowed. In the Runyowa case, the decision of Gundu and Sambo v. Hayward and A.G. of Southern Rhodesia, was delivered on June 9, 1965. The Runyowa case came before the Privy Council on December 6, 1965. Thus like the appeal before us the opinion on the point of law was decided by the appellate court after the decision appealed against had been made. The Privy Council approved the decision of Gundu and Sambo v. Hayward & A.G. of Southern Rhodesia and applied it in Runyowa v. The Queen. The contention that the decision was delivered after the case of Runyowa v. The Queen was decided, was neither suggested nor considered.
I regard this reasoning as jurisdically sound and unimpeachable. Since the appellate court is interested in the views on the point of law of the court below it seems to me immaterial whether the view sought was in the same case or another. So long as the view expressed governs the point of law in issue, it will be sufficient for the purposes of the Appellate Court. In the instant case, the point raised by Counsel for the appellant had been decided in Peenok’s case. I do not see any basis for questioning the authority of that case which is binding on the Court of Appeal and in this Court.
The conditions under which new points of law can be taken and considered on appeal have often been stated. These are (i) That the point of law raised will be argued on the same facts as were relied upon in the court below (ii) That the point if argued in the court below would have been decisive. It is for these reasons that the issue of jurisdiction is allowed to be argued at any stage of the trial or appeal. This is because if it is valid it is unanswerable. – See Shonekan v. Smith (1964) All NLR.168.
In Fadiora v. Gbadebo (1978) 3 SC. at pp.248, it was held that a court of last resort may refuse to entertain a question of law raised before it for the first time if it is satisfied that the Court below would have been in a more advantageous position to deal with the matter. – Moola (M.E.) Sons Ltd. Official Liquidator v. Burjorjee (1932) 48 TLR.279. The Court below is only in a more favourable position in dealing with findings of facts which are based on oral testimony and credibility of witnesses. It is not in a more advantageous position where the issue is one for the interpretation of law where the facts are before the Court of appeal. See The Tasmanial )1880) 15 App. Cas.223. Where the point of law raised for the first time involves substantial point of law and no additional or fresh evidence is required for its decision, this Court will allow the question to be raised and the point taken – See Shonekan v. Smith (1964) All NLR.168-173, Akpene v. Barclays Bank Nigeria Ltd. & Anor. (1977) 1 SC.47. This Court has not been governed by United Marketing Co. v. Karra (1963) 2 All ER, where the Privy Council added that wherever a point of law is raised for the first time on appeal, appellate court needed the opinion of the Court below before it can pronounce on the point of law. This last mentioned reason makes the point of law so raised not a new one and does not seem to fall within the principle.
It is pertinent to observe that the point of law now relied upon by appellant in this case was admittedly taken before us for the first time since this litigation, and in this court. It is not disputed that the facts on which the new point of law raised is the same as were in the pleadings. It is elementary rule of pleading that only facts, and neither evidence nor law ought to be pleaded. It is however important to appreciate also that the same point arose from and was decided in this court in Peenok Investments Ltd v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (1982) 12 SC. 1 on the 3rd of December 1982. At the time of the argument before the Court of Appeal of the instant appeal, Peenok Investment Ltd v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. had not been decided. Arguments in the instant case in the Court of Appeal was concluded, and judgment was reserved on the 3rd November 1982. Judgment was delivered on the 31st January, 1983 after the judgment in the Peenok Investments Ltd. v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. had been delivered on the 3rd December, 1982. It is however relevant to mention, that the invalidity of Edict No.15 of 1972 has up till the time of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, was not in issue. What was in issue was the validity of Exhibit “A”.
The real issue before this Court now is the question of the validity of Edict No. 15 of 1972, which has been held to be inconsistent with section 31(2) of the Constitution 1963. This is a point of law of immense constitutional importance which can be taken at any state in this Court even if not taken in the Court below. If the contention of the appellant founded on the Peenok Case is successful, then the question of the validity of Exhibit “A” will depend upon the validity of Edict No. 15 of 1972. If the Peenok Case is held not to be applicable, then the question will lie entirely on the correctness of the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
PEENOK V. HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL LTD.
I consider it helpful to discuss the Peenok Case because the principles of law and issues are entirely identical with the issues in this case Peenock Investments Ltd., a Limited Liability Company brought an action in the Enugu High Court, against the Hotel Presidential Ltd, another Limited Liability Company which owns properties in Enugu and Port Harcourt. The claim by Peenock was for rents and mesne profits in respect of properties occupied by the Hotel Presidential Ltd., known as PlotA/42 Diobu G.R.A., Port Harcourt for the period 24th March 1972 to 23rd March, 1977 inclusive. In their statement of defence, it was pleaded that the lease of Plot A/42 Diobu Port Harcourt had been cancelled and the ownership of the property now vested in the Rivers State Government and not the Plaintiff in accordance with Edicts Nos. 15 and 17 of 1972 of the Rivers State Government. In reply to this pleading, Plaintiff averred as follows –
“(1). In answer to paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the statement of defence the plaintiff will put the defendant to strict proof of the allegations or fact contained therein except as hereinafter admitted and will at the trial contend:
(i) That the then Military Governor of Rivers State, A.P. Diete-spiff, approached the Managing Director of Plaintiff Company, Chief P.N. Okeke, through one RAMANI ABAH of Ramani Abah & Co., to sell the buildings, the subject matter of this suit, to the said A.P. Diete-Spiff personally and the said Chief P.N. Okeke bluntly refused the offer. This was on the 22nd February, 1972.
(ii) That the said notice of cancellation of lease dated 26th September, 1973 was:
(a) irregular, vindictive, malafide and an abuse of power;
(b) giving a public veneer to purely personal vendetta.
(iii) That the government of Rivers State did not itself need and has never used the said building for any public purpose or at all. The plaintiff will rely on various correspondences touching this matter and especially the RIVERS STATE GOVERNMENT’S letters of 7th, 8th, 30th September and 29th November, 1976.
(iv) That the defendant directly and/or through its agent continues to use and occupy the said building”.
The trial Judge granted the claim of the plaintiffs up to the date of the coming into force of Edict No.15 of 1972, on 16th October, 1972, i.e. 26th September, 1973. The appeal was dismissed on the grounds inter alia that the issues affecting the validity of the Edict were not distinctly raised in the pleading., of the appellants. In the further appeal to this Court, as in the instant case, the validity of Edict No.15 of 1972 was distinctly raised and made a ground of appeal. One of the questions for determinations was formulated by Counsel for the appellant as follow –
VALIDITY OF EDICTS NOS. 15 AND 17 OF 1972
“(ii)(a) Whether Edicts Nos.15 and 17 of 1972 are void on the ground that they were made in bad faith by the then Governor of Rivers State.
(b) Whether the aforesaid Edicts were also void on the ground that they are inconsistent with the Constitution of the Federation 1963 as modified by the Decrees of the former Military Government”
I am here concerned with (b), italicised, which this court answered in the affirmative for a number of reasons. First, the lessee of a State Land can only lose such land on the grounds stated in the States Land Law. There is no provision for cancellation of a lease. Secondly, cancellation of leases is in violation of section 31 of the 1963Constitution. Thirdly, Edict NO.15 of 1972 is an addition to the purposes for resumption of State Lands spelt out in sections 22 and 23 of the States Land Law.
It is clear from the judgment in the Peenok Case that the State Land (Cancellation of Leases) Edict No.15 of 1972, being in conflict with the provisions of Section 31(2) of the Constitution 1963, is by virtue of such conflict void and of no effect.
In the Peenok Case, It was stated that “public purpose” within the States Land Law, has been defined in section 23 of that Law, and any other purpose must be construed ejusdem generis. The circumstances under which and the manner in which the State may re-enter State Land is also provided under sections 16 and 22 of that law. It was therefore held that an outright cancellation
of a lease as provided under Edicts No. 15 and 17 of 1972 of the Rivers State is an addition to the purposes and circumstances and in the manner prescribed under the states Land Law. (see 1982) 12Sc. at pp.29, 30 per Irikefe, J.S.C., as he then was (now C.J); Idigbe, J.S.C. at pp.64-67. Obaseki, J.S.C. at pp.113-115. Nnamani, J.S.C. at pp. 139-140.This is a contravention of section 31(2)(b) of the constitution 1963 which provides as follows-
“(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the operation of any law in force on the thirty-first day of March, 1958, or any law made after that date that amends or replaces any such law and does not –
(a) add to the kinds of property that may be taken possession of or the rights over and interests in property that may be acquired;
(b) add to the purposes for which or the circumstances in which  such property may be taken possession of”.
Section 31 of the Constitution 1963 was preserved by the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No.1 of 1966. Accordingly the States Land Law, Cap 122 of the Laws of Eastern Nigeria which came into force on 8th April, 1918, and therefore a law in force on the 31st March, 1958, could not be amended or replaced in such a manner to add to the kinds of property that may be taken possession of or the rights over and the interests in property that may be acquired. Also the purposes for which, the circumstances or manner in which property may be taken possession of or acquired, cannot be added to. This is because s.31 (2) of the Constitution 1963 which preserved laws made before 31.3.1958, and ensured that laws made after that date do not add to the purposes, of, and circumstances and manner of acquisition in the existing laws. Consequently, although the Military Governor was empowered to exercise legislative power and could repeal the States Land Law, (see s.1(3) of Constitution (Suspension & Modification) Decree No.1 of 1966)such exercise of powers will inevitably be in conflict with the provisions of s.31(2) of the Constitution 1963, if the provisions of such acquisition, the circumstances and manner in which the property may be taken pose session is different and additional to those in the existing law. It is on this reason that Edict No.15 of 1972, i.e. States Land (Cancellation of Leases) Edict, which seeks to cancel leases held under the States Land Law, Cap. 105, has been held to be invalid as prescribing new purposes for acquisition.
THE EFFECT OF PEENOCK V HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL LTD
I pause here for a critical consideration of the effect of the Peenock decision on pending litigation.
It is of crucial importance to this appeal to consider the effect of the judgment in this case on the parties to the litigation in the light of Peenock’s case. It is well settled, that the decisions of this Court are binding on all lower courts on issues of law and of facts which are in pari materia. The issue which was decided in the Peenock case which is being contested now before us, is that the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict No.15 of 1972, being in conflict with s.31 of the Constitution 1963 was invalid and could not cancel an existing lease and could not enable the Rivers State Government to execute another in place of the property leased in favour of the Plaintiff/Respondent. The contention now is that since the Edict cancelling the original lease was invalid by virtue of the Peenock Case that lease remained extant, and the Rivers State Government could not execute a lease of the same property to Plaintiff/Respondent. Accordingly Exhibit A executed by the Rivers State Government to the Plaintiff/Respondent is invalid. As Irikefe J.S.C. (now C.J.N.) stated in the Peenok Case, it is an “exercise in futility”. I think the maxim nemo dat quod non habet is an accepted fundamental principle of our law, and has been applied to several cases. It applies in this situation. A lease is cancelled presumably because it is already vested in someone.
Hence when the cancellation becomes invalid by virtue of the Constitutional provision, the ownership remains where it was before the attempt to cancel was made. It is also well settled that pleadings are based on facts, and not evidence or law. There is no doubt that the facts on which the present legal contention is based are to be found in the pleadings. It is admitted that the parties and the Courts before the Peenock Case assumed that the State Land (Cancellation of Leases) Edict No. 15 of 1972, was valid, and operated to cancel the lease in respect of No.5 Emekuku Street, Diobu, Port-Harcourt. It was only after the decision that appellant raised the argument which has always been available to him since the inception of the case. It was therefore contended that since the Peenok Case was decided when this case was on appeal to the Court of Appeal, this case could not be affected by the ratio of the Peenok Case. There is no support for this view which I think goes too far to reject the application of the doctrine of binding precedents. The Peenock decision is a declaration of the law relating to the validity of the Edict. And since the Edict has been held to be in conflict with the Constitution 1963 it is invalid. The declaratory theory of precedent is an exposition of the declaratory theory of Judicial law making; that Judges merely declare the law and do not make them. However imperfect and elusive the theory seems to be, there is no doubt that the declaration in a judgment of what the law is entirely rests on the facts before the Court, invariably of an antecedent situation to declare the true legal position. The declaration in the judgment is as to what the law is with respect to the parties in the litigation. The declaration is as to what the law has always been and it is accordingly retrospective in effect.
In the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction both the Court of Appeal in Section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act 1976 and this Court in Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act 1960 have the power in rehearing the case before them to give such judgment as ought be given as if the case were before the Court of first instance. In Quilter v. Mapleson (1882) 9 QBD. at p. 676 Jessel M. R. in construing Order LVIII r. 2. Similar to our Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act 1960 with respect to the powers of rehearing of an appellate Court, said,
“On an appeal strictly so called, such a judgment can only be given as ought to have been given at the original hearing, but on rehearing such a judgment may be given as ought to be given if the case came at the trial before the Court of first instance. ”
Since the rules were intended to enable the Court of Appeal to do complete justice, and the effect of the judgment on appeal is intended to be retrospective to the date of the judgment of the Court of first instance, the Court of Appeal is entitled to grant such relief to which the party was entitled according to the law as it stood at the hearing of the appeal. As was stated by Bowen L.J. in Quilter v. Mapleson supra at p.677-678, it tantamounts “to be pressing the rules of procedure too far to say that the Court of Appeal cannot decide according to the existing state of the law.” The true and correct view is that the Court of Appeal in giving judgment gives the judgment which the Court of first instance ought to have given. Hence, in this appeal, the law as at the time of our decision is represented by the Peenok Case. This Court is in my respectful view only entitled to give judgment on the State of the law when the appeal was heard. The Court of first instance in this case ought to have given the same judgment as was given in the Peenok Case.
Retrospective effect of judgments is the norm, and is a well settled principle of our administration of justice. The House of Lords decisions in Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) AC 562 and R v. Manley (1963) 1 K.B. 529 are clear examples of retrospective nature of juridical decisions. Both Manley and the manufacturers in Donoghue v. Stevenson were liable even though the law was otherwise at the time they acted. Thus in the Peenok Case the invalidity of the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict No. 15 of 1972, was held to be retrospective to date of its enactment. The fact that the issue was neither discussed nor decided in the courts below was clearly irrelevant. In the instant appeal, the fact that the issue was neither discussed nor decided in the court below, and indeed the contrary view was assumed by all concerned, could not have rendered the erroneous views of all concerned the correct law. The position is that the constitutional provision which the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases Edict) infringed has always been in existence. To ignore the effect of the application of the Peenok Case to the appeal before us, is to shut our minds to the declaratory theory of law, and to condone wrong reasoning by approving an erroneous judgment and allowing it to remain binding even in the face of a subsequent contrary judgment of a Superior Court. It is extremely important to recognise that where  there is an appeal, the litigation is not at an end until the determination of the appeal. In this case the effect of the successful argument in this court is to alter retrospectively the ratio decidendi of the judgment in the High Court. The doctrine of stare decisis and the bindingness of judicial precedents are the corner stones of our legal system. Effect must be given to the Peenok judgment.
The Declaration and establishing the claim
The next question is whether Respondent/Plaintiff established his claim. The action which gave rise to this appeal started from a writ of summons whereby Plaintiff/Respondent was seeking a declaration as owner of the property in issue, i.e. No.5 Emekuku Street, Diobu. He also sought for possession and injunction. It is well settled that our Courts are entitled to exercise jurisdiction to make a declaration even in those cases where the Plaintiff has not got a complete or subsisting cause of action. – See Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay (1915) 2 K.B. 536. A declaration will only be granted where the Plaintiff has an enforceable legal right see Nixon v. Attorney-General (1930) 1 C.B. 566. It will not be granted where the claim would not give Plaintiff relief in any sense. – See Thorne Rural District Council v. Buntina (1972) 1 All E.R. 439. In Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay (supra) the question was whether a plaintiff can have a declaration in respect of a cause of action residing in the defendant and not in the plaintiff. Even in that case the Court was of the view that a legal right ought to be established before the declaration could be granted. It was said at p.575
“The conclusion which I have come upon the whole matter is that, if the respondents could establish any grounds for relief from any further proceedings in the American Courts then this Court would have jurisdiction to give them that relief, not only by the granting of an injunction but by the making of a declaratory judgment or order upon the matter in dispute between the parties; but short of making out such a case I am of opinion that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiffs claim. ”
A declaration is a discretionary remedy which is generally exercised with caution. For a declaration to be made, the Plaintiff must establish that, he is entitled to the relief claim should be lawful, constitutional, and not be inequitable for the Court to grant.
In the appeal before us, the claim for the declaration is founded on Exhibit “A”, i.e. the Lease of 5 Emekuku Street, Diobu, by purchase. The question is whether a legal right in respect of Plaintiffs action can be founded on these documents I am of the opinion that they cannot. I am in agreement with the contention of Mr. Olukole learned Counsel for the appellants in this appeal. In the first place, on the authority of the Peenok Case the Lessor of Exhibit “A” has no property Plot 295 to transfer to Plaintiff, and Exhibit A conveyed nothing. This is because the Lease having not
been validly cancelled property remained in the lessee. Secondly, Exhibit “B” which was tendered as evidence that Plaintiff, purchased 5, Emekuku Street, Diobu, cannot in law have that effect since the property was still vested in the lessee.
It seems to me apparent from the Peenok Case, that to grant the declaration claimed would tantamount to a holding that the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict No. 15 of 1972 was valid and validly cancelled the original lease of 5, Emekuku Street, Diobu, and therefore was not in conflict, with section 31(2) of the Constitution 1963.
It is clear that both Exhibits “A” and “B” on which Respondent relied for the Declaration sought do not confer on him a legal right in respect of which a declaration can be granted. Consequently the respondents do not seem to me to have a cause of action. – See Offin v. Rochford Rural Council (1906) 1 Ch. 342. It is of immense importance to consider the premises from which the Court of Appeal decided the appeal before it. Because of its assumption that the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict was valid, it did not consider the issue of the validity of Exhibit “A” on which Plaintiff relied, and the effect of Exhibit “B”, Exhibit “A” relates to the lease of Plot 295 and Exhibit “B” to the house situated on it as No.5 Emekuku Street, Diobu was at the time an Abandoned property. In that case it was for Plaintiff to establish that Exhibit “A” was made to him by the Abandoned Property Implementation Committee, in which all such property was vested. The Abandoned Properties Decree No. 90 of 1979 which came into force on the 25th September, 1979 provides in section 1(1)(3) as follows-
1. (1) Every sale, disposition of abandoned properties conducted by the Abandoned Properties Implementation Committee (hereinafter in this Decree referred to as “the Committee”) set up by the Federal Military Government shall be deemed to have been lawful and properly made and any instrument issued by the Committee which purports to convey any estate or interest in land, shall be deemed to have been validly issued and shall have effect according to its tenor or intendment. (3) The registrar or any other person in charge of registration of land, instruments, deeds or rights affecting land shall, upon presentation to him of a contract of agreement signed by or on behalf of the Committee, expunge from the relevant register the name of any person in whose name any interest is registered in respect of any property affected by this Decree and substitute therefore the name of the new owner.”
There is no provision in this Decree or any other Decree or Edict enabling the Rivers State Government to deal with abandoned properties by selling and transferring title to any person. The Abandoned Properties Edict No. 8 of 1969, did not contain any such provisions. Exhibit “B” written by an official of the Ministry of Land who had no authority to do so, cannot be accepted as acting for and on behalf of the Abandoned Property Implementation Committee, which is the authority vested with such powers.
The learned trial judge in his judgment pointed out this defect in the case of the Plaintiff and held that the case failed also for that reason. The Court of Appeal did not deal with that point; Plaintiff having abandoned it. The Court was concerned more with the weakness of the case of the defendant than for the Plaintiff to establish his case. See Zaidan v. Mohisen (1973) 1 NMLR 427. It is a well settled principle that a Plaintiff can only succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the case of the defendant – See Kodilinye v. Odu (1935) 2 WACA 336 Elufisoye v. Alabetutu (1968) NMLR 298 Akpapuna v. Obi Nzeka II (1983) 7 S.C. at p.25, 60. In Kodilinye  v. Odu (supra) delivering the judgment of the Court, Webber C.J. Sierra Leone said at p.337.
“The onus lies on the plaintiff to satisfy the Court that he is entitled on the evidence brought by him to a declaration of title. Plaintiff in this case must rely on the strength of own case and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. If this onus is not discharged, the weakness of the defendant’s case will not help him, and the judgment is for the defendant”.
In Akpapuna v. Obi Nzeka II (supra) at p.61 Obaseki, J.S.C. observed of this statement as follows –
“This statement has over the years since 1935 guided the Courts in this country in its adjudication on declaratory actions and both the lawyers and courts have followed it with religious dedication.”
I agree with this view. I add further in amplification that actions for declaration as employed in this country with respect to title to or interest in land, are clearly different from mere declarations of right under Order XXV r.5, and now Order 15 r.16. Rules of the Supreme Court of England. A
Plaintiff seeking a declaration of title in our Courts must establish the title he claims. It is not sufficient for Plaintiff merely to show that Defendant has no title. See Zaiden v. Mohisen (1973) 1 NMLR 427. Okafor & Ors. v. Nnaife & Ors. (1973) 1 NMLR 245. The Plaintiff must establish what he is asking the Court to make a declaration in his favour. Where he has failed to establish the claim, he will not be entitled to the declaration sought. See Kodilinye v. Odu (Supra). It is the law of this country that a consideration of the weakness of the defendants case does not arise until plaintiff has established a prima facie case. See Aromire & Ors. vs. Awoyemi (1972) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) p. 101 Adeshoye v. Siwoniku (1952) 14 WACA 86.
It is clear on the pleadings that Plaintiff/Respondent cannot and did not establish that he is the owner of 5 Emekuku Street, Diobu, and therefore is not entitled to the declarations sought in his writ of summons. It is pertinent to refer to the reason given by the Court of Appeal for reversing the judgment of the learned trial judge and to examine whether the reason was right.
The Court of Appeal after distinguishing Ereku’s Case (Supra) said,
“The Rivers State Government has already acquired the plot.
The certificate of title had been given to the Government. The purpose of the acquisition judging from the fact that the area is a layout and there are several residential buildings on it, is for the Government to carve the said land into plots and lease them into individuals for the creation of their own personal houses. This purpose in my opinion falls within the definition of public purpose as defined in section 2 of the Public Lands Acquisition Law. The purpose is still subsisting and if the Rivers State Government after canceling the original lease of one of the plots by virtue of section 3(1) of the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972 and subsequently leased the same plot to another individual, the second lease in my view will be within the original public purpose for which the layout was originally acquired.”
Chike Ofodile SAN has supported this judgment on this ground. His argument before us is the same as was submitted before the Court of Appeal and accepted by that court.
With respect, this view cannot be correct. The correct statement of the law is that land acquired for public purposes under the Public Lands Acquisition Law, on acquisition becomes States Lands and vest in the State to be held under the State Lands Law. Even if it is conceded, which is not, that the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict 1972 is valid, and operates to cancel the lease of the original lessor , the property still reverts to vest in the State as State Lands to be held under the States Land Law to be dealt with under the provisions of that law. The Edict is only valid for the purposes of cancellation of the leases. It does not go further to determine the right of the State to deal with the land which reverts to it. That is still the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Land Law which reverts to it. That is still the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Land Law which was not repealed or suitably amended. It is clear from the provisions of section 23 of the State Land Law, the circumstances under, and the manner in which the State may resume ownership of State Land for public purposes are limited to the purposes prescribed in that section. Allocating the piece or parcel of land to another is clearly not one of the purposes under the section. In the circumstance, although the entire area might have been acquired for a public purpose under the Public Lands Acquisition Law, it is now held under the States Land Law, the public purposes of which are clearly different.
It is right as was contended that the cases of Ononye v. Chief Commissioner, Eastern Provinces 17 NLR 142 and Ereku’s Case (1974) 10 S.C. 59 which declared an acquisition of land specifically for allocation to a commercial concern invalid was not within public purpose. Those cases are clearly (different from the instant case for the reason that those are cases under the Public Lands Acquisition Law, whereas the instant case is under the State Lands Law. As I have said earlier in this judgment the purposes are different.
I have stated in this judgment that the basis of the contention of appellants has remained the same from the trial court. That is that Exhibit “A” vests no title in the respondents, and that the Rivers State Government has no right to write Exhibit “B”. This is so whether the invalidity arises from the invalidity of the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict No. 15 of 1972, or by the invalid exercise of a power under a valid Edict. It is well settled in our jurisprudence that where the judgment of the Court is right, and only the reasons for the judgment are wrong, the appellate court will not interfere with the judgment merely because of the wrong reasons.
What the Appeal Court is concerned with is whether the decision of the judge was right not whether the reasons were. In Ukejianya v. Uchendu 13 W.A.C.A. as at p.46 Blackall P. said,
“It seems to me, however, that what this court has to decide is whether the decision of the Judge was right not whether his reasons were. It is only when the misdirection had caused him to come to a wrong decision that it would be material.”
There is no doubt that the reasons given by the learned trial judge for declaring Exhibits “A” and” B” invalid and of no effect were on the authority of the Peenock Case wrong. However, in accordance with the Peenock Case the decision for so declaring was right. Exhibits “A” and “B” were in the High Court correctly declared invalid for the wrong reasons. In such a situation it was for the Court of Appeal to correct such an error which was manifest on the face of the record. The true reason why Exhibits “A” and “B” are invalid was because they were founded on the State Lands (Cancellation of Leases) Edict No. 15 of 1972, which was by virtue of its conflict with S.31(2) of the Constitution 1963, void and of no effect. Accordingly the leases purported to have been cancelled remained, unaffected, and Exhibit “A” did not pass any title.
The claim of the Plaintiff in the Court of first instance should have been dismissed on this ground alone. Considerations of the ancillary reliefs sought are in my opinion unnecessary. In the circumstances, I hold that the  Court of Appeal was clearly wrong to have set aside the judgment of the learned trial judge. I will accordingly set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal and restore the judgment of the Court of first instance. Appellants shall have N300 as costs of this appeal.

KAWU, J.S.C.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Uwais, J.S.C. For the reasons so ably stated by him, I would also dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal with N300.00 costs to the 1st Respondent.

Appeal Dismissed
Judgment of the Court of Appeal Confirmed
Case Remitted to the High Court for
Assessment of Damages for the Plaintiff.
1st Respondent.

 

Appearances

  1. A. OlukoleFor Appellant

 

AND

Chief. Ofodile, S.A.N. (with him, E. Ofodile)
A. K. Addai-Mensah, D. D. Civil Litigation, Rivers State (with him, R. B. Okadigbo, Miss)For Respondent