HONEY CROWN PRODUCTS LIMITED v. SHELL ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING
(2013)LCN/5927(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 15th day of February, 2013
CA/L/273/09
RATIO
“This case was first instituted in 1998 and actual hearing commenced in June 2008. The feeling of the learned trial judge that the period was long enough for any diligent lawyer to have effected whatever amendment he desired to make is understandable. But it is trite that an amendment can be made at any stage of the proceedings. Order 27 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2000, which applied as at the time this application to amend was made provides: “An application for leave to amend may be made by either party to the court or a Judge in chambers at the trial of the action, and this amendment may be allowed upon such terms as to cost or otherwise as may be just.” On the strength of the above rule an amendment of pleadings is a right granted to parties in order to ensure that justice is done in the case. In MELIFONWU v. EGBUNIKE (SUPRA) @ 280 – 281, the court observed: “As a matter of law, there is no stage in the proceeding, where a court will not grant an application for amendment if the case demands. It is a right awarded to parties by Rules of Court at any time before judgment and it should not be treated lightly.” A long line of authorities have generally laid down circumstances when a party will be allowed to amend its pleadings to include: (i) at any stage of the proceedings (ii) when the amendment will bring the real issue in controversy injustice to the other party, amongst others. See IMONIKHE V. ATTORNEY GENERAL (1992) 2 NSCC 23 480 @ 489 LINES 5 – 2. The Appellant deposed in the affidavit in support of the applications that the purpose for the amendment and re-call of witness was to enable it bring the full facts of the matter before the court which would assist it in determining the real issues between the parties effectively. These depositions were not controverted by the Respondent. It was not enough for the respondent to say in court that he opposed the application when no counter-affidavit was filed and no reasons on law were given for the opposition. The appellant’s counsel is correct in his submission that the learned trial Judge ought to have, on this ground granted the Appellant’s application for amendment, instead of formulating the extraneous issue of age of the case upon which the applications were refused. In OJA AND ORS V. OGBONI AND ORS (1976) 10 N.S.C.C. 244 @ 247 LINE 30 – 45, the SC observed: “The correct principle to guide the court in considering whether to grant an application for amendment of pleadings was aptly expressed by Bowen L. J. in Crooper v. Smith (1884) 26 Ch. D. 700 AT 711 when he said: “I think it is a well established principle that the object of courts is to decide the right of the parties and not to punish them for mistakes which they have made in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights. ?I know of no kind of error or mistakes which if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the court ought not to correct, if it can be done without injustice to the other party. Court do not exist for the sake of deciding matters in controversy and I do not regard such amendments as a matter of favour or grace. ..it seems to me that as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy. It is as much a matter of right on his part to have it corrected, if it can be done without injustice, as any thing else in the case is a matter of right.” Per IYIZOBA, J.C.A.
“A Judge is vested with unfettered discretion, but when such discretion is exercised erratically, it then fetters the parties before it. He, by his very duty as an umpire in the temple of Justice is supposed to set the captives free. Lord Hudson in PETITT V. PETITT (1970) A.C. 777 @ 808 observed thus, on the issue of discretion. “The uncertain and crooked cord of discretion for the golden and straight met-wand of the law” In BAKER V. CARR (1962) 369 U.S. 186, Supreme Court of the United States of America per Justice Frankfurter had this to say “The Courts Authority possessed of neither the purse nor the sword – ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.” Per PEMU, J.C.A.
“A judge should always strive to remain calm and unruffled in all situations. That is the only way to come up with sound decisions untainted with the personal feelings of the trial judge at the material time.” Per IYIZOBA, J.C.A.
“Having said this, the law non the less is that it is not every error committed by a trial judge that will result in the decision being set aside on appeal. There must be a miscarriage of justice for the error to end in the setting aside of the decision on appeal.” Per IYIZOBA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
FATIMA OMORO AKINBAMI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
HONEY CROWN PRODUCTS LIMITED Appellant(s)
AND
SHELL ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING
(HOLDING COMPANY LIMITED) Respondent(s)
CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an Appeal brought by the Defendant/Appellant against the decision of Archibong J. Of Federal High Court, Lagos delivered on the 6th day of November, 2008 refusing to grant the prayers contained in the two Motions on Notice dated 26th September, 2008, for leave to amend its Statement of Defence and to recall PW1 for continuation of cross examination.
The substantive case is a consolidated suit for trade mark infringement and passing off instituted by the Respondent/Plaintiff by a writ of summons dated 17th September, 2001. The Respondent/Plaintiff, in its amended statement of claim, dated 26th January, 2002, prayed the Honourable Court inter alia for injunctive reliefs and general damages of One Million Naira. The Appellant/Defendant subsequently filed their statement of Defence and other processes. On the 12th day of June, 2008, trial commenced with the evidence in Chief of PW1. At the end of his testimony, the Defence Counsel requested for an adjournment. The suit was adjourned to 13th June, 2008. When the matter came up on 13th June, 2008 the Defence Counsel requested for another date to prepare for his case (see pages 39 and 40 of the Record of Appeal). Despite objection from Plaintiff’s counsel that the Defendant had enough time to prosecute its case and the age of the suits, the Honourable Court still obliged the Defendant another adjournment to 18th June, 2008. At the commencement of the matter on 18th June, 2008, the Defendant’s Counsel informed the Court that he was ready for cross examination (see page 41 of the Records of Appeal). Having gone far into his cross examination the Defendant’s counsel again requested for another adjournment “in order to do proper justice to the case”. When the court did not give heed to the request, the said Counsel then said that the reason for the request for another adjournment was that he was considering amending the Statement of Defence (page 43 of the Records) the Court refused to grant this third request for adjournment on the ground that an adjournment cannot be granted on the basis of an intention. The Honourable Court then foreclosed the Defendant’s cross examination and called on the Plaintiff’s Counsel to proceed with re-examination; at the end of which, the court adjourned the matter for the defence of the Defendant. When the matter again came up on 6th November, 2008 the Defendant’s counsel informed the court that he had two applications dated 26th September, 2006, one seeking leave to amend Statement of Defence and the other to recall PW1. The Plaintiff’s counsel on being called upon by the learned trial judge for his reaction stated that he is opposing the applications. The record of appeal at page 98 shows that the defendant’s counsel then stated that he moved the applications in the interest of justice. The Honourable court thereupon ruled denying the applications in the interest of speedy administration of justice. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, the defendant filed a notice of appeal with two grounds of appeal, out of which he distilled two issues for determination. The issues are:
1. Whether the learned trial Judge erred in law when it failed to consider and determine on merit the two separate applications brought by Motions on Notice both dated 26 September, 2009.
2. Whether the failure to consider and determine the said applications on merit amounts to denial of the fundamental right to fair hearing guaranteed under Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
The plaintiff now Respondent in his brief formulated a single issue for determination:
Whether the learned trial Judge properly exercised his discretion when he refused the Defendant/Appellant’s two applications dated 26th September, 2008 for the amendment of Statement of Defence and recall of PW1.
The appeal was heard on the 28n day of November, 2012. The appellant was not represented but there was evidence on record that hearing notice was duly served on his counsel. Mr. Olubor of counsel for the respondent adopted and relied on the respondent’s brief and urged the court to dismiss the appeal. Pursuant to Order 18 rule 9(a) Court of Appeal Rules, the appellant’s brief was deemed duly argued.
I shall adopt the appellant’s two issues in the determination of this appeal.
APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
Learned Counsel for the appellant in his brief submitted that it is trite principle of law that an application for amendment of pleadings calls for the exercise of the court’s discretionary power which must be exercised judiciously and judicially. Relying on the case of MELIFONWU V. EGBUNIKE (2001) 1 NWLR (PT. 694) 271 @ 280 A – B, counsel submitted that an Appellate court will intervene where it is shown that the trial court did not exercise its discretion properly. Learned counsel argued that the above stated principle of law applies to every other interlocutory application before the Court, including an application to re-call a witness for the purpose of putting the real issues in a case before the court, and giving a party an opportunity to properly ventilate its case before a court of justice. Counsel cited of OGBONNA V. UKAEGBU (2005) 17 NWLR (PT. 954) 432 @ 443 C – D. Counsel further submitted that a determination of an interlocutory application by a court without due consideration of the relevant facts and adherence to relevant principles and provision of the law, will amount to a wrong exercise of judicial discretion. Counsel contended that it amounts to abuse of discretion for a Judge to suo motu raise an issue and rely on it as the basis of its ruling in a pending application without hearing the parties in respect of the issue. UGO V. OBIEKWE & ANR. (1989) 7 NSCC 296 @ 306.
Counsel submitted that in the instant case, the Appellant in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the affidavit in support of the Motion for amendment at page 88 of the record of appeal, as well as in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the affidavit in support of motion to re-call PW1 at pages 96 and 97 of the record of appeal, deposed to facts upon which its two applications were based; but instead of determining the Defendant’s motions based on the facts, evidence and issues before the court as contained in the Applications and supporting affidavits, the trial court on its own raised the issue of speedy dispensation of justice and age of the case, and thereupon predicated his ruling on it at page 98 of the Record of Appeal in the following words: “And I deny both applications in the interest of speedy administration of justice…” Counsel submitted that this is a wrong exercise of judicial discretion. NORWOOD (NIGERIA) LTD & ORS V. STAHLBUA GMBH & CO. LTD., (1989) 2 NSCC PAGE 411 @ 420.
Relying on the cases of MOHAMMED V. COP (1999) 12 NWLR (PT.630) PAGE 331 AT 340, PARA F AND VENTURES LTD V. PETROPLAST IND. LTD. (2000) 4 NWLR (PT.651) PAGE 151 AT 167 PARA A – C counsel submitted that the refusal to grant the Defendant/Appellant an adjournment for the purpose of amending its statement of defence and the eventual refusal of the applications to amend the statement of defence and re-call PW1, on the ground of the age of the case, without due consideration of the merit of the applications led to the sacrifice of justice at the altar of speed and age of the case. Counsel argued that this amounts to wrong exercise of judicial discretion.
Learned counsel referred to the principles guiding the grant of an application for amendment of pleadings as set out in Order 27 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2000 applicable at the time the application to amend was filed and submitted that amendment of pleadings is a right granted to parties to ensure that justice is done in the case. Counsel examined the circumstances under which a party will be allowed to amend his pleadings and relevant authorities and submitted that an amendment can be made at any stage of the proceedings, even before judgment. Learned counsel submitted that the Respondent did not file any counter affidavit to the applications filed before the lower court. The affidavits in support of the applications were thus uncontroverted and are consequently deemed admitted. The lower court ought to have accepted the facts as established.
On issue 2, learned counsel relying on the cases of O.O.M.F. Ltd v. N.A.C.B. Ltd (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt.1098) 412 @ 434, B-D and Jadcom Ltd v. Oguns Electricals (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt 859) 153 @ 178 A – C submitted that it is a denial of fair hearing when a court of law wrongly and unduly exercised its discretion against an application to amend the pleadings and/or recall a witness for conclusion of cross-examination. Counsel further submitted that it amounts to shutting the defendant/appellant out from presenting its case without “let or hindrance from beginning to the end” as required under the cardinal rules of fair hearing. Learned counsel urged the court to hold that the learned trial judge failed to exercise his discretion judicially and judiciously in refusing the appellant’s applications to amend its statement of claim and to recall PW1. Counsel urged us to uphold the appeal.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
In response to the above, learned counsel for the Respondent in his brief submitted that at page 98 of the Record of Appeal the Appellant’s counsel said he moved the application “in the interest of justice”. Failure of the counsel to state cogent reasons why he wanted the Court to exercise its discretion in the Appellant’s favour prompted the court’s reaction, which ruled that the application was denied in the interest of speedy administration of justice. The court referred to the age of the case and was of the opinion that all material facts ought to have been brought in (within those years that the matters have been pending in court) by a diligent counsel. Counsel submitted that in the circumstances of this case it was not necessary for the court to invite parties to the action to address it on the age of the suits based on the fact that the age of suits is ascertainable from the Court’s records and not from submissions of Counsel. Counsel referred to The Nigeria Navy & 2 Ors v. Lionel Okon Garnich (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt.969) 69 @ 101 H where Court of Appeal held per Omokri J.C.A.
“….The learned trial judge stated clearly that the proof of service was in his record. There is therefore no room for doubt or speculation as to the fact that the appellants were duly served by the Court below. The Court below was perfectly entitled to take judicial notice of its own proceedings and records and also their contents.”
Learned counsel argued that the Appellant’s Counsel sought amendment of Statement of defence in “the interest of justice” and that courts do not exercise their discretions in granting leave to amend pleadings solely in the interest of justice. Counsel further submitted that justice is not a one way traffic for the defendant alone but a three way traffic for the Plaintiff, Defendant and the Court.
Counsel referred to the records of Appeal which he alleged showed various antics used by the Appellant to delay the proceedings culminating in requests for two adjournments for the cross examination of the PW1 (who was actually the Plaintiff/Respondent’s only witness) which the court granted; that it was when the court insisted that the Defendant/Appellant’s Counsel must proceed with the cross examination of PW1, after the third request for an adjournment, that the Appellant’s Counsel (who at the commencement of the day’s proceedings categorically told the court that he was ready for cross examination) abandoned his cross examination, the court having no other choice called on the Plaintiff/Respondent Counsel to re-examine the witness, if he had any. After the re-examination the Court then adjourned the matter for the Defendant/Appellant to open its defence. On the next adjourned date instead of opening its defence the Defendant/Appellant came up with applications to amend the Statement of Defence and recall PW1. Counsel submitted that in the circumstances the Honourable Judge was justified in referring to the age of the case and the interest of justice in refusing the motions for amendment and recall of PW1.
Counsel further submitted that the Defendant/Appellant’s application to have PW1 recalled was unjustified and was not worthy of consideration by the court. He referred to the case of Willoughby v. I.M.B. LTD (1987) 7 NWLR (Pt 48) 705 @ 113 F-G where the Supreme Court held per Oputa J.S.C. (as he then was)
“A party applying to recall a witness must supply the trial Judge with sufficient facts relating to why he wants the witness recalled and what he intends to put to the witness. It is on those facts that the trial Judge will decide whether or not the justice of the case obliges him to exercise his discretion one way or the other. It is easy to hide behind the cloak of “doing justice between the parties” but one soon discovers that justice is not done in vacuo.”
Counsel submitted that a perusal of the Defendant/Appellant’s motion for the recall of PW1 (pages 94 to 97 of the records of Appeal) shows that there were no facts stated on why it wanted PW1 recalled and no information as to what it intended to ask the witness. Counsel submitted that in the circumstances it would have been inappropriate for the Honourable Court to have granted the application under the cloak of doing justice to the Appellant. Tiwani Limited v. Citi Trust Merchant Bank Limited (supra) @ 152 D – F.
On appellant’s issue 2 on fair hearing, Counsel submitted that the Defendant/Appellant can not complain of lack of fair hearing when the Honourable Court indulged them on two occasions by the grant of two adjournments for cross examination of just a witness, which is exceptionally liberal. Counsel referred to the case Kuusu v. Udom (1990) 1 NWLR (pt.127) 421 @ 445 D-E where the Supreme Court per Karibi Whyte J.S.C. (as he then was) observed:
“….The fact that witnesses were not cross examined per se will not constitute non-compliance with rule of natural justice. As long as the parties were heard and there was opportunity to cross examine, the failure of a party to take advantage of the opportunity does not in my opinion constitute a non-compliance with the rule of natural justice”
Counsel argued that the above case dealt with a situation where witnesses were not cross examined at all by a party who had the opportunity to do so; how much more the present case in which a party after party cross examining a witness and after a rare indulgence by court of two adjournments in the course of cross examination of only one witness, the party concerned for no justifiable reason decides to abandon his cross examination. Counsel submitted that such a party can not complain of lack of fair hearing.
Learned Counsel finally urged us based on the above submissions to dismiss this appeal as lacking in merit.
RESOLUTION
The issue at stake in this appeal is quite narrow and simple. Did the learned trial judge err in summarily dismissing the applications to amend the statement of defence and to recall PW1 for further cross-examination? It is necessary in my view to set out in full the proceedings of the court on 6/11/08, the day the lower court refused the applications of the appellant. The proceedings are at page 98 of the record of appeal:
“T. Olubor Esq. for the Plaintiff with him R. Okpete. Obafemi Agaba Esq. for the Defendant/Applicant
Agaba: We have two applications both dated 26th September, 2006
1. To amend statement of defence.
2. To grant leave to recall P.W.1
Court: Mr. Olubor.
Olubor: We are opposing both applications.
Agaba: We move those applications in the interest of justice.
RULING
Court: And I deny both applications in the interest of speedy administration of justice. This is a 1998 case and I think all material facts would have been brought into this matter by a diligent defence. See H.A. Willoughby v. International Merchant Bank (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt.48) p.105 pp. 108
Court: 15th January, 2009 for opening of defence.”
It is obvious from these proceedings that the learned trial judge was piqued by the attitude of the appellant. Learned counsel had set out in his brief, summarized above the various antics deployed by the appellant to delay the hearing of the case. He had been granted adjournment twice for the cross-examination of the sole witness called by the respondent PW1. He was still bent on further adjournments. It was when he saw that the lower court was not going to grant any more adjournment on 18/6/08 after he had nearly concluded his cross-examination that he came up with the idea of intention to amend his statement of defence. The lower court rightly informed him that adjournments are not granted on the basis of intentions. The judge then called on the respondent to re-examine the witness and adjourned the case for the defence to open. When the case came up for hearing the appellant appeared with his two applications. The learned trial judge should have immediately seen the red light. Unfortunately His Lordship did not. He fell into the appellant’s trap which gave rise to further protracted delay which is probably what the appellant had been angling for. The learned trial Judge in my humble view erred in summarily dismissing the applications without due consideration of the affidavit evidence and the principles guiding the grant of applications for amendment of pleadings and recall of a witness for further examination. At the time the appellant stated that he “moved the application in the interest of justice”, the learned trial Judge ought to have called on Counsel to address him on reasons why the applications should be granted in order to create grounds for determination of the applications on their merits. It was inappropriate for the learned judge to have immediately retorted “and I deny both applications in the interest of speedy administration of justice”. He allowed his sentiments to get the better of him. This is one pitfall a trial judge should always guard against. A judge should always strive to remain calm and unruffled in all situations. That is the only way to come up with sound decisions untainted with the personal feelings of the trial judge at the material time.
Having said this, the law non the less is that it is not every error committed by a trial judge that will result in the decision being set aside on appeal. There must be a miscarriage of justice for the error to end in the setting aside of the decision on appeal. Was there a miscarriage of justice in the instant case?
In paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the affidavit in support of the application for amendment of the statement of defence, the appellant deposed:
4. That in the course of conducting cross-examination of PW1 on June 12, 2008, and upon further review of the case file, the defence team observed that some vital facts had been omitted from the Statement of Defence.
5. That further to paragraph 4 above, it is necessary and vital to further amend the Defendant’s Statement of Defence so as to bring the full facts of this case before this Honourable Court.
6. That this amendment is necessary to enable this Honourable Court completely and effectively adjudicate upon and determine the real questions in controversy between the parties, and make a fair and just decision on the case.
This case was first instituted in 1998 and actual hearing commenced in June 2008. The feeling of the learned trial judge that the period was long enough for any diligent lawyer to have effected whatever amendment he desired to make is understandable. But it is trite that an amendment can be made at any stage of the proceedings. Order 27 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2000, which applied as at the time this application to amend was made provides:
“An application for leave to amend may be made by either party to the court or a Judge in chambers at the trial of the action, and this amendment may be allowed upon such terms as to cost or otherwise as may be just.”
On the strength of the above rule an amendment of pleadings is a right granted to parties in order to ensure that justice is done in the case. In MELIFONWU v. EGBUNIKE (SUPRA) @ 280 – 281, the court observed:
“As a matter of law, there is no stage in the proceeding, where a court will not grant an application for amendment if the case demands. It is a right awarded to parties by Rules of Court at any time before judgment and it should not be treated lightly.”
A long line of authorities have generally laid down circumstances when a party will be allowed to amend its pleadings to include: (i) at any stage of the proceedings (ii) when the amendment will bring the real issue in controversy injustice to the other party, amongst others. See IMONIKHE V. ATTORNEY GENERAL (1992) 2 NSCC 23 480 @ 489 LINES 5 – 2. The Appellant deposed in the affidavit in support of the applications that the purpose for the amendment and re-call of witness was to enable it bring the full facts of the matter before the court which would assist it in determining the real issues between the parties effectively. These depositions were not controverted by the Respondent. It was not enough for the respondent to say in court that he opposed the application when no counter-affidavit was filed and no reasons on law were given for the opposition.
The appellant’s counsel is correct in his submission that the learned trial Judge ought to have, on this ground granted the Appellant’s application for amendment, instead of formulating the extraneous issue of age of the case upon which the applications were refused. In OJA AND ORS V. OGBONI AND ORS (1976) 10 N.S.C.C. 244 @ 247 LINE 30 – 45, the SC observed:
“The correct principle to guide the court in considering whether to grant an application for amendment of pleadings was aptly expressed by Bowen L. J. in Crooper v. Smith (1884) 26 Ch. D. 700 AT 711 when he said:
“I think it is a well established principle that the object of courts is to decide the right of the parties and not to punish them for mistakes which they have made in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights.
…I know of no kind of error or mistakes which if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the court ought not to correct, if it can be done without injustice to the other party. Court do not exist for the sake of deciding matters in controversy and I do not regard such amendments as a matter of favour or grace. ..it seems to me that as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy. It is as much a matter of right on his part to have it corrected, if it can be done without injustice, as any thing else in the case is a matter of right.”
All the above are matters which the learned trial judge ought to have taken into consideration in exercising its discretion to grant or refuse the application if he had kept an open mind in the matter. The fact that the respondents did not file any counter-affidavit in opposition to the application ought to have weighed on the mind of the trial judge to exercise its discretion in favour of granting the two applications.
I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the error of the trial judge in refusing the application without considering it on its merits led to a miscarriage of justice. The learned trial Judge failed to exercise his discretion judicially and judiciously in refusing the Appellant’s applications. This appeal therefore succeeds. It is hereby allowed. The ruling of Archibong J. In Suit No. FHC/L/CS/769/2001 delivered on 6/11/08 is set aside. Leave is hereby granted the appellant to amend its statement of defence as shown in the proposed amended statement of defence exhibit HCL1 of the affidavit in support of the application. The suit is remitted back to the Federal High Court Lagos for hearing and determination with despatch by any other judge, other than Archibong J. There shall be no order for costs.
RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A.: I have had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my brother CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA J.C.A., and I agree with the reasoning and conclusions.
The learned trial judge erred, in dismissing summarily the applications before him. In his attempt to achieve “speedy administrative of Justice”, his dismissing summarily the application before him without due consideration of the affidavit evidence, occasioned miscarriage of justice.
A Judge is vested with unfettered discretion, but when such discretion is exercised erratically, it then fetters the parties before it. He, by his very duty as an umpire in the temple of Justice is supposed to set the captives free.
Lord Hudson in PETITT V. PETITT (1970) A.C. 777 @ 808 observed thus, on the issue of discretion.
“The uncertain and crooked cord of discretion for the golden and straight met-wand of the law”
In BAKER V. CARR (1962) 369 U.S. 186, Supreme Court of the United States of America per Justice Frankfurter had this to say
“The Courts Authority possessed of neither the purse nor the sword – ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.”
The Appeal succeeds and same is hereby allowed by me.
I subscribe to the consequential order made in the lead judgment, inclusive of the one as to costs.
FATIMA OMORO AKINBAMI, J.C.A.: My learned brother, the Hon. Justice Chinwe Eugenia Iyizoba JCA has obliged me with a copy of the draft of the judgment just delivered by him.
I had read before now, the briefs of argument of the learned counsel to the parties vis-a-vis the record of appeal as a whole. I cannot but concur with the reasoning and conclusion reached in the said judgment.
Having adopted the reasoning and conclusion reached in the lead judgment as mine, I hereby dismiss the appeal for lacking in merits.
I adhere to the order of my learned brother on costs.
Appearances
Appellant not represented.For Appellant
AND
Timothy Olubor Esq. with Adetayo Okunaija Esq.For Respondent
