HON. MULIKAT AKANDE-ADEOLA & ANOR v. HON. OGUNWUYI EBENEZER SEGUN & ORS
(2015)LCN/7943(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 7th day of July, 2015
CA/IB/EPT/REP/02/2015
RATIO
ELECTION PETITION: TIME LIMITATIONS IN ELECTION MATTERS; THE EFFECT OF THE FAILURE TO FILE THE PRE-HEARING NOTICE APPLICATION WITHIN THE STIPULATED TIME
In OKECHUKWU v. INEC (supra) p.225 the Supreme Court held that even though the modern rule in relation to a period of time fixed by statute within which an act is to be done after a specified event is that the day of the event is to be excluded, because of the sui generis nature of election and election related matters in which time is of essence, and the stand of the Supreme Court in the Interpretation of the Practice Directions vis-a-vis the Interpretation Act, the provisions of the Interpretation Act on Computation of time shall not apply to the requirement of time by the Practice Directions. The Court further held that time shall run in the peculiarity of the Electoral Act, Practices Directions and the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) from the day of the act and the day shall not be excluded. In OGBENI ADESOJI AREGBESOLA V. SENATOR IYIOLA OMISORE & ORS. APPEAL NO. CA/AL/EPT/GV/OS/6/2015. The Court of Appeal held: “In the instant case pleadings are deemed to have effective closed on the date of the Respondents’ replies on the Petitioners, being 9th October 2014. The petitioners’ obligation to apply for issuance of pre-hearing notice in Form TF 007 crystallized on that day.” The above decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in SENATOR IYIOLA OMISORE & ANOR V. OGBENI RAUF AREGBESOLA 72 ORS. Suit No. SC/204/2015 where Nweze JSC said in part:
“I endorsed the unanswered submission that the Tribunal having found that the pre-hearing notice application was not filed within the time stipulated after close of pleadings pursuant to Paragraph 18(1) (supra) ought to have dismissed the petition under ENWEZOR V. INEC (2009) 8 NWLR (PT. 1143) 223, 237; OKEREKE V. YAR?ADAU (2008) 12 NWLR (PT. 1100) 95 DADA V. DOSUMU (2006) 18 NWLR (PT. 1010) 1341; MOHAMMED V. MARTINS ELECTRONICS (2009) LPELR 3708. per. MONICA BOLNA’AN DONGBAN-MENSEM J.C.A.
ELECTION PETITION; THE OBJECTIVE OF THE COURT IN EXCLUDING THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERPRETATION ACT CAP 192 LFN 1990 IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ITS PROVISION TO SUCCESSIVE ELECTORAL ACTS IN THIS COUNTRY
It has long been decided in a long line of judicial decisions that an election petition creates a special jurisdiction and the ordinary rules of procedure in civil cases do not serve its purpose. Because of their peculiar nature, the Courts have endeavoured to hear them expeditiously. See ORUBU v. INEC (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt.94) 323 per UWAIS, JSC (as he then was). Against this background, and in order to underscore the significance of elections to democratic governance, the Courts have seen very good reasons to exclude the provisions of the Interpretation Act CAP 192 LFN 1990 in the interpretation and application of its provisions to successive Electoral Acts in this country. See ACTION CONGRESS AND ANOR V. JANG & ORS (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt.1132) 475 and more recently in OKECHUCHWU V. INEC & ORS. (2014) 9 SCNJ 47 at 78 per ARIWOLA, JSC which was approved and applied by Nweze, JSC in SENATOR OMISORE & ANOR v. OGBENI AREGBESOLA & 2 ORS (unreported) SC 204/2015 delivered on Wednesday 27th May, 2015. Per. ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
MONICA BOLNA’AN DONGBAN-MENSEM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MUDASHIRU NASIRU ONIYANGI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. HON. MULIKAT AKANDE-ADEOLA
2. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY Appellant(s)
AND
1. HON. OGUNWUYI EBENEZER SEGUN
2. LABOUR PARTY
3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) Respondent(s)
MONICA BOLNA’AN DONGBAN-MENSEM J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant took out this appeal to challenge the decision of the Oyo State National and State Houses of Assembly Election Tribunal which on the 1st of July 2015 dismissed the petition of the Appellant.The reason for the decision is that the Appellants had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of the 1st Schedule of the Electoral Act 2010 (as Amended). The Appellants are aggrieved and charge that the learned members of the Tribunal erroneously followed the decisions in Okechukwu v. INEC & Ors (2014) 9 SCNJ 47 @ 78 and Omisore v. Aregbesola SC 204/2015 which are totally distinguishable and inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the petition.
The facts which led to this appeal are as follows: On the 28th of March 2015, elections were held into the Ogbomoso North, South and Orire Federal Constituency into the Federal House of Representatives. The 1st Appellant and the 1st Respondent were candidates of the 2nd Petitioner and 2nd Respondent respectively. At the conclusion of the election, the 1st Respondent was declared the winner having polled 33,908 votes to defeat
the 1st Petitioner who scored 19,514 votes.
Being disgruntled by the declaration of the 1st Respondent as the winner of the election, the Appellants filed a petition on the 17th of April 2015.They sought the following reliefs:
1. A declaration that Labour party never conducted any primary election wherein the 1st Respondent was selected and or nominated as candidate of the party in the General Election held on the 28th day of March, 2015.
2. A declaration that the 1st Respondent is not qualified to contest the General Election held on the 28th day of March, 2015 under Labour Party when he was still a member of PDP.
3. An order of the Tribunal directing the 3rd Respondent to withdraw the certificate of return issued to the 1st Respondent for not having qualified to contest the general election held on the 28th March 2015 and his return as the winner is null and void.
4. An order of the Tribunal directing the 3rd Respondent to issue a certificate of return to the Petitioner on having polled the highest lawful votes cast at the general election held on the 28th of March 2015 be declared the winner.
5. An order of the Tribunal directing the 1st Respondent to refund
all the monies received or collected from the National Assembly, if any as his statutory emoluments, payments and any other payments made to him.
Paragraph 6 of the petition states the grounds thus:
(1) That the Respondent was at the time of the election not qualified to contest the election.
?(2) That by virtue of the mandatory provision of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Sections 85, 87 and 141 of the Electoral Act (as amended), the 1st and 2nd Respondent?s neither conducted, contested the 2nd Respondent?s primary election and participated at the general election conducted by 3rd respondent to the House of Representatives held on the 28th March 2015.
In response to the Petition, the 1st Respondent filed the following processes:
(i) 1st Respondent’s Reply dated 20/5/15 together with other accompanying processes such as witness statement on oath, list of witnesses, list of documents to be relied on e.t.c. (see pages 61-128 of the records).
?(ii) Motion on notice dated 4th 2015 seeking to set aside the service of the petition on the 1st Respondent (see pages 197-215 of the records for this appeal which was transmitted to this Court on the 14th July
2015).
(iii) Notice of preliminary objection dated 5th June 2015. (See pages 216-248 of the records).
The reply of the 1st Respondent was served on the Petitioners on the 20th May 2015 while that of the 2nd Respondent was served on the Petitioners on the 22nd of May 2015.
On the 27th of May 2015, the petitioners filed a joint reply to the replies of the 1st and 2nd Respondents. (Pages 177-193 of the records).
On the 29th of May 2015, the petitioner applied via the letter dated 28th May, 2015 for the issuance of pre-hearing notice. The Tribunal on the 2nd June 2015 issued a notice which was served on the parties. (Page 193 of the records).
On the 11th June 2015, the Tribunal adjourned hearing of the 1st Respondent?s pending application to 19th June 2015.
?However, the 1st Respondent moved in, taking advantage of Paragraph 18 (1) and (4), and 16 (1) to not only knock out the Appellant as petitioners, but to completely knock the petitioners out beyond resuscitation. On the 16th June 2015, the 2nd Respondent upon discovery of the failure of the Petitioners to apply for the pre-hearing notice in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 18 (1) of the
First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) filed a motion on notice seeking the following reliefs:
(i) An ORDER setting aside the Petitioners joint reply to the replies of the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ filed on the 27th May 2015, same having been filed a day outside of the period limited in Paragraph 16 (1) of the First Schedule of the Electoral Act of 2010 (as amended).
(ii) An ORDER setting aside the application of the Petitioners dated 28th May 2015 and filed on the 29th May for issuance of pre-hearing Conference Notice, same having not been made in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 18 (1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended).
(iii) An ORDER setting aside the pre-hearing conference Notice (FORM TF 007) dated 2nd June 2015 issued by this Honourable Court and served on the parties.
(iv) An ORDER dismissing this petition as abandoned for failure of the petitioners to apply for the issuance of pre-hearing Conference Notice in accordance with the Provisions of Paragraph 18 (1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended).
?
?The application was heard on the 26th June, 2015 and in a considered ruling delivered on the
1st July 2015, the Tribunal granted the application and dismissed the petition as having been abandoned. (See pages 378-399 of the records). A notice of Appeal containing 10 Grounds of Appeal was filed on the 6th July, 2015. (See pages 400-411 of the records).
The narrow issue that calls for determination in this appeal is whether the Appellants as Petitioners, filed the application for pre-hearing notice conference out of time. It is the submission of Mr. Yunus Ustaz Usman, SAN, learned senior counsel for the Appellant, leading four other learned counsel, M. I. Tola Esq., Omoniyi J. Odeyemi Esq., Maryam Abass (Miss) and Femi Kasumu Esq, submits that by whatever construction, the application for the issuance of the pre-hearing notice was made within time. The learned members of the Tribunal were wrong, maintains the learned SAN, to have held that the application was filed out of time. The learned silk declares the learned Judges acted in error by holding themselves bound by the principle of stare decisis in a matter which did not decide the fact in the matter placed before them.
?All the Respondents, the 1st Respondent being represented by Mr. O. O. Ogunbade,
appearing with three other learned counsel, the 2nd Respondent by Mr. Kanni Olaleye with B. Q. Badamaasi and the 3rd Respondent by Mr. Abiodun Abdu-Raheem are ad idem in their respective submissions that the Appellant as petitioner filed the pre-hearing notice out of the mandatory time allowed by the provisions of Paragraph 18 (1) of the Electoral Act, therefore the Tribunal was right in foreclosing the Appellant by dismissing the petition.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
APPELLANTS ISSUES
1. Whether the Tribunal was right in failing to hold that the Petitioners application for issuance of Pre-hearing Notice filed on the 29/5/15 was filed in time after holding that the word “after” in the Subparagraph (1) of Paragraph 18 of the First Schedule of the Electoral Act of 2010 (as amended), is different from the word “within…of” used in Paragraph 16 (1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act (ground 1 of the notice and grounds).
2. Whether the words “after” used in Subparagraph (1) of Paragraph 18 of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) excluded the date the petitioners were served with the Respondent’s
Reply (ground 2 and 3).
3. Whether the trial Tribunal was right in not excluding the date the Respondent’s reply was served on the Petitioners in computing the 7 days allowed the Petitioners to apply for the Pre-Hearing Notice (Ground 4).
4. Whether the Supreme Court decision in OMISORE & ANOR v. AREGBESOLA (UNREPORTED) SC 204/2015 as well as all the other cases relied upon by the trial Tribunal were interpreting the word “after” in Subparagraph (1) of Paragraph 18 of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) so as to apply their ratio decidendi to this petition on appeal (ground 5).
5. Whether the trial Tribunal was right in holding that the petitioners reply to the 1st Respondent’s Reply to the petition was filed out of time (ground 6).
6. Whether the Tribunal was right in striking out/dismissing the petition (ground 7, 8, 9 and 10).
7. Whether the Tribunal ought to have struck out the 1st Respondent’s motion praying to strike out/dismiss the Petition after he had taken several steps after being aware of the irregularity or nullity complained of (grounds 9 and 10 of the Notice and grounds of appeal).
1ST RESPONDENT’S ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
The 1st Respondent’s issues are:
(i) Whether the Tribunal’s interpretation of the provisions of Paragraphs 16 (1) and 18 (1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) , without recourse to the Interpretation Act was not correct, particular regard being had to the decision of the Supreme Court in Senator Iyiola Omisore & Anor v. Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola – suit No. SC.204/2015 delivered on Wednesday 27th May 2015 (unreported).
Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Notice of Appeal.
(ii) Whether the principle of waiver is applicable to the failure of the Appellants to comply with the mandatory provisions of Paragraph 18 (1) of the First Schedule and if so, whether the 1st Respondent had waived the said act of non-compliance?
Grounds 9 and 10 of the Notice of Appeal.
(iii) Whether having found that the Appellants failed to comply with the provisions of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (As Amended) , the Tribunal was not correct when it dismissed the petition as abandoned?
Ground 8 of the Notice of Appeal.
2ND RESPONDENTS ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
i. Whether the Tribunal’s rightly dismissed the Appellant’s petition for failure
to comply with the provisions of Paragraphs 16 (1) and 18 (1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 . Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Notice of Appeal.
ii. Whether the 1st Respondent had waived his right to challenge the Appellants’ failure to comply with the mandatory provision of Paragraph 18 (1) of the First Schedule to Electoral Act 2010 .
Grounds 9 and 10 of the Notice of Appeal.
?
3RD RESPONDENTS ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
Whether the decision of the Tribunal is supportable having regards to the circumstance of the petition.
In their respective briefs, the learned Counsel for the Respondents respectively submitted inter alia as follows:
The learned counsel for the 1st Respondent Mr. O. O. Ogunbade submits that:
“… ‘within’ in Paragraph 18 (1) clearly applies to both limbs of the Paragraph. The word “or”? employed in the Paragraph is simply used to differentiate between two totally different processes to wit, the Petitioners reply and the Respondents reply and is not so employed to indicate a dichotomy in the computation of the period of time required of a diligent Petitioner in filing this application for issuance pre-hearing session
notice. In both cases, the word “within” is applicable to the seven day period….”
The 2nd Respondent’s learned counsel Mr. Kanmi Olaleye submits that:
“(i)….contrary to the Appellants contention that the word ?after” used in Paragraph 18 (1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act excludes the day of service, the operative word from that Paragraph is not ‘after’ but ‘within’ therefore, the Appellant is mandated to apply for pre-hearing notice in form IF 007 from the day of service of the Respondents reply.
(ii) that the Appellant argument to give different meanings to the first and second limbs of Paragraph 18 (1) amount to hair splitting. This cannot stand in the face of several authorities on Paragraph 18(1) please see Okechukwu v. INEC (2014) 17 NWLR pt.1436 225 @ 282, see also Senator Iyiola Omisore v. Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola & 2 Ors suit no. SC 204/2015.
?(iii) Further submit that contrary to the Appellant submission that since they were served with 2nd Respondents reply at 12 noon on 22nd May, 2015, they have up to 12 noon of 29th May 2015 to apply for issuance of pre-hearing notice. We submit that the computation of a day starts from 12 am to
another 12am and not 12noon to 12noon and that the provision of Section 18(1) is for the vigilant and diligent petitioners. See PDP v. INEC (2014) 17 NWLR pt. 1437 525 @ 553.
(iv) submits that in an election petition, Sunday is reckoned with in computation of days, therefore the petitioners joint reply filed on the 27th of May 2015, after receipt of the 2nd Respondents reply on the 22nd May 2015, is in competent and clearly out of time. See the Court of Appeal decision in Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola v. Senator Iyiola Omisore & Ors. Appeal no. CA/AC/EPT/GV/OS/6/2015.”
The 3rd Respondent who formulated a sole issue adapts in principle the respective arguments of the 1st and 2nd Respondent in submitting that the learned members of the Tribunal were right in dismissing the petition.
?In the Appellants’ reply briefs to the arguments of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the learned Silk persists in and accentuates the argument that the learned members of the Tribunal were not bound by the two decisions of the Supreme Court. The distinction which the learned silk dwells on the fact that none of the decisions interpreted the word ?after?. It is further the submission
of the learned silk, upon the authority of APC v. INEC, (2015) 8 NWLR pt 1462 p.531 @ 538, that the Supreme Court itself dissuades the Courts to follow its decision without the supporting similar facts. The sweet spot of the said decision as cited by the learned silk is:
“one hastens to restate that a case is authority for what it actually decided… for a previous decision of this Court to bind any Court, the Apex Court not exempted, the facts and the law in the subsequent case must be the same or similar to the which informed the Courts earlier decision.The decision cited and relied upon by counsel on both sides in the instant application, therefore, applies to the matter at hand to the extent that the facts and applicable law in respect of the issue being determined herein are same or similar to those in the earlier decisions. Decisions of Courts must, therefore, irredeemably relate to the facts which inform them. Justice suffers whenever decisions of Courts proceed not on the basis of the facts which should otherwise inform those decision.?
The learned silk urges us to revert to the original grammatical meaning used in the Paragraph. Nowhere, is the
word ?after? interpreted to mean no more than ”next”. If the doctor says one must drink water after eating, should it be interpreted to mean drink after ten hours or when one finishes eating?
The learned silk has proliferated the narrow issues in the appeal by raising seven issues for determination. We are not however intimidated by such and find no difficulty at all in sifting through the shaft to pick out the grain. Wading through the shaft/mass of repetitions, we find issues one to six which is solely on the determination of the time line provisions of Paragraphs 18 (1) and 16 (1), replicated through the argument.
Issue seven raises the question of waiver in the electoral proceedings it appears therefore that the issues formulated by the Respondents are more reflective of the core of the appeal. Thus the first issues for determination is whether the Tribunal is at liberty to jettison the decision of the Apex Court in Okechukwu v. INEC and Omisore v. Aregbeshola which held that the interpretation Act does not apply in the computation of time in election matters. Thus that the Interpretation Act cannot be employed to elongate the time regime of the
Electoral Act.
In considering the arguments canvassed before it the learned members of the Tribunal had the responsibility to consider the decisions on the principle of time in election proceedings cited before them. After a cautions mental mastication of the numerous cases the learned judges opined that the provisions of Paragraphs 18 (1) and 16 (1) could be different. The learned members reasoned that the use of the word ‘within’ as against ‘after’ respectively in the two Paragraphs could stake the word ?after? as meant to fall on the next not the same day which ends the occurrence of an event. That interpretation favours the Appellants. However the learned members went further to consider the import of the decision of the Apex Court in Okechukwu v. INEC followed in Omisore v. Aregbeshola. The two decisions which considered the applicability of the Interpretation Act held that the principle of interpretation in the Interpretation Act is not applicable to electoral proceedings. The Tribunal felt bound and followed and applied the said decisions.
?The learned Silk for the Appellants is unhappy with this development. It is the submission for the
Appellants that and which the learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent picturesquely referred to as an invitation to this Court to ‘invalidate or declare a judgment of the Supreme Court as having been made ‘per incuriam’ that neither the Tribunal nor this Court are bound by the said decisions of the Apex Court.
Sadly, the electoral law is on the side of the Respondent on this. In the case of Okechukwu v. INEC and Ors (2014) 9 SCNJ 47 @ 78, Ariwoola JSC held that the sui generis nature of election and election related matters in which time is of the essence the provisions of the Interpretation Act on computation of time shall not apply to the requirement of time by the Practice Direction. The Court also held that time shall run from the day of the act and the day shall not be excluded.
Following the Okechukwu decision, Nweze JSC similarly held in Omisore v. Aregbesola that:
“In effect any process filed out of time is incompetent and is liable to be struck out…”
This Court, by a decision of a full panel of five had similarly earlier held in Gebi v. Dahiru (2012) NWLR pt. 1282 p. 560 that……
“The special electoral adjudicatory procedure is different, unique
; sui generis. My learned brother Ba’aba JCA (of blessed memory) puts it admirably in these terms:
An election petition is heard and determined by an appropriate election Tribunal as usually provided by the Constitution. In the 1999 Constitution, such provision is made under Section 285 and the 6th Schedule to the Constitution. The procedure is largely governed by a law made specially to regulate the proceedings. The jurisdiction of an election Tribunal to deal with election petition is of a very special nature different from that in an ordinary civil case; see Onitiri v. Benson (1950) SCNLR 314 at 317.
It is plain that the proceedings are special for which special proceedings rare made under the Constitution. See Oyekan v. Akinjide (1955) NMLR 381 at 383. Election Petitions are distinct from the ordinary civil proceedings. See Obih v. Mbakwe (1984) 1 SCNLR 192. It is such that in certain circumstances, the slightest default in complying with the procedural step which otherwise could be cured or waived in an ordinary case could result in fatal consequences to the petition.”
I agree.
In English ‘within’ means- inside or enclosed, while ‘after’ means subsequent,
next, later or behind. Within five days envisages and includes the 1st – the last day of the five days. Thus if the thing is to be done between 1st to 5th, then it must be done either on the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th or 5th day. Anything after falls out of the within five days. However, where the provision says after seven days, then seven days start from 1-7 i.e. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th then naturally after seven days will be from the 8th day. This would be by the Interpretations Act regime. The Electoral Act regime is unfortunately different.
Ordinarily seven days after an event would start to count from the day immediately after the day of the event-that is by the Interpretation Act. However, the Supreme Court declaration that the Interpretation Act does not apply to the timeline posture of the Electoral Act means that time starts to count on the day of the event. In other words, time starts to count on the performance of the act. Thus once for instance the petitioner is served with the Respondent?s reply; his timeline to file a reply starts to run on that very day. Surely that is ‘after’ the service of the Respondents Reply? Once the process is
served, the period following is an ‘after’ period. The Apex Court says there is no in between day from one act to the next until the process is determined one way or the other.
No argument, construction, concoction, circumlocution nor manipulation can transmute 7 days into 8 days or vice versa under the provisions of the Electoral Act.
As to whether from the time of filing a party has 24 or 12 hours, a full, half or a quarter day is a matter of semantics. If a party is available to be served at 12 midnight, then his time starts to run from 12 midnight. If he is able to find the registry of the Tribunal to file at 11:59 pm, well and good he can go ahead and so file. To argue that because one was served a process at 6pm of the last day and therefore time starts to run from the following day is to shoot one’s self in the foot- especially in the face of the unequivocal decision of the Supreme Court on the Point.
?Caution dictates that a party avoids last minute crash action. No amount of argument can turn the hand of the clock once it has moved forward. By this their erroneous presumption, the learned senior counsel elected to add a day to the mandatory date and that
is the albatross of the petitioner. There is no cure, no remedy. Although the learned silk has refrained from filing for an extension of time that in fact is exactly what the learned silk is doing. The Tribunal is circumscribed to extend time by whatever calculation. For the avoidance of doubt, let us go mathematical:
1. The petition was filed on- replies were filed as follows-
2. 1st Respondent, on 20/05/15
3. 2nd Respondent, on 22/05/15
4. Joint reply of Appellant, on 27/05/15.
The last day of filing the Respondent’s process was 22/05/15.
On that very day the Petitioners’ days to file their reply started to run and ended on 28/05/15 without a reply from the petitioner. The reply filed on the 29/05/15 was thus clearly filed out of time.
At the hearing of this appeal on the 30/07/15. The learned silk highlighted and further adumbrated on his argument on pages 15 – 16 of the Appellants brief. The said argument is best reproduced:
“We refer to Paragraph 18 (1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) and submit that supposing (which is not conceded) that the said 22/5/2015 were even included, pleadings did not close until after
the end of 5 days allowed the Petitioner to file their Reply to the 1st Respondent’s Reply to the Petition and so, the seven days allowed to apply for pre-hearing Notice crystalized on 27/5/2015. Therefore the Petitioners had up to 4/5/2015 to apply for pre-hearing notice and so, their application for the Pre-hearing notice filed on the 29/5/2015 was filed within time. We also submit that supposing (but not conceding) that pleadings closed on the 22/5/2015 and even if the said 22/5/2015 were to be computed in calculating the seven days, we submit that even in that circumstance, the petitioners had up to 12 noon of 29/5/2015 to file their application for issuance of pre-hearing notice because the framers of the Electoral Act (and its schedules) do not intend nor should they be construed as intending to give the Petitioners less than 7 days for applying for the pre-hearing notice. A day has 24 hours. To hold that the petitioners who were served at 12 noon on 22/5/2015’s 7 days ended on 28/5/2015 means that the petitioners were given only 6 days and 12 hours to apply for the pre-hearing notice. Thus in Akeredolu v. Akinremi (1976) 16 NSCC 1283 per Oputa JSC
at pages 1297:
“excluding the date on which the event happened that gave rise to the computation accords with good sound common sense; one will be faced with the difficulty of calculating a fraction of a day as a day. It is my humble view that unless expressly provided by statute, to argue that a fraction of a day is equal to a whole day involves the ineradicable fallacy of making a half equal to a whole. Such an interpretation would be an assault on common sense and would do violence to the plain meaning of words.”
(underlining ours for emphasis only).
We submit that English grammar and common sense would be astonished at such a construction which makes 12hours equal to a day or 6 days and 12 hours equal to 7 days.”
The learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants laboriously reproduced the issues which fell for determination in the cases of Okechukwu v. INEC and Omisore v. Aregbesola. In a brilliant argument urging this Court to align with counsel that this appeal is distinguishable from those decisions of the Apex Court. The case of Abubakar v. Nasamu (no.1 & 2) (2012) 17 NWLR pt. 1330 p. 407 are also listed among those distinguishable
authorities.
?Akeredolu v. Akinremi is good and binding authority on this Court. However, the exception recognised by Oputa JSC (of blessed memory) finds more application in electoral proceedings of the now, in that the time line restriction of the Electoral Law confers jurisdiction on the Apex Court which has given life to the said provision by the pronouncements of the Court. Akeredolu v. Akinyemi is therefore not applicable.
If the learned Silks argument is correct, it then means that although the Appellants are not to be given only 6 days and 12 hours, they can be given 7 days and 12 hours.
The learned Silk for the Appellant has derided the decision of the Tribunal as erroneous and a summersault. The learned counsel for the respective Respondents each submits otherwise, I have painstakingly studied the decision of the Tribunal and find no contradiction, no indecision nor fright in the pronouncement. The learned members of the Tribunal approached the issues placed before them systematically. They first considered the issue of time of filing the Appellants reply brief and then went on to the pre-hearing notice. Their findings are best reproduced in their own
words.
For the purpose of completeness, I crave indulgence to-extensively quote some portions of the decision of the Tribunal:
“….The learned SAN pointed out that one of the five days from the date of service was a Sunday, and submitted that the said Sunday should not be reckoned with in the computation of the five days. He relied on ADESULE v. MAYOW (2011) 13 NWLR (PT. 1253) 135 at PP 181-182; ETSAKO WEST LGC v. CHRISTOPHER (2014) 14 NWLR (PT. 426) 73 at 91 para C-H. The Learned SAN further submitted that the situation under the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) and the First Schedule to the Electoral Act is different from the Supreme Court Practice Direction which specifically prohibits the application of the Interpretation Act to election matters. He referred also to Paragraph 26 of the First Schedule and cited AKEREDOLU v. AKINREMI (1985) 2 NSCC 1283.
Mr. Ogungbade for the 1st respondent canvassed a view diametrically opposed to that of the Learned SAN. He submitted that Sundays/public holidays are not excluded in the computation of time in election matters and that the Interpretation Act does not apply in the said election matters. Counsel cited KUPOLATI v.
OKPE (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 486) 1858 AT 1916; IKECHUKWU v. INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (PT. 1436) 255 AT 553 PARAS F-G 554 PARAS C-E 571 PARAS F.G, and also SENATOR IYIOLA OMISORE & ANOR v. OGBENI RAUF AREGBESOLA (supra).
Because of the importance of the issue we have taken time as we are indeed bound in our sacred responsibility to read the authorities.
In ADESULE v. MAYOWA (supra) the Court of Appeal held that in the absence of any specific provision in the Electoral Act disallowing the application of Interpretation Act the provisions of the Interpretation Act are applicable.
In ETSAKO West LGC v. CHRISTOPHER (supra) the Supreme Court held as regards the Rules governing computation of time that when the time expires on a public holiday or Sunday the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken on the next day afterwards not being a public holiday.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court in OKECHUKWU v. INEC (supra) held that an election petition is time bound and any provision relating to time must be strictly applied. That it does not permit a resort to the interpretation Act… the learned Judges next the decision in Senator Omisore v. Aregbesola and
concluded thus:
“?Premised on the foregoing, the petitioners’? reply ought to have been filed on 24th May, 2015. Filed on 27th May 2015, as it was indeed filed, was out of time prescribed by Paragraph 16(1) of the First Schedule and must be, and is hereby struck out.”
The Tribunal continues in these terms:
“We find as a matter of fact as borne out by the proof of service of the Respondent’s replies on the Petitioners that the 2nd Respondent’s reply was served on the Petitioners on 22nd May, 2015….”
The submissions of the Respondents before the Tribunal are formidable, part of which is reported by the Tribunal as follows:
“The 1st Respondent’s Counsel submitted that in the absence of a competent reply’ from the petitioners pleadings were deemed closed on the service of the Respondents’ replies on the Petitioners. That the petitioners were therefore expected to apply for the issuance of pre-hearing session notice latest on 28th May, 2015 but did not do so but rather decided to apply for it on 29th May, 2015, a day after their time lapse. Counsel ascribed the same Interpretation to “within” as used in Paragraph 16(1) to “within” as used in Paragraph
18(1). He cited OKECHUKWU v. INEC & ORS (supra). In effect, he submitted that the 7 days should start to count from 22nd May 2015 when the 2nd Respondent served her reply on the Petitioners. That done in that manner, the 7 days that the Petitioners shall apply for issuance of pre-hearing conference Notice expired on 28th May, 2015.
The Learned SAN contended otherwise. He submitted that the word “after” excludes the date of happening of the event. Counsel referred the Tribunal to Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition at page 65 which defines “After the fact” as subsequent to an event of a legal consequence e.g. accessory after the fact”…
Their Lordships found as follows:
“No doubt, the wordings of Paragraphs 16(1) and 18(1) are different. The phrase used in Paragraph 16(1) is “within five (5) days from the receipt of the Respondent’s reply” while the following phrase is used in Paragraph 18(1): “within 7 days after the filing and service of the Petitioners’ reply.”
?We are however constrained by the time honoured doctrine of stare decisis to keep our temptation under control, and our views to ourselves….
In OKECHUKWU v. INEC (supra) p.225 the Supreme
Court held that even though the modern rule in relation to a period of time fixed by statute within which an act is to be done after a specified event is that the day of the event is to be excluded, because of the sui generis nature of election and election related matters in which time is of essence, and the stand of the Supreme Court in the Interpretation of the Practice Directions vis-a-vis the Interpretation Act, the provisions of the Interpretation Act on Computation of time shall not apply to the requirement of time by the Practice Directions. The Court further held that time shall run in the peculiarity of the Electoral Act, Practices Directions and the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) from the day of the act and the day shall not be excluded.
In OGBENI ADESOJI AREGBESOLA V. SENATOR IYIOLA OMISORE & ORS. APPEAL NO. CA/AL/EPT/GV/OS/6/2015. The Court of Appeal held:
?”In the instant case pleadings are deemed to have effective closed on the date of the Respondents’ replies on the Petitioners, being 9th October 2014. The petitioners’ obligation to apply for issuance of pre-hearing notice in Form TF 007 crystallized on that day.”
The above decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in SENATOR IYIOLA OMISORE & ANOR V. OGBENI RAUF AREGBESOLA 72 ORS. Suit No. SC/204/2015 where Nweze JSC said in part:
“I endorsed the unanswered submission that the Tribunal having found that the pre-hearing notice application was not filed within the time stipulated after close of pleadings pursuant to Paragraph 18(1) (supra) ought to have dismissed the petition under ENWEZOR V. INEC (2009) 8 NWLR (PT. 1143) 223, 237; OKEREKE V. YAR?ADAU (2008) 12 NWLR (PT. 1100) 95 DADA V. DOSUMU (2006) 18 NWLR (PT. 1010) 1341; MOHAMMED V. MARTINS ELECTRONICS (2009) LPELR 3708.?
?Thus, the current standing of the law is that the 7 days Paragraph 18(1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), contrary to the submission of the Learned SAN for the Petitioners, but in agreement with the submission of the Mr. Ogungbade for the 1st Respondent shall count 22nd May, 2015 being the date the Respondent served its reply to the petition on the Petitioners. The said 22nd May, 2015 was the day petitioners obligation, per Paragraph 18(1) of the First Schedule to apply for pre-hearing notice became
due. The said 7 days therefore expired on 28th May, 2015 and thus rendered the application for pre-hearing conference notice filed on 29th May, 2015 belated, and not in fidelity with the provision of Paragraph 18(1) (supra). The said application is therefore incompetent and is hereby struck out….”
…The question before us is not that of how the Petitioners have applied for the pre-hearing notice. It is of a fundamental nature, that is, that the Petitioners have filed the application outside the time prescribed by Paragraph 18(1) which has the same effect with having not applied at all. (See A.C.N. V. NOMIYE (2012) 7 NWLR (PT. 1300) 568.
In SENATOR IYIOLA OMISORE & ORS V. OGBENI RAUF ADESOJI AREGBESOLA & Ors (supra) the Supreme Court said:
?If a petitioner fails to consummate the pre-hearing notice (Form TF 007) within seven days he cannot fall back on Paragraph 53 (1), a provision which because Paragraph 18 (4) (supra) prohibits the extension of time, is inapplicable and so does not avail a tardy petitioner?
Premised on the above authorities with which we are bound, this petition stands to be dismissed as an abandoned.
….we hereby dismiss
this petition.
SGN
HON. JUSTICE J.G. ABUNDAGA
CHAIRMAN1/7/15?
?
Are the members of the Tribunal in error in holding that the Appellants were out of time when they filed the application for the issuance of the pre-hearing notice for conference?
In finding that pre-hearing notice was filed out of time and thereby dismissing the petition of the Appellants, the learned members of the Tribunal proceeded on two planks. The approach of the Tribunal was based upon the application placed before it by the parties.
The first issue argued was on the competence of the reply brief filed by the Appellants. Time was the issue.
The 2nd Respondent who stirred the hornet’s nest took out a motion on notice for the determination of the petition of the Appellants by invoking the provisions of Paragraph 16 (1) of the 1st Schedule of the Electoral Act. The reason is that the Appellants filed the petitioners reply out of time. The other respondents associated with the argument in support of the first plank for striking out of the Petitioners? reply which had been filed out of time.
Apparently the same virus inflicted the pre-hearing notice which was also said to have been filed out
of time. This dual fundamental defects were argued to have rendered null, the notice for pre-hearing conference issued by the Tribunal. The cumulative effect of all these led to the demise of the petition, argues the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, urging the Tribunal to dismiss the petition.
Mr, Yunus Ustaz Usman, SAN, argued on the interpretation of “after” to exclude the day of the event in the seven days within which to file, as the olive branch which saves the petition. It is the contention of the learned silk that the employment of the word “after” as against “within” seven days within which the Appellant had to file a reply brief thereby extended the mandatory time to eight rather than the decreed seven days. The Sunday which occurred among the seven days was also dangled as a bonus naturally-extending seven, to eight days. The question is; does this fall in consonance with the special electoral legislation and their interpretation as handed down by the Apex Court?
In support of their position, the Appellant’s have argued amongst others that the Tribunal was wrong when it held itself bound, upon the principles of stare decisis, by the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Senator Iyiola Omisore & Anor V. Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola- suit no, SC. 204/2015 delivered on Wednesday 27th May, 2015 (yet to be reported). Therefore the Appellant’s have by the Notice of Appeal and the arguments contained in the Appellant’s brief urged this Court to hold that the decision of the Supreme Court was per incuriam. The learned silk did not however state by which authority this Court can make such a pronouncement on a decision of the Apex Court.
The 1st Respondent argues that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion, and also urges the Court to decline the invitation extended to this Court to invalidate or declare a Judgment of the Supreme Court as having made per incuriam.The Appellants have argued that the word “after” did not fall for interpretation in both the Supreme Court decisions relied upon by the Tribunal.
?It was not necessary for the Supreme Court to repeat its decision in Okechukwu v. INEC. My Lord Nweze JSC clearly so stated and I quote the learned jurist as follows:
“My Lord in view of the earlier Magisterial position of this Court on the inapplicability of the Interpretations Act on
the computation of time in election matters, Okechukwu V. INEC & Ors (2014) 9 SCNJ 47, 78, per Ariwoola JSC, this issue need not delay us further in this Judgment.
From a perusal of paragraphs 4.97-4.115, pages 34-35 of the Appellants’ brief, it is not in doubt that the main plank of their contention is that in the interpretation of the time frame stipulated in Paragraph 16 (1) of the First Schedule of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), the relevant instrument to be considered is Section 15 of the Interpretations Act, Cap 123, LFN 2004. That done, this Court should hold that the Appellants’ reply was filed within time.
The simple answer is that the said Interpretations Act is inapplicable to the said matter being an election matter, Okechukwu V. INEC and Ors (supra).
?Thus as his reply was not filed in strict fidelity to the time protocol ordained in Paragraph 16 (supra), the lower Court, rightly struck it out. This must be so because the timelines therein are sacrosanct due to the peculiar nature of election matters which are time-bound, Buhari v. INEC & Ors (2008) 19 NWLR (pt. 1120) 246. Strictly speaking, this sort of invidious provision should not
feature in a user friendly judicial process. However, in the peculiar circumstance of the urgency involved in the determination of such electoral disputes, the much this Court can do is to wink at the tyranny of deadlines entrenched therein. In effect, any process filed out of time is incompetent and is liable to be struck out, Okechukwu v. INEC & Ors (supra) 79.?
To say that the word “after” did not call for interpretation is to trivialise issues and wish away an unfavourable decision. Nweze JSC has clearly stated that the invocation of any other Section of the Electoral Act in an attempt to elongate the mandatory timeline is untenable. The thorny issue here is the meaning given to the strict time regime of the electoral proceedings and the Apex Court has held that there is no next day but next-event.
?Thus as the last process is filed, the next process is set in motion. This makes judicial sense and common sense too. The purport of the time restriction is to ensure that election matters are determined in time to enable the elected representatives of the citizens to settle down fully in the service of the expectant electorates. A petitioner, who elects
to leisurely and lackadaisically treat the provisions of the Electoral Act and its procedures, does so at the high risk of being shut out. The Petitioner took a palpable risk by waiting to their perceived last day of filing to file. Apart from error in the calculation of the days, there could be other obstacles which could make filing on the perceived last day simply impossible. There is no filing process by intention. Even if one can file the process online, what guarantee is there that the satellite will function properly on the last day?
Issue one, which incorporates the Appellants issues 1-6 is hereby resolved against the Appellants.
ISSUE 2
The facts which give rise to this issue are same as those in issue one and need not be repeated. The argument here is that the 2nd Respondent who took out the fatal motion had waived his right to complain therefore the learned members of the Tribunal should have struck out his application. The provisions of Paragraph 53 (1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act are cited to buttress this argument.The Respondents fault the argument of the learned Silk by submitting that the principle of waiver does not apply in this
situation. We had cause in the case of Aliyu Ibrahim Gebi V. Alhaji Garba Gebi & Ors (2012) NWLR pt. 1282 p. 560 @ 611 – 618 to consider the issue of discretion and waiver. In a full panel of five, this Court dissected the provisions of Paragraphs 18 & 53 of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). The learned trial Tribunal had presumed to have discretion to exercise in all the provisions of the 1st Schedule. This Court found to the contrary. I crave the indulgence, to reproduce the portions of the said decision which are relevant to this appeal as follows:
“A wholistic analysis and perusal of Para. 18 discloses a common feature in all the Sub-paragraphs; a salient, albeit silent quest for the determination of electoral matters timeously on the merit. While “preservative” provisions are built in right through the said Paragraph 18 to ensure that the tenets of fair hearing are upheld, there are also mandatory time line Provisions…
Any method of application, the learned members of the Tribunal have the discretion to determine whether a letter simpliciter or a motion ex parte or a notice is adequate, in my opinion, a lot is required in
a request to issue pre-hearing notice. It is the failure to make the request that is fatal to the petition, not the method of making it.
In the circumstance, the learned members of the Tribunal have discretion. A dispassionate community consideration of the entire provisions of Paragraph 18 of the 1st Schedule disclose an underlying intendment of the legislature to accommodate the principles of fair hearing at each stage of the electoral proceedings but strictly within the time line set out for the determination of the petition. Time is therefore of the essence in this special procedures. Paragraph 18(2) (a-c) refer to expeditious disposal of matters.
However, where the application is not made at all and the petitioner is out of time, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend the time within which to apply for the issuance of the pre-hearing notice. Thus, once pleadings close there is no discretion to extend time to apply to issue the pre-hearing notice…….
We must make a distinction as to the form of the application and the fact of the application under Paragraph 18(i). Form of application refers to the manner of making the request for the issuance of the
pre-hearing notice-should it be by motion ex parte, motion on notice or a simple letter application? I am unable to comprehend the argument that this vital request should be by motion on notice. Apart from the secretary, who has the duty to issue the pre-hearing notice in consultation with the chairman of the Tribunal, who else is supposed to be put on notice and for what purpose? At the close of pleadings, the petitioner has seven days within which to apply/request for the issuance of the pre-hearing notice. At the expiration of the seven days if he does not apply, the respondent can apply, failing which the Tribunal must dismiss the petition suo motu. A petition dismissed under this Paragraph is irredeemable; it is dead and cannot be revived; cannot be resuscitated. From this point forward, the learned members lack jurisdiction to do any other thing for they become functus officio in the said petition”.
For the umpteenth time, I will state that when it comes to the time within which to take a step, there is no negotiation. It is either the party is within time in accordance with the relevant provisions or out.
Argument is the article of trade of the profession,
otherwise, why would one expend energy on a clear and unambiguous provision such as Paragraph 16 (1), 18 (1) and 18 (4)? For the ease of reference, I reproduce the unequivocal, Paragraph 18 (4) which states as follows: “Where the Petitioner and the Respondent fail to bring an application under this Paragraph, the Tribunal or Court shall dismiss the petition as abandoned petition and no application for extension of time to take that step shall be filed or entertained.”
Thus even if the Respondents had not raised the issue, the learned members of the Tribunal were duty bound to raise it suo motu and dismiss the petition as abandoned. Even the Tribunal had no choice, therefore raising the instrument of waiver is a non-issue, (see Gebi V. Dahiru pg. 550 @ 615).This appeal is without merit. The decision of the Oyo State National and State Houses of Assembly Election Tribunal holden at Ibadan, delivered on the 1st July, 2015 is hereby affirmed. The appeal is dismissed. The respective parties shall bear their costs.
ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading before now the lead judgment of my learned brother, DONGBAN-MENSEM, JCA, I fully agree
with his reasoning and conclusion.
I wish to add that it is now well accepted and taken as fully established and settled in judicial circles in this country that election matters are sui generis because of their peculiar features. They also stand alone, on their own and bound by their distinct set of rules. Such rules have been understood and applied as mandatory. Consequently, defects, defaults or irregularities which are readily pardonable or overlooked in regular civil suits before our regular Courts do not enjoy such kid glove treatment in election matters. Thus the slightest default in complying with a procedural step such as applying for pre-hearing proceedings under Parag. 18(1) of Schedule 1 to the Electoral Act 2010, as amended or filing of a reply by a petitioner to the reply of a Respondent under Parag. 16, could result in irredeemable, devastating and fatal consequence for the petitioner or petition. See CHIEF AMBROSE OWURU vs. CHIEF SERGEANT AWUSE & ORS (2004) LPELR 7339 CA and SAIDA & ANOR V. MAIFATA & ORS (2008) LPELR 4915 CA.
?I particularly agree with my learned brother Dongban-Mensem, JCA that the issues for determination appear to
have been exaggerated by the Appellant. There were 2 very clear findings of the lower Court that culminated in this appeal. They all pertain to computation of time within which to take certain steps in an election matter. The learned judges of the lower Court are of the opinion and view that the Joint reply of the petitioners to the replies of the 1st and 2nd Respondents was filed out of time and also that the petitioners were out of time in their application for the issuance of a pre-hearing conference notice pursuant to Paragraph 18(1) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended. Also, according to the ruling on appeal, Sundays and public holidays are to be included within the days within which to take any required step in the prosecution of an election petition.
I do not, with all due respect, find anything new or strange in the strong views expressed by the learned judges of the lower Court because whatever was said as the foundation for those views are very well founded on sound and credible decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court.
?It has long been decided in a long line of judicial decisions that an election petition creates a special
jurisdiction and the ordinary rules of procedure in civil cases do not serve its purpose. Because of their peculiar nature, the Courts have endeavoured to hear them expeditiously. See ORUBU v. INEC (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt.94) 323 per UWAIS, JSC (as he then was). Against this background, and in order to underscore the significance of elections to democratic governance, the Courts have seen very good reasons to exclude the provisions of the Interpretation Act CAP 192 LFN 1990 in the interpretation and application of its provisions to successive Electoral Acts in this country. See ACTION CONGRESS AND ANOR V. JANG & ORS (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt.1132) 475 and more recently in OKECHUCHWU V. INEC & ORS. (2014) 9 SCNJ 47 at 78 per ARIWOLA, JSC which was approved and applied by Nweze, JSC in SENATOR OMISORE & ANOR v. OGBENI AREGBESOLA & 2 ORS (unreported) SC 204/2015 delivered on Wednesday 27th May, 2015.
It is equally settled that time is of essence in election petitions. Therefore, when time is limited for a proceeding, failure to comply is usually fatal. It is because of this that Section 15(2) (a) and (b) of the Interpretation Act (supra) that time begins to
run on the day following the day of the happening of the event is always excluded remains only relevant and applicable in regular civil matters before regular Courts but it remains totally inapplicable in election matters in which anything to be done “within” a particular time frame must be perfected any time between the event and the last date, inclusive, of course, of both dates, including also Sundays and public holidays. This has been our understanding of the law since the application of the Electoral Act, 2010 started. It is therefore surprising that learned senior counsel to the appellant sought to take things for granted and is now arguing a position of the law that has since been consigned to history.
It is for the above reasons and others in the lead judgment that I hold that this appeal is totally devoid of any merit. I too would accordingly dismiss it and affirm the ruling of the Oyo State National and State House of Assembly Election Tribunal holden at Ibadan, delivered on 1st July, 2015 in Petition No: EPT/IB/NA/HR/1/2015. I shall also not make any order for costs.
MUDASHIRU NASIRU ONIYANGI, J.C.A.: I have read in advance the lead judgment of my
learned brother Monica Bolna’an Dongban-Mensem, JCA just delivered and I entirely agree with the reasoning contained therein and the conclusion arrived thereat.
Let me simply add that it is settled law that where a statute prescribes or dictates a particular procedure or time for doing a thing, there is no other way, time, and procedure of doing it other than the way prescribed by the particular statute. In the instant appeal Paragraphs 16 (1) and 18 (1) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 are clear, straight forward and devoid at any ambiguity. Failure to comply with their dictates would sniff out potency and life in a petition before a Tribunal and an order of dismissal as in the instant appeal would result.
Let me stop here. My learned brother in the lead judgment said it all. I seek leave to adopt the reasons adumbrated by him. I too feel that the appeal has no merit and should be dismissed. I order accordingly and the appeal be and is hereby dismissed.
Appearances
Yunus Ustaz Usman, SAN with him, M. I. Tola, Esq., Omoniyi J. Odeyemi, Esq., Maryam Abass [Miss] and Femi Kasumu, Esq.For Appellant
AND
O. O. Ogunbade with him, Chukwudi Maduka and Toyose Owoade for 1st Respondent
Kanmi Olaleye with him, B. Q. Badmaasi for 2nd Respondent
Abiodun Abdu-Raheem for the 3rd RespondentFor Respondent
