HON. MOHAMMED NURUDEEN UMAR v. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS
(2019)LCN/13467(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 11th day of June, 2019
CA/A/339/2019
RATIO
JURISDICTION: THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS FOR A COURT TO HAVE JURISDICTION
In resolving the main Appeal, for a Court of law or Tribunal to have jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter before it, it must satisfy the settled conditions or have the following ingredients;
1. It must be properly constituted as to the number or qualification of its membership.
2. Any condition precedent to its exercise of jurisdiction must be fulfilled.
3. The subject matter must be within its jurisdiction; and
4. The case must have been brought to the court by the due process of the law.
See MADUKOLU Vs NKEMDILIM 1962 NSCQR 1 ALL NLR 87.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION: IS ALSO DETERMINED BY THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM CONTAINED IN PLEADINGS
The jurisdiction of the Court is also determined by the plaintiff’s claim as disclosed in the pleadings i.e. writ of summons and/or endorsed in the statement of claim, or as in the instant case, the affidavit in support of the originating summons, rather than the defendants’ statement of defence. See the cases of SKEN CONSULT Vs UKEY 1981 1 Sc 6; LADO Vs CPC 2011 18 NWLR PT. 1279 689.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
PRE-ELECTION MATTERS: PERIOD WITHIN WHICH IT IS TO BE COMPLETED
It is pertinent for me here to reproduce the provisions of section 285 (9) of the CFRN (4th alteration Act 2017) for ease of reference. It provides thus;
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event decision or action complained of in the suit.” (Underline mine for emphasis)
It is not in dispute that this case borders on pre-election matter and thus, strict adherence to the provision of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution must be made. A careful perusal of the provision of Section 285 (9) above, indicates to me that the action in every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
STATUTE OF LIMITATION: HOW TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN ACTION IS CAUGHT BY STATUTE OF LIMITATION
In consideration of whether an action is caught by statute of limitation, what is of paramount consideration is the determination of;
a. The cause of action
b. When the cause of action accrued; and
c. When the action became statute-barred.
To determine these conditions, what the Court would look at are the originating summons and the affidavit in support alleging when the wrong which gave the plaintiff a cause of action was committed and by comparing that date with the date on which the originating summons was filed. If the time contained in the originating summons as the time the cause of action arose is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred. See the cases of; MUHAMMAD Vs MIL. ADMIN, PLATEAU STATE (2001) 16 NWLR PT. 740 PG 570; OBIKA Vs OBIKA (2018) LPELR – 43965.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
COMPUTATION OF TIME: UNDER NIGERIAN LAW: REGULATED BY STATUTE
Computation of time in Nigeria has always been regulated by statute with series of judicial pronouncements on the effect of such statutes. The highest enactment on computation of time in Nigeria is the Interpretation Act Cap 123, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2004 which in its Section 15 (2) (a) provides that;
“(a) reference in an enactment to a period of days shall be construed – (a) where the period is reckoned from a particular event, as excluding the day on which the event occurs;”
The Interpretation Act is obviously a general statute regulating the construction of other statutes in Nigeria except where a particular statute provides for other interpretations in which case such interpretation will govern the statute concerned. As regards computation of time in judicial proceedings, especially in civil litigation, the provisions of Section 15 of the Interpretation Act (Supra) has essentially been adopted by the various procedural rules applicable in Nigerian Courts. For instance Order 48 rule 1 (a) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 provides that;
“where, by any law or order made by a Judge, a time is appointed or limited for the doing of any act, the period shall be reckoned: (a) as excluding the day on which the order is made or on which the event occurs;”
The Courts have had occasions to pronounce on the above provisions. See the case of AKEREDOLU Vs AKINREMI (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 10) P. 787.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
ELECTION PETITION: WHETHER THE INTERPRETATION ACT APPLIES TO THE ELECTORAL STATUTES AS REGARDS TIME
However, the striking feature of all the decisions in the Election related matters seeking to depart from the general position is that they all held that the Interpretation Act does not apply to construction of Electoral statutes on the ground that election matters are sui generis. In OKECHUKWU Vs INEC (SUPRA) the Supreme Court per Ariwoola JSC held at page 204 of the report that:
“Ordinarily, but for the sui generis nature of election matters, according to the common construction of the English language: ‘within any number of days after an act is to be understood exclusive of the day of the Act’…in Morton v. Hamson (1962) VR 364 at 365 the Court held that the modern rule in relation to period of time fixed by a statute “within” which an act is to be done after a specified event is that the day of the event is to be excluded, the next day is the first day of the stipulated period and the time expires on the last day of the period, counting from and of course including the first day. However, being aware of the sui generis nature of election related matters in which time is of the essence, and the stand of this Court on the interpretation of the practice directions vis-a-vis Interpretation Act, I hold no hesitation in concluding that the provisions of the Interpretation Act on computation of time shall not apply to the requirement of time by the practice directions.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
ELECTION PETITION: HOW TIME IS CALCULATED IN ELECTION PETITIONS IN NIGERIA
Time shall run, in the peculiarity of our Electoral Act, Practice Directions and the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria “as amended” from the day of the act and the day shall not be excluded.” (Underline mine for emphasis)PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
WORDS AND MEANING: DEFINITION OF THE WORD FROM UNDER SECTION 285(9) OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
The word “from” as used in Section 285 (9) of the CFRN (Fourth Alteration Act No. 21) 2017 in my view means that the period provided for must be calculated as including the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.
In UMARU & ANOR Vs ALIYU & ORS (2009) LPELR ? 5052 (CA) this Court held that:
“From” in that provision connotes immediately without any delay. In other words, it means, the event will be reckoned from the stated period. Perhaps, if we may say, that is what gives the section its uniqueness as election matters are sui generis. It simply means from the happening of the event and in the instant case, the declaration of election results on the 15th April, 2007. The intention of the legislature is clear and it is that the computation must include the date on which the event happened and that is the declaration of the result of the election and time will begin to run from that date and 30 days will include the date on which the declaration was made
Also, the Supreme Court in PDP Vs INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (PT. 1437) P. 525 AT 554 PER OKORO JSC while interpreting Paragraph 6 of the Practice Directions (Election Appeals to the Supreme Court (No. 33 of 2011) which provides that the Respondent’s brief shall be filed within 5 days of the service of the Appellant’s brief held as follows:
“The 26th Respondent was served on 22nd August, 2014. Its time started to run from that same date irrespective of the fact that it was served at 4.00pm, or thereabout. Accordingly its time for filing its brief expired on 26th August 2014. The subsequent filing of the brief on 27th August 2014 was done outside the time allowed by the practice directions…. On the whole, I hold that the brief of the 26th Respondent filed on 27th August, 2014, having been filed in flagrant disobedience to paragraph 6 of the practice direction is incompetent and is hereby struck out.”PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
PRE ELECTION MATTERS AND ELECTION PETITION: TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE IN ELECTION PETITIONS AND THEY ARE BOTH SUI GENERIS
In HASSAN Vs ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR Pt. 1223 Pg. 547 @ Pg 599 paras B- F, per Onnonghen JSC (as he then was) held thus:
“It is settled law that in an election or election related matter, time is of the essence, I will add that the same applies to pre-election matters are sui-generis; very much unlike ordinary criminal or civil proceedings. Appellant ought to have instituted the action, soon after the substitution to keep his Interest in the political contest alive, but he did not…. I hold the view that at the time the appellant decided to go to Court in the circumstances of this case, the question of nomination by way of substitution which is a pre-election matter has ceased to exist, leaving only the election proper to be questioned and the proper place to do so is the election Tribunal. If the situation in this case is encouraged it will breed uncertainty in the polity when a person may wake up a year or more after an election and swearing in of a president or governor to challenge his nomination by way of substitution for the election that brought him to power or he may even do so after the tenure of the office of official concern which attitude ought not to be encouraged by the law.” The law is trite that cases predicated upon pre-election and election related matters are sui generis and dissimilar with ordinary civil or criminal proceedings?”PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
ADAMU JAURO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
HON. MOHAMMED NURUDEEN UMAR – Appellant(s)
AND
1. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL
COMMISSION (INEC)
2. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC)
3. PHALAL BAKO – Respondent(s)
ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appeal herein is against the Judgment of the Federal High Court, sitting at Minna, delivered on 4th day of April, 2019 by Hon. Justice A. B. Aliyu in suit No. FHC/MN/CS/43/2018.
The Appellant herein was the plaintiff at the trial Court, while the 1st 2nd and 3rd Respondents were the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants respectively.
A Brief summary of the facts of this case resulting in this appeal is that, by an Originating Summons dated 21st November, 2018 and filed on 23rd November, 2018 the appellant as Plaintiff at the trial Court sought for the determination of the questions as can be found at pages 1 to 2 of the record of appeal.
Upon the determination of the said questions, the Plaintiff prays the Court for the reliefs, as can be found on page 4 of the record of appeal. The Originating Summons is supported by an affidavit of 42 paragraphs and exhibits attached. The 2nd and 3rd respondents filed a counter affidavit of 29 paragraphs in opposition to the originating summons with exhibits attached. See page 78-81 of the record of appeal.
The 2nd and 3rd respondents as
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2nd and 3rd defendants at the trial Court also filed a Notice of preliminary objection dated and filed on 28th December, 2018 accompanied by written address, urging the Court to strike out the suit for lack of jurisdiction. See page 66-68 of the record of appeal. The appellant as plaintiff/respondent at the trial Court filed amended reply to the notice of preliminary objection on 6th February, 2019. See page 262-273 of the record of appeal. On 5th March, 2019 the parties adopted all their processes, and the trial Court adjourned for judgment. In its judgment delivered on 4th April, 2019 the trial Court found that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, it held inter alia as follows;
“?. Having found that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain and determine this suit, all other issues, raised are mere academic exercise. This suit lacks merit it ought to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. Parties to bear their own cost.”
Dissatisfied with the said judgment of the trial Court, the Appellant who was the plaintiff at the trial Court filed his notice of appeal dated 15th April, 2019. The notice of appeal which appears on pages 295-298 of
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the record of appeal contains 3 grounds of appeal.
The record of appeal was compiled and transmitted to the Court on 18/4/2019. The briefs of argument were subsequently filed and exchanged by the parties in accordance with the Rules of Court.
On 15th May, 2019, the appeal was heard before the Court. The Appellants’ Counsel adopted the Appellants’ brief of argument as well as the Reply Brief and urged the Court to allow the appeal. The 2nd and 3rd Respondent’s Counsel on their part adopted the 2nd and 3rd Respondent’s brief of argument and urged the Court to dismiss the appeal. The 1st Respondent has not filed any brief of argument.
The Appellant from his 3 grounds of appeal distilled two issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether the trial Court was not wrong to have held that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s suit in view of the evidence before it?
2. Whether the trial Court was not wrong to have held that “the plaintiff is not complaining that he is the person who scored the highest number of votes cast at the election of 7th October, 2018 and his name was substituted with that of the 3rd defendant” without
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considering the appellants’ suit on the merit?
The 2nd and 3rd Respondent on their part distilled a lone issue for determination as follows;
1. Whether the lower trial Court was right in holding that it had no jurisdiction to try and determined suit No. FHC/MN/CS/43/2018 bearing in mind the grounds, reliefs sought by the appellant (plaintiff) and the content of the affidavit in support of the originating summons?
I will determine this appeal on the basis of the two issues raised in the Appellant’s brief of argument and I will determine them together.
ISSUE ONE
Whether the trial Court was not wrong to have held that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s suit in view of the evidence before it?
Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the trial Court was wrong to have declined jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s suit. He referred the Court to the cases of; GABRIEL MADUKOLU & ORS Vs JOHNSON NKEMDILIM 1962 2 ALL NLR 581 AT 589-590; AARON OKARIKA & 4 ORS Vs ISAIAH SAMUEL & 1 OR. 2013 53 NSCQR PT. 1 220 AT 252; CHIEF E.W.J WOHEREM JP Vs JOEL EMEREUWA & ORS 2004 LPELR – SC 161/2000.
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He contended that looking at the contents of the originating summons and the supporting affidavit attached thereto filed by the appellant, there is no doubt that the cause of action in this suit arose on 9th November, 2019 when the 1st respondent published the name of the 3rd respondent as the candidate of the 2nd respondent in the 2019 general election, into the Niger state house of assembly representing Kontagora 1 constituency.
He argued that it is incorrect for the trial Court to separate the incident of the primaries of the 2nd respondent conducted on 7th October, 2018 from the incident of 9th November, 2018, as both events occurred in the course of same transaction. It is when the last of the series of event that constitute the entire transaction that a cause of action would be said to have arisen. He referred the Court to the cases of;
PROF. C.C NWEKE VS. NNAMDI AZIKIWE UNIVERSITY, AWKA SC. 209/2007 (2017) NGSC 28; UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN Vs OLUWADARE (2006) 14 NWLR PT.1000 751 AT 773.
In view of all the above, the appellant urged the Court to hold that the appellant’s suit at the trial Court is not statute barred as same was filed within 14 days
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limitation allowed by Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution (4th alteration No. 21) Act, 2017 and resolve this issue in favour of the appellant.
On issue two, learned counsel reproduced the issue and submitted that the trial Court erred in law when it made wrong inference from the case of the appellant. The trial Court has no duty to go on voyage of discovery; its obligation is only to consider the issues before it. He referred the Court to the cases of; DAME PAULINE K. TALLEN & ORS Vs DAVID JANG & ORS 2011 LPELR-9231 CA; FCDA STAFF MULTI PURPOSE COOP SOCIETY & ORS Vs SAMCHI & ANOR 2018 LPELR – 44380 CA; ADETONA VS. ZENITH INT’L BANK PLC 2011 18 NWLR PT. 1279 AT 627.
In view of the above authorities, he urged the Court to hold that the trial Court erred in law when it held thus;
“The plaintiff is not complaining that he is the person that scored the highest number of votes cast at the election of 7th October, 2018 and his name was substituted with that of the 3rd defendant.”
He urged the Court to allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the trial Court and grant all the reliefs sought by the appellant in his
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originating summons.
The 2nd and 3rd Respondent’s counsel on their part, submitted that the trial Court was right in its holding that it lack the jurisdiction to try and determine the appellant’s case, because the effect of the provision of S. 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution (4th alteration No. 21) Act, 2017 clearly deprive the Court of the jurisdiction, and also effectively make the suit as constituted statute barred. He referred the Court to said Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution (4th alteration No. 21) Act, 2017.
He contended that the appellant’s suit at the trial Court by its nature is pre-election matter. By the provision of Section 285 (9) supra, any pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the action complained of in the suit. He referred the Court to the cases of;D.U. TAMTI VS. NIGERIAN CUSTOM SERVICE BOARD & ANOR. 2009 7 NWLR PT. 1141 AT 654; TABIK INVESTMENT & ANOR Vs GTB 2011 LPELR 3131 SC; BUHARI Vs INEC 2008 19 NWLR PT. 1120 AT 366.
He argued that in the instant appeal, the appellant as plaintiff at the trial Court filed his action on 23rd November, 2018, whereas,
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the cause of action arose on the 7th October, 2018. Therefore, the appellant’s suit was clearly filed outside the 14 days provided by the Constitution.
He maintained that the contention of the appellant that his cause of action arose on 9th November, 2018, upon publication of the name of the 3rd respondent as the candidate of the 2nd respondent for the general election, is far from the truth.
He insisted that the cause of action arose from the moment the result of the primary election was announced on 7th October, 2018, and this is obvious from the grounds upon which the originating summons was brought, the reliefs sought and the affidavit in support of the originating summons.
Learned counsel, submitted further that, in case this Court is inclined to believe that the case of the appellant as presently constituted has to do with the publication of the 3rd respondent’s name by the 1st respondent as the 2nd respondent’s candidate for the general election, the suit is still statute barred, as the case is filed outside the 14 days as envisage by the constitution. He referred the Court to the case of OKECHUKWU Vs INEC 2014 9 & 10 SCNJ PG. 47 AT 53.
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He maintained that a simple arithmetic from 9th November, 2018 to the 23rd November, 2018 inclusive of the 9th November, 2018, is exactly 15 days and thus outside the 14 days envisage by the Constitution, as such the suit is statute barred. He referred the Court to the cases of; OKECHUKWU Vs INEC SUPRA; A. G. ADAMAWA STATE & 16 ORS Vs A. G. FEDERATION 2015 ALL FWLR PT. 767 AT 636.
Learned counsel argued further that the comment made by the trial Court regarding the cause of action of the appellant as plaintiff before it, that the plaintiff is not complaining that he is the person who scored the highest number of votes cast at the election of 7th October, 2018, is nothing but obiter dicta as it does not form part of the reason the trial Court arrived at its decision. He referred the Court to the cases of; OMEGA BANK PLC Vs GOVT OF EKITI STATE 2007 ALL FWLR PT. 386 AT 666; NGIGE Vs OBI 2006 ALL FWLR PT. 330 AT 1060.
He urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the 2nd and 3rd respondents.
In his reply brief of argument learned counsel for the Appellant raise a preliminary point that submitted that the 2nd and 3rd
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respondents’ brief of argument was not signed as required by law, and this is fatal, as this Court cannot take cognizance of unsigned process. He referred the Court to the cases of; BUHARI Vs ADEBAYO 2014 10 NWLR PT. 1416 AT 585; FCDA STAFF MULTI PURPOSE COOP SOCIETY & ORS Vs SAMCHI & ORS SUPRA.
He urged the Court to so hold and determine the appeal solely based on the appellant’s brief of argument alone.
On the case of OKECHUKWU Vs INEC SUPRA, learned counsel contended that the case is not applicable to this suit being pre-election matter.
On the respondents contention that the appellant’s case was statute barred having been filed 15 days outside the period allowed by law. He referred the Court to Section 318 (4) of the 1999 Constitution, Section 15 (2) of the interpretation Act, the case of KABIR & ANOR Vs AC & ORS 2011 LPELR-8929 CA and submitted that there is nothing special about the amendment made to the provision of Section 285 of the 1999 Constitution that will excuse the application of the Interpretation Act to its provisions. Hence it was argued that 9th November, 2019 should be excluded and computation to commence by
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the next day.
He also referred the Court to the cases of; AKERODOLU Vs AKINREMI 1985 2 NWLR PT. 10 AT 804-805; EZEIGWE Vs NWAWULU 2010 4 NWLR PT. 1183 AT 197; YUSUF Vs OBASANJO 2003 16 NWLR PT. 847 AT 629.
He contended that the 2nd and 3rd respondents misconceived the position of the law by arguing that the appellant suit was filed outside the limitation period allowed by the Constitution.
On the 2nd and 3rd respondents’ contention that the trial judge’s comment was an obiter dictum, the appellant’s counsel submitted that the affirmation of the trial Court was not obiter dictum, but a ratio decendi that guided the trial Court’s pronouncement. He referred the Court to page 290 of the record of appeal, and the case of IGP & ORS Vs MOBIL PRODUCING NIG. UNLIMITED & ORS 2018 LPELR -44356 SC. 378/2010.
He urged the Court to so hold, and resolved in favour of the appellant.
RESOLUTION
Let me start by saying that, I have observed that the appellant raised a preliminary point, that the 2nd and 3rd respondent’s brief of argument was not signed. I have carefully perused the 2nd and 3rd respondent’s brief of argument, particularly the
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page where the addresses for service was provided, and it is my view that the said brief of argument was duly signed by one Mohammed E. Abubakar Esq, and sealed by an NBA stamp bearing his name on it. Therefore, the appellant’s argument on this point is a mere technicality.
In resolving the main Appeal, for a Court of law or Tribunal to have jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter before it, it must satisfy the settled conditions or have the following ingredients;
1. It must be properly constituted as to the number or qualification of its membership.
2. Any condition precedent to its exercise of jurisdiction must be fulfilled.
3. The subject matter must be within its jurisdiction; and
4. The case must have been brought to the court by the due process of the law.
See MADUKOLU Vs NKEMDILIM 1962 NSCQR 1 ALL NLR 87.
The jurisdiction of the Court is also determined by the plaintiff’s claim as disclosed in the pleadings i.e. writ of summons and/or endorsed in the statement of claim, or as in the instant case, the affidavit in support of the originating summons, rather than the defendants’ statement of defence. See the
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cases of SKEN CONSULT Vs UKEY 1981 1 Sc 6; LADO Vs CPC 2011 18 NWLR PT. 1279 689.
It is pertinent for me here to reproduce the provisions of section 285 (9) of the CFRN (4th alteration Act 2017) for ease of reference. It provides thus;
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event decision or action complained of in the suit.” (Underline mine for emphasis)
It is not in dispute that this case borders on pre-election matter and thus, strict adherence to the provision of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution must be made. A careful perusal of the provision of Section 285 (9) above, indicates to me that the action in every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.
The Appellant?s/Plaintiff’s complained as can be seen from the originating processes filed at the trial Court, is the charade called primaries carried out by the agents of the 2nd respondent in Kontagora 1 Constituency unit of Niger State
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and the action of the 1st respondent in publishing the name of the 3rd respondent as the 2nd respondent’s candidate for Kontagora 1 State Constituency of Niger State House of Assembly election. See paragraphs 21 to 40 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, particularly paragraph 39 thereof at page 10 of the printed record of appeal.
In consideration of whether an action is caught by statute of limitation, what is of paramount consideration is the determination of;
a. The cause of action
b. When the cause of action accrued; and
c. When the action became statute-barred.
To determine these conditions, what the Court would look at are the originating summons and the affidavit in support alleging when the wrong which gave the plaintiff a cause of action was committed and by comparing that date with the date on which the originating summons was filed. If the time contained in the originating summons as the time the cause of action arose is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred. See the cases of; MUHAMMAD Vs MIL. ADMIN, PLATEAU STATE (2001) 16 NWLR PT. 740 PG 570; OBIKA Vs OBIKA
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(2018) LPELR – 43965.
In the instant case, the appellant contended that the cause of action arose on 9th November, 2018 when the 1st respondent published the name of the 3rd respondent as the candidate of the 2nd respondent in the 2019 Niger state house of assembly representing Kontagora 1 state constituency. While the 2nd and 3rd respondent contended that the cause of action arose from the moment the result of the primary election was announced on the 7th October, 2018.
2nd Respondent as 1st defendant at the trial Court contended that, by the authority of OKECHUKWU Vs INEC (SUPRA) time will be begin to run from the date of the occurrence of the event (i.e from 9th November, 2018 when the name of the 2nd Respondent was published by the 3rd Respondent), while, the Appellant as plaintiff on the other hand contended that the day on which the event occurs should be excluded in computation of time.
In resolving this issue, the trial Court in its judgment held thus;
“It is not in dispute that what gave rise to this proceeding occurred on 7th October, 2018, that is the primary election for Kontagora 1 of Niger state house of assembly. If the date of the
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occurrence of the event is excluded, time will begin to run from the 8th October, 2018. I have taken judicial notice that this suit was filed on 23rd November, 2018 which is well after 14 days allowed by the provisions of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution 1999 as amended and I find that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and determine this suit.”
In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the appellant’s action was instituted at the trial Court on 23rd November, 2018. The appellant himself deposed in his affidavit is support of the originating summons that he was aggrieved by the development in view of the charade called primaries carried out by the agents of the 2nd respondent and by the action of the 1st respondent in publishing the name of the 3rd respondent, hence he instructed his counsel to seek redress in Court. Election related matters are sui generis. They are unlike ordinary civil proceedings without a time bar. See:HASSAN Vs ALIYU (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 539) 1007 AT 1046. By virtue of the provisions of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution 4th Alteration Act, 2017, the cause of action in every pre-election matter arises from date of
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the occurrence of action complained of by the Plaintiff in his suit. In the circumstances of this case, and particularly in view of the appellant’s deposition in paragraphs 39 & 40 in his affidavit in support of the originating summons, it is my view that the cause of action arose on 7th October, 2018 when the result of the 2nd respondent’s primary election for Kontagora 1 State constituency was announced. More so, there is no evidence or any exhibit attached to the appellant’s/plaintiff’s originating processes showing that the alleged publication of the 3rd respondent’s name by the 1st respondent was made on 9th November, 2018.
Computation of time in Nigeria has always been regulated by statute with series of judicial pronouncements on the effect of such statutes. The highest enactment on computation of time in Nigeria is the Interpretation Act Cap 123, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2004 which in its Section 15 (2) (a) provides that;
“(a) reference in an enactment to a period of days shall be construed – (a) where the period is reckoned from a particular event, as excluding the day on which the event occurs;”
17
The Interpretation Act is obviously a general statute regulating the construction of other statutes in Nigeria except where a particular statute provides for other interpretations in which case such interpretation will govern the statute concerned. As regards computation of time in judicial proceedings, especially in civil litigation, the provisions of Section 15 of the Interpretation Act (Supra) has essentially been adopted by the various procedural rules applicable in Nigerian Courts. For instance Order 48 rule 1 (a) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 provides that;
“where, by any law or order made by a Judge, a time is appointed or limited for the doing of any act, the period shall be reckoned: (a) as excluding the day on which the order is made or on which the event occurs;”
The Courts have had occasions to pronounce on the above provisions. See the case of AKEREDOLU Vs AKINREMI (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 10) P. 787.
However, the striking feature of all the decisions in the Election related matters seeking to depart from the general position is that they all held that the Interpretation Act does not apply to construction of Electoral statutes on the
18
ground that election matters are sui generis. In OKECHUKWU Vs INEC (SUPRA) the Supreme Court per Ariwoola JSC held at page 204 of the report that:
“Ordinarily, but for the sui generis nature of election matters, according to the common construction of the English language: ‘within any number of days after an act is to be understood exclusive of the day of the Act’…in Morton v. Hamson (1962) VR 364 at 365 the Court held that the modern rule in relation to period of time fixed by a statute “within” which an act is to be done after a specified event is that the day of the event is to be excluded, the next day is the first day of the stipulated period and the time expires on the last day of the period, counting from and of course including the first day. However, being aware of the sui generis nature of election related matters in which time is of the essence, and the stand of this Court on the interpretation of the practice directions vis-a-vis Interpretation Act, I hold no hesitation in concluding that the provisions of the Interpretation Act on computation of time shall not apply to the requirement of time by the practice directions.
Time shall run, in the
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peculiarity of our Electoral Act, Practice Directions and the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria “as amended” from the day of the act and the day shall not be excluded.” (Underline mine for emphasis)
The word “from” as used in Section 285 (9) of the CFRN (Fourth Alteration Act No. 21) 2017 in my view means that the period provided for must be calculated as including the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.
In UMARU & ANOR Vs ALIYU & ORS (2009) LPELR ? 5052 (CA) this Court held that:
“From” in that provision connotes immediately without any delay. In other words, it means, the event will be reckoned from the stated period. Perhaps, if we may say, that is what gives the section its uniqueness as election matters are sui generis. It simply means from the happening of the event and in the instant case, the declaration of election results on the 15th April, 2007. The intention of the legislature is clear and it is that the computation must include the date on which the event happened and that is the declaration of the result of the election and time will begin to run from
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that date and 30 days will include the date on which the declaration was made
Also, the Supreme Court in PDP Vs INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (PT. 1437) P. 525 AT 554 PER OKORO JSC while interpreting Paragraph 6 of the Practice Directions (Election Appeals to the Supreme Court (No. 33 of 2011) which provides that the Respondent’s brief shall be filed within 5 days of the service of the Appellant’s brief held as follows:
“The 26th Respondent was served on 22nd August, 2014. Its time started to run from that same date irrespective of the fact that it was served at 4.00pm, or thereabout. Accordingly its time for filing its brief expired on 26th August 2014. The subsequent filing of the brief on 27th August 2014 was done outside the time allowed by the practice directions…. On the whole, I hold that the brief of the 26th Respondent filed on 27th August, 2014, having been filed in flagrant disobedience to paragraph 6 of the practice direction is incompetent and is hereby struck out.”
In view of the above, I do not agree with the appellant’s contention that the cause of action arose on 9th November, 2018. The cause of action as I have earlier
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said in this judgment arose on 7th October, 2018. I so hold.
In this case, the appellant’s action was filed at the trial Court on 23rd November, 2018 on an event which occurred on 7th October, 2018. From 7th October, 2018 to 23rd November, 2018 when the appellant filed his suit at the trial Court, in my view is well over 14 days. Therefore, the Failure of the appellant to file his suit within 14 days from the day of the action complained, as required by Section 285 (9) of the CFRN (4th alteration Act 2017) is fatal to his case and ousted the trial Court of its jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
However, as contended by the 2nd and 3rd respondent, even if the appellant’s cause of action arose on 9th November, 2018 when the 1st respondent published the name of the 3rd respondent’s name, this suit is still statute barred, as the case was filed outside the 14 days as envisaged by the Constitution. See OKECHUKWU Vs INEC SUPRA. The contention of the appellant that the case of OKECHUKWU Vs INEC is not applicable this case being pre-election matter, is grossly misconceived. The computation ought to commence from the date of the event not from the next
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date, as envisaged by Section 15(2) (a) of the Interpretation Act.
In HASSAN Vs ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR Pt. 1223 Pg. 547 @ Pg 599 paras B- F, per Onnonghen JSC (as he then was) held thus:
“It is settled law that in an election or election related matter, time is of the essence, I will add that the same applies to pre-election matters are sui-generis; very much unlike ordinary criminal or civil proceedings. Appellant ought to have instituted the action, soon after the substitution to keep his Interest in the political contest alive, but he did not…. I hold the view that at the time the appellant decided to go to Court in the circumstances of this case, the question of nomination by way of substitution which is a pre-election matter has ceased to exist, leaving only the election proper to be questioned and the proper place to do so is the election Tribunal. If the situation in this case is encouraged it will breed uncertainty in the polity when a person may wake up a year or more after an election and swearing in of a president or governor to challenge his nomination by way of substitution for the election that brought him to power or he may even do so
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after the tenure of the office of official concern which attitude ought not to be encouraged by the law.” The law is trite that cases predicated upon pre-election and election related matters are sui generis and dissimilar with ordinary civil or criminal proceedings”
Issue one is resolved in favour of the 2nd and 3rd respondents.
Having held that the jurisdiction of the trial Court had been ousted, the other issue raised in this appeal have become academic and of no moment.
This appeal is adjudged to be unmeritorious and it is hereby dismissed. The decision of the trial Court in suit No. FHC/MN/CS/43/2018 is hereby upheld, as the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s suit filed on 23rd November, 2018.
There shall be no order as to costs.
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my Learned brother, Lord Justice Adamu Jauro, JCA. I agree with the reasoning, conclusions and orders therein.
MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A.: My learned brother ADAMU JAURO, JCA afforded me the opportunity of reading before today a draft copy of
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the lead judgment just delivered.
I adopt the judgment as mine with nothing further to add.
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Appearances:
E. N. Jiya Esq.For Appellant(s)
A. A. Siraj Esq for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. 3rd Respondent Absent and Not Represented.For Respondent(s)
Appearances
E. N. Jiya Esq.For Appellant
AND
A. A. Siraj Esq for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. 3rd Respondent Absent and Not Represented.For Respondent



