GOV, RIVERS STATE & ANOR v. EMMANUEL & ORS (2020)

GOV, RIVERS STATE & ANOR v. EMMANUEL & ORS

(2020)LCN/14663(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, October 30, 2020

CA/OW/411/2018(R)

RATIO

APPEAL: EXTENT OF THE POWER OF THE COURT OF APPEAL TO HEAR APPEALS FROM THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT

I think the law is very clear, and every serious legal practitioner knows or should know, that the National Industrial Court of Nigeria is a Special Court, created to hear and handle labour matters in Nigeria, and is vested with enormous powers by the law (constitutional provisions), which make its decisions, largely, unquestionable, except on issues of criminal trial and fundamental rights matters, which allow the intervention of this Court (Court of Appeal) to review such decision(s) as of right, and that as final Court. See Sections 254 and 243(2)(3) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. See Roche Construction Nig. Ltd Vs Enyidede (2017) LPELR – 42438 CA; Ikwuano Local Government Council Vs Owobe & Ors (2016) LPELR – 41306 CA.
Of course, that position had prevailed, until the Supreme Court’s intervention in the case of Skye Bank Plc Vs Iwu (2017) 16 NWLR Pt.1590) 24, which opened the window for possible appeals from decisions of that Court (NICN) to the Court of Appeal, on matters outside the narrow compass of Section 243(2) of the Constitution (as amended), that is, matters relating to Issues of fundamental rights, under the Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution, only.
By the provision of Section 243(2) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended:
“An appeal shall lie from the decision of the National Industrial Court, as of right, to the Court of Appeal on questions of fundamental right as contained in Chapter IV of this Constitution as it relates to matter upon which the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction.”
By Section 9(1) (2) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006:
(1) “Subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and Subsection 2 of this Section, no appeal shall lie from the decisions of the Court to the Court of Appeal or any other Court, excepts as may be prescribed by this act or any other Act of the National Assembly.
(2) An appeal from the decision of the Court shall lie only as of right to the Court of Appeal, only on questions of fundamental rights as contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.”
The exclusive powers of the National Industrial Court on issues it is vested with jurisdiction, was further ex-rayed in the cases of Eze & Ors Vs Udeh & Ors (2017) LPELR – 42716 CA; A.M.T.N. LTD Vs Ojugboli & Ors (2018) LPELR – 46265 CA; Omang Vs Nsa (2020) LPELR – 50225 (CA).
In the case of Roche Construction Nigeria Ltd and Anor Vs Enyidede (2017) LPELR – 42438 (CA), this Court held, based on the provisions of the Statute and Constitution, as follows:
“… The National Industrial Court is vested with the final authority, and determinant of the matters placed before it except in respect of issues of fundamental right and in respect of criminal causes. See the case of Ikwuano Local Government Council Vs Ikechukwu C. Owobe & Ors (2016) LPELR – 41306 CA, where this Court observed:
“Meanwhile the combined reading of Section 9 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and Section 243(2) and (3) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, appears to allow no penetration, or opening of the seal of the judgments of that Court (National Industrial Court) for any review, except in respect of issues of enforcement of fundamental rights, whereof appeal to the Court of Appeal is as of right. See the case of Coca Cola Nig. Ltd Vs Akinsanya (2013) 18 NWLR (Pt.1386) 255; Lagos Sheraton Hotel and Towers Vs Hotel & Personnel Services Senior Staff Association (2014) LPELR – 23340 (CA) and Zenith Bank Plc Vs Caroline Dennis Durugbor (2015) LPELR – 24898 CA… until there is an enactment prescribing the instances of appeal to this Court from the National Industrial Court, or an amendment of Section 243 of the Constitution, the National Industrial Court remains the final Court in such matters upon which the Court has jurisdiction, except in decisions relating to questions of fundamental rights, expressed under Chapter IV of the Constitution.”
As earlier stated, the above situation had prevailed, until the Supreme Court intervened in the case of Skye Bank Plc Vs Iwu (2017) LPELR – 42595 (SC); (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt.1590) 24, when it opened a leeway for Appeals to be generated on Issues and matters, other than fundamental rights matters under Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution, provided the leave of the Court of Appeal is sought and obtained. It was held, as follows:

“…While Subsection (2) of Section 243 specifically provides that an appeal from the National Industrial Court lies as of right to the Court of Appeal on questions of fundamental rights; Subsection (3) thereof, read together with the proviso, only create a situation where the appeal to the Court of Appeal is not as of right, but with leave to the Court of Appeal. Subsection (3) to Section 243 does not abrogate the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to hear and determine appeals from the decision of the National Industrial Court. It will be incongruous to construe Subsection (3) to mean that unless and until an Act of the National Assembly is enacted to vest in the Court of Appeal jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from the National Industrial Court on issues or matters other than fundamental rights question, the Court of Appeal cannot exercise the jurisdiction vested on it by Section 240 of the Constitution to hear and determine appeals from the National Industrial Court. I think it is reasonable to construe Subsection (3) of Section 243 to mean additional jurisdiction and the procedure for the exercise of the right of appeal already donated by Section 240. I cannot envisage a situation where the National Assembly, pursuant to Section 243(3) of the Constitution, would enact an Act depriving the Court of Appeal appellate jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from the National Industrial Court, unless such appeal is only on questions of fundamental rights. Such an Act would be in conflict with Section 240 and therefore void to the extent of its inconsistency in view of Section 1 of the Constitution. Such absurdity is not intended by the Constitution. Pursuant to Section 243 (3) the National Assembly can only enact, as it did (for appeals from the High Court) under Section 24 of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004, the procedure for exercising the right of appeal from the decision of the National Industrial Court to the Court of Appeal. The Proviso to Subsection (3) of Section 243 makes it clear the National Assembly can only prescribe that an appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision of the National Industrial Court “shall be with leave of the Court of Appeal.” That clearly brings out the intention of the framers of the Constitution that civil appeals from the National Industrial Court on any matter other than fundamental rights questions “shall be with leave of the Court of Appeal.” Section 243(3) of the Constitution cannot be construed to mean that a litigant aggrieved by the decision of the National Industrial Court has no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal unless and until the National Assembly enacts a Law or an Act vesting that right. Reading Section 240 and 243(2) of the Constitution together means that a party aggrieved by the decision of the National Industrial Court on any question of fundamental right can appeal as of right to the Court of Appeal. And reading Sections 240 and 243(3) of the Constitution together would mean that the right of appeal is not as of right, but upon leave of the Court of Appeal. When the provisions of Sections 240, 243(3), 36(1) & (2)(b) and 17(2) of the Constitution are read, together I cannot fathom the construction being suggested that unless and until the National Assembly enacts a Law or Act vesting a right of appeal, a litigant aggrieved by the decision of the National Industrial Court has no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal except on only question of fundamental rights. Section 36(2)(b) of the Constitution would make it unconstitutional if any Act of the National Assembly makes the decision of the National Industrial Court, as a Court of first instance, final and conclusive, except only on any question of fundamental rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution. Any provision of a statute that makes “the determination of the administering authority final and conclusive” violates Section 36(2)(b) of the Constitution. See BOARD OF EDUCATION Vs RICE (1911) AC 179 (HL) at page 182; LOCAL GOVT. BOARD Vs ARLIDGE (1915) AC 120 (HL) 132; HART Vs MILITARY GOVERNOR RIVERS STATE & Ors (1976) 11 SC (Reprint) 109 SC. I do not think the Constitution intends that the first instance decision of the National Industrial Court shall be final and conclusive. The promulgation of Section 240 of the Constitution makes the point more poignant, particularly when it is read together with Section 36(2)(b) of the same Constitution. My firm view on Sections 240; 243(2) & (3) and 36(2)(b) of the Constitution is that – (i) From the decision of the National Industrial Court there is a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal; (ii) Appeal is of right to the Court of Appeal from any decision of the National Industrial Court on any question of fundamental right under Chapter IV of the Constitution; (iii) Appeal, is not as of right, but upon leave of the Court of Appeal, from any decision of the National Industrial Court other than an appeal on any fundamental rights question.” (Underlining mine)
Thus, an aggrieved party in a labour matter at the National Industrial Court, can approach this Court (Court of Appeal) for leave to appeal, on any question outside Fundamental Rights Matters, based on the grace extended by the Skye Bank Plc Vs Iwu Plc (supra). PER MBABA, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Raphael Chikwe Agbo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ita George Mbaba Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ibrahim Ali Andenyangtso Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. GOVERNOR OF RIVERS STATE OF NIGERIA 2. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF RIVERS STATE OF NIGERIA APPELANT(S)

And

NDEE GODSWILL EMMANUEL 2. NKOR KEENAM 3. SA-UE BARIKA 4. KPAKOL HARVEST REUBEN 5. OMEREJI ODINAKA O. (And 49 Other Members Of Staff Of Ken Saro Wiwa Polytechnic, Bori Whose Names Are Set Out In Schedule “A” Attached Herewith) 6. KEN SARO WIWA POLYTECHNIC RESPONDENT(S)

ITA GEORGE MBABA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): Appellants filed a Motion on Notice on 8/10/2019, for leave to amend their Notice of Appeal, filed on 13/6/2018. Their said Appeal was entered in this Court on 5/2/2019, upon the grant of their motion to deem the Records of Appeal as duly compiled and transmitted to this Court.

When the said motion for leave to amend the Notice of Appeal came up, this Court called attention of the parties to the fact that this Appeal emanated from the decision of National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN), and sought the Appellants to address the Court, whether there was a competent Appeal, vis a vis the power of this Court (Court of Appeal), to entertain Appeals from decisions of National Industrial Court, as of right, pursuant to Section 243(2) (3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended.

Appellants filed a written Address on this Issue, on 19/10/2020, which their Counsel, P. Enebeli Esq., adopted on the same date 19/10/2020, and in support of the motion for leave to amend the Notice of Appeal.

Counsel referred us to Exhibit A (the judgment of NICN, appealed against) which

Suit was commenced by Originating Summons by the 1st to 6th Respondents and Appellants had filed a Counter Affidavit, in opposition, as well as a Notice of Preliminary Objection.

Counsel said Appellants (as 1st and 2nd Applicants/Respondents at the Lower Court) had raised and argued their Preliminary Objection on the following issues:
(1) Whether the trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain the Suit?
(2) Whether the Suit was an abuse of the Court process?
(3) Whether, having regard to Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the Defendants/Applicants were persons entitled to be heard in defence of the separate, distinct and personal claims of each of the claimants/Respondents? See pages 2 – 3 of the judgment (Exhibit A)

Counsel said that the trial Court had resolved the issues raised in the preliminary objection against them and proceeded to enter judgment for the Claimants (now 1st to 6th Respondents). Hence their Appeal, filed on 13/6/2019 (the Exhibit B), for which they seek the leave of this Court to amend the Notice of Appeal, as per the proposed amended Notice of Appeal

(Exhibit C) herein, attached.

Counsel raised the Issue for determination, as follows:
Whether the Appellants/Applicants can appeal against the judgment of National Industrial Court of Nigeria, as of right, on questions of fundamental right of the Appellants/Applicants?

Counsel argued that Section 243(2) of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), allows a party, as of right, to appeal on questions of fundamental right, against the judgment of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. He relied on the case of Skye Bank Plc Vs Iwu (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt.1590) 2. He argued that it has been held, consistently, that the Constitution or a statute should not be interpreted in isolation, but in the context of the law, as a whole, therefore the whole of the law in issue must be read, in order to determine or construe the meaning and effect of the words being interpreted in a given section. He relied on the case of Buhari Vs Obasanjo (2005) ALL FWLR (Pt.275) 1; (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt.941) 1; Awolowo Vs Shagari (1979) 6 – 9 SC 51; (2001) FWLR (Pt.73) 53; Bronik Motors Ltd Vs Wema Bank Ltd (1983) 1 SCNLR 296; Chime Vs Ude (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt.465) 379.

Counsel also relied in the case of Civil Service Commission of Rivers State & Ors Vs Dr. (Mrs.) Justina Jumbo: CA/PH/505/2016, unreported decision of this Court, delivered on 2/2/2018, wherein it was held:
… The word ‘decision’ is all encompassing as its meaning includes “any determination of the Court, be it final or interlocutory, so long as it touches on questions of fundamental rights as contained in the Chapter (IV) of the Constitution, the appeal therefrom shall be as of right, irrespective of whether it was properly raised or whether it will succeed or not.”
Counsel also relied on Ataije & Ors Vs His Majesty King A.M. Ikuru KSC, Okanama (VII) & Ors (2018) LPELR – 45946 (CA) at 28 – 31.

He argued that the grounds and particulars of Appellants’ Notice of Appeal border on denial of fair hearing and referred us to grounds (1) and (3) of the Notice of Appeal.

He urged us to hold that the Appeal is competent and to grant the leave sought to amend the Notice of Appeal.

Counsel for the 1st to 6th Respondents, D.O. Okoro Esq, replied, orally, saying that

by Section 243(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), Appellants have no right of Appeal against the decision of National Industrial Court of Nigeria, as of right, except in respect of criminal trial and on matters founded on breach of fundamental rights, under Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. He also relied on the case of Skye Bank Plc Vs Iwu (supra) and Coca Cola Nig. Plc Vs Akinsanya (2017) NWLR (Pt.1593) 94, which he said interpreted the provisions of Section 243(2) of the 1999 Constitution, to make room for aggrieved parties on issues other than criminal and fundamental rights trials to appeal, but with the leave of the Court of Appeal, first sought and obtained. He argued that for failing to seek and obtain the leave of this Court to appeal, the Appeal was not competent.

To show faith in his argument, the 1st to 6th Respondents’ Counsel, who had also filed application seeking leave and extension of time to cross appeal against the same decision of the NICN, said he applied to withdraw the said application on noticing that the Appeal was incompetent, (which application was granted before

Appellants addressed the Court), and the processes, struck out.

Counsel for the 7th Respondent, J.E. Toolee (Mrs) adopted the position of learned Counsel for the 1st to 6th Respondents and urged us to refuse the application.

RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE
I observed that Appellants’ appeal has 7 Respondents whereas the motion paper and address omitted the name of the 3rd Respondent. But D.O. Okoro Esq, therefore still appeared for the 1st to 6th Respondents, not 1st to 5th Respondents, as suggested by the Motion paper!

(2017) LPELR – 42438 CA; Ikwuano Local Government Council Vs Owobe & Ors (2016) LPELR – 41306 CA.
Of course, that position had prevailed, until the Supreme Court’s intervention in the case of Skye Bank Plc Vs Iwu (2017) 16 NWLR Pt.1590) 24, which opened the window for possible appeals from decisions of that Court (NICN) to the Court of Appeal, on matters outside the narrow compass of Section 243(2) of the Constitution (as amended), that is, matters relating to Issues of fundamental rights, under the Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution, only.
By the provision of Section 243(2) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended:
“An appeal shall lie from the decision of the National Industrial Court, as of right, to the Court of Appeal on questions of fundamental right as contained in Chapter IV of this Constitution as it relates to matter upon which the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction.”
By Section 9(1) (2) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006:
(1) “Subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and Subsection 2 of this Section, no appeal shall lie

from the decisions of the Court to the Court of Appeal or any other Court, excepts as may be prescribed by this act or any other Act of the National Assembly.
(2) An appeal from the decision of the Court shall lie only as of right to the Court of Appeal, only on questions of fundamental rights as contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.”
The exclusive powers of the National Industrial Court on issues it is vested with jurisdiction, was further ex-rayed in the cases of Eze & Ors Vs Udeh & Ors (2017) LPELR – 42716 CA; A.M.T.N. LTD Vs Ojugboli & Ors (2018) LPELR – 46265 CA; Omang Vs Nsa (2020) LPELR – 50225 (CA).
In the case of Roche Construction Nigeria Ltd and Anor Vs Enyidede (2017) LPELR – 42438 (CA), this Court held, based on the provisions of the Statute and Constitution, as follows:
“… The National Industrial Court is vested with the final authority, and determinant of the matters placed before it except in respect of issues of fundamental right and in respect of criminal causes. See the case of

Ikwuano Local Government Council Vs Ikechukwu C. Owobe & Ors (2016) LPELR – 41306 CA, where this Court observed:
“Meanwhile the combined reading of Section 9 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and Section 243(2) and (3) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, appears to allow no penetration, or opening of the seal of the judgments of that Court (National Industrial Court) for any review, except in respect of issues of enforcement of fundamental rights, whereof appeal to the Court of Appeal is as of right. See the case of Coca Cola Nig. Ltd Vs Akinsanya (2013) 18 NWLR (Pt.1386) 255; Lagos Sheraton Hotel and Towers Vs Hotel & Personnel Services Senior Staff Association (2014) LPELR – 23340 (CA) and Zenith Bank Plc Vs Caroline Dennis Durugbor (2015) LPELR – 24898 CA… until there is an enactment prescribing the instances of appeal to this Court from the National Industrial Court, or an amendment of Section 243 of the Constitution, the National Industrial Court remains the final Court in such matters upon which the Court has jurisdiction, except in decisions relating to questions of fundamental rights, expressed under Chapter IV of the Constitution.”

As earlier stated, the above situation had prevailed, until the Supreme Court intervened in the case of Skye Bank Plc Vs Iwu (2017) LPELR – 42595 (SC); (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt.1590) 24, when it opened a leeway for Appeals to be generated on Issues and matters, other than fundamental rights matters under Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution, provided the leave of the Court of Appeal is sought and obtained. It was held, as follows:
“…While Subsection (2) of Section 243 specifically provides that an appeal from the National Industrial Court lies as of right to the Court of Appeal on questions of fundamental rights; Subsection (3) thereof, read together with the proviso, only create a situation where the appeal to the Court of Appeal is not as of right, but with leave to the Court of Appeal. Subsection (3) to Section 243 does not abrogate the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to hear and determine appeals from the decision of the National Industrial Court. It will be incongruous to construe Subsection (3) to mean that unless and until an Act of the National Assembly is enacted to vest in the Court of Appeal

jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from the National Industrial Court on issues or matters other than fundamental rights question, the Court of Appeal cannot exercise the jurisdiction vested on it by Section 240 of the Constitution to hear and determine appeals from the National Industrial Court. I think it is reasonable to construe Subsection (3) of Section 243 to mean additional jurisdiction and the procedure for the exercise of the right of appeal already donated by Section 240. I cannot envisage a situation where the National Assembly, pursuant to Section 243(3) of the Constitution, would enact an Act depriving the Court of Appeal appellate jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from the National Industrial Court, unless such appeal is only on questions of fundamental rights. Such an Act would be in conflict with Section 240 and therefore void to the extent of its inconsistency in view of Section 1 of the Constitution. Such absurdity is not intended by the Constitution. Pursuant to Section 243 (3) the National Assembly can only enact, as it did (for appeals from the High Court) under Section 24 of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004, the procedure

for exercising the right of appeal from the decision of the National Industrial Court to the Court of Appeal. The Proviso to Subsection (3) of Section 243 makes it clear the National Assembly can only prescribe that an appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision of the National Industrial Court “shall be with leave of the Court of Appeal.” That clearly brings out the intention of the framers of the Constitution that civil appeals from the National Industrial Court on any matter other than fundamental rights questions “shall be with leave of the Court of Appeal.” Section 243(3) of the Constitution cannot be construed to mean that a litigant aggrieved by the decision of the National Industrial Court has no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal unless and until the National Assembly enacts a Law or an Act vesting that right. Reading Section 240 and 243(2) of the Constitution together means that a party aggrieved by the decision of the National Industrial Court on any question of fundamental right can appeal as of right to the Court of Appeal. And reading Sections 240 and 243(3) of the Constitution together would mean that the right of

appeal is not as of right, but upon leave of the Court of Appeal. When the provisions of Sections 240, 243(3), 36(1) & (2)(b) and 17(2) of the Constitution are read, together I cannot fathom the construction being suggested that unless and until the National Assembly enacts a Law or Act vesting a right of appeal, a litigant aggrieved by the decision of the National Industrial Court has no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal except on only question of fundamental rights. Section 36(2)(b) of the Constitution would make it unconstitutional if any Act of the National Assembly makes the decision of the National Industrial Court, as a Court of first instance, final and conclusive, except only on any question of fundamental rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution. Any provision of a statute that makes “the determination of the administering authority final and conclusive” violates Section 36(2)(b) of the Constitution. See BOARD OF EDUCATION Vs RICE (1911) AC 179 (HL) at page 182; LOCAL GOVT. BOARD Vs ARLIDGE (1915) AC 120 (HL) 132; HART Vs MILITARY GOVERNOR RIVERS STATE & Ors (1976) 11 SC (Reprint) 109 SC. I do not think the Constitution

intends that the first instance decision of the National Industrial Court shall be final and conclusive. The promulgation of Section 240 of the Constitution makes the point more poignant, particularly when it is read together with Section 36(2)(b) of the same Constitution. My firm view on Sections 240; 243(2) & (3) and 36(2)(b) of the Constitution is that – (i) From the decision of the National Industrial Court there is a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal; (ii) Appeal is of right to the Court of Appeal from any decision of the National Industrial Court on any question of fundamental right under Chapter IV of the Constitution; (iii) Appeal, is not as of right, but upon leave of the Court of Appeal, from any decision of the National Industrial Court other than an appeal on any fundamental rights question.” (Underlining mine)
Thus, an aggrieved party in a labour matter at the National Industrial Court, can approach this Court (Court of Appeal) for leave to appeal, on any question outside Fundamental Rights Matters, based on the grace extended by the Skye Bank Plc Vs Iwu Plc (supra).
But it is a clear misconception or misapplication

of that mercy extended by the Supreme Court decision, in my view, for a party to file an appeal in this Court, directly, against a decision of the National Industrial Court, not founded on Fundamental Rights Matters, without seeking and obtaining leave of this Court (the Court of Appeal), claiming that an issue of fair hearing was raised in the case appealed against, or that the grounds of the Appeal raised or intends to raise (at the Court of Appeal)question of fundamental right, as argued by Appellants/Applicants in this application.
Raising a ground of appeal or issue on question of fair hearing or fundamental rights by appellant, in my view, is quite a different thing from the Suit (at the lower Court) being one of Fundamental Rights, under Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution. While the former has to do with an issue of fair hearing or fundamental right, which can arise in any appeal process, the latter has to do with the entire Suit, being one fought or founded on the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009, in which the principal/primary claim was/is a fundamental rights claim, not ancillary. See Tukur Vs Govt. Gongola State (1989) 4

NWLR (Pt.117) 517; Usman & Ors Vs COP & Ors (2019) NWLR (Pt.1732) 262; Pharmabase Nig. Ltd Vs Olatokunbo (2020) NWLR (Pt.173) 379. Thus, enforcement of fundamental rights, must be the main claim in an application for enforcement of fundamental rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution as amended. See EFCC Vs Thomas (2018) LPELR – 45547 CA; Emeka Vs Okoroafor & Ors (2017 LPELR – 41738 (SC).
Applicants have admitted their failure to seek leave to file this Appeal and had confessed that they had no need for leave. That, I think, makes the Notice of Appeal, filed by Appellants on 13/6/2018, and all the processes relating thereto, including the Records of Appeal, the briefs and Motions (including this motion for leave to amend the Notice of Appeal), incompetent, and they are hereby struck out, for the incompetence.

Applicants’ Motion, filed on 8/10/2019, and the Appeal are therefore, hereby, struck out, with cost, assessed at One Hundred Thousand Naira (N100,000.00) to the Respondents.

RAPHAEL CHIKWE AGBO, J.C.A.: I agree.

IBRAHIM ALI ANDENYANGTSO, J.C.A.: I agree.

Appearances:

ENEBELI ESQ., (PSC. RIVERS STATE) For Appellant(s)

O. OKORO ESQ. – for 1st to 6th Respondents
J. E. TOOLEE (MRS.) – for 7th Respondent For Respondent(s)